Terrorism: what, who, why, and how

Sarah Scholtz April 2008

Any
intelligent discussion of terrorism must have some way of

identifying the phenomenon under scrutiny. Only then is it possible to devise criteria for describing a given action, agent, or organization as `terrorist', to investigate the causes and objectives of terrorism, and to set parameters for a legitimate response to what some regard as a fundamental challenge to world peace.[52]

Introduction
Terrorism features highly on the contemporary public agenda. Following the September 11, 2001 (9/11 hereinafter) attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon, it has been the focus of attention in international politics, in the academic literature (particularly the social and political sciences, international relations, history, law, psychology and criminology), policy-oriented research institutions (i.e. the RAND Corporation and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) and the media, where hardly a day goes by without some sort of reference to

terrorist

incident.

terrorism,

the

war

on terror, or reports on the latest

The widespread interest in and attention conveyed upon terrorism has not always been helpful in understanding what is actually meant by the term. Contention exists with regard to what counts as an act of terrorism, who the perpetrators are, and what motivates them. Though many abhor the cliche that

one

mans terrorist is anothers freedom ghter, this proverb inherently en-

tails an element of truth because the rhetoric of terrorism is always employed by someone against someone else in pursuit of a specic political objective[55] . This means that the term is relativistic in the sense that the same kinds of action (though dierentiated by behavioural and intentional characteristics) will always be described dierently by dierent observers, and is highly dependent on where it took place and

whose

side the observer is on[56] . Accordingly,

if one identies with the victim, the act is considered terrorism, whereas if one

1 Kapitan, The terrorism 2 Taylor & Quayle (1994), 3 Teichman (1989), p.507

of terrorism , in Sherba (2003), p.47 p.10

identies with the perpetrator, the act is regarded in a more sympathetic light and is not. The aim of this chapter is twofold; rstly, to highlight some of the problems regarding the denition of terrorism, and secondly providing an overview of how the phenomenon has manifested and expressed itself. The rst section, titled

terrorism

in general, will introduce the reader to some of the ways in which

it has been dened and discuss some of the main assumptions that have been made about the phenomenon; its relation to the creation of fear, who the main perpetrators have been, what their motivations for terrorism were, and whether or not it inherently constitutes a criminal act (both in the legal and moral sense). Examples will be given of that which has been, or could be, generally accepted to constitute terrorism . The second section will specically focus on terrorism 1968-present, because this is generally recognised to constitute a for analysis[7, 59, 19] . mark in the development of terrorism and has been taken as the starting point

watershed

References to and examples of earlier occurrences of

terrorism will be included when so deemed appropriate.

Terrorism in general

1.1 Denitions
Because terrorism is a multi-faceted phenomenon, with over one hundred dierent denitions identied to date, many authors concede that a generally agreed on denition is unlikely to be found [14, 15, 38, 56, 50, 26]. examples of how terrorism has been dened in the literature.

Below are some

1.1.1 Academic denitions

the premeditated use, or threat of use, of extranormal violence to obtain a political objective through intimidation or fear directed at a large audience. [21]

...violent acts wherein the perpetrators articulate goals or purposes which relate to grievances against the policies or actions of some identieable political actor(s) or state(s). [13]

the use of covert violence by a group for political ends...usually directed against a government. [38]

4 These

are historically illustrative rather than designed to support a particular theory or Wolf & Frankel (2006); Enders & Sandler (2001) and (2004); Laqueur (1987); Teichman (1989); Ruby (2002); Halliday p.3

denition of terrorism

5 Bassiouni (1981); 6 Crenshaw (1981)

(2004)

7 Enders & Sandler (2002), 8 Corsi (1981), p.48 9 Laqueur (1987), p.72

the deliberate use of violence aimed against civilians in order to achieve political ends [23]

10

terrorist action is carried out for political or other social purposes...by individuals or relatively small groups. It is normally a criminal action according to national and/or international law but is not invariably unlawful according to natural law. It includes successful or unsuccessful attempts on the lives of or innocent or guilty targeted or untargeted victims; or the taking of combatant or non-combatant hostages; it includes torture of innocent or guilty people; and it usually but not necessarily has either the eect or the intention or both of causing terror and panic. [56]

11

the deliberate and systematic assault on civilians to inspire fear for political ends. [43]

12

the recurrent use or threatened use of politically-motivated and clandestinely organised violence, by a group whose aim is to aect one or more psychological targets in order to make them behave in a way which the terrorists desire. [18]

13

the use and/or threat of repeated violence in support of or in opposition to some authority, where violence is employed to induce fear or similar attacks in as many non-immediate victims as possible so that those threatened accept and comply with the demands of the terrorists. [49]

14

the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change. [28]

15

1.1.2 Government denitions

the use or threat is designed to inuence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause.

16

the calculated use of violence or the threat of violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious or ideological.

17

the unlawful use of violence against the United States, citizens of the United States or any other nation, outside the boundaries of the United States, apparently intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population,

10 Ganor (2005), cited online at http://www.jcpa.org/brief/brief004-26.htm 11 Teichman (1989), p.512 12 Netanyahu (1995), p.8 13 Drake (1998), p.54 14 Rosie (1986), p.9 15 Homan (1998), p.20 16 United Kingdom Terrorism Act 17 United States Department of State

inuence government policy, or to aect the conduct of a government for political or social objectives.

18

the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.

19

the enduringly conducted struggle for political goals, which .

[is]

intended to be achieved by means of assaults on the life and property of other persons, especially by means of severe crimes as detailed in art. 129a, sec. 1 of the penal law book (above all: murder, homicide, extortionist kidnapping, arson, setting o a blast by explosives) or by means of other acts of violence, which serve as preparation of such criminal acts.

20

terrorist acts are. . . premeditated; perpetrated by a sub-national or clandestine agent; politically motivated, potentially including religious, philosophical, or culturally symbolic motivations; violent; and perpetrated against a noncombatant target.

21

..the use of violence or the threat of violence aimed at harming public security; or endangering public safety and security to instill fear among the public; or endangering their lives and security; or inicting damage to the environment, or public and private installations and buildings, or international installations and diplomatic missions; or occupying any of them; or endangering national resources; or obstructing the implementation of the constitution and law.

22 [59]

Despite their dierences, these denitions identify several common features of terrorism: 1. It is commonly associated with the creation of fear and terror, 2. The main targets (or victims) of terrorism are states and their citizens, 3. The means (or tactics) by which terror is created are amoral and unlawful, 4. The goals of the perpetrators of terrorism are usually related to bringing about some kind of political and/or social change.

1.2 A strategy of fear

As demonstrated by the above examples, most denitions assume that the idea of terrorism involves creating fear and terror amongst a target audience. Of the

18 United States Anti-Terrorism Act 19 United States Federal Bureau of Investigation 20 Oce for the Protection of the Constitution of the Federal Republic 21 United States National Counter-Terrorism Centre 22 Jordanian Penal Code, cited in Wolf & Frankel (2006), p.262

of Germany

16 denitions given above, ten include either the words

fear or intimidation violence

23 .

and one refers to harming public security through violent means. The association of terrorism with fear and terror has also been demonstrated in empirical research. Schmid and Jongman (1988) found that included in 83.5%, was

political

goals in 65% and

inicting

fear and terror in

51% of a total of 109 academic and ocial denitions of terrorism[41]

Another interesting point in this context is the idea that though terror is primarily created by the actual use of violence, it can also be generated merely by the threat thereof; making it a form of psychological as well as physical violence. In the sample provided above, eight denitions specically acknowledge this.

1.3 Targets and perpetrators

If one accepts the premise that acts or threats of violence is perceived to constitute a

core

quality[32, 55]

24 of terrorism, the assumption follows that this

is a phenomenon that occurs irrespective of who the perpetrators are. Though six of the above denitions clearly identify

governments

or

states

as the

intended victims of terrorism, there is no reason to assume that these actors are themselves incapable of carrying out or being engaged in terrorism and that this is something which only relates to non-state actors. During the Jacobins In fact, historically speaking terrorism is associated with fear and terror being created by the state.

Reign

of Terror` (1793-1794), measures such as the ar-

rest (approximately 300,000) and/or execution (approximately 17,000) of those suspected of being enemies of the revolution led Sir Edmund Burke to refer to them as

hell-hounds

called terrorists in 1795[59]

25 .

Accordingly, terrorism as a phenomenon of political violence can be carried out by both the state and non-state actors alike. Ariel Merari (1993) makes the following distinction: and

state vs. state, state vs. citizens, citizens vs. citizens, citizens vs. the state [41]26 .

1.3.1 State vs. state

This is usually referred to conventional war between two (or more) state actors, all of which acknowledge the fact that they are engaged in this act of violence. The tactics at their disposal is usually some form of military violence; including air strikes, commando raids, the assassination of enemy agents, and use of atomic, biological or chemical weapons. Examples include the strategic bombing campaigns of both English and German cities during the Second World War (WWII hereinafter), the role of the SAS (also WWII), the assassination of Reinhard Heydrich (WWII), the use of tear, mustard, phosgene and chlorine

23 Schmid & Jongman, Political Terrorism, in Merari (1993), p.2 24 Jenkins, International terrorism: the other world war, in Kegley
Quayle (1994), p.12 tion (1935), in Wolf & Frankel (2006), p.261

(1990), p.35; Taylor &

25 Greer, The

Incidence of the terror during the French revolution: a statistical interpreta-

26 Merari

(1993), pp.5-11

gas during the First World War, and the dropping of the two atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki (1945). Problematic in this context are situations which do not count as war in the conventional sense, but neither constitute acts of violence in times of peace (i.e. low-intensity conicts, peace-enforcement missions, nation-building activities, or civil wars).

1.3.2 State vs. citizens (their own)

Often used interchangeably with

statist

terror, this denotes acts of violence

by a government against its own citizens in order to intimidate and/or prevent them from opposing the regime. As previously discussed, this is where the word originated. Examples thus include the Jacobins during the Reign of Terror, the Bolsheviks during and after the Russian Revolution, the Great Purges in Stalinist Russia (1936), and the Nazis in Germany during the 1930s and 40s. Campaigns of genocide as occurred in Cambodia (1975-1979) and Rwanda (1994) have also been classied as constituting statist terrorism, as has the use of poisonous gas against the Kurdish population of Iraq by Saddam Hussein in the town of Halabja (1988).

1.3.3 Citizens vs. citizens

Though not traditionally associated with terrorism per se, it predominantly refers to acts of vigilante and ethnic violence in this category. Though the former is traditionally connected to unauthorised attempts to control crime by a specic group (i.e. militias operating in the deep south of the United States), this often occurs in conjunction with acts of violence against specic ethnic or political minorities. The most prominent example of this is the American KuKlux Klan, which combines both types of violence but has also been labeled as a terrorist organisation (albeit in a specied domestic environment).

1.3.4 Citizens vs. the state (their own)

This refers to the type of terrorism that is most commonly associated with the 20th century; namely acts of violence that are carried out by individuals and groups during times of peace (as opposed to conventional war), for a particular political purpose, against a state and its citizens. Perhaps confusingly, it has also been categorised as constituting the idea of asymmetry; or

insurgent
27 .

terrorism or

guerilla

war

designed to overthrow the government[41]

Inherent in this assumption is

violence to dominate a strong majority[11] extent, the Second Chechen War (1999).

the

threat of a weak minority using stealth and

28 . Examples include the Vietnam

War (1965-1975), the Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua (1979), and to some

27 Merari (1993), p.5 28 Clutterbuck (1975),

pp.148-149

1.3.5 State-sponsored terrorism

Because Merari does not include state-sponsored terrorism, it will be discussed as an additional category. Traditionally, state-sponsored terrorism refers to acts of violence carried out by certain (usually non-state) actors that are provided by certain states with the means for them to do so. Boaz Ganor further sub-divides this into three categories; states

perpetrating

supporting
29 .

terrorism, states

operating

terrorism, and states

terrorism[24]

States supporting terrorism

States can support terrorist groups by provid-

ing nancial aid, ideological support, military or operational assistance. Their primary motivation for doing so is because it can serve their strategic interests, particularly inuencing neighbouring states, or toppling hostile regimes. Classic examples include Jordan and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) prior to 1972; Syria and Hamas, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Abu Nidal Organisation and Palestine Islamic Jihad; Pakistan and Kashmiri terrorist groups; Iran and Hamas, Hizbollah and other radical Islamic groups; and Afghanistan and the Taliban[10]

30 .

Given that this often includes nancial support and a base from which to operate, it means that acts of retaliation usually take place on the harbouring states territory, though the state is not the primary

guilty

party as such.

Notwithstanding, states found to be sponsoring terrorist groups are usually punished; either by military retaliation tactics such as air strikes (as carried out by the U.S. against Libya in 1986), or by a declaration of conventional war against them (as was the case when the U.S. declared war against Afghanistan in 2002 in conjunction with the

war

on terror).

States operating terrorism

States involved in operating terrorism do so in

the sense that they initiate and direct the activities of terrorist groups via groups outside their own government institutions. Arguably, paramilitary organisations during the Bosnian war (1992-1995) can be deemed as as example of states operating terrorism, since these organisations were formed and given free reign to operate at least with the knowledge, if not more direct support, from the Serbian government. The killing of over 3,000 civilians in Nicaragua by the U.S.supported rebels of the 1980s can also be classied as an example thereof[52]

31 .

States perpetrating terrorism

States actively perpetrating terrorism (and

terrorist acts) do so through ocial state bodies (i.e. members of its security forces, intelligence services, and/or their direct agents), which intentionally attack civilians in other countries without declaring war. This has been deemed worthy of discussion in this context in relation to counter-terrorist tactics carried out by states during times of peace. Governments often deploy agents to

29 Ganor (no date), p.12 30 Byman (2005), pp.4-13 31 Herman and O'Sullivan

(1989), in Sherba (2003), p.49

specically target sub-state actors that happen to be operating in other countries without necessarily being harboured by them. A famous example of this is the Israeli `Operation Wrath of God, where members of the Intelligence Agency Mossad and Special Forces Sayeret Matkal tracked down and assassinated members of the Palestinian Black September Organisation responsible for the death of eleven Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympic Games.

1.4 Criminality
As demonstrated, many (government) denitions explicitly refer to terrorism as a crime because its main targets are people that should not be targeted (civilians), and involves methods that should not be used (i.e. hostage-taking, suicide bombing) according to the laws of war (ius ad bellum) and the laws in war (ius in bello)[52]

32 . For that reason, terrorism in the contemporary context

is a term that entails both moral and legal illegitimacy. States have referred to terrorism as a crime in domestic and international law over the course of the 20th century, though disagreements over its meaning have prevented it from becoming universally dened. As early as 1936, the League of Nations proposed to dene terrorism as all criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons or group of persons or general public, which was not ratied because of disagreements between the member states. After the Munich Olympic Games Massacre (1972), then UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim attempted to return to the debate and ensure that the organisation did not remain a `mute spectator' to such acts of violence. Though a majority of member states supported the Secretary-General, representatives from a group of Arab, African and Asian states rejected the proposal, stating that

people who strug33 . Attempts to

gle to liberate themselves from foreign oppression and exploitation have the right to use all methods at their disposal, including force [36] the Rome Conference (1999) were also rejected[30]

include the strategic act of terrorism in the list of crimes against humanity at

34 .

Because of these disagreements, terrorism has been more commonly equated with crime in relation to the way in which terrorists aim to achieve their political objectives, meaning that those suspected of terrorism are prosecuted for a variety of dierent criminal oenses rather than terrorism itself[37] so-called

35 . These

terror

tactics,

terrorist

acts or

acts

of terrorism include assas-

sination, bombing attacks, acts of suicide, shooting, and hostage-taking in all its related forms (i.e. aircraft, maritime and train hijacking, kidnapping and barricade hostage incidents). As acts of terrorism, they have been identied in international legislation like the Convention Relative to the Protection of Civil-

32 Kapitan, The terrorism of terrorism , in Sherba (2003), p.49 33 Homan (1998), in LaFree et al (2006), p.5 34 Arsanjani, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
p.79

in Jedoin (2007),

35 LaFree

& Dugan,

How

does studying terrorism compare to studying crime, in Deem

(2004), p.58

ian Persons in Times of War (1949), Convention on Oences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (1963), International Convention against the Taking of Hostages (1979), Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (1970), Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (1971), Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (1988) and the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing (2001). They are distinguished from pure criminal acts in that the terrorists are presumed to engage these solely for the purpose of furthering their political goals rather than for the

enrichment

of the individuals concerned[32, 12]

3637 .

1.4.1 Advantages
There are several advantages for states to confer a status of illegitimacy upon terrorism, both in the strategic and tactical sense. them in the following way[52]

38 :

Thomis Kapitan outlines

1. Firstly, it erases any incentive an audience might have in trying to understand the reasons for terrorism; particularly the origins of these grievances and the possibility that they might actually contain elements of legitimacy. Examples of this include Russias President Putins referral of the Chechens as terrorists in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the Phillippino government in relation to so-called (FARC) as

Muslim

terrorists, Colombian

ocials referring to the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia

narco-terrorists39 ,

Israels former President, Ariel Sharon,

in relation to the ongoing conict in Palestine, and, perhaps most famously, the US administration in relation to military action against the Taliban in Afghanistan, and the Iraqi regime under Saddam Hussein (now also includes various radical Islamic groups wreaking havoc in some of the countries major cities). 2. Secondly, it rules out any possibility for negotiations; reected in the everpopular proverb that

we

do not negotiate with terrorists.

This is of

particular importance in the context of this thesis in that it constitutes one of the core elements of the positional bargaining framework adopted by states against terrorists. Because governments regard themselves as

36 Jenkins, International
buck (1978), p.27

terrorism: the other world war, in Kegley (1990), p.30; Clutter-

37 An

excellent example to illustrate this point is the 1975 Balcome Street siege; a barricade

hostage-situation that resulted after four members of the Provisional IRA were chased through London by Metropolitan Police ocers after having red gunshots through the window of Scotts Restaurant in Mayfair. Because the incident included four members of the Provisional IRA- Joe O'Connell, Eddie Butler, Harry Duggan and Hugh Doherty- that had previously terrorised London by a string of bombings campaigns (including the Guildford and Woolwich pubs) and the murder of broadcaster/author Ross McWhirter, it constitutes an act of terrorism rather than representing a straight-forward criminal act.

38 Kapitan, The terrorism of terrorism , in Sherba (2003), 39 They had previously been referred to as narco-guerillas

pp.7-9

morally and legally superior to the terrorists, they are highly unwilling (and unable) to make any forms of concession, since this would be perceived as

giving in to the enemy.

This will be the focus of more, in-depth

attention in later chapters. 3. Thirdly, the inferior moral and legal status of terrorism functions as a

blank

cheque in the way which governments are able to deal with the This can take

perpetrators, predominantly related to the use of force.

place in one of two ways; openly declaring war or engaging in so-called

counter-terrorist

operations against states harbouring terrorists or the

terrorist groups themselves, which is considered legitimate in the sense that they are merely reacting to an already existing amoral and illegal activity. Delegitimising certain actors as terrorists also sties any objections to the manner in which governments deal with them, though these might in themselves constitute acts of terrorism. In example, the massacre of over 2,000 Palestinian civilians in the Sabra and Shatilla refugee camps in Beirut (1982) is not referred to as `terrorist' activities, nor are the perpetrators and their allies (some of which allegedly were in the Israeli military) called terrorists. The same is true of the destruction of Grozny by the Russian military during the Second Chechen war (1999) and the Israeli bombardment of Beirut (1982)[52]

40 .

1.4.2 The pejorative problem

The main problem surrounding the association of terrorism with criminality refers back to the concept of legitimacy, which in the contemporary context takes place between state and non-state actors, both of which regard this as a

Manichaean struggle between good and evil, us

versus them

41 . Thus, while

states demote terrorism as a criminal activity for the reasons outlined above, the so-called terrorist protest that their aims are justiable in the context out of which they arise, and that nobody who pursues a a terrorist[32]

42 . Using this line of argument, Abu Iyad (Yassir Arafat's deputy

just cause can be labeled as

and one of the leaders of Fatah and Black September) justied activities such as the 1972 Munich Olympic Games Massacre by referring to it as an act of political violence, which makes the activity both respectable and legitimate[24] similar vein, the IRA specically chose to refer to itself as an label[57]

43 . In a

army

in order

to emphasise the legitimacy of their struggle and thereby counter the terrorist

44 . Also, scholar Amin Walid Ruwayha referred to terrorism as having

gained its denition

from the various Western and israeli acts-past and present-

of colonialism, suppression, conquests, plundering other countries and peoples, committing so-called covert operations, deciding who is a good guy and who

40 Kapitan, The terrorism of terrorism , in Sherba (2003), p.5 41 Record (2003), p.8 42 Jenkins, International terrorism: the other world war, in Kegley 43 Ganor (no date), p.3 44 Truman (2003), p.7

(1990), p.28

10

is a bad guy, making him/them pay[51] called

45 .

This line of argument becomes complicated in situations where former so-

terrorists

become todays national leaders; meaning that they have

somehow made the transition from terrorism (whose cause is deemed unjust) to statesmen by becoming engaged in politics, which is perceived to constitute a just cause[53]

46 . In example, the Israeli government on numerous occasions de-

nounced the (late) President of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), Yassir Arafat, as a

terrorist and the PLO as a terrorist organisation,

ignoring

the fact that one of their own former Prime Ministers, Menachem Begin, was at one time engaged in similar activities as part of the radical Jewish organisation Irgun Zvai Leumi. Perhaps ironically, Arafat would himself come to be recognised as one of the leading political (rather than terrorist) gures in the Middle East. In the Northern Ireland conict, Gerry Adams has also made the transition from being an IRA terrorist to now being a politician with whom it is regarded to be

legitimate

to enter into negotiations.

1.5 Social and political goals

The notion that terrorism is carried out for a specic social and/or political purpose is closely linked to the assumption that the predominant perpetrators are sub-state groups and individuals. Meeting certain social and political aims is generally regarded to constitute the long-term goals of the terrorists, while short-term achievements primarily relate to the tactic they employ to meet their overarching political objectives. In both cases, individual motivations such as hopelessness and a desire for revenge have been identied as strong motivators for terrorism, but will not be discussed in this thesis[9, 33]

47 .

1.5.1 Long-term goals

Long-term goals have been identied in the literature as existing in three major categories:

anarchic/revolutionary, nationalist/separatist, and religious/fundamentalist,

48 .

though it is acknowledged that these categories (particularly the latter two) often overlap[39, 4, 59, 18]

Anarchic/revolutionary

The social and political aims of anarchic/revolutionary

terrorist groups is to expose the apparent evils of the political system in which they operate, including the corruption of the ruling regime, repression and exploitation of the ordinary citizen, and general decay of society, which they perceive to be sucient justication for doing what they do. If possible, they also attempt to overthrow the government. In the words of Kozo Okamato (one of the members of the Japanese Red Army responsible for the 1972 Lod Airport

45 Ruwayha (1990), p.294 46 Simonsen & Spindlove (2000), p.14 47 Bloom (2005); Krueger & Maleckova 48 Lutz & Lutz (2005), pp.11-13; Atran
266; Drake (1998), p.55

(1987) (2006), pp.129-130; Wolf & Frankel (2006), pp.264-

11

Massacre);

with no class struggle. [11]

revolutionary

war is warfare created for justice...creating a society

49

This category has been sub-divided by some authors into

right

and

left

wing terrorist aims. Groups pursuing right-wing aims include the Turkish Grey Wolves, the Japanese Shield Society, the American Ku-Klux Klan, and the Italian Avantguardia Nazionale, while the 19th century Russian Narodnaya Volya, the German Red Army Faction (RAF; though also commonly referred to as the `Baader-Meinhof gang after its two founders, Andreas Baader and Ulrike Meinhof ), the Italian Red Brigades (Brigate Rosse), Japanese Red Army Faction, Uruguayan Tupamaros, Argentinian Montoneros, Palestinian Abu Nidal Organisation, Irish National Liberation Party (INLA) and the African National Congress (ANC) express leftist sympathies[49, 39]

50 .

Nationalist/separatist

Since decolonisation was in full swing in the late

1960s, it is perhaps not surprising that the establishment of an independent homeland became a prominent feature on the international agenda. Moreover, given the success of forcibly driving out foreign occupying countries like Britain, France and the Netherlands out of Asian and African countries a decade earlier, this nally appeared to possible and many so-called terrorist organisations made this their main priority. They include the Irish Republican Army (IRA), Chechen separatists, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE or Tamil Tigers), Euzkadi ta Askatasuna (ETA), the Partia Karkaren Kurdistan (PKK; which despite originating as a leftist organisation in the 1970s places the main emphasis on Kurdish identity), as well as the PLO, the Harakat ul-Mujahidin (a Pakistani militant group whose primary aim is the liberation of Kashmir) and the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF)[39]

51 . In many cases (i.e. Chechens,

PLO, IRA), this is combined with a strong desire for religious change as well; usually in the expressed desire to establish an independent, religious state.

Religious/fundamentalist
achieve sweeping changes

Religious/fundamentalist terrorism

seeks

the

use of violence to advance divinely commanded purposes, in an attempt to ligion, though other aims like the exposure of a corrupt or morally degraded

52 . Thus, the actors are primarily motivated by re-

regime and establishment of an independent, theocratic homeland often coincide. Examples of early religious terrorist groups include the Jewish Zealots and Sicarii in the rst century AD and the Ismaili (Muslim) Assassins in the 12th century, while the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo group, Al Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, and radical Shiite and Sunni elements operating in Iraq are frequently cited as examples of contemporary fundamentalist terror. The term fundamentalism is perhaps badly chosen since it implies irrational and

crazy behaviour and the pursuit of aims that do not make sense to anyone
Clutterbuck (1975), p.113 pp.99-128

49 Clyne, An Anatomy of Skyjacking, in 50 Rosie (1986), p.23; Lutz & Lutz (2005), 51 Lutz & Lutz (2005), pp.153-157 52 Wolf & Frankel (2006), p.265

12

but the terrorist him/herself.

Whilst this is a frequent feature in the media,

this idea has been all but dismissed after a variety of studies failed to show correlations between psychopathology and terrorism[6] idea of the

53 .

Religious/fundamentalist goals are often discussed in conjunction with the

martyr

and engaging in

jihad

operations for the glory of God; In example, a Hamas sui-

particularly when combined with suicide attacks. there were other ways to do jihad, sweetest`[35]

cide bomber (whose bomb failed to detonate) stated though he knew that

54 . Because the religious motivations of these groups mean they

this one (suicide bombing) is sweetthe

are less constrained by political concerns and therefore more willing to inict large numbers of casualties (i.e. by resorting to tactics such as suicide bombing), religious/fundamentalist terrorism has also been referred to as in some literature[2, 17].

new

terrorism

1.5.2 Short-term goals

As mentioned above, short-term terrorist goals by and large refer to attaining concessions from their adversaries (states and their representatives in the context of this thesis) by means of violent coercion. They are directly related to the tactics used by terrorists to achieve their long-term goals as identied above. In example, terrorists aiming to obtain the freedom of their fellows are more likely to resort to acts where a process of negotiation is involved (i.e. hostage-taking), whilst those who principal goal is to embarrass the government by demonstrating its incapacity to protect its citizens prefer non-negotiable acts of terrorism (i.e. suicide bombing). Amongst others, short-term political goals of terrorists have included the embarrassment of the target state, the withdrawal of military forces from occupied territories, drawing attention to their cause, monetary extortion, or the release of fellow terrorists from jail. Though the impact of generating fear amongst a target audience is also an important feature in this context, it is not the primary ambition.

Media coverage
dened as one of

The aims of drawing attention to their cause is of particular

importance in relation to the advent of mass communications in the late 1960s. In the literature, the relationship between terrorism and the media has been

blood

cease to exist[57, 55, 42]

55 .

and oxygen:

without the media, terrorism would

Aware that media portrayal gives a particular meaning to terrorist attacks (which in some cases may linger beyond the immediate impact of its violence and/or destruction), many terrorist groups have highly developed media centres and media managers responsible for portraying the organisation in the desired way. An excellent example of this is the Hamas website, which runs a daily

53 Barlow (2007), p.188 54 Hassan, An Arsenal

(2006), p.52

of Believers: Talking to the `Human Bombs, in Kydd & Walter

55 Truman

(2003); Taylor & Quayle (1994); Nacos (1994)

13

childrens television program very much like the Disney Channel in the United States; Mickey Mouse being replaced by a Hamas version named Farfour

56 . The

organisation also features numerous music videos that encourage teenagers to die as suicide bombers, or martyrs in their own words. In this way, terrorism is as much a

rhetorical

as political act[57]

57 . In addition, terrorists choose

specic tactics designed for gaining media attention, taking advantage of the fact that the most unusual, spectacular and interesting stories usually receive the most wide-spread coverage. This is best summarised by the German anarchist Johannes Most (1880): public and awaken its audience to political issues [59] to be

outrageous

violence will seize the imagination of the

58 . Unfortunately, this is

often associated with acts of extreme violence aimed at those generally presumed

innocent

(i.e. civilians, women and children). Suicide bombings are so

spectacular in their very nature that they attract much media attention; the 9/11 attacks being the most illustrative example thereof. Though in many cases, such terrorist tactics have failed to produce the desired long-term outcome, it can be said that, irrespective of whether or not a terrorist group manages to achieve their social and political goals, the tactics of terrorism will always the attention of its target audience[42]

59 .

get

Terrorism 1968-present

Though the section above has demonstrated that the phenomenon has existed for a long time and can be carried out by many dierent actors for many dierent reasons, there is general consensus in the literature that 1968 constituted a

watershed

year for terrorism, for four major reasons[20, 22, 47, 16]

60 .

The rst reason was the humiliating defeat of the Arab armies after the Six Day War (1967), followed by the realisation that the Arab states could not hope to defeat Israel by conventional, military means. Instead, they began supporting a variety of Palestinian groups resisting the physical and spiritual occupation of their homeland, launching small-scale excursions into Israel as a means of demonstrating resistance. The idea of national resistance was further strengthened by Ayatollah Khomeinis rise to power in Iran (1979), providing a further

impetus

to the spread of Shiite Islamic Revolution, by violent means[34]

61 .

The second reason was the general mood of dissatisfaction in Europe. Predominantly related to the performance of their governments, a number of (mainly leftist-oriented) organisations were formed as a means of protesting against the state. A particular point of contention was the way in which the United Some, like the German RAF, began
Jihad, Spiegel online,

States was handling the Vietnam war.

56 Hamas

Mickey

Mouse

Teaches

http://www.spiegel.de/international/zeitgeist/0,1518,481940,00.html

57 Truman (2003), p.115 58 Garrison (2004), in Wolf & Frankel (2006), p.267 59 Nacos (1994), p.8 60 Enders & Sandler (1999), p.7; Freedman (2005), p.10; 61 Schweitzer, Terrorism:

Reich (1995), p.20; Dobson & Payne

(1979), p.193

a weapon in the Shiite arsenal, in Kurz (1987), p.66

14

as peacefully-oriented student protest, which then resorted to terrorist tactics because they were convinced that peaceful protests would not achieve their objectives[5]

62 .

The third reason was the development of mass air travel, which paved the way for the possibility of hijacking. ways. This emerged as a tactic of terrorism in the late 1960s and early 1970s; diering from previous incidences in three major Firstly, the terrorists made explicit political demands, secondly, they targeted specic airlines that were regarded as being symbols of the state, and thirdly, they ensured constant media attention by creating a theatre[58, 1]

63 .

travelling

This directly relates to the last point; namely the advent of the mass media, whose increasing availability and sophistication meant that terrorists were now able to get their messages across to their target audiences much easier than in previous years; which, as outlined above, constitutes a major short-term terrorist goal. Television was already fast becoming internationally availabel; the rst live satellite broadcast focusing on the Tokyo Olympic Games (1964)[32]

64 . Only

eight years later, the Munich Olympics would demonstrate to an estimated 500 million viewers around the world the power of a small, then largely unknown terrorist group called Black September. Other high-prole events would follow and equally capture the attention of the international media; making the late 1960s a period where

obscure men in uncertain cause have seized their moment

65 .

of prime time, choreographed a series of violent and dreadful deeds for the media and the millions, and established new directions in political violence[8] creasingly international. The interplay of these factors mean that as of 1968, terrorism became inNot only could acts of terrorism be planned in one country and executed in another, but terrorist groups from dierent countries could also cooperate with each other in terms of training, sharing knowledge and experiences as well as executing certain acts together, or on behalf of each other. There are many examples of international cooperation between terrorist groups; the PFLP with the RAF, the Japanese Red Army and the IRA; ETA and the IRA; and the RAF and the Brigate Rosse[16] ued in recent years, as demonstrated by the various links between Al-Qaeda and the Jemmah Islamiyah, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and fundamentalist elements in Iraq, Algeria, Libya, and Somalia. This section will examine the way in which terrorism presented itself since 1968, particularly focusing on the tactics terrorist use in order to achieve their political and social goals, and the changes related to the way in which these were carried out and whom they targeted. The examples provided only represent the most high-prole cases, and except in the case of barricade hostage-taking (of

66 . This trend has contin-

integrators, in Wilkinson & Jenkins (1999), p.55; Arey (1973), p.182

62 Aust (1998), pp.44-74 63 Homan, Aviation security 64 Kidder, Why

and terrorism: an analysis of the potential threat to air cargo

modern terrorism? Three causes springing from the seeds of the 1960s,

in Kegley (1990), p.137

65 Bell (1977), p.476 66 Dobson & Payne (1979),

pp.151-191

15

which a complete list will be provided in an appendix at the end of this thesis), lesser well-known cases will not be discussed for reasons of space and relevance.

2.1 Assassinations
The selection and killing of a specic person or a particular group, is one of the oldest and most eective known tactics available to terrorist groups[59]

67 . They

are closely connected to the element of publicity and are usually carried out in the public eye in order to send a message to those opposing the terrorists. Early historical examples include the Zealots and Sicarii, both of which used to kill in broad daylight and in front of witnesses, and the Assasssins, who resorted to stealth tactics, sneaking up on their victims and killing them swiftly and almost without leaving a trace. In the contemporary sense, assassinations have primarily targeted military personnel, politicians, diplomats or other state representatives. Examples include Tsar Alexander II of Russia (1881), the Irish secretary Lord Cavendish (1882), the Shah of Persia (1886), the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife (1914), King Alexander of Yugoslavia and the Austrian Chancellor Dollfuss (1934), Lord Moyne (1944), and King Faisal of Iraq (1958), to name a few

68 [49].

Prominent assassinations from 1968 onwards include those of the Jordanian Prime Minister Was Tell (1971) by Black September, German Chief Justice Prosecutor, Siegfried Buback (1977) by the RAF, Lord Mountbatten (1979) by the IRA, Indian Prime Minister Indira Ghandi (1984) by two of her Sikh bodyguards, Dr. Gerold von Braummuehl, head of the political department at the Ministry of Foreign Aairs (1986) by the RAF, Israeli Prime Minister Yizhak Rabin (1995) by a right-wing Orthodox Jew who opposed the signing of the Oslo Accords, and the former Prime Minister of Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto (2007) by yet unidentied terrorists. Failed attempts at assassinations include that of the Israeli ambassador to the UK Shlomo Argov (1982) by the Abu Nidal Organisation, and Dr. Hans Tietmeyer, then a state secretary in the Ministry of Finance (1988) by the German RAF

69 [49].

2.2 Armed attacks

Armed assault were also a frequent occurrence in the terrorist arsenal. of an imprisoned member the previous month The Brigate Rosse shot and killed two carabinieri (1979) in revenge for the suicide

70 . In the mid-1980s, the Abu

Nidal Organisation (an extreme splinter group of the PLO), launched a series of attacks against civilians in over 20 countries, killing or injuring over 900 people. The most notorious attacks were on two El Al ticket counters at Rome and

67 Wolf & Frankel (2006), p.264 68 Rosie (1986), pp.13-22 69 Rosie (1986), pp.13-22 70 'Gunmen Murder Italian Police',
p.74

Financial Times, 22 November 1979; in Drake (1996),

16

Vienna airports (1985).

At Rome, four Arab gunmen spontaneously opened

re on passengers in simultaneous shootings, killing 16 and wounding 99. Only minutes later, three terrorists threw hand grenades at passengers waiting in Vienna to check-in to a ight to Tel Aviv, resulting in the death of two and wounding 39. It was assumed that these attacks were carried out in order to sabotage peace negotiations between Israel and the PLO; in which both Austria and Italy played a signicant part. The PFLP then carried out a similar act at Athens airport (also 1985), though only one person was killed and one wounded.

2.3 Robbery
A few groups also turned to robbery (especially banks) in order to nance their cause. The RAF engaged in this from time to time, as did ETA, the Tupamaros, Montoneros, and the IRA. In 1975, the IRA made an approximated $1-3 million

71 from robberies, but also donations, and protection rackets. The Italian

Red Brigades also resorted to robbery, landing them an estimated $5-10 million in 1980 though some of that sum can be attributed to ransom money resulting from kidnapping. In South America, the FMNL also resorted to robbery as a means of nancing their organisation; bringing them an income of $30 million in 1982.[38]

72

2.4 Drugs
Some terrorist organisations turned to the drugs trade as a lucrative way of nancing themselves. In some countries, the extent to which this has blossomed has become so great that this is sometimes referred to as

narco-terrorism. narco-terrorist

This

phenomenon is most commonly associated with organisations like the Taliban in Afghanistan (opium), and the FARC in Columbia; the latter of which had an estimated budget of $50-150 million as a result of their ties (1985)[38] activi-

73 . A UN study has recently declared Afghanistan as the worlds

leading drug producer (2007); detailing that the county has an approximated 193,000 cultivated hectares of opium poppies, making the land use larger than the corresponding total for coca cultivation in South America (Colombia, Peru and Bolivia combined) and accounting for 93% of the global opiates market

74 .

2.5 Bombings
Bombs are

well-established

terrorist arms; easy to make, safe to handle, and

can be altered in a variety of ways. This means that on the whole, there is very little risk for the terrorists themselves (in conjunction with non-suicide attacks), making it an incredibly popular terrorist tactic. A 1978 CIA report showed that

71 The value of this is calculated against the value of the $ in 1980 72 All statistics taken from Laqueur (1987), pp.102-103 73 Laqueur (1987), p.103 74 United Nations Oce on Drugs and Crime, Afghanistan
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/research/AFG07_ExSum_web.pdf

Opium

Survey

2007,

17

incendiary and explosive bombings accounted for over 60% of total terrorist attacks committed 1967-1978, making it the most utilised terror tactic[7]

75 .

It is thus not surprising that this tactic strongly prevailed in the late 1960s; the main targets being buildings, aircrafts and individuals. The IRA in particular has a long track record of bombing buildings: a Belfast restaurant (1972), killing two and injuring 136 people; two pubs in Birmingham (1974), leaving 19 dead and 182 wounded; Harrods (1983), killing six; and Manchester (1996), injuring 200

76 . They also detonated bombs in predominantly Protestant areas

in order to attack commercial premises or security force members and facilities; of which the Enniskillen bombing (1987; killing eleven people and injured 63), Northern Ireland Forensic Laboratories (1992) and Shankill Road bombing (1993; killing nine civilians and one of the bombers)[18] the administrative headquarters of the Springer newspaper company (1972). In Colombia, the FARC exploded several bombs outside the Presidential Palace, killing 17 and injuring 65 people (2001)

77 . The RAF bombed

78 [9].

The IRA have also made use of letter bombs targeting individuals; sending one to the bishop acting as a chaplain to the British Forces in Northern Ireland with the purpose of deterring Catholics from joining up

79 . The RAF

used a bomb in a car to kill Dr. Karl- Heinz Beckurts (a member of the nuclear energy working group of the German National Industries Association) and his driver (1986), as well as the Chairman of the Deutsche Bank, Alfred Herrhausen (1989)[18]

80 . More recently (2002), the Jemaah Islamiyah resorted to 81 car bombing, killing 202 people; a year later, another killed 125 in Iraq[2] .
Mass transportation have also proved as popular targets for terrorist bombing attacks; between 1980-2004, a total of 134 were carried out against public transport (predominantly busses) aircraft hijacking, accounting for the majority of fatalities in association with attacks against commercial airliners (93% between 1947-1996)[58] prole examples include the bombing of an Air India aircraft (1985; killing 329 passengers and crew) by the Sikh extremist group Golden Temple of Amritsar, the bombing of the American destroyer U.S.S. Cole (2002; killing 17 servicemen and damaging the vessel), and the March 11, 2004, commuter train bombings in Madrid (killing 191 and injuring 1500).

82 . Bombs also feature in conjunction with 83 . Other high-

75 Central Intelligence Agency (1979), International terrorism in 1978,

p.6

in Bassiouni (1981),

New York Times, November 16, 2003, in Bloom (2005), p.135

77 Drake (1998), p.69 78 Bloom (2005), p.133 79 Pyle (1986), p.74 80 Drake (1996), p.75 81 Asal & Blum (2005), p.10 82 Chronology of terrorist 83 Merari, Attacks

76 Drake

(1996), p.

69; Arsu & Filkins,

20

in Istanbul die in bombings at Synagogues,

attacks

against

public

transit,

http://transit-

safety.colpe.dot.gov/security/SecurityInitiatives/DesignConsiderations p. 18

on civil aviation: trends and lessons, in Wilkinson & Jenkins (1999),

18

2.6 ABC weapons

The idea that terrorists might acquire a nuclear weapon has received much attention in the literature. This possibility represents the absolute worst-case scenario; ranking high in terms of

dread

and

unknown

incidents of low-probability but high-damage capacity[48]

84 .

risk, which refers to

Thankfully, this to date only constitutes a hypothetical debate, though under serious consideration since the threshold of acquiring and using weapons has already been crossed; some terrorist groups having used chemical weapons against the state. The most prominent example thereof is the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo group that released Sarin nerve gas in Matsumoto (1994) and on the Tokyo underground (1995). The latter resulted in the death of twelve people and 5,000 injured, but experts estimate that it would have been more lethal had the gas been concentrated[58]

85 .

2.7 Suicide attacks

Inherent in a suicide atttack is the expectation is that those carrying out the attacks are not meant and do not expect to survive[47]

86 .

This distinction

is important in that this separates it from other acts of terrorism (such as hostage-taking), where both the probability and expectation of the terrorists to escape alive is much higher. Many hostage-taking incidents specically include demands aimed at preserving the lives of the terrorists, such as safe passage, granting of asylum in a safe haven of some sort, or include elaborate escape plans, whilst these elements are largely absent in suicide missions. States most likely to have been targeted by suicide terrorism are Israel, the United States, Russia, Sri Lanka, Turkey, and India; the targets both military and civilian institutions[45]

87 .

Suicide attacks began to emerge in the late 1960s, after the defeat of the Arab countries during the Arab-Israeli War (1967). It was usually carried out by driving an explosive-laden vehicle into the designed target area. Since the late 1960s, suicide attacks (mainly in the form of suicide bombing) have increased dramatically. One of the most notable successes were the attacks on the U.S. Marine headquarters, in Beirut (1983), which killed 287 and wounded 81. Since then, the terrorist organisation Hezbollah launched an extensive campaign of suicide attacks, most of which took place between 1984-86, and from 1999 onwards[45]

88 , the majority of which involved the use of public transport

laden with explosive devices. Other methods for suicide attacks include carrying explosive charges in handbags, activating explosive boats, detonating hand grenades, using booby-trapped bicycles, and using aircraft as mobile units for suicide terror (as demonstrated most chillingly on September 11, 2001).

84 Ropeik & Slovic (2003), p.55 85 Wilkinson, Enhancing global 86 Merari, The readiness to kill
(1995), p. 194

aviation security?, in Wilkinson & Jenkins (1999), p.152

and die: suicidal terrorism in the Middle East, in Reich

87 Pedahzur 88 Pedahzur

(2005), p.13; pp.241-253 (2005), p.48

19

Suicide terror also constitutes a tactic that appears to be on the increase; especially in the Middle East. According to data from the RAND Corporation's Chronology of International Terrorism, two thirds of all such incidents in Israel have occurred since the start of the Second Intifada (2000)[29]

89 . Particularly

worrying in this context is the association between suicide attacks and religious and fundamentalist terror tactics, which appears to be more correlated than the other categories. RAND vice president and terrorism analyst Bruce Homan has found that 80% of suicide attacks since 1968 have occurred after 9/11; jihadis representing 31 of 35 responsible groups[4] and Fatah

90 . The three main perpetrators of

suicide terrorism currently are Hezbollah, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ),

91 .

Hamas has also used suicide terrorism, primarily in order to

sabotage the peace process between Israel and the Palestinian Authority[31]

92 .

Suicide attacks constitute one of the most eective tactics of terrorism; both in their cost/benet ecacy and in the selling value for the media. The PKK used suicide terror in the late 1990s in order to prevent their captured leader, Abdullah calan, from being executed by the Turkish authorities, as well to entice the government to engage in heavy-handed counter-terrorist strategies leading to more support for the PKK. Aware of these benets, groups like the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE, or Tamil Tigers) and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade have created special missions.

suicide squads to carry out their chilling

Female suicide bombers in Chechnya (the so-called Chechen Black

Widows) began to make use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), often mimicking a pregnancy, to pass through security checkpoints more unharassed since a pregnant woman is deemed to be

beyond

suspicion or reproach[9]

93 .

2.8 Hostage-taking
The taking of hostages is one of the oldest tactics of terrorism. In 197 B.C., the Romans took hostages from defeated tribes as guarantees of future good conduct. This also took place during Tyrones rebellion in Ireland (16th century) and the counter-revolution in Vendee (France, 1793). Frederick Barbarossa seized over 300 hostages in order to secure a favourable peace treaty with Milan (1158), and King Richard I. of England was taken hostage upon his return from the Third Crusades (1193)[47]. The main short-term aim of terrorists in a hostage-taking incident is the attainment of concessions from the authorities by the expressed or implied threat to kill or harm the hostages. These may include ransoms, securing the release of fellow terrorists from foreign or domestic jails, demanding to engage in dialogue with high-ranking ocials that would not be possible under dierent circumstances, or acquiring access to the media; thus functioning as a tactic of

89 Homan (2003), p.2 90 Homan (2005), in Atran 91 Pedahzur (2005), p.56 92 Karmon (2000), p.1 93 Bloom (2005), p.143

(2006), p.127

20

to maintain control over the situation, capture and hold the medias attention for as long as the situation endures, and by entering into a process of negotiation force governments into recognising them and their status, it has also been referred to as

political blackmail[47]94 .

Because the taking of hostages enables the terrorists

smart

terrorism[47]

95 .

There are many dierent ways of taking hostages. since one situation can easily lead to another. aircraft is contained on the ground. contained area.

Although this will be

discussed under dierent headings, the categories are not mutually exclusive, This is particularly true for cases of aircraft hijacking, which can turn into a barricade situation once the Likewise, a barricade situation can turn into a hijacking if the terrorists and their hostages are permitted to leave the

2.8.1 Kidnapping
Terrorists began to employ kidnapping for the political blackmail[11]

96 in 1968. Between 1968 and 1975, 50 such incidences

apparently

express purpose of

occurred; commencing in South America (especially Guatemala, Colombia, Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay) before spreading to Europe (Italy, West Germany,

97 . In Western Europe, incidences 98 of kidnapping peaked in 1971 (6), and 1970 in the rest of the world (29)[3] .
Turkey, and the UK) and the Middle East[11] Like assassinations, the principal targets of the terrorist kidnappers were diplomats, politicians, military personnel and other high-ranking state ocials. High-prole kidnapping include that of the American ambassador to Brazil, Charles Elbrick (1968) by the ALN, American police advisor Dan Mitrione by

the Tupamaros (1970, the West German honourary consul, Eugene Beihl (also 1970) by ETA, the policeman Renato Penterioni (1976) by the Red Brigades, and U.S. General James Dozier (1981), also by the Red Brigades. In the Middle East, the Jihad al-Islami was one of the main perpetrators kidnapping foreigners in the Lebanon in the mid 1980s; especially American, French, and even Lebanese nationals; a majority of which were working for the United Nations. The group held seven U.S. citizens captive at the American University of Beirut (1985) as safety guarantees that the death sentence passed three of their comrades held captive in Kuwait would not be carried out[34]

99 .

Later the same year, they captured two French diplomats in order to pressurise the French into reconsidering an arms deal with Saudi Arabia, and achieve to better treatment of Shiites in South Lebanon by French soldiers in the UNIFIL. Another Shiite terrorist group, calling themselves the Khaibar Brigades, kidnapped six prominent Jewish members of the South Lebanese community (also

94 Crenshaw, The logic of terrorism, in Reich (1995), p.21 95 Hermann & Hermann, Hostage-taking, the presidency and crisis, in Reich (1995), p.211 96 Clutterbuck (1975), p.33 97 Clutterbuck (1975), pp.33-43 98 Average number drawn from three dierent databases on terrorism by Jenkins, Mickolus
and Wilkinson; cited in Aston (1982), p.24

99 Schweitzer, Terrorism

is the Shiite arsenal, in Kurz (1987), p.71

21

1985) with the purpose of deterring Israel from attacking Shiite targets in Lebanon. Some of these kidnappings proved fruitful and eective in attaining concessions from governments and in terms of ransom money. In exchange for the release of the German politician Peter Lorenz (1975), each participating RAF member received DM 20,000 as ransom money, as well as securing the release of ve jailed comrades[16]

100 .

There have also been cases where kidnapping have not been successful in achieving the expected aims. leasing their victims. In some instances, this led to the terrorists reThe Tupamaros kidnapped the British ambassador Sir

Georey Jackson (1971), but released him when the government refused to negotiate. Similarly, they released the American agricultural advisor Dr. Claude Fly after medical reports showed he would be highly likely to die if exposed to the stressful conditions for much longer. Other hostages were not lucky. The Tupamaros shot Dan Mitrione when the government refused to accede to the demands of freeing 150 of their comrades (1970). In Canada, the Front de Liberation de Quebec (FLQ) strangled their hostage, provincial government minister Pierre Laporte, after Prime Minister Trudeau introduced the

War Measures Act, thereby formally declaring war on

the terrorists, and refusing to release 13 prisoners, publicise the FLQ manifesto and pay the $500,000 ransom money. Similarly, after it became clear that the Argentinian government would not release the 50 prisoners as demanded by ERP, and upon being surrounded by Argentinian police in their hideout, they killed their hostage, Fiat president Berdan Sallustro (1972). The RAF executed the industrialist Hanns-Martin Schleyer (1977)after realising that their demands would not be met by the West German government[11]

101 .

2.8.2 Hijacking Aircraft

As demonstrated above, aircraft hijacking became a popular terrorist tactic in the late 1960s. In most cases, it proved very successful in coercing governments terrorists from foreign jails, monetary extortion, or having an aircraft at ones disposal for the purpose of escape (i.e. ight path), extortion and in a few cases tween 1968-1988 into meeting the terrorists demands, which have included the release of fellow

102 .

diverting an aicraft from its original

The majority of hijacking took place in the Middle East (74 out of 110) be-

103 [58]. The most notorious perpetrator was the Popular Front

for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), whose primary target was the airliner

100 Dobson & Payne (1979), p.207 101 Clutterbuck (1975), pp.36-43 102 The rst two often overlap; the
be friendly.

terrorists both making demands and taking the aircraft

to another destination, which is often an airport in a country that the terrorists perceive to

103 St.

John,

The

politics of aviation terrorism, in Wilkinson & Jenkins (1999), p.32

22

El Al, which was considered to be a representative of the targeted country, Israel. In July 1968, the PFLP carried out their rst hijacking; taking over El Al 707 in Rome, diverting the plane from its original destination, Tel Aviv, to Algiers, where upon releasing all non-Israelis and the women and children (leaving them with twelve male Israeli hostages), they demanded the release of 1,200 Arabs held in Iraeli prisons. The terrorists arrived at this number on the basis that of an Israeli statement that the life of one Israeli was worth that of 100 Arabs

104 [11]. The hostages were eventually freed after the Israelis agreed to re-

lease 16 Arabs caught during the 1967 war. A year later, the PFLP hijacked another plane to Damascus. This particular incident gained much attention in the international media due to the fact that one of the hijackers, Leila Khaled, was a

strikingly

beautiful

105 [1, 6]woman. At Dawsons Field (1970), three west-

ern airliners (totalling approximately 300 hostages) were hijacked by members of the PFLP and taken to an airstrip near Amman, in Jordan. The terrorists demanded the release of PFLP members (including Leila Khaled) from jails in West Germany, the UK, and Switzerland. After 24 hours of intense negotiation, the demands were acceded to, the hostages released, and the planes destroyed in a series of explosions; the latter undoubtly stated for the international media. In 1972, the PFLP hijacked a Lufthansa airplane to Aden, releasing the hostages upon receiving $5 million in ransom. After the Israelis introduced new security precautions, the PFLF ceased targeting El Al and switched to other aircrafts. In 1984 and 1985, Hizbollah hijacked two aircraft in an attempt to coerce the Kuwaiti government to release the brother-in-law of the man behind the attacks, Imad Mughniyah, along with 18 others. Also in 1985, one of the bloodiest attacks in aviation history occurred at Valetta, Malta. After a failed attempt at hijacking an Egyptair Boeing 737, four terrorists claiming to represent the Egyptian Liberation Organisation shot ve of their hostages, one of which died as a result. The rescue attempt by the Egyptian Special Forces ended in a disaster when it failed to take the terrorists by surprise, and in the ensuing gun battle, the rear of the aircraft caught re; accounting for 42 of the 57 deaths (there were 98 passengers in total)

106 [34].

Other terrorist groups also resorted to hijacking. The Japanese Red Army hijacked a plane en route from Tokyo to Fukuoka (1970), demanding to be taken to North Koreas Pyongyang airport, threatening to blow up the plane if this demand was not met. After days of tensions, an agreement was reached: the hostages released and the terrorists continuing on to North Korea. In 1977, they hijacked another aircraft, demanding a ransom money of $6 million and the release of six fellow terrorists from jail; both of which they received. In 1986, the Abu Nidal Organisation hijacked a Pan Am aircraft at Karachi Airport, holding 389 hostages for 16 hours before shooting and detonating grenades inside, resulting in the death of 16 and wounding over 100 people. The two most famous examples of aicraft hijackings are undoubtly those that ended in Entebbe (1976) and Mogadishu (1977), though they can also be viewed

104 Clutterbuck (1975), p.98 105 Arey (1973), p.77; Barlow (2007), 106 Schweitzer, Terrorism: a weapon

p.156

in the Shiite Arsenal, pp. 60-70, in Kurz (1987)

23

as barricade hostage-taking incidents in the later stages of their development. The former began as a hijacking when an Air France aircraft (totalling 256 passengers and twelve crew) was taken over by seven members of the PFLP aiming to secure the release of jailed fellow terrorists. After stopovers in Bengazhi (Libya) and Sudan, the plane landed at Entebbe, where the hostages were ushered into the airport terminal building. Once apparent that the Ugandan president Idi Amin colluded with the terrorists, Israeli Special Forces launched a spectacular rescue mission that saw only one hostage killed during the rescue (compared to all perpetrators and 35 Ugandan soldiers) numerous MIG-Fighterjets of the Ugandan airforce destroyed, and only one Israeli rescue casualty (the commander, Lt. Col. Yonathan Netanyahu)

107 [54]. A year later, the PFLP

hijacked a Lufthansa jet with 87 passengers and ve crew, demanding the release of jailed PFLP members in West Germany. After the terrorists killed the pilot, the German counter-terrorist unit GSG-9 assaulted the aircraft, killing all but one terrorist, and none of the hostages. The operation had only taken seven minutes from start to nish, and, together with the Entebbe assault, has to date become the prime examples of

successful

hostage rescue

108 [54]. More

recently, the hijacking of an Airbus from Algiers to Marseille (1994) ended in the death of all hijackers and the rescue of the 170 hostages after the French National Gendarmerie Action Group (GIGN) stormed the aircraft.

Train
Though a rarer occurrence than aircraft hijacking, trains have also been taken over by terrorist groups. One of the earliest and most successful operations was the Chopin express hijacking (1973). sation (formed 1971 from the Palestinian branch of the Syrian Baath Party) Two members of the As-Saiqa organi-

took over a train from Moscow to Vienna, carrying predominantly Soviet Jewish emigres to Israel. Taking four hostages, they demanded that the Austrian government close the Schonau transit camp, thus preventing more Jews to emigrate to Israel. Austrian chancellor Kreisky aceeded to the terrorist demands on the grounds that he would not allow Austria to become a Middle East conict. The four hostages were released, Schonau closed, and the terrorists own out to Libya. Then-Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir referred to this as

secondary
109 [49].

theatre of the

a

great victory for terrorist organisations

Two other major train hijackings took place in the 1970s.

In the Nether-

lands, a group called the South Moluccans hijacked two train at Beilen (1975) and Assen (1977) in order to draw attention to the fact that they were being suppressed by the Indonesian government and tried to coerce the Dutch (their former colonial masters) to come to their aid. In case of the former, two of the 80 hostages (and all hijackers; thirteen in total) lost their lives after an assault was conducted by the Dutch Royal Marines following the degeneration of negotiations that had persisted over the course of 19 days. Both cases illustrate

107 Taillon (2002), pp. 108 Taillon (2002), pp. 109 Rosie (1986), p.84

107-121 125-138

24

how such tactics fulll the criterion of gaining attention; before these two hijacking, almost nobody had heard of the South Moluccans, nor were aware of their cause

110 [25].

Ships
Ships and their crew have also been seized by terrorists in return for concessions. The most well-known example of a maritime hijacking by sub-state terrorist groups is the

Achille Lauro

(1985), where four members of the Palestinian They took its 427

Liberation Front (PLF) took over the Italian cruise liner.

passengers and 80 crew members hostage, demanding the secure the release of 50 Palestinians held in Israeli jails, though the head of the PLF, Abu Abbas, later revealed the initial plan had been to use the ship in a suicide raid on the port of Ashdod, but were discovered cleaning their weapons. When negotiations turned sour, they shot and killed one of the hostages, wheelchair-bound American Leon Klinghoer, before surrendering to the Egyptian authorities. Other, less known incident is the hijacking of a ferry by a mixed group of Palestinians and Japanese terrorists after they had failed to blow up an oil renery near Singapore (1974)

111 [11], that of the Greek vessel

Vori

in Karachi harbour by

Pakistani Muslims (1974) and that of a Malaysian ship (1979) by the Moro National Liberation Front; the latter resulting in the death of three passengers

112 [49].

Other
In some cases, terrorists have also resorted to hijacking other forms of public transport. In 1984, four Palestinian terrorists took over a bus and forced the driver to divert its route from Tel Aviv-Askhelon to the Gaza strip. The decision to launch an assault was taken, and members of the Israeli army stormed the coach, killing two of the hijackers. Though relatively

minor

in terms of the

actual hijacking itself, the event turned into a major political issue after the two surviving terrorists were beaten to death by members of the Israeli Antiterrorist Force Shin Bet. Israeli population Plans for prosecuting the responsible agents led to nothing, partly because their actions were condoned by a large segment of the

113 [49].

2.8.3 Barricade
Barricade hostage-taking is dened as a situation that takes places in a xed space, which can be contained by external measures, essentially turning it into a siege. It is not an exclusive category and can turn into other forms of hostagetaking. In example, the 444-day Iranian hostage crisis (1979-1981), initially a

110 Griths (2003), pp.114-117 111 Clutterbuck (1975), p.103 112 Rosie (1986), p.144 113 Rosie (1986), p.127

25

conventional hostage situation, adopted some of the characteristics of kidnapping as the hostages were removed from the US embassy in Tehran to other, secret locations once it transpired that a rescue operation was being planned. Similarly, the Entebbe and Mogadishu incidents began as aircraft hijacking, which then turned into a barricade situation; the former because the passengers were led from the aircraft into the terminal building, and the latter because the aircraft was contained on the ground (unable to take o due to a fuel shortage). Because of the many benets associated with barricade hostage-taking, it became a popular tactic for terrorists operating in the late 1960s; the year featuring the highest occurrence (1968-1980) being 1974, with 10

114 [3]. Again,

only the most high-prole examples will be mentioned since a chronology of barricade-hostage incidents 1968-present will be provided in the appendix. A substantial amount of barricade hostage incidents have occurred in Western European countries. One of the rst, and undoubtly most high-prole barricade hostage events ever was the 1972 Munich Olympic Games Massacre. Eight members of the Black September Organisation snuck into the Olympic village and took eleven Israeli athletes hostages, of which two were killed immediately. They then barricaded themselves in the quarters at 31 Connollystrasse and demanded the release and safe passage to Egypt of 234 Palestinians and non-Arabs jailed in Israel, along with the founders of the RAF, Andreas Baader and Ulrike Meinhof. A bungled rescue attempt by the West German authorities left all hostages and ve of the terrorists dead, despite initial confusion owing to press releases reporting that all hostages had been freed successfully

115 [46].

From

the authorities point of view, it was a complete debacle and resulted in many western countries setting up special counter-terrorist units for the purpose of dealing more eectively with such situations in the future. Yet another high-prole siege occurred in 1975, when the notorious terrorist Carlos the Jackal (operating on behalf of the PFLP) and three members of the RAF managed to take over the entire OPEC Council during a conference in Vienna, in the course of which a policeman was executed by one of the RAF terrorists

116 [40]. Possibly encouraged by previous Austrian accession to terrorist

demands at the Chopin train siege three years earlier, demands now included delivering the PFLP communique on all Austrian television and radio networks and safe passage out of the country for him, the hostages and his fellow terrorists. Once again, Chancellor Kreisky gave in to the terrorists and Carlos, having additionally secured a ransom of between $20-50 million, achieved his aims and escaped without any member of his team being dead or captured

117 [25].

Barricade sieges also occurred in South America. In Columbia, the left-wing M-19 group stormed the Palace of Justice in Bogota, taking over 500 people hostage (1985). Their motive for doing so was because the government had betrayed a truce the year before. The President refused all negotiations and called

114 Average

number drawn from three dierent databases on terrorism by Jenkins, Mickolus

and Wilkinson; cited in Aston (1982), pp.24-25

115 Reeve (2000), pp.1-167 116 MacWilson (1992), p.23 117 Griths (2003), pp.43-47

26

for armoured vehicles to smash their way into the building, which was initially successful in that many of the hostages were able to escape. Unfortunately, the explosive charges used killed the remaining hostages (over 100) rather than the terrorists, which managed to escape to another oor. Despite the willingness on part of the hostage-takers to negotiate, the government refused and launched a nal attack, killing all 24 terrorists precisely.

118 [49].

A second high-prole barricade siege took place in South America; Peru more Twenty Tupamaros stormed the Japanese embassy (1997), taking nearly 600 hostages and demanded the release of jailed comrades, reform of the Peruvian prisons, a greater distribution of wealth amongst the countrys poor, and the restoration of civil liberties; particularly to those arrested for opposing the government of Alberto Fujimori. During the course of negotiations, the majority of the hostages were released, leaving the terrorists with 92 (a far more manageable number than before). After 128 of captivity, Fujimori ordered an assault on the building, with the precise instructions of leaving no prisoners. Faced with over 100 counter-terrorist commandos, the terrorists were overwhelmed and killed; all of the hostages escaping alive and unharmed

119 [25].

The Middle East has also seen its share of barricade incidents. In 1974, three Palestinian Arabs (part of the marxist-oriented Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine) soldiers stormed an Israeli school at Maalot, taking over 100 children (aged 14-16) hostage and demanding that the Israeli Government release 26 Arab prisoners (including a Japanese national involved in the Lod airport massacre). Two dierent versions are available detailing what happened next, the truth (as usual) probably hidden somewhere in between. According to Israeli sources, when the terrorists refused to extend the deadline, a rescue operation was launched, resulting in the death of 21 children and all terrorists. Palestinian sources, on the other hand, maintain that they were willing to enter into serious negotiations; contrary to the Israeli government, which stormed the school forty minuted prior to the deadline and killed some of the children in the ensuing battle

120 [25]. This has been referred to as constituting one of the most 121 [17]. inuential events in the conict between Israel and Palestine

Other examples with high numbers of casualties include the Iran Theatre Hostage Crisis (1978; resulting in the death of 477 people) and the Grand Mosque Hostage Crisis in Mecca (1979; killing 158)

122 [2].

In more recent years, Russia has been the stage of several barricade hostage incidents; all of which were instigated by Chechen separatist groups. Their track record includes the Budyonnovsk hospital siege (1995), take-over of the military base at Kizliar (1996), the Dubrovka theatre siege (2002), and, most recently, the Beslan school siege (2004). In each case, the Russian attempted to end the situation by an armed assault, which was in part responsible for the high casualty toll: 130 dead and 414 injured at Budyonnovsk, 40 dead and 50

118 Rosie (1986), p.77 119 Griths (2003), pp.101-103 120 Griths (2003), pp.84-85 121 Dolnik & Fitzgerald (2008), p.28 122 Asal & Blum (2005), pp.9-10

27

injured at Kizliar, 129 dead at the Dubrovka theatre, and 330 at Beslan

123 [17].

2.9 Examining the tactics-target link

2.9.1 Changing tactics
As demonstrated above, the tactics used by terrorist groups from the late 1960s until today are by and large eective in producing the desired outcome. Therein, they can be said to be rational in the sense of pursuing that which is deemed to maximise utility. When one type of tactic no longer produces the desired eect, terrorist groups are likely to switch to other tactics to see if this produces a better outcome. This is particularly true of suicide terrorism, which is seen as a tactic to which terrorists turn when all others have failed

124 [6]. This has been demon-

strated convincingly by Robert Pape (2005), who has demonstrates that, based on a data set of all suicide attacks from 1980 to 2003 (315 in total), suicide attacks are predominantly employed by actors for whom peaceful tactics have failed and conventional military tactics are infeasible because of an imbalance of power

125 [44]. This gives legitimacy to the terrorist cause since they perceive

themselves to have been willing to pursue other, less violent means, which have been ignored. A prime example of this is that of the Second Intifada (2000), which resulted in the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Gaza strip. A Hamas leader (interviewed 2005) commented that ceeded in less than ve years to force the Israelis to withdraw

when

we took up arms...we suc-

126 [35], whilst

the First Intifada had achieved nothing of that kind of success in spite of its more moderate approach regarding the tactics and targets. Similarly, upon asking as to why he is prepared to engage in suicide terrorism, a Sri Lankan Tamil replied that this was the

only way we

can get our Eelam (homeland)

127 [35].

An important reason why terrorists become inclined to switch their tactics is because new security measures/legislation makes it increasingly dicult and costly for terrorists to continue pursuing the same tactic. Due the success of aircraft hijacking, many airlines (El Al, Pan Am) began introducing new security measures aimed at both the aircrafts and airports, including passenger screening, metal detectors prior to boarding, locked cockpit doors and the presence of armed sky marshals, who

shoot

to kill . These were by and large successful;

statistics showing that incidences terrorist attacks on commercial airliners fell to 134 in the years 1987-1997, compared to 348 between 1977-1986, and 179 in 1966-1976. International aviation bodies such as the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) and the International Air Transport Association (IATA), addressed the problem of hijacking, passing what is todays international stan-

123 Dolnik & Fitzgerald (2008), pp.45-50, 60-92, 109-136 124 Barlow (2007), p.185 125 Pape (2003), p.103 126 Hassan, An Arsenal of Believers: Talking to the `Human
(2006), p.52 (2006), p.52

Bombs, in Kydd & Walter

127 Hassan, An

Arsenal of Believers:

Talking to the `Human Bombs,in Kydd & Walter

28

dards on civil aviation: Annex 17 to the Chicago Convention on International Civil Air Transport (ICAO) and the Passenger Conference and Security Manuals (IATA). The American Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) produced a handbook titled

U.S.

eorts to deter hijackings.

International legislation

passed as a response to the outbreak of aircraft hijacking include the Convention on Oences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (1963), Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (1970), Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (1971), and the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing (2001). Because this made hijacking very costly, the PFLP abandoned this tactic. Similarly, the fortication of embassies following a number of barricade hostage incidents during the 1970s resulted in the decline of seizing embassies as a tactic of terrorism which will be examined in more detail in the second chapter of this thesis. Another reason why terrorists switch to dierent tactics is the lack of support from within its own community, which is important since many terrorist groups (especially those pursuing nationalist/separatist aims) depend on this very much. The IRA carried out various assassinations of prominent businessmen in the late 1970s, claiming that their very presence underpinned the British occupation of Northern Ireland. This tactic was swiftly abandoned because of its unpopularity, and when the IRA decided to employ this tactic once more from the mid-1980s onwards, they attacked only those which carried out activities directly supporting the British security forces. Similarly, the PKK abandoned suicide tactics once apparent that this no longer constituted a viable option; loosing more support for the organisation than gaining it. Thus, in some cases, terrorism might be more eective if it is aimed at specic individuals rather than indescriminate targeting for the reason that many terrorist groups actively depend on the support of their environment. Since this predominantly consists of civilians, examples like the dwindling support for the PKK and Chechens illustrate how choosing the wrong tactic (most notably suicide attacks) can become very counter-productive for terrorist organisations, which are subsequently forced to switch to other tactics change. In

128 [32]. This is closely related to the concept of deterrence,

129 [11].

Conversely, if a particular tactic seems to be working, there is no need for

Dying to win

(2005), Robert Pape demonstrates that half of all the

suicide attacks between 1980 and 2003 were closely followed by substantial concessions from the target governments. Thereby, terrorists are neither or indiscriminate in their attacks

130 [18].

mindless

2.9.2 Changing targets

Switching tactics also often includes changing targets. elements of While in some cases, in case of bomb

collateral

damage are dicult to avoid (i.e.

attacks on government buildings, where the presence of civilians is given but

128 Jenkins, International terrorism: 129 Clutterbuck (1975), p.143 130 Drake (1996), p.79

the other world war, in Kegley (1990), p.37

29

unintentional)

131 [24], whilst in others, this transition is deliberate (i.e. in case

of suicide bombings), or the terrorists have become increasingly accept civilian casualties, though they may not constitute the primary targets. There are many examples when this has occurred. After a hijacking was foiled on the ground at Lod airport (1972), resulting in the death of the two PFLP hijackers, a revenge operation was launched by members of the Japanese Red Army Faction a week later. Boarding a plane to Tel Aviv, the three men indiscriminately opened re on the people in the baggage claim hall, killing 24 and wounding 72. Though frequently carrying out bombing attacks against political and military institutions, the IRA also targeted civilians by attacking buses, clubs, busses, and shops, resulting in the death of many civilians. Between 1969-1977, the deaths of security forces accounted for 26% of all deaths, while 74% were Protestant and Catholic civilian casualties

132 [34].

Since 1995, religiously-motivated multi-casualty attacks (dened as attacks with any type of weapon that kill a minimum of 100 people) have become more and more common; compared to the 1980s and early 90s the Riyahdus-Salikhin Suicide Battalion went from initially attacking Russian military installations and personnel to deliberately targeting civilians (such as the schoolchildren in Beslan) in an attempt to force the government into serious negotiations

133 [2]. In Chechnya,

134 [17, 27]. Similar trends have been observed in Sri Lanka, where

the Tamil Tigers too are progressing from attacking military and government targets to killing Sinhalese villagers. Perhaps even more disturbing than this trend is the fact that public support for these suicide attacks has skyrocketed. According to a senior leader Hamas, the number of young men volunteering to be sent on suicide missions is, making it

dicult

to select only a few`

135 [33]. Since the year 2000, more than two

thirds of Palestinians polled favour such tactics, citing citing the ineectiveness and poor performance of the Palestinian Authority in creating an independent state, and seeing renewed violence against Israel as the only way of achieving this goal. A 2001 polls demonstrated that support for such attacks ranges equally across all educational and occupational groups

136 [33].

2.9.3 Changing proles?

There
is no clear prole anymorenot for terrorists and especially not for suicide bombers," a senior member of the Israeli Defense Forces told researcher Bruce Homan on a visit to the country. In the early years of suicide terrorism, it was much easier to identify potential terrorists than today, both due to the advance of technology and cunning amongst the perpetrators. Previously, they tended to carry their bombs in nylon backpacks or duel bags, were also typically

131 Ganor (no date), p.11 132 Robertson, Northern Ireland: Change, Continuity and 133 Asal & Blum (2005),p. 14 134 Dolnik & Fitzgerald (2008), p. 138; Hill (2005), p.1 135 Hassan, interviews carried out 1996-1999, in Krueger & 136 Krueger & Maleckova (2003), p.125

Trends, in Kurz (1987), p.37

Maleckova (2003), p.122

30

male, aged seventeen to twenty-three, and unmarried; whilst today, they are male or female, middle-aged and young, are both married and unmarried, and have children

137 [29].

Additionally, terrorists have used home-made explosive

devices and attaching them to oneself, an aircraft, bus, car or other forms of public transport in order to cause damage and wreak havoc. An oshoot of the PFLP, the PFLP-General Commando (PFLP-GC), headed by Ahmed Jibril, developed Semtex, which could be pressure-detonated once inside an aircraft and could pass through baggage scans almost undetected. Other terrorists have no qualms about disguising themselves as soldiers (some terrorists have worn the same green fatigues as soldiers of the Israeli Defense Forces), devout Jews, or have worn wigs in Arabs

138 [29].

an

eort to look like hip Israelis rather than threatening

Another trend has been the gradual inclusion of women into the active ranks of terrorist organisations. Previously conned to supporting such groups in more traditional roles of mothers to future terrorists, they are now playing an active part in the terrorist process. According to Hamas Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, holy war is an imperative for all Muslim men and women` making use of IEDs.

139 [9]. In Chech-

the

nya and Palestine, female bombers actively participate in suicide operations by

Conclusion

Terrorism, as demonstrated, is a complex phenomenon which is dicult to dene and categorise. The purpose of the discussion of terrorism in this chapter has been to gain a deeper understanding of the various forms in which it occurs; ranging from the way in which perpetrators view themselves, what tactics they are likely to use, and their underlying rationale for doing so. In the context of this thesis, all these aspects are of great importance in relation to barricade hostage-taking. The ability to understand the way in which terrorists think, feel and carry out their plans is of the utmost importance in this entire process; inuencing both the negotiation strategy and aecting the (political) decision to use tactical intervention to resolve the incident. This in turn is signicant because it denotes that what may be an eective way of dealing with one hostage-taking incident may prove counter-productive in another. In example, the oer of free passage out of the country to members of the Black September Organisation involved in the 1972 Munich Olympic Games Massacre was happily received, whilst members of the Chechen Riyadus-Salikhin Suicide Battalion partaking in the 2004 Beslan School siege viewed this as an insult[17]. Similarly, whilst threats to the lives of IRA terrorists proved vital in achieving a peaceful surrender in the 1975 Balcome Street siege, they appeared to impress neither the combined PFLP/Baader-Meinhof members prior to the Israeli intervention at Entebbe airport in 1976, nor the Chechen hostage-takers

137 Homan (2003), p.3 138 Homan (2003), p.3 139 Yassin, cited in Bloom

(2005), p.151

31

occupying the Dubrovka Theatre in Moscow. The next chapter will focus on the development of counter-terrorist organisations and security institutions as a response to the rise of terrorism in the 1960s; particularly following the tragic events of the 1972 Munich Olympic Games, which, after a disastrous rescue attempt by the authorities, resulted in the death of eleven Israeli athletes that had previously been taken hostage in the Olympic village by members of the radical Palestinian organisation Black September (named after the expulsion of its mother organisation, the Palestinian Liberation Authority, from its safe haven Jordan). A brief history of and the aims and responsibilities of these institutions will be provided, as well as the theoretical framework which they use to dene a success in a hostage situation; according to both the process and the outcome. Special attention will be paid to the British Special Air Service (SAS), the German Grentzschutzgruppe (GSG9), the Russian Spetznaz, and the Israeli Sayeret Matkal (the American Delta Force, French GIGN and Dutch Royal Marines will be mentioned briey), since these were the actors involved in resolving the hostage situations outlined in the case study examples.

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