Trex 04152

BP Confidential
DocumentNo. Applicablllty Date
GP 48-50 Group 5 June 2008
GP 48-50
MajorAccldentRisk(MAR) Process
This GroupDefinedETPhas beenapprovedby the GVPSafety andOperations implementation for acrossthe BP Group.
BP GROUP ENGINEERING TECHNICAL PRACTICES
q/ -{2
Exhibit No. Worldwide Court
rters,Inc.
HIGHLY ONFIDENTIAL C
-2 BP-HZN 1TeMD a0407e37 L
5 June2008
BP Gonfidential
GP 48-54 MajorAccidentRisk(MAR) Prccess
. Foreword
This issueof EngineeringTechnical Practice(ETP) GP 48-50 includesthe follorving significnnt changes: I 2. 3. 4. Improved cladtv ol scope and applicability of MAR process. Incorporation of oft-shr:re IT"IAR methodology. Incorporation of recommended tenporary activities. methodclogy for assessing Significantly reibrmattedto reflect that much conteilt is acnrally 'commentary' thns improv'ing clarity of the requirements.
Thesechangeswere so extensivethat rer,'isions have not been indicatedin the margin a.sis normal practlce. BP beiievesit is appropriateto supplerneut generalsafery* its efforts'with a specifrc processsaf'et-v et'tcrt to lbcus on conturuous reduction in the risk of potentralmajor accidents. The !L\R processis a high level quantil-red risk assessment w-itha consistentapproachtbr all BP operationsthat havethe potentiai to give rise to a major accident(i.e-, one that could theoretically causemultiple latalities and,/or severedaurageto tb.eeuvilr:rurent). Theseinclude sitesthat are coveredbv the U.S. EPA R.rskNlaaagement Plan (RMP), the EuropeanSevesoDirective lesislation, and the tiK Olfshore Safefy"societal risk" (i.e.. risk of CaseRegulations.The MAR processidentii-ies urultrpie tataiities rathertlran "ildividual risk'). The lvLA.R processprovides urarageureutacrossBP lrith ar urderstandi:rgof risk and, thus. w'hereto tbcus risk reduction ellbrts. A variety ofother hazard identification and risk anal'tsistools should be u.sed supportrisk management existing operr)tions to in and capital projects.These mav include techniclues. such as desieningto comply rvith recognisednatiosal and industr-v standards and codesof practiu:e, hazardidentillcation (HAZID), layers of protectionanalysis(LOP1U,hazard and operabiiiry shrdies(HAZOP). and quantilied risk assessment (QRA). In-herent the IvIAR approachis the principle of continuousriskreduction tbr risl's to people and dre rn envuotluent. BP Operatiol leadersare accountrble lbr risk reductionplals tbr their operatiorr. Tire BP Group has however detined a level of societal risk above*'hich the risks and associated mitigation md risk reductionplans arereponed to the Group. This documenthasbeen classilled as "BP Confidential" becauseit cortains conlldential idbrmation regardin-u type r-rf Lhe major accidenl, risks that arc reported to the Group level, antl it shall be handled in a manncr consistcntwith that classification.
Coprnght i} i008 Bl Intemarroual Ltd. All rights reso.ed. ihli docliEetrtmd ary datr or iDlbmalion g4srted tiom lts we are clx!!d:ed, s I mrnimum,BP Contidetrdxl. Drsirlbutionis linted to BP a{thorizerlrecipienis onlv. Exceptlbr usexmotrgthote individuals.reproduction probibired. FunherdGseminarioB is requtes L\e consetrt ofth BP GrDrp II;ad ofEngineeringo: his delegate this puposs. lbr aod adherence BP Group guidelfues ibr hmdliDg cltrsif.ed idbmarion. ro
lil tho erent of r cooflicthctlvce[ ftis d(Euneot atrd a relil.rrt larv cr rc-eulaliou, thc relevrot liw or rceulatioq:ball be :bllorvcd. If thc rlocmcnt crcatcs a higlu abligaticn, it shall bc tbllqwcd as louE as thrs abo ach.icvcs full compliancc rvith thc larv or rcguluion.
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BP-HZN-21 I 7eMD10040793
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BP Confidential
GP 48-5C Major Accident Risk (MAR) Process
Tableof Gontents
Page Foreword 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Scope........... N o r m a t i vfe f e r e n c e s . . . . . e T e r m s n dd e f i n i t i o n s . . , . . a S y m b o la n da b b r e v i a t i o n s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . s Applicability.. of O b j e c t i v e st h e M A Rp r o c e s s . . . . . . . . . 6.1. Oblectives..... ..................... 6.2. 1ntent............. 6 . 3 . F e a t u r eo f t h eM A Rp r o c e s s . . . . . . . . . . . . . : - . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . s f y p e s o fr i s k c o v e r e d . . Accountability a femporary ctiviiies....... .-.....-..2 .'.'.'......'.6 . . . . . . . . ...... . . . . . 6 . . . . . . '... . . . . . . . . 6 ..'.....'.."'.."...'.7 .................9 ....................10 1. . . . . . . - . . . - . . . - . - .0' . . . . ....".'............---11 . . . . - . . . 1.1 . . ....-............-12 ..,.........12 . . . . . . . . . . . " ' .1 . . .3 ".. ....',...13 , ' . . ' . . . . . . . . . . .1.5 . ' . ' . ............17 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .....1 8. . . .. 1 . . . . . . . .9 -..-.----..20 ..............,....".20 ..'.'...."21 ........'..21 ...............,..,.....21 ..........,...........,..'21 ......'.23
7. 8, 9,
10. Methodology li 1 1 . G r o u p e p o r t i n gn e s r of 12. Grouping operations 13. Projects......... 1 4 . M A Ra n dm o r ed e t a i l es t u d i e s d M 1 5 . U p d a t i no f " b a s e a s e " A Rs t u d i e s . . . . . . . . . . g c 1 6 . C o n f i d e n t i a lotfyn f o r m a t i o n i i 1 7 . F u r t h eh e | p . . . . . . . . . . . . . . r M o A n n e xA ( N o r m a t i v e )e t h o d o l o g y d s c e n a r i d e v e l o p m e n t an A.1. Meihodology. A . 1 . 1G e n e r a l . . . . . . . . . . on e A . 1 . 2 . e t h o d o l o g y f o rs h o r o p e r a t i o n s . , . . M 1.3. Methodology offshore for operations A. al A . 2 . S e l e c t i oo f s c e n a r i o-sd e c i d i n g n t h e h y p o t h e t i ce v e n t s . . o n o A . 2 . 1 .S c e n a r i ofs r o n s h o r e p e r a t i o n s o o o A . 2 . 2 .S c e n a r i ofs ro f f s h o r e p e r a t i o n s
. . . . . . . . . . . ........ . . - . - 2 4 .......-......24 .............26 .........;........... ...........-.-27
A n n e xB ( N o r m a t i v e )o n s e q u e n c eo d e l l i na n dv u l n e r a b i l i t i e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C m g
.........................27 B . 1 . O n s h o ro p e r a t i o n s e .. .....................27 e 8 . 1 . 1 "D i s p e r s i oo f f l a m m a b lo r t o x i cv a p o u r s n ..............31 B . 1 . 2 .M o d e l l i no f f i r et h e r m arla d i a t i o n g 8 . 1 . 3 "M o d e l l i n g o f v a p o u r c l o u d e x p l o s i o n o v e r p r e su n ce o f i n e d o b s t r u c t e d a r e a s . . 3 4 sur on 8 . 1 . 4 .M o d e l l i n g o f v a p o u r c l o u d e x p l o s i o n o v e r p r e s s u r e o f c o n f i n e d o b s t r u c t e d a r e a s . . . . . . 3 5 . . . .. . . . . . . . . 3 6 a 8 . 1 . 5 .C o n d i t i o np rlo b a b i l i t i e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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GP48-50 Process MajorAccidentRisk(MAR)
8 . 1 . 6 .S h u t d o w a n dm i t i g a t i os y s t e m s . . . . . . . . n n
......37
B.2. Offshore facilities ......38 B.2.1General........-.-...,.., . .............38 8 . 2 . 2 .M o d e l l i n g o f d i s p e r s i o n o f f l a m m a b l e o r t o x i c v a p o u r f o r o f f s h o r e f a c i l i t i e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 S B . 2 . 3 .M o d e l l i n g o f f i r e t h e r ma d i a t i o n f o r o f f s h o r e f a c i l i t i e s . . . . . . . . ...............38 r l 8.2.4. Jet fire and poolfirethermal ....... 38 radiation B . 2 . 5 .F i r e b a dl u et o e s c a l a t i o n l ..........................39 B.2.6.Modelling vapour of cloudexplosion overpressure offshore for facilities ......,............39 impact,escape, B.2.7. Vulnerability hypothetical to releases offshore on facilities immediate a n de v a c u a t i o . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .n ......................39 B . 2 . 8 . u l n e r a b i l itto n o n p r o c e s s e n t s . . . , . . . . . . . V y ............,.........40 ev p .............41 8 . 2 . 9 .l g n i t i o n r o b a b i l i t i e s B . 3 . M o d e l l i ne n v i r o n m e n tia l p a c t . . . . . . g m B . 4 . P l o t t i na n F - Nc u r v e . . , . . . . . . . . . g A n n e xC ( N o r m a t i v e )t a n d a r e v e n t a t a . . . . . S d d C.1. Genera1.................... C . 2 . O n s h o r e a t a. . . . . . .... d C . 3 . O f f s h o rd a t a . . . . . . . . . . . e D . 1 . I n t r o d u c t i o n . . - . ... . . . . D . 2 . C R Rp r o c e s s e s . . . . . D . 3 . R i s km i t i g a t i om e a s u r e s . . , . . n AnnexE (Normative) Categorisation environmental of events.. ....,...............41 ...,..,...41 .....,.........43 ......................43 .. . . .... . . . . .. . .. .. 4 3 .....................,.48 ........55 . . . . . . . ...... . . . .5 5 .. .........................55 ..........59 ..........60
A n n e xD ( N o r m a t i v e )e m o n s t r a t i o f c o n t i n u o u ss kr e d u c t i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - , D n ri
AnnexF (lnformative) .............61 Comparison MARand QRA studies of Annex G (lnformative) Offshore modifier calculation. 65 methodology Hydrocarbon leak frequency G.1. Introduction............... G.2. Methodology............ G.3. Data omparison... c G . 4 . S a m p l e a l c u l a t i o n m p a r i nm a j o r i s i g n i f i c l e a kd a t a . . . c co g ant List of Tables T a b l e . 1- l g n i t e dl a m m a b lc l o u dl e t h a l i try n g e o r i n s t a n t a n e o ue | e a s e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . 3 0 B f e rs a f T a b l eB . 2- l g n i t e dl a m m a b lc l o u dl e t h a l i try n g e o r c o n t i n u o urs | e a s e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1 f e a f e T a b l e . 3- T o x i cc l o u d e t h a l i try n g e o r i n s t a n t a n e o a n dc o n t i n u o u s | e a s e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3.'.l . . . . . B l a f us re . - J e tf i r ev u l n e r a b i l i t i e s Table .4 B . . . . . . . . . .3.2 . . T a b l e . 5 - P o o lf i r ev u l n e r a b i l i t i e s 8 Table .6- BLEVE ulnerabilities 8 v ..........33 ...........33 ....................65 ......................65 .........................64 ...........................68
T a b l eB . 7- E x p l o s i ov u l n e r a b i l i t i e s n .......35 - G e n e r i cm m e d i a tie n i t i o n r o b a b i l i t ife s p r e d e f i n em o d e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6. Table .8 d 8 p i g or 3.
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BP - H Z N - 2 1 M D 0 0 4 0 7 e 4 Te 1
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GP 48-50 Process MajorAccidentRisk(lvlAR)
mode"" "" for probabilities predefined ignition delayed TableB.9 - Generic p es e 8 T a b l e . 1 0- l g n i t i o n r o b a b i l i t i f o r c a l c u l a tm o d e . . ' . . . . . . . ' . poinis and evacuation routes """""' of TableB.11- lmpairment escape vulnerabilities and Table8.12 - lmmediate escape n ee T a b l e . ' 1 3 V u l n e r a b i l i t ia ts v a c u a t i op o i n t . ' . . . . . ' . . B - Evacuation vulnerabilities TableB.14 e on B T a b l e . 1 5- V u l n e r a b i l i t ite s o np r o c e s s v e n t s . . . . . " . . . ' nt T a b l e . . 1 6 D e v e l o p m e o f a F - Nc u r v e , . . . . . . . . . . . 8 for TableC.1 - Eventfrequencies roadtransport - E v e n f r e q u e n c i e o r r a i lt r a n s p o 'r.t- - . ' . - ' . . . . - - . . fs t f a b l eC . 2 (O l e T a b l e . 3 - O f f s h o rs y s t e m se a kf r e q u e n c i e s l R 1 2 ). . ' . " . ' . ' . " . . . C e a T a b l e . 4 - R i s e r s n dp i p e l i n els a kf r e q u e n c i e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C - D r i l l i n a n dw e l lo p e r a t i o nls a kf r e q u e n c i e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . " . e g Table .5 C - Frequencies nonprocess events for TableC.6 fg e T a b l e . 7 - N o n p r o c e s sv e n t s I n f l u e n c i n a c t o r s . . ' . ' . . . . . C T a b l e . 1- E n v i r o n m e n W E V s . . . . . . . D tal p on o T a b l e . 2- E v e n t r i o r i t i s a t i b a s e d n W E V . . . . . . ' . . " . D - A d j u s t m e n tf l e a kf r e q u e n c i e s . . . . . . . . . o Table .1 G List of Figures Figurel-Approachtomajoraccidentrisk'....."....'.' i g 2 F i g u r e - S a f e t y r o u pr e p o r t i nlgn e s o n s i t e . . . . . . ' . . . ' . g i 3 F i g u r e - S a f e t y r o u pr e p o r t i nlgn e s o f f s i t e . . . ' . ' . ' . . . . - environment.-....-...." i 4 F i g u r e - G r o u pr e p o r t i nlgn e s release of FigureB.1- Dispersion transient - E v e n f r e q u e n c i e o r h i g hr i s kr e f i n e ru n i t s . . . . . . . . . . . ' . y fs t C Figure .1 u fs f C F i g u r e . 2- E v e n t r e q u e n c i eo r h i g hr i s kc h e m i c a l n i t s , . . . . . " ' . . " ' u d fs f C F i g u r e . 3- E v e n t r e q u e n c i e o r s t a n d a r p r o c e s s n i t s . . . . . . . . ' . " " risk spendversuspriority reduction FigureD.1- lndicative
"""" ' 36 """"""'37 """"""""' 39 """' 40 " """"""""""' 40 """""'-""""""" 40 """" """"' 41 """"42 """""'47 ' """""""' 47 """"""""""" """"" " "'""""""""" 49 ' 50 50
"""""' 51 """""""" 53 """" " " """"" ' 56 """"""""""" 57 ""' """"""""' "' 68
"""""""""""""11 """""""""""' 15 """"""""""" """"""""""" 16 15
" """""-""28 """""""""""" ' 43 """""""""""'44 """"""""""""44 " " " """' 58
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JfE q{F
e41 Loo407 TeMD BP-HZN-21
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BP Confidential
GP 48-54 Major AccidentRisk(MAR)Process
Scope
lhis GP describesrequirementsof the MAR process.
2.
Normativereferences
clausesand normative The tbllowing referenceddocumentsmr;v, to the extelt specilied in subsequent arurexes, required tbr full cornpliancern'iththis GP: be . . For datedreferences,onl.irthe ed.itioncited applies. docuurelt (ittciuding any the For rurdatedreferences. latesteditiou ofthe retbrerrced applies. amendments)
BP
cDP 3l-00-01 GDP44-00-01 GN 48-003 GN 48-00.1 GP48-04 GRI]STDOI Enerry Institute @$ PARIOC2OOI
2
of prioritisation. and nranagement dsk. Assessment, Reporting HSSE and Operationallncidents. Individual tusk. AsscssinglrtlajorAccidcnt Risk for TcnrporaryActivitics. hrherentiy Sat'erDesign (-ISD). for Group Stand;rrd Integriry Mana-gement-
Pipeline and riser loss of cotrteinmentdatabase.
Termsand definitions
For the purposesof this GP, the tbllowin-sterms and definitions apply: Base caseilLA.R study IvL\R shrdy rctlcctilg normal opcrating conditions {ali plalt running normalll- and no transicnt populationsdue to activities, such astumaroundsor proiect constnrction). BP Operation BP StratcgicPcrtbrmanccUnits, BusincssLlnits, projccts, thcilitics, sitcs, and opc'rations. Catastrophic release event. a Sudden anritotal lossofcontainmentreDresentinq"worst case"release Delegated individual A personwith authority delegatedby the Group SPA :\lAR to pertbrm a specilic role reletinq to NI-AR. Engineering plan Au arurualplan developedby the BP Operatiousunmarising I*-[ antl engineeringplaruringand activ-ities, inciudmg a proqralnme tbr implementing Site'iechnical Practicedevelopment. Entitl @P entity or Operating entity) \\'hilst theseterns are not used in this CP they have a specilic ureaningin O),IS. If this GP refersto BP Operation it should be interpretedas BP Entity or OperatingEntit-vrvhenrvorking to OMS.
cp $.61 -+rf
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100407s42 T9MD BP-HZN-21
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GP 48-5C Major Accident Risk (MAP) Process
BP confidential Group singlePoint of accountability (SPA) ]\, AR The personat Group ler.etrvith the or,erallresponsibility tbr developingand maintaininq the NL{R pfocess. Nlrrjor accident An incident with the potential tbr either,/or: a. b. Three or more t'atalities. to N1ajordamageto the environmentleadin,c a potentially seriousadversesocietal reaction as describedin Annex E.
rv*l:rjoraccident risk (]IAR) in of The combination of likelihood and consecluence major accidents.This is usuallv expressed an F-N curve lbr risks to people.and as an F-E curve lbr risk to lire environment. graphical lbrmat as NIajor release a release)representin-e "mote likely" releaseevent. A smaller tailure (relative to a catastrophic Quantificd risk asscssmcnt(QRA) A ofmajor accidents. that A.n assessmeut quantifiesrisk basedon the likelilrood and consequences (Xher lvL\R study is a typJof QKA conductedusing a specitic methodology,data,and assumpiions ("detailed QRA") thao a IvLA'R QL4 srudiesmayie both broader("full QRA") ancintore detailed assessment.
4.
Symbolsand abbreviations
lor the purposeof this GP, the tbllo*'in-e symbols and abbreviationsapply:
.\EA
ALARP BLEVE CRR C!? D
Atomic Encrgy,A.uthoritY As low as reasonablypractical. Boiling liquid expandingvapour explosion Continuousrisk reduction. Capital value process. Diameter. txplt-rration and Productton. g En-uinccrin authority. Imergency shutdorm. CurruLativefrequency(F) aglilst euvironmeutalinpact @). (F) Cumtlative liequenc-v againstnutlber of thtalities(li). Full bore ruptrlre. Hazard identit-rcation.
E&P EA ESD F.E F-N FBR

HAZID
.Dp l*rF
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C HIGHLY ONFIDENTIAL
BP-HZN-217?MDL]0407e43
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GP 48-50 Accident Risk(MAR)Process lvlajor
T{AZOP Hazard and operability (study). HP HSSE T{PHT HVAC L\{ ISD
High pressnre. security,environment. Health- sat'ery, High pressure, high temperature. Heating vantilation, and air conditioning. lntegntv management. Inherently safe design. Joint venture. Knockottt. Lethal dose. Lower tlammable ltmit. Liquefied natural gas. Layers of protection analvsis. Lolv pressure. risk. Major acciclent Poweredemergercy releasecoupling. relief valve. Pressure Quantilied risk assessment. Rrsk managernentpian.
n'
KO LD LFL LNG LOPA LP NIAR PERC PRV QR.A. tu\lP
SCEWO Sal'ctycritical cquipmcnt work ordcrs. SIS SIL SLOI) SLOT SPA SPU
mstrumentedsysten. Sat-ety Safetyintegity level. Signilicant likelihood of death. Signilicant leve1of toxicity. Single point of accountability. Strategicpertbrmancetrnit.
TEI\,IPSC Totally enolosedmotor propeiietl sun'ival crait. Tlio LIKCS

The NetherlandsOrganisationfor Applied Scientiic Research. Uniled Kilrgdom Continental Sheli'.
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GP 48-50 Prccess AccidentRisk(MAP) lvtajor
Vapourcloud explosion. value. Weighted e:rpectation
wEv
5.
Applicability
a. GRp STD 01, sectiol 1.2, shall be interpretetland applied as follows with respectto the applicability of the lvL'\R process: I1BP doesnor have operationaiconhol ofa.Ioint Venture, BP shall. aher an l. to endea.l'orr conduct a.ivIAR stutly with the cooperation risk assessment, appropriare of the operatorof the JV. ?. If BP rclics on a contrnctorto pcrt-ormwork that would bc subicct to GRP STD 0l if pertbrmed by BP employees,or usesa third party-tbr the movement of BP products' endeavourto condncta NLAR snrdy B? shail, after au appropriaterisk assessment, with the cooperationof the contractor/thrd party'
3. b.
If I or 2 applies,the resultsof tire MAR study shall be used.to infbrm BP strategyoo contiilranc; or modification of BP involvement in the acriviry* to The ibllowing eventsshall be i:tcluded in the MAR processif ttrey have rhe ptitentia] ur 5.d tbro*gh 5.f): causea majo; accident(unlessexcludedor made optional I. 2. 3. 4. Accidentalreleasesofhazardousmaterials. External eventsand natural eventswith the potential to atlect otlshole strucnlres. on Nonprocess t-tres ol-lihore strucfures' Transportrtion by helicopter, tlxed wirg rircraii, or boat if the tnnsport is speciii.alty contractedtbr the movementof BP *'orktbrce to and ti'on: BP Operatrons and if Bp could directly afibct risks to personnelby a changein the logistics of the operalion. by Transpgrtatignrisks due to the uovement of BP rvork-tt-rrce rctad'if the movcment of persorurelfullits all of the tbllowing conditions: contrilctedtbr the movementof tsP rvorkforce to and tiom BP a) It rs specit-rcally the at-t'ect risks to personnelby a changein Operationsaod if gp couid <lirectl,v-. oPeration' the logistics ofthe b) c) d) It is a rcgular opcration (grcatcr than once a month)' lt involr'es hansportationof more than 5 people' It rnvolves uanspottationin a singlejourney over a distancegreaterthan 50 km (30 mi).
5.
{:.
be orrl-v usedto processis usetlto evaluateeveritsirt BP OperationsancishoLrld Tle I\LA,R (e.g., arising neal 01next to BP Operltions) evaluateeventsarisingloutsideBP Operations if: L 2. by The BP vorktbrce can be afl'ected thoseevents' mitigate thoseevcntscrr thc risks arising liom them' Bp Opcratiunscan tzikcstepstr-r proccssbut not Sucli an cvcnt should bc includcd in thc CRR part of drc NLA.R included in dre F-N cnrveAccidents atltcting onshorebuilclings(e.-e, building fires. nahrrrl events.stntcntral sltbstancc. collapsc,on,l cxtcmal impact), unlcssduc to a rclcasc of s hazLrrdotts Road trat'lic accidents,unlessthey:
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d.
should not he inchrdedin the N4ARprocess: The ibllor,vin-e I 2.
.$!.! "r$r
L00407e4 79MD BP-HZN-21
5 JUne ZUU5
GP 48-50 Process Risk(MAR) MajorAccident BP Confidential a) b) 3. 4. material. ofhazardous Invotve a release [lv,>[ve regularmasstransportationas defioed h 5.b'
accidentsinvohing DP workforce travelling on nor.nal scheduled Transpot'ration (i.e.,public transport). sen;rces Delal'ed health efl'ects(e.g., carcinogeniceffects), fatal or othenvise,due to acciderrtal occupationalexposule. or Pollution arising from long term discharges, Heaith relatedet'ents(legionnaires' disease,food poisoning, occupationalexpclsrllcs. contagiousillness, etc.). Occlparional sat-ety related injuries or thtalities (slips,trips, falls. construction nctivities, etc.). when tackling an incident. Iratalitiesamongstdedicatedemergencyresponders Non accidentalevents(e.g., designbasis eventssuch as IlMe opelatlon during ventl1rg).
5 6
i. 8. 9.
10. Events that do not cornply with to the dehnition of a major aceident. Tire tirllou'ing accidentaleventsmay be inclnded in the ivIAR Process: l. 2. 3. in materialsresultng onl,v- ecoilomic loss. of Acciclentalreleeses hazardous Extennl evelts and llatural eventsaft'ectingott'shorestrucfuresresultilg on]y lll economtclossincidents. w-ith secru-ity ofhazardous materialsassociated NIajor accidentalreteases satotage,and thett inciudingterrorism, anclscope in the ]vt4R context is c:ailuble ftorn Fttrtltergtitlcutce on cqplicabiliry^ ol rhe Group SP:.1 lu{'LR delegdtedindividual' Beibre any IvIAR shrdy is conducted,the scopeof the stttdy shall be clearlv establi;hedand asreedwith the BP Operationsleader.
6.
Objectivesof the MAR process

the TheBP goat is to dri-t'ecotttittuous risk reduction th.rough,ttrt entire range o"f to goal of no accidents,no harm to people, dnd no dunla.qe M4R, vviih the Ltltimate the enlrirontn.erit.
6.1.
Objectives a. of The objectir;es the MAR Processare to: It. 3. 4. b. BPand to approach assessing quantifringIvIAR across Fnsurea consistent Provitie r basis lirr-idettifi;ilg areasof higher MAR. Provide assurarcethat the overall BP I\t-{R is understoodreduction of lV,{R acrossBl. Drive a processof conti.nuous
to BP Operntionssirall actively seekmeasures reducemojor accidentrisk and prioritise their actionsbasedon the level of achievablerisk reduction,taliing into accoulltstlch t'actorsas l'easibililv and cost efl'ectiveness. . The cotrceptofCMrecognises that the resourcesavailable to reduce rtsk are nol to infinite, but that BP actit'eh,seeksntertsures retluce risk atttl prioriiite fiese
gL q+r
Page 10 of 68
1 L0 BP-HZN-2 TeMD 0407e4
5 June2008 BP Confidential
GP48-5C Process MaiorAccidentRisk(MAR) Severel option.tfor ngartffes in relution to their ri.\kreduction effectiveness. in are clenrcnstating CR-R. cliscussecl AruzexD.
6.2,,
lntent a, b. The intent of the NLARprocessis describedin FiSre l. GRP STD 0l . Element 3, describesthe stepsto be taken, dependingon whether an activiry is tbund to be aboveor below the Group reporting line. in The CRR reqrLirement the GRP STD 0l for activities found to be belotg the Grottp that the group reporting Lineis not a "target" and that activities reportrngline demonstrmes that t'all beiorv the line may not have fu1ly comptetedactivitv in terms of risk nritigation. let,el of tisk but The Group reporting line tloesnot define an acceptableholerable rather a letel of ri'skth.It it sufficientli high to waffant Group attenlion' Figure 1 - Approach to maior accident risk
c 0)
f
o q)
'a (o c) O .f
Decreasingconsequence 6.3. Features of the MAR Process o-[ The lteneJi.ts the 'lLlR pn:cess ore: c approximatelyafevt tveeksshtdl;Per ncio;' Tlte trpp'oach reqriires ry,*picatf; 1 itscontparedto approsimatelrv vr lor a Jilll QR4' .fucilih;
'.
o.fcor:iiituotis t'iskrethrction acrossall operatians. ':"'::"'::,';,,':,:::::::::':::;:::,,-
T,:'::;;:,:,';:::'::;,::;,;,:.::":;:::::::,,i;'?;.i,L,i{J
r*ê, are base,,.n Bp his,.ricc,,cnir reflect "nerage" Jacility*designand-operational ,roricnirle experienceand Erluipntefi designandior operation that is mttch better or v'arse .iailure r.cttes. generall,vnot be laken inta flccounLAn etceptiott to tlli! is i.vi.ll than the cne.rage the useof the ifiihore leak data that is basedon North Seadata artclnral' be adjustetlto reflect local leak experiance(seeAnites G)'
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Page i1 of 68
Te 1 BP - H Z N - 2 1 M D 0 0 4 0 7 e 4
5 JUne ZUV6
GP 48-50 Risk(MAP)Process Accident Maior BP Confidential It is a high levelprocess for rhe evaluarion of |uAR and is not inrendedto provicle appi'oprtateclesigttuiteria.
7.
Types of risk covered

a. The IvL{R processshall be applied to major accidenteventsarising from both t'xed facil ities and transportoperattons. of ivfAR snrtly shall inclutle the characterisation tlfee discretet)?es of risk: l. population"- This population includesmyone The societalrisk t0 Lhe"r.lnsite physically locatcd on BP thcilitics (including visitors and contractors)and anyonc industry oa i'acilities closeto employed ia BP Opererionsor rvorkinq in oi1and -cas BP Operations.For BP road and rail operatioru, this definitiorr ilcludes artv other peopleon tb'r usersofthe iniiastructure (motoristsand rail passengers), pipeLines. pump stations.and tbr shipping operations,the ship crew. anvone The socieralrisk ro the'.ntllsite population". ofilsite population inclut-les otl'site and not employedin BP Operationsor oil and gas industry. For BP transport operations,this includesanyoneliving aloagsidetransPortroutesnsed by BP Tf sttchas mokrrislsand rail passengers. users, dp"ratigns bul not olherinliastructure thlre are no "otlbite" populationsatl'ectedAom the site, this shall be documentedin the lvL{R report. with damageto the environmentfrom BP tacilities The environmentalrisk associated or operations. Societalrisk isfi-ameclitx terms oJthe ntm'tberof people ttho could suslctitxfalal injtries rJ'ah,potltetical ntrior accidenthere to occLff.Em,ironnlental risk is (IS of the fi:wrtectin teinis oJ'tltedegreeofpublic retrction to the incident a re|Tection places on a damagedecos1,'stent vahtesocien^ accidenis, Bt; c{efinition.the L[4R processfoanseson the unlikely, high consequence of titerihV.requn ing anenrian rc rheserisks.It re.Iuires de.telopment hy'pothetic:al will motivate Identtficatiort o/risli by this proces.s ftuiher continuousimpra'ement thosedirectl- itt,-olvedin bM doesnot imply thot BP hasnrbjected or v,ili sub,iect the oil ancl gasindttstty or thepublic, to unrecsonablerisli c. of This CP requiresdre assessment societalaud environmentalrisk only. Facilities ma-v individual risk and economicrisk iiom major accidents.Guidanceon also cholrseto assess individualrisk is providedin GN 48-003.
2.
3.
8.
Accountability
a. for: Tlie BP Operationsleader shall be accountable L 2. 3. 4. b" c. Llsuring that a N'IAR shrdy is cooductedin line with the requirementsof 10.b, 10.c' and I0.i 10.d. Ensuring thil e reFort is preparedand reviewed il line rvith requirementsof I0.j. to actionplan arecommnnicated the and any associatetl Ensuringthat the results ler appropriatc ei. and rcPort. Updaring thc snrciY
mitigati:rg action plan shall be ownedb'r the BP The report on thc risls and accompanyrng Operationsleader and shall be revielvedby the thcilLtyEA and the SPA for IIvI. The Grortp SPA lvL\R shall be responsibletbr:
Page 12 of 68
$rt *hf
7e BP-HZN-21MDL00407e
5 June2008 BP Gonfidential
l.
GP 48-54 Process Risk(MAR) MaiorAccident
of aspects the MAR lrocess. oithe technical Ownership Developmentand ownership of tbe onshoreald otlihore MAR Calculators. of Assig:nment the Group reporting line to BP Operatioos. ofissuesover scopeand applicabiiityofN{AR process. Resolution Review of MAR reports. of Endorsement MAR srudv leader competenc-v.
2. 3.
n
5. 6.
9.
activities Temporary
a. The basecaseMAR srudy shall include regular and predictabletransientactivities that are part of normal operatiors (e.g., normal plant nlainterarce, drilling, wLrelining,and workovers) and populations(e.g.. a major sportrngevent occurring on a weekly basis).Tor rhis basecaseIvIAR sntcly.rhe reporting reqrirements describedin the GRP STD 0 I, llement 3, shail appl-v*. For othcr transicnt activitics,rcfcr to GN 48-004.
b.
10. Methodology
a. methodologr stepsshall be follorved for developmentof the The tbliou"ing assessment MAR shrdy model: baseca-se l. qr range r.lfhypatheticalmajr,rr identily a represenlative For a l'acilit_y gther opelati.ons. accidentevenrs(iê.,incidentsthat could lead to tluee or more lbtalities or to major as accidentenvironmentnlconsequences describedin Annex E). likelihood of theseevents.The likelihood of the evenrswill Quanti$ the h.vpotheticrrl dependon the types oflacilities operated. thcir Quantify thc potcntial physical cflbcts rcsulting trom thcsc cvcnts and asscss will consequences the location studied.The potential consequences be heavily at iriluenccd by the location of the tircilities. If the timeto auescalatedeveilt (e.9., BLEVE or boilover) is sutficiently long to aliorv ample time to condncta sate evacuationof potentially irftectedpopulations,this mly be taken ilto accountin of assessilgthe conseqrrence this event-In this case,there shouldbe a robust plans to operateunder all denonstration of the etlbctivenessof the response conditions(e.g,, if the incident occrusin the mrddle of the nigJtt)of consequences the events optittnsto mitigate the likelihood andr'or F,r'aluate considcr0d. fequre an The characterisatioficaldpt'ioiitisaiiDn of risk redtction measures of ttnderstandingof both the ln'pothetIcalconsequences potential maior accidents and tlrc likelihood tkt thesehltpotheticalacctdentswill happen. b. The processshall be perlbrmed using the I\LAR methodology and ru1eset and dre onshore of and oftlhore MAR Calculatorsthrt are provided by the Group or,vners lvAR process.A general.ing lrutpulin the samelbrmiu, may be used xa iujcssment, eeprivalent 1'unctionally if validated by the Group SPA L'L\R or delegatediadiviilual. IvL\R assessment I2. shoukl be pertbrmed inhouseeither by site or segmeotbased assessment The N1LA,R rcsourcc. specialistw-hoshail iead the tean shall urcludeat least oue I\'{,4.R The assessment study and at leastone team membertatnilirr w-ith operationolthe thcilit-v.
2. 3.
4.
c.
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04 217 BP-HZN- 9MDL0 07e4e
5 iune 2008 BP Confidential 3-
GP 48-50 Risk(MAR)Process MajorAccident of shall The leadas-qessor havereceivedspecitic1!fARtraining and endorsement his compctcncyto pcrtbrm N{AR studicsb.vthc Group S?A l'/tdR or dc-lcgatcd irrdividual. Endorsementof MAR study leadercompetencymay be delegatedil '"vritingby the rvithin BPCroup SPA VLAR to otl.rerlvlAR speci.aliss team should also havereceived specific traurrng in Other membersof the assessment Anyupdating ofa snrdyshallberevie*'edby a lead assessorN{ARprocess.
4. 5.
A
If an inhouseresourceis not readily available,an extems'lresourcein the tbrm of consultapts|r1aybe used,either as snrdy ieaderDr t-aul metnber,trut only ifthe consultants to oftheir competency pertbnn !vL\R studiesby the Group havereceived endorsement sPA IVIARor delegatedindiridual and also havereceivedspeciiic kaining in NIAR techniqueand tools. and Ivlcthodologry rulc sct l. 2, horv tc selecthypothetical eventsthat should The methodologl'nnd rule set describes be included in the assessment. The potential physioal et'fectsshall be modellett following the samemethodology in Anncx A. Thc onshorc and ofl'shorcMAR Caiculatorscontain standardcvcnt liequency data. Eveot frequencydata are describedil Annex C. Deviation aom the gtaotlrrd evenl tlequency shall be justitied (e.9.,using analysisof or site speciilc data) and approvedby Group SPA IVLAR delegaterlindividual. ctntlelfects.the progruru calculatesan -f-N From this inptil data of eventfr"etptency pair 1or each et,ent,wheref i.r th.eh1'pothetical frequencl, of the el|entan.{ N the rurrtber ofJafttlities lhat codtl be cut'::edby the hypotheticul event. Theprogrunt F generatesan F-N awe, which is thepre<lictedcuntulati,-e JrequencyoJ'et'ents iesultbtg in at leastN potential Jhtalities. Constnrctiottof an F-N line is dxcribed 8.4 rttrther in Anrzex into one oftbnr ranges.Theseranges Potential environmentaldamageshal1be categorised of are basedon the clegree societal reactionto majctrenvkon-ental damage(seeAnnex E)' oJ I'he program generatesct cune repiesentingt]rc cumulati"-e-frequenc-v" 0 eventsresulting in ut l.eost given nrcasureof public retzction. environnentCtl Various curvesshall be produced(unlessthe risk is zero for the particular category): l. 2. 3. h. risk An F-N curv'c,rcprcscntingthc prc-d'ictcd to thc onsitc population. An F-N curve, representingthe predictedrisk to the ottbite population. An F-E curve, representiagthe cumulative liequency ol eoviionmental events of in resuitin-9 at leasta givot meastrre ptlblic reaction.
3. 4.
transportoperationsor The curvesmay be lium (ither a li.recll'ucility and its ussociatetl tlom transportof goodsthat arc consitlcrcdindcpcndcnto{ a spcciiic thcility the ln aclilition to theseannes. the tool also ti"yrs e|enls in terms oJ'their risk WLf to aid in the rcntkingof the at'entsar;dp|ioi"iisittion of risk reducing measm'es'Risk prioritisation is etplainedfttrther it -4tuterD. lvtAR studicstbr cxisting opcrations l. N,IARstudiestbr existing opernticnsshould incltrde a site visit- Ii a business operations(e-g',retail stations),it ma.vbe comprisesa number of suraller sLurilar sut'ficientto conduct a shrdy ot a sampleof the tacilities to gail a picture of the overall dsk levels.
=:l
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Page14of 68
1ft+f
7gMD BP-HZN-21 LO040795
5 June2008 BP Confidential 2.
GP48-5A Risk MajorAccicient (MAR) Process andvisitedshouldhe the Ifthe approach I is adopted, nurnberofsites selecled in sufiicicntly rcprcscntativcto caphrrcthc primarv faciors influcncing NLAR(c.g., sizc ofoperations, numbersancllocltion ofonsite persotnel, ofI'acility. tvpesrnd scales and otTsitepopulatiou detsity). Total risk should be determinedby scalingup the risk fiom eachtlpe of operationby the number ofsimilar operationsand totalling acrossall operationtypes. In such instances,mitigation oppomlnities that are identified tbr one type of operetion shouldbe ctrnsirlered all other operationsoI a sinrilm type. for
3. 4.
with a tbrnat approvedby the Group SPA MAR reportsshall be preparedi'r accordance MAR anciGroup Legal. Prior to issue,all reports shall be reviervedand auditedibr completeness the Group SPA N{AR or delegatedindividual. by
11. Group reporting lines

a. IVIAR sflrdy leader shall n'ork rl'ith the Group SPA IV{AR rrr deiegatedindividual to determinethe appropriateGroup reporting line tbr use rn a particular operation,The assetor operationshouldrellect the position ol the Group reporting line for any particulerr scaleofthe ooeration. Examples IExamplesare shown in Figures2, 3. and 4 for medium, large, and very Iarge tixed to t'acilitiesand operations.The lines were derived l,'ith ret'erence regulatory precedents and conrpanysustainability.
b.
lines- onsite Figure2 . Safetygroupreporting Line for FiredFacilities Onsite GroupReporting

l.0E+00
c >J L o
t.0E-01 1.0E-02 1.0E-01 t.0t-04 'VeryLuge Faci.iirl
a q
..'Lorgc Faci.liry
l.0E-05
i.0E-06 1.0E-07
.bp Jnlit '1n.'
Page15of68
1 7e BP-HZN-21MDL00407e
5 iune 2008 BP Confidential
GP 48-54 Process Risk MaiorAccicient (MAR) Figure 3 - Satety group reporting lines - of{site
Group Reporting Line for Fixed Facilities - Ofl'site

1.0E-01 r.0F-03 L0E-01 1.0t-04
I
.Vew Large Facility

'Large
1.0E-05 I 0E-06 1.0E-07 1.0E-08
I iI t
I
Facilitv
I
I I
t-,;vradirrn "___'*" I
Fcciliry
lines- environment Figure4 - Groupreporting Environment Group Reporting Line for Fixed Facilities
1.gf,r r)D , -Very
r .0F,-01
i.0E-02 i
Large F aciliT]" - .Lnrge Iacrlrt-v

-r,f-i;r,6
l.0E-D-3
Iaciliw
L.0E-0.1 (i r.0E-05
CB PublicReaction
(as 19./o A large faciliry/operationshould equateto approximafel,v of Croup operation^s b.v, rneasured tbr example.capital value or revenue),a mediun approximately11,396, and a very large approximately3%o.
.ep $.!n!
Page 16 of68
'tr*i
7e BP-HZN-21 MD1004079

l
GP48'5C Risk(MAR)Process MaforAccident A typical large facilityloperation would be a retinely or maj or chemrcal manulacturin -etbcilitl . factlrtl'$'ith A typical medium tacilityloperation worild be a chemical manutactunne units one or two processing
4.
c.
A typical 1.sry'largeBP Operation wotld he an F'&P SPII' agailrstEoup For .Jv-s,the totai risk (i.e.' not jrat the BP share)shall be cornpatd total operrtion' reporting line appropriateto the scaleofthe
12. Groupingof oPerations

a. tacilities processshall be peribrmed on indir"idualfhcilities or grorips of The assessment of bushess' that tbnn uahrral seglents TheGroupreportinglirreshalibeclrosenreiativetothesegroupirrgs'Exanrplesirrclude: location. presentsa A retrnery,chemical site, or ["QP t'acilitv that. due to its t-rxed l. These sitesnay tre made risk to a popuiation or ec-osystelr.. single sourceof potential ristrc-s and eq'\rment operaieoby many tlitlerent 6*sinessrnits. The 'pirf processes of transporta:tion matcrialsto.thc sitc and prod*cts to cnd uscrs *utui.a shall includc in rvhich this transportcompiies rvith the prel"iousdetlnitions'
1
ABPoperationthatowxsoroPefates.severalrypesoft.aciiitiestobringitsprodrrctto associated market (e.g.. an oil or gasprodiction lircilitv with its dependent mcro'e termrnals trsnsportaion and terrrinal intrsstructure. such as the prpeliaes and thcilitv product to market)' rerluiredto deliver the (e'g'' a Cll'ul olsmLrll assets a A BP Operationthal operates lcrgenumberof sm.all product distribution alld rctail sitcsrvrlh o, producrionplatt-orms o groop ot:smail ' transportationintiast-u:ture) In thesecases a iheir d.perrient associated The overall BP lbr ,.rpr=..ritotiu. sa'rple of t'acilitieso,ay tre selected assessuel]t. eachrepresentative o-p?ationprolile can be determned on th" basisof tha numbers of associiltedwith transportatrcu tvpe of th;itil'. Il there is signrlicant potentiaiIr'{AR n*iviti.r, theie activities should also be inciuded ur the IvIAR assessment if this is considered A BP operationthat operatesa major multrclient pipeline system' ' thcilirvto be an operationindepeodentof a specilic Groupshippingoperations.
13. Projects
a. to rreed be considered: of trvo For a iVtARassessment, main t-vpes pro-iects platlbrm (e.g., a irerv large ot'fshore l . Thosethat rvill becourea sta[dalone BP operation ol'projects shall have a separatel'lAR srr'rdy or ne.l manttacturing site). Theset-vpes tircility being rnd be comparedagainsta rePoningiine thar is sPeciticto the Operation to If the staadalonefacili& is being delir-ered a' exrsti'g BP constmctedl N1ARshrily tbr the new should.incorporate thot has an existing NL{R, BP Operation thciliry into existing lddR at dre next N{AR updatecycle' to naterieLly allect ThosethaLwill uikl to an e.ristingBP operationand are expected in "matcially" is dct-rncd 15.b.1)(c.g.. d'ilting of a nc'n' thc lcvcl of N{AR (rv'hcrc or well in an ofl'shoretietd or constructionofa nervprocessunit srrrellite rurit on alr existil-quraluthchrring site). Thesetvpes of debottlelecking of arrexistilg the becon're projec-ts shall be ilcorporoteirvithin the parenttacilrty r\,!:\R and shnll staltlrp' nervbasecaselvlAR tbr the faciliry on in considerarions desigrl IvI,A.R
Page 17 of 68
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79 BP-HZN-21 MD1004079
5 iune 2008 BP Confidential 1. 2.
GP48-5C Process Risk(/VIAR) Majot Accident in safedesignas described GP 48-04 shallapply to The principlestbr inherenrly mitigation cftbrts wirh thc objcctivc of rcducing MAR' IVIAR shall be a si.gniticantt'acrorn the identilicatrttn At Appraise alcl Selectsta-ees, ibt and seiectio' ot' optir;ns.IvLqR shaUbe assessed the ranqeof representative options identiticd during Appraise. t-easible N,{ARstu<lvshould be updatedas design detailsthat may atfect ivlAR are l-rnalised' of The basis tbr the chosenoption sho[ld be documentedwithin the requirements tbr Gp 48-04. clanse7.8, anclinclude a considerationofthe relative levels of NIAR the optiolrs exanined. above the Group reporting line shall be At the end of Appraise,a MAR assessment subjectto the reporting requirercentsdescribedin CRP STD 0l' Element 3' sholvsa risk near or abovethe Group feporting line, the project may If IvtAR assessment to cortducta tnote detaileri ot more focussedQR'\ to identifl'urqor risk cltoose The conkibutors and help to prioritise actioosin suppof of continuousrisk reduction' and thesesrudiesma,vbe used to revise the basecaseIVIAR,provided $e_studies results of endorsedby the Group SPA IVIARor the revision to the basecasehave beenreviewed and delegatedindividual. with the basecaseIl41R,tvhich is This ftrther Qk4 shotlct not be confusec{ A clakt, and set o! ctssuntPtiorts, cttntptttison u per[ormecl 'beiueen us-ing speciJicmetlwtlologl', awl luL4R mote detailed studiesis pravided in 14 ' 5. 'I of shall include an assessment the IvLARfor tlie constructton he rvlAR assessmenr site worktbrce during cV? Executephaseofthe project. u the lhciliry is on a greentield the and there are noi'r'drocarbons hrtroducedto the l'acilitv prior to startup'IvAR on constructionrvorKbrce may not be needed. should be pertotmed, including risks trom adjace[t third A preliminary N{.ARassessment betbre any cotltuctual agleme1tsare in place thai iir the pai.;- auclBP-operatiLiDs. be io.,rtioo of a proposedtacility. Similarly, MAR for the constructionphaseshould reduction through the pertbnned srilAcientlV early io identiff oPportunities fbr IvLA-R method of constniction (e.g.' otlsite modular coustruction)' there will be opporhrnitiesfor frrther rei-nementusing Druing Defuie and [xecute stages, shall be ilre pr|ciples of CRR. This is describedlurther in Annex D.2.4. MAR assessment updotedprior to startup' if apprr'rpriate, revieu,edand, progresse: through the contkrttullv evolveas the clesign Tlrc LLLR usles;nterrttitcl.v o/ the fuL1R*-ill be updatedttt lhe encloJ'each varioru plnsesof a projict. fypicallv, the Ch'P srepes.
3. 4.
14. MAR and more detailedstudies

pracets is tt spec[fc atample o{ a QMwith t|rcloll,llving feulures: T}te iuI4R . ' ft rs us'uallyctnducted hv'an inltotLtelean' level' ttre FretVrcrteies mainly definedat unit'/svstem
'. ''^':::;:;i:,1::,'";)::"::;:""'::::-,::;:::iiiio;",* "n

. c .
indus,,,, his,oricat
tutci,'orBP datct, dre Conseqtrcnces sitespectfic lbut ttsualll,nonnal operationsoniy). in Riskouittttt is Presentetl a standatd-fonnat Arrrruptiow tre.Ttity 't(inetl anti con'sistent'
J4t t'P
Page18of68
BP-HZN.2179MDLO040
Rtrk Accident WAPfF'i::: Maior

By conl: rtst.JitilQRAs usuall,-have thefoilov'ing features: . t . c . t t . {lsual4; conilucretlh;- a rulge of extemal contrcgtors' releaseltequencies. generic equiprnent sTwlhesisetlfram Event,freqttencies Ignition ant'!explosionpt'obaltilities often basedoniudgment/model' anLl A.sstnnption.r olttPut nxtg:varyfront sttr't' to stu4"' mcy (or mqv not) be separatelvconsidered' anc!extemal causes Operational nor of Bectttr.\e rhe earlier commentan),eventfrequencies-may alwal's.be to one stttcty\ another and ma1'not reflect actual erpetience' consi.rleni from Ccataccottntfor detail belott' unit"sl'-stemlet'el' (bui usuallv nornml operatiort oitly)' Site speciJicconseq.rcnces
in is anct QIc4sfu,/ie.s clesctibed ntore detail in annex F. The LflR The role o-l'iv,LtR and produces a ccnsisteniapp,roalh- ._ on approach''clraws hitoricctl experienee level. Afull or derailed QR4 clitails at sztburiitisltstem iiross BP brr(cLtilxotac{,lress oJ' piclure of the risla, and the abjective gire will not necessL?rilv- a more accurate sltozid not bi simpll, to counter thefbtdings of the lr{4R commissioningxtci a sndy ccm demilecl QB4 sttttlies provide,a greatet'understandingof ke''' ,tr,r,r^.f*gr;a a,c! cel ietp in the determini,g the benefit of ^, risis idenirTertb.t fu"^Rprocess u/ull QR1 cer'uil't n'i6gut[on meu\urh- G\ p(n"tof fhe iRR p'u",''' In somecu'ses' or Jl'partner' a be ntur^ specificall.vreqtdted b.,- regulator which rndicatea dift'erentlevei of risk to thar determiaedusing IAAR approach More detailed studres line and also fbr or be used to determinelr''hether not an operationis abovethe Group reporting may iodividuai. sPA N{AR or delegated by cRR, nrbject to their enclorsenent the Group
o'base studies case" M.AR 15. Updatingof

a. bprocesses changes1l1 B[se case],LAR studiesshall be periodically updatedto accounttbr and ol]'site persoonei' ofonsite in or changes the exposures "periodicallv"means: of For the purposes upelating, I_ the that is exlectedto rnateriallyat'fect level of N[AR. A change If thereis a change Group be shonlcl ,.gor,iid as rraterial if it leadsto a site moving aboveor belorv the by \VIEV) reporting lh"e or if the onsite,ofl'site.or environmentalrisks (as measrued bY change morethnn 109i. At leastevery5 'r. Implementationof risk reduction measures' tircilities Cha'ges to (ad,Jitionofor shurdownot) processingequipmentaod storage handling t'lammableor toxic materials' materialsofpotentially hazardous in Changes shiprnents
2. c.
Such changesma-vinchide: I. 2. :1.
4:iJ:.;t*,fJ"T,*:::Hiffi j'".*.i'shiptratnc ,TJi?:HlT"1i;ffi ,1::'*

5. hsve Changesin otlsite population densities.Since changesin otliite populadon.can shorildmaintain a on the oil,siterisk protlte, eachBP_f)peration o *rgrifi.on. etl'ect neat the rvith local authoritiesto enablethe site to in-flueoce laod usein atears <liaiogue the tacilirY. 6'Clrangestooverallonsitepopr-rlationormanningdistributious. operetions' of i . Adtlirion of nerv operations,modiilcations, or abandonment eristing
bp
Page 19 of68
7e BP-HZN-21 MDL00407e
5 iune 200E BP Confidential g.
GP48-5C MaiorAccidentRisk(MAR)Process (rperations, thus changinetlre position of A sigiificant change rn the overall scaleof thc GrouPrcPorting linc.
16. Confidentialityof information

a. and mitigation plans is The information that will be containetliI N'[ARassessments sensitivetionrasecrrritystmdpor.rrtandmayalsobecompetitivelysensitiv.e.All documcntsshall bc labcllcd "BP Con1-rdcntral"' peribrmed prior to anv Legol revier- by local le.ealcounselof the report should be distribution bur tlrey shall he opera'ring a Contlactorsm.y be risedro assistin cont:lrrcring lvlAR snrdy, of the under a contri that ensures cont-rdeltialiry- the intbrmatioo' of VIAR documcntsand othcr Dccisions rcgarding rhc rclcasc or disclosurcto third partics oi the resultsof a l'feR assessmeot rritigation plans shall be Tod:.tlm intbrmation about or inibr:lation' the third input fiom Bp Legal. U Bp decidesto releaselv{AR docuuents the alenedto the sensitivenature of &e material contai:redin port}. ,..ipi*, shJuld be documents.
b. c. d.
17. FurtherhelP
SPA MAR or a delegated Furtirerhelp on the NI.ARplocess car be obtailrerltiour the Group indiriduai.
s't ik.f
Page 20 of 68
TeMD BP-HZN-21 100407e5
5 iune 2008
BP Confidential
R"* Accident MAR1F:"::: Maiot
A Annex
(Normative)
and scenariodevelopment Methodology

A.1.
A.1.1,
MethodologY
General a. to estimatethe ^ Thrs A-oler describesthe details of NIAR processtl.ratshali be adopted of assessmstrt MAR at a t'aciliry or operotion.Its obiectir.eis to achievea representative ofhigh impact events' the likelihood and cooseqllences llYPotheticalscenarios l. This Process'while valuable aud importanr' has somelimitations'
b.
2.ThenahrreoftheseassessmentsrequiresthatBPdevelophypotheticalscenanos. accidentsthat might result Aom 3. By tireir aature. thesehypotheticel scenariosassume itlentitiedhazards.Theseassumptionsaresnecessarl.partoftlrisprocess. tlre evenlwill occur' or kr are 4- Theseassumpl-iuns not intended predicLwhether no[ 5.Theblpotlreticaiscenarioscorrsiderverylargeevents*'ithseriousco0sequencesto disclosethe nsks that rvill be managed'
6:.1,19',:in:X1Ti'l:11::ir,"".ff weiel'linstorarger ffi:i:ffi fi1iffi

A.1.2, Methodology for onshore operations into tive strges: shortldbe separated The methodolog,v Each of theseareaswill TIl.eta,rilities should be dir,i,Jedinto a lurrrber of discreteareasl. major accidentevents(e'g', have a similar risk of h-vpothetical consist of units that oould processingunits,atmosphericstoragetuuks,pressurisedstoragevessels'roadioading areas,marine jetties' pipelhe systems)' (greaterthan 50 m [160 a. similar units that have a signiticant geogtaphicalseparation areils' tt]) should be assigredto separate b.Releasetiequenciesgir,eninAnne'tCfbrprocesstrnitsaresirolrnperprocessunit yeal ald ret-erto a typicai sizedulit' c[xamPles ofProcessuntts are: l. Z. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9Desalter' Crude distillation unit. \'acuum distillation tntt. NaphthahYdrotrerter. Catalyric teformer. Distillatehyckotreater Fluid catalYic cracker. H.vdrocracker. Visbreaker.
10. lvlerox unit. I 1. Colier.

Page 21 of 68
f"t chd
BP.HZN-2179MDLOO4
5 iune 2008 gP Confidentiat unit. 12. Alkylation 13. Isourerisationunit. lJ. Steamreforming unit.
Rtrk Accident (MAR?Fr:f:: Maior
15. '{mineunit. unit. 16. Sulphutrecovery 17. Acetic acid Plaot18. Pwiliecl terephthaliicacid rmit. 19. Paraxllleneunit plant. 20. ,A.mmonia cracker. 21. F,thylene 22. Poiyethyleneplant. 23. PolypropylenePlant. d. Dcfiniiion ofunit l. 2. areeshould be describedin tems Lnsome cases,it is not clear rvhethera process of a singleunit or multiPle units' ..hyclrogen plant'. might he consideretlas a For example,on a relinery, a standaloni..steamreibrming unit" or as a sectionofa "hydrocracka".
3.FortlrepurposesoftheMARprocess,aurutisdetjnedmonein*.hichtlre of obviotrscomponents the uoit, the vessels,pipeworlg coolers,ptSq 1t'. be urakeup a sirigleplot afeu(tlpically, tiris r,rould ill the|egro[ of I 000 sIu I 000 ft:J to 5 000 m' 154t)t)0tYJ in area). Hypothetical events. a. b. c. d. For each area,a set ofhypotireticai eveotsshould be def-rned' The eventsdetined arethose invohing hypothetica!sceaariosin'olving large potential consequences. accidents'tirereby B.vdetinition, this processfoctses on mlikely high consequence requiring attentionto theserisks. I,lentilication of risk by this processw-ill motivate f,rther continuousimptovement or but doesnot ilrpiy thai BP lras sub-iected *'ill sutlect thosedirectl-viuvolved in the risk' oil anclgas rndustryor the public to urueirsonable should be For eachhypothetical event. the event likeliltood and consequence as input data to the IvIAR Calculatorsollrvare. zurcl cleveloped usecl Ceneric event frequencydata that should be used il NIAR ptocessare included within the MAR Calculator. etc.) should be Event physical ettlcts {clispersiondistance,blast overpressure, srrchas"Cirrus"' analysissofltvare, calculitetlusingcttnsetluence Etvir.orugettal ett'ectsshall be chalacterisedusiugthe degreeofsocief-vreactrolto ar). event as describedin Anner t. A rule set to aid consistencyrn perfbrniing the nodetling is discussedlater.
J.
Event likelihood and consequence a. b. c. d. e.
Page 22 of 68
,!.d1l.
th{r
t 100407e5 1 BP-HZN-zTeMD
3 JUne IJUA
GP48-5C AccidentRisk(MAR)Process Major BP Gonfidential 4. Physical eifect ftroqnint a. b. event is tlapped outo a Plot of Eachphysical etllct footpri-trttrom eachrepresentative the MAR Calculator' the taciiity by poprrlationare also Ifappropriate, any surroundingareasrvith industrial or residentlll bY mrPPed the MAR Calculator' c.Tlrenurntrerofpeoplewit]rilarret.lectfootprintiscotrvertedtothelrumberof factor a potential fatalities i}the event wefe to occur by mui.tiplying b-v "'ulnerabiliry(seenote). also included in the lvlAR A genetic set ofrtlnerabilitv thctors is describedlnter trntl d Calculatorsoftware. into thosc iasidc and outsidc r'vorkinghours for c. Thc numbcr afttctcd arc scpnratcrl peopleare inside burldings populations,taliing into rccount i,vhether onsite and ot't'site of outdoo[spetlple n'idrin at etfect The ivL{R Calcularorsoffivarerviil con.,'enthe number of t. anv double countitg. It allows lbr relevant tbotprrnt to potential i.atalitiesand ar,'oids and ignition probability' conclitionaiprobohilin.r, slch as wintl ctireciionprohabiliry proportion of Note: A factor that modifies a consequence (e.g,, the physical effect who are fatally injured people exposed to a 'by tire effect) is defined as a vulnerability' A factor that gas cloud modifies a frequency (e'g', the likelihood that a and hence give a flash fire effect) is defined will be ignited as a conditional ProbabilitY' 5. palrs (t:-Npairs) and/or calcuiateslrequenc-v-consequelce Tire MAR Calculator soltw-are The risks arereported pairs (f-E iairs) tbr eachetTecttrequency-env'oo-.o,.Lr."",ion of given mtrgninrde. event' F-N b-uth. .o"ffnr*. as the cumulativ. f"qrr.o.-v of at ieast a also prorides a risk rankilg of eventsbasedon their wEV' and F-E curves-The sot'tware rvith multiple risk associated to The methodhas been designe<l give a rapid indicrtion of the dimrage'The rnethotlis not intended latali{.yeventsurd eventsinvolving sevelesnvlronmental arc likcly to involving onc or ivo fatalitics, and thc rcsults shown i"-pr"ii" cv-cnts incidents.These lesserconsequeoee ofthese lesserconsequence *uierestimate the frequen-cy BP mauagedby crther satbty niuragernelltsystems' eventszu-e Methodology for offshore operations used: for The rbllowing urethoclology offshore operationsshould be a'Dividethet.aciiityirrtodiscretelocationswherereleasesofhazrrdorrsmaterralscould occur.,lhelocotronsslrouldbephysicallyseoaratedbybaniersordistancesuchtirat ErlmpLes hchrde: io releases orr" to.ution or.,*lituiy to enteiacljacentlocltic.rns. llre\valls' by iueasofmodules sepiuuted soiid decksantl"'or lin-liedcompiex' 2. Processequrpmenton in,lividual plattbrrnsrvitirin a brrdge Icletrtitl-locations where peoplernay be presentou the thcility. LProcess
A.'1.3.
b.
c.Idcrltiiytlrclocationandrypcofcscapcrout'!-S'rct\gcs.andcr-acu'tticnpoil]ts. dBreakprocesslntosystemsandallocatetheSvstemsauossthereleaselocationsdei.Lned undet a" theseacrossthe locltions e. Identity the fyle anclmrmber of clriliing operationsand allocate under a. del-tned
.Dp Jf!-
Page 23 of 68
'tr$r
BP-HZN-217?MDL]0407e5
5 iune 2008 BP Gonfidential
GP 48-54 Process Risk(lvlAR) MajorAccident
evenls weli operations,and dril ling l.rypothetical Process, process,',vell operations.and dr:illurghypotheticalevents.and evaluatetireir l. Dct-rne and potentiil eil'ectson populatioDlocations, escaperoutes,refu-ees, evacrtatron thcilities. Z. 3. producing p1ant, process from risers, eventsr,villincludereleases hypothetical Process system). wells, and utilities (e.g., fuel -eas Drilhng and r.ell operationshypothetical eventsu'ill include blorvoutsii-om developmentdrilling, well workovers, and wireliningcoiled rubmg opelations.
Determine potentiel f:rtalitiesfrom the immediate impact of the hypotheticrrlevents,as and escalationaud dtrring escape nell as anypotential fataiities due to subsequent evacuatlorl. events.suchas strip collisions, Determile impact on platform populations fron: nonprocess tires" and dropped eartlquakes,orrin,y*uo.s, stnrcfiual collapse,sinking, accourntodation obiects. Determine potential thtalirieswhile tansporting populationsto the ticility (e.g., helicopter anciboat accidents).
4.2. A.2.1.
Selection of scenarios - deciding on the hypothetical events Scenariosfor onshore oPerations a. a "calastrophic" area selected shouldrepreseot tbr chosen each Ilypot[eticalevents
be release.The intent is to go beyond eventsthat might reasonably expectedto occut and eventstharareverv unlikely lo occurbut,iflhey were lo occur,could itlentity hypothetical causcmultiplc tatalitics or scvcrc cnviromcntal damagc. units trom process releases Catastrophic l. "catastrophic"releaseshouldbe the units, the h.vpothetical For exampie,tbr process inventoryon tlle unit over a 60 s periodtbllorving *riimr,. isolatable ot--the release Ioss of containment. shutdorvn The maximum isolatableinventory is the inventory betrveenemergency valves and is often that containedin the largestvesselon the unit rhen If shutdown is not initiated attomaticallv and there is no remofe acti''raJion, tigther considerationshould be given to back aad tbruard florvs dnring the 60 s period. the Ii the vesselis large and the pipework joining the vesselis too small to reieasc' olpipervort coriteutsi1 a 60 s perio,J,a longer duration nay be calculatedrf iractr-rre is thought to be the only signiticant mechanismof tailure' and with rupture of ecluipment, the et'fects Thesetlpes of releaseare often associated a quasiinstlmlaneotn releaseof materiai are motlelled using For storagetanks and vessels.the hypothetical "catastrophic"releaseshould be the releaseofthe entire contentsofthe storageumt. This could be rupture of the tanl: shell or a releasetfuough an orifice etpivalent to the to attached a vesselpipe diameter largest rvould releirsethe inl-entory ir lessthan 60 s, a teleaserate slrould ifthese scenarios be calculatedon the basis ofrr 60 s releaseduration'
b.
2. 3
4.
5. c,
liom storagetarrksand vessels Catastroplticreleases l. 2. ,1.
Jftt! 'Ii$a
Page24 of 68
0407e6 217 BP-HZN- 9MDL0
c JUne luva
GP 48-54 Process Risk(NIAR) MajorAccident BP Confidential from processunits, storagetanks' and v'essels to lvlajor releases atmosphere '1uajor" releaseis associated with a hole iI equipurer:tthat resultsrn a A h-vpothetical l. tlow of materiai to atmosphere continuolls bv assuning that 2. Etlicts irom thrs contimroustype ol releasecan often be modelled limit. they reactra steadystate tirroug]r at] 3. This "urajor" scenarioshoulelbe cletiuedas a releaseoflrateriai equivalent50 rnm (2 in) diameterhole in a vesselor pipe' 4.Insomecases(e.g.,toxicreleases).thehazardmaybeafunctionoftirerelease dnraiion5.Tnsuchcases'allautolTlaticorremotelyoperatedEsDorshutdownsystemmaybe bccn subjcctto a takcn into accountrf dctcrmining thc duratioo cvcnt, providcd it has SIL assessment. tiom PiPelines Releases l.Forburiedunderglountlp-ilelines.therateofreleasetiomafullboreglrilltrtine calculated. nrpfure(i.e., releo.e Aoti both sides oftire pipeline) should be 2. that have to break out of the ground should be modelled as a Gas antl vapow releases vertical relexsefrom a crater in the ground' relensedfrom the of -1. This will havethe ei-t'ect reclucingthe velocity of the material should bi calculatedusing the tblloiving conelation: crater.Tle crater d1ameter szr't 266ip;o w = 1,78(D)t width (n:) Where: W is thecrater (m)' diameter D thePiPeline (bar)' P tlrePiPeline Pressu'e of the hypothetical "t'vorst For heavierthan air vapours,this will allor.vthe assessmeat potentially thlls bnck.to disperse where the cloud is initially pushedupwards and case,,, along the ground or along the protmd. ! or oil and othei tiquid ."I""r"t, the travel of tluid reaching The likelihood of flammable liqrricLs via warer corusesshoultl be nroclelled. impacr' of as should degEee envirorunental population cenuesshould be assessed, input of thc Calculator softrvarc,if uscd tor GP 48-50 bascdstudics,will allorv Thc N,LA.R lbllowing physical ettct envelopeslrom releaseevents: 1. 7. 3. 4. 5. 6. 1. releesein D5 and F2 conditions. Toric cloud liom an instantaneous in release D5 and F2 conditions' Toxic cloud tom a continuous teleasein D5 and F2 uondilions' Driliing i:ioud/llash iire liom an instantaneous Dritiing cloud/t'iashfire from a contiquors releasein D5 and Fl conditions releasein 2 n-ls (6 ft/s) and 5 r'-s (16 ft) wild' Localised t-rrefrom an instantaneous ( frs) wind' Localiscd tirc aom a cootinuousrclcasc in 2 r"rs (6 fr/s) and 5 rn/s 16 frebrlVtsLEVE.
8'Vapourcloulexplosionfromaclouddriftingintoanobstructedarea. 9. Explosionstsotlrce-
10. Enviromnentaletfect. h ale the abovescenflriLas The ream conductingthe IvtAR sflrily shortldtletermine*'hich of the faciliw. Del'aultfreqnencydata for tvpical eventstirat eive relevant firr eachsectronof
Page 25 of 68
J44cL
Lf
7e BP - H Z N - 2 1 M D 1 0 0 4 0 7 9
GP48-50 Process Riski/rtAR) MaiorAccident rise to theseel-fectsare included in the softrvareand examplesshou'nin Anner R- if cvcnts and cllicts can bc inciudcd in thc analvsis appropriatc,othcr uscr dct-rncd
4.2.2.
Scenarios for offshore operations a. s release for Releaserates shoulclbe calc'ulated medium (50 mm [2 in] D) and catastrophic (limited to 100 mm [a in] D holes tbr initial event but full bore rupture fbr escelated er,.errts). The hazardswill be due to toxic etltcts from H:S rich stleams,thermal radiation, and from explosions' smoke trom tires ond blast overptessure module tlres, tiee jet f-ues,and seapool fues. The types of fires will be cool-rned of Accotrnt w-ill neetl to be tatrcen ',rdether,lecks are gratedor plated when determiningthe location of eveuts. e. t'. Scenariosshould retlect the potential tbr escaiationto other inventories.other modules' refuges,escaperoutes, and struchral suPports. The tbllorving processeveotsshould rypically be considered: l2. 3. 45. 6. 1. 8. 9. no Gas and tiquid tires produci-ng escalation. to Gasancilitpid fires escalating other inventories. collapse. to to Gasaltl liquid tir.esleadin_u dama-ee refuges,/structural VCE sutficient to causefatalities within module and breach of nonblastresistiug module rvall. VCE sutfrcient to causeescalation. to VCE sufl-rcient ci[rse strucn]raldetlection and massiveescalation. VCE sutfrcient to causesructural collapse. (e--o-. rich streams)HrS Ilnig:ritedtoxic releases tlres. Escalated
b. c. d.
J't
4{i
Page 26 of 68
10040796 1 BP-HZN-2 TeMD
5 iune 2008
BP Confidential
GP48-50 Process Risk(MAR) MajorAccident
AnnexB
(Normative)
and vulnerabilities modelling Consequence

B.1. 8.1.1.
8.1.1.1.
oPerations Onshore or of Dispersion flammable toxicvapours

General a. Vapour cloud scenarros l.Vaptlurcloudscenariose.fgreatestimPortaflceonshorearetirosethatspreadat grourd level arrdcould atl'ectpeopleor buildings' of aDrbielt air' 2. Theseclourls w.ill ofteu have a density equal to oI gleater than tltat 3,Formostmajorteleases.tlreheal-vgasmodel(modelD2inCim;s)rvillberelevarrt. b. Releaserate 1. 2. in the The releaserate tlom catastrophicand maior eventsshould be estimated mtnner describedearlier. scenariosin wbich the rnaterial has a lorv flash fraction, evaporrtion For c:rtastrophic materiai should be used as the soluce term tbr the dispersion a pool of release,l frorn calculations. In casesin which the material has a higl-rtlash fraction, it is [ikely to be more code' appropriateto irrput the calcuiaterlreleaserates directti, to the dispersio[ (60 s d reieasewill be modelle using the "transient" the In many cases, catastrophic release)option for the heary gasmodelin as This 60 s releaseis desc'ribed instantaneous Cirnx' tall to ground rvithin rhe unit area,tbr example' Ifthe catastrophicevent cannot (greater than 3 m II0 ft] heigh! ofgas or flashinggas'useofthe releases elevated momennrmdisp.iJloo model (model Dl in Cimrs) w'ill be more appropriate. a''vayti'om The result of a transientreleaservi1lbe an expandingcloud that will driA the soutce. (660 lb/s) is An exarrple of a I min releaseof propl'lene at a releaserate of 300 kgi s time periods after givel in Figgre B. I and shows instancesof the cloud at dii-l'erent rclease. 3" 4. 5. The plot shorvsthe movementof the LFL coutoui-' The cloud travelsboth uprvild and downwind of the sourceiocation. cloud l-ras 2 TIre largestshgJe plrrne occursafter approximatel-v min (126 s), and tlris 300 rn (SSbftl in r downr','inddirection and I60 'r (525 of ippi.rr-"t.ly din.rensio's ti) in width.
3. c.
modellirg release Catastrophic 1. 2. 3-
d.
Result of a transientrelease 1. 2.
6.TlreentireclouddispersesbelolvitsLFLafterapproximately6,25min,andtlre 950 m maximum dtstanceut *hi.h it hasremained t'lammableis approximately (3 100 ft) t!,rm the source.
Page 27 of 68
1i{l
TeMD BP-HZN-21 100407e6
5 June 2008 BP Confidential
GP 48-50 Pnrcess Risk(MAR) MaiorAccident
Figure 8.1 - Dispersion of transient release

is LowerConc 2.4 %volivol proovlene release. 300ko/ s for 1 minute WindSpeed:5 m/s : Category D StabifiiY
Tins of
Downwind Distance (*)
,or"n", I prcpene
Flash firc l'Ignitionatary*irrstancelvitlrintlre.:hulrtionofthecloud(6'25min)qi]iresuliina flash fue. this flash tire will be an ellipse the 2. For mndelling purposes, maximum hazardzone nf m (5?5 ft)' of 300 m (980 it) downrvind of the source.with a width of 160 3. distancein the plme The IvLARcalculatorwill ask tbr input of the marimum hazard ofthervind(thesumo|tlreupwindancldownwinddistancettomthesource:50m the =i 000 n 13300 ftl t'or this exan.rprle)' meurimuor [160 ft] + 9i0 m [3 100 ft] (160 n 1525ftl), and the otlser of the sourcereletive to the plume il*me i'idth cootour. the berr.veen ftirthestupwind position of tlre conttlur divided is Tte ot't-,set the drstance = as a upwiad pius downwind distance(50i I 000 5%)' It is input by the total Percentage. the to into segments rePfeseDt The NIAR Calculatorwill divide tile overall cr-rntour tire, portiorr oftlre driftirrg cloud tlrat could be hvolved irr a sirrglet.laslr cnttrc arca swcpt out Thc samc input is rcquircd t-ortoxic-clouds.For toxic clouds, thc (the as by the clotrd.shoul.lde treatec! the ellect lbotprint in the IvIAR Calculator at a pa:ticulalilstauce il tine)hazardis not depenilenton igllititru give a lethal dosecan be of The exposuretime and, heuce,concentration interestto alteredtobeconslstentwitlrtlretinretakentbrthecloudtodisPersebelowatoxic dose. rvitha leak l'r'oma 50 l1rm(? il1)hole rvill often be mote associated N{ajor releases the tbrmation of a appropnatelymodelled as a continuousrelenseand will result in continuoussteadysiatePlume.
4.
5.
Toxic clouds l.
2.
g.
Statepluure l.
Page 28 of 68
JrtiF 'thF
100407e6 79MD BP-HZN-21
GP 48-50 Process AccidentRisk(MAR) Mator model can be used as In theseplurne cases'either a momellfiinl or heal* gas in Cirrus' rcspcctivcly)' uppropri"tc (modcl Dl and D2 case'A rnstantaneous The buzard zone is tlescribedin the same$'av as tbr the r'vind(the surr of the upwind and marimum hazar,l distancein the plaue of the width. alrdthe ot'fsetof the dowrrrvinddistancefrom the so"r..i, rlt" maxinu0l pluure sourcerelative to the plume contour'
4.Areleasethathasthepotentialtotbrmamomentrrrnjetshoutdnotnormallybe possiblc lbr thejct to lmpuilgeon lirctored i,'to the -u6ittng, sincc it rvrl1usually be anobjcctorthcground,dissipatingtlrcmclnrcntuminthcproccss.Inthcsccascs,a lrorizontalgro.rn-dtev.lnooo'o,,'"ofo-dispersioncloudslrouldbeassumed. 8.1.1.2. End point for dlspersioncalculatlons a.- Fiammable clottds 1. ilstanta[eous ald the LIL should tre used to del.ure hazarclzone of t-ianllable continuousdispersioncloudsthat atl'ecrpeople outdoors'
2.L-t'Lslrouldalsobeusedtodel]irretlrelrazardzoneofl]ammablecontnuous that afibct people indoors dispersionclotrd's 3.3,3times|.heLFLshoulrlbcusetltodefine[rehazardzonco|Ilammable clouclsthat atl'ectpeoplerndool, 3'3 LFL is used in these *.;;;;Jspersion clrcumstances'sincetlrisistheexternalconcentrationwhich,forthepurposesof vapout' a buiidup of flaurmabLe as Uen pr.o*tr, is-clefinerl that whichwoulci lead to lndoors' concentratron ventilated mechanically 4. The value of 3.3 LFL hasbeenderivedby taking a typical buiirlingto havea venrilationrateof ventilated building or othernormally per br (once every I 0 min)' approxilately 6 air changes 5. releaservill dritt over a specitic ofa rypicai clourl lroma catastrophic The passage to give 3 min. Theretbre,the oursideconcenuationneeded I"";il;;coxlmately values' basedon theset-v-pical insidea buildilg is i.3 LFL, a. LFL conc'e'tration
6.ContinuousreleasesateassrtmedtocarryontbrsutficienttimetoallowanLFL concentrationoutdoolstobuiiduptoanLFLconcentrationiadoors.Herrce,t]rereis arisirrgfrom ctrntinuous no distinction made for buildings inside t'iammableclouds rclcascs. b. Toxic clouds l..AnLDiactorshouldbeusedtodeterrrrineoneofmoleeodpointstbrto*icdispersion clouds(t-vpicallythe TNO green.book Z. If the material has a toxic probit ircluder-lin Cinus lethalit-v.10o^lethaiity, and be modelied to 900,'" probit), the dispersioncloutl shoulcl lethalitY' 1% Often, shouldbe r.rsed' 3. Iithis is not available,otlter authoritativeleihrrlifi intbrmation provicledin a suitable tbrmat tbr determininglethalitiest",.]""[gu a"" is not in the UII HealrJrand Safety 4, An example of this type of intbrmation can be tbund respeclively) and 509,b l% letiralirv" valles (representint Exec'tive SLOO an4 S1OT be lbund at: This data can qov ul^'/hid"haztox htm' htto://wrvrv'hse'
+"-f
bp .r!'41
Page 29 of 68
040796 7eMDL0 BP-HZN-21
5 it ne 2C08 BP Confidential
GP 48-5A Risk(MAR)Process MajorAccident
Exposuretime will be Dose is related to exposuretime. In the Cirnrs nrodel, a concentration calculatedto give the requireddosethat is dependenton the exposuretime input by the user.
a For continuousreleases, det-aultof .30min exposuretirne or, altemativelv. an by exposuretime relatedto the dwation of the releasecan be assuored the user. For tansient reletses, an exposue time related to the time taken for the cioud to pass over a particular ground position may be used,In dtis method,the time taken for the cloud to passa specific point on the grorutd cal1beesrinatedby using the radius of the maximurn cloud and diuding this by the rvind speedat ground level. The D5 and F2 rveathercategoriesret-erto \r'hd speedof 5 s-"s (16 l!s) and 2 ws at (6,6 tu$, respectively, measured aheight of 10 rn (33 li)if At grouncllevel, the wiild speedis approxirnatelyherlfof this, so valuesof 2,5 rrvs (8 ft s) and I r"Js (3,3 lVs) sbould be used i:r calculatingthe time of exposureto toic heary gas clouds.An iterative processshouldbe used to model the lethal cloud. asthe cloud shapewill dependon the concenlrarionof interest,u,hich itself rvill dependon tmre. the exposure
8.1.1.3.
The vulnerabilities to be used in dispersion events a. Dispersion of flammable materials by Dispersionof flammable materialsto the LFL boundary accompanied ignition will give a flash tire.
a
to Thc rTlncrabiiify of pcrsonsoutdoors and within thc flash firc is assumcd bc 1. previously, the dispersionof llammable materialsto the 3,3 LFL As discussed release),or the LFL boundarv (continuousrelease)is boundarv (instantaneous assumed harar people inside buildings. to
4.
T)'picall-v,large dispersionciouds nill drilt or.erman.vbuildings, and not all of these could be expectedto sulTeringressand ignition of flammable vapoursTo cover the situation in w'hich the inhabitantsof somebuildngs rvill not be harmed the by a flash t"u.e, applicablebuildilg vulnerabili.tyfactors are shown in Table B.1 If buildings wiil oft'er little protection againstflc,\h fires, for example,those rvith many open windorvs, theseinhabitantsshould be trearedas if thev were outdoors. in the For tlarrmable vapour releases, vul.;nerabiiities Table B. I or Table B.2 should be usedas del'aultvalues.
).
6.
b.
of people ilside buildings can sulfer lower concentrations material During a toxic release, but ibr greaterdru'ation.Typically, mitigation stepscan be taken, such as closins doors and the winilow.s.For toxic relea-ses, rrrlnerabilities in Table B.3 should be usedas dethult values ir most cases.
Table 8.1 - lgnited flammable cloud lethality range for instantaneous releases
Naturally ventilated building or building with HVAC andno toxiclflammable gas Building with HVAC, detection, and manual Building with HVAC and automatic detection and
Average vulnerability of
to Source 3,3timesLFL 3,3LFLto LFL

BevondLFL
peopleoudide 1 1
0
svstenl_ detection 0,50 0,00

O.O0
svstem shutdown 0,25 0,00

0,00
svstem shutdown 0,01 0,00

0'00
.$rcL
Page 30 of 68
a.F
04 BP-HZN-217?MDL0 07e6
5 iune 2008 BP confidential
GP 48-50 MaiorAccident Risk(MAR)P/iocess
releases Table 8.2 - lgnited flammable cloud lethality range for continuous building ventilated Naturatly and or buildingwlth HVAC gas no toxicrflammable 0,50
0 0,00 Building'irrith flVAC, detection, and manual
Average vulnerabilityof
Sourceto LFL Bevond LFL -
with HVAC Building and automatlc detectionand
0,25
O'00 0'00
Tab|eB.3.Toxiccloud|etha|iwrangeforinstantaneousandcontinuousre|eases
Average vulnerability of Sourceto 90% fatality 90% to 10o/i, fatality 1 O Yt o 1 % o fatality Source to 500/o fatality 50% to 1o/o
no(
NaturallY ventilated building or building with HVAC and no toxic/flammable gas
guilding with HVAC, detection, and manual

i)4
Building with HVAC and automatic detection and nnl 0,00
0,475 5 0,1 0,015
U,J
0,08
0,03 0,71 0,07
0.00
o,'18
0.035
0,01 0,00
0,02
It is inportant not Thesewlnerabilities are the det'alrltvalueswithin the Ir{AR Calculator' zone and' t'or example'a potential t'atalitieswithh both a sollrceto 909"i, to .ioublq.oont zone.Use of the fufAR Calculator soAu'areev'oidsdouble counting sourceto 109/o 8.1.1.4. onsnore and roughness parametersfor dispersion calculations for Weather Conctitions facilities (stabiiity D, wind speed5 m/s Toxic and flanunable clouds shoulclbe modelletl ia D5 and F2 (stabilitv F. wind speed2 mis [6'6 tVsl) rveatherconditions' if Otltf i of all weather weather conditions D5 and F? can be usedto lepresentthe entile laDge conditions. taken fbr D5:F2' Ifuntrarorvnfor the site. a relative probabilif of 80:20 should be respectively,w'ith 100% ofF2 conditions occurrinq at night. qeneral'the rougJtness 'lhese ptobabiiities are the delault valuesin the MAR Calculator' In conditionsshould be dethultedto 0'05'
8.1.2.
Modelling of fire thermal radiation
8 . 1 . 2 . 1 . Jet fires
a. Thermal radiation L that both the t-lirmeand the thermal For modelling purposes.it shouldbe assnmed amongpeople. both outdoorsand inside radiation tio* ajei fire can ca*setbtalities on buildurgs(buiklings are sel" lire)' but cc'mpouent' the to The thermal radiatio[ in geoeralis assumed have no clirectional componentd*e to either being blorvn by the rvind t'lamehas an ob'ious d'Jctional
2.
Page 31 of 68
.$!tif
L0 TeMD 0407e6 BP-HZN-21
5 June2Qoe BP Confidential
GP48-5C Process MajotAccidentRisk(MAR) andri;r the rilease being in a specific direction. Modeliing should be perftrnrredftrr a 5 aris (16 fts) and 2 ur,s (6,6 tvs) wind spccd *'ill nc'rt normally give rise to pencil-iike iet fires but lessdirectionai" Catastropbicreleases should usualll'be modeiled as a nrrbuient t-ues.Turbulent fires Aom catastrophicreleases pool tire or tlreball. Reiease&om a 50 mm (2 in) hole can give rise to a jet t-ue.This shouldbe modelled the typicnlly as a jet releaseat an angleof 45 degreesto the horizontal (rvhich represents averageoricntation betweeahurizontal and vertical)' d The thermal radiation should be calculatedto ffur levels of 35 kwu: and 12,5 k\;v'lmr(4 000 Btu/hrltt:). ( I I 000 Btu'l}Iift:)
The NIAR Calculator requireshazard zonesfor thesewo tlux levels to be detined with a rnturimumlength equal to the ilistancebetweenthe upwind and duwnwind boundariesoi thc lux at groun<llcvcl, a ma.rimumcrosslyindlcngth. and an ollict of thc soruccrclativc to the plume contout. The oA'setis the distanceberiveenthe lirthest upwind position of the contcur divided bv the total upwind plus dcrwlwind distance.It is input as a percentage' ' Thc N.L{RCalculator also aliorvs a "rvind indcpcndcnf jct trc to bc dcfincd. This is inrendedto be used ifthejet frre is large and its direction fixed due to the orieutationofthe dc'or).Ttre source(e.g., a large iguilerl releasethrough an open pig launcher,'rEceiver oricntation of thc jct lirc rvill bc thasofthc launchcr/rccc11'cr. needbe coasidered,as the upper thermal radiation boundary of OnlV radiation ett-ects the to (l I 000 Bnvluilir; is assumed har,'e sameeft'ecton peopieanil buildings 35 kwm? as ilame. (The ra,liation tlux levels chosencorrespondto approximarely 100?6lirtality and i9,ot-atalit1' exposwesof -10s). Tbe urlnerabilities in Table B.4 shouid be used and are tbr included rs the default vahresin the lvLARCalculator Table B.4 - Jet fire vulnerabilities
Lethality range
of vulnerability Average peiple outdoors r 0,1 O
to Source 35 kW/mz (110OO Btu/hrft'z) to (11 35 kW/m2 000Btu/hr/ftl k\l/lm'(4000Bturhriff) 12,5 Lessthan12,5-kWlm2
tt nnl arttlh"ltl\
of vulnerability Average peopleinsidefire buildings resistant 0 O 0
of vulnerability Average people insideother buildings 1 0'05 o
i.
In tiris context. a "t-ireresistantbuildrng" is one that is designedto provide a habitable the throughour durationof the tire if drehuilding is tbr envrronment its occtrpants subiectedto the nraximum thermal load tiorn the lire.
8.1.?.2.
Pool fires a. For modelling purposes,it should be assumedthat people inside md outsideof normal blildings in,itruning pool of tlammable litpid or inside a.flrhlrlent fire rvoult'lbe iltally iniured. It is possiblcthat pcoplc outsitlcofthc frc arcacan alsobe hanncJ by thcrmalradiati.rn' is but this is lesslikely, as escape possible. Similar to jet fires, moclellingshould assnmea 5 m/s (16 ft1s)wind and tlefine nvo hazrd contoursof 35 kWm'z ( I I 000 Bttlthrift:) and zonesbas;d on the thennai r-adiation 12.5kWm: i4 o0o Btu,4ul112).
Page 32 of 68
b. c.
rirrrt thlF
79MDLAA4O7 BP-HZN-21
GP 48-5C Process Risk(MAR) MajorAccident The two hazardzonescan be dra*n as ellipseswith a maximum length equal to the lcvcl and a distanccbctwccn thc uplvin<land downrvind boundaricsof thc tlux at gSound maximum crossrvtndlength. be Oulv radiation effects neecl consideled,as the uppel thermal radiation bounda-v of to Peopleard buiidings 35 kwlur ( 1I 000 Btu,lu;ft:; is assumed have the salneeft'Ecto11 as tfame. f. are These hazarddet-rnitions thoserequired as input to the MAR Calculator. Pocrlt-re vrrlnerabilitiesare asdescribedin Table B-JTable 8.5 - Pool flre vulnerabillttes
s.
Lethality range
Averagewlherability of
people outdoors
of ,Average vutnerability
people inside fir resistant buildings
Averagewlnerability of
people inside other buildinqs 1
to Source 35 kWfm2 (11000Btu/hrff) (11 Btu/hrtt?)to 35 kW/m2 OoO 12,5 kWm'(4 000Btu/hritr) kW/m2 Lessthan12,5 Btu/hr/d)
1 0,1 0
0,05 0
8.1.2.3.
Fireball/BLEVE
CaLculations Firebtrll calculationsshould be basedon the normal murimnm inventory within the pressurevesselbeirtg sfudied. Calcuiationsshouldbe pertbrmed to give the distancefrom the soulceto the 1009'b lethality ct'rntouriapprosimatedby the tirebali radius) and the l.% lethaltq contour.
J
4 b.
circulRrhazardzones' Theset'r..oboundluiescan be used to del-rne vesselto deterrninepeopleand buildings be ThesehazardzonesshouLd centredon tl-re by ati-ected dre eveut.
The u,rlnerabilitiesin Table 8.6 should be usedwith thesehazardzonesatrd are the delault values rn the NL\R Colculator. Tahle 8.6 - BLEVE vulnerabilities
Lethality range
lethality(- fireballradius) Sourceto 100o/o lethality 100% to 1o/i,
I a^^ +h^^ {o/, I^thalih/
Ayerage wlnetability of people outdoors 1
Average vulnerability of people Inslde Dullolrl$1

0
c,1
0
in The va.hres Table 8.6 rakeno accountof tl'rePotentialfor personnelto be evacrtated betbre the BLIVL occrus.DLIVIs can occur tbr tire engull'nent durationsof as iittle as Passiveprotection can plovide a reliable l5 min, even if I'rxedwater sPla).sare l'Lrted. fbr the meansof dela.ving occurrenceof RT,F,VF, much loneer periods.Tnthese that chcgmstalces, evacurtion nlay be taken into account,provided it can be demonstrated lailttre. the initial t-rrecan be detectedand evacuationperformed within the tirne [o I'esso'l Failure of I flrre KO pot follorved by ignition ean be modelledas a t-ueballeveot !\r rs a flrrbulent t-re using a pool t-rremodel.
js! 'i#F
Page 33 of 68
2 BP - H Z N -17 e M D L 0 0 4 0 7 e
5 iune 2008
BP Confidential
GP 48-50 Major Accident Risk (MAR) Process
8.1.3.
Modelling of vapour ctoud explosion overpressure of unconfined obstructed areas a. generation Severityofoverpressure lThe severiryofovelpressure generationduring a vapour cloud explosion is associated vapour cloud and not the with rhe volume ol obstructions filled by a flammable absolutesize of the cloud or the quantitlt of material releasedduring an event. In this context, an obstnrctedvnlume is tlpicall;r a processunit containing pipes and with the volume delined by the obvious componentsof the unit. the vessels, vessels, pipewnrk, coolers,purlps, etc. with an obstacledensity of I m of Obvious cornponents the unit will have a boundar-v of pipe,fuessel eqriivalentper mi or less(3 11of pipe/vesselor equivalentper 35 ft'). or Pipetracksadjornetlto tb.eunit should not be included in the unig unlessthey contain rnorethan three corsecutiveverticai pipes and have a height of at leasthalf the averalre height ofdre unit. The height shouldnot include areasabovethe muin processineequipment&at cootail only a tbrv obstacles,such as the toFs of cohrmns.Vohrmes c6alsining large to singlc obstructions.such as ranlct'arms,arc assumcd not gcncratccxplosion overprressures.
2-
34" : 5.
. b.
Typical processarea 1. to For a typical processarea,the entire l-ohrmecan be assumed conrributeto the explosion if the releaseis suffrcient to till approsimatelyone third of the volume with a flammable cioud, as the cornbustionprocesscan push unbumed mlrture into al1the ohstructe<l volumc. are TlLeretbre, urostuuits containing llanmable gasses assumedto be capableo[ sutl'eringa major explosion. (An exceptionwould be releaseof materialsthat are to should be assumed catch fue abovetheir autoignitiotrtemperature. Thesereleases before a llammable cloud could develop.) by Adjacent units that have volumes ofhigJr obstacledensity separated gapsmay not be able to explodeas one total volume. In thesechc.umstences, obstructedvolumeswith a separatiol distanceof greaterthen to halfthe coltiguous length ofthe adjacentobstucted voluure should be assuured act as separate explosioncentres-
?. , . 3. 4.
c.
volume Obstrtcteci [. 2. . 3. 4. that all the obstructedvolume ofa processunit is involved in an It shouldbe assumed explosion. The exceptionwr.uld be the nirximum inventory of llammable vapour that could be released the unit, if drhrtedto a vapour air mixture of iorver llammable limit in concentralionis lessthan one third of t}.ecalculatedobstnrctedvohrnre. volume ot-theT.FT, con[ourderivedliom ir Cirrus dispersion This is not-the ecluivalent modcl but a quicsccntmirttuc. ln this case,an obstnrctedvolume of three times the mixture volume should be used to defne the unit obstructedvoltmte.
an The explosionmodellins should be pertbrmedusing the TNO mtrltienergymodel 'uvith value in Cirnrs). Three circular hazardzonesto energycoellicient of 7 ( this is the def-ault shouldbe 300 mbar 14,4psig), 150mbar (2.2 psig),and 50 urbar(0,7 psig)overpressures assessecl.
,$,9
Page 34 of 68
nrr
407 BP-HZN-217SMDLA] e70
5 iune 20Q8 BP Confidential
GP 48-50 Process Risk(MAR) MajorAccident ranges {TableB-7) in buildingsrvithin the hazard nrlnerabilitv of occupants Tlre average thc lvlAR Calculator' should bc"uscdand arc thc dcfauit valucs in by generated a tbr rulnerabilities shouldbe assumed pressureu'aves similar overpressure vesselburst. Careshouldbetakennottodoublecountthosewitlrinmorethanonerange.{]seofthe ivlAR Caiculator will avoid this double couuting' Table B.? - Explosion vulnerabilities
Vulnerability of occuPants in a building designed to resist a 200 mbar (2,9 PSig)
na
range Overpressure than300mbar Greater (4.4psig) to 150mbar(2.2Psig) 300mbar(4,4PSig) to 50mbar(0.7Psig) (2,2Psig) 150mbar than50 mbar Less
VulnerabilitYof occuPants in a conventional building

nq aL nnq
Vulnerability of People outdoors

U,J
0,03 0
n
n 0
8.1.4.
Mode||ingofvapourc|oudexp|osionoverpressureofconfinedobstructedareas a. Confinement ofa vaPourcloud L in a continementof a tlammable vapour cloud, for example, Iu some cucumstances. buildurgornrodule,tblloweclbyignitiorrcaugenerateexp.losionovelpressures.
2.Asthecombustionptoductsolt]rereacti'onareapproximatelyeiglrttimestlrevolurrre could be developedif the up of the rurbumedmixture, plessures to erghi afiospheres robustto withstandthis pressure' was suf'ticiently continingbuilding the ptessltrebuildup,is tlependclt on the 3. For a box that doesnot contail obstacles, to as it rvili takglou-ger move heavier materialmaterial. weight of the b"iil; 4.Inthemethodin5',itisasstrmeclthltlightbuildingsq'illventtheexplosronat bttildingsat 200 mbar (2'9 psig) antlherrvier 100 mbar (1,5 psi-c) 5IIthebuildingctlntainsobstacles.theseobstaclesctluldcauseturbulentflame field. To similar to that of an obsrfuctedvolume in aee acceleration* ;;;;, modeltheou=rpr.rr.',ttiomarerplosionduetoignitiooofafLammabievapour urethodshotrldbe used: inside a building o,:ott .l' eucloslue.the tbllc.rwing a)Calculatetlretotalvolumeo|tlrebuildirrg,Ifthebuildirrgisofhea'yin the TNtl multienergy construction,i''g', tt]ot"t" or bnck)' use ths volume motleliocleterurirreblastovelTressllreusingcoetlicient5Ilthebuildirrgisof in the TNO multienerg-v fi$t.onrtr.r.iion (..g., ,,..1 ciadding),use this volume using coefficient 4' biast overpressure to determrne rnodel b)Calctrlatethevolumeoftlreobstructedareaslvithinthebuilding.Addan use volume of the building)' to additional 509/o dris (but limited to the maximum thisenhanceclvohuleinrhe'l.NOrnuliienergymodeltodetermineblast using coelticient7' overpressure methoda) andb) tbr theivtAR process' c) Selectthe "lvorst case"befir'een housil-u equipmentfor The methodr-logyrn a. shoulclL.eapplieclto truildings/Dro,lules house)'This 't'iSniticant explosion (e'g'' a coarpressor l'hich gas,ng.esscor,lclgenerat"
b.
tJrftt tJ
.bp
Page 35 of 68
e7 79MD100407 BP-HZN-21
GP 48-50 Risk(MAR)Process MaiorAccident gasingresscould leadto an to be would not normall-v apptiecl occulied buil,lingsti.rrwhich intcrnal crplosion.
8.1.5.
Conditional Probab ilaties
8 . 1 . 5 . 1 . lgnition probabilities
a. iqrition all'ectstire of Two categories ignition probabiiity are used, as the delay betbre trarn olphysical eltcts that can occur' These are: of Immediate ignition - ignition rvithin a te1n'seconds the releaseoccurring' l. Hence' this i[oitioo *iit oot ailow the tbrmation of a f]ammable gas cloud' Irrmediate ei)'ects' ignition tlpe precludesllash tire and explosion 2.Delayedignition-ignitionofdrittin.evapourtbllot'in-satleastat.ewsecondsof reieaseof flauluable nraterial' ' of the release Reiease The probability of inrmediateigmtion w'ili dependon the cause than by mechanicalirirpacthave a higher immediateignitio* probabiiilv eventsca'sed cr:rrosionor vibratinn. The generic iaihrres- s*ch as those causetlbV more qrriescent ignitionprobabilitiesinTableB.Bs]rouldbeusedhthelv,[ARprocess. TableB's.Genericimmediateignitionprobabilitiesforpredefinedmode cause Release impact mechanical by caused highenergy Release causes Other ignition pleqabilitv lmmediate 0'3
n,1
b.
l.
iglition fhe alerage vshie has been taken as the default immediate Calculator
valu
in the lvLA'R
ignition Dela-ved l.Theprobabilrtyofdelayedignitionr,villdependontlret,lpeondnumberofignition by sourcesthat are encountere.l the cloud' ignition ifthe clolrd drifts into areasof 2. Lngeneral,the probabiliry of ciel.ryed than that where unclatrolled ignition ,oo.."r, siich asiesiclentialareas,will be greaier are coatrolled' tbr example,on oi1or chemical sites' ignition sources 3. high energy ignttion sources, ifthe cloud encounters The onsite probability is -lrei'rter delalied ignition probabilities in Tabie B 9 are Tbe or such as I'ru-'aces f'ueclLeater:s. mode' usedi.nthe MAR Calculator if used in "Predel-rned"
mode Table B.9 - Generic delayed ignition probabilities for pre defined
Cloud footprint over a large onsitearea Cioud footprint DelejLed ignition probability 0'5
area residential offsite over footprint a large Cloud t'. -
0'9
C. "
..calc,u1atel' mo<le,the I{AR Calculator requiresthe user to.specifuthe location If userlin probabilities in *a probability of iguition ,o.rr..r. For this purpose,the delayedigrrition Table B.10 shouldbe ruediftite increases If a cloud reachesa large offsite residenrialarea.the probabilit-v:t{il:l In 4eirsiryantl the tlistanceof pene1'ation. the MAR Calculator' *i f, ignition soruce
#
Page 36 of 68
e7 100407 TeMD BP-HZN-21
5 JUne IUUA
GP48-5C Process Risk MaiorAcctdent (MAR) BP Confidential default values ofignirion sourcedensity are useclto calculate f-N Pairs. and associatcd offsite ignititm probahility
Table B.10 - lgnition probabilities for cafculate mode

Description Ra<irlential/ Residential/ publicareas Worker buildings Type Area Atea Area Value Day Dav . 7 20 x 1O'' Night , 3,60 x 10 Units m Her Per personm2 Per m2 comment uerdurtvorL Defaultvalue Defaultvalue'
Roads
Area
=(Nxo,1)/A
5,4 x 10{
perm2
[fffi]F,ll:".xlT:l?l"si,L?i"*, than 1'

time. Can be less specified
mz x0,033)ir_ per Lensrh =(N H:Jei,f,l5.x;"#:iJffiii;! ", any speciliedtime. Can be less than 1'
parks car
Raillines
Ground flares/fired heaters/furnaces Heavy electrical equipment (nonclassified
d! gd!,/
Area
Area
Point Area
=(N0,002)/A x
=Nx 0,007
1 4'1 x 10'2
Per m2
Perm2
Per unit Per m'
[[i$i,i""ll;"ilt:iSli}i?i3t"o*o
in A area (m2) a 24 hr Period' of number trains N Where is theaverage thatrun onthe routeperday-
electfical Mdium equrpmenl (nonclassified *"*i*
Area
1,8x 10'3
Perm'
Area
=N/i730 A) x
per m2
of Vri hereN is the number hotwcr( peryr in a plant (12 permits hr permit)
8.1.5.2,
Wind direction effects a. b. used and input to the MAR The actualrvind dfection probability for the site should be calculatof. wind roscInpuLcan be in terms r.rfim 8 seck'rr'12 sector'c'r l6 sector
8.1.6. 8.1.6.1-
Shutdown and mitigation systems Shutdownsystems a. b. theseate likely to act in suftrcieut Credit may be given for emergencyshuldorvnsystens il event' of trme to limit the consequences an a high in eventsconsiclereci lvl{Rprocess that often iovolve For rnajor and caiastrophic generally ol]Iy be the case rate tbr a short chuation,mitigation lrv shuttli-x.r,'nrvould release activatedb-vg;rsdetecttou' if shutdosn sYstensare automaticall-v lcvcl in lt) at g5round i50 A nonrnomcntumgas cloud can drift approximatcl-v mi490 qr 1:: rtj freiErt * 5 *;114-ys) w'ind' (The rvind speed t *io if th. rvind speedat a l0 \Yi'd speedclose to the .rs.d i,' th. dispersio,rcodes is thai at a heigit of l0 Ln[33 fl]. ground is npproximatelyhalt of thls')
c.
8.1.6.2.
Mitigationsystems a. eanbe activatedin sullicient Similar credit may be given tbr mitigatioo systemsif the,v to ti-ure tritigate conseqtences'
Page 37 of 68
$r4L
rr+'
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e7 L TeMD A0407 BP-HZN-21
5 iune 2C08 BP Confidential

D
GP 48-50 Process Risk(MAR) MajorAccident
Passivemitigation in particular is significant' as releases' tfrese Nlanual systens shouid be considereduntikely to mitigate catastlophic by the event oI too remote are dependenton personaelwho may be imnediately atlected to visually observethe event.
8.2.
8.2.1.
Offshore facilities
General of confiner-nent the The pr.imarydifferqrces between ot'fshoreand onshorefaciiities are the shelter,and of relative availahiLit,v escape, physicai ettectsbrvwatls and ceilings,_the -ela:uetion' installatitto' antl the need to tnk" ioto accountG three tlimensioual geometry of an otL'shore
g.2.2.
facilities Modelling of dispersion of flammable or toxic vapour for offshore a, VaPour release l. can cause of Reletrses toxic or l'lanrmablevap()urinside an enslosedolllhore module u.ithinthc cont'incdvolumc. In this casc,usc of thc Acc accumulationof thc vapour and field dispersionmodeli containedin Cimrs r*'ould be both inappropriate wurecessary. Z. this to the The methodology should assess ventilation rate of the module and use vapour calculatethe minimum releaserate required to llll the module rvith toxrc asstrmingn 10 min expostre) trr t1amm1'rble (vapour a.tthe lethality concentrations . ]rupo* loopo* at the LFL). This releaserate should be used to describethe size and frequencyofequiprnentlailurethatcouldresultintlrisscenario. a t'lash -1. Ignition of a t'lammablevapour fi1li:rg an otlihore module can result in eitler exPlosioufue or.. disperse 4. I{the facility structuredoesnot confine a gas release,allorving tb.egasto models in Cirnrs can be used tbe L"y,orra cont-nesof installatjon, the clispersion t distances' predici the dispersir'rn to""ty rotEbncss Thc weathcrstability categoryover water shouid bc taken lo be categoryD- The input to coetilcient ou., rtntl", shoirldbe 0,0 001. If relev'ant,the rvild clirectionshould be Use of a wind direction inside conllned modules is the otfshore N{r\R Ctaiculator. inappropriate.
b.
B.2.3.Mode||ingoffirethermalradiationforoffshorefacilities a.Jetfiresshouldbeurodellediutlresaulewayasonshoretbciiities. for' b. Walls or orher obstnrctionsthat act asbarriers lo the let tre should be allorved ofthe barrier. dependingon the duration ofthe potential releaseand the lire resistance c. Ilthe distanceto the barrier is short comparedrvith theiet tire t)ame length. the scenario should be treatedas an onni-dilecdonal tulbulent tile'
5.2.4-
Jet fire and pool fire thermal radiation a. tr. l-Eeis Flammableliquid jet fres and poul l-uesshoultl takc intcraucounl whetheror not ihe in thc opcn or lvit}'in an cnclosutc. be used' to lf the fire is in the open, similar mo,Jels thoseusedin onshoremodelling ma.rcasestbr rvhich a thu.mable litluid lvorrld spreatl except care shollcl be taken to assess or ancl b.yond or through a module t)oor, cascadin-s spreatlinuthe tire into lorver modules to seirst[t-rce.
sF
Page38 of 68
e7 217 BP-HZN- ?MDL00407
5 iune 2008 BP Confidential c.
GP 48-50 Process Risk(MAR) MajorAccident tn Assumptir.ms the vllnerabil.ity of petrple in the flame and to thermal radiarion offlsht'rre should bc thc samc as thosc -eivcnt'or onshorc,wi.th thc cxccption thai shcltcring bchind tlre resistantbarriers,ifdesigned tbr the t-re tluratioq should be taken into accountduring the urodelliug. d. e. Dispersioq of smoke and its etl'ecton people and ingess into occupiedareasshould be assessed. Escalationofa fle incident to causestruchlral damaqeand potential collapseofstructures shoulcibc assessed.
8,2.5.
Fireball due to escalation

a.
b.
Certain vesselsoft-\horemay have the abilir.vto rupture under fire engulfmentconditionsProper considerationshouldbe given, basedon an assumptiouthat an initiating pool fire or allow'ing jet iire impinging on the vesselwill have sufficient duratiou to causeescalation.tbr the sea suribce and provision of blorvdown l-aciiities' runoffro other modules or to Tf an escalationevent occursoffshore, the vulnerabiliry of personnelto the hmothetitrally resulting tireball at the time of escalationis assumedto be 1.
u.z,o,
Modelling of vapour cloud explosion overpressure for offshore facilities occur by the samemechanismsas thoseonshore.The explosion a. Explosions oi-fshore at ir modelling prcrgram the Cimrs packageis designedto predict the ovelpressure assumingI remole tiom the obstructerlvolume involved rn the e:r.plosion, distances homogcncous"avcraqc" ovcfprcssurcwithin thc cxplodin.*,obstructcdvolumc. b. While this may still be a valid approacholt'shore,exceptionalcare should-betaken given that the resllti only shorvoverpressuesremote trom the urstallationitselt, olten in open seaareas. Otfshorc pcrsonnclwill alsobc affcctcd if thcy arc insidc thc cxplodine obstnrctcdvolumc to or close to this explosion centre,due to blast dama-{e occuPiedorexs' on dependent tbe Those in occgpiedareasnear the erplosion centrervill have rLrl-nerabiliry positioning of blast wallsderign of the ibcility and the The strengthand positioning of blast walls may ollen havebeen decidedbasedon t'luid withi-nthe dyaamic codesthat aio to predict the inhomogeneityof explosion overpressure obstructetlvolume itsell-.
c. d e.
8.2.7.
Vutnerability to hypothetical releases on offshore facilities - immediale impact, escape, and evacuation a. thc If asscssing nrkrcrabiliry of a population group to a particular hypothctical cvcnt, of considerationshould be given to the presence wal.lsand barriers in shielciingoccrtPanis should be givcn to fue, blast, antl smokc impuirment from the initlal event.Ct-rnsideraLion of escape wnys, as well as impairmeot of refllges and evacuationpoints, The critenc in Table B.lt should be used ibr t-re and gas impairment of escaperoutesand evacuation pofults. points Table B.11- lmpairmentof escaperoutes and evacuation
lmpairment g Flammable as Thennal radiation {kwm'?) (Bttyhtff ) (Yo Smoke concentration of source) Escape routes
tEr
Evacuation points
ltrl
3s (11 000)
15
(4 12,5 000)
7
Jiir{-
Page of 68 39
-rr*r
s7 100407 BP-HZN-21TeMD
GP 48-54 Process AccidentRlskfMAP,) Major Blast impairnrentshall take into accountwhether or not module rvalls lre breachedend il'hcthcr thcrc is major struchrraldamagc. V'ulnerabilitiestbr v'ariouscombinationsof immediate (fuII, partial. or low) unpact, escape (unirnpaired,llre and blast irnpaired, or smoke impaired), and shelter(remain i-nshelteror possibilities tabulated TableB.12,Table B.13, and TrrblcB.14. evacuate) are in Table 8.12 - lmmediate and escape vulnerabilities
lmmediate and escape (mustering) vulnerabillty type Full (100o/o immediate fatalities). Partial,Esc. unimp.Evacuate. Partial,Esc. smoke imp. Evacuate. Partial,Esc. fire/blasUtoxic imp. Evacuate. Low, Esc. unimp. Evacuate. Low, Esc. Smoke imp. Evacuate. Low. Esc. Fire,'blasVtoxic Evacuate. imo. Partial.Esc. unimp.Shelter. Partial.Esc. smoke imp. Shelter. Partial.Esc. fire/blasutoxic imp. Shelter. Low, Esc. unimp.Shelter. Low. Esc. Srrroke imp. Shelter. Low. Esc. Fireiblast/toxic imp. Shelter.
lmmediate fatalitv rate

I
Escape (mustering) fatalitv rate
n?
0,3 n
U n n?
0 0 0.1 0 0,1 0
0,3 0
al
0 0,'1
Table B.13 - Vulnerabilities at evacuation Doint Protectionof evacuationroute and system Fullyprotected outof range. or protected. Partially Exposed. Fatalityrate at evacuationpoint n 0,3
1
Table8.14- Evacuation vulnerabilities

point Evacuation equipment evacuation at
Throwcver liferaft. Davit launchedliferafti open lifeboauescape chutes. Davit TE|\'IPSC (mount3dstern to or clearancegreater than 10 m [33 ft]). Davit TENIPSC(clearance less than 10 m [33 ft]). Free fall TEMPSC.
Evacuation/escape cold fatalitv rate 0,2 0,2 c,1 0,1 0,02 0,05 0,005 0.6 0,02 0,05 0,005 0,6
warm 0,1 0,03 0,01 0,03 0,004 0,3
Disorderlv escaoe. wet
El.2.8.
Vulnerability nonprocessevents to The.,ulnerabilities Table15should applied nonprocess events in be hlpothetical tbr
cp jtir, T4J
Page 40 of 68
e7 BP-HZN-21 TeMD 100407 6
GP 48-54 Risk(MAR)Prccess Accident Maior Table B.15 - Vulnerabilitiesto non process events
damage(totalloss). Passingship collision- leadingto structural damage(severedamage). Passingship collision- ieadingto structural Passing ship co{lision- leading to catasirophic dser orwell release (this only needs to be included for platforms that have exposed risers/wells). Visiting vesse{ collision - accommodation platform (severe damage). riserorwell release. Msitingvessel collision- leadingto catastrophic Earhquake loadingat designstrengthlevel - minor damage,no releaseof hydrocarbons. Earthquake loading ar ductility level causes plafform collapse and release of hydlocafbons Wind/waveloadingin excess of design leads to severedamage (e'9., collapseof tall structure). Wind/waveloadingin excess of design causesplatformcollapse' Floaiing structure - loss of stability leading to rapid capsize. NP11 floating structure - lcss of stability leading to slow progression of event. NP12jackup rig collapses(totalloss). NP13 droppedobject. fire. NP14 accommodation on impacts(fatalities platform). NP15 helicopter crash inflighl(not survivable). TPo1 helicopter TP02 helicopter crash inflight(survivable). TP03 helicopter crash landing/takeoffat platform (not survivable). TP04 helicopter crash landingitakeoff at platform (survivable).
0,5 0,05 1 0,05 1 0,05 0,5 .0,05 0,5 0.05 0,021 6 Q,1 0,1 91 0,090 1 0,64 1
0,25 -
6.2.J.
lgnition probabilities a. b. Ignition probabilities should relateto the qvpeoflocation where the releaseoccurs. The isnition model used in the ottshore MAR Calcuiator is basedon Table 9 of the Igrritiirl Probabilitv Review ald lvlodel Development- Phase2 Look Up Conelation Report preparedby AtA ibr the United Kingtlom Otl'shoreOperatorsAssociation,the Enersv lnstitnte and the Healrh and Salbty Executive, October 2004'
8.3.
impact Modellingenvironmental
iupact is defined in terms of societal reactionas describedin In N{AR plouess,ertrironuLental AnnexE.
8.4.
Plottingan F-N curve

a. An F-N cun e describesthe cumulativefrequency of an event involving potential harm to risk, vnrious hypolhetical evenlswill N or mere lersons. During the analysisto esti-rrate wdl hav'can associatcdflcqucncy ofoccurcncc', havc bccn asscsscd. Each ofthcsc cvrcnts t, and an asscrciated number of personspotentially harmed,N. fteqrency and To constnrctthe F-N curve, a list of all the eventsand their associated magritude oiNconsecLuence should be cornpiledand sortedin decreasing of conscqltcncc Nl that occursat an If cvcnt El is thc most scvcrc and has an ossociat!-d associated ltequency of 1l and the secondmost severeeventis E2 andhas an associated of frequenr:yol12' ctu., lbr ptrrpuscs of consc(lucnce N2 Lhatoceurs al zmassgeiatcd constructingan F-N curve, at leastN2 personsrvill be assumedharmed in eachof the of eventsEl anclE2,.Therelbre,the statisticallypredictedcumuladve freqnenc,v hamring at as is leastN2 persons calculated 1'l + P.
h. c.
P a g e4 1 o f 6 8
e7 TeMD 00407 L BP-HZN-21
GP48-50 Process Risk(MAR) MaiorAccident of This calculationof tlie cumu'lativet-requenc-v at leasta given N, where N1 > N? > N:i > N4, is summariscd Tablc 8.16. ri Table 8.16 - Development of a F-N curve
Event Event frequency (Der vr)
l1
Event consequence Nr Nz N: Nu
frequency Cumulative
(per vr)
fi fr +fz ft +fz+f-. f1+f2+f.+fo
This processis usedrvithin the IvIAR Calculalor to piot the F-N and environ-ental F-E curv-es.
s't t*t'
Page 42 of 68
TeMD BP-HZN-Z1 100407e7
c JUne luua BP Confidential
GP 48-54 MajorAccident Risk(MAR)Process
AnnexC
(Normative)
Standardeventdata
C.1. General
a. b. c. d. in The follorn'ingevent data in this Annex shouldbe used in conductingMAR reviews with this GP' accordance is Onshorealata derivedfrom world averaqeinclustryand BP tlata and should be used llnadjusred. Ifevents are relatedto specific operatiors (e.g.. r'esselovert-rlls)'the results of a specific may be used in phce of the genericvalues' SIL,'I,OPA assessmeqt Otlthore datais derivedprimarily tiom Nonh sea data and should be adjustedto retlect the local historical experieuceof leaks'
C.2. C.2.1. C.2.1.1.
Onshore data units Process units Higherrisk refinery ' FigureC' t )' units(see as aredefined "higirerrisk refinery Crackers units for FigureC.1- Eventfrequencies high risk refinery
Cafritienat Probrbalif.s R.fneryHilhRiskProcesunit M.io.Lct of lNdtry Qls@hrcr lhFd.te lgiltion Delaved lgnido u"oo*tbud ixPbsion Cu,"r*pn," Frqusry/tr Etucb
l.lf-ol
c!3r@Phi(
kd
Fin
3.lE-ol
f.iorh.t;i..
l,jE-03
Y.por
Cbd
*PC'on
6.!E-Oi
QEs@hic
tuih
FiG S.n bdl
nF
6.C-03
M.ls
Fbeh FtaS.n
lcet
Fie
1.0-OZ
Catalbqhic
Lnignit.d R&.e
1.cl-02
[.i.r
Unisnibd Rela<.
c.2.1.2.
Hlgher rlsk chemlcalunlts and Ethylene cracker,F{P gaspolymerisation (polyeth11ene,'polypropylene). etlylene oxide uniis arc dcfincd as "highcr risk' chcrnicnlunits (scc Figurc C'2)'
.rftL 'qft-
Page 43 of 68
BP.HZN-2179MDLO04
5 June2008
BP Confidential
GP 48-50 Risk MAR) Process Irlajor Aocident

F i E u r e C . 2 - E v e n t l r e q u e n c i e s f o r h i g h risk chemicalunits
&difonal Prcbbiliffes oevd lSiitd n*o* touo a**.on* Frqu6" /Y'
Ch.hil
High Ri*
Pre!3
hit
lhFdilb lgn:tlon
c.b.qhicq[.iorl6t
of ld.ntory
uPblid
d.si-c{
Q:asr@hicbolfir
5.5E or
{.icr
L<rtFi-
l.:E'03
vlPilr
Chd
APb:'on
6.5e-04
qlcsB@hi<
tuth
ft.! smbtFe
6.5i-04
[.ic.
flsh;i:!th.^
-cot Fi".
!.of.ol
GusuPhi<
Lnignited leb.F
l.OE-ol
hi..
U.ilnrd
R.h3.
units C,2.1,3. Standard Process

as wits processing aredet-ined "standard" processunits (see!igure All otheroil andchemical c.3).
processunits Figure C.3 - Event frequencies for standard

&ndilioncl Stnderd C:tr3mphcdr Pod*Unit llatorLo3s of lilenbry lmmdi.te lgridd P?obrbilid.s vapourcbud ExPbsin C.bttFgtrcb6tFE Frequftcy lyr EhcE Debyd l!ilton
3.:E-01
l.iE.o{
MalortdFke
l.:E.Ol
WPaurOb&ExCorte
6.CE.O4
CrEsU(FhcFl$h
FiF tu
L6dFle
6,CE'04
M{or
Fhih FiE tfi{
LodtFitc
9.!E-01
ca6lirc9ffc(hEilrd
ReE
9.9E'01
$ajor Unignitd
Rebde
C.2.2.
Processequipment a. b. c. d. e. t'g. L. i. j. Greaterthan 75 mm (3 inJ D pipework FBR Greaterthan 75 mm (3 in) D pipervork- 50 rml (2 in) hole Lessthan 75 (3 in) mm D pipeworkFBR Less than 75 mm (3 in) D pipervork - 50 mm (2 in) hoie FBR Greaterthan 75 mm (3 in) D 1'lange mm (3 in) D tlange - 50 mm (2 in ) hole Greaterthan 75 l,essthan 75 mm (3 in) D tlangeFBR Less thtur75 uun (3 in) D llartge- 50 mm (2 in) hote' Greaterthan 75 mm (3 in) D valve fDR Greaterthan 75 mm (3 in) D valve - 50 mm (2 in) hole 6,0 x 10-/m yr l,2x l0-6/myr 1,0 x l0-6imyr 5,0 x l0-6/myr yr 1,0x 10-6it1ange 2,0 x l0'dr'tlange 1't NiA I ,0 x I 0-6ltlauge1.r y 4.0 x l0-6fualve 4,0 x 10-6ivalve w
11rlf{,
Page 44 of 68
'*r
8 100407s 1 BP-HZN-2 TeMD
5 June 2408
GP48'W Prccess Rlsk MalotAcddent (MAR) BPconfidentiol

t.
L
ln,
Lesslhan75mm (3 irr)D vnlveFRR Lecsthan75 mur(3 iu) D valve' 50 nrm (2 in) hole and All pumps compr.esort'50 rnm (2 in) hole failure- 50mm (2 in) htrlc Hcai exchirnger tlom PRV (50 mrl [2 in] hole) Release
4,0x l0'6/purnP Yl 4,0x l0'611:urlp Yr yr 1,0x l0'r/trnit 6,0x l0'r/urit yr 2,0x l0'lunit Yr
c.2.3.
Atrnospharlcand ref rlgeratedtanks a. failurc Catashophic I. 2. b. ' 1. 2, c. 1. 2. 3.

d.
wEU Singlecontaiflmetrt wall Donblecontainment SiugtccontainmcntwoU wall Doubleoontainneot roofsingleskinledtonlt Flonting trnk Fixedroof singloskitrned Fixedroofdoubleskitnedtank
5,0x lOi/tark yr 1,0x l0-"itaflkyr yr i,0 x l0-l/tank 1,0x l0-r/tsnkyr 1,2x l0'/tilrk yr t,0 x l0-lltonkyr 1,0x l0ltank yt 6,0x l0's/tankyr 4,0x l0'r/tftnkfire I,0 x I03/$il0 3,0x l0''/wulehouse
Major leakinto dike
Full surfact mof fue
lunk Largebund fhe, singleslcirured offrrlt suiface to give multipletankfires fire Escalation Silocxpltrsion fite Warehouse
t.
c.2.4.
Presourlsedgtoragcvessels a. Cokloatasttophiothilutc L 2. b, l. 2. 3, 4. o. d. (leseUun 5 te [5,5 t]) Srnall LPG vessels presnuevossels All otherhydrocarbon fite hns Vessei passira protection proteoti(trr systems Verselhnshigh infegrity $ystms htrs Vesscl mcdiuminteglitypnrtction systerlls Vcssel low intcg ity protectiou lrls yr I,0 x l0'E/vessel 5,0x lO'?/vesscl 1r yr t,o x l0-x/vessel p t,0 x l0'5/vessel y' I ,0 x l0-5/vassel yc 1,0x l0-'/vessel 2,0 x lO't/operation
tsLEVE
opentlroinsystctn Mojorrelease rluringdrainopcrafions Storagc vcssclovcrfill rclcnsc 1, 2. 3. High integriWprotectior systeors syslem$ inlegrityprotection Meclium Low integrity protccdonsystcms
l,o x lo"6/fill 1,0x lorilill 1,0x lon/fril
shipping and letty operauons a. b.

IF
port Collisionil opensoa mil (greater tlranI km [518 wittth) Collisiouin wiclcestrrnry
5,0x 104/eucoruter 4,0r lO-tlescouiler
4F
Page16 of 68
79MD100407e81 BP-HZN-21
5 June2008 gP confidential
0.
aP 4840 Procsss Risk ttalct Accldent (,r.{AR) rn dver( 100 [330ft] [o I km [5/8mi] width) I,2 x 1lt'r,/encounter in Collision vritle 5,0x I0-a/ettcorurter Cotlisionin nmrowriv'ct(lessdranlC0 m [330fJ width) 6,5x l0't4qa iu Grountli:rg openseapott width) 8,0x l0'6/kri mi] (greater than1 kro [518 in Ch'ounding wide estuary in Grounrling wideriver (100m [330tt] ro I km l5l8 mil widil) l,6x l0-5ftm 6,5x l(f-slkm in Cilnunding nnrrowriver (legctltar 100m [330lt] widtlt) Struckwhenberthedin wide estunryor set port in Struckwhenberthed wlderiver (100m [330ft] to I km [5/8 mi] widft) Struckwhenberthcdin nanow river (losr thrm100m [330 ft] width) I. Gusship or doublehulled liquid oanier l. 2. ofrupEueoo sevcrtimpact . PtobabiLity impact ofqlill on severe Ptohnhility impact ofruptureon severe Probability irnpact ofspill on severc Probability 2,0x loi/striking 2,0x 104/shiking 4,0 x l0-6/encormter 9,0x I 0"6lenoounter4,2x l0'5lencoilnter
ci.
t.
s.
h.
!
j.
m. Siuglchulledliquid canier l. 2. D, o. 2,0 x lo4/shikiry 2,0x I0'r/striking 4,0 x l0'?/herthing 1,2x lo'itransl'er 9,?x lo-rltrmsfer 5,0x lorldelna$d
to Onboordfl'e csoclnting cnrgotank lire tmlsfer operations Maior spilt druinghose
operationr spill duringhardann lransfer p. Ma.ior of Probability failureon demrnd <1. PERCsystem. Roadand fall transfer operaflons e, Hofd armnqiure during tnursferoperations High integrily Prolwtion sYstem b. Hosenrpftu'eduring hansferopcrntions system 1. IUgb intogrityprotection 2.
i I
3,0x l0'3/trunsfcr 2,0x l0-?trzursfer 4,0x l0-6ibausfcr 4,0x 10'5/trarrsi'et
Mcdium intcgrity ptotcction systcrn system Low integrityprotcction
3. c,
:
l i I
of BLEVE of roadtankerfi'om es']alation loc{l fire rn proteolionprevents Deluge/passive ha.zard mngeof tnnket' l. 2. 3, 4. systcnt No dcluge Remotemanutl delugetctivation detcotiou on activatiorr frrclgas Altomatic deluge protection Possive
3,0 10-' x 1,0 10-' x 3,0x l0-2 3,0x 10'{
tl.
of locol liomescolation provenhlJLliVB ofstoragevcssol protection Deluge/pn;sive vessel loodingfire in hozardrtnge of storage
l. 2, 3. No dclugcsys[om lctivntion manual deluge Renrotc dotectiol Automaticdelugoactivationon fitc,/gas
1,0 10'r x 3,0 l0'2 x 1"0 10"2 x

Page46 of 88
{F
407 7eMDL00 sez BP-HZN-21
5 June2008
BP Confidential
GP4A-54 Prcoass Rlsk MalorAacldent (l,4AR) protection PasFive or Mourxled L.tuied 1,0 l0'{ x 1,0 10'{ x
4. 5.
v.z,( .
Roadand rall transport a. on tioDra uK shrcly lncidcntdatain Tnblcc. l andTobtcc.2 havcbccndcvclopcd substences: of transportation dangerous for TableC,1- Eventfrequencles roadtranspoft E v e n tT y p e
rexploslon p e r k m per {open

larrme v
LEAK
Puncfi,lre
Rupture p e rk m (open
rn, d\
roa dl
Hishly Fiamm.LlCuid 25kglspool - lgn 5 te pool-ign 12ie Eool- ion. G F Llqufled lamm, as TorchFires rrre9 F/a3n BLEVES
4 4:'e 24E-10 2.4E-10 5.2E-10 52E-11 60E-10 1.51E{9 BOE^11 '1.78-10 1 6.7E-{
for TableC,2 . Eventfrequeneles rall transport E v e n tT y p e P uncture Leak lexploslon perkm per lorrrnc v 1.7E{ 1.9E-9
Rupture p e rk m (opo n track)
l i g h l y F l a m m .L l q u i d 25kg/sleak rool firefiomreleaseofwhole ofwagonconb-nt d L i q u e l i e F l a m m .G a s 8,3E-10 TorohFires FlsshFirss 2.1E-10 BLEVES/Fballs b.
4.5E-10 1.18-9 1.3E-10 3.9E-10 5.08"11
modificrssirouldbc o[ly, andappropr"iatc rclatcto uK conditions Thc dataspccifically rates in to usedif asslsing risia in olhersounbies retlectdrediftereuce road/railaccident andttrrkcrdcsigrs
c,2,8.
operatlons Plpellne a. b. c, d. on Pipe lir:eI'aihresarehigNy dopendent localoouditiolu' (e.&, fnilues candominabtheihilure fuazru'd lnndslide) naturel areos, In mormtainous ftequency. the (e'g" diggers)candominare lhihrfe third psfi:)'interferetrce eress, In pop$late'J ti'eqrrency. 19 cxceeds rnln is by Ruphue third parties highlyurlikely if thepipewrll thickness for datr avernge andshouldbeused (0,i5 in;. itre tbliorvinginfoirnntiourepresents goi<tanr:e : onlY genanrl ?,2 x l0'5&m yr FBR l. 6 in to 9 in D pipeline
#F
CONFIDENTIAL HIGHLY
bo
Paga17 of 68
7eMD100407983 BP-HZN-21
5June2008 BF Confidential FBR 2 . ltl irrto 1,1 D pipeline in

J.
(**iF,1:;22 Rtsk ttror Acctdant

6,1x l0'iiknr yr yr 5,0x l.0'r/tcrn yr 3,8x 10'tAcur 2,6x lO'tikm yr l,l x l0{&m yr yr 9l x 10-5/km 3,9x l0'<ikmyr 2,4x | ()1/trpcrltittn 2,4x l0'1loperation
FDR 15 il to 20 in D pipeline FBR 21 in to 32 in D pipeline 33 iu lo 48 in D pipelincFBI{ 6 il to 9 in D pipeline50nrm (2 in) hole 50 10ur to 14 in D pipeline mrn (2 in) holo 50 33 in to 48 io D pipeline mm (2 in) hole interlouks. Wilhout With interlocks.
4. 5. t
1
50 15in to 20 in D pipeline mm (2 iu) hole5,?x l0'rlkrn yr operntione evurt 1 0 . FBR equiva.lent durhrgpig receivet/launcher a) b)
c.3. c.3,1,
Offshore data systems Hydrocarbon a. (OIR is from the OIR l? UKCS database Thedatain TableC.3hasbeendeveloped for lbrm usetl. UK HenithanrlSufetyExeoutive by incidcnt rcpor[,t stnndartl OflshorE rclesses). of hydrooarbon cotleotion dotaon ollbhote to to ate 75%ofthe releases equivalent 50 mm (2 in) hole sizemd 25% oqnivalent 100um (4 il) holesize. Norlh Sea l. 2. 3. . 4. to rcgulaloty thathasbecnsubject a stuong TheOiR 12dataapplytu thc North Sea rogimo tbllowingthe PiperAlpho inoident. Recognising theNorth Searegimemnynot applyin othelpartsof thoworld, a $rat set modiliet'may heni)pliedto the da.ta to rellect local IM perforrrance. ti'equenoy tult.iplier shouldonlybe appliedif it is reogrdsedthatleah This ftequenoy li'equencies obove Notth Seaovetoge' nre tho 'l'hc in deson"bed AanexG. usingtheapptoaoh urrLy dcterrninec{ be multiplier
b. c.
andplpelhes Rlsers n, b. in datnfor risersandpipelines TablcC.4 havebeenhken from PARLOC200| . The t'silure to be drorrlcl take$8se(Fivalent a 50 mm (2 in) D hole andlnrge Mediumsizefnilures failuresasfulI botc.
c.3.3,
Drlllingandwell operatlons blowoutsitTable C.5hovebcentokenfrom the The datatbr drilling atd well opetotions databasc. Scrndporver events Nonprocess a. b. c. gertedc frequoncy ca,se from a base overlts bederivcd cnn The tletpencyofnonprocess faotots". spccitio "irrflucnoing rnodificdby up to tll'cc locotion/inct&llatiorr. case fi'ctluencies osshownirr TobleC.6. nre Thebase Influencing factors inTablc C.? apply.
#
CONFIDENTIAL HIGHLY
Page48 of 68
407 BP-HZN-21 79MDL00 e84
5 June 2@8 BP Gonfidentlal
GP 4840 MalorAccldenl RlsR(MAR) Prccess
Table C.3 - Olfshore systems teak frequencies (OlR 12) Svstem Flo$'llnes.oil Flowllnesgag - condensate Flovr,ilnes hport - oll lnport - gas lmport- condensate Manifold oil Manifold gas Msnlfold- oondensate Metedng- oll Meterhg - gas Meterlng- condensate Bloirdown Closeddraln oPendrain HP ll6re LP flare HP vent LP vent Separa0on oll tst Separatlon oil producthn oll treatmon{ Produoed watertreqtnent - oll Producd waterlrsatmenl- gas InJecflongas Methanol Methanol Injeotlon oll Chemlcg{ lnlectlon gas ChemlcalInlection oil Exporl- oil . Export gas Expcrt- oondensate . SeFaratlon gas test Separatlon gas pfoductlon ca6 dhytratlon LPG/oofldensate Sour lreairnent Gasccmprosslon Helliletfuel Dlesel Heatkansferoll lurbine Powergeneratlon Fuelgas turbine Po,,ver oeneratlon Base releaselrequncYryr 3,20x 1044 4,16x 10-u 2,65x 10'e 7,72x1arl 9,10 10n x 3 , 1 0x 1 0 4 { 1,69 10o x 5 , 1 2x 1 0 4 5,12x 10'q 2,78x 104 x 1,69 1Od 1 , 7 9 1 00 ! x 2 , 1 9x 1 O G x 1,97 104 3,95x 1o'a 6,47x 10{3 3,28x 10s 2,46x 104 2,69x l0{ 1,10 104 x 9 , 1 9x 1 o s 4,06x 104 1 , 1 6x 1 0 { 6 , 3 1x 1 O m 6,'17 104 x 4,29x 1oq 4,29x 104 SJB x 104 1,18 10e x 1.55 10{ x 4,99x 10{ 3,13x 104 2,28x 10'm 9,78x 1os 1 , 1 7x 1 0 4 x 1,10 1o{2 1,55x 104 9,56x 10'6 9,56x 10n g,56 x 10'05 2,04x 10'u '1'25 l0{ x qg8 ! 1E$
Page10 of 68
CONFIDENTIAL HIGHLY
17eMD100407e85 BP-HZN-2
20oo 5 Juna
BP Confidsntlal
GP 48-64 Maiar Acclden!Rlsk('tlAR) P'ocess
Table c.4 - Rlsers and plpelines leak frequencles svstEm stgel rlser< 9 In Steelrl8erI In to16 In Steelrlser> 16 In dser Flexlble In Pipellne safetyzone< I In zone 10 In ln Plpellne eafetY t o 1 6i n in Plpllne safsiYzon > 16 in In Flexiblo saflyzone S t e ep l p e l l n e < 9 i n l plpellne 10In to16 h .Steel Steelplpellno> 16in ReleasoFroquelglBivr Fraction larqE 0,50 4,68x I 0{ g,1ox1o{4 0,50 0,50 x 1,25 10{a 0,50 3,33x 10'03 O,5S 1,44x 1043 per FrequengY No' of rlsere No.olflsers No. ofrisers No' of rlsers No' of PiPelines zone ln safetY l.lo.of pipelines In safetyzone i.lo.of piPlin6e in safetyzsnB No.of plplheg ln eafetyzone No.of km No,of km No.of km
g,os 1on x I ,39x 10-o{ 2,?2x1oo3

2,79x 10'a 6,05x 10{! x 1,32 10a!
1
0,58 o'58 o'58 0,40 0,40 0,40
l6akfrequencles andwsll oPeratlons TableC,5- Drlltlng drllled Yr Wells Per par drilled Yr Wells drllled )/r Wlls Per drilled Yr Welle Per drllld Yt Wells Per drllbdPer Wells Yr dt'lllod Yr Wells Per drilled Yr Wello Per Oporatlons Yr Pef Opratlons Yr Per Opemlion8 Yt Per Operations Yr Per opratlon8 Yr Por Operalions Yr Per Operallons Yf Per Opemtlons )/r Per Operatlono Yr Per Operailors Yr Per onllne Yr Wells Per onllne Yr Wells Per onllne Yr Wclls Per
onllne
Exp.drllllng,shailowgas. gas. shallow Dv,drllling, Exp,drilllng,deeP(norm')' (HPtlT wslls). Exp.drllting gas). deep(norm. Oev.drllllng, deep (norm'oil). Dev.drllling, (HPHTweltogas)' Dev"drllung (HPHT welleoll). Dev.drllllng comploton-gas. Compl6ton- oll. Wlreline gas. Wireline oil. {ublng gae' Coiled lublng- oil' Colled snubblng- gas. Snubbing oll. Workover gas. Woftover - oll. wells- gas Prcduclng wells- oll Producing wells Gas Inlsotlon
x 1,30 10n 9 1,1 x '10'ot x 2,80 10's 1,70 10@ x x 8,40 10{! x 5,30 10{5 x 5,20 10'cr 3,20 10's x l,5ox 1o'u x 7,30 1o'os x 1,10 1045 x 5,50 1OaE 2,40 1co4 x x 1,20 10'n x 5,60 10n x 2,00 1o{a x 3,90 I 0{a x 1,40 10"& x 2,30 1O'os x G 7,00 10 2,30 10'05 x
3.80x 104
0,36 0,36 0,41 0,41 0,41 c,41 0,41 0,41 0
0 0 n o 0 n
#
CONFIDENTIAL HIGHLY
Pogo 50 cf 68
7sMD100407e86 BP-HZN-21
n08 SJune BPConfidential
GP48-54 (htAR)Pncess AcddentRlsR Maior events ior Tablec.6 " Frequencles nonprocess
Frontl/FE !v!nt ltr.qu?ncy 2.59E.04 E,06
'!!tlng GII (cllitlon trMthgin
lotlt toss,seyeredaoagc ot {gralcam 6ma9 Pfalortloo resuttln0jn iotat bs
cnlt ps ye.f
60.0t
iiG;;;;M cfirmnr ma.r $.Y.ral lsol cstn sca, shattN wrGr l.q Gq{ Sndf
,t.00E.07
p6Ykll
9SOZ R4gh Se' , oeeF Water (e! llo/h sei
1.5n.0t
p.. vhlt
ssol catm 5et, sllus
wtls
rcg (M
>MU
a.mE07 !,508 0t 5.00E.03

Ev{l lr.quftY
LiJL.O{
Fsrvan
pf, Yillt
l{thqiQ
lodlng 8t ttrcng$ t Yet la) mlnor dsrle
rc r6.a3t ol ly&caruont,
Parysr
!nll
EI
Evqt Dps
{lnd,/wrw todltE in erco$ of dGlgn lsd! b al{p$ ot bu I
1,00E.01
P.r yr
pef )$r
tlnd,/waic todtng ln axGt of dcrlin lrqdt b 0ltuorm @[6P|e tru(urnt f[&n/lsi of of $tabiUty thung ttrwtures
't.00t{t5 ,00.{,t
p( F.r
,,u4t.q4
pef F8r
flro somnaodatlon
)r@pe{ oblKt
't.00E03
lar yar
pq lltt
l.r0E-0t
i;Co*szrilh-lnftf
13 P.obab,Utvaaddcnt mt turylYdl
PaobiHlltY ncl@nt inl fnR{tEl
06 6.00E
per hr
0.s
t,00E.06
P. I OL
tll@fftr
cnih t.adlr{ / hk@ff .t Pla(larn
0.t07
o,0!
#
CONFIDENTIAL HIGHLY
Page51 oi 68
4A7 1 BP-HZN-2 79MDL00 e87
5 Juna2008
BP Confidential
GP48.50 Ptocoss Rlsk Mal$ Acaldon! (MAR)

iYSI faequ.trcy unI PCIrar pca Fra per )ca( ter F.l
riEfifiiaffi;E.dirt ln qGs! ol dcrlBn teldt o cotlnPte cf bu ltru(uc
05 1,00E
Filiu
ffii6iiiiJturt'x"r
t,00E.04
7,0.t.04
FT IEI
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.1.00-0 J 1,20E.05
Fl Far otr [rt
lcfierts Qsh Inltltht
{h00E-06
par nr
0.It J.00E{0 -Etbrbllty iccldst hai (ahtltle!
tef Tqt
0.t5
0.t07
ffipdct
::: ::::: :: ;: :::T fnlb ot he{ldccl'fter a orl
P@b'blltq ot lre{@'K ltr!
! ! !
: !
: : :
0.0E
tuge52of88
79MD100407e88 BP-HZN-21
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_l f: q
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CONFIDENTIAL HIGHLY
1 BP-HZN-2 7eMD100407990
D Annex
(Normative)
risk of Demonstrationcontinuous reduction

D.1. lntroduction
a. cDP 3i-00-01alsocalls and r.equir.es HSSErisksto bc assessed rsoorded. oDP 31-00-01 CRR. plonsto support of lbr prepruation risk reduction Note: At the time of i$6ueof tho revisedGP 4&50, GDP 31-00'01 in "implementationdrafi" form. lt is anlicipatedthat' revised as appropriatefollowlngthe "lmplementationdraft" stage' Please the Risk Practlcewlll containtheee requlrementE. refer to the OMS Libraryfor current version. b. with tro risk BP sh$lialsoapplycorrtinuous reduotion all BP Operntio_ns a,poteltiaifor a witl this 0P. For tvfAg CRRshallbc applietlto nll iir rnajoraccidcnt iocordauoe to sooiehlreoction environmefltsl MARg,krkingcluslccountof anticipoted itlentifferl ns damage, well nsothercffect.g. Fol gnrwthof a husitress precltrde of of Thea<ioption a proce*s CRRdoesnntnecer.rar.ily thcscrisks modollcdto bc abovcthc Grouprcporting linq rcportingrcquircmcntsnrc wholly withitt tlte 3. in describetl GRPSTD 01, Element All riskswiu be managed segruent functiou, or shoild be to showthat MAR is on u sicady thc Within theBIr Oper:riious, overtll objective increose thal MAR crurnol not of dealine lilc with theprinciples CRR.This does munn iu risks shouldnot olly be or within ally husi$"s,g ut any site,ro&er thnt thc incrensed ovcr timo,by risk rcdtctions rnamgcd alsoshouldbc morcthanbdanocd, cftb::tivcty but or of (e.g.,due to discOntitruance somooporations tlu ougheftbrtsto elsewhere achieved risk). uritigate (c.g., anrl is If tl.rere a su<lden nrbstantialchalge in thascaleof activity within n segrnetrt dueto acqrisitions,divuttiturss, or majot newptojects),this changein soalemay rysuit in Uuderthese in a tefiporaryincrerrc(or decrease) theoverailMAR witlrinthe se8merrt, whichcontltluous against a to circuilstances, maybe necessory establish now trenchmark it is dsk reduction measured.
c.
d.
c.
D,2;
o.2,1.
GRRprocesses
Gneral n. h. u, d. CRR. to in hnvea prooess placc denronstrate shonld Ail BP Opcralior'.s (o.g.. di0'{,'rc{oos ovcr thcapplioability crrltunrl of xt In t}c conte o1'MAI{,because regionarl npproloh' tha-e ofcost bclelit npproaches), is no groupnrandstexl nnd with input liour the regions,shouk!tlecidehow this eaflbe$tbc achieved Segurcnts, shouldbe a<lopted' rvbatruetrics 'Ihe for risk produccs ov-erall ptolilo olil ttredsk oontributols a thcility. the MARprocess uray in to of A nuurber appr.oashescRR aredcscribed D.3 to D,5. Thescapproacbes be (lIlR. lneilttsof achie'ring to ai or iLr rured i.solntitru in conrbirrajioo nrril,.e th6rnostclTective
o.2,2.
F.N basedapproach cutvcslbt sitedoperations' gutertlesF-N ou<lF-E a.. The MAR Frocess aud curyss sPU, scgrncoi, ch'ouplevel. at 10 be acuumulatecl gencrate 1,. These oiur
Page55 of 8
#$
CONFIDENTIAL HIGHLY
7eMDL00407ee1 BP-HZN-21
itr ho cun on lines Ciroup repotting (haserl scrieofopelation) also aceunrulnted Approprrate thc ronlcwe'y'. and to This oppcachis bestsuite<i reYiewhgthern0glitudeof overnllrisk.rat segnerit Grouplevel. time,scale.s to target wouldbe to establish reCuction Onervayof derrronstt.atingfisk ald the F pro$essively reclttce F'N arrd E oulvcsat segmeut Grouplevel'
0.2.3.
WEV
D , 2 . 3 , 1 , General
a. fN andfE values l, 2. 3, 4. b. in risk also The MAR process generates WEV for rislcconftihutors the formof fNr'5 atrdfE valil.es. measures. prioritiesfor risk rcduction Thesevoluescanbe ussdto cstablish a lalues,whetea hig[cr valueropresents gr*tcr major The fNtr/fE atenumcric risk. accident or for Therefme,if all tisk contr:ibrrlors a fac'ility, segment, tbe Croup arelisted in purposes. priofitiesoanbe identifrcd risk rcduction tor termsoI l}'{r,sifE theldghest , vnluc thc If I sccnnriois sbls to uffcct onsitc turdoffaito populations, ovcrull c'rpcctcd populations aq:ount. into shouldtskehol"h orderol of In recognition thepreoisethattheoffsiteGrouprryortingline is_one vaiucs shouldbe the 1ine, otTsite Orouprcporting maglitudelorverthauths onsite valuetbr scenario expectetion weiglrtea a tactorof l0 (i.0.,the combhedweighted by i is givenby): WEVI= (f1N11'0 + 1O.(fiNrr'5 )ofa1.} ) nrtb 'l'he for a.sitsi.sgivenby: total WEV
Expectedvaluesof onsitenndofllite poptlations L 2.
3.
WEVrr"= tFfrNrt'6 *rr" * iO\EftNrt'6 )orrlo) ) 'WEV environmeutal impact' for the beuscdto dstermiue in ExpressioDs TabteD.l may WEVS TableD.I - En,/lronmental
Environmentalsevqrlty category elobal Regional Natlonal Local
No(e: f = frequorlcyofevcnL
WEI fx3000 fx 300 fx 30 fx3
D,2,3.2.
prloiltlesbasedon WEV Establtshlng u of aad lhe by As MAR is caloulated consitieringboth mture of the acoidcnt thenuurber n risk. For exa:nplc. in peoplepxposed, canbepreseutcd lennsof souoc and/ortarget it cr of MaR sruavouiputeanbegivenin terms r risk l}om aneventto all populations arisk to from all events a singlepopulation.
Page58 of 68
CONFIDENTIAL HIGHLY
407 1 BP-HZN-2 79MDL00 sez
I t
:
i
:
m?ynlcasure a sinSle meilqure$' of'mi(igaiion pc&ntial dtc If evAluntins risk rerlrtccion bc of tir[.o,ttt;rrutirt, lnd thcou*I]ntiut bcucfits hc ulcts.r:caLorlld ;;t,;;;;iliiir priorities tbr A riskrgd*ctionrneasrres. sohemc esta6lisbi'g tbr prioritisurg lirrJ., "i^rii il lbasedorrWEV is showrr TableD.2. : basedon WEV TaUeO.2- Eventprloritisatlon wEV
than3,0 Groater lhan3 x 1o"r Greater Greaterlhan3 x 10'2 {han3 x 10-r Greater lhan 3 x l0{ Greater lhan 3 x l0'5 Greater lhan l x lO'8 Greater Leue thanl x 10
FrloritY
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 I
D.2,4.
Costbenetltconslderatlons busjnes^s any aveilatrletbr sustainable tltat tecognises theresources 11 Tlis apuroaclt a. 'reduceriskarenotiufi$iteandttrat,t'orcertai[decisiolu.costbe[etitaualysrsolnsl( ll reduction may measrtres be approprinte, thnt rrorldto demonsirabe risks prrts of .the use is analysis in common in somo t- I cost u.'unt tlre in otlreilocations, techniq[eis ncrtaocqrted. whercas . arebcingadeqoot"ty n,^nog"d, ; is io tt," ur, u iotib*"fit osptoacb wcll recoqittd 1lf.11 ?L --^-, 'i io, "*,ipla rvitlr the UK standarrl fll. demonstrating tegaft"rluit"ment to rranagerisks in accordnnce 'i ofALAM. : makiug o, ' Dccision D, Figrrre I provi&s arrindication j r. To aid irr decisiorr rmking on fltrtlrerrisk rcduotion, risk to r.rout"J* oppropriate redltce pliority levels' : oiflre indicative in as impacts clescribed 1, 2, Thetotd WEV (iucludingousite, offsite,andenvironmetltal nritigatio' $eastlle(e,g',ss pZ,f) sho{tO oalculatid v'ith andwithouta-pronoscd 1r" : itt Oai iu placeandihc roductionil VEV (AWEV) caloulatcd ! j 3 Thc AI#EV canbc converte'J iuto a riskreductiou priotity rankinglrase4on D.2. Tablc 4,Usingthegtaph,thecorrespondiugindicativeresourcesorereflectedlbrthistisk rcrluction. valuc the capilalcxpendihuc, anuol i[dicativeresolrccs involvc.r 5. If themcasurc by expendrture multiplyingby the sirrgle equivalent shoulilbeoonveiedItto an life rcmainiug oltle facilitY. risks.Ifbusinr:ss und ofpersonncl cnviroilmsntal oonsitlcratitn iacludcs FigurcD.1 !o tcdrcs ir nfsoconsid*crl, it mny'bc opproprittt to usc additionalrcsorucas i"i.r*pti* the tisk,
i n
lrp
Page57 of 68
TIAU CONFIDEN HIGHLY

$ t t
3 100407es 1TsMD BP-HZN-2
i, :
; { t
I
prlorlty riskreductlon spendversus D.1 Ftgure - Indlcative

gandv's hdcatlveSpend FriorltT Rlsl(Rdrrcllon
t1.00oooqilo
lloo'olqo6o
i
i
*.oooorn
n.ooa$o 3t00,o0 tiMo0 u,oro $0(
E t E A ; E. !
Filow gard brRlrh Rodun{6mr.uE
e.
lie tnensures within thcirrespectivc ofvariousmitigation ofwhcthetcosts EvalUnlion caoh to is spends interrded infom (but rrotdiotnto)a conolusionasto vdrether indicativc ot is nreasure io be implemented tlot. For rne{s[res for which the desisionis not to and. shouldbe documented justifierl,i[clrrdingaddressing the implemeut" reasons fcasibility,nnd WEV. effectiveness, safety to in described d. havebeendeveloped increase l. Thecostbcneiitoonsiderations andprotecttlc enviroument. 2. suchasproperty losses, conrmerci0l ngninsf may Mitigationof aDcideuts alsoprotect mayalsobe includcdal the loss. 1'hjsaspect intcmrption arrd. dzunige busincss leader of dissretion lfie BP Operation and to as be shoutd nsed onemechanism aid techniortl brsinuss wEv analysis to judgmont aboutwhichoptionsareappropriate implenrent' the nevcr.be only judgmentantishould tbr is WEV mralysis uot a substihrte such whiclioptionssreto te implcmented' in cousicleration detetrnining may judgment,lvEv analysis for While not s sutrsritute orsitetech[icalandbusi[ess aidirrdecisionurakirrgbysuggestilrgapotentiallyappropriatetevclofrcsourocrto to witb Tc$peot ony given risk rcduotionnpproaoh' expend
f.
making in Otherfactors decision t. 2, 3.
D,2.5,
flsk Conttnuous raductionlh projects cRR (asoP 48-04 of be conceprs ISD should thc firc! means aehieving of u. Theapplication usi'g S'EV as priodtisntiorioffrutherrirk red.ctionmeasrues 6e achieved may applies). in descdbed D.2.3.2. lcvel risk"a tnrget nn do b. Sinccthc MAI{ approach csnot estrbiish ncoeptable/tolerable of to of uderebytheProcess cRR canbc deemed be complete be simply'establishecl, cannor troz,ctr. andthe projectdesign o. d. nn rhoultlbe to <tcliver oprating lhcility'ihstwouldnot of one objeotivo cRR in projects high up on the segsentspnoritisatiou list. immedirtely ferRrrc haverisks whioh wotrld to would be expectud in of le-vel I to 3 (as<lescribed D.2.3.2) Any evurt witha prior.ity any tbaiureot sschn iisl, Th"r"fot"" projectssirouldscehin the fust instance1ornitigaie sltchevents.
#
ll
Page58 of68
407 BP-HZN-217eMDL00 ss4
I I
e.
descrihed approach u5ingthe lrlalj riirk any Fnrrnthereon, atllitional rnitigation hen$sesse(l tnD.2.4.
D.3.
Risk mitigation measures a. be: ahonld meastres Risk reduotiou 1. is to ditTerence cunentsihrafion aPParellt)' Tangible(solrematerial
2.Measurnble(rednctioniJlfrequefcvandi,orconsequenceisevirlerrt). iq 3. Sustainrbte(effectiveness unlikelv to he eroiledovertitoe)' 4, b. Practioal(lossible to inplement)' irrclrrde d:o be that measures should considored ofpoteutitl riok reduction Examples following: t. 2, 3. 4. S. 6. 1, B. g. a Closingtlown or relocating l'acilityol operation' peoPlc, Relocating flnids' Reducingtheinventoryofhazardous fluid' a Sutrstihrting lesshozstdous duriug applicabtc overa higherrisk one(partioularly a Selcctigg lowu risk process of stage.r Fojects)' the npprnisdsolect protection lbr (e,g.,providing blast/fr'e ofan Mitigatingthe conseqnencos qcoideut on buitdirrgsor rnodules offshoreplattbrms)' or fireprooling wutct delugcsystems. sur.rh syutems, rrsprrssive Apply proteotive or provisionof equipmegt elilergarcy isolation'depressruing deinven{oryiugtbr
adingtheSIL levellbr an existingSIS' Additionofa SISor upgr proccdrncs' | 0. Dcvctopitgncwor modifrcd teohniques' inspection ot inspeotiotr useof tretter I 1' Iusrensd
i.
has coutlolof thc activitybut a MAR str.rdy been not ff nf does own rnd haveoperatiorral may be otlretdsk mitigltion I iri (e"g., desorihctl 5.a,olauses and2), there as conducted for inolrtding, arample: thai nreasurea may be pucsuerl, of or I ' Discontinuance modification theactiviS' 2" 3. nrrmgenents' Revisionof cantraotual or ofconhactors W partners' Change
Page 59 of68
: : |:
l
lr
17eMDL00407ee5 BP-HZN-2
AnnexE
(Normative)
events Gategorisation environmental of

set usingthecppronoh out in evenushollbe categorised reaction envimnmenttl Societal to CDP 44-00-01, 1,2, Appcrrdices and3. tlo societal reasons, potential eventlbr envlonmeutal ir. To constifirte rnajotaocident a ooiegorised severity to D il thosesolurrlru. ts A sball rreoctiou be limitedto evenls
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1 BP-HZN-27eMDL004079ee
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CONFIDENTIAL HIGHLY
7eMD100408000 BP-HZN-21
AnnexG (lnformative) modifier leakfrequency otfshore methodotogy Hydrocarbon calculation

G,1.
lntroduclion a. b. spreadsheet MAR Calculator withinthe offshore [enks for The frequencies hydrocarbon arebassl on UKNotih S"a dakr(OIR 12databnse)' within than can elsewhere havediffcrentleakfi'e<lueucies instnllntions BP Bccouse asscts it and conditions IM regitnes, is thtts asset Noth Seaduein part to dift'ering theUK differencar- : for t(t usscls B(3COun( urese kr I'nckrr thesc tr: nco$!ftfy applyr cOrrcction that This Annexwill cxploiutheplooedurs shouldbeusetlto derivetheleakfreqtrency Operotion' modifier tbr o specific.tsP
o,
G.2.
MethodologY a. The correotiotrfactor shouldbe fountl by cornparhgleak datafiom thc uK Nofih seawith BP frou the relevant Opuationandiubseqnertlyfindingtheleak fi'eqtenuy Leakdata bv: is factor.Thig ca'lculotion cnmplioatecl l. Differingplatformcornplexities l) b) o) per per are Lealctie<pencies cnlculated installation year' ofirstallatious, the areusedfor assessing uunrber Hence,ifdifferent npprorches into is inconsistenoy introrluced theoalculation' and siruchrc is counted, manyofthe each In the oIR t2 database, individual units with gteatnumbersof hydrocatbon UK platforarsarelatgeintegrated systems. frequently than.UKasscb, are lvtauyuol UK assets sigtificnntlytcssoomplcx witlr the mgaued leurote satellites, comprisingseverslsnoll urrnranned witlt hydrccarbotr ofbridge liukai ptarfornrs oftr complcxes'consisting nur:sber the$' across distriLruled systenrs 'I'here ofthesedifferingassets aad uo is therefore ob'rious direotcoutpatisotr a and,hence, bcstfit estinateisrequired'
d) -
c) 2.'
b,
Qualityandavailtbility of data fincoths collected has Datl for a1 UKNorth Seaoperrtions beenrigorously d early1990s. with dateis morovuriablc, b) Elscwlicrciu BP, thc availrbiliiyof (cokfi'cquorcy ond the fi.oEr oIR 12databme, ofteubeingdiller.ent tlretcpor|ingstructule develeipctl rigtrurof reptrrtilgis slill being it of Due to the rlitl'sriug cuuditioDs B! assets, seelrsirappropdatcto omit fl leak of litnitstionsin theprocess kr but lirotor, it rs irnporten[ recognise fraluencycotteoti<in andthequnlily cnmplexities hy ibe rteriving firctorthatareposect thediffcringptut.lorm ofthe lcakftoquenov andavnitabilityof lcaLdati. ilencc,to rcllecttheiimitcd accurncy f{ctorswill bc applied: broadlycotegorised only thi foltowhrg factor, I - As NorthSea. Sen' aboveNorth ofrnagnitude 3 - I{atf(iogarithntic)orcler
.Dp
Paga65 of68
1 10040800 TsMD BP-HZN-21
Sea. ahovaNorth of 10- Oneorder nragni{.:tde c. ofa rega:Cilgtheallocatiou leaktequencyfactor,the uncertainty Ifthere is particuter thir detlotlstrating uncettolnty. include se[sitivitycc.ses reportstrould
G.3.
Datacomparlson
a. UK frn 1'betbltowiogarethods cornparing North Senleakdatarvith dataflour therelevant iduutified: havebeen BP Openrtiorr 1. of Courparison o'rqrallleakdata s) of lerk tle cornpares overallBP Operniion dalq indapendent dre This approoah overa range time,with theUK North Sea of sizeof leat<s hasbeencollected lhat (OIR t2 database) trvclallicak dota, oftotal lcaksperplatforolperyesr. as Leaklieqtencvis calculated numbcr
b) 2.
inoidcnlr of Comparison leakdataspeciflingrnajorandsignifioant incidcrrts within thc of majorandsignifroout frcqucncy comparcs a) This nppronolr within theUI( of with tiequency majorandsig[ihcantfurcidents BP Operation North $ea. b) o) O for Minor ilcidents atc not accounted in this case,nsdreyart dccmed frorl. a MAI{ perspective. insignificant is oo ond significnnt, nrinorincidents based the Thedefinitionofmajor:, definitionin theOIR l2 rjatabase.
3,
as is Lcnk frequeucy cnlcrrlateci therumber oftnojor ald siguilicant leaksper plctbrm PerYear' !o into categorisecl equivalentleak tliarnetsrB differentiate Cornpuison of lsnk tJaru (25 betwesn nnraller mm [l in]) urtl llrger ( t 00 mm [4 in]) leaksize otl25m (l in) uud100nrru(4 in) ltolos tic comparcs frequenr:y s) Thiu apprcrar:h of witl within theBP OpeLntion the ftequenoy 25 m:rr(l ir) and 100mu (4 itt) holErin lhe UKNorth Sea. b) o) Thtsc hole sizesate equivalentholsssizes. rate For eachinoideuLtlreiuplM rveragerelense (i,e., nus releateddivided bv arc in prcssurc ofthc systcm whiohtbc rclcagc.ocourcd and druation) opcraling two with these parameters. usedto derivea hole sizsconsistcut that the hns Thisapproach beenuscdto catcrlate relerscfterluencies arersed in lator. theoffsiloreMAR Calcu
tlain of 4. ' Compadson Tr@)c,tion (m publishcdir ihc arouthly"B andP Hcalth nnd 'ltansport compales tle report")- Thisapproach Sofety Spillsandt{C Leakantl in nurnberof lcaks,osreportecl Tr@stion in ths UK" ,rdth ths numberof leaksin t'he BP Operrtion. as tlte of of oompares numher leolcs, tep'oded 5. Comparisou MIA dnta- This upptooch in (thnt in theMIA datnbasc dlawson dainii'omTr@)clion) theUI(, with theotlmhcr of leaksin theBP Opemtion. as conpmes mmbcr of leaks. repoded the of 6. Comporison HiI'o dahr This approach (whieh dtarvson datafi'olr Tt@,ctiotl)h drc UIq with the il the LIiPodatnbrse ofleaks iu the BP O1:eratiou. nuurber
#
CONFIDENTIAL HIGHLY
Paga 66 of 68
79MD100408002 BP-HZN-21
i'; is Ar lank datiris geilerallyreportetlas flre total nunrheroi'!elks in a given BP Operation, t'o impofi.{ut nlwn}s to cnlculntc tic mrnrhcl of lcrlts pcr platibrn p$ vcar to bc nblc compare numbel's acrossBP Operntious of diittrilg sizes c, !-or the rnethods in n. the following thctors should also be 0ccotlntec for-: l. Accounting fcn all plattbrrns or l'nty for manneCplatforms
b)
a)
of BP within tl:e reiev'aut OperatioIr only lo lor Whether accor.nt atl plattbrurs to judgment, for oocouot themmnedplotforns is 0 nntter of eng;iaeeru:g ns not does hnvemanyunmmnedplatfonns thst It is cleemed if o BP Operntion sho[ld he ncmunted platfornrs theuKNortlr Sen,onlymanned comprred with for. ofmanncdto unmtnlcd plntforms u ttrqBP opcrationhasa similurproporiiou fbr' be shotrld accounted ptatlbrms astheUK Nortl Scr, thc unmamed from a less onn platfortns oftenbedcemed significant Unmamred risk majoraccident perspeottve. sooietnl/individual risk platforos canstill posca siguitionnt to visitorsto theplatform Unmaoned risk andfi'omanenvironmental perspective.
e)
North Seaoronly fron witir lenkdataftorn theetttire the Compnr.ing BP Operation North Seatlte $outhern fof North seaor only to Rccount thesouthern for a) whetherto account theentire judgmenl' North Seais olso0 matterof engineering the stucfLu:es' of mainly r:onsists small,non<:ompler b) if tireBP Operation ' datu NorthSea Southern only comparisooshorrkl be with tlLe o) ' ruritswith grcatnumbets lnrgeiutegrated opefote$ similar'ly,if ttreBP Operation be should '.viththeentireNorth sec the systems, oomparisol of hythocarbon
data BP Compndng Operation witlr UK NorthScadato that it <l{tawith llK Northseadatrr, is cleemed compuring BP L lf comparing Operntion for estimato provides nrostaccurnte the incidcr:ts ancl fi.cquencics'ofurajo;r significant ofsirnilar sizcs' lea[<s moclilier,asoneis cor:rparing theieakttequenoy on thus the 2. Ifgufficient datois ovnilablo, factorshoulci bc based ovadl frcquency.of with o<rmpured &e oveTlill within dreBP Operation, brcidctrrs maiurarxlsiCnifiuunt wittrinOIR 12 dntabasc' incidcnts liciucncy olmnjor ondsignitioant could Sirnilntly,dntotiom Tr'(t-r)ction olsobeused. it be drta ncrv, con:paratively Tr@)ction shouldon11' usedorrco since'fr@ctionis still ro durntion be overe luge enotrgh heen tlatahn..q collectetl ,$rfbcietlt is <teemei'that representative. consiclered and that.lll lenksarerepotted drat in that It is importnnt riliour is errgaged cnsnring itr leaksarerepotal esrnajor aud signitica$toudSat rigotrr is engage<l reporting in lonks Tr(1!stiol. tlle on of ttre rcgaril.ing sufticlency l)P operrtionclatn sizcof 19aks. If ihereis anyquestiou o.li indepenrioLt the sizeof lhe lcalgshould tiak hequenoies, overailBp rJperation available [fdata i1 ns lcak lrecltincies rcported the OtR t2 clataLrase' with be comporecl the overntt modificr ti'cqucncy thc ot nvoilablc a l0tcl'stagc, lce.k bcoomo in tttcpicrcncdformets rccordiuglY' sbouldbeupdatcd lesk as data, well astheruajor'/sigrrilictrnt data(or tlte systeuratically lfthe ovetalllealc shouldbe tbt is dot{r) avsit&le, leakflcquency-thctor:s bothdatasets reportedTr@)ctior of to nid calcrilateC compared velify thc consisicncy thercslilt'
bp
Poge67 of 68
CONFIDENTIAL HIGHLY
7eMD100408003 BP-HZN-21
g. -
ir.
oi25 rnrn(1 in) and eqrrivalent iliameters leak leak Comparing 1lequenciesbaqedon this 1o os t00 riun tq itri is noi rccommcndcd, sufticient<idnis oflcn not nvnilablc dcp!.oy approach. on based MIAs, asgenerally to Similnrly,it is not recotulended coupsreleakfiequencies leaks' for not hence accounting srnaller above100bbl arereportcd, only leaics of the and MIAs is still devcloping, hcnce, consistency tlte Furthermtrra, rigcr of reporting alsonot this potedtislincidents, datashould depicts datais doubtful,As theHiPo <Iatabase trcluulleuk lrequenoies. bEuscdiI cv*lua.ting lM mahix dre Oncettreleak teg.renoy faolorhosbccn calculrrted, obtrined lacfor could of the furthetmoretreconparedwitr the IM mstrk asa meursof assessing accuracy theoalculntcd fuotor. zue Bl how thevarious Operations perfoltriugwitlt regrds to 2. This ruat'ix sbows integdty SCETVO' of nuntber overdue (suohastotalSCEWO, leding indicotors wirh costs associated lM) and _ and 6ue related aotions endcomplcbd, expenditut integrity relatedHiPos, in(egrity taggingindicators(ir*egrity retrted rtnjor incidcnts.. reloares). lolated unoonlroUed showhow the tle The M nratrixdoesnot qumrtify indicatonin l. and2,, but it does in with c,ompures otherulils, asrvcll rs tbc rlirection wbichthe relevuut Opcrution BP is BP Opcration moving. uncetninty if feotorhasbeen'let'm'rined,theleis particular Onoethe leakfrequenoy ituhde fnctor,thereportshonldasnrentioned oi the arouncl allocation r leakfiecprency this sensitivitycrsesdtmonstrating unccrhinty'
l.
k'
G,4,
leak maJor/significant data comparing calculalion Sample

n. b. beuscd. of In TqbleG.l, r f'aotor tlueeshould Onewouldjust look at would beflresaure. used,fre oalaulation datawerc If Tr(Qction leaksbetrveeut btrl *nd 100 bbl audleaksnbovt l()tl l:bl" of TableG.l - Adjustment leaklrequencies
Soufce Number ol Incidents
Siqnlficanl Malot
Numberof phtforms 10 71,4
Tlma Numbetof perlod plalform yr (vr)

5 10 50 114
(release Frequency Per blatformvrl
BP Opsratloil UKSouthern NorthSa ACiuelmanl faclor
140
22
__ug.lor Total Si.sNfi-c-q$". 0 , 1 0 0.70 0.00 0,23 0,03

3.06
3.25
3.0s
Paga 68 of 68
i
C HIGHLY ONFIDENTIAL 7eMD100408004 BP-HZN-21

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BP Confidential

DocumentNo. Applicablllty Date

GP 48-50 Group 5 June 2008

BP GROUP ENGINEERING TECHNICAL PRACTICES

-2 BP-HZN 1TeMD a0407e37 L

GP 48-54 MajorAccidentRisk(MAR) Prccess

GP 48-5C Major Accident Risk (MAR) Process

. . . . . . . . . . . ........ . . - . - 2 4 .......-......24 .............26 .........;........... ...........-.-27

79MD 10040793e BP-HZN-21

GP48-50 Process MajorAccidentRisk(MAR)

T a b l eB . 7- E x p l o s i ov u l n e r a b i l i t i e s n .......35 - G e n e r i cm m e d i a tie n i t i o n r o b a b i l i t ife s p r e d e f i n em o d e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6. Table .8 d 8 p i g or 3.

GP 48-50 Process MajorAccidentRisk(lvlAR)

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GP 48-54 Major AccidentRisk(MAR)Process

Pipeline and riser loss of cotrteinmentdatabase.

100407s42 T9MD BP-HZN-21

GP 48-5C Major Accident Risk (MAP) Process

E&P EA ESD F.E F-N FBR

GP 48-50 Accident Risk(MAR)Process lvlajor

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GP 48-50 Prccess AccidentRisk(MAP) lvtajor

Vapourcloud explosion. value. Weighted e:rpectation

should not he inchrdedin the N4ARprocess: The ibllor,vin-e I 2.

L00407e4 79MD BP-HZN-21

Objectivesof the MAR process

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Types of risk covered

GP 48-54 Process Risk(MAR) MaiorAccident

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7gMD BP-HZN-21 LO040795

11. Group reporting lines

lines- onsite Figure2 . Safetygroupreporting Line for FiredFacilities Onsite GroupReporting

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Group Reporting Line for Fixed Facilities - Ofl'site

.Vew Large Facility

1.0E-05 I 0E-06 1.0E-07 1.0E-08

Large F aciliT]" - .Lnrge Iacrlrt-v

5 iune 2008 BP Confidential

12. Groupingof oPerations

5 iune 2008 BP Confidential 1. 2.

14. MAR and more detailedstudies

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Rtrk Accident WAPfF'i::: Maior

o'base studies case" M.AR 15. Updatingof

Such changesma-vinchide: I. 2. :1.

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16. Confidentialityof information

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R"* Accident MAR1F:"::: Maiot

and scenariodevelopment Methodology

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10. lvlerox unit. I 1. Colier.

Rtrk Accident (MAR?Fr:f:: Maior

Event likelihood and consequence a. b. c. d. e.

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electfical Mdium equrpmenl (nonclassified "i*