The nature of mind D.M.

Armstrong

Adriana Baares Camacho February, 2012 History of analytic philosophy: Metaphysics, science and mind. Universitt Bayreuth

I. Introduction.

Armstrong wants to draft a materialistic or physicalist theory of mind. He considers that the better clue we have about nature of mind is given by the modern science that deals with the nature of man. Ultimately, what he wants is develop an explanation of the nature of the mind that is consistent with the perspective that says that man is just a physical-chemical mechanism: this is, the materialistic view.

II. Scientifism

As I already anticipated, Armstrong gives to the science an special authority to decide questions of the human mind, but why? Why this scientifism?

Because only in science we can go beyond the life of a single human being and reach substance agreements on what is the case. That is, we can only reach an intellectual conensus on controversial issues, through the results of scientific research. Is possible that consensus may be wrong, but Armstrong says that consensus is the best authority. Furthermore, in the other discipline we can never get a consensus, which gives us a plus for science to decide such issues.

III. Criticism of Behaviourism

From his materialist perspective, Armstrong criticizes the traditional philosophy: he doesn't believe that the mind is an inner field responsible of the external conduct of the body. He believes that mind is an external action, as Ryle said: Mind isn't something behind the behavior of the body, but It's just part of physical behavior. This is a view of the mind that could be compatible with the materialist perspective. Because mental processes are identified with their terms (expressions); then the existence of the mind isn't in conflict with the view that man is just a physical-chemical mechanism. However, there may be mental processes that occur even though It doesn't happen any way that may be treated as an expression (term) of these processes. Then Armstrong speaks about the disposition to behave: the tendency or propensity of a person to act in a certain way under certain circumstances. But How to use the notion of a disposition to behave to deal with the objetion to behavioursim that there may be mental processes that occur even though the subject isn't doing any relevant conduct (behavior)? The answer is: although the subject isn't acting, he's in disposition to act in some way relevant.

Man doesn't act, but still has a disposition to act.

However, behaviorism may be wrong in indentifying the mind and mental ocurrences with behavior, but maybe they're right when they think that our notion of mind and mental states is logical individual mental states linked to the logical behavior. Maybe the mind can be defined as the internal cause of a behavior. In this case, we would have a position which makes possible the physicalist position.

Modern Philosophy says: the only cause of behavior that is indicative of a mind, is a phsycalchemical operation of central nervous system.

Criticism to Behaviorism.

In contrast, he will say that:

Behaviorists were wrong to identify the mind with the conduct. Behaviorists were not so wrong when they tried to deal with causes in which mental events are ocurring in the absence of behavior by saying that these were dispositions to act. (dispositions to behave). Armstrong thinks that the view that sees the dispositions as states is correct.

What Armstrong suggests, is conceive these dispositions as actual states of the person who has the disposition.

At this point, we can say there are two different lines of thought:

1. Conceiving the mind as behavior goes against the grain. Armstrong says. The mind is more like that which is behind and produce our complex behavior. 2. The dispositions of the behaviorists are actually states that underlie behavior, and, under appropiate circumstances, produce behaviors.

If we consider both lines, we have: the conception of a mental state as a condition of the person capable of producing a certain range of behaviors.

The mind is conceived as an internal principle identified in terms of outward conduct which is capable of producing. Armostrong.

IV. Experience and Percepcion.

Armstrong, continues his critique of behaviorism saying that Behaviorism can be a satisfactory explanation of the mind from the perspective of another person, but It doesn's work as a satisfactory explanation of the mind from the point of view of the first person. This is because:

In others we only see the behavior In our own case we are conscious of much more than the behavior.

Armstrong gives the example of when we act automatically, for example a person who is driving for hours and really he isn't thinking about driving. With this example we can conclude that the mental process continue when one is in automatic.

This leads us to consider the link sensory perception selective conduct (behavior):

Perceptions of internal states or events capable of produce certain types of selective behavior towards our environment.

How does this discussion of the perception relate with the question of consciousness or experience, the kind of thing that the driver is in state of automatism not have, but we usually have?

Answer: Consciousness is the perception of the awareness of our own state of mind. (Experience as perception)

Awarness of our own mental states can be likened to the perception of our mental states, and as

other perception, can conceived as a state or national event that gives us an ability to selectively conduct in this case selector to conduct our own mental states.

Conclusion:

What Armstrong wanted with this essay, was just drafting a programm to the philosophy of mind, but he argues for a physicalist theory of mind, to which he considers an exciting and plausible intellectual option.