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Critical Studies on Terrorism

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Analysing elite discourse on terrorism and its implications: the case of Morocco
Valentina Bartoluccia a Department of Peace Studies, Bradford University, Bradford, UK Online publication date: 23 April 2010

To cite this Article Bartolucci, Valentina(2010) 'Analysing elite discourse on terrorism and its implications: the case of

Morocco', Critical Studies on Terrorism, 3: 1, 119 135 To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/17539151003594269 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17539151003594269

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Critical Studies on Terrorism Vol. 3, No. 1, April 2010, 119135

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Critical 1753-9161 1753-9153 RTER Studies on Terrorism, Vol. 3, No. 1, February 2010: pp. 00 Terrorism

Analysing elite discourse on terrorism and its implications: the case of Morocco
Valentina Bartolucci*
V. Bartolucci Critical Studies on Terrorism

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Department of Peace Studies, Bradford University, Bradford, UK This paper approaches terrorism as a discursive construction. The discussion concentrates on the Moroccan governments representations of terrorism. The social and political construction of radicalism and extremism as the major causes of (Islamist) terrorism in Morocco is shaped by the global understanding of these phenomena and is intimately entwined with understandings and policies within the country itself. This paper aims at shedding light on the possible implications of such labelling beyond the formulation, acceptance, and implementation of a counter-terrorism strategy. Special attention is devoted to the governments appropriation of the discourse on terrorism to further domestic agendas and to target specific groups. Critical Terrorism Studies is welcomed, especially for the emphasis it puts on the artificiality of terrorism and for its aim to destabilise dominant interpretations and demonstrate the inherently contested and political nature of the discourse to reveal the politics behind seemingly neutral knowledge, a central concern also of Critical Discourse Analysis. Keywords: terrorism; discourse; Critical Discourse Analysis; Islamism; Morocco

Introduction The labelling of the September 2001 events as acts of terrorism has allowed the (re)production of a discourse that has been uncritically accepted and widely reproduced up to the point of it becoming the principal security discourse at the global level. To analyse the events of September 2001, it is necessary to keep in mind that the framing of these events as terrorism results from a deliberate choice, not an explication of the Truth. This helps in understanding the linguistic constructions around terrorism and the implications of the creation of the terrorism and counter-terrorism discourse and practice. Framing an event as terrorism is not a natural act, nor it is neutral, and alternative framings are always possible. Furthermore, different constructions bring with them different kinds of actions. Larsen (1997) argues that when something is considered rational, it is because it is only the expression of the temporary hegemony of a particular political discourse (p. 22). This insight is important as it indicates that understandings of terrorism are shaped by a temporary and constructed hegemony of understanding of what terrorism is and the global War on Terror paradigm, interacting with other discourses on security, threat, religion and identity.

*Email: v.bartolucci@bradford.ac.uk
ISSN 1753-9153 print/ISSN 1753-9161 online 2010 Taylor & Francis DOI: 10.1080/17539151003594269 http://www.informaworld.com

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Although interest in the discursive formation of (counter-)terrorism is growing (Jackson 2005, 2006, 2007b, Silberstein 2004), in comparison with the thousands of academic publications on terrorism and counter-terrorism, the limited quantity of analyses devoted to the language and discourse on terrorism illustrates that much more work remains to be done. The analysis is informed by Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) and is carried out through the lens of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). CTS is especially welcome for the emphasis it places on the artificiality of terrorism and for its aim to destabilise dominant interpretations and demonstrate the inherently contested and political nature of the discourse to reveal the politics behind seemingly neutral knowledge (Jackson 2007b, p. 247), a central concern also of CDA. For CDA, there is a dialectical relationship between discourses and social structures: language is viewed as a social practice, and discourse is seen as contributing to the construction of the social world. At the same time, discourses are seen as constituted by other social practices (Fairclough and Wodak 1997). This paper critically analyses the main features of the elite political discourse on terrorism interlinked with the counter-terrorism discourse, and its implications beyond the formulation and acceptance of the counter-terrorism strategy known as the War on Terror. It seeks to contribute to further opening a critical space of reflection in seeing terrorism primarily as a discourse and to underline the implications of such discourse beyond words. The discourse on terrorism is analysed in the first part of the article. The (re-)production of the terrorism discourse in parallel with the discourse of the War on Terror in Morocco is addressed in the second part. These two parts, together with an analysis of the linkages constructed between terrorism, radicalism, and Islamism in the elite political discourse, serve as the basis of the overall argument to show some of the implications that this discourse can have. Critical Discourse Analysis of terrorism Terrorism is a ubiquitous discourse with diffuse effects on many aspects of the public and private lives of individuals, and it conditions many dimensions of contemporary life.1 The discourse on terrorism, its associated narratives and interlinked discourses, is articulated within academic, political, media, and cultural productions and is widely present in daily conversations and political debates. It has become so pervasive as to be found in popular jokes, designs for tattoos, novels, children books, and television programmes (Croft 2006). The presumed objectivity of the discourse, facilitated by the media representation of the collapse of the Twin Towers live, facilitates an impression of impartial truth towards which there is no room for discussion. The success of the discourse on terrorism is illustrated by the extent of its hegemony in public debates. Certainly, a discourse is never completely hegemonic and voices of dissent always exist. In the case of the discourse on terrorism, however, for a series of reasons starting from its immoral and taboo connotations, such dissent has been slow to emerge. Although loaded with assumptions, cultural biases, and moral charges, terrorism is used uncritically and unreflectively with far-reaching consequences. Indeed, it is difficult to overestimate the importance of such a discourse, given its appropriation to justify military interventions and stricter security controls, among others actions. What is striking when approaching this discourse is its extraordinary level of consistency among different genres, spaces and times. The same set of words and linguistic constructions is used, reproduced again and again, and finally naturalised. It becomes common-sense. Indeed, to understand the events of 11 September 2001 as terrorism becomes so evident, so clear, so true that the fact of putting it under discussion is unthinkable. In the words of

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Zulaika and Douglass (1996), Terrorism is so real that it requires no frame, so true that no interpretation is necessary, so concrete that no meaning need to be inferred (p. 5). The English-speaking academic literature on terrorism is extremely rich,2 and literature focusing on counter-terrorism issues is also extensive.3 However, critical analyses are rare, and apart from few notable exceptions (see George 1991, Rogers 2007, Zulaika and Douglass 1996, and the CTS scholars) analyses from the Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) scholars tend consistently to reproduce the same conceptualisations and understanding of terrorism briefly presented below. Similarly, language or discourse-based analyses of terrorism and counterterrorism, while growing, remain few.4 The defining work on the discourse of terrorism remains Terror and Taboo: The Follies, Fables and Faces of Terrorism (Zulaika and Douglass 1996), with the work of Jackson (2005, 2007a,b,c) further opening this space of analysis. This paper is informed by an emerging new avenue of research in terrorism studies that goes under the name of CTS composed of a growing number of scholars. CTS scholars acknowledge a number of conceptual, methodological, and epistemological problems affecting mainstream terrorism studies (Jackson 2007b). Attention is drawn toward the failure of mainstream terrorism studies to develop rigorous theories, its over-reliance on secondary data, its unwarranted assumptions (such as the exceptional character of new terrorism) which obscure debate, and the failure to appreciate culturalideological biases in a field dominated by a Western view. Moreover, it refuses to treat terrorism as an ontologically stable and objective phenomenon that can be uncritically approached. Rather, the same notion of terrorism is put under a critical analysis and the consequences of its use are scrutinised. The objectification of terrorism is contested, together with the tendency of reinforcing and reproducing many of the dominant myths about it. Thus, attention to the discursive foundations which make terrorism studies possible in the first place is deemed necessary by CTS scholars. CDA seems to be an ideal framework to address the importance of analysing the terrorism discourse and its implications. It is a research agenda aimed both at providing an analysis of discourses and to discerning connections between language and other elements in social life that are often opaque (Fairclough 2003). For CDA, there is a dialectical relationship between discourses and social structures: language is seen as a social practice and discourse as contributing to the construction of the social word. At the same time, discourses are seen as constituted by other social practices (Fairclough and Wodak 1997). CDA sees discourses not as neutral ways of describing the world, but as ways of reproducing or challenging relations of power and dominance in society. Indeed, particular attention is devoted to the relation between language and power (Wodak and de Cillia 1997). Operationally, CDA complements the linguistic analysis of discursive texts with an interdisciplinary approach directed at the deconstruction of the whole socio-political and historical contexts in which discourses are embedded (Fairclough 1992). The analytical part of this article is based on a textual analysis of data collected from policy documents and statements and twelve interviews with European diplomatic officials and Moroccan government representatives, as well as one academic and one religious leader. Access to official documents and information on government practices has often proved difficult. This difficulty reflects and reproduces the securitisation of Islamism, radicalism, and terrorism in Morocco. Given its sensitive nature, many institutions have no interest in releasing documents or information on terrorism and related issues. These problems were partially overcome by using contacts developed when working closely with governmental officials for a period of two years. Primary texts are reported as they were actually presented, without any correction or modification, barring the use of text highlighting to drawn out the nature of the analysis undertaken.

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Prevalent conceptualisations of terrorism Today, the term terrorism is so widely used and misused that it is becoming meaningless (Mockaitis and Rich 2003). The meaning of the term has changed significantly since its first use, when it qualified French revolutionary actions against domestic enemies in 1793 and 1794 (Tilly 2004). The word terror, from which terrorism derives, indicated violence perpetuated by the dominant forces of a society (Laqueur 2000) and it did not have the negative connotation that modern terrorism has. This definition has been abandoned in favour of the contrary: modern definitions of terrorism carry with them a negative connotations (Hoffmann 2006, p. 23). Many manipulations, unfounded beliefs, and assumptions hamper a detached understanding of terrorism. Here, only the most common understandings of terrorism are considered in order to highlight major disputes and neglected debates. First, according to the prevalent understanding, terrorism is perpetuated by non-state actors targeting the West. Wilkinson (1981) argues that the term terrorism is now widely used to denote the systematic use of terror by non-governmental actors (p. 467). Although historically state terrorism has been immense, and the West and its clients have been the major agents (Hermann and OSullivan 1991, p. 49), when discussing terrorism the dominant official discourse normally refers to the use of terrorism by extremist non-state actors targeting the state, neglecting the issue of state terrorism. As pointed out by Alexander George, the term terrorism has been virtually appropriated by mainstream political discussion to signify atrocities targeting the West (George 1991, p. 1). The understanding of the West as a victim of terrorism has also been promoted by the mass media (George 1991, p. 43). Rolston (1991) argued that the reason why it is so difficult to assess accurately governments actions comes from the habit of the Western governments to warp terms systematically. Hermann and OSullivan (1991), however, showed that historically state terrorism caused many more killings than terrorism perpetuated by non-state actors. Despite that, the targets of terrorism are usually considered to be innocents, non-combatants, and victims living in the West. Following this logic, terrorism ends up being related to anti-state rebels or extremists and the use of counter-terrorism intended as the Western strategy to retaliate against the terror perpetuated against the West (Hermann and OSullivan 1991, p. 50). Indeed, in the dominant discourse the West and its clients only retaliate and engage in counter-terror its victims and other enemies terrorize (p. 50). The language of terrorism is manipulated to assume that if practiced by a lawful state it is legitimate self-defence, if practiced by a sub state group it is terrorism (Zulaika and Douglass 1996). Second, terrorism is an emotive subject (Silke 2001, p. 2) and a morally detached analysis is difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. Due to this reality, the political agenda on terrorism has important implications in shaping and limiting research agendas and approaches: some aspects of terrorism are widely researched and written about (e.g., research on WMD terrorism) while others are relegated to marginal positions in the debates (e.g., state terrorism). Third, modern terrorism is widely considered a new phenomenon. Since the late 1990s, many scholars and experts on terrorism have started to talk about a new form of terrorism (Laqueur 2003, Carter et al. 2002). This tendency further increased following the 11 September 2001 events. Although it has been argued that terrorism is a phenomenon as old as the hills (Laqueur 1990, p. 69), as a term it started to be commonly used only in the early 20th century, and it started to be seen as one of the prevalent concerns in the security debates of many countries only during the 1970s. Zulaika and Douglass (1996) note:
The year 1972 marked a major transition in the framing of the medias treatment of political violence. Events that previously were covered under the rubrics of assassination, bombing,

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torture, repression, massacre, etc., were now classified as terrorism. The word (and hence the concept) was catching on.

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In the late 1970s, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) claimed that since 1968 the number of terrorist incidents occurred was 3336. Just one year later, in its report, the number of incidents reported was increased to 6714 over the same period (Zulaika and Douglass 1996). As pointed out by Zulaika and Douglass: the reasons for the dramatic increase in just one year were definitional. It was decided, retrospectively, to include in the statistics threats and hoaxes. Depending on how acts are characterized, terrorism multiplies (p. 23). This tendency also emerges from the analysis of the Moroccan elite political discourse on terrorism. In Morocco, indeed, terrorism started to exist and to permeate public debates and media coverage only very recently. Previously, similar acts of violence were not named terrorism and, thus, terrorism did not exist. Fourth, terrorism is widely associated with Islamist/ic terrorism and Islamist/ic radicalism, and since 2001 it has become increasingly associated with the al-Qaeda network.5 This move has been also registered in the Moroccan context and is not a completely new feature of the dominant discourse on terrorism. Van Dijk (1995) reports that already in 1993 most articles linked terror, terrorism or terrorists to Muslims and Muslim Fundamentalists. He showed that virtually no articles in the NYT [The New York Times] or the WP [The Washington Post] link terrorism with other actors and places of political violence in the world . . . (Van Dijk 1995, p. 150). This tendency was further strengthened following the 2001 events in the United States. Nine days after the attacks, George W. Bush said: Al Qaeda is to terror what the Mafia is to crime. But its goal is not making money; its goal is remaking the world and imposing its radical beliefs on people everywhere (Office of the Press Secretary 2001). The above analysis clearly shows how the concept of terrorism is not neutral or natural, but has been socially and politically constructed and reframed, in particular after the 11 September 2001. The next section analyses the dominant public terrorism discourse. The above discussion, linked with the next section, helps to frame the analysis of the Moroccan discourse where the reproduction of the assumptions here identified will emerge, together with other specific Moroccan narratives.

US elite political discourse on terrorism The terrorism discourse (re)constructed in the aftermath of the 2001 events can be analysed as an Othering discourse in which our positive attributes are contrasted with the negativity of theirs. Such a discourse is characterised by a binary opposition between good and evil. In analysing recent published material on terrorism, Van Dijks notions of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation are particularly useful. In the majority of official pronouncements, the polarisation between us (Americans, Westerners), and them (terrorists, Arabs, Muslims fundamentalists, etc.) clearly emerges. The following statements by Bush are illustrative:
Americans are asking, why do they hate us? They hate what we see right here in this chamber a democratically elected government. Their leaders are self-appointed. They hate our freedoms our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other. (Office of the Press Secretary 2001) These terrorists kill not merely to end lives, but to disrupt and end a way of life. With every atrocity, they hope that America grows fearful, retreating from the world and forsaking our friends. They stand against us, because we stand in their way. (Office of the Press Secretary 2001)

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The us versus them polarisation reached the highest point in Bushs youre either with us, or against us speech (Bush 2002a).6 Such polarisation dividing the moral us versus the immoral them oversimplifies such a complex topic, reducing it to a broad binary opposition using condensational symbols. No middle ground is possible indeed, organisations become either not terrorist or terrorist and people are either on the side of terrorism or against it. This dichotomous form is expressed through language such as extremist, coward, or vicious, which pejoratively places terrorists in the category of evildoers. Terminological slippages and conflations, overlaps and collisions between terms are widespread at all levels of the discourse on terrorism, and not only at the level of the political elite. Here I will focus upon the speeches of Bush and a small amount of additional data coming from the Proceedings of the 2006 Weinberg Founders Conference, that have been included to reiterate the main points. In the discourse under analysis, the terrorists are depicted as blaspheming their own God, perverting, defiling, and hijacking Islam, having a false religion or no religion at all. See, for instance, the following statements:
those who commit evil in the name of Allah blaspheme the name of Allah. The terrorists are traitors to their own faith, trying, in effect, to hijack Islam itself. (Bush 2001) in the name of some kind of false religion. (Bush 2002b) Our enemies dont follow the great traditions of Islam. Theyve hijacked a great religion. (Bush 2002c)

The attention granted to the religious dimension of the enemy follows the current dominant understanding of terrorism as being no longer motivated by mainly political reasons but rather religious ones (Juergensmeyer 2000). In all public speeches covering the issue of terrorism, attention is exclusively devoted to so-called Islamic terrorism, completely neglecting other terrorisms and failing to acknowledge such problematic notions. This has political implications. For instance, as pointed out by Ahmed (2003), the fact that all 19 of the hijackers were Muslims appeared to condemn by association every Muslim on the planet. Any expression of Muslim identity risked the fear of being suspected as terrorist activity (p. 34). The political elite discourse on terrorism is deeply characterised by the terminological linkages between terrorism, radicalism and Islam/ism. The imprecise use of Islam, Islamism, (Islamist/ic) terrorism and clash of civilisation is not a recent feature of the political discourse. The 2001 events only exacerbate these formulations, and thus suspicion toward the Muslim world. As Mozaffari (2001) has noted:
Subsequent to the tragic events of September 11th, we witness an impressive disorder and great confusion in the following terms and concepts War, Crusade, Jihad, Clash of Civilisation, Islam, Islamism, Islamic terrorism and so forth and so on. This confusion could be misleading and to such an extent that it could lead to immensurable and disastrous consequences. (p. 1; emphasis added)

While suspicion toward the Muslim world by Christian Europe can be found from the time Islam appeared (Hourani 1991), it is after the 2001 events that the link between Islam and terrorism emerged as the central concern of the US Administration and more generally of the West. Since September 2001, Islam has been invoked, written about, challenged, and defended in a variety of forums (Lawrence 2002, p. 485). Political discussions around Islam and terrorism, initially associated with Samuel Huntingtons widely cited but increasingly discredited Clash of Civilizations (Huntington 1996), demonised Islam and linked it to catastrophic images of ongoing terrorist attacks.

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Later, that general argument came to be modified by a more precise line of thought which asserted that terrorism was not generically derived from Islam, but from a particular interpretation of it that of Wahhabi Islam, a strict Sunni interpretation prevalent in Saudi Arabia. Many observers have pointed out that misperceptions, farfetched stories about Islam, and invented connections between Muslims and terrorism have been the guiding factors in shaping the attitudes of the American establishment toward the Muslim world (Bulliet 2003, p. 10). A deluge of stereotypes, such as the vision of the West as secular, advanced and civilised in contraposition to a Muslim and Arab world seen as barbaric, permeated discussions around terrorism. This pervasiveness of stereotypes has been present in all domains. While Mamdani (2004) has analysed the link between Islam and terrorism in the media coverage, this construction has been widely echoed beyond media circles. Among English-speaking scholars, influential academics such as Bernard Lewis and Francis Fukuyama have written about Islam and Arabs with a recurrent negativity, accenting Western exceptionality in their work (Lewis 2002, Fukuyama and Naday 2002). Western societies are represented as modern, marked-oriented, liberal, and democratic in opposition to Muslims societies with their traditional customs that hamper their modernisation and acceptance of West and, in particular, the United States. Indeed, these scholars often predict a clash of civilizations will emerge (Lewis 1990, Huntington 1996). Similarly, while on several occasions the Bush Administration distanced itself from anti-Islamist statements, reiterating that Islam is a religion of peace, public statements reveal a pattern of anti-Islamist polemics. Several Muslim associations and civil right groups, for instance, have considered the Patriotic Act, initiated by the Bush Administration, as anti-Muslim (Haddad 2004, pp. 104f.). Indeed, despite rhetorical attempts made by Bush to disconnect terrorism from Islam, these have become conflated with the wider debate about security more generally. As pointed out by Ahmed (2003):
The idea of Islam as an enemy was gaining ground in the West in spite of Western leaders insisting this was not true. From the beginning, bin Laden, who had threatened the United States with mass terror on several occasions, was widely believed to have been the mastermind of the attacks. If a Peruvian or a Japanese cult stepped forward and claimed that it had organised the attacks, it would have been hard to accept. In the public mind, Islam was to blame.

The prevalent division indeed seems to be located not between terrorists and civilians, but between bad Muslims and good ones (Mamdani 2004). As already pointed out, politicians such as Tony Blair and Bush reiterated on many occasion the need to distinguish between the good and the bad. In the Moroccan context, King Mohammed VI often reiterates the distinction between good Islam, identified in the Malekite school, and the bad one, of Saudi influence, to be ostracised. In US political elite discourse on terrorism, radicalism and radicalisation are considered major global threats leading to terrorism. The statement by Satloff, Executive Director of The Washington Institute and US National Security Council Advisor, speaking at the 2006 Weinberg Founders Conference, is indicative of this trend:
Virtually no corner of the world remains immune to the threat of radical Islamists. Africa, Asia, Europe, the two Americas in different ways, using different means, and operating under different guises, jihadists of various stripes have waged war against infidels (America, Israel, the West) and apostates (non-Islamist Muslims) around the globe. In some respects, the radicals are in ascendance. (Weinberg Founders Conference 2006, p. ix)

This quote illustrates how terms are conflated and how this reinforces the link between Islamists, radicals and jihadists: it moves from radical (adjective) Islamists, to jihadists

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(implying that radical Islamists and jihadists are the same), and then to radicals, a noun, as short-hand for radical Islamists that are by implication jihadists. Indeed, radical as a descriptive qualification shifts to radical as a noun thus moving the object of concern from particular Islamists to all radicals. It is this conflation that allows Satloff to view the following as positive. Satloff considers it a positive sign that leaders and commentators are beginning to refer to the global contest now underway as a battle against radical Islamism, not just an amorphous and ill-defined War on Terror (Weinberg Founders Conference 2006, p. ix). In writing that the target of the War on Terror has to be radical Islamism, this crucial statement exemplifies the prevalent assumptions equating terrorists with radical Islamists. Terms are also mixed in the statement by Philip Zelikow, Counsellor of the US State Department and former Executive Director of the 9/11 Commission and Director of the University of Virginias Miller Center of Public Affairs:
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We saw the rise of political Islam, its decline in the 1990s, and perhaps now were seeing its resurgence again. Were seeing the growth of violent Islamic extremism, which President Bush has referred to using a more commonplace and less academic phrase: Islamic radicalism. (Weinberg Founders Conference 2006, p. 4)7

Zelikow underlines that the Bush Administration, among other priorities, is adopting a whole series of new strategies for combating terrorism . . . new attention to the role of Islamic radicalism, the willingness to confront those ideologies directly . . . (Weinberg Founders Conference 2006, p. 7). The assumption of causal linkages between radicalism and terrorism is even clearer when addressing the counter-terrorism strategy. For Fiscal Year 2008, the US Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations (2007) includes a specific budget line for De-legitimizing terrorist ideology. In one of his speeches, Bush said: The hatred of the radicals existed before Iraq was an issue . . . and it will exist after Iraq is no longer an excuse (Bush 2005). As further analysed below, such semantic mixes and assumptions not only hamper a detached understanding of these phenomena, but also have important political implications. From such understandings Islamists, radical or not, end up being considered as potential terrorists. Indeed, Islamist groups are seen as the target group because they are considered vulnerable to the appeal of terrorist violence. The misuse of the label terrorism is further analysed in the following section in relation to Morocco. There, the elite political discourse on terrorism, linked with other discourses (radicalism, extremism and Islamism), has been used to marginalise groups considered by the political establishment potentially dangerous, such as Justice and Charity, to further domestic agendas (such as the control over the Western Sahara), and to strengthen national support around the monarchy. All this is discussed in the following sections focused on the reframing of the terrorism discourse in Morocco and the implications of such discourse. Terrorism discourse in Morocco Morocco is an interesting case to analyse for the following reasons. First, in Morocco, terrorism started to be perceived as a threat only recently and the word terrorism started to be widely used after the events of 11 September 2001 in the United States and even more following the 2003 Casablanca bombings and the subsequent involvement of Moroccans in other episodes such as in Madrid. Second, Morocco, while critical of US support for Israel, is the principal ally of the War on Terror in the region, placing it in an ambivalent position. Third, it is interesting to see whether and how the Moroccan terrorism discourse

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differs from the Western one and how it has been incorporated in the public narrative. Finally, it allows an exploration of the discursive relationship between Islamism, radicalism and terrorism, and of the conflation of these discourses in an exceptional Muslim country considered for so long immune to these threats. In order to understand the implications of the terrorism discourse in Morocco, it is useful to point out that Morocco has a long history of moderate and tolerant Islamism. Morocco is a constitutional monarchy, and according to the 1962 constitution, the king is both the highest political and the highest religious authority. The king is amir al-muminin (commander of the believers) and even though he has taken incremental liberalising steps, he retains supreme powers (including the power of life and death over his subjects). The slogan Allah, al Watan, al Malik (Allah, the homeland, the king) is ubiquitous: in all police stations, public offices and even carved onto mountains as a demonstration of the strong link between political power, nationalism and religious faith. In the Moroccan context, terrorism is solely understood as Islamist terrorism and radicalism is seen as one of the primary causes of terrorism. Indeed, the assumption that radicalisation leads to terrorism is common. However, these issues are not often openly addressed in public speeches. Official speeches or government documents dealing with these phenomena are not common and not publicly available. This tendency to silence these phenomena is typical of the Moroccan government. As one diplomatic officer claimed: if you do not talk publicly about terrorism, it does not exist in the mind of people. Contrary, if you explicitly refer to it the risk of attractiveness toward violence can increase.8 It can also be argued that the Moroccan government has difficulty in admitting that the terrorist appeal and radicalisation can originate from inside Morocco, thus indirectly acknowledging the existence of problems in the Moroccan development model and the authoritarian nature of power. Despite that, terrorism is widely covered by newspapers and weekly magazines and the term is widely used in relation to the question of the Western Sahara and for categorising certain dangerous groups, such as Islamist associations. In the discourse, radical-ism/isation are considered the main factors leading to terrorism (understood as Islamic terrorism). In Moroccan elite political discourse, explicit references to the existence of a causal relation between Islamic radicalism and terrorism are rare. In different interviews, however, it has emerged that the specific Moroccan environment, anchored to Islamic values but also very attracted to modernisation, can foster radicalisation, in particular of youths and thus can lead to terrorism.9 Furthermore, the governments practical actions show that the issue of radicalisation is taken seriously as a way of preventing terrorist violence. In 2003, the Human Development Initiative was launched with the aim of combating poverty as a means to combat radicalism and terrorism.10 In addition, King Mohammed VI has stressed his control over the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and over the imams. Indeed, particular attention has been devoted to the teaching of good Islam, particularly in schools. The Dahir (law) No. 1-03-193 of December 2003, establishing the roles and the organisation of the Minister of the Habous and Islamic Affairs, stated in article 8 that one of the functions of the Directorate of the Islamic Affairs is to spread the authentic concepts of the Muslim religion and to work to diffuse the Islamic precepts of tolerance and its true values (Dahir No. 1-03-193, 2003). Mohammed VI has often differentiated between a good and a bad Islam. For instance, he states:
Is there thus a need for the Moroccan people, strong of the unity of his religious rite and of the authenticity of his civilisation, of importing rites of cult foreign to his traditions? No, we will not tolerate that, for the additional reason that these doctrines are incompatible with the specific Moroccan identity. (Mohammed VI 2003)

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On the other hand, radicalism is linked with Islamism. In the aftermath of the 2003 Casablanca bombings, the governments reaction was to attempt to draw an explicit link with international terrorism. When international linkages were found hard to prove, terrorism started to be associated with radicalism, with the focus on the roots of radicalism soon identified in Islamism. The local authorities labelled the majority of those involved [in the Casablanca attacks] as members of Salafia Jihadia, a term that became common currency after the attacks (Pargeter 2005). However, some observers argued that all these labels . . . are far removed from reality and the security services wanted to put all the Islamic currents onto one shelf (Idris Wilt al-Kaliba, cited in Pargeter 2005). Government speeches in the aftermath of the 2003 bombings outlined a direct link between terrorism as perpetuated by radicalised Islamists and the necessity of strengthening security and control measures against them. The same can be noted with regard to the association between fundamentalism and Islam (Said 1997). Again, this can be considered another clear case of public narrative influencing the policy formulation process. Other scholars have already shown this link in other counter-terrorism discourses (Jackson 2005, 2007c, Van Dijk 2005). In the discourse, a simple logic of causation is implicitly assumed in such a way that the link between radicalism and terrorism becomes indissoluble. Similarly, as Islamists are considered the most vulnerable to radicalisation they end up being considered terroristes en puissance (potential terrorists) (Dialmy 2003, 2005). According to Professor Darif, the government does not distinguish between fundamentalism and terrorism, at the risk of confusing non-violent radicals with real terrorists.11 In several official speeches, conflations between the discourses on radicalism, extremism, Islamism and terrorism occur. For example, when talking about the crucial role of imams the king said:
It is your role . . . to incite them [the faithful] to fight extremism, ostracism and terrorism, through the dissemination of noble ideals that Islam recommends, and that are a bastion to spare our country from the unacceptable scourges of fanaticism and the excess pushed to the extreme. (Mohammed VI 2008)

In such a fragment, extremism, ostracism and terrorism are put on the same level linked with the conjunction and creating the impression of a continuum between the first and the last. Furthermore, during interviews it was commonly acknowledged that terrorist violence attracted poor people with very little who can easily get entangled in the mysticism around Islam, which makes them willing to do anything in order to get to paradise.12 In this fragment, the discourses on poverty, religion and violence are clearly mixed. In such a statement, the assumption that poverty is a factor causally linked to the radicalisation of individuals and to terrorism is reiterated. The validity of these assumptions can be contested but what matters here are the strong implications deriving from such terminological mixes and simple causal understanding.13 As already pointed out, different constructions, in fact, bring with them different kinds of actions. Thus, for instance, if the prevalent discourse portrays radical Islamists as particularly disposed to violence, common reactions would be of fear and suspicion toward them.

Implications of the terrorism discourse in Morocco The central argument of this article is that the official public discourse reproduced and propagated by media, think-tanks and academic institutions among others, sets the logic and possibilities of the policy formulation of the counter-terrorism strategy and helps

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create legitimacy and social consensus (Jackson 2007c); but it has also other functions. Indeed, this discourse impacts on all aspects of public and private life. Some of the implications of this discourse are addressed in this section. This article does not focus on the Moroccan government reaction to terrorism. It is enough to say that Morocco has reacted to the terrorism threat quickly and strongly. An anti-terrorism law Law 03-03 was approved in May 2003 with a definition of terrorism so broad as to include the promulgation and dissemination of propaganda or advertisement in support of deliberate acts whose main objective is to disrupt public order by intimidation, force, violence, fear or terror (Law 03-03, 2003). The lack of proper definition and categorisation of terrorism in the law has had consequences for its fair application: for instance 5000 people have been arrested under the antiterrorism law in the space of a few months, often in a non transparent way (Vermeren 2004). Far stronger powers have been used to detain and arrest Islamist militants, even on the basis of suspicion alone, as well as longer prison sentences and the application of death penalty for grave crimes that caused death to one or more persons (article 218-3). Here the focus is rather on the linkages between terrorism and Islamism in the elite political discourse and especially on the construction of (moderate) Islamists as potentially dangerous and thereby needing to be kept under control. However, according to several observers, the inclusion of the Islamist political party (Party of Justice and Development PJD) in the political life of the country has been a good strategy to promote a peaceful Islamism. The FAS reported that U.S. officials in Morocco state that the United States should pursue a policy of engagement with the PJD rather than ignore it (Vermeren 2004). This approach seems to reflect Makram-Ebeids concern:
there is no doubt that the rise of Islamist parties is a source of great concern for the West . . . However, the main problem . . . is that there is no alternative to the Islamist parties. . . . they cannot be eradicated; the remaining alternative is to legalize them and open the door to their participation in politics. This strategy is clearly one with large risks; however, the examples of Turkey and Algeria show that it is the best approach . . . Secular party leaders have also been compelled to join forces with Islamists, because, alone, they are unable to garner the same level of popular support. (Weinberg Founders Conference 2006, p. 29)

One of the reasons why the US aims to strengthen its relations with the PJD in particular is explained by Mustapha Khalfi (a member of PJD) who says: The US needs to show that it has no problem with Islam. So it is encouraging the PJD model as a moderate Islamist model for other Arab and Muslim countries (Kristianasen 2007). It must be said that the Moroccan government has had an ambivalent position toward Islamism, and the official position toward Islamist movements is still unclear. Initially, after negating the existence of a Moroccan Islamism, the Makhzen14 tried to associate it with terrorism, fascism and obscurantism in order to discredit it (Vermeren 2004). Since the beginning of the 1990s, Hassan II attempted to control the growing influence of Islamism in the country, isolating the radical component and integrating what appeared to be the most respectable one, in order to have an interface between the Islamist movement and the Palace (Mohsen-Finan 2005). The Islamist movement, indeed, has always been a source of concern for the Moroccan monarchy, in part because the Islamists put under discussion the monarchical control on religion and try to dissociate it from the monarchy. The PJD was initially incorporated in the political life of Morocco as a way of having it under the power and control of the Makhzen. In fact, the legitimisation of the PJD as an Islamist political party presupposed the recognition of the king as the highest temporal and spiritual authority. The entrance of the PJD in the political system did challenge a few

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things: members of the party reserved themselves the right to oppose some government decisions, such as the issue of micro-credit or the reform of the Moudawana (code of personal status) and its popularity seemed to grow. The 2003 bombings in Casablanca, however, strongly affected the status of PJD at the popular level. In the aftermath of the bombings, the PJD has been attacked for its supposed moral responsibility for the terrorist attacks, for its moralising and populist discourse, and for the invoked amalgam between religion and politics that exacerbated passions (Mohsen-Finan 2005). Members of the government, such as the Minister of Justice, went as far as asking for its dissolution. As a result, the political party was considerably marginalised, despite its repeated repudiation of terrorism and violence more generally. In the face of the accusations against it, the leaders of the PJD decided to autoregulate themselves during the elections of summer 2003. Responding to the will of the Palace, the leaders of the PJD, the main opposition force, decided to be contest only in the 18% of the ridings and not to stand candidates in cities like Casablanca (the most likely pro-PJD area). Despite that, wherever present, the party has had success. The situation of the Islamist groups (in particular the PJD, Justice and Charity, Badil Al Hadari and Al Oumma) further deteriorated after the February 2008 dismantling of a large terrorist network, referred as rseau terroriste Belliraj. Members of Islamist political parties and Islamist movements have been heavily implicated. After the presumed implication of Mustapha Motassim, leader of Badil Al Hadari in the affaire Belliraj, the party was dismantled two days later without suspension being sought (suspension is possible under article 50 of the law on political parties). A member of the PJD was also arrested and members of the Islamist party Al Oumma, not officially integrated in the political game but tolerated by the government, were also arrested. On 21 February, Ahmed Herzenni, President of the Human Rights Consultative Council (CCDH), was reported to be in favour of the eradication of the Islamic movement (Chadi and Amar 2008, p. 30). The heavy involvement of Islamist parties in the affair has been officially justified by the fact that Islamists parties are nothing more that the political faade of a terrorist network with long term objectives (Akdim and Iraqi 2008, p. 41). While the above analysis concentrates on the PJD, the same attitude emerged with regards to the biggest Moroccan Islamist movement, al-adl wal ihssan (Justice and Charity), officially illegal but tolerated by the monarchy. This movement, led by Sheikh Abdessalem Yassine, has an ideological affinity to mysticism, refusing incorporation into the political system and acknowledgement of the sacredness of the Kings power, arguing that power belongs to God alone. Increasingly, members of the movement are arrested on the basis of suspicion alone, and Nadia Yassine, daughter of the Sheikh, has been strongly attacked for her support of a democratic system and has been prosecuted several times.15 The same linguistic devices (inter-discursive linkages between radicalism, Islamism and terrorism) have been used to categorise the members of the Polisario Front, the group fighting for the independence of the Western Sahara from Morocco. In the Moroccan political elite discourse on terrorism, the categorisation of Polisarios members as (potential) terrorists has become more frequent. The issue of the Western Sahara has been dominant in the Moroccan elite political discourse for at least four decades. Immediately after the end of the French protectorate, the former king, Hassan II, started building his internal legitimacy upon the pursuit of a Greater Morocco (which claims Ceuta, Melilla, the Spanish Sahara, Mauritania, some parts of Algeria, Mali and Senegal) and made the question of the Western Sahara an element of national unity internally, and an argument for political stability in the international realm (Lacoste 1988, Pointier 2004, Shelley 2004). Despite the fact that the Moroccan government has tried since the mid-1970s to label Polisario as a terrorist organisation, it is

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only recently that the Moroccan official political discourse has addressed the issue of the Western Sahara more specifically in the wider context of international terrorism, seemingly trying to connect it discursively to the main concerns of the US international agenda. In March 2007, the Moroccan Minister of Justice at the time, Mohamed Bouzoubab, accused the Polisario Front of being in collusion with al-Qaeda with the aim of destabilising the Sahel region. He stated: There are, now, cooperation and coordination between Al Qaida, specifically the Algerian GCPS and the Moroccan Salafia Jihadia, that engage in a common action with the Polisario Front (Algerie.dz 2007). The labelling of Polisario members as potential terrorists has been noted as a source of concern, for instance, by Camacho, a Spanish journalist who wrote in April 2008: Until now, its role as the Sahrawi peoples liberation movement has never been disputed, but now they have been downgraded to no more than a vulgar terrorist group (Camacho 2008). Similarly, the International Crisis Group (ICG) (2007) reports that Morocco has often pointed out that the Polisario Front is following a radical Islamist ideology and that the linkages between Polisario and jihadist networks are clear. However, Moroccan authorities have never offered any evidence to substantiate these claims (ICG 2007). Unfortunately space does not permit a full analysis of this discourse. It is sufficient for the moment to note that as a result of the construction of Polisario as a potential terrorist organisation, Polisario finds itself under tight and contradictory pressures. The Security Council and the US strongly pressure it to compromise with Morocco. At the same time, however, the rising of Saharawi nationalism during these latest years has been growing stronger and stronger (Mundy 2007, Pointier 2004, Shelley 2004). Pressures to resume violent hostilities are growing among the nationalist movement and by that way the Polisario position and legitimacy inside the movement is being questioned. Conclusion Terrorism is a ubiquitous discursive construction with effects that impact greatly on several aspects of the public and private lives of individuals. Although loaded with assumptions, such a discourse, interlinked with other discourses such as on religion and identity, continues to be used uncritically. The importance of this discourse is not only to be analysed in relation to its appropriation to justify military interventions and security controls, but also to further domestic agendas and to target potentially dangerous groups. Here, the focus has been on the discourse of the political elite for the reason that the (re)creation of the discourse surrounding the events that took place on 11 September 2001 in America was undoubtedly an elite project widely reproduced by the media. In situations of crisis, political elites have the greatest rhetorical power. As Croft (2006) notes political leaders are empowered in times of insecurity. And thus, as a source for understanding the nature of the narrative, to comprehend the essence of the discourse, the statements of the political leadership are vitally important (p. 10). The elite political discourse on terrorism was first analysed with a focus on President George W. Bushs speeches. The analysis then moved to examine the speeches of the King of Morocco, Mohammed VI, to see how the discourse has been reproduced in a different context, and how it differs. The final aim was to show the wide application of the discourse, as well as some of the implications deriving from its (mis)use. In Morocco, there has been an attempt to link the issue of terrorism with long-term issues affecting the country, such as the danger of Islamists and the dispute over the Western Sahara. Indeed, Islamists have been often linked to the threat of terrorism and depicted as vulnerable to radicalism, obscurantism, extremism and, thus, to terrorism. Similarly, Polisario members have been associated

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with these wider concerns and with terrorism. The appropriation of this discourse, deeply problematic for its assumptions and uncritical usage in different contexts and for seemingly separate issues, must be carefully analysed. Here, attention has concentrated only on Morocco, but similar research is needed for other contexts and different historical periods in order to continue to expand the insights generated by Critical Terrorism Studies. Notes
1. The notion of discourse is contested. This paper adopts the definition of Fairclough, who draws on Foucault. Discourse here is intended as a practice not just of representing the world, but of signifying the world, constituting and constructing the world in meaning. Fairclough goes further in specifying: Discourse is for me more than just language use: It is language use, whether speech or writing, seen as a type of social practice. The term discourse is here used to refer to semiotic elements of social practices. Following that, discourse includes language (written and spoken and in combination with other semiotics, for example, music in singing), non-verbal communication (facial expressions, body movements, etc.) and visual images (photographs, film) (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999). Authoritative reviews of the field include: Burnett and Whyte (2005), George (1991), Ranstorp (2006), Silke (2004), Schmid and Jongman (1988), and Zulaika and Douglass (1996). The literature includes: Bacevich (2004), Boggs (2003), Booth and Dunne (2002), Callinicos (2003), Cole (2003), Hiro (2002), Rogers (2004, 2007), and Scheuer (2005). Literature on the discourse on terrorism includes: Collins and Glover (2002) and Croft (2006). The expression Islamist terrorist is used here to refer to terrorism undertaken by Islamists. Islamic terrorism is considered misleading. In fact, from a linguistic point of view, Islamists differs from Islamic. Islamist is an immediate derivative of Islamism and refers to a politico-religious phenomenon linked to the events of the 20th century. In this study, Islamism is defined as an Islamic movement bearing a holistic vision of Islam with the final aim of restoring the caliphate (drawing on Mozaffari 2001). Differently, Islamic refers to a millenarian culture and religion. It is not a case if Islamists call themselves Islamiyyoun to differentiate from Muslimun (Muslims). However, in the majority of discussions on terrorism and Islam, such differentiation is not done. Thus, in the analysis of documents and speeches, the two expressions will be considered as referring to Islamist terrorism. See also, We are in a conflict between good and evil, and America will call evil by its name. Zelikow later also served as an aide to Secretary of State, Condoleeza Rice. Confidential conversation with a diplomatic officer based in Morocco, 20 November 2007. Information provided to the author by an intelligence officer. Other intelligence officers and counter-terrorism experts in Morocco on condition of anonymity have reiterated a similar argument during interviews carried out in June 2007 and February 2008. Interview with a Moroccan political leader in Rabat, 2 June 2008. Interview by the author with Mohammed Darif in Casablanca, 7 March 2008. Interview with Driss Basri, former Minister of Interior, in Morocco, ABC, 30 May 2004. Many terrorists are not poor at all. Bin Laden, for instance, commonly considered the terrorist par excellence is extremely wealthy. The Makhzen is a form of traditional government, centred on the appropriation, reborn, and renovation of the Cherifian Sultanat. It has three main functions: to control the main centres of productions, to serve as an arbiter in intra-tribal and group conflicts, and to defend the territory from external penetrations. It remained in place after the decolonisation process and continues to exist today. In usual usage it denotes the monarchical system in its totality. Interview with Nadia Yassine in Sal, April 2008.

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2. 3. 4. 5.

6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

15.

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