India's War & Defense System

Indias War & Defense System
Sino-Indian War
Sino-Indian War
The Sino-Indian War occurred between India and China.
Date Location Result Territorial changes

Belligerents
October 20[1] - 21 November 1962 South Xinjiang (Aksai Chin) and Arunachal Pradesh (South Tibet, North-East Frontier Agency) China declares unilateral cease-fire and withdraws to pre-war positions. No significant territorial change compared with prior to the war. China controls Tibet (excluding Tawang and area south of McMahon Line) and retains Aksai Chin area (de facto) and India controls NorthEast Frontier (South Tibet, Arunachal) area (de facto).
India Commanders Brij Mohan Kaul Jawaharlal Nehru Pran Nath Thapar Strength 10,000-12,000 Casualties and losses 1,383 Killed[5] 1,047 Wounded [5] 1,696 Missing[5] 3,968 Captured[5]
China Zhang Guohua[2] Mao Zedong Liu Bocheng Lin Biao Zhou Enlai 80,000[3][4] 722 Killed.[5] 1,697 Wounded[5][6]
The Sino-Indian War (Hindi: - Bhrat-Chn Yuddh), also known as the Sino-Indian Border Conflict (simplified Chinese: ; traditional Chinese: ; pinyin: Zhng-Yn Binjng Zhnzhng), was a war between China and India that occurred in 1962. A disputed Himalayan border was the main pretext for war, but other issues played a role. There had been a series of violent border incidents after the 1959 Tibetan uprising, when India had granted asylum to the Dalai Lama. India initiated a Forward Policy in which it placed outposts along the border, including several 1|Page

north of the McMahon Line, the eastern portion of a Line of Actual Control proclaimed by Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai in 1959. The Chinese launched simultaneous offensives in Ladakh and across the McMahon Line on 20 October 1962, coinciding with the Cuban Missile Crisis. Chinese troops advanced over Indian forces in both theaters, capturing Rezang la in Chushul in the western theater, as well as Tawang in the eastern theater. The war ended when the Chinese declared a ceasefire on 20 November 1962, and later withdrew from the disputed area. The Sino-Indian War is notable for the harsh conditions under which much of the fighting took place, entailling large-scale combat at altitudes of over 4,250 metres (14,000 feet).[7] This presented enormous logistics problems for both sides. The SinoIndian War was also noted for the non-deployment of the navy or air force by either the Chinese and Indian sides
Location
China and India share a long border, sectioned into three stretches by Nepal and Bhutan, which follows the Himalayan mountains between Burma and what was then West Pakistan. A number of disputed regions lie along this border. At its western end is the Aksai Chin region, an area the size of Switzerland, that sits between the Chinese autonomous region of Xinjiang and Tibet (which China declared as an autonomous region in 1965). The eastern border, between Burma and Bhutan, comprises the present Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh (formerly the North East Frontier Agency). Both of these regions were overrun by China in the 1962 conflict. Most combat took place at high altitudes. The Aksai Chin region is a vast desert of salt flats around 5,000 metres above sea level, and Arunachal Pradesh is extremely mountainous with a number of peaks exceeding 7000 metres. According to military doctrine, to be successful an attacker generally requires a 3:1 ratio of numerical superiority over the defender; in mountain warfare this ratio should be considerably higher as the terrain favours defense.[citation needed] China was able to take advantage of this: the Chinese Army had possession of the highest ridges in the regions. The high altitude and freezing conditions also cause logistical and welfare difficulties; in past similar conflicts (such as the Italian Campaign of World War I) more casualties have been caused by the harsh conditions than enemy action. The Sino-Indian War was no different, with many[who?] troops on both sides dying in the freezing cold.[8]
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Background
Pre-Simla British map published in 1909 shows the so called "Outer Line" as India's northern boundary. Main articles: Sino-Indian relations and Origins of the Sino-Indian border dispute The cause of the war was a dispute over the sovereignty of the widely-separated Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh border regions. Aksai Chin, claimed by India to belong to Kashmir and by China to be part of Xinjiang, contains an important road link that connects the Chinese regions of Tibet and Xinjiang. China's construction of this road was one of the triggers of the conflict. Arunachal Pradesh (called South Tibet by China) is also claimed by both nations although it is roughly the size of Austria, it was sparsely inhabited in the days of the War (by numerous local tribes) due to its mountainous terrain. [citation needed] However, it has a population of over one million today.
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The Johnson Line
The western portion of the Sino-Indian boundary originates in 1834, with the Sikh Confederation's conquest of Ladakh. In 1842 the Sikh Confederacy, which at the time ruled over much of Northern India (including the frontier regions of Jammu and Kashmir), signed a treaty which guaranteed the integrity of its existing borders with its neighbours.[9] The British defeat of the Sikhs in 1846 resulted in transfer of sovereignty over Ladakh, part of the Jammu and Kashmir region, to the British, and British commissioners contacted Chinese officials to negotiate the border. The boundaries at its two extremities, Pangong Lake and Karakoram Pass, were well-defined, but the Aksai Chin area in between lay undefined.[10] In 1865, British surveyor W H Johnson came to an agreement with the Maharaja of Kashmir, in whose service he was employed,[11] on a proposed "Johnson Line" which placed Aksai Chin in Kashmir.[12] China rejected the arrangement, and the British government also harboured doubts, so decided to take up the issue in an attempt to reach a settlement. However in 1892, before the issue had been resolved, China erected boundary markers at Karakoram Pass on the ancient caravan route between Xinjiang and Ladakh (which were disputed by the British Indian Government).[7][12] Throughout most of the 19th century Great Britain and the expanding Russian Empire were jockeying for influence in Central Asia, and Britain decided to hand over Aksai Chin to Chinese administration as a buffer against Russian invasion. The newly-created border was known as the MacCartney-MacDonald Line, and both British-controlled India and China now began to show Aksai Chin as Chinese.[12] In 1911 the Xinhai Revolution resulted in power shifts in China, and by 1918 (in the wake of the Russian Bolshevik Revolution) the British no longer saw merit in China's continuing possession of the region. On British maps the border was redrawn as the original Johnson Line,[7] but despite this reversion the new border was left unmanned and undemarcated.[7][12] According to Neville Maxwell, the British had used as many as 11 different boundary lines in the region, as their claims shifted with the political situation.[13] By the time of Indian independence in 1947, the Johnson Line had become India's official western boundary.[7] On 1 July 1954, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru definitively stated the Indian position.[14] He claimed that Aksai Chin had been part of the Indian Ladakh region for centuries, and that the border (as defined by the Johnson Line) was nonnegotiable.[15] According to George N. Patterson, when the Indian government finally produced a report detailing the alleged proof of India's claims to the disputed area, "the 4|Page

quality of the Indian evidence was very poor, including some very dubious sources indeed".[16][17] During the 1950s, China constructed a road through Aksai Chin, connecting Xinjiang and Tibet, which ran south of the Johnson Line in many places.[7][12][15] Aksai Chin was easily accessible to the Chinese, but access from India, which meant negotiating the Karakoram mountains, was more problematic.[15] Consequently India did not even learn of the existence of the road until 1957 finally confirmed when the road was shown in Chinese maps published the following year.[2]
The McMahon Line

Main articles: McMahon Line and Simla Accord (1913) In 1826 British India and China gained a common border after the British wrested control of Manipur and Assam from the Burmese, following the First Anglo-Burmese War of 1824-1826. In 1847, Major J. Jenkins, agent for the North East Frontier, reported that the Tawang was part of Tibet. In 1872, four monastic officials from Tibet arrived in Tawang and supervised a boundary settlement with Major R. Graham, NEFA official, which included the Tawang Tract as part of Tibet. Thus, in the last half of the 19th century, it was clear that the British treated the Tawang Tract as part of Tibet. This boundary was confirmed in a 1 June, 1912, note from the British General Staff in India, stating that the "present boundary (demarcated) is south of Tawang, running westwards along the foothills from near Ugalguri to the southern Bhutanese border." [7] A 1908 map of The Province of Eastern Bengal and Assam prepared for the Foreign Department of the Government of India, showed the international boundary from Bhutan continuing to the Baroi River, following the Himalayas foothill alignment.[7] In 1913, representatives of Great Britain, China and Tibet attended a conference in Simla regarding the borders between Tibet, China and British India. Whilst all three representatives initialed the agreement, Beijing later objected to the proposed boundary between the regions of Outer Tibet and Inner Tibet and did not ratify it. The details of the Indo-Tibetan boundary was not revealed to China at the time.[7] The foreign secretary of the British Indian government, Henry McMahon, who drew up the proposal, decided to bypass the Chinese (although instructed not to by his superiors) and settle the border bilaterally by negotiating directly with Tibet.[15] According to later Indian claims, this border was intended to run through the highest ridges of the Himalayas, as the areas south of the Himalayas were traditionally Indian.[18] However, the McMahon Line lay south of the boundary India claims.[15] India's government held the view that the Himalayas were the 5|Page

ancient boundaries of the Indian subcontinent, and thus should be the modern boundaries of India,[18] while it is the position of the Chinese government that the disputed area in the Himalayas have been geographically and culturally part of Tibet since ancient times.[19] Months after the Simla agreement, China set up boundary markers south of the McMahon Line. T. O'Callaghan, an official in the Eastern Sector of the North East Frontier, relocated all these markers to a location slightly south of the McMahon Line, and then visited Rima to confirm with Tibetan officials that there was no Chinese influence in the area.[7] The British-run Government of India initially rejected the Simla Agreement as incompatible with the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, which stipulated that neither party was to negotiate with Tibet "except through the intermediary of the Chinese government".[20] The British and Russians cancelled the 1907 agreement by joint consent in 1921.[21] It was not until the late 1930s that the British started to use the McMahon Line on official maps of the region. China took the position that the Tibetan government should not have been allowed to make a such a treaty, rejecting Tibet's claims of independent rule.[15] For its part, Tibet did not object to any section of the McMahon Line excepting the demarcation of the trading town of Tawang, which the Line placed under British-Indian jurisdiction.[15] However, up until World War II, Tibetan officials were allowed to administer Tawang with complete authority. Due to the increased threat of Japanese and Chinese expansion during this period, British Indian troops secured the town as part of the defense of India's eastern border.[7] In the 1950s India began actively patrolling the region. It found that, at multiple locations, the highest ridges actually fell north of the McMahon Line.[15] Given India's historic position that the original intent of the Line was to separate the two nations by the highest mountains in the world, in these locations India extended its forward posts northward to the ridges, regarding this move as compliant with the original border proposal, although the Simla Convention did not explicitly state this intention.[15]
Events leading up to war

Main article: Events leading to the Sino-Indian War
Tibet controversy
The 1940s saw huge change in South Asia with the Partition of India in 1947 (resulting in the establishment of the two new states of India and Pakistan), and the establishment 6|Page

of the People's Republic of China in 1949. One of the most basic policies for the new Indian government was that of maintaining cordial relations with China, reviving its ancient friendly ties. India was among the first nations to grant diplomatic recognition to the newly-created PRC.[22] At the time, Chinese officials issued no condemnation of Nehru's claims or made any opposition to Nehru's open declarations of control over Aksai Chin. In 1956, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai stated that he had no claims over Indian controlled territory.[22] He later argued that Aksai Chin was already under Chinese jurisdiction, implying that there was therefore no contradiction with his earlier statement since China did not regard the region as "Indian controlled", and that since the British hand-over China had regarded the McCartney MacDonald Line as the relevant border.[15] Zhou later argued that as the boundary was undemarcated and had never been defined by treaty between any Chinese or Indian government, the Indian government could not unilaterally define Aksai Chin's borders.[13] However, within a short time the PRC announced its intention to reclaim Tibet, and later extended its influence by placing border posts within the Indian-claimed territory of Aksai Chin.[12] India protested against these moves and decided to look for a diplomatic solution to ensure a stable Sino-Indian border.[12][22] To resolve any doubts about the Indian position, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru declared in parliament that India regarded the McMahon Line as its official border.[22] The Chinese expressed no concern at this statement,[12][22] and in 1951 and 52, the government of China asserted that there were no frontier issues to be taken up with India.[22]
The Indian government's 1950 maps show the Sino-Indian border using undemarcated lines and the Aksai Chin frontier is labeled "boundary undefined".
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The Indian government's 1954 maps unilaterally delimited the Sino-Indian border in the Aksai Chin, and Sino-Indian borders are no longer indicated as undemarcated. In 1954, Prime Minister Nehru wrote a memo calling for India's borders to be clearly defined and demarcated:[14] in line with previous Indian philosophy, Indian maps showed a border that, in some places, lay north of the McMahon Line.[23] Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, in November 1956, again repeated Chinese assurances that the People's Republic had no claims on Indian territory, although official Chinese maps showed 120,000 square kilometres of territory claimed by India as Chinese.[22] CIA documents created at the time revealed that Nehru had ignored Burmese premier Ba Swe when he warned Nehru to be cautious when dealing with Zhou.[24] They also allege that Zhou purposefully told Nehru that there were no border issues with India.[24] In 1950, the Chinese People's Liberation Army invaded Tibet in an effort to reclaim it. Four years later, in 1954, China and India negotiated the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, by which the two nations agreed to abide in settling their disputes. India presented a frontier map which was accepted by China, and the Indian government under Prime Minister Nehru promoted the slogan Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai (Indians and Chinese are brothers). According to Georgia Tech political analyst John W Garver, Nehru's policy on Tibet was to create a strong Sino-Indian partnership which would be catalyzed through agreement and compromise on Tibet. Garver believes that Nehru's previous actions had given him confidence that China would be ready to form an "Asian Axis" with India.[2] This apparent progress in relations suffered a major setback when, in 1959, Nehru accommodated the Tibetan religious leader at the time, the 14th Dalai Lama, who was fleeing Lhasa after a failed Tibetan uprising against Chinese rule. The Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, Mao Zedong, was enraged and asked the Xinhua News Agency to produce reports on Indian expansionists operating in Tibet. [citation needed]
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Border incidents continued through this period. In August 1959, the People's Liberation Army took an Indian prisoner at Longju, which had an ambiguous position in the McMahon Line,[7][12][23][25] and two months later in Aksai Chin a clash led to the death of nine Indian frontier policemen.[12] On 2 October, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev defended Nehru in a meeting with Mao. This action reinforced China's impression that the Soviet Union, the United States and India all had expansionist designs over China. The People's Liberation Army went so far as to prepare a self-defensive counterattack plan.[2] Negotiations were restarted between the nations, but no progress was made.[14][26] As a consequence of their non-recognition of the McMahon Line (see above), China's maps showed both the North East Frontier Area (NEFA) and Aksai Chin to be Chinese territory.[18] In 1960, Zhou Enlai unofficially suggested that India drop its claims to Aksai Chin in return for a Chinese withdrawal of claims over NEFA. Adhering to his stated position, Nehru believed that China did not have a legitimate claim over either of these territories, and thus was not ready to concede them. This adamance was perceived in China as Indian opposition to Chinese rule in Tibet.[2] Nehru declined to conduct any negotiations on the boundary until Chinese troops withdrew from Aksai Chin; a position supported by the international community.[15] India produced numerous reports on the negotiations, and translated Chinese reports into English to help inform the international debate. China believed that India was simply securing its claim lines in order to continue its "grand plans in Tibet".[2] India's stance that China withdraw from Aksai Chin caused continual deterioration of the diplomatic situation to the point at which internal forces were pressurizing Nehru to take a military stance against China.
The Forward Policy

At the beginning of 1961, Nehru appointed General B. M. Kaul as army Chief of General Staff,[27] but he refused to increase military spending and prepare for a possible war.[27] According to James Barnard Calvin of the U.S. Navy, in 1959, India started sending Indian troops and border patrols into disputed areas. This program created both skirmishes and deteriorating relations between India and China.[7] The aim of this policy was to create outposts behind advancing Chinese troops to interdict their supplies, forcing them north of the disputed line (McMahon).[7][22][25][28] There were eventually 60 such outposts, including 43 north of the McMahon Line, to which India claimed sovereignty.[7][14] China viewed this as further confirmation of Indian expansionist plans directed towards Tibet. According to the Indian official history, implementation of the 9|Page

Forward Policy was intended to provide evidence of Indian occupation in the previously unoccupied region through which Chinese troops had been patrolling. Kaul was confident, through contact with Indian Intelligence and CIA information, that China would not react with force.[15] Indeed at first the PLA simply withdrew, but eventually Chinese forces began to counter-encircle the Indian positions which clearly encroached into the north of McMahon Line. This led to a tit-for-tat Indian reaction, with both forces attempting to outmanoeuver each other. However, despite the escalating nature of the dispute, the two forces withheld from engaging each other directly.[2] Chinese attention was diverted for a time by the military activity of the Nationalists on Taiwan, but on 23 June the U.S. assured China that a Nationalist invasion would not be permitted.[29] China's heavy artillery facing Taiwan could then be moved to Tibet. [30] It took China six to eight months to gather the resources needed for the war, according to Anil Athale, author of the official Indian history.[30] The Chinese sent a large quantity of non-military supplies to Tibet through the Indian port of Calcutta.[30]
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Early incidents
Various border conflicts and "military incidents" between India and China flared up throughout the summer and autumn of 1962. In May, the Indian Air Force was told not to plan for close air support, although it was assessed as being a feasible way to repel the unbalanced ratio of Chinese to Indian troops.[31] In June, a skirmish caused the deaths of dozens of Chinese troops. The Indian Intelligence Bureau received information about a Chinese buildup along the border which could be a precursor to war.[31] During the period of June-July 1962, the Indian military planners began advocating "probing actions" against the Chinese, and accordingly, moved mountain troops forward to cut off Chinese supply lines. According to Patterson, the Indian motives were threefold: 1. Test Chinese resolve and intentions regarding India. 2. Test whether India would enjoy Soviet backing in the event of a Sino-Indian war. 3. Create sympathy for India within the U.S., with whom relations had deteriorated after the Indian annexation of Goa.[16][32] On 10 July, 1962, 350 Chinese troops surrounded an Indian occupied post in Chushul (north of the McMahon Line) but withdrew after a heated argument via loudspeaker.[8] On 22 July, the Forward Policy was extended to allow Indian troops to push back Chinese troops already established in disputed territory.[22] Whereas Indian troops were previously ordered to fire only in self-defense, all post commanders were now given discretion to open fire upon Chinese forces if threatened.[22] In August, the Chinese military improved its combat readiness along the McMahon Line and began stockpiling ammunition, weapons and gasoline.[7]
Confrontation at Thag La
In June 1962, Indian forces established an outpost at Dhola, on the southern slopes of the Thag La Ridge.[7] Dhola lay north of the McMahon Line but south of the ridges which India interpreted that the McMahon Line was supposed to represent.[citation needed][15]
[23][33]
In August, China issued diplomatic protests and began occupying positions at the
top of Thag La.[7][2] On 8 September, a 60-strong PLA unit descended to the south side of the ridge and occupied positions that dominated one of the Indian posts at Dhola. Fire was not exchanged, but Nehru said to the media that the Indian Army had instructions to "free our territory" and the troops had been given discretion to use force.[2] On 11 11 | P a g e

September, it was decided that "all forward posts and patrols were given permission to fire on any armed Chinese who entered Indian territory".[22] However, the operation to occupy Thag La was flawed in that Nehru's directives were unclear and it got underway very slowly because of this.[7][15] In addition to this, each man had to carry 35 kg of luggage over the long trek and this severely slowed down the reaction.[34] By the time the Indian battalion reached the point of conflict, Chinese units controlled both banks of the Namka Chu River.[7] On 20 September, Chinese troops threw grenades at Indian troops and a firefight developed, triggering a long series of skirmishes for the rest of September.[7][34] Some Indian troops, including Brigadier Dalvi who commanded the forces at Thag La, were also concerned that the territory they were fighting for was not strictly territory that "we should have been convinced was ours".[25] According to Neville Maxwell, even members of the Indian defence ministry were categorically concerned with the validity of the fighting in Thag La.[15] On 3 October, a week before the triggering of the war, Zhou Enlai visited Nehru in New Delhi promising there would be no war. On 4 October, Kaul assigned some troops with securing regions south of the Thag La Ridge.[7] Kaul decided to first secure Yumtso La, a strategically important position, before re-entering the lost Dhola post.[22] Kaul had then realised that the attack would be desperate and the Indian government tried to stop escalation into an all-out war. Indian troops travelling to Thag La had suffered in the previously unexperienced conditions; two Gurkha troops died of pulmonary edema.[34] On 10 October, an Indian Punjabi patrol of 50 troops to Yumtso La were met by an emplaced Chinese position of some 1,000 soldiers.[7] Indian troops were in no position for battle, as Yumtso La was 16,000 feet (4,900 m) above sea level and Kaul did not plan on having artillery support for the troops.[34] The Chinese troops opened fire on the Indians under their belief that they were north of the McMahon Line. The Indians were surrounded by Chinese positions which used mortar fire. However, they managed to hold off the first Chinese assault, inflicting heavy casualties.[7] At this point, the Indian troops were in a position to push the Chinese back with mortar and machine gun fire. However, Brigadier Dalvi opted not to fire, as it would mean decimating the Rajput who were still in the area of the Chinese regrouping. They helplessly watched the Chinese ready themselves for a second assault.[34] In the second Chinese assault, the Indians began their retreat, realising the situation was hopeless. The Indian patrol suffered 25 casualties, with the Chinese suffering 33. The Chinese troops 12 | P a g e

held their fire as the Indians retreated, and then buried the Indian dead with military honors, as witnessed by the retreating soldiers. This was the first occurrence of heavy fighting in the war.[7] This attack had grave implications for India and Nehru tried to solve the issue, but by 18 October it was clear that the Chinese were preparing for an attack on India, with massive troop buildups on the border.[7] A long line of mules and porters had also been observed supporting the buildup and reinforcement of positions south of the Thag La Ridge.[34]
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Chinese and Indian preparations
Motives
Two of the major factors leading up to China's eventual conflicts with Indian troops were India's stance on the disputed borders and perceived Indian subversion in Tibet. There was "a perceived need to punish and end perceived Indian efforts to undermine Chinese control of Tibet, Indian efforts which were perceived as having the objective of restoring the pre-1949 status quo ante of Tibet". The other was "a perceived need to punish and end perceived Indian aggression against Chinese territory along the border". John W. Garver argues that the first perception was incorrect based on the state of the Indian military and polity in the 1960s, it was, nevertheless a major reason for China's going to war. However, he argues the Chinese perception of Indian aggression to be "substantially accurate".[2] The CIA's recently declassified POLO documents reveal contemporary American analysis of Chinese motives during the war. According to this document, "Chinese apparently were motivated to attack by one primary consideration their determination to retain the ground on which PLA forces stood in 1962 and to punish the Indians for trying to take that ground".[24] Another factor which affected China's decision for war with India was a perceived need to stop a Soviet-U.S.-India encirclement and isolation of China.[2] India's relations with the Soviet Union and United States were both strong at this time, but the Soviets were preoccupied by the Cuban Missile Crisis and would not interfere with the Sino-Indian War.[7] P. B. Sinha suggests that China timed the war exactly in parallel with American actions so as to avoid any chance of American or Soviet involvement. American buildup of forces around Cuba occurred on the same day as the first major clash at Dhola while China's buildup between 10 and 20 October coincided exactly with the United States establishment of a blockade against Cuba which began 20 October.[22] Garver argues that the Chinese correctly assessed Indian border policies, particularly the Forward Policy, as attempts for incremental seizure of Chinese-controlled territory. On Tibet, Garver argues that one of the major factors leading to China's decision for war with India was a common tendency of humans "to attribute others behavior to interior motivations, while attributing their own behavior to situational factors". Studies from China published in the 1990s confirmed that the root cause for China going to war with
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India was the perceived aggression in Tibet, with the forward policy simply catalyzing the Chinese reaction.[2] Neville Maxwell and Allen Whiting argue that the Chinese leadership believed they were defending territory they believed to be legitimately Chinese, and which was already under de facto Chinese occupation prior to Indian advances, and regarded the Forward Policy as an Indian attempt at creeping annexation. [2] Mao Zedong himself compared the Forward Policy to a strategic advance in Chinese chess: Their [India's] continually pushing forward is like crossing the Chu Han boundary. What should we do? We can also set out a few pawns, on our side of the river. If they don't then cross over, thats great. If they do cross, we'll eat them up [chess metaphor meaning to take the opponent's pieces]. Of course, we cannot blindly eat them. Lack of forbearance in small matters upsets great plans. We must pay attention to the situation.[2] The motive for the Forward Policy was to cut off the supply routes for Chinese troops posted in NEFA and Aksai Chin.[7] According to the official Indian history, the forward policy was continued because of its initial success, as it claimed that Chinese troops withdrew when they encountered areas already occupied by Indian troops. It also claimed that the Forward Policy was having success in cutting out supply lines of Chinese troops who had advanced South of the McMahon Line, though there was no evidence of such advance before the 1962 war. However, the Forward Policy rested on the assumption that Chinese forces "were not likely to use force against any of our posts, even if they were in a position to do so". No serious re-appraisal of this policy took place even when Chinese forces ceased withdrawing.[22] Nehru's confidence was probably justified given the difficulty for China to supply the area over the high altitude terrain over 5000 km from the more populated areas of China. The Chinese leadership initially held a sympathetic view towards India as the latter had been ruled by British colonial masters for centuries. However, Nehru's forward policy convinced PRC leadership that the independent Indian leadership was a reincarnation of British imperialism. Thus, the Indian government must be taught an unforgettable lesson. Mao Zedong stated: "Rather than being constantly accused of aggression, it's better to show the world what really happens when China indeed moves its muscles." By early 1962, the Chinese leadership began to fear that India's intentions were to launch a massive attack against Chinese troops, and that the Indian leadership wanted a war.[7][2] In 1961, the Indian army had been sent into Goa, a small region without any other international borders apart from the Indian one, after Portugal refused to surrender 15 | P a g e

the exclave colony to the Indian Union. Although this action met little to no international protest or opposition, China saw it as an example of India's expansionist nature, especially in light of heated rhetoric from Indian politicians. India's Home Minister declared, "If the Chinese will not vacate the areas occupied by it, India will have to repeat what she did in Goa. India will certainly drive out the Chinese forces",[7] while another member of the Indian Congress Party pronounced, "India will take steps to end [Chinese] aggression on Indian soil just as she ended Portuguese aggression in Goa".[16] By mid-1962, it was apparent to the Chinese leadership that negotiations had failed to make any progress, and the Forward Policy was increasingly perceived as a grave threat as Delhi increasingly sent probes deeper into border areas and cut off Chinese supply lines.[16] Foreign Minister Marshal Chen Yi commented at one high-level meeting, "Nehru's forward policy is a knife. He wants to put it in our heart. We cannot close our eyes and await death."[2] The Chinese leadership believed that their restraint on the issue was being perceived by India as weakness, leading to continued provocations, and that a major counterblow was needed to stop perceived Indian aggression.[2] Xu Yan, prominent Chinese military historian and professor at the PLA's National Defense University, gives an account of the Chinese leadership's decision to go to war. By late September 1962, the Chinese leadership had begun to reconsider their policy of "armed coexistence", which had failed to address their concerns with the forward policy and Tibet, and consider a large, decisive strike.[2] On 22 September 1962, the People's Daily published an article which claimed that "the Chinese people were burning with 'great indignation' over the Indian actions on the border and that New Delhi could not 'now say that warning was not served in advance'."[35][36]
Military planning
The Indian side was confident war would not be triggered and made little preparations. India had only two divisions of troops in the region of the conflict. [37] In August 1962, Brigadier D. K. Palit claimed that a war with China in the near future could be ruled out.
[37]
Even in September 1962, when Indian troops were ordered to "expel the Chinese"
from Thag La, Maj. General J. S. Dhillon expressed the opinion that "experience in Ladakh had shown that a few rounds fired at the Chinese would cause them to run away."[2][22] Because of this, the Indian army was completely unprepared when the attack at Yumtso La occurred.[7][37] Recently declassified CIA documents which were compiled at the time reveal that India's estimates of Chinese capabilities made them neglect their military in favour of 16 | P a g e

economic growth.[38] It is claimed that if a more military-minded man had been in place instead of Nehru, India would have been more likely to have been ready for the threat of a counter-attack from China.[38] On 6 October 1962, the Chinese leadership convened. Lin Biao reported that PLA intelligence units had determined that Indian units might assault Chinese positions at Thag La on 10 October (Operation Leghorn). The Chinese leadership and the Central Military Council decided upon war to launch a large-scale attack to punish perceived military aggression from India.[2] In Beijing, a larger meeting of Chinese military was convened in order to plan for the coming conflict.[2] Mao and the Chinese leadership issued a directive laying out the objectives for the war. A main assault would be launched in the eastern sector, which would be coordinated with a smaller assault in the western sector. All Indian troops within China's claimed territories in the eastern sector would be expelled, and the war would be ended with a unilateral Chinese ceasefire and withdrawal to prewar positions, followed by a return to the negotiating table.[2] India led the Non-Aligned Movement, Nehru enjoyed international prestige, and China, with a larger military, would be portrayed as an aggressor. However, he said that a well-fought war "will guarantee at least thirty years of peace" with India, and determined the benefits to offset the costs.[2] On 8 October, additional veteran and elite divisions were ordered to prepare to move into Tibet from the Chengdu and Lanzhou military regions.[2] On 12 October, Nehru declared that he had ordered the Indian army to "clear Indian territory in the NEFA of Chinese invaders" and personally met with Kaul, issuing instructions to him. On 14 October, an editorial on People's Daily issued China's final warning to India: "So it seems that Mr. Nehru has made up his mind to attack the Chinese frontier guards on an even bigger scale....It is high time to shout to Mr. Nehru that the heroic Chinese troops, with the glorious tradition of resisting foreign aggression, can never be cleared by anyone from their own territory... If there are still some maniacs who are reckless enough to ignore our well-intentioned advice and insist on having another try, well, let them do so. History will pronounce its inexorable verdict... At this critical moment...we still want to appeal once more to Mr. Nehru: better rein in at the edge of the precipice and do not use the lives of Indian troops as stakes in your gamble." [36]
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Marshal Liu Bocheng headed a group to determine the strategy for the war. He concluded that the opposing Indian troops were among India's best, and to achieve victory would require deploying crack troops and relying on force concentration to achieve decisive victory. On 16 October, this war plan was approved, and on the 18th, the final approval was given by the Politburo for a "self-defensive counter-attack", scheduled for 20 October.[2]
Chinese offensive
On 20 October 1962, the Chinese People's Liberation Army launched two attacks, 1000 kilometers apart. In the western theater, the PLA sought to expel Indian forces from the Chip Chap valley in Aksai Chin while in the eastern theater, the PLA sought to capture both banks of the Namka Chu river. Some skirmishes also took place at the Nathula Pass, which is in the Indian state of Sikkim (an Indian protectorate at that time). Gurkha rifles travelling north were targeted by Chinese artillery fire. After four days of fierce fighting, the three regiments of Chinese troops succeeded in securing a substantial portion of the disputed territory.[7]
18 | P a g e

Eastern theatre
The disputed areas in the eastern sector Chinese troops launched an attack on the southern banks of the Namka Chu River on 20 October.[34] The Indian forces were undermanned, with only an understrength battalion to support them, while the Chinese troops had three regiments positioned on the north side of the river.[34] The Indians expected Chinese forces to cross via one of five bridges over the river and defended those crossings.[7] However, the PLA bypassed the defenders by crossing the shallow October river instead. They formed up into battalions on the Indian-held south side of the river under cover of darkness, with each battalion assigned against a separate group of Rajputs.[34] At 5:14 am, Chinese mortar fire began attacking the Indian positions. Simultaneously, the Chinese cut the Indian telephone lines, preventing the defenders from making contact with their headquarters. At about 6:30 am, the Chinese infantry launched a surprise attack from the rear and forced the Indians to leave their trenches.[34] The Chinese troops overwhelmed the Indians in a series of flanking maneuvers south of the McMahon Line and prompted their withdrawal from Namka Chu.[34] Fearful of continued losses, Indian troops escaped into Bhutan. Chinese forces respected the border and did not pursue.[7] Chinese forces now held all of the territory that was under dispute at the time of the Thag La confrontation, but they continued to advance into the rest of NEFA.[34] On 22 October, at 12:15 am, PLA mortars fired on Walong, on the McMahon line.[39] 400 PLA troops began firing on the Indians post there. Flares launched by Indian troops 19 | P a g e

the next day revealed numerous Chinese milling around the valley.[39] The Indians tried to use their mortars against the Chinese but the PLA responded by lighting a bushfire, causing confusion amongst the Indians.[39] The Chinese eventually captured Walong at the cost of more than 200 dead or wounded; the Indian forces also suffered heavy casualties. On 23 October, Chinese troops launched a three-pronged attack on Tawang, which the Indians evacuated without any resistance.[7]
20 | P a g e

Western theatre
The disputed areas in the western sector On the Aksai Chin front, China already controlled most of the disputed territory. Chinese forces quickly swept the region of any remaining Indian troops.[40] Late on 19 October, Chinese troops launched a number of attacks throughout the western theatre.[8] By 22 October, all posts north of Chushul had been cleared.[8] On 20 October, the Chinese easily took the Chip Chap Valley, Galwan Valley, and Pangong Lake.[41] Many outposts and garrisons along the Western front were unable to defend against the surrounding Chinese troops. Most Indian troops positioned in these posts offered resistance but were either killed or taken prisoner. Indian support for these outposts was not forthcoming, as evidenced by the Galwan post, which had been surrounded by enemy forces in August, but no attempt made to relieve the besieged garrison. Following the 20 October attack, nothing was heard from Galwan.[7] On 24 October, Indian forces fought to hold the Rezang La Ridge, in order to prevent a nearby airstrip from falling to the Chinese .[42] The Chinese suffered 1,000 casualties, while the Indians lost 109 killed,.[citation needed] among them Major Shaitan Singh. After realizing the magnitude of the attack, Indian Western Command withdrew many of the isolated outposts to the south-east. Daulet Beg Oldi was also evacuated, but it was south of the Chinese claim line and was not approached by Chinese forces. Indian troops were withdrawn in order to consolidate and regroup in the event that China probed south of their claim line.[7]
21 | P a g e

Overall, the Indian forces in the western theatre were heavily outnumbered and suffered from poor leadership. [citation needed]
Lull in the fighting

By 24 October, the PLA had entered territory previously administered by India to give the PRC a diplomatically strong position over India. The majority of Chinese forces had advanced sixteen kilometres south of the border. Four days of fighting were followed by a three-week lull. Zhou ordered the troops to stop advancing as he attempted to negotiate with Nehru. The Indian forces had retreated into more heavily fortified positions around Se La and Bombdi La which would be difficult to assault. [7] Zhou sent Nehru a letter, proposing 1. A negotiated settlement of the boundary 2. That both sides disengage and withdraw twenty kilometers from present lines of actual control 3. A Chinese withdrawal north in NEFA 4. That China and India not cross lines of present control in Aksai Chin.[7] Nehru's 27 October reply expressed interest in the restoration of peace and friendly relations and suggested a return to the "boundary prior to 8 September 1962". He was categorically concerned about a mutual twenty kilometer withdrawal after "40 or 60 kilometers of blatant military aggression". He wanted the creation of a larger immediate buffer zone and thus resist the possibility of a repeat offensive. Zhou's 4 November reply repeated his 1959 offer to return to the McMahon Line in NEFA and the Chinese traditionally claimed MacDonald Line in Aksai Chin. Facing Chinese forces maintaining themselves on Indian soil and trying to avoid political pressure, the Indian parliament announced a national emergency and passed a resolution which stated their intent to "drive out the aggressors from the sacred soil of India". The United States and the United Kingdom supported India's response, however the Soviet Union was preoccupied with the Cuban Missile Crisis and did not offer the support it had provided in previous years. With the backing of other great powers, a 14 November letter by Nehru to Zhou once again rejected his proposal.[7] Neither side declared war, used their air force, or fully broke off diplomatic relations; however, the conflict is commonly referred to as a war. This war coincided with the Cuban Missile Crisis and was viewed by the western nations at the time as another act of 22 | P a g e

aggression by the Communist bloc.[7][43] According to Calvin, the Chinese side evidently wanted a diplomatic resolution and discontinuation of the conflict.[7]
Continuation of war
After Zhou received Nehru's letter, the fighting resumed on the eastern theater on 14 November (Nehru's birthday), with an Indian attack on Walong, claimed by China, launched from the defensive position of Se La and inflicting heavy casualties on the Chinese. The Chinese resumed military activity on Aksai Chin and NEFA hours after the Walong battle.[7]
23 | P a g e
Indo-Pakistani War of 1965

Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 Part of the Indo-Pakistani Wars Date Locatio n Result August September 23, 1965 Indian subcontinent
United Nations mandated ceasefire.[1] No permanent territorial changes (See Tashkent Declaration).
Belligerents
India Commanders Joyanto Nath Chaudhuri Harbakhsh Singh Arjan Singh Gurbaksh Singh Strength
Pakistan
Ayub Khan Musa Khan Tikka Khan Noor Khan Nasir Ahmed Khan
~150 aircraft Casualties and losses Neutral claims[2][3] 3,000 men[2] At least 175 Neutral claims
[2]
3,800 men[2] 200 tanks[2] 20 aircraft[2] Over 1,813 km2 (700 mi2) of territory lost
tanks[2] 6075 aircraft[2] 777 km2 (300
24 | P a g e

mi2) of territory lost Indian claims 59 aircraft lost[4] Pakistani claims 19 aircraft lost
Indian claims 73 aircraft lost 280 tanks lost
Pakistani claims 110 lost[5] aircraft
The Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 was a culmination of skirmishes that took place between April 1965 and September 1965 between India and Pakistan. This conflict became known as the Second Kashmir War fought by India and Pakistan over the disputed region of Kashmir, the first having been fought in 1947. The war began following Pakistan's Operation Gibraltar, which was designed to infiltrate forces into Jammu and Kashmir to precipitate an insurgency against rule by India.[6] The five-week war caused thousands of casualties on both sides. It ended in a United Nations (UN) mandated ceasefire and the subsequent issuance of the Tashkent Declaration.[1] Much of the war was fought by the countries' land forces in Kashmir and along the International Border between India and Pakistan. This war saw the largest amassing of troops in Kashmir since the Partition of British India in 1947, a number that was overshadowed only during the 20012002 military standoff between India and Pakistan. Most of the battles were fought by opposing infantry and armored units, with substantial backing from air forces, and naval operations. Many details of this war, like those of other Indo-Pakistani Wars, remain unclear.[1] Pre-war escalation
25 | P a g e
A declassified US State Department letter that confirms the existence of hundreds of "infiltrators" in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. Dated during the events running up to the 1965 war. Since Partition of British India in 1947, Pakistan and India remained in contention over several issues. Although the Kashmir conflict was the predominant issue dividing the nations, other border disputes existed, most notably over the Rann of Kutch, a barren region in the Indian state of Gujarat.On March 20, 1965, and later in April 1965, fighting broke out between India and Pakistan in the Rann of Kutch due to intentional provocation by the latter[7]. Initially involving border police from both nations, the disputed area soon witnessed intermittent skirmishes between the countries' armed forces. In June 1965, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson successfully persuaded both countries to end hostilities and set up a tribunal to resolve the dispute. The verdict, which came later in 1968, saw Pakistan awarded 350 square miles (900 km) of the Rann of Kutch, as against its original claim of 3500 square miles.[8] After its success in the Rann of Kutch, Pakistan, under the leadership of General Ayub Khan, believed the Indian Army would be unable to defend itself against a quick military campaign in the disputed territory of Kashmir as the Indian military had suffered a loss to China in 1962.[9] Pakistan believed that the population of Kashmir was generally discontented with Indian rule and that a resistance movement could be ignited by a few infiltrating saboteurs. Pakistan attempted to ignite the resistance movement by means of a covert infiltration, codenamed Operation Gibraltar
[10]
The
Pakistani
26 | P a g e

infiltrators were soon discovered, however, their presence reported by local Kashmiris, and the operation ended in a complete failure. The war On August 5, 1965 between 26,000 and 33,000 Pakistani soldiers crossed the Line of Control dressed as Kashmiri locals headed for various areas within Kashmir. Indian forces, tipped off by the local populace, crossed the cease fire line on August 15.[9] Initially, the Indian Army met with considerable success, capturing three important mountain positions after a prolonged artillery barrage. By the end of August, however, both sides had relative progress; Pakistan had made progress in areas such as Tithwal, Uri and Punch and India had captured the Haji Pir Pass, eight kilometers into Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. On September 1, 1965, Pakistan launched a counterattack, called Operation Grand Slam, with the objective to capture the vital town of Akhnoor in Jammu, which would sever communications and cut off supply routes to Indian troops. Attacking with an overwhelming ratio of troops and technically superior tanks, Pakistan made gains against Indian forces, who were caught unprepared and suffered heavy losses. India responded by calling in its air force to blunt the Pakistani attack. The next day, Pakistan retaliated, its air force attacked Indian forces and air bases in both Kashmir and Punjab. India's decision to open up the theater of attack into Pakistani Punjab forced the Pakistani army to relocate troops engaged in the operation to defend Punjab. Operation Grand Slam therefore failed, as the Pakistan Army was unable to capture Akhnoor; it became one of the turning points in the war when India decided to relieve pressure on its troops in Kashmir by attacking Pakistan further south.
27 | P a g e
Lt. Col. Hari Singh of the India's 18th Cavalry posing outside a captured Pakistani police station (Barkee) in Lahore District. India crossed the International Border on the Western front on September 6, marking an official beginning of the war.[11] On September 6, the 15th Infantry Division of the Indian Army, under World War II veteran Major General Prasad, battled a massive counterattack by Pakistan near the west bank of the Ichogil Canal (BRB Canal), which was a de facto border of India and Pakistan. The General's entourage itself was ambushed and he was forced to flee his vehicle. A second, this time successful, attempt to cross the Ichhogil Canal was made over the bridge in the village of Barki, just east of Lahore. These developments brought the Indian Army within the range of Lahore International Airport. As a result, the United States requested a temporary ceasefire to allow it to evacuate its citizens in Lahore. However, the Pakistani counter attack took Khem Karan from Indian forces which tried to divert the attention of Pakistanis from Khem Karan by an attack on Bedian and the adjacent villages. The thrust against Lahore consisted of the 1st Infantry Division supported by the three tank regiments of the 2nd Independent Armoured Brigade; they quickly advanced across the border, reaching the Ichhogil (BRB) Canal by 6 September. The Pakistani Army held the bridges over the canal or blew up those it could not hold, effectively stalling any further advance by the Indians on Lahore. One unit of the 28 | P a g e

Indian Jat Regiment, 3 Jat, had also crossed the Ichogil canal and captured[12] the town of Batapore (Jallo Mur to Pakistan) on the west side of the canal. The same day, a counter offensive consisting of an armored division and infantry division supported by Pakistan Air Force Sabres forced the Indian 15th Division to withdraw to its starting point. Although 3 Jat suffered minimal casualties, the bulk of the damage being taken by ammunition and stores vehicles, the higher commanders had no information of 3 Jat's capture of Batapore and misleading information led to the command to withdraw from Batapore and Dograi to Ghosal-Dial. This move brought extreme disappointment[13] to Lt-Col Desmond Hayde, CO of 3 Jat. Dograi was eventually recaptured by 3 Jat on 21 September, for the second time but after a much harder battle due to Pakistani reinforcements.
Destroyed or abandoned Pakistani Patton and Sherman tanks on display near Khem Karan. About 97 Pakistani tanks were either destroyed or captured by India during the Battle of Asal Uttar.[14][15] On September 8, 1965, a company of 5 Maratha Light Infantry was sent to reinforce a Rajasthan Armed Constabulary (RAC) post at Munabao - a strategic hamlet about 250 kilometres from Jodhpur. Their brief was simple. To hold the post and to keep Pakistan's infantry battalions from overrunning the post at bay. But at Maratha Hill (in Munabao) - as the post has now been christened - the Indian company could barely manage to thwart the intense attack for 24 29 | P a g e

hours. A company of 3 Guards with 954 heavy mortar battery ordered to reinforce the RAC post at Munabao could never reach. The Pakistani Air Force had strafed the entire area, and also hit a railway train coming from Barmer with reinforcements near Gadra road railway station. On September 10, Munabao fell into Pakistani hands, and efforts to capture the strategic point did not succeed
[16]
On the days following September 9, both nations' premiere formations were routed in unequal battles. India's 1st Armoured Division, labeled the "pride of the Indian Army", launched an offensive towards Sialkot. The Division divided itself into two prongs, was forced back by the Pakistani 6th Armoured Division at Chawinda and was forced to withdraw after suffering heavy losses of nearly 100 tanks. The Pakistanis followed up their success by launching Operation Windup, which forced the Indians back farther. Similarly, Pakistan's pride, the 1st Armoured Division, pushed an offensive towards Khem Karan, with the intent to capture Amritsar (a major city in Punjab, India) and the bridge on River Beas to Jalandhar. The Pakistani 1st Armored Division never made it past Khem Karan, however, and by the end of September 10 lay disintegrated by the defences of the Indian 4th Mountain Division at what is now known as the Battle of Asal Uttar (lit. meaning "Real Answer", or more appropriate English equivalent "Fitting Response"). The area became known as 'Patton Nagar' (Patton Town), because of the large number of US-made Pakistani Patton tanks. Approximately 97 Pakistani tanks were destroyed or abandoned, with only 32 Indian tanks destroyed or damaged. The Pakistani 1st Armoured Division less 5th Armoured Brigade was next sent to Sialkot sector behind Pakistani 6th Armoured Division where it didn't see action as 6th Armoured Division was already in process of routing Indian 1st Armoured Division which was superior to it in strength. The war was heading for a stalemate, with both nations holding territory of the other. The Indian army suffered 3,000 battlefield 30 | P a g e

deaths, while Pakistan suffered 3,800. The Indian army was in possession of 710 mile (1,840 km) of Pakistani territory and the Pakistan army held 210 mile (545 km) of Indian territory. The territory occupied by India was mainly in the fertile Sialkot, Lahore and Kashmir sectors,[17] while Pakistani land gains were primarily south in deserts opposite to Sindh and in Chumb sector near Kashmir in north.[18] Aerial warfare Main article: Aerial warfare in 1965 India Pakistan War Further information: Indian Air Force#Second Kashmir War
1965 and Pakistan Air Force#Indo-Pakistani War of 1965
The F-86 Sabre was the PAF's sole front-line fighter.
The war saw aircraft of the Indian Air Force (IAF) and the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) engaging in combat for the first time since independence. Though the two forces had previously faced off in the First Kashmir War during the late 1940s, that engagement was very limited in scale compared to the 1965 conflict. The IAF was flying large numbers of Hawker Hunter, Indianmanufactured Folland Gnats, de Havilland Vampires, EE Canberra bombers and a squadron of MiG-21s. The PAF's fighter force comprised 102 F-86F Sabres and 12 F-104 Starfighters, along with 24 B-57 Canberra bombers. During the conflict the PAF was outnumbered by around 5:1.[19]
31 | P a g e

The PAF's aircraft were largely of American origin, whereas the IAF flew an assortment of Soviet and European aeroplanes. It has been widely reported that the PAF's American aircraft were superior to those of the InAF, but according to some experts this is untrue because the InAF's MiG-21, Hawker Hunter and Folland Gnat fighters actually had higher performance than their PAF counter-part, the F-86 Sabre.[20] Although the InAF's de Havilland Vampire fighter-bombers were outdated in comparison to the F-86 Sabre, the Hawker Hunter fighters were superior in both power and speed to the F-86 according to Air Cdre (retired) Sajjad Haider, who lead the PAF's No.19 Squadron in combat during the war.[21] According to the Indians, the F-86 was vulnerable to the diminutive Folland Gnat, nicknamed "Sabre Slayer."[22] The PAF's F-104 Starfighter of the PAF was the fastest fighter operating in the subcontinent at that time and was often referred to as "the pride of the PAF". However, according to Air Cdre (retired) Sajjad Haider who flew with the PAF's No.19 Squadron, the F-104 did not deserve this reputation. Being "a high level interceptor designed to neutralise Soviet strategic bombers in altitudes above 40,000 feet," rather than engage in dogfights with agile fighters at low altitudes, it was "unsuited to the tactical environment of the region."[23] It can be argued that, although the IAF is believed to have feared the Starfighter,[23] in combat it was not as effective as the IAF's far more agile, albeit much slower, Folland Gnat fighter.[24][25]
Indian Folland Gnat on display at the PAF Museum Gallery.
32 | P a g e

The two countries have made contradictory claims of combat losses during the war and few neutral sources have verified the claims of either country. The PAF claimed it shot down 104 IAF planes and lost 19 of its own, while the IAF claimed it shot down 73 PAF planes and lost 35.[26] According to one independent source, the PAF flew 86 F-86 Sabres, 10 F-104 Starfighters and 20 B-57 Canberras in a parade soon after the war was over. Thus disproving the IAF's claim of downing 73 PAF fighters, which at the time constituted nearly the entire Pakistani front-line fighter force.[27] Indian sources have pointed out that, despite PAF claims of losing only a squadron of combat craft, Pakistan sought to acquire additional aircraft from Indonesia, Iraq, Iran, Turkey and China within 10 days of the beginning war.November 2009[citation 2009[citation needed]
needed]
But this could be
explained by the 5:1 disparity in numbers faced by the PAF.November
33 | P a g e
Tank battles
Tanks of 18th Cavalry (Indian Army) on the move during the 1965 Indo-Pak War.
The 1965 war witnessed some of the largest tank battles since World War II. At the beginning of the war, the Pakistani Army had both a numerical advantage in tanks, as well as better equipment overall.[28] Pakistani armour was largely American-made; it consisted mainly of Patton M-47 and M-48 tanks, but also included many M4 Sherman tanks, some M24 Chaffee light tanks and M36 Jackson tank destroyers, equipped with 90 mm guns.[29] The bulk of India's tank fleet were older M4 Sherman tanks; some were up-gunned with the French high velocity CN 75 50 guns and could hold their own, whilst some older models were still equipped with the inferior 75 mm M3 L/40 gun. Besides the M4 tanks, India fielded the British-made Centurion Tank Mk 7, with the 105 mm Royal Ordnance L7 gun, and the AMX-13, PT76, and M3 Stuart light tanks. Pakistan fielded a greater number and more modern artillery; its guns out-ranged those of the Indian artillery, according to Pakistan's Major General T.H. Malik.[30] At the outbreak of war in 1965, Pakistan had about 15 armoured cavalry regiments, each with about 45 tanks in three squadrons. Besides the Pattons, there were about 200 M4 Shermans re-armed 34 | P a g e

with 76 mm guns, 150 M24 Chaffee light tank and a few independent squadrons of M36B1 tank destroyers. Most of these regiments served in Pakistan's two armoured divisions, the 1st and 6th Armoured divisions the latter being in the process of formation. The Indian Army of the time possessed 17 cavalry regiments, and in the 1950s had begun modernizing them by the acquisition of 164 AMX-13 light tanks and 188 Centurions. The remainder of the cavalry units were equipped with M4 Shermans and a small number of M3A3 Stuart light tanks. India had only a single armoured division, the 1st 'Black Elephant' Armoured Division, also called 'Fakhr-i-Hind' ('Pride of India'), which consisted of the 17th Cavalry (The Poona Horse), the 4th Hodson's Horse, the 16th 'Black Elephant' Cavalry, the 7th Light Cavalry, the 2nd Lancers, the 18th Cavalry and the 62nd Cavalry, the two first named being equipped with Centurions. There was also the 2nd Independent Armoured Brigade, one of whose three regiments, the 3rd Cavalry, was also equipped with Centurions. Despite the qualitative and numerical superiority of Pakistani armour,
[31]
Pakistan was outfought on the battlefield by India, which made
progress into the Lahore-Sialkot sector, whilst halting Pakistan's counteroffensive on Amritsar.[32];[33] they were sometimes employed in a faulty manner, such as charging prepared defenses during the defeat of Pakistan's 1st Armoured Division at Assal Uttar.
Pakistani soldiers during the Battle of Chawinda. Brigadier A.A.K. Niazi, (3rd from left) observing a map Although India's tank formations experienced same results, India's attack at the Battle of Chawinda, led by its 1st Armored Division and 35 | P a g e

supporting units, was brought to a grinding halt by the newly raised 6th Armoured Division (ex-100th independent brigade group) in the Chawinda sector. The Indians lost 120 tanks at Chawinda.[34] One true winner to emerge was India's Centurion battle tank, with its 105 mm gun and heavy armour, which proved superior to the overly complex Pattons and their exaggerated reputations.[33].However, in the Sialkot sector outnumbered Pattons performed exceedingly well in the hands of the 25th Cavalry and other regiments of the 6th Armoured Division, which exacted a disproportionately heavy toll of Centurions from the Poona Horse and Hodson's Horse. The Indian Army has made much of the fact that some of its Centurions survived repeated hits; yet have failed to point out that the majority of tanks in the Sialkot sector were Shermans whose guns were inadequate even in 1944. Neither the Indian nor Pakistani Army showed any great facility in the use of armoured formations in offensive operations, whether the Pakistani 1st Armoured Division at Asal Uttar or the Indian 1st Armoured Division at Chawinda. In contrast, both proved adept with smaller forces in a defensive role such a the 2nd Armoured Brigade at Asal Uttar and the 25th Cavalry at Chawinda, where they defeated their better equipped but clumsier foes
36 | P a g e
Naval hostilities The navies of India and Pakistan did not play a prominent role in the war of 1965, although Pakistani accounts dispute this.[35] On September 7, a flotilla of the Pakistani Navy carried out a small scale bombardment of the Indian coastal town and radar station of Dwarka, which was 200 miles (300 km) south of the Pakistani port of Karachi. Codenamed Operation Dwarka, it did not fulfill its primary objective of disabling the radar station and there was no immediate retaliatory response from India. Later, some of the Indian fleet sailed from Bombay to Dwarka to patrol the area and deter further bombardment. Foreign authors have noted that the "insignificant bombardment"[36] of the town was a "limited engagement, with no strategic value."[35] According to some Pakistani sources, one submarine, PNS Ghazi, kept the Indian Navy's aircraft carrier INS Vikrant besieged in Bombay throughout the war. Indian sources claim that it was not their intention to get into a naval conflict with Pakistan, and wished to restrict the war to a land-based conflict.[37] Moreover, they note that the Vikrant was in dry dock in the process of refitting. Some Pakistani defence writers have also discounted claims that the Indian Navy was bottled up in Bombay by a single submarine, instead stating that 75% of the Indian Navy was under maintenance in harbour.[38] Covert operations The Pakistan Army launched a number of covert operations to infiltrate and sabotage Indian airbases.[39] On September 7, 1965, the Special Services Group (SSG) commandos were parachuted into enemy territory. According to Chief of Army Staff General Musa Khan, about 135 commandos were airdropped at three Indian airfields(Halwara, Pathankot and Adampur). The daring attempt proved to be an "unmitigated disaster".[39] Only 22 commandos returned to Pakistan as planned, 93 were taken prisoner (including one of the Commanders of the operations, Major Khalid Butt), and 20 37 | P a g e

were killed in encounters with the army, police or civilians[40] The reason for the failure of the commando mission is attributed to the failure to provide maps, proper briefings and adequate planning or preparation[41] Despite failing to sabotage the airfields, Pakistan sources claim that the commando mission affected some planned Indian operations. As the Indian 14th Infantry Division was diverted to hunt for paratroopers, the Pakistan Air Force found the road filled with transport, and destroyed many vehicles.[42] India responded to the covert activity by announcing rewards for captured Pakistani spies or paratroopers.[43] Meanwhile, in Pakistan, rumors spread that India had retaliated with its own covert operations, sending commandos deep into Pakistan territory,[41] but these rumors were later determined to be unfounded.[44]
38 | P a g e
Assessment of losses India and Pakistan make widely divergent claims about the damage they inflicted on each other and the amount of damage suffered by them. The following summarizes each nation's claims. Indian claims
[45]
Pakistani claims[46] 2,279 combat sorties 73
Independent Sources[
[47]
Casualties Combat flying effort
3,000
Indian
soldiers
3,800 Pakistani soldiers
4,073+ combat sorties 35 IAF (official),
PAF.Other sources[48] based on the Official Indian Armed Aircraft lost Forces History[49] put actual 19 IAF losses at 30 including 19 IAF accidents (non combat sortie rate is not known) and PAF's combat losses alone at 43. Aerial victories 17 + 3 (post war) 128 Tanks destroyed 150 Pakistani Indian tanks,[52] 152 tanks 165 destroyed Pakistan 30 PAF, 104
20 PAF, Pakistan claim India rejected arbitration.[50][51]
neutra
Pakistani
tanks Pakistani tanks
captured,
destroyed.[52] Officially 471 tanks[53] and 38 captured
Land won
area 1,500 mi2
(3,885 km2)
of 250 mi (648 km) Indian
India of 710 mi(1,1840 km) Pakistani territory
hel
Pakistani territory
an
39 | P a g e

Pakistan territory 210 mi(545 km) Indian territory Neutral assessments There have been several neutral assessments of the losses incurred by both India and Pakistan during the war. Most of these assessments agree that India had a upper hand over Pakistan when ceasefire was declared. Some of the neutral assessments are mentioned below According to the United States Library of Congress Country Studies: The war was militarily inconclusive; each side held prisoners and some territory belonging to the other. Losses were relatively heavyon the Pakistani side, twenty aircraft, 200 tanks, and 3,800 troops. Pakistan's army had been able to withstand Indian pressure, but a continuation of the fighting would only have led to further losses and ultimate defeat for Pakistan. Most Pakistanis, schooled in the belief of their own martial prowess, refused to accept the possibility of their country's military defeat by "Hindu India" and were, instead, quick to blame their failure to attain their military aims on what they considered to be the ineptitude of Ayub Khan and his government.[54] TIME magazine reported that India held 690 mi2 of Pakistan territory while Pakistan held 250 mi2 of Indian territory in Kashmir and Rajasthan. Additionally, Pakistan had lost almost half its armour temporarily.[55] The same article stated that Severely mauled by the larger Indian armed forces, Pakistan could continue the fight only by teaming up with Red China and turning its back on the U.N. Devin T. Hagerty wrote in his book "South Asia in world politics"[56] The invading Indian forces outfought their Pakistani counterparts and halted their attack on the outskirts of Lahore, Pakistan's second40 | P a g e
hel

largest city. By the time United Nations intervened on September 22, Pakistan had suffered a clear defeat. In his book "National identity and geopolitical visions",[57] Gertjan Dijkink writes The superior Indian forces, however, won a decisive victory and the army could have even marched on into Pakistani territory had external pressure not forced both combatants to cease their war efforts. An excerpt from Stanley Wolpert's India,[58] summarizing the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965, is as follows: In three weeks the second Indo-Pak War ended in what appeared to be a draw when the embargo placed by Washington on U.S. ammunition and replacements for both armies forced cessation of conflict before either side won a clear victory. India, however, was in a position to inflict grave damage to, if not capture, Pakistan's capital of the Punjab when the cease-fire was called, and controlled Kashmir's strategic Uri-Poonch bulge, much to Ayub's chagrin. In his book titled The greater game: India's race with destiny and China, David Van Praagh wrote[59] India won the war. It gained 1,840 square kilometers of Pakistani territory: 640 square kilometers in Azad Kashmir, Pakistan's portion of the state; 460 square kilometers of the Sailkot sector; 380 square kilometers far to the south of Sindh; and most critical, 360 square kilometers on the Lahore front. Pakistan took 540 square kilometers of Indian territory: 490 square kilometers in the Chhamb sector and 50 square kilometers around Khem Karan. Dennis Kux's "India and the United States estranged
democracies" also provides a summary of the war.[60] Although both sides lost heavily in men and materiel, and neither gained a decisive military advantage, India had the better of the war. New Delhi achieved its basic goal of thwarting Pakistan's attempt to 41 | P a g e

seize Kashmir by force. Pakistan gained nothing from a conflict which it had instigated. "A region in turmoil: South Asian conflicts since 1947" by Robert Johnson mentions[61] India's strategic aims were modest it aimed to deny Pakistani Army victory, although it ended up in possession of 720 square miles of Pakistani territory for the loss of just 220 of its own. An excerpt from William M. Carpenter and David G. Wiencek's "Asian security handbook: terrorism and the new security environment"[62] A brief but furious 1965 war with India began with a covert Pakistani thrust across the Kashmiri cease-fire line and ended up with the city of Lahore threatened with encirclement by Indian Army. Another UNsponsored cease-fire left borders unchanged, but Pakistan's vulnerability had again been exposed. English historian John Keay's "India: A History" provides a summary of the 1965 war[63] The 1965 Indo-Pak war lasted barely a month. Pakistan made gains in the Rajasthan desert but its main push against India's Jammu-Srinagar road link was repulsed and Indian tanks advanced to within a sight of Lahore. Both sides claimed victory but India had most to celebrate. Uk Heo and Shale Asher Horowitz write in their book "Conflict in Asia: Korea, China-Taiwan, and India-Pakistan"[64] Again India appeared, logistically at least, to be in a superior position but neither side was able to mobilize enough strength to gain a decisive victory. Newsweek magazine, however, praised the Pakistani military's ability to hold of the much larger Indian Army.[65] "By just the end of the week, in fact, it was clear that the Pakistanis were more than holding their own."
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Ceasefire The United States and the Soviet Union used significant diplomatic tools to prevent any further escalation in the conflict between the two South Asian nations. The Soviet Union, led by Premier Alexey Kosygin, hosted ceasefire negotiations in Tashkent (now in Uzbekistan), where Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and Pakistani President Ayub Khan signed the Tashkent Agreement, agreeing to withdraw to preAugust lines no later than February 25, 1966. With declining stockpiles of ammunition, Pakistani leaders feared the war tilting in India's favor. Therefore, they quickly accepted the ceasefire in Tashkent.[66] Despite strong opposition from Indian military leaders, India budged to growing international diplomatic pressure and accepted the ceasefire.[66] On September 22, the United Nations Security Council unanimously passed a resolution that called for an unconditional ceasefire from both nations. The war ended the following day. India's Prime Minister, Shastri, suffered a fatal heart attack soon after the declaration of the ceasefire. As a consequence, the public outcry in India against the ceasefire declaration transformed into a wave of sympathy for the ruling Indian National Congress.[67] The ceasefire was criticized by many Pakistanis who, relying on fabricated official reports and the controlled Pakistani press, believed that the leadership had surrendered military gains. The protests led to student riots.[68] Pakistan State's reports had suggested that their military was performing admirably in the war which they incorrectly blamed as being initiated by India and thus the Tashkent Declaration was seen as having forfeited the gains.[69] Some recent books written by Pakistani authors, including one by ex-ISI chief titled "The Myth of 1965 Victory",[70] allegedly exposed Pakistani fabrications about the war, but all copies of the book were bought by Pakistan Army to prevent publication because the topic was "too sensitive".[71][72]
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India and Pakistan accused each other of ceasefire violations; India charged Pakistan with 585 violations in 34 days, while Pakistan countered with accusations of 450 incidents by India.[73] In addition to the expected exchange of small arms and artillery fire, India reported that Pakistan utilized the ceasefire to capture the Indian village of Chananwalla in the Fazilka sector. This village was recaptured by Indian troops on 25 December. On October 10, a B-57 Canberra on loan to the PAF was damaged by 3 SA-2 missiles fired from the IAF base at Ambala[74] A Pakistani Army Auster was shot down on 16 December, killing one Pakistani army captain and on 2 February 1967, an AOP was shot down by IAF Hunters. The ceasefire remained in effect until the start of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971. Intelligence failures Strategic miscalculations by both India and Pakistan ensured that the war ended in a stalemate Indian miscalculations Indian military intelligence gave no warning of the impending Pakistan invasion. The Indian Army failed to recognize the presence of heavy Pakistani artillery and armaments in Chumb and suffered significant losses as a result. The "Official History of the 1965 War", drafted by the Ministry of Defence of India in 1992, was a long suppressed document that revealed other miscalculations. According to the document, on September 22 when the Security Council was pressing for a ceasefire, the Indian Prime Minister asked commanding Gen. Chaudhuri if India could possibly win the war, were he to delay accepting the ceasefire. The general replied that most of India's frontline ammunition had been used up and the Indian Army had suffered considerable tank losses. It was determined later that only 14% of India's frontline ammunition had been fired and India held twice the number of tanks
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as Pakistan. By this time, the Pakistani Army had used close to 80% of its ammunition. Air Chief Marshal (retd) P.C. Lal, who was the Vice Chief of Air Staff during the conflict, points to the lack of coordination between the IAF and the Indian army. Neither side revealed its battle plans to the other. The battle plans drafted by the Ministry of Defence and General Chaudhari, did not specify a role for the Indian Air Force in the order of battle. This attitude of Gen. Chaudhari was referred to by ACM Lal as the "Supremo Syndrome", a patronizing attitude sometimes held by the Indian army towards the other branches of the Indian Military.[45] Pakistani miscalculations The Pakistani Army's failures started with the supposition that a generally discontented Kashmiri people, given the opportunity provided by the Pakistani advance, would revolt against their Indian rulers, bringing about a swift and decisive surrender of Kashmir. The Kashmiri people, however, did not revolt. Instead, the Indian Army was provided with enough information to learn of Operation Gibraltar and the fact that the Army was battling not insurgents, as they had initially supposed, but Pakistani Army regulars.
Telegram from the Embassy of the United States in Karachi: "Continuing propaganda regarding achievements of Pak forces seems
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to have convinced most that only Pak forbearance saved the Indians from disaster." The Pakistani Army also failed to recognize that the Indian policy makers would order an attack on the southern sector in order to open a second theater of conflict. Pakistan was forced to dedicate troops to the southern sector to protect Sialkot and Lahore instead using them to support penetrating into Kashmir. "Operation Grand Slam", which was launched by Pakistan to capture Akhnoor, a town north-east of Jammu and a key region for communications between Kashmir and the rest of India, was also a failure. Many Pakistani commentators criticized the Ayub Khan administration for being indecisive during Operation Grand Slam. These critics claim that the operation failed because Ayub Khan knew the importance of Akhnur to India (having called it India's "jugular vein") and did not want to capture it and drive the two nations into an all-out war. Despite progress being made in Akhnur, General Ayub Khan relieved the commanding Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik and replaced him with Gen. Yahya Khan. A 24-hour lull ensued the replacement, which allowed the Indian army to regroup in Akhnur and successfully oppose a lackluster attack headed by General Yahya Khan. "The enemy came to our rescue", asserted the Indian Chief of Staff of the Western Command. Later, Akhtar Hussain Malik criticized Ayub Khan for planning Operation Gibraltar, which was doomed to fail, and for relieving him of his command at a crucial moment in the war. Malik threatened to expose the truth about the war and the army's failure, but later dropped the idea for fear of being banned.[75] Some authors have noted that Pakistan might have been emboldened by a war game conducted in March 1965, at the Institute of Defence Analysis, USA. The exercise concluded that, in the event of a war with India, Pakistan would win.[76][77] Other authors like Stephen Philip Cohen, have consistently commented that the Pakistan Army had
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"acquired an exaggerated view of the weakness of both India and the Indian military... the 1965 war was a shock".[78] Pakistani Air Marshal and Commander-in-Chief of PAF during the war, Nur Khan, later said that the Pakistan Army, and not India, should be blamed for starting the war.[79][80] However propaganda in Pakistan about the war continued; the war was not rationally analyzed in Pakistan,[81][82] with most of the blame being heaped on the leadership and little importance given to intelligence failures that persisted until the debacle of the 1971 war, when then East Pakistan was invaded by India and seceded from West Pakistan, leading to the creation of Bangladesh. Involvement of other nations The United States of America, which had previously supplied military equipment to India and Pakistan, imposed an embargo against further supplies to both countries once the war had started. The US was apprehensive that military equipment that it had provided to be used in a battle against communism, would instead be used by the countries to fight one another. The American embargo especially affected Pakistan since the majority of its equipment was provided by America. This would cause Pakistan to believe that it could not continue the war beyond September.[83] Following imposition of the American embargo, other NATO allies (including the UK) discontinued providing military equipment to the nations. Both before and during the war, China had been a major military associate of Pakistan and had invariably admonished India, with whom it had fought a war in 1962. There were also reports of Chinese troop movements on the Indian border to support Pakistan.[84] As such, India agreed to the UN mandate in order to avoid a war on both borders. India's participation in the Non-Aligned Movement yielded little support from its members. Pakistan, however, gained assistance from countries of Asia with large Islamic populations, including Turkey, Iran 47 | P a g e

and Indonesia. The USSR was more neutral than most other nations during the war and even invited both nations to talks that it would host in Tashkent.[85][86]
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Aftermath India Despite the declaration of a ceasefire, India was perceived as the victor due to its success in halting the Pakistan-backed insurgency in Kashmir.[87] In its October 1965 issue, the TIME magazine quoted a Western official assessing the consequences of the war[88] Now it's apparent to everybody that India is going to emerge as an Asian power in its own right. In light of the failures of the Sino-Indian War, the outcome of the 1965 war was viewed as a "politico-strategic" victory in India. The Indian premier, Lal Bahadur Shastri, was hailed as a national hero in India.[89] While the overall performance of the Indian military was praised, military leaders were criticized for their failure to effectively deploy India's superior armed forces so as to achieve a decisive victory over Pakistan.[90] In his book "War in the modern world since 1815", noted war historian Jeremy Black said that though Pakistan "lost heavily" during the 1965 war, India's hasty decision to call for negotiations prevented further considerable damage to the Pakistan Armed Forces. He elaborates[91] India's chief of army staff urged negotiations on the ground that they were running out ammunition and their number of tanks had become seriously depleted. In fact, the army had used less than 15% of its ammunition compared to Pakistan, which had consumed closer to 80 percent and India had double the number of serviceable tanks. As a consequence, India focussed on enhancing communication and coordination within and among the triservices of the Indian Armed Forces. Partly as a result of the inefficient information gathering preceding the war, India established the Research and Analysis Wing for external espionage and intelligence. Major improvements were also made in command and control to address various shortcomings and the positive impact of these changes was clearly visible during 49 | P a g e

the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 when India achieved a decisive victory over Pakistan within two weeks. China's repeated threats to intervene in the conflict in support of Pakistan increased pressure on the government to take an immediate decision to develop nuclear weapons.[92] Despite repeated assurances, the United States did little to prevent extensive use of American arms by Pakistani forces during the conflict which irked India.[93] At the same time, the United States and United Kingdom refused to supply India with sophisticated weaponry which further strained the relations between the West and India.[94] These developments led to a significant change in India's foreign policy India, which had previously championed the cause of non-alignment, distanced itself further from Western powers and developed close relations with the Soviet Union. By the end of 1960s, the Soviet Union emerged as the biggest supplier of military hardware to India.[95] From 1967 to 1977, 81% of India's arms imports were from the Soviet Union.[96] After the 1965 war, the arms race between India and Pakistan became even more asymmetric and India was outdistancing Pakistan by far.[97] Pakistan At the conclusion of the war, many Pakistanis considered the performance of their military to be positive. September 6 is celebrated as 'Defence Day' in Pakistan, in commemoration of the successful defence of Lahore against the Indian army. The performance of the Pakistani Air Force, in particular, was praised. However, the Pakistani government was accused by foreign analysts of spreading disinformation among its citizens regarding the actual consequences of the war.[98] In his book "Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani foreign policies", S.M. Burke writes[56] After the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965 the balance of military power had decisively shifted in favor of India. Pakistan had found it difficult to replace the heavy equipment lost during that conflict while her
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adversary, despite her economic and political problems, had been determinedly building up her strength. Most observers agree that the myth of a mobile, hard hitting Pakistan Army was badly dented in the war, as critical breakthroughs were not made.[99] Several Pakistani writers criticized the military's ill-founded belief that their "martial race" of soldiers could defeat "Hindu India" in the war.[100][101] Rasul Bux Rais, a Pakistani political analyst wrote[102] The 1965 war with India proved that Pakistan could neither break the formidable Indian defenses in a blitzkrieg fashion nor could she sustain an all-out conflict for long. Moreover, Pakistan had lost more ground than it had gained during the war and, more importantly, failed to achieve its goal of occupying Kashmir; this result has been viewed by many impartial observers as a defeat for Pakistan.[103][104][105] Many high ranking Pakistani officials and military experts later criticized the faulty planning of Operation Gibraltar that ultimately led to the war. The Tashkent declaration was also criticized in Pakistan, though few citizens realised the gravity of the situation that existed at the end of the war. Political leaders were also criticized. Following the advice of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan's foreign minister, Ayub Khan had raised very high expectations among the people of Pakistan about the superiority if not invincibility of its armed forces,[106] but Pakistan's inability to attain its military aims during the war, created a political liability for Ayub.[107] The defeat of its Kashmiri ambitions in the war led to the army's invincibility being challenged by an increasingly vocal opposition.[108] One of the most far reaching consequences of the war was the widescale economic slowdown in Pakistan.[109][110] The cost of the 1965 war put an end to the impressive period economic growth Pakistan had experienced during early 1960s. Between 1964 and 1966, Pakistan's defence spending rose from 4.82% to 9.86% of GDP, putting tremendous strain on Pakistan's economy. By 197071, defence 51 | P a g e

spending comprised a whopping 55.66% of government expenditure.
[111]
Pakistan was surprised by the lack of support by the United States, an ally with whom the country had signed an Agreement of Cooperation. USA declared its neutrality in the war by cutting off military supplies to both sides,[9] leading Islamabad to believe that they were "betrayed" by the United States.[112] After the war, Pakistan would increasingly look towards China as a major source of military hardware and political support. Another negative consequence of the war was the growing
resentment against the Pakistani government in East Pakistan (present day Bangladesh),[78] particularly for West Pakistan's obsession with Kashmir.[113] Bengali leaders accused the central government of not providing adequate security for East Pakistan during the conflict, even though large sums of money were taken from the east to finance the war for Kashmir.[114] In fact, despite some Pakistan Air Force attacks being launched from bases in East Pakistan during the war, India did not retaliate in that sector,[115] although East Pakistan was defended only by an understrenghted infantry division (14 Division), sixteen planes and no tanks.[116] Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was critical of the disparity in military resources deployed in East and West Pakistan, calling for greater autonomy for East Pakistan, which ultimately led to the Bangladesh Liberation war and another war between India and Pakistan in 1971
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Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 Part of Indo-Pakistani Wars and Bangladesh Liberation War
Date Location
Result Territorial changes
316 December 1971 Eastern front: East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) Western front: India-West Pakistan border Decisive Indian victory. Eastern front: Pakistani forces surrender. Western front: Ceasefire negotiated. Secession of East Pakistan as the independent state of Bangladesh.
Belligerents
India Sam Manekshaw J.S. Arora G.G. Bewoor K. P. Candeth 500,000 troops
Pakistan Commanders Gul Hassan Khan Abdul Hamid Khan Tikka Khan A. A. K. Niazi (P.O.W.) Strength 365,000 troops Casualties and losses 9,000 killed[2] 4,350 wounded 97,368 captured[3] 2 Destroyers[4] 1 Minesweeper[4] 1 Submarine[5][6] 3 Patrol vessels 7 Gunboats
3,843 killed [1] 9,851 wounded[1] 1 Frigate 1 Naval Plane
The Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 was a military conflict between India and Pakistan. Indian, Bangladeshi and international sources consider the beginning of the war to be Operation Chengiz Khan, Pakistan's December 3, 1971 pre-emptive strike on 11 Indian airbases.[7][8] Lasting just 13 days it is considered one of the shortest wars in history.[9][10] However, Pakistan considers it to be a part of the overall Bangladesh Liberation War, in which India had been providing direct financial and military support for the Mukti Bahini Bengali operatives.[citation needed] 53 | P a g e

During the course of the war, Indian and Pakistani forces clashed on the eastern and western fronts. The war effectively came to an end after the Eastern Command of the Pakistan Military signed the Instrument of Surrender on December 16, 1971 following which East Pakistan seceded as the independent state of Bangladesh. Around 97,368 West Pakistanis who were in East Pakistan at the time of its independence, including some 79,700 Pakistan Army soldiers and paramilitary personnel[11] and 12,500 civilians,
[11]
were taken as prisoners of war by India.
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Eastern theatre
On the eastern theater, the PLA attacked Indian forces near Se La and Bomdi La on 17 November. These positions were defended by the Indian 4th Division. Instead of attacking by road as expected, PLA forces approached via a mountain trail, and their attack cut off a main road and isolated 10,000 Indian troops. Se La occupied high ground,and rather than assault this commanding position, the Chinese captured Thembang, which was a supply route to Se La.[7]
Western theatre
On the western theatre, PLA forces launched a heavy infantry attack on 18 November near Chushul. Their attack started at 4:35 am, despite a mist surrounding most of the areas in the region. At 5:45 the Chinese troops advanced to attack 2 platoons of Indian troops at Gurung Hill. The Indians did not know what was happening, as communications were dead. As a patrol was sent, China attacked with greater numbers. Indian artillery could not hold off against superior Chinese forces. By 9:00 am, Chinese forces attacked Gurung Hill directly and Indian commanders withdrew from the area.[8] The Chinese had been simultaneously attacking Rezang La which was held by 118 Indian troops. At 5:05 am, Chinese troops launched their attack audaciously. Chinese medium machine gun fire pierced through the Indian tactical defences.[8] At 6:55 am the sun rose and the Chinese attack on the 8th platoon began in waves. Fighting continued for the next hour, until the Chinese signaled that they had destroyed the 7th platoon. Indians tried to use light machine guns on the medium machine guns from the Chinese but after 10 minutes the battle was over.[8] Logistical inadequacy once again hurt the Indian troops.[44] The Chinese gave the Indian troops a respectful military funeral.[44] The battles also saw the death of Major Shaitan Singh of the Kumaon Regiment, who had been instrumental in the first battle of Rezang La. [44] The Indian troops were forced to withdraw to high mountain positions. Indian sources believed that their troops were just coming to grips with the mountain combat and finally called for more troops. However, the Chinese declared a ceasefire, ending the bloodshed.[8] Indians suffered heavy casualties, with dead Indian troops' bodies being found in the ice, frozen with weapons in hand. Chinese forces also suffered heavy casualties, especially at Rezang La. This signalled the end of the war in Aksai Chin as China had reached their 55 | P a g e

claim line - many Indian troops were ordered to withdraw from the area. China claimed that the Indian troops wanted to fight on until the bitter end. However, the war ended with their withdrawal, so as to limit the amount of casualties.[7] The PLA penetrated close to the outskirts of Tezpur, Assam, a major frontier town nearly fifty kilometers from the Assam-North-East Frontier Agency border.[15] The local government ordered the evacuation of the civilians in Tezpur to the south of the Brahmaputra River, all prisons were thrown open, and government officials who stayed behind destroyed Tezpur's currency reserves in anticipation of a Chinese advance.[22]
Ceasefire
The revised map of the disputed territory of Kashmir following the Sino-Indian War; notice the now Chinese-administered Aksai Chin region. China had reached its claim lines so the PLA did not advance farther, and on 19 November it declared a unilateral cease-fire. Zhou Enlai declared a unilateral ceasefire to start on midnight, 21 November. Zhou's ceasefire declaration stated, Beginning from 21 November 1962, the Chinese frontier guards will cease fire along the entire Sino-Indian border. Beginning from 1 December 1962, the Chinese frontier guards will withdraw to positions 20 kilometers behind the line of actual control which existed between China and India on 7 November 1959. In the eastern sector, although the Chinese frontier guards have so far been fighting on Chinese territory north of the traditional customary line, they are prepared to withdraw from their present positions to the north of the illegal McMahon Line, and to withdraw twenty kilometers back from
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that line. In the middle and western sectors, the Chinese frontier guards will withdraw twenty kilometers from the line of actual control. Zhou had first given the ceasefire announcement to Indian charg d'affaires on 19 November, (before India's request for United States air support) but New Delhi did not receive it until 24 hours later. The aircraft carrier was ordered back after the ceasefire and thus American intervention on India's side in the war was avoided. Retreating Indian troops, who hadn't come into contact with anyone knowing of the ceasefire, and Chinese troops in NEFA and Aksai Chin, were involved in some minor battles[7] but for the most part the ceasefire signalled an end to the fighting. The United States Air Force flew in supplies to India in November 1962, but neither side wished to continue hostilities. Toward the end of the war India increased her support for Tibetan refugees and revolutionaries, some of them having settled in India, as they were fighting the same common enemy in the region. The Nehru administration ordered the raising of an elite Indian-trained "Tibetan Armed Force" composed of Tibetan refugees.[45] The CIA had already begun operations in bringing about change in Tibet.
World opinion
The Chinese military action has been viewed by the United States as part of the PRC's policy of making use of aggressive wars to settle its border disputes and to distract from its internal issues.[46] According to James Calvin from the United States Marine Corps, western nations at the time viewed China as an aggressor during the China-India border war, and the war was part of a monolithic communist objective for a world dictatorship of the proletariat. This was further triggered by Mao Zedong's views that: "The way to world conquest lies through Havana, Accra, and Calcutta". Calvin believes that Chinese actions show a "pattern of conservative aims and limited objectives, rather than expansionism" and blames this particular conflict on India's provocations towards China. However, Calvin also expresses that China, in the past, has been adamant to gain control over regions to which it has a "traditional claim", which triggered the dispute over NEFA and Aksai Chin and indeed Tibet. Calvin's assumption, based on the history of the Cold War and the Domino Effect, assumed that China might ultimately try to regain control of everything that it considers as "traditionally Chinese" which in its view includes the entirety of South East Asia.[7] The Kennedy administration was disturbed by what they considered "blatant Chinese communist aggression against India". In a May 1963 National Security Council meeting, 57 | P a g e

contingency planning on the part of the United States in the event of another Chinese attack on India was discussed. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and General Maxwell Taylor advised the president to use nuclear weapons should the Americans intervene in such a situation. Kennedy insisted that Washington defend India as it would any ally, saying, "We should defend India, and therefore we will defend India".[47] The Johnson Administration considered and then rejected giving nuclear weapons technology to the Indians. The non-aligned nations, perhaps unsurprisingly, remained non-aligned, and only the United Arab Republic openly supported India.[48] Of the non-aligned nations, six, Egypt, Burma, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Ghana and Indonesia, met in Colombo on 10 December 1962.[49] The proposals stipulated a Chinese withdrawal of 20 km from the customary lines without any reciprocal withdrawal on India's behalf.[49] The failure of these six nations to unequivocally condemn China deeply disappointed India.[48] In 1972, Chinese Premier Zhou explained the Chinese point of view to President Nixon of the US. As for the causes of the war, Zhou asserted that China did not try and expel Indian troops from south of the McMahon line and that three open warning telegrams were sent to Nehru before the war. However, Indian patrols south of the McMahon line were expelled and suffered casualties in the Chinese attack.[50] Zhou also told Nixon that Chairman Mao ordered the troops to return to show good faith.[51] The Indian government maintains that the Chinese military could not advance further south due to logistical problems and the cut-off of resource supplies. While Western nations did not view Chinese actions favourably because of fear of the Chinese and competitiveness,[7] Pakistan, which had had a turbulent relationship with India ever since the Indian partition, improved its relations with China after the war.[52] Prior to the war, Pakistan also shared a disputed boundary with China, and had proposed to India that the two countries adopt a common defense against "northern" enemies (i.e. China), which was rejected by India.[22] However, China and Pakistan took steps to peacefully negotiate their shared boundaries, beginning on 13 October 1962, and concluding in December of that year.[15] Pakistan also expressed fear that the huge amounts of western military aid directed to India would allow it to threaten Pakistan's security in future conflicts. Mohammed Ali, External Affairs Minister of Pakistan, declared that massive Western aid to India in the Sino-Indian dispute would be considered an unfriendly act towards Pakistan. As a result Pakistan made efforts to improve its relations with China. The following year, China and Pakistan peacefully 58 | P a g e

settled disputes on their shared border, and negotiated the China-Pakistan Border Treaty in 1963, as well as trade, commercial, and barter treaties.[52] On 2 March 1963, Pakistan conceded its northern claim line in Pakistani-controlled Kashmir to China in favor of a more southerly boundary along the Karakoram Range.[15][49][52] The border treaty largely set the border along the MacCartney-Macdonald Line.[14] India's military failure against China would embolden Pakistan to initiate the Second Kashmir War with India. However, it effectively ended in a stalemate as Calvin states that the Sino-Indian War had caused the previously passive government to take a stand on actively modernizing India's military.[7] China offered diplomatic support to Pakistan in this war but did not offer military support.[49] In January 1966, China condemned the Tashkent Agreement between India and Pakistan as a Soviet-US plot in the region. [49] In the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, Pakistan expected China to provide military support, but it was left alone as India successfully helped the rebels in East Pakistan to found the new nation-state of Bangladesh.[53]
Aftermath
China
According to the China's official (communist) military history, the war achieved China's policy objectives of securing borders in the western sector, as China retained de facto control of the Aksai Chin. After the war, India abandoned the Forward Policy, and the de facto borders stabilized along the Line of Actual Control. However according to James Calvin even though China had won a military victory it may have lost in terms of its international image. Western nations, especially the United States, were already suspicious of Chinese attitudes, motives and actions. These nations saw China's goals as world conquest, and clearly viewed China as the aggressor in the Border War.[7] China's first nuclear weapon test in October 1964, and her support of Pakistan in the 1965 India Pakistan War tended to confirm the American view of communist world objectives, including Chinese influence over Pakistan.[7]
India
The aftermath of the war saw sweeping changes in the Indian military to prepare it for similar conflicts in the future, and placed pressure on Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru, who was seen as responsible for failing to anticipate the Chinese attack on India. Indians reacted with a surge in patriotism and memorials were erected for many of the Indian troops who died in the war. Arguably, the main lesson India learned from the war 59 | P a g e

was the need to strengthen its own defences and a shift from Nehru's foreign policy with China based on his stated concept of "brotherhood". Because of India's inability to anticipate Chinese aggression, Prime Minister Nehru faced harsh criticism from government officials, for having promoted pacifist relations with China.[15] Indians in general became highly skeptical of China and its military. Many Indians view the war as a betrayal of India's attempts at establishing a long-standing peace with China and started to question Nehru's usage of the term "Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai" (meaning "Indians and Chinese are brothers"). The war also put an end to Nehru's earlier hopes that India and China would form a strong Asian Axis to counteract the increasing influence of the Cold War bloc superpowers.[2] The unpreparedness of the army was blamed on Defense Minister Menon, who resigned his government post to allow for someone who might modernize India's military further. India's policy of weaponisation via indigenous sources and self-sufficiency was thus cemented. Sensing a weakened army, Pakistan, a close ally of China, began a policy of provocation against India by infiltrating Jammu and Kashmir and ultimately triggering the Second Kashmir War with India in 1965. However, India had set up the HendersonBrooks-Bhagat Report to determine what the reason was behind India's unpreparedness in the war, and was prepared for the Pakistani military. The result was inconclusive, since sources were divided on what decides victory. Some sources argued that since India had captured more territory than Pakistan, India had clearly won. However, others[who?] argued that India had taken significant losses considering the country's larger military and hence, the outcome of the war was inconclusive. Two years later, in 1967, there was a short border skirmish known as the Chola Incident between Chinese and Indian soldiers. In this incident 8 Chinese soldiers and 4 Indian soldiers were killed.[54] British journalist Neville Maxwell, controversial writer regarding India[55], writes that the "hopelessly ill-prepared Indian Army that provoked China on orders emanating from Delhi, and paid the price for its misadventure in men, money and national humiliation".
[56]
As a result of the war, the Indian government commissioned an investigation,
resulting in the classified Henderson-Brooks-Bhagat Report on the causes of the war and the reasons for failure. India's performance in high-altitude combat in 1962 led to an overhaul of the Indian Army in terms of doctrine, training, organization and equipment. Maxwell also claimed that the Indian role in international affairs after the border war was also greatly reduced after the war and India's standing in the non-aligned movement suffered[15]. 60 | P a g e

According to James Calvin, an analyst from the U.S. Navy, India gained many benefits from the 1962 conflict. This war united the country as never before. India got 32,000 square miles of disputed territory even if she felt that NEFA was hers all along. The new Indian republic had avoided international alignments; by asking for help during the war, India demonstrated her willingness to accept military aid from several sectors. And, finally, India recognized the serious weaknesses in her army. She would more than double her military manpower in the next two years and she would work hard to resolve the military's training and logistic problems. India's efforts to improve her military posture significantly enhanced her army's capabilities and preparedness.[7]
Later skirmishes
Main articles: Sino-Indian relations, Chola incident, Naxalbari, and 1987 Sino-Indian skirmish India also reported a series of skirmishes after the 1962 war, which were never confirmed by China. One report provided by India shows that in late 1967, there were two skirmishes between Indian and Chinese forces in Sikkim. The first one was dubbed the "Nathu La incident", and the other the "Chola incident". Prior to these incidents had been the Naxalbari uprising in India by the Communist Naxalites and Maoists.[57]
Diplomatic process
In 1993 and 1996, the two sides signed the Sino-Indian Bilateral Peace and Tranquility Accords, an agreement to maintain peace and tranquility along the Line of Actual Control (LoAC). Ten meetings of a Sino-Indian Joint Working Group (SIJWG) and five of an expert group have taken place to determine where the LoAC lies, but little progress has occurred. India is concerned about China's military modernisation. On 20 November 2006 Indian politicians from Arunachal Pradesh appealed to parliament to take a harder stance on the PRC following a military buildup on the border similar to that in 1962. [58] Additionally, China's military aid to Pakistan as well is a matter of concern to the Indian public,[37] which fought another war with Pakistan in 1999. On 6 July 2006, the historic Silk Road passing through this territory was reopened. Both sides have agreed to resolve the issues by peaceful means
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Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 Part of Indo-Pakistani Wars and Bangladesh Liberation War
Date Location
Result Territorial changes
316 December 1971 Eastern front: East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) Western front: India-West Pakistan border Decisive Indian victory. Eastern front: Pakistani forces surrender. Western front: Ceasefire negotiated. Secession of East Pakistan as the independent state of Bangladesh.
Belligerents
India Sam Manekshaw J.S. Arora G.G. Bewoor K. P. Candeth 500,000 troops
3,843 killed [1] 9,851 wounded[1] 1 Frigate 1 Naval Plane
Pakistan Commanders Gul Hassan Khan Abdul Hamid Khan Tikka Khan A. A. K. Niazi (P.O.W.) Strength 365,000 troops Casualties and losses 9,000 killed[2] 4,350 wounded 97,368 captured[3] 2 Destroyers[4] 1 Minesweeper[4] 1 Submarine[5][6] 3 Patrol vessels 7 Gunboats
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The Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 was a military conflict between India and Pakistan. Indian, Bangladeshi and international sources consider the beginning of the war to be Operation Chengiz Khan, Pakistan's December 3, 1971 pre-emptive strike on 11 Indian airbases.[7][8] Lasting just 13 days it is considered one of the shortest wars in history.[9][10] However, Pakistan considers it to be a part of the overall Bangladesh Liberation War, in which India had been providing direct financial and military support for the Mukti Bahini Bengali operatives.[citation needed] During the course of the war, Indian and Pakistani forces clashed on the eastern and western fronts. The war effectively came to an end after the Eastern Command of the Pakistan Military signed the Instrument of Surrender on December 16, 1971 following which East Pakistan seceded as the independent state of Bangladesh. Around 97,368 West Pakistanis who were in East Pakistan at the time of its independence, including some 79,700 Pakistan Army soldiers and paramilitary personnel[11] and 12,500 civilians,
[11]
were taken as prisoners of war by India
Background
The Indo-Pakistani conflict was sparked by the Bangladesh Liberation war, a conflict between the traditionally dominant West Pakistanis and the majority East Pakistanis.[4] The Bangladesh Liberation war ignited after the 1970 Pakistani election, in which the East Pakistani Awami League won 167 of 169 seats in East Pakistan and secured a simple majority in the 313-seat lower house of the Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament of Pakistan). Awami League leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman presented the Six Points to the President of Pakistan and claimed the right to form the government. After the leader of the Pakistan Peoples Party, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, refused to yield the premiership of Pakistan to Mujibur, President Yahya Khan called the military, dominated by West Pakistanis to suppress dissent[12][13]. Mass arrests of dissidents began, and attempts were made to disarm East Pakistani soldiers and police. After several days of strikes and non-cooperation movements, the Pakistani military cracked down on Dhaka on the night of 25 March 1971. The Awami League was banished, and many members fled into exile in India. Mujib was arrested on the night of 2526 March 1971 at about 1:30 a.m. (as per Radio Pakistans news on 29 March 1971) and taken to West Pakistan. 63 | P a g e

On 27 March 1971, Ziaur Rahman, a rebellious major in the Pakistani army, declared the independence of Bangladesh on behalf of Mujibur[14]. In April, exiled Awami League leaders formed a government-in-exile in Baidyanathtala of Meherpur. The East Pakistan Rifles, a paramilitary force, defected to the rebellion. A guerrilla troop of civilians, the Mukti Bahini, was formed to help the Bangladesh Army.
India's involvement in Bangladesh Liberation War

The Pakistan army conducted a widespread genocide against the Bengali population of East Pakistan,[15] aimed in particular at the minority Hindu population,[16][17] leading to approximately 10 million[16][18] people fleeing East Pakistan and taking refuge in the neighboring Indian states.[15][19] The East Pakistan-India border was opened to allow refugees safe shelter in India. The governments of West Bengal, Bihar, Assam, Meghalaya and Tripura established refugee camps along the border. The resulting flood of impoverished East Pakistani refugees placed an intolerable strain on India's already overburdened economy.[17] General Tikka Khan earned the nickname 'Butcher of Bengal' due to the widespread atrocities he committed.[7] General Niazi commenting on his actions noted 'On the night between 25/26 March 1971 General Tikka struck. Peaceful night was turned into a time of wailing, crying and burning. General Tikka let loose everything at his disposal as if raiding an enemy, not dealing with his own misguided and misled people. The military action was a display of stark cruelty more merciless than the massacres at Bukhara and Baghdad by Chengiz Khan and Halaku Khan... General Tikka... resorted to the killing of civilians and a scorched earth policy. His orders to his troops were: 'I want the land not the people...' Major General Farman had written in his table diary, "Green land of East Pakistan will be painted red". It was painted red by Bengali blood.'[20] The national Indian government repeatedly appealed to the international community, but failing to elicit any response,[21] Prime Minister Indira Gandhi on 27 March 1971 expressed full support of her government for the independence struggle of the people of East Pakistan. The Indian leadership under Prime Minister Gandhi quickly decided that it was more effective to end the genocide by taking armed action against Pakistan than to simply give refuge to those who made it across to refugee camps.[19] Exiled East Pakistan army officers and members of the Indian Intelligence immediately started using these camps for recruitment and training of Mukti Bahini guerrillas.[22]
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India's official engagement with Pakistan Objective
Illustration showing military units and troop movements during operations in the Eastern sector of the war. By November, war seemed inevitable; a massive buildup of Indian forces on the border with East Pakistan had begun. The Indian military waited for winter, when the drier ground would make for easier operations and Himalayan passes would be closed by snow, preventing any Chinese intervention. On 23 November, Yahya Khan declared a state of emergency in all of Pakistan and told his people to prepare for war.[23] On the evening of 3 December Sunday, at about 5:40 p.m.,[24] the Pakistani Air Force (PAF) launched a pre-emptive strike on eleven airfields in north-western India, including Agra which was 300 miles (480 km) from the border. During this attack the Taj Mahal was camouflaged with a forest of twigs and leaves and draped with burlap because its marble glowed like a white beacon in the moonlight.[25] This preemptive strike known as Operation Chengiz Khan, was inspired by the success of Israeli Operation Focus in the Arab-Israeli Six Day War. But, unlike the Israeli attack on Arab airbases in 1967 which involved a large number of Israeli planes, Pakistan flew no more than 50 planes to India and failed to inflict the intended damage.[26] As a result, Indian runways were cratered and rendered non-functional for several hours after the attack.[27] In an address to the nation on radio that same evening, Prime Minister Gandhi held the air strikes as a declaration of war against India[28][29] and the Indian Air Force responded 65 | P a g e

with initial air strikes that very night that were expanded to massive retaliatory air strikes the next morning.[30] This marked the official start of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971. Prime Minister Gandhi ordered the immediate mobilization of troops and launched the full-scale invasion. Indian forces responded with a massive coordinated air, sea, and land assault. Indian Air Force started flying sorties against Pakistan from midnight and quickly achieved air superiority.[4][25] The main Indian objective on the western front was to prevent Pakistan from entering Indian soil. There was no Indian intention of conducting any major offensive into West Pakistan.[24]
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Naval hostilities
Pakistan's PNS Ghazi was the only submarine operated by either of the warring nations in 1965. The Ghazi sank off the fairway buoy of Visakhapatnam near the eastern coast of India under unclear circumstances during the 1971 war, making it the first submarine casualty in the waters around the Indian subcontinent. In the western theatre of the war, the Indian Navy, under the command of Vice Admiral Kohli, achieved success by attacking Karachi's port in the code-named Operation Trident[4] on the night of 45 December[4], which resulted in the sinking of the Pakistani destroyer PNS Khyber and a minesweeper PNS Muhafiz; PNS Shajehan was badly damaged[4]. This resulted in tactical Indian success: 720 Pakistani sailors were killed or wounded, and Pakistan lost reserve fuel and many commercial ships, thus crippling the Pakistan Navy's further involvement in the conflict. Operation Python[4] followed Operation Trident which was on the night of 89 December [4], in which Indian rocketarmed motor torpedo boats attacked the Karachi Roads that resulted in further destruction of reserve fuel tanks, and in the sinking of three Pakistani commercial ships in Karachi Harbour.[4] In the eastern theatre of the war, the Indian Eastern Naval Command, under Vice Admiral Krishnan, completely isolated East Pakistan by establishing a naval blockade in the Bay of Bengal, trapping the Eastern Pakistani Navy and eight foreign merchant ships in their ports. From 4 December onwards, the aircraft carrier INS Vikrant was deployed in which its Sea Hawk fighter-bombers attacked many coastal towns in East Pakistan including Chittagong and Cox's Bazaar. Pakistan responded by sending the submarine PNS Ghazi to negate the threat.[5] Indian Eastern Naval Command laid a trap to sink the submarine and Indian Navy destroyer INS Rajput sank Pakistani submarine PNS Ghazi through depth charges off Vishakapatnam's coast[31][32] reducing Pakistan's control of Bangladeshi coastline[6] . But on 9 December, the Indian Navy suffered its biggest
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wartime loss when the Pakistani submarine PNS Hangor sank the frigate INS Khukri in the Arabian Sea resulting in a loss of 18 officers and 176 sailors.[33] The damage inflicted on the Pakistani Navy stood at 7 gunboats, 1 minesweeper, 1 submarine, 2 destroyers, 3 patrol crafts belonging to the coast guard, 18 cargo, supply and communication vessels, and large scale damage inflicted on the naval base and docks in the coastal town of Karachi. Three merchant navy ships - Anwar Baksh, Pasni and Madhumathi [34]
and ten smaller vessels were captured.[35] Around 1900 personnel
were lost, while 1413 servicemen were captured by Indian forces in Dhaka.[36] According to one Pakistan scholar, Tariq Ali, the Pakistan Navy lost a third of its force in the war.
[37]
Air operations
Main article: East Pakistan Air Operations, 1971 After the initial preemptive strike, PAF adopted a defensive stance in response to the Indian retaliation. As the war progressed, the Indian Air Force continued to battle the PAF over conflict zones[38], but the number of sorties flown by the PAF gradually decreased day-by-day.[39] The Indian Air Force flew 4,000 sorties while its counterpart, the PAF offered little in retaliation, partly because of the paucity of non-Bengali technical personnel.[4] This lack of retaliation has also been attributed to the deliberate decision of the PAF High Command to cut its losses as it had already incurred huge losses in the conflict.[40] The PAF also did not intervene during the Indian Navy's raid on Pakistani naval port city of Karachi. In the east, the small air contingent of Pakistan Air Force No. 14 Sqn was destroyed, putting the Dhaka airfield out of commission and resulting in Indian air superiority in the east.[4]
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Ground operations
An Indian newspaper cover (1971) Pakistan attacked at several places along India's western border with Pakistan, but the Indian army successfully held their positions.[citation
needed]
The Indian Army quickly
responded to the Pakistan Army's movements in the west and made some initial gains, including capturing around 5,500 square miles (14,000 km2) of Pakistan territory (land gained by India in Pakistani Kashmir, Pakistani Punjab and Sindh sectors was later ceded in the Simla Agreement of 1972, as a gesture of goodwill). On the eastern front, the Indian Army joined forces with the Mukti Bahini to form the Mitro Bahini ("Allied Forces"); Unlike the 1965 war which had emphasized set-piece battles and slow advances, this time the strategy adopted was a swift, three-pronged assault of nine infantry divisions with attached armored units and close air support that rapidly converged on Dhaka, the capital of East Pakistan. Lieutenant General Jagjit Singh Aurora, who commanded the eighth, twenty-third, and fifty-seventh divisions, led the Indian thrust into East Pakistan. As these forces attacked Pakistani formations, the Indian Air Force rapidly destroyed the small air contingent in East Pakistan and put the Dhaka airfield out of commission. In the meantime, the Indian Navy effectively blockaded East Pakistan. The Indian campaign employed "blitzkrieg" techniques, exploiting weakness in the enemy's positions and bypassing opposition, and resulted in a swift victory.[41] Faced with insurmountable losses, the Pakistani military capitulated in less than a fortnight. On 16 December, the Pakistani forces stationed in East Pakistan surrendered.
Surrender of Pakistani forces in East Pakistan

The Instrument of Surrender of Pakistani forces stationed in East Pakistan was signed at Ramna Race Course in Dhaka at 16.31 IST on 16 December 1971, by Lieutenant General Jagjit Singh Aurora, General Officer Commanding-in-chief of Eastern 69 | P a g e

Command of the Indian Army and Lieutenant General A. A. K. Niazi, Commander of Pakistani forces in East Pakistan. As Aurora accepted the surrender, the surrounding crowds on the race course began shouting anti-Niazi and anti-Pakistan slogans.[42] India took approximately 90,000 prisoners of war, including Pakistani soldiers and their East Pakistani civilian supporters. 79,676 prisoners were uniformed personnel, of which 55,692 were Army, 16,354 Paramilitary, 5,296 Police, 1000 Navy and 800 PAF. [43] The remaining prisoners were civilians - either family members of the military personnel or collaborators (razakars). The Hamoodur Rahman Commission report instituted by Pakistan lists the Pakistani POWs as follows: Branch Army Navy Air Force Paramilitary including police Civilian personnel Total: Number of captured Pakistani POWs 54,154 1,381 833 22,000 12,000 90,368
American and Soviet involvement
The Blood Telegram The United States supported Pakistan both politically and materially. President Richard Nixon and his Secretary of State Henry Kissinger feared Soviet expansion into South and Southeast Asia.[44] Pakistan was a close ally of the People's Republic of China, with whom Nixon had been negotiating a rapprochement and where he intended to visit in February 1972. Nixon feared that an Indian invasion of West Pakistan would mean total Soviet domination of the region, and that it would seriously undermine the global 70 | P a g e

position of the United States and the regional position of America's new tacit ally, China. In order to demonstrate to China the bona fides of the United States as an ally, and in direct violation of the US Congress-imposed sanctions on Pakistan, Nixon sent military supplies to Pakistan, routing them through Jordan and Iran,[45] while also encouraging China to increase its arms supplies to Pakistan. The Nixon administration also ignored reports it received of the "genocidal" activities of the Pakistani Army in East Pakistan, most notably the Blood telegram. This prompted widespread criticism and condemnation both by Congress and in the international press. When Pakistan's defeat in the eastern sector seemed certain, Nixon ordered the USS Enterprise into the Bay of Bengal. The Enterprise arrived on station on 11 December 1971. It has been documented that Nixon even persuaded Iran and Jordan to send their F-86, F-104 and F-5 fighter jets in aid of Pakistan.[48] On 6 December and 13 December, the Soviet Navy dispatched two groups of ships and a submarine, armed with nuclear missiles, from Vladivostok; they trailed U.S. Task Force 74 into the Indian Ocean from 18 December 1971 until 7 January 1972. The Soviets also had a nuclear submarine to help ward off the threat posed by USS Enterprise task force in the Indian Ocean.[49] The Soviet Union sympathized with the Bangladeshis, and supported the Indian Army and Mukti Bahini during the war, recognizing that the independence of Bangladesh would weaken the position of its rivalsthe United States and China. The USSR gave assurances to India that if a confrontation with the United States or China developed, it would take counter-measures. This assurance was enshrined in the Indo-Soviet friendship treaty signed in August 1971.
Aftermath India
The war stripped Pakistan of more than half of its population and with nearly one-third of its army in captivity, clearly established India's military dominance of the subcontinent.[18] In spite of the magnitude of the victory, India was surprisingly restrained in its reaction. Mostly, Indian leaders seemed pleased by the relative ease with which they had accomplished their goalsthe establishment of Bangladesh and the prospect of an early return to their homeland of the 10 million Bengali refugees who were the cause of the war.[18] In announcing the surrender to the Indian Parliament, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi declared:
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"Dacca is now the free capital of a free country. We hail the people of Bangladesh in their hour of triumph. All nations who value the human spirit will recognize it as a significant milestone in man's quest for liberty."[
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Pakistan
A Pakistan stamp depicting the 90,000 POWs in Indian camps. This stamp was issued with the political aim of raising global awareness of the POW issue to help secure their release. The POWs were released by India after the signing and ratification of the Simla Agreement. For Pakistan it was a complete and humiliating defeat,[18] a psychological setback that came from a defeat at the hands of intense rival India.[11] Pakistan lost half it territory, significant portion of its economy and its geo-political role in South Asia. [11] Pakistan feared that the two-nation theory was disproved and that the Islamic ideology had proved insufficient to keep Bengalis part of Pakistan.[11] Also, the Pakistani military suffered further humiliation by having their 90,000 prisoners of war (POWs) released by India only after the negotiation and signing of the Simla Agreement on July 2, 1972. In addition to repatriation of prisoners of war also, the agreeement established an ongoing structure for the negotiated resolution of future conflicts between India and Pakistan (referring to the remaining western provinces that now composed the totality of Pakistan). In signing the agreement, Pakistan also, by implication, recognized the former East Pakistan as the now independent and sovereign state of Bangladesh. The Pakistani people were not mentally prepared to accept defeat, the state-controlled media in West Pakistan had been projecting imaginary victories. [11] When the surrender in East Pakistan was finally announced, people could not come terms with the magnitude of defeat, spontaneous demonstrations and mass protests erupted on the streets of major cities in West Pakistan. Also, referring to the remaining rump Western Pakistan as simply "Pakistan" added to the effect of the defeat as international acceptance of the secession of the eastern half of the country and its creation as the independent state of Bangladesh developed and was given more credence.[11] The cost of the war for Pakistan in monetary and human resources was very high. Demoralized and finding himself unable to control the situation, General Yahya Khan surrendered power to Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto who was sworn-in on 20 December 1971 as President and as the
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(first civilian) Chief Martial Law Administrator. A new and smaller western-based Pakistan emerged on 16 December 1971.[50] The loss of East Pakistan had shattered the prestige of the Pakistani military.[11] Pakistan lost half its navy, a quarter of its air force and a third of its army. [51] The popularized myth that one Muslim had the fighting prowess of five Hindus no longer held any legitimacy.[11] The war also exposed the shortcoming of Pakistan's declared strategic doctrine that the "defence of East Pakistan lay in West Pakistan".[52] Hussain Haqqani, in his book Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military notes, "Moreover, the army had failed to fulfill its promises of fighting to the last man. The eastern command had laid down arms after losing only 1,300 men in battle. In West Pakistan 1,200 military deaths had accompanied lack luster military performance." [53] In his book The 1971 Indo-Pak War: A Soldiers Narrative Pakistani Major General Hakeem Arshad Qureshi a veteran of this conflict noted, "We must accept the fact that, as a people, we had also contributed to the bifurcation of our own country. It was not a Niazi, or a Yahya, even a Mujib, or a Bhutto, or their key assistants, who alone were the cause of our break-up, but a corrupted system and a flawed social order that our own apathy had allowed to remain in place for years. At the most critical moment in our history we failed to check the limitless ambitions of individuals with dubious antecedents and to thwart their selfish and irresponsible behaviour. It was our collective conduct that had provided the enemy an opportunity to dismember us."[54]
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Bangladesh
Bangladesh became an independent nation, the world's third most populous Muslim state. Mujibur Rahman was released from a West Pakistani prison, returned to Dhaka on 10 January 1972 and to become first President of Bangladesh and later its Prime Minister. On the brink of defeat around 14 December, the Pakistani Army, and its local collaborators, systematically killed a large number of Bengali doctors, teachers and intellectuals,[55][56] part of a pogrom against the Hindu minorities who constituted the majority of urban educated intellectuals.[57][58] Young men, especially students, who were seen as possible rebels were also targeted. The extent of casualties in East Pakistan is not known. R.J. Rummel cites estimates ranging from one to three million people killed. [59] Other estimates place the death toll lower, at 300,000. Bangladesh government figures state that Pakistani forces aided by collaborators killed three million people, raped 200,000 women and displaced millions of others.[60] In 2010 Bangladesh government set up a tribunal to prosecute the people involved in alleged war crimes and those who collaborated with Pakistan.[61] According to the Government, the defendants would be charged with Crimes against humanity, genocide, murder, rape and arson.[62]
Hamoodur Rahman Commission

In aftermath of war Pakistan Government constituted the Hamoodur Rahman Commission headed by Justice Hamoodur Rahman in 1971 to investigate the political and military causes for defeat and the Bangladesh atrocities during the war. The commission's report was classified and its publication banned by Bhutto as it put the military in poor light, until some parts of the report surfaced in Indian media in 2000. When it was declassified, it showed many failings from the strategic to the tactical levels. It confirmed the looting, rapes and the killings by the Pakistan Army and their local agents. It lay the blame squarely on Pakistani generals, accusing them of war crimes and neglect of duty. Though no actions were ever taken on commissions findings, the commission had recommended public trial of Pakistan Army generals.
Simla Agreement
In 1972 the Simla Agreement was signed between India and Pakistan, the treaty ensured that Pakistan recognized the independence of Bangladesh in exchange for the return of the Pakistani POWs. India treated all the POWs in strict accordance with the Geneva Convention, rule 1925[25]. It released more than 90,000 Pakistani PoWs in five months[63]. Further, as a gesture of goodwill, nearly 200 soldiers who were sought for war crimes by Bengalis were also pardoned by India. The accord also gave back more than 13,000 km of land that Indian troops had seized in West Pakistan during the war, though India retained a few strategic areas.[64] But some in India felt that the treaty had been too lenient to Bhutto, who had pleaded for leniency, arguing that the fragile democracy in Pakistan would crumble if the accord was 75 | P a g e

perceived as being overly harsh by Pakistanis and that he would be accused of losing Kashmir in addition to the loss of East Pakistan[11].
Long term consequences

Steve Coll, in his book Ghost Wars, argues that the Pakistan military's experience with India, including Pervez Musharraf's experience in 1971, influenced the Pakistani government to support jihadist groups in Afghanistan even after the Soviets left, because the jihadists were a tool to use against India, including bogging down the Indian Army in Kashmir.[65][66] After the war, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto came to power. Pakistan launched Project706, a secret nuclear weapon development program, to defend itself from India. A vast majority of Pakistani nuclear scientists who were working at the International Atomic Energy Agency and European and American nuclear programs immediately came to Pakistan and joined Project-706.[citation needed]
Important dates
7 March 1971: Sheikh Mujibur Rahman declares that, "The current struggle is a struggle for independence", in a public meeting attended by almost a million people in Dhaka. 25 March 1971: Pakistani forces start Operation Searchlight, a systematic plan to eliminate any resistance. Thousands of people are killed in student dormitories and police barracks in Dhaka. 26 March 1971: Sheikh Mujibur Rahman signed an official declaration of independence and sent it through a radio message on the night of 25 March (the morning of 26 March). Later Major Ziaur Rahman and other Awami League leaders announced the declaration of independence on behalf of Sheikh Mujib from Kalurghat Radio Station, Chittagong. The message is relayed to the world by Indian radio stations. 17 April 1971: Exiled leaders of Awami League form a provisional government. 3 December 1971: War between India and Pakistan officially begins when West Pakistan launches a series of preemptive air strikes on Indian airfields. 6 December 1971: East Pakistan is recognized as Bangladesh by India. 14 December 1971: Systematic elimination of Bengali intellectuals is started by Pakistani Army and local collaborators.[57] 76 | P a g e

16 December 1971: Lieutenant-General A. A. K. Niazi, supreme commander of Pakistani Army in [East Pakistan, surrenders to the Allied Forces (Mitro Bahini) represented by Lieutenant General Jagjit Singh Arora of Indian Army at the surrender. Bangladesh gains victory 12 January 1972: Sheikh Mujibur Rahman comes to power
Military awards
For bravery, a number of soldiers and officers on both sides were awarded the highest military award of respective countries. Following is a list of the recipients of the Indian award Param Vir Chakra, Bangladeshi award Bir Sreshtho and the Pakistani award Nishan-E-Haider:
India
Recipients of the Param Vir Chakra: Lance Naik Albert Ekka (Posthumously) Flying Officer Nirmal Jit Singh Sekhon (Posthumously) Major Hoshiar Singh Second Lieutenant Arun Khetarpal (Posthumously)
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Bangladesh
Recipients of the Bir Sreshtho Captain Mohiuddin Jahangir (Posthumously) Lance Naik Munshi Abdur Rouf (Posthumously) Sepoy Hamidur Rahman (Posthumously) Sepoy Mostafa Kamal (Posthumously) ERA Mohammad Ruhul Amin (Posthumously) Flight Lieutenant Matiur Rahman (Posthumously) Lance Naik Nur Mohammad Sheikh (Posthumously)
Pakistan
Recipients of the Nishan-E-Haider: Films Border, a 1997 Bollywood war film directed by J.P.Dutta. This movie is an adaptation from real life events that happened at the Battle of Longewala fought in Rajasthan (Western Theatre) during the 1971 Indo-Pak war. Border at the Internet Movie Database Hindustan Ki Kasam, a 1973 Bollywood war film directed by Chetan Anand. The aircraft in the film are all authentic aircraft used in the 1971 war against Pakistan. These include MiG-21s, Gnats, Hunters and Su-7s. Some of these aircraft were also flown by war veterans such as Samar Bikram Shah (2 kills) and Manbir Singh. Hindustan Ki Kasam at the Internet Movie Database 1971 - Prisoners of War, a 2007 Bollywood war film directed by Sagar Brothers. Set against the backdrop of a prisoners' camp in Pakistan, follows six Indian prisoners awaiting release after their capture in the 1971 India-Pakistan war. Major Muhammad Akram (Posthumously) Pilot Officer Rashid Minhas (Posthumously) Major Shabbir Sharif (Posthumously) Sowar Muhammad Hussain (Posthumously) Lance Naik Muhammad Mahfuz (Posthumously)
Dramatization
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Kargil War
This is the latest accepted revision, accepted on 23 July 2010. Kargil War Part of the Indo-Pakistani Wars Date Location Result May-July 1999 Kargil district, Kashmir, India India regains control over Pakistani occupied ridges.
Pakista
withdrew from Indian-controlled Kashmir to pre-war Line of Control. Territori al changes Belligerents Pakistan India Mujahideen Foreign Volunteers[1] Commanders Ved Malik Strength 30,000 5,000 Prakash Pervez Musharraf Jihadi Status quo ante bellum
Casualties and losses Indian Figures: 527 killed[2][3][4] 1,363 wounded[5] 1 POW Official Pakistani Estimates: 357 4,000 killed[6][7] 665+ wounded[6] 79 | P a g e

8 POW[8]
The Kargil War (Urdu: karagil jang, Hindi: karagil yuddh), also known as the Kargil conflict,[note (I)] was an armed conflict between India and Pakistan that took place between May and July 1999 in the Kargil district of Kashmir and elsewhere along the Line of Control (LOC). The cause of the war was the infiltration of Pakistani soldiers and Kashmiri militants into positions on the Indian side of the LOC,[9] which serves as the de facto border between the two states. During the initial stages of the war, Pakistan blamed the fighting entirely on independent Kashmiri insurgents, but documents left behind by casualties and later statements by Pakistan's Prime Minister and Chief of Army Staff showed involvement of Pakistani paramilitary forces,[10][11][12] led by General Ashraf Rashid.[13] The Indian Army, later on supported by the Indian Air Force, recaptured a majority of the positions on the Indian side of the LoC infiltrated by the Pakistani troops and militants. With international diplomatic opposition, the Pakistani forces were forced to withdraw from remaining Indian positions along the LOC. The war is one of the most recent examples of high altitude warfare in mountainous terrain, which posed significant logistical problems for the combating sides. This was only the second direct ground war between any two countries after they had developed nuclear weapons; it is also the most recent. (India and Pakistan both testdetonated fission devices in May 1998, though the first Indian nuclear test was conducted in 1974.) The conflict led to heightened tension between the two nations and increased defence spending by India. Location Before the Partition of India in 1947, Kargil was part of the Baltistan district of Ladakh, a sparsely populated region with diverse linguistic, 80 | P a g e

ethnic and religious groups, living in isolated valleys separated by some of the world's highest mountains. The First Kashmir War (1947 48) concluded with the LOC bisecting the Baltistan district, with the town and district of Kargil lying on the Indian side in the Ladakh subdivision of the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir.[14] After Pakistan's defeat in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, the two nations signed the Simla Agreement promising not to engage in armed conflict with respect to that boundary.[15]
Location of the conflict The town of Kargil is located 205 km (120 miles) from Srinagar,[16] facing the Northern Areas across the LOC. Like other areas in the Himalayas, Kargil has a temperate climate. Summers are cool with frigid nights, while winters are long and chilly with temperatures often dropping to 48 C (54 F).[17] An Indian national highway (NH 1D) connecting Srinagar to Leh cuts through Kargil. The area that witnessed the infiltration and fighting is a 160 km long stretch of ridges overlooking this only road linking Srinagar and Leh.[9] The military outposts on the ridges above the highway were generally around 5,000 metres (16,000 ft) high, with a few as high as 5,485 metres (18,000 ft).[18] Apart from the district capital, Kargil, the populated areas near the front line in the conflict included the Mushko Valley and the town of Drass, southwest of Kargil, as well as the Batalik sector and other areas, northeast of Kargil.
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One of the reasons why Kargil was targeted was that the terrain surrounding it, lent itself to pre-emptive seizure of unoccupied military positions.[19] With tactically vital features and well-prepared defensive posts atop the peaks, a defender of the high ground would enjoy advantages akin to a fortress. Any attack to dislodge a defender from high ground in mountain warfare requires a far higher ratio of attackers to defenders,[20] and the difficulties would be exacerbated by the high altitude and freezing temperatures.[21] Kargil is just 173 km (108 mi) from the Pakistani-controlled town of Skardu, which was capable of providing logistical and artillery support to Pakistani combatants. Background
The town of Kargil is strategically located. After the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, there had been a long period with relatively few direct armed conflicts involving the military forces of the two neighbors - notwithstanding the efforts of both nations to control the Siachen Glacier by establishing military outposts on the surrounding mountains ridges and the resulting military skirmishes in the 1980s.[22] During the 1990s, however, escalating tensions and conflict due to separatist activities in Kashmir, some of which were supported by Pakistan, as well as the conducting of nuclear tests by both countries in 1998, led to an increasingly belligerent atmosphere. In an attempt to defuse the situation, both countries signed the Lahore Declaration in February 1999, promising to provide a peaceful and bilateral solution to the Kashmir conflict.
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During the winter of 1998 -1999, some elements of the Military of Pakistan were covertly training and sending Pakistani troops and paramilitary forces, some allegedly in the guise of mujahideen, into territory on the Indian side of the LOC. The infiltration was code named "Operation Badr";[23] its aim was to sever the link between Kashmir and Ladakh, and cause Indian forces to withdraw from the Siachen Glacier, thus forcing India to negotiate a settlement of the broader Kashmir dispute. Pakistan also believed that any tension in the region would internationalise the Kashmir issue, helping it to secure a speedy resolution. Yet another goal may have been to boost the morale of the decade-long rebellion in Indian Administered Kashmir by taking a proactive role. Some writers have speculated that the operation's objective may also have been as a retaliation for India's Operation Meghdoot in 1984 that seized much of Siachen Glacier.[24] According to India's then army chief Ved Prakash Malik, and many other scholars,[25][26] much of the background planning, including construction of logistical supply routes, had been undertaken much earlier. On several occasions during the 1980s and 1990s, the army had given Pakistani leaders (Zia ul Haq and Benazir Bhutto) similar proposals for infiltration into the Kargil region, but the plans had been shelved for fear of drawing the nations into all-out war.[27][28][29] Some analysts believe that the blueprint of attack was reactivated soon after Pervez Musharraf was appointed chief of army staff in October 1998.[23][30] After the war, Nawaz Sharif, Prime Minister of Pakistan during the Kargil conflict, claimed that he was unaware of the plans, and that he first learned about the situation when he received an urgent phone call from Atal Bihari Vajpayee, his counterpart in India.[31] Sharif attributed the plan to Musharraf and "just two or three of his cronies",[32] a view shared by some Pakistani writers who have stated that only four generals, including Musharraf, knew of the plan.
[27][33]
Musharraf, however, asserted that Sharif had been briefed on
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the Kargil operation 15 days ahead of Vajpayee's journey to Lahore on February 20.[34] War progress Further information: Kargil order of battle There were three major phases to the Kargil War. First, Pakistan infiltrated forces into the Indian-controlled section of Kashmir and occupied strategic locations enabling it to bring NH1 within range of its artillery fire. The next stage consisted of India discovering the infiltration and mobilizing forces to respond to it. The final stage involved major battles by Indian and Pakistani forces resulting in India recapturing some territory held by Pakistani forces and the subsequent withdrawal of Pakistani forces back across the Line of Control after international pressure. Occupation by Pakistan
Infiltration and military build-up. During the winter season, due to extreme cold in the snow-capped mountainous areas of Kashmir, it was a common practice for both the Indian and Pakistan Armies to abandon some forward posts on their respective sides of the LOC and to reduce patrolling of areas that may be avenues of infiltration. When weather conditions became less severe, forward posts would be reoccupied and patrolling resumed. During February 1999, the Pakistan Army began to re-occupy the posts it had abandoned on its side of the LOC in the Kargil region, but also sent forces to occupy some posts on the Indian side of the LOC. [35] 84 | P a g e

Troops from the elite Special Services Group as well as four to seven battalions[36][37] of the Northern Light Infantry (a paramilitary regiment not part of the regular Pakistani army at that time) covertly and overtly set up bases on the vantage points of the Indian-controlled region. According to some reports, these Pakistani forces were backed by Kashmiri guerrillas and Afghan mercenaries.[1] Pakistani intrusions took place in the heights of the lower Mushkoh Valley, along the Marpo La ridgeline in Dras, in Kaksar near Kargil, in the Batalik sector east of the Indus River, on the heights above of the Chorbatla sector where the LOC turns North and in the Turtok sector south of the Siachen area. India discovers infiltration and mobilizes Initially, these incursions were not detected for a number of reasons: Indian patrols were not sent into some of the areas infiltrated by the Pakistani forces and heavy artillery fire by Pakistan in some areas provided cover for the infiltrators. But by the second week of May, the ambushing of an Indian patrol team led by Capt Saurabh Kalia,
[38]
who
acted on a tip-off by a local shepherd in the Batalik sector, led to the exposure of the infiltration. Initially, with little knowledge of the nature or extent of the infiltration, the Indian troops in the area assumed that the infiltrators were jihadis and claimed that they would evict them within a few days. Subsequent discovery of infiltration elsewhere along the LOC, and the difference in tactics employed by the infiltrators, caused the Indian army to realize that the plan of attack was on a much bigger scale. The total area seized by the ingress is generally accepted to between 130 km - 200 km;[33][39] Musharraf, however, stated that 500 square miles (1,300 km) of Indian territory was occupied.[36] The Government of India responded with Operation Vijay, a
mobilisation of 200,000 Indian troops. However, because of the nature of the terrain, division and corps operations could not be mounted; subsequent fighting was conducted mostly at the regimental or 85 | P a g e

battalion level. In effect, two divisions of the Indian Army,[40] numbering 20,000, plus several thousand from the Paramilitary forces of India and the air force were deployed in the conflict zone. The total number of Indian soldiers that were involved in the military operation on the Kargil-Drass sector was thus close to 30,000. The number of infiltrators, including those providing logistical backup, has been put at approximately 5,000 at the height of the conflict.[9][33][1] This figure includes troops from Pakistan-administered Kashmir who provided additional artillery support. The Indian Air Force launched Operation Safed Sagar in support of the mobilization of Indian land forces, but its effectiveness during the war was limited by the high altitude and weather conditions, which in turn limited bomb loads and the number of airstrips that could be used. The Indian Navy also readied itself for an attempted blockade of Pakistani ports (primarily Karachi port)[41] to cut off supply routes.[42] Later, the then-Prime Minister of Pakistan Nawaz Sharif disclosed that Pakistan was left with just six days of fuel to sustain itself if a fullfledged war had broken out.[9] India attacks Pakistani positions It has been suggested that Operation Vijay (1999) be merged into this article or section. (Discuss) The terrain of Kashmir is mountainous and at high altitudes; even the best roads, such as National Highway 1D from Leh to Srinagar, are only two lanes. The rough terrain and narrow roads slowed traffic, and the high altitude, which affected the ability of aircraft to carry loads, made control of NH 1D (the actual stretch of the highway which was under Pakistani fire) a priority for India. From their observation posts, the Pakistani forces had a clear line-of-sight to lay down indirect artillery fire on NH 1D, inflicting heavy casualties on the Indians.[43] This was a serious problem for the Indian Army as the highway was its main logistical and supply route.[44] The Pakistani shelling of the 86 | P a g e

arterial road posed the threat of Leh being cut off, though an alternative (and longer) road to Leh existed via Himachal Pradesh. The infiltrators, apart from being equipped with small arms and grenade launchers, were also armed with mortars, artillery and antiaircraft guns. Many posts were also heavily mined, with India later stating to having recovered more than 8,000 anti-personnel mines according to an ICBL report.[45] Pakistan's reconnaissance was done through unmanned aerial vehicles and AN/TPQ-36 Firefinder radars supplied by the US.[46] The initial Indian attacks were aimed at controlling the hills overlooking NH 1D, with high priority being given to the stretches of the highway near the town of Kargil. The majority of posts along the Line of Control were adjacent to the highway, and therefore the recapture of nearly every infiltrated post increased both the territorial gains and the security of the highway. The protection of this route and the recapture of the forward posts were thus ongoing objectives throughout the war. The Indian Army's first priority was to recapture peaks that were in the immediate vicinity of NH 1D. This resulted in Indian troops first targeting the Tiger Hill and Tololing complex in Dras, which dominated the Srinagar-Leh route.[47] This was soon followed by the Batalik-Turtok sub-sector which provided access to Siachen Glacier. Some of the peaks that were of vital strategic importance to the Pakistani defensive troops were Point 4590 and Point 5353. While 4590 was the nearest point that had a view of NH 1D, point 5353 was the highest feature in the Dras sector, allowing the Pakistani troops to observe NH 1D.[48] The recapture of Point 4590 by Indian troops on June 14 was significant, notwithstanding the fact that Point 4590 resulting in the Indian Army suffering the most casualties in a single battle during the conflict.[49] Though most of the posts in the vicinity of the highway were cleared by mid-June, some parts of the highway near Drass witnessed sporadic shelling until the end of the war.
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The tail of an Indian air force MiG-21 fighter shot down by a Pakistani missile. The pilot Squadron Leader Ajay Ahuja was killed. Once India regained control of the hills overlooking NH 1D, the Indian Army turned to driving the invading force back across the Line of Control. The Battle of Tololing, among other assaults, slowly tilted the combat in India's favor. The Pakistani troops at Tololing were aided by Pakistani fighters from Kashmir. Some of the posts put up a stiff resistance, including Tiger Hill (Point 5140) that fell only later in the war. Indian troops found well-entrenched Pakistani soldiers at Tiger Hill, and both sides suffered heavy casualties. After a final assault on the peak in which 10 Pakistani soldiers and 5 Indian soldiers were killed, Tiger Hill finally fell. A few of the assaults occurred atop hitherto unheard of peaks most of them unnamed with only Point numbers to differentiate them which witnessed fierce hand to hand combat. As the operation was fully underway, about 250 artillery guns were brought in to clear the infiltrators in the posts that were in the line-ofsight. The Bofors field howitzer (infamous in India due to the Bofors scandal) played a vital role, with Indian gunners making maximum use of the terrain that assisted such an attack. However, its success was limited elsewhere due to the lack of space and depth to deploy the Bofors gun. It was in this type of terrain that aerial attacks were used with limited effectiveness. The IAF lost a MiG-27 strike aircraft which it attributed to an engine failure as well as a MiG-21 fighter which was shot down by Pakistan; initially Pakistan said it shot down both jets after they 88 | P a g e

crossed into its territory[50][51] and one Mi-8 helicopter to Stinger SAMs. Years later, a retired Pakistani Officer confirmed that the MiG-27 was lost to technical failure
[52]
. During attacks the IAF used laser-guided
bombs to destroy well-entrenched positions of the Pakistani forces.[9] On May 27 1999, Flt. Lt. Nachiketa developed engine trouble in the Batalik sector and bailed out of his craft. Sqn Ldr Ajay Ahuja went out of his way to locate his comrade but was shot down using a shoulderfired Stinger missile. According to reports, he had bailed out of his stricken plane safely but was apparently killed by his captors as his body was returned riddled with bullet wounds.[9] In many vital points, neither artillery nor air power could dislodge the outposts manned by the Pakistani soldiers, who were out of visible range. The Indian Army mounted some direct frontal ground assaults which were slow and took a heavy toll given the steep ascent that had to be made on peaks as high as 18,000 feet (5,500 m). Since any daylight attack would be suicidal, all the advances had to be made under the cover of darkness, escalating the risk of freezing. Accounting for the wind chill factor, the temperatures were often as low as 11 C to 15 C (12 F to 5 F) near the mountain tops. Based on military tactics, much of the costly frontal assaults by the Indians could have been avoided if the Indian Military had chosen to blockade the supply route of the opposing force, virtually creating a siege. Such a move would have involved the Indian troops crossing the LoC as well as initiating aerial attacks on Pakistan soil, a manoeuvre India was not willing to exercise fearing an expansion of the theatre of war and reducing international support for its cause. Two months into the conflict, Indian troops had slowly retaken most of the ridges that were encroached by the infiltrators;[53][54] according to official count, an estimated 75%80% of the intruded area and nearly all high ground was back under Indian control.[23] Withdrawal and final battles
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Following the outbreak of armed fighting, Pakistan sought American help in de-escalating the conflict. Bruce Riedel, aide to then President Bill Clinton reported that the US intelligence had imaged Pakistani movements of nuclear weapons to forward deployments for fear of the Kargil hostilities escalating into a wider conflict between the two countries. However, President Clinton refused to intervene until Pakistan had removed all forces from the Indian side of the Line of Control.[55] Following the Washington accord on July 4, where Sharif agreed to withdraw Pakistani troops, most of the fighting came to a gradual halt, but some Pakistani forces remained in positions on the Indian side of the LOC. In addition, the United Jihad Council (an umbrella for extremist groups) rejected Pakistan's plan for a climbdown, instead deciding to fight on.[56] The Indian army launched its final attacks in the last week of July; as soon as the Drass subsector had been cleared of Pakistani forces, the fighting ceased on July 26. The day has since been marked as Kargil Vijay Diwas (Kargil Victory Day) in India. By the end of the war, India had resumed control of all territory south and east of the Line of Control, as was established in July 1972 as per the Simla Agreement.
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World opinion Pakistan was criticised by other countries for allowing its paramilitary forces and insurgents to cross the Line of Control.[57] Pakistan's primary diplomatic response, one of plausible deniability linking the incursion to what it officially termed as "Kashmiri freedom fighters", was in the end not successful[58]. Veteran analysts argued that the battle was fought at heights where only seasoned troops could survive, so poorly equipped "freedom fighters" would neither have the ability nor the wherewithal to seize land and defend it. Moreover, while the army had initially denied the involvement of its troops in the intrusion, two soldiers were awarded the Nishan-E-Haider (Pakistan's highest military honour). Another 90 soldiers were also given gallantry awards, most of them posthumously, confirming Pakistan's role in the episode. India also released taped phone conversations between the Army Chief and a senior Pakistani general where the latter is recorded saying: "the scruff of [the militants] necks is in our hands,"[59] although Pakistan dismissed it as a "total fabrication". Concurrently, Pakistan made several contradicting statements, confirming its role in Kargil, when it defended the incursions saying that the LOC itself was disputed.[60] Pakistan also attempted to internationalize the Kashmir issue, by linking the crisis in Kargil to the larger Kashmir conflict but, such a diplomatic stance found few backers on the world stage.[61] As the Indian counter-attacks picked up momentum, Pakistani prime minister Nawaz Sharif flew to meet U.S. President Bill Clinton on July 4 to obtain support from the United States. Clinton rebuked Sharif, however, and asked him to use his contacts to rein in the militants and withdraw Pakistani soldiers from Indian territory. Clinton would later reveal in his autobiography that "Sharifs moves were perplexing" since the Indian Prime Minister had travelled to Lahore to promote bilateral talks aimed at resolving the Kashmir problem and "by crossing the Line of Control, Pakistan had wrecked the [bilateral]
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talks."[62] On the other hand, he applauded Indian restraint for not crossing the LoC and escalating the conflict into an all-out war.[63] G8 nations supported India and condemned the Pakistani violation of the LOC at the Cologne summit. The European Union also opposed Pakistan's violation of the LOC.[64] China, a long-time ally of Pakistan, insisted on a pullout of forces to the pre-conflict positions along the LoC and settling border issues peacefully. Other organizations like the ASEAN Regional Forum too supported India's stand on the inviolability of the LOC.[61] Faced with growing international pressure, Sharif managed to pull back the remaining soldiers from Indian territory. The joint statement issued by Clinton and Sharif conveyed the need to respect the Line of Control and resume bilateral talks as the best forum to resolve all disputes.[65][66] Gallantry awards A number of Indian soldiers earned awards for gallantry during the campaign.[67] Grenadier Yogendra Singh Yadav, 18 Grenadiers, Param Vir Chakra, Lieutenant Manoj Kumar Pandey, 1/11 Gorkha Rifles, Param Vir Chakra, Posthumous Captain Vikram Batra, 13 JAK Rifles, Param Vir Chakra, Posthumous Squadron Leader Ajay Ahuja, Indian Air Force, Vir Chakra, Posthumous Rifleman Sanjay Kumar, 13 JAK Rifles, Param Vir Chakra
Two Pakistani soldiers received the Nishan-e-Haider.[68] Captain Karnal Sher Khan, Nishan-e-Haider, Posthumous Havaldaar Lalak Jan, Northern Light Infantry, Nishan-e-Haider, Posthumous 92 | P a g e

Impact and influence of media The Kargil War was significant for the impact and influence of the mass media on public opinion in both nations. Coming at a time of exploding growth in electronic journalism in India, the Kargil news stories and war footage were often telecast live on TV, [69] and many websites provided in-depth analysis of the war. The conflict became the first "live" war in South Asia;[70] it was given such detailed media coverage that one effect was the drumming up of jingoistic feelings. The conflict soon turned into a news propaganda war, in which press briefings given by government officials of each nation produced conflicting claims and counterclaims. The Indian government placed a temporary news embargo on information from Pakistan, banning the telecast of the state-run Pakistani channel PTV[71] and blocking access to online editions of the Dawn newspaper.[72] The Pakistani media criticized this apparent curbing of freedom of the press in India, while India media claimed it was in the interest of national security. The Indian government ran advertisements in foreign publications including The Times and The Washington Post detailing Pakistan's role in supporting extremists in Kashmir in an attempt to garner political support for its position. As the war progressed, media coverage of the conflict was more intense in India than in Pakistan.[73] Many Indian channels showed images from the battle zone in a style reminiscent of CNN's coverage of the Gulf War (one of the shells fired by Pakistan troops even hit a Doordarshan transmission centre in Kargil while coverage continued).
[74]
Reasons for India's increased coverage included the greater
number of privately owned electronic media in India compared to Pakistan and relatively greater transparency in the Indian media. At a seminar in Karachi, Pakistani journalists agreed that while the Indian government had taken the press and the people into its confidence, Pakistan had not.[75]
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The print media in India and abroad was largely sympathetic to the Indian cause, with editorials in newspapers based in the west and other neutral countries observing that Pakistan was largely responsible for the conflict. Some analysts believe that Indian media, which was both larger in number and more credible, may have acted as a force multiplier for the Indian military operation in Kargil and served as a morale booster.[76] As the fighting intensified, the Pakistani version of events found little backing on the world stage. This helped India gain valuable diplomatic recognition for its position. WMDs and the nuclear factor Since Pakistan and India each had weapons of mass destruction, many in the international community were concerned that if the Kargil conflict intensified, it could lead to nuclear war. Both countries had tested their nuclear capability in 1998 (India conducted its first test in 1974 while it was Pakistan's first-ever nuclear test). Many pundits believed the tests to be an indication of the escalating stakes in the scenario in South Asia. When the Kargil conflict started just a year after the nuclear tests, many nations desired to end it before it intensified. International concerns increased when Pakistani foreign secretary Shamshad Ahmad made a statement on May 31 warning that an escalation of the limited conflict could lead Pakistan to use "any weapon" in its arsenal.[77] This was immediately interpreted as a threat of nuclear retaliation by Pakistan in the event of an extended war, and the belief was reinforced when the leader of Pakistan's senate noted, "The purpose of developing weapons becomes meaningless if they are not used when they are needed."[78] Many such ambiguous statements from officials of both countries were viewed as warnings of an impending nuclear crisis where the combatants would consider use of their limited nuclear arsenals in 'tactical' nuclear warfare in the belief that it would not have ended in mutual assured destruction, as could have occurred in a nuclear conflict between the United States and the 94 | P a g e

USSR. Some experts believe that following nuclear tests in 1998, the Pakistani military was emboldened by its nuclear deterrent to markedly increase coercion against India.[79] The nature of the India-Pakistan conflict took a more sinister turn when the U.S. received intelligence that Pakistani nuclear warheads were being moved towards the border. Bill Clinton tried to dissuade Pakistan prime minister Nawaz Sharif from nuclear brinkmanship, even threatening Pakistan of dire consequences. According to a White House official, Sharif seemed to be genuinely surprised by this supposed missile movement and responded that India was probably planning the same. In an article in May 2000 Dr Sanjay Badri-Maharaj claimed that India too had readied at least five nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles, but could not back up this claim with any official proof.[80] Sensing a deteriorating military scenario, diplomatic isolation, and the risks of a larger conventional and nuclear war, Sharif ordered the Pakistani army to vacate the Kargil heights. He later claimed in his official biography that General Pervez Musharraf had moved nuclear warheads without informing him.[81] Recently however, Pervez Musharraf revealed in his memoirs that Pakistans nuclear delivery system was not operational during the Kargil war;[36] something that would have put Pakistan under serious disadvantage if the conflict went nuclear. The threat of WMD included chemical and even biological weapons. Pakistan accused India of using chemical weapons and incendiary weapons such as napalm against the Kashmiri fighters. India, on the other hand, showcased a cache of gas masks, among other firearms, as proof that Pakistan may have been prepared to use nonconventional weapons. US official and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons determined that Pakistani allegations of India using banned chemicals in its bombs were unfounded.[82] Aftermath 95 | P a g e

India
Indian PM A.B.Vajpayee flashes the V sign after the Parliamentary elections in which his coalition emerged the victors. His handling of the Kargil crisis is believed to have played a big part in garnering the votes. From the end of the war until February 2000, the Indian stock market rose by over 30%. The next Indian national budget included major increases in military spending. There was a surge in patriotism, with many celebrities expressing their support for the Kargil cause.[83] Indians were angered by media reports of the death of pilot Ajay Ahuja, especially after Indian authorities reported that Ahuja had been murdered and his body mutilated by Pakistani troops. The war had produced higher than expected fatalities for the Indian military, with a sizeable percentage of them including newly commissioned officers. One month after conclusion of the Kargil war, the Atlantique Incident - where a Pakistan Navy plane was shot down by India - briefly reignited fears of a conflict between the two countries. After the war, the Indian government severed ties with Pakistan and increased defence preparedness. India increased its defence budget as it sought to acquire more state of the art equipment.[84] Media reported about military procurement irregularities
[85]
and criticism of
intelligence agencies like Research and Analysis Wing, which failed to 96 | P a g e

predict the intrusions or the identity/number of infiltrators during the war. An internal assessment report by the armed forces, published in an Indian magazine, showed several other failings, including "a sense of complacency" and being "unprepared for a conventional war" on the presumption that nuclearism would sustain peace. It also highlighted the lapses in command and control, the insufficient troop levels and the dearth of large-calibre guns like the Bofors.[86] In 2006, retired Air Chief Marshal, A.Y. Tipnis, alleged that the Indian Army did not fully inform the government about the intrusions, adding that the army chief Ved Prakash Malik, was initially reluctant to use the full strike capability of the Indian Air Force, instead requesting only helicopter gunship support.[87] Soon after the conflict, India also decided to complete the project - previously stalled by Pakistan - to fence the entire LOC.[88] The end of the Kargil conflict was followed by the 13th Indian General Elections to the Lok Sabha, which gave a decisive mandate to the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government. It was re-elected to power in SeptemberOctober 1999 with a majority of 303 seats out of 545 in the Lok Sabha. On the diplomatic front, Indo-U.S. relations improved, as the United States appreciated Indian attempts to restrict the conflict to a limited geographic area.[89] Relations with Israel which had discreetly aided India with ordnance supply and matriel such as unmanned aerial vehicles and laser-guided bombs, as well as satellite imagery also were bolstered.[90] Kargil Review Committee Soon after the war the Atal Behari Vajpayee government set up an inquiry into its causes and to analyze perceived Indian intelligence failures. The high-powered committee was chaired by eminent strategic affairs analyst K. Subrahmanyam and given powers to interview anyone with current or past associations with Indian security, including former Prime Ministers. The committee's final report (also referred to as the 'Subrahmanyam Report'[91]) led to a 97 | P a g e

large-scale restructuring of Indian Intelligence.[92] It, however, came in for heavy criticism in the Indian media for its perceived avoidance of assigning specific responsibility for failures over detecting the Kargil intrusions.[93] The Committee was also embroiled in controversy for indicting Brigadier Surinder Singh of the Indian Army for his failure to report enemy intrusions in time, and for his subsequent conduct. Many press reports questioned or contradicted this finding and claimed that Singh had in fact issued early warnings that were ignored by senior Indian Army commanders and, ultimately, higher government functionaries.[94][95][96] In a departure from the norm the final report was published and made publicly available.[97] Some chapters and all annexures, however, were deemed to contain classified information by the government and not released. K. Subrahmanyam later wrote that the annexures contained information on the development of India's nuclear weapons program and the roles played by Prime Ministers Rajiv Gandhi, P. V. Narasimha Rao and V P Singh.[98][99]
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Pakistan Faced with the possibility of international isolation, the already fragile Pakistani economy was weakened further.[100][101] The morale of Pakistani forces after the withdrawal declined as many units of the Northern Light Infantry suffered heavy casualties.[18][102] The government refused to accept the dead bodies of many officers,[103][104] an issue that provoked outrage and protests in the Northern Areas. [105]
[106]
Pakistan initially did not acknowledge many of its casualties, but
Sharif later said that over 4,000 Pakistani troops were killed in the operation and that Pakistan had lost the conflict.[7] Responding to this, Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf said, "It hurts me when an expremier undermines his own forces," and claimed that Indian casualties were more than that of Pakistan.[107] Many in Pakistan had expected a victory over the Indian military based on Pakistani official reports on the war,[100] but were dismayed by the turn of events and questioned the eventual retreat.[27][108] The military leadership is believed to have felt let down by the prime minister's decision to withdraw the remaining fighters. However, some authors, including ex-CENTCOM Commander Anthony Zinni, and ex-PM Nawaz Sharif, state that it was General Musharraf who requested Sharif to withdraw the Pakistani troops.[109][110] With Sharif placing the onus of the Kargil attacks squarely on the army chief Pervez Musharraf, there was an atmosphere of uneasiness between the two. On October 12, 1999, General Musharraf staged a bloodless coup d'tat, ousting Nawaz Sharif. Benazir Bhutto, an opposition leader and former prime minister, called the Kargil War "Pakistan's greatest blunder".[111] Many ex-officials of the military and the Inter-Services Intelligence (Pakistan's principal intelligence agency) also believed that "Kargil was a waste of time" and "could not have resulted in any advantage" on the larger issue of Kashmir.[112] A retired Pakistani Army General, Lt Gen Ali Kuli Khan, 99 | P a g e

lambasted the war as "a disaster bigger than the East Pakistan tragedy",[113] adding that the plan was "flawed in terms of its conception, tactical planning and execution" that ended in "sacrificing so many soldiers."[113][114] The Pakistani media criticized the whole plan and the eventual climbdown from the Kargil heights since there were no gains to show for the loss of lives and it only resulted in international condemnation.[115] Despite calls by many, no public commission of inquiry was set up in Pakistan to investigate the people responsible for initiating the conflict. The Pakistan Muslim League (N) (PML(N)) published a white paper in 2006, which stated that Nawaz Sharif constituted an inquiry committee that recommended a court martial for General Pervez Musharraf, but Musharraf "stole the report" after toppling the government, to save himself.[116] The report also claims that India knew about the plan 11 months before its launch, enabling a complete victory for India on military, diplomatic and economic fronts. [117] A statement in June, 2008 by a former army corps commander of Pakistan that Sharif "was never briefed by the army" on the Kargil attack,[118] reignited the demand for a probe of the episode by legal and political groups.[119][120] Though the Kargil conflict had brought the Kashmir dispute into international focus which was one of the aims of Pakistan it had done so in negative circumstances that eroded its credibility, since the infiltration came just after a peace process between the two countries was underway. The sanctity of the LOC too received international recognition. President Clinton's move to ask Islamabad to withdraw hundreds of armed militants from Indian-administered Kashmir was viewed by many in Pakistan as indicative of a clear shift in US policy against Pakistan.[121] After the war, a few changes were made to the Pakistan army. In recognition of the Northern Light Infantry's performance in the war which even drew praise from a retired Indian Lt. General[43] - the 100 | P a g e

regiment was incorporated into the regular army. The war showed that despite a tactically sound plan that had the element of surprise, little groundwork had been done to gauge the politico-diplomatic ramifications.[122] And like previous unsuccessful infiltrations attempts, such as Operation Gibraltar, which sparked the 1965 war, there was little coordination or information sharing among the branches of the Pakistan military. One U.S. Intelligence study is reported to have stated that Kargil was yet another example of Pakistans (lack of) grand strategy, repeating the follies of the previous wars.[123] Casualties
Memorial of Operation Vijay
Casualties for both sides were heavy. Pakistani claims gave two figures. The figure of 357 soldiers dead was challenged by some Pakistani officials, who claimed that 4,000 Pakistani soldiers were killed in the conflict. Pakistan also confirmed that more than 665 Pakistani troops were wounded and 8 were captured. According to India, Indian losses stand at 527 soldiers killed, 1,363 wounded, and 1 captured. Pakistan army losses have been difficult to determine, partly because Pakistan has not published an official casualties list. The US Department of State had made an early, partial estimate of close to 700 fatalities. According to numbers stated by Nawaz Sharif there were over 4,000 fatalities. His PML (N) party in its "white paper" on 101 | P a g e

the war mentioned that more than 3,000 Mujahideens, officers and soldiers were killed.[124] Another major Pakistani political party, the Pakistan Peoples Party, also says that "thousands" of soldiers and irregulars died.[125] Indian estimates stand at 1,042 Pakistani soldiers killed.[126] Musharraf, in his Hindi version of his memoirs, titled "Agnipath", differs from all the estimates stating that 357 troops were killed with a further 665 wounded.[6] Apart from General Musharraf's figure on the number of Pakistanis wounded, the number of people injured in the Pakistan camp is not yet fully known. One Indian Pilot was officially captured during the fighting, while there were eight Pakistani soldiers who were captured during the fighting, and were repatriated on 13 August 1999;[8] Kargil War in the arts The brief conflict provided considerable dramatic material for
filmmakers and authors in India. Some documentaries which were shot on the subject were used by the ruling party coalition, led by Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), in furthering its election campaign that immediately followed the war. The following is a list of the major films and dramas on the subject. LOC: Kargil (2003), a Hindi movie which depicts many incidents from the war was one of the longest in Indian movie history, running for more than four hours.[127] Lakshya (2004), another Hindi movie portraying a fictionalised account of the conflict. Movie critics have generally appreciated the realistic portrayal of characters.[128] The film also received good reviews in Pakistan because it portrays both sides fairly.
[129]
Sainika (2002),[130] the Kannada film directed by Mahesh Sukhdhare depicted the life of a soldier with Kargil war as one of the events. Starring C.P.Yogishwar and Sakshi Shivanand.
Dhoop (2003),[131] directed by national award winner Ashwini Chaudhary, which depicted the life of Anuj Nayyar's parents 102 | P a g e

after his death. Anuj Nayyar was a captain in the Indian army and was awarded Maha Vir Chakra posthumously. Om Puri plays the role of S.K. Nayyar, Anuj's father. Mission Fateh - Real Stories of Kargil Heroes, a TV series telecast on Sahara channel chronicling the Indian Army's missions. Fifty Day War - A theatrical production on the war, the title indicating the length of the Kargil conflict. This was claimed to be the biggest production of its kind in Asia, involving real aircraft and explosions in an outdoor setting. Kurukshetra(2008) - A Malayalam film directed by a former Indian Army Major - major Ravi (Retd) based on his actual experience of Kargil War. Many other movies like Tango Charlie[132] drew heavily upon the Kargil episode, which still continues to be a plot for mainstream movies with a Malayalam movie Keerthi Chakra.[133] The impact of the war in the sporting arena was also visible during the India-Pakistan clash in the 1999 Cricket World Cup, which coincided with the Kargil timeline. The game witnessed heightened passions and was one of the most viewed matches in the tournament.
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Indian Peace Keeping Force

Indian Peace Keeping Force
IPKF First day cover released by the Government of India. Active Country Allegiance July 1987March 1990 Sri Lanka India Indian Army Branch Indian Navy Indian Air Force Peacekeeping Role Counterinsurgency Special operations Size 100,000 (peak) Operation Pawan Engageme nts Operation Viraat Operation Trishul Operation Checkmate Decoration s One Param Vir Chakra Six Maha Vir Chakras
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Commanders Notable commande rs Lieutenant General Depinder Singh Major General Harkirat Singh (General Officer Commanding) Lieutenant General S.C. Sardeshpande Lieutenant General A.R. Kalkat
Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF; Hindi: ) was the Indian military contingent performing a peacekeeping operation in Sri Lanka between 1987 and 1990. It was formed under the mandate of the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord signed between India and Sri Lanka in 1987 that aimed to end the Sri Lankan Civil War between militant Sri Lankan Tamil nationalists such as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Sri Lankan military.[1] The main task of the IPKF was to disarm the different militant groups, not just the LTTE. It was to be quickly followed by the formation of an Interim Administrative Council. These were the as per the terms of the accord signed between India and Sri Lanka, at the behest of Rajiv Gandhi, then Prime Minister of India. Given the escalating level of the conflict in Sri Lanka, and with the pouring of refugees into India, Rajiv Gandhi, took the decisive step to push this accord through. The IPKF was inducted into Sri Lanka on the request of then-Sri Lankan president J. R. Jayewardene under the terms of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord.[1] Currently LTTE is proscribed as a terrorist organization by the United States and European Union. The force was initially not expected to be involved in any significant combat by the Indian High Command.[2] However, within a few months, the IPKF became embroiled in battle with the LTTE to enforce peace. The differences started with LTTE trying to dominate the Interim Administrative Council, and also refusing to disarm, which was a pre-condition to enforce peace in the island. Soon, these differences led to the LTTE attacking the IPKF, at which point the IPKF decided to disarm the LTTE militants, by force if required. In the two years it was 105 | P a g e

in northern Sri Lanka, the IPKF launched a number of combat operations aimed at destroying the LTTE-led insurgency. Given LTTE's tactics in guerrilla warfare and using women and child soldiers to fight battles, it soon escalated into repeated skirmishes between the IPKF and LTTE. The IPKF began withdrawing from Sri Lanka in 1989, following the election of the Vishwanath Pratap Singh government in India and on the request of the newly-elected Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa.[2] The last IPKF contingents left Sri Lanka in March 1990. Background Sri Lankan Conflict 1976 - 2009 Background Sri Lanka History of Sri Lanka Origins of the Civil War Origins of the Civil War Sri Lankan Tamil nationalism Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism Riots Black July Main phases Eelam War I Indian intervention Eelam War II Eelam War III Eelam War IV LTTE LTTE Black Tigers Attacks Expulsion of Muslims Military of Sri Lanka Military of Sri Lanka Attacks Major leaders M. Rajapaksa V. Prabhakaran Karuna S. Chandrakanthan G.
Rajapaksa Sarath Fonseka
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Indian involvement Operation Poomalai Indo-Sri Lanka Accord Indian Peace Keeping Force Operation Pawan Rajiv Gandhi RAW See also Battles Casualties Human rights War crimes Allegations of state terror Notable assassinations Child soldiers Disappearances Tamil militant groups (List) TMVP 2009 Tamil diaspora protests This box: view talk edit See also: Operation Poomalai Sri Lanka, from the early 1980s, was facing increasingly violent ethnic strife in the Sri Lankan Civil War. The origins of the Sri Lankan Civil War can be traced to the independence of Sri Lanka in 1948, after the end of British rule. At the time, a Sinhalese majority government was instituted. This government passed legislation deemed discriminatory by some against the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka. In the 1970s, two major Tamil parties united to form the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), a separatist Tamil nationalist group that agitated for a separate state of Tamil Eelam in north and eastern Sri Lanka[3] that would grant the Tamils greater autonomy within the federal structure. However, the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of Sri Lanka, enacted in August 1983, classified all separatist movements as unconstitutional,[1][1] Outside the TULF, Tamil factions advocating more militant courses of action soon emerged, and the ethnic divisions eventually led to violent civil war.[3] Indian involvement and intervention Initially, first under Indira Gandhi[4][5] and later under Rajiv Gandhi, the Indian Government sympathized with the Tamil insurrection in Sri Lanka because of the strong support for the Tamil cause within the 107 | P a g e

Indian state of Tamil Nadu. Emboldened by this support, supporters in Tamil Nadu provided a sanctuary for the separatists and helped the LTTE smuggle arms and ammunition into Sri Lanka, making them the strongest force on the island. In fact in 1982, the LTTE supremo Prabhakran was arrested by the police in Tamil Nadu, for a shoot-out with his rival Uma Maheswaran, in the middle of the city. Both of them were arrested and later released by the police. This activity was left unchecked as India's regional and domestic interests wanted to limit foreign intervention on what was deemed as a racial issue between the Tamils and the Sinhalese. To this end, the Indira Gandhi government sought to make it clear to Sri Lankan President Junius Richard Jayewardene that armed intervention in support of the Tamil movement was an option India would consider if diplomatic solutions should fail.[6] The first round of civil violence flared in 1983 when the killing of 13 soldiers of the Sri Lanka Army sparked anti-Tamil pogromsthe Black July riotsin which over 3000 Tamils were killed. The riots only aided in the deterioration of the ethnic relations. Militant factions, including the LTTE, at this time recruited in large numbers and continued building on popular Tamil dissent and stepped up the guerrilla war. By May 1985, the guerrillas were strong enough to launch an attack on Anuradhapura, attacking the Bodhi Tree shrinea sacred site for Buddhist Sinhalesefollowed by a rampage through the town. At least 150 civilians died in the hour long attack. Rajiv Gandhi's government attempted to re-establish friendly relations with the various factions in Sri Lanka while maintaining diplomatic efforts to find a solution to the conflict as well as limiting overt aid to the Tamil fighters.[6][7] The Sri Lankan government, deducing a decline in support for the Tamil rebels from India, tried to rearming itself extensively for its antiinsurgent role with support from Pakistan, Israel, Singapore, and South Africa.[6][8] In 1986, the campaign against the insurgency was stepped 108 | P a g e

up. In 1987, retaliating against an increasingly bloody insurgent movement, the Vadamarachchi Operation (Operation Liberation) was launched against LTTE strongholds in Jaffna Peninsula. The operation involved nearly 4,000 troops, supported by helicopter gunships as well as ground-attack aircraft.[6] In June 1987, the Sri Lankan Army laid siege on the town of Jaffna.[9] This resulted in large-scale civilian casualties and created a condition of humanitarian crisis.[10] India, which had a substantial Tamil population in South India faced the prospect of a Tamil backlash at home, called on the Sri Lankan government to halt the offensive in an attempt to negotiate a political settlement. However, the Indian efforts were unheeded. Added to this, in the growing involvement of Pakistani advisers, it was necessary for Indian interest to mount a show of force.[6] Failing to negotiate an end to the crisis with Sri Lanka, India announced on 2 June 1987 that it wound send a convoy of unarmed ships to northern Sri Lanka to provide humanitarian assistance[11] but this was intercepted by the Sri Lankan Navy and forced to turned back.[12] Following the failure of the naval mission the decision was made by the Indian government to mount an airdrop of relief supplies in aid of the beleaguered civilians over the besieged city of Jaffna. On 4 June 1987, in a bid to provide relief, the Indian Air Force mounted Operation Poomalai. Five Antonov An-32s under fighter cover flew over Jaffna to airdrop 25 tons of supplies, all the time keeping well within the range of Sri Lankan radar coverage. At the same time the Sri Lankan Ambassador to New Delhi, Bernard Tilakaratna, was summoned to the Foreign Office to be informed by the Minister of State, External Affairs, K. Natwar Singh, of the ongoing operation and also indicated that the operation was expected not to be hindered by the Sri Lankan Air Force. The ultimate aim of the operation was both to demonstrate the seriousness of the domestic Tamil concern for the civilian Tamil population and reaffirming the Indian option of active intervention to the Sri Lankan government.[10] The Indo-Sri Lanka Accord 109 | P a g e

Main article: Indo-Sri Lanka Accord Following Operation Poomalai, faced with the possibility of an active Indian intervention and lacking any possible ally, the President, J. R. Jayewardene, offered to hold talks with the Rajiv Gandhi government on future moves.[9] The siege of Jaffna was soon lifted, followed by a round of negotiations that led to the signing of the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord on July 29, 1987[13] that brought a temporary truce. Crucially however, the negotiations did not include the LTTE as a party to the talks. The signing of the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord on 29 July 1987[13] brought a temporary truce to the Sri Lankan Civil War. Under the terms of the agreement,[14][15] Colombo agreed to a devolution of power to the provinces the Sri Lankan troops were withdrawn to their barracks in the north, the Tamil rebels were to disarm.[16] The Mandate for the IPKF Among the provisions undersigned by the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord was the commitment of Indian military assistance should this be requested for by the Sri Lankan Government, as well as the provision of an Indian Peace Keeping Force that would "guarantee and enforce the cessation of hostilities".[6][14] It was on these grounds, and on the request of President J. R. Jayewardene, that Indian troops were inducted to Northern Sri Lanka. J N Dixit, the then Indian ambassador to Colombo, in an interview to rediff.com in 2000 described that ostensibly, Jayawardene's decision to request Indian assistance came in the face of increasing civil riots and violence within the southern Sinhala majority areas, including the capital Colombo that were initiated by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party that necessitated the withdrawal of the Sri Lankan Army from the Tamil areas of northern Sri Lanka to maintain order.[2] IPKF Order of Battle Originally a reinforced division with small naval and air elements, the IPKF at its peak deployed four divisions and nearly 80,000 men with 110 | P a g e

one mountain (4th) and three Infantry Divisions (36th, 54th, 57th) as well as supporting arms and services. At the peak of its operational deployment, IPKF operations also included a large Indian Paramilitary Force and Indian Special Forces elements. Indeed Sri Lanka was first theatre of active operation for the Indian Navy Commandos. The main deployment of the IPKF was in northern and eastern Sri Lanka. Upon its withdrawal from Sri Lanka the IPKF was renamed the 21st Corps and was headquartered near Bhopal and became a quick reaction force for the Indian army. Indian Army The first Indian Army troops to be inducted into Sri Lanka were a ten thousand strong force from the 54th Infantry division, composed of elements of the Sikh Light Infantry, the Maratha Light Infantry and the Mahar Regiment which flew into Palay airbase ,[17] from July 30 onwards. This was followed later by the 36th Infantry division. By August, the 54th Infantry Division under the command of Maj Gen Harkirat Singh and the 340th Indian Inf Bde had landed in Sri Lanka. By 1987, the IPKF consisted of
[10]
54th Air Assault Division. (Major General Harkirat Singh (General Officer Commanding), Brigadier Kulwant Singh, Dy GOC):- Became an infantry division later due to lack of airlift capacity within the Indian armed forces. 10 Para Commando. (Jaffna) - an attached unit 65 Armoured Regiment (originally with T-54 tanks and later with T-72s). - an attached unit, it was later determined that the T55 was a better vehicle for counterinsurgency operations. Listed by some sources as an independent unit. 91 Infantry Brigade (Jaffna) 5 Madras Bn 8 Mahar Bn 111 | P a g e

1 Maratha Light Infantry Bn 76 Infantry Brigade (Brigadier I.M. Dhar) (Munnar,
Vavuniya, Mulliativu) 47 Infantry Brigade (Trincomalee-Batticoloa-Amparai) 36 Infantry Division.[18] 115 Infantry Brigade.(Jaffna) 5th Bn The First Gorkha Rifles.(5/1 GR).(Battle Of Urumparai,Battle Of Nallur Temple Jaffana,Battle Of Manipai) 72 Infantry Brigade.(Jaffna) 4 Bn./5 Gorkha Regiment. 13 Sikh LI Bn. 41 Infantry Brigade. (Jaffna) 5 Rajputana Rifles 57th Infantry Division, trained in jungle warfare, 4th Mountain division, only two brigades used. Independent Units 340 Independent Infantry Brigade (Amphibious).
(Trincomalee) The Indian Marines 18 Infantry Brigade. (Jaffna) 5 Para Battalion. Indian Air Force Soon after its intervention in Sri Lanka and especially after the confrontation with the LTTE, the IPKF received a substantial commitment from the Indian Air Force, mainly transport and helicopter squadrons, including:[19] No. 19 Squadron- Antonov An-32s No 109 and No. 119 Helicopter Units - Mil Mi-8 helicopters. 112 | P a g e

No. 125 HU - Mil Mi-24s. No. 664 AOP Squadron Chetak and Cheetah
Indian Navy The Indian Navy regularly rotated naval vessels thru Sri Lanka waters, mostly smaller vessels such as patrol boats. Indian Naval Air Arm No. 321 Squadron of the Indian Navy- HAL Chetaks No. 310 Squadron of the Indian Navy- Breguet Aliz MARCOS (also the Marine Commando Force or MCF) - Took part in Operation Pawan (Hindi, "wind") in 1988 and in the raid on an LTTE base at Guru Nagar. MARCOS operators (including Lt Singh) boarded two Gemini rafts off the coast of Jaffna City and towed two wooden rafts of explosives into a channel leading to the city's Guru Nagar Jetty. Avoiding mines, eight men and two officers shifted to the wooden rafts and paddled to the jetty then fixed demolition charges to the jetty and LTTE speedboats. The commandos were detected but laid down suppressive fire and detonated the explosives before retreating to the Geminis without taking casualties. Two nights later, commandos swam back into the harbour amidst heavy patrolling by the LTTE to destroy the remaining speedboats. They were again detected and sustained minor injuries. These actions helped recapture Trincomalee and Jaffna harbours from the LTTE. For leading these actions the 30 year old Lt. Singh became the youngest officer to receive the Maha Vir Chakra Award. Indian paramilitary forces Central Reserve Police Force Indian Coast Guard
Combat operations Main article: Indian intervention in the Sri Lankan Civil War 113 | P a g e

Analysis Casualties The IPKF suffered around 1,255 killed in action and several thousand wounded. After several years, the Sri Lankan Armed Forces realised the role of IPKF and proposed building a memorial to the Indian dead in Sri Lanka. The LTTE casualties are not known reliably but number in several thousands. Some estimates state that over 7,000 cadres died in various encounters with the IPKF. Intelligence Failures The Indian intelligence agencies failed to consistently provide accurate information to the forces. One example is the Jaffna football ground massacre. The LTTE's disinformation machinery leaked information to the Indian army that the LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran was hiding in a building near the Jaffna university football ground.[citation needed] The operation plan was chalked out. It was decided to airdrop commandos on the ground while subsequent movement by tank formation ensured that Prabhakaran was caught alive. It was a good plan on paper. The formation moved out. Battle-hardened commandos were selected for the operation. The commandos started moving down from helicopter. But soon a rain of bullets from the LTTE fighters and sharpshooters perched on the tree tops started to fall on the commandos. The choppers also came under fire. The fate of the tanks moving in pincer formation on the ground was not much different. The LTTE had laid anti-tank mines in the way leading to the operational zone. And the football ground massacre was complete. The irony of the entire story was that the man they were hunting for was nowhere around the area on the day of the operation.[20] The IPKF complained that accurate maps of the operational theatres were not made available to them by the various intelligence agencies.
[citation needed]
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There was also a case where an agent of Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) was killed in an ambush set up by the IPKF. He had been acting on orders to carry out back channel diplomacy and peacetalks with the LTTE.[citation needed] Impact The IPKF mission while having gained tactical successes, did not succeed in its intended goals. On May 21, 1991, the LTTE assassinated Rajiv Gandhi for his role in sending the IPKF to Sri Lanka. The primary impact of the IPKF, has been that it shaped India's counter-insurgency International techniques history. and The military political doctrine. fallout, On the international scene, it does not find significant mention in National or military the IPKF's casualties, as well as the deterioration of international relations has however shaped India's foreign policy towards the Sri Lankan conflict. (see below) Assassination of Rajiv Gandhi The decision to send the IPKF in Sri Lanka was taken by then primeminister of India, Rajiv Gandhi, who held office until 1989. The operation in Sri Lanka was one of the factors that led to the ouster of the Rajiv Gandhi-led Congress (I) government in 1989. Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated at a rally at Sriperumbudur on 21 May 1991, while he was campaigning for re-election during the 1991 Indian General Election, by a suicide bomber, who was a member of the LTTE, named Dhanu. India's foreign policy The debacle that was IPKF's intervention in Sri Lanka is raised at times in Indian political discourse whenever the situation in Sri Lanka shows signs of deteriorating, and there is a question of intervening; or, in Sri Lankan politics (particularly by the LTTE), when it is proposed that India, or, more broadly, other foreigners, ought to have a role in promoting peace on the island nation. 115 | P a g e

As a result, relations between India and Sri Lanka became extremely sour and India vowed never to offer any military help to Sri Lanka again. This policy has not been changed since and no defence pact has been signed between India and Sri Lanka. India has never been directly involved in the peace talks between the LTTE and Sri Lanka but has supported Norway's efforts. Controversies The IPKF's role in the Sri Lankan conflict was much maligned by voices both there and at home at the time. It was alleged by the LTTE to have engaged in a number of incidents of human rights violation. Some neutral organisations also alleged the IPKF and LTTE to have engaged with scant regard for civilian safety and to have violated human rights. These allegations led to considerable outcry and public resentment within Sri Lanka as well as India, especially in Tamil Nadu, where the IPKF came to be viewed as an invading and oppressing force. Indian forces were accused of indulging in number of civilian massacres, Involuntary disappearances and rapes during their time in the Northeastern province of Sri Lanka.[21][22] These include complicity in the incidents such as Valvettiturai massacre in which on 2 , 3 , and 4 August 1989 over 50 Tamils were massacred by the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Valvettiturai, Jaffna. In addition to the killings over 100 homes, shops and other property were also burnt and destroyed.
[23]
Another notable incident was the Jaffna teaching hospital massacre
on October 22, 1987, following a confrontation with Tamil militants near the hospital, IPKF quickly entered the hospital premises and massacred over 70 civilians. These civilians included patients, two doctors , three nurses and a pediatric consultant who were all in uniform. The hospital never completely recovered after this massacre.
[24][25][26]
The IPKF was also accused of complicity in murder of Sinhalese
civilians in the 1987 Trincomalee massacre where according to Asian Times in August 1987, a number of majority Sinhalese civilians were 116 | P a g e

massacred. The then Sri Lankan government accused the Madras Regiment posted in the Trincomalee district of complicity, although the Indian officials denied responsibility, they withdrew the Madras Regiment from Trincomalee district.[27
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India's Nuclear Weapons Program

India as A Nuclear Power: 1998-2001 The immediate aftermath of the nuclear tests conducted by India, and then by Pakistan was not an encouraging one. In the two weeks since the conclusion of testing the Indian government has been a source of both conciliatory and potentially threatening remarks. While repeated statements have been made, most notably by Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister Mr. Brajesh Mishra on 22 May, and PM Vajpayee himself on 26 May, that India has declared a unilateral moratorium on testing, and that the weapons are not intended for aggressive purposes. India has also offered to open talks with Pakistan to discuss issues of contention and a possible nuclear weapon "no first use" agreement. On Monday 18 May, just one week after the first test, Home Minister L.K. Advani issued sharp warnings to Pakistan about interfering in Indian-controlled Kashmir. PM Sharif responded the next day with an accusation that India had threatened to attack the territory under Pakistan's control. Although sporadic exchanges of gunfire have occurred over the years along the Line-Of-Control (LoC) that intersects Kashmir and separates the Indian and Pakistani armies, in the days following Advani's warnings there was a pronounced escalation of small arms and artillery fire on a daily basis. On 22 May B. Mishra stated "Let it not be forgotten that PoK (Pakistan occupied Kashmir), including the so-called northern areas, is an integral part of India. After all the unanimous resolution of the Indian Parliament in February 1994 to this effect is absolutely clear." Pakistan just as firmly believes that Indian controlled Kashmir is an integral part of Pakistan. Two of the three Indo-Pakistani wars have been fought over this same territory. The increasingly aggressive Indian posture, coupled with the current outbreak of armed conflict on
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the LoC, raised a very real possibility of war returning to the region after a 17 year absence. Over the next year however this threat seemingly receded. On 20 February 1999 Indian PM Atal Behari Vajpayee made history when he crossed over the Pakistani border by bus to meet Pakistani President Nawaz Sharif at Lahore, raising hopes that with the nuclear arsenals now out of their closets the two powers would back away from confrontational approaches. On 21 February 1999 the two prime ministers signed the "Lahore Declaration", committing the two nations to peacefully resolving their differences. Development continued on India's nuclear delivery systems - on 11 April 1999 India conducted a successful 14 minute test flight of the 2,500 kilometer Agni-II missile. "The entire process of achieving a minimum deterrent has been completed," Vajpayee announced following the test. "We are satisfied that we are now fully capable of defending our borders," he added. Pakistan responded with an eightminute test flight of the Ghauri II three days later. The promise of the Lahore Declaration proved to be stillborn. On 5 May 1999 two Indian army patrols in the snowy Yaldor area in Kargil, a border region next to Kashmir, were surprised to encounter a group of armed men, apparently from Pakistani Kashmir (known in India as "Pakistan-occupied Kashmir" or POK; in Pakistan they are called the Northern Areas or NA). This was the first contact with an infiltration operation from Pakistan to seize the mountain peaks inside India as an escalation of the long-standing Kashmir conflict, which would be become known as the Kargil War. The "line of control", or LoC, between India and Pakistan runs across some of the harshest, most rugged, and highest territory in the world and consequently much of it consists of "unheld areas", territory so inhospitable that both sides abandon it during the brutal winters. It was because India had suspended patrol operations in the winter that made it possible for infiltrators to set up camp without being detected. 119 | P a g e

The patrols that encountered them were the first of the season. Such areas had been opportunities for adventurousness in the past, as when the Siachen glacier was suddenly occupied by armed forces many years ago - becoming the highest and coldest battlefield on Earth. But this was the first time Pakistan had ever tried to exploit this particular region.It appears the infiltration operation was already underway during the signing of the Lahore Declaration The larger of the two patrol parties went to check on the strangers, and found itself in an ambush and lost four soldiers. Firing continued for nearly a week before aerial surveillance on 12 May revealed to the army realized that the incursion was far more serious than it had assumed. Around 500 heavily armed guerillas had occupied at least 35 well-fortified positions atop the ridges facing Dras, Kargil, Batalik and the Mushko valley. Cover fire was being provided by the Pakistani artillery, which had begun a systematic bombardment of National Highway 1A that connects Leh to Srinagar in the Dras-Kargil region. Within days the Indian army moved nearly 30,000 troops into the Kargil-Dras area along with special forces dropped on the high ridges by helicopter, and the battle was on in earnest; "Operation Vijay" (victory) to recapture the heights was launched in late May. Pakistan initially claimed not to be involved with the infiltration effort, a remarkable attempt at dissociation considering that the infiltrators were very well equipped and supplied, came from territory controlled by the Pakistani military, and were clearly in direct contact with the Pakistanis from which they were receiving direct artillery fire support. Eventually the continued direct involvement of regular Pakistani forces made the pretense an embarrassment for Pakistan, which dropped the attempt at evasion. Over the next several weeks India outmaneuvered Pakistan both on the battlefield and in international diplomacy. Heavy Pakistani fire directed by the infiltrators from their commanding positions made the situation very difficult for India, but Pakistani positions on the Indian 120 | P a g e

side were progressively captured or cut off from support as the superior weight of Indian forces made itself felt. By promising not to cross the LoC itself, India garnered nearly universal international support - and especially active Amercian support - for its position, while at the same time by mobilizing its forces along the entire Pakistani border it signalled that India was prepared to escalate and use its full military strength if necessary to prevent a Pakistani victory. The objective of this operation seems to have been to try to obtain a limited gain on the ground - revising the LoC several kilometers in Pakistan's favor. The LoC has after all always been defined in de facto terms - it has no recognized status, it simply marks the effective zones of control of the two nations. The operation was calculated to circumvent India's military superiority - by picking the most difficult terrain possible for India's operations, and achieving the initial gain through stealth alone. Pakistan evidently hoped that international pressure would halt the conflict before India succeeded in driving the guerillas back. By mid June the tide was turning, and by mid July the Kargil incursion had turned into a rout for Pakistan, both militarily and diplomatically. Pakistani forces retreated behind the LoC, and Pakistan suffered another severe blow to its international credibility, and in turn boosted India's prestige. After the end of the war Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif asserted that the operation had been instigated without his knowledge - a claim, which whether true or not, was unfortunately all too plausible in Pakistan, with its tradition of the military operating free from civilian control. The total depth of penetration across the LoC was no more than eight or nine kilometres at most. As intended by Pakistan, the operations for retaking the occupied areas were very difficult for India and this short, sharp war resulted in 474 killed and 1109 wounded on the Indian side (as of July 26, 1999). For a detailed discussion of the Kargil War see The Kargil Review Committee Report [Kargil 2000]. 121 | P a g e

A crucial but at the time unreported consequence of the Kargil War, tied in with the Indian mobilization along the Pakistani border, was the apparent deployment of at least five nuclear armed missiles. "Four nuclear armed Prithvis and one Agni were deployed for retaliatory strikes" according to Dr. Sanjay Badri-Maharaj, author of The Armageddon Factor (Indian Express, 18 June 2000). This would have been a preproduction model of the Agni-II, the first deployable Agni version. Sharif's demurral became even more plausible three months later when a showdown occurred between PM Sharif and army chief Gen. Pervez Musharraf on 13 October 1999. Acting while Musharraf was out of the country, Sharif fired him, but hours later Musharraf returned and overthrew Sharif in a coup (later to put Sharif on trial for his life). Following the aggressive, destabilizing, and ill-conceived military operation of Kargil, the military coup in Pakistan did absolutely nothing to reassure India or the world regarding Pakistan's soundness and circumspection. The result was naturally even deeper isolation for Pakistan, on top of the sanctions that followed the 1998 tests, and the Kargil adventure. Overt hostilities along the border continued to persist after the conclusion of the Kargil War. On 10 August 1999 an Indian fighter jet shot down a slow-moving Pakistani reconnaissance plane, killing all 16 aboard. The Indians said the plane had strayed across the border, though most of the wreckage landed in Pakistan. On 17 August 1999, India took the major - though belated step toward formalizing its declared status as a nuclear power by issuing a six-page document detailing a proposed doctrine governing its nuclear arsenal, entitled the "Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine". The report, which was prepared by a government-appointed advisory board, was made public Tuesday by National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra.
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The essential points of this doctrine were that India asserted a right to possess nuclear weapons, and would pursue a policy of credible "minimum" nuclear deterrence and use nuclear weapons only to retaliate against a first strike. According to the draft, "Any nuclear attack on India and its forces shall result in punitive retaliation with nuclear weapons to inflict damage unacceptable to the aggressor." "India's peacetime posture aims at convincing any potential aggressor that any threat of use of nuclear weapons against India shall invoke measures to counter the threat," the draft said. It further stated that India would not use nuclear weapons against a state that does not have them or is not aligned with a nuclear-armed power, and that nuclear weapons would be tightly controlled and launched only with the authorization of the prime minister, or a designated successor. The draft said the size, components, deployment and employment of nuclear forces would be decided in light of the strategic environment, economic imperatives and the needs of national security. But it took an expansive view of the concept of "minimum deterrence", recommending an arsenal that is able to deliver a nuclear blast from "a triad of aircraft, mobile land-based missiles and sea-based assets," one that can respond to an attack "in the shortest possible time" and employs a space-based early warning system. To raise the threshold for the outbreak of military conflict, India also would maintain highly effective conventional warfare capabilities, the draft document said. The draft did not mention the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) but it criticized the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, saying it legitimized the possession of nuclear weapons by states that already had them. The official U.S. State Department reaction given by Spokesman James P. Rubin was that India was "moving in the wrong direction" by trying to create a credible nuclear deterrence. Rubin said "We think it would be unwise to move in the direction of developing a nuclear deterrent and encouraging the other country to develop a nuclear 123 | P a g e

deterrent and thereby creating an action-reaction cycle that will increase the risks to both countries." China also condemned the document; and Pakistan, which 15 months ago matched India's nuclear tests with its own, said it would soon be matching India's doctrine with a published doctrine of its own. Unlike from the U.S., the initial reaction from Europe was cautious. France welcomed the draft doctrine as a logical consequence of the decision to develop nuclear weapons. The situation was cogently summarized by Tanvir Ahmad Khan in the Pakistani newspaper The Dawn on 24 August 1999: The present draft is a landmark for three major reasons. First, it gathers together in a forceful single document elements that had surfaced disparately and with a certain air of tentativeness since the tests. Secondly, it relegates to history half-way concepts like existential deterrence and recessed deterrence that had been debated in both India and Pakistan. In doing so, it delivers a mighty blow to efforts aiming at freezing Indian and Pakistani capability at a non-weaponized level. Third, the nuclear doctrine as set forth in the text has hardly any meaning unless the weapons are manufactured and actually deployed in large numbers, and a sizable reserve of warheads and delivery vehicles is permanently maintained. Tanvir Khan also observed that "the draft published at the moment does not add any transparency to the Indian targeting policy. Nor does it specify Pakistan or China as the principal zones of targeting." He also made some interesting assertions about Indian strategic literature: Some analysts define the objective as the destruction of Pakistan as a social and economic entity. The targets considered in the relevant Indian literature include six to ten Pakistani metropolitan centres, four 124 | P a g e

hydroelectric and thermal power stations, flooding of Punjab, obliteration of Pakistani railway system with attacks on Gujrat, Bahawalpur, Hyderabad and Dera Ghazi Khan , and disruption of all sea communications with nuclear attacks on Karachi and Gwadar. It has been calculated that a total of seventeen nuclear strikes will achieve all the objectives. If Pakistan also draws up a similar list of countervalue targets, breakdown of deterrence and the ensuing nuclear exchange would mark the end of a civilization. Although a the time of its announcement, it was expected that the government in place following the elections in the autumn of 1999 would enact the draft doctrine formally, by early 2001 no action had been taken and the draft remained a proposal without official weight, except to the extent it reflected the thinking of Indian government officialdom. For a discussion of the doctrine see Indian Nuclear Doctrine: A Discussion by Air Marshal B.D.Jayal (Retd.). In May 2000 the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) which has been set up on 15 November 1983 by order of the President of India to exercise regulatory and safety functions for atomic energy in India was split off from the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC). According too an unnamed senior official of the Dept. of Atomic Energy (DAE) quoted by Aviation Week & Space Technology (19 June 2000), this split indicated that nuclear warheads for India's armed forces had entered series production. The separation "means the weaponization program at BARC is completed," explained the official. "It is a clear assertion that BARC does not want the AERB to look into its weaponization program." Instead, BARC will have an internal safety committee, which was set up by BARC Director, Anil Kakodkar. The order for the split issued by Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Chairman, Rajgopalan Chidambaram stated, "The regulatory and safety mechanism of BARC and its functions, hitherto exercised by the AERB, will henceforth be exercised through an internal safety 125 | P a g e

committee structure to be constituted by the BARC director.... This is being done so as to ensure safety of the strategic nuclear program." Chidambaram added that the regulatory body is "always transparent" and has frequent interactions with the public. He said that BARC's internal committee will ensure compliance "wherever applicable" with the principles of good safety management as given in safety standards developed by the AERB. Despite the assertion of 'transparency' Chidambaram, speaking to a UNI reporter declined to give any details of the new committee saying that it was of strategic importance and details could not be revealed. The DAE official said, "Most weapon laboratories have their internal checks systems, the Lawrence Livermore [Laboratories] in the U.S. being an example." However, he omitted to mention that in the U.S. the Department of Energy maintains independent oversight with the Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board (DNFSB) which even includes reviewers outside of the DOE. Further insight on the significance of this split was added in a Times of India article on 15 June 2000. S. Rajagopal, an expert on nuclear affairs and a professor of the Bangalore-based National Institute of Advanced Studies, observed that this decision effectively reclassified BARC as a nuclear weapons laboratory. "This in turn will eliminate the need to place it under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards programme," he said. Chidambaram's eight years in office as Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission ended on 30 November 2000 when he was replaced by Dr. Anil Kakodkar today took charge as AEC Chairman, and as Secretary to the Government of India, Department of Atomic Energy in a brief ceremony held at Anushakti Bhavan, CSM Marg, Mumbai. Kakodkar This continued the tradition since Vikram Sarabhai's death in 1971 of having the top official in Atomic Energy be a leader of India's nuclear weapon program. As BARC director,
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Kakodkar had been the principal scientist involved in the May 1998 nuclear tests.
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India and weapons of mass destruction

India
Nuclear program start 1967 date First nuclear weapon test First fusion weapon test Last nuclear test Largest yield test Total tests Peak stockpile Current stockpile Maximum missile range NPT signatory 6 45-80 (2009 est.) 45-80 (2009 est.) 2,500km (Agni-II) No 18 May 1974 (Smiling Buddha) 11 May 1998 (disputed) 13 May 1998 Underground - 20-60 Kt total in Pokhran-II (yield is disputed)[1] (11 May 1998)
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Prithvi Air Defence (PAD) Advanced Air Defence (AAD)
List of treaties India possesses nuclear weapons and maintains shortand
intermediate-range ballistic missiles, nuclear-capable aircraft, surface ships, and submarines under development as possible delivery systems and platforms. Although it lacks an operational ballistic missile submarines India has ambitions of possessing a nuclear triad in the near future when INS Arihant the lead ship of India's Arihant class of nuclear-powered submarines formally joins the Indian Navy in 2012 after undergoing extensive sea-trials. Though India has not made any official statements about the size of its nuclear arsenal, estimates suggest that India has between 40 and 95 nuclear weapons,
[2][3]
consistent with estimates that it has produced enough weapons-
grade plutonium for up to 75-110 nuclear weapons.[4] Production of weapons-grade plutonium production is believed to be taking place at the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, which is home to the CIRUS reactor acquired from Canada, to the indigenous Dhruva reactor, and to a plutonium separation facility. India is not a signatory to the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which India argues entrenches the status quo of the existing nuclear weapons states whilst preventing general nuclear disarmament.[5] India tested a nuclear device in 1974 (code-named "Smiling Buddha"), which it called a "peaceful nuclear explosive." The test used plutonium produced in the Canadian-supplied CIRUS reactor, and raised concerns that nuclear technology supplied for peaceful purposes could be diverted to weapons purposes. This also stimulated the early work of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.[6] India performed further nuclear tests in 1998 (code-named "Operation Shakti"). Brief historical overview Agni II was India's first long range missile 129 | P a g e

As early as 26 June 1946, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, soon to be India's first Prime Minister, announced: As long as the world is constituted as it is, every country will have to devise and use the latest devices for its protection. I have no doubt India will develop her scientific researches and I hope Indian scientists will use the atomic force for constructive purposes. But if India is threatened, she will inevitably try to defend herself by all means at her disposal.[7] India's first nuclear test occurred on 18 May 1974. Since then India has conducted another series of tests at the Pokhran test range in the state of Rajasthan in 1998. India has an extensive civil and military nuclear program, which includes at least 10 nuclear reactors, uranium mining and milling sites, heavy water production facilities, a uranium enrichment plant, fuel fabrication facilities, and extensive nuclear research capabilities. In 1998, as a response to the continuing tests, the United States and Japan imposed temporary economic sanctions on India. Current arsenal and estimates of inventory In 2005, it was estimated that India had between 40 and 50 warheads.[2] In November 2008, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists estimated that India has about 70 assembled nuclear warheads, with about 50 of them fully operational.[8] A report by David Albright, published by the Institute for Science and International Security in 2000, estimated that India at end of 1999 had 310 kilograms of weapon grade plutonium, enough for 65 nuclear weapons. He also estimated that India had 4,200 kg of reactor grade plutonium which is enough to build 1,000 nuclear weapons.[3][9] By the end of 2004, he estimates India had 445 kilograms of weapon grade plutonium which is
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enough for around 85 nuclear weapons considering 5 kg of plutonium required for each weapon[10]. Former R&AW official J.K. Sinha, claimed that India is capable of producing 130 kilograms of weapon grade plutonium from six "unsafeguarded" reactors not included in the nuclear deal between India and the United States.[11] Doctrine India has a declared nuclear no-first-use policy and is in the process of developing a nuclear doctrine based on "credible minimum deterrence." In August 1999, the Indian government released a draft of the doctrine[12] which asserts that nuclear weapons are solely for deterrence and that India will pursue a policy of "retaliation only". The document also maintains that India "will not be the first to initiate a nuclear first strike, but will respond with punitive retaliation should deterrence fail" and that decisions to authorize the use of nuclear weapons would be made by the Prime Minister or his 'designated successor(s).'"[12] According to the NRDC, despite the escalation of tensions between India and Pakistan in 2001-2002, India remains committed to its nuclear no-first-use policy. Command and control India's Strategic Nuclear Command was formally established in 2003, with an Air Force officer, Air Marshal Asthana, as the Commander-inChief. The joint services SNC is the custodian of all of India's nuclear weapons, missiles and assets. It is also responsible for executing all aspects of India's nuclear policy. However, the civil leadership, in the form of the CCS (Cabinet Committee on Security) is the only body authorized to order a nuclear strike against another offending strike: In effect, it is the Prime Minister who has his finger "on the button."
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International treaties
Thermonuclear device used in the Pokhran Test India is not a signatory to either the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), but did accede to the Partial Test Ban Treaty in October 1963. India is a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and four of its 17 nuclear reactors are subject to IAEA safeguards. India announced its lack of intention to accede to the NPT as late as 1997 by voting against the paragraph of a General Assembly Resolution[13] which urged all non-signatories of the treaty to accede to it at the earliest possible date.[14] India voted against the UN General Assembly resolution endorsing the CTBT, which was adopted on 10 September 1996. India objected to the lack of provision for universal nuclear disarmament "within a timebound framework." India also demanded that the treaty ban laboratory simulations. In addition, India opposed the provision in Article XIV of the CTBT that requires India's ratification for the treaty to enter into force, which India argued was a violation of its sovereign right to choose whether it would sign the treaty. In early February 1997, Foreign Minister Gujral reiterated India's opposition to the 132 | P a g e

treaty, saying that "India favors any step aimed at destroying nuclear weapons, but considers that the treaty in its current form is not comprehensive and bans only certain types of tests." In August 2008, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) approved safeguards agreement with India under which the former will gradually gain access to India's civilian nuclear reactors.[15] In September 2008, the Nuclear Suppliers Group granted India a waiver allowing it to access civilian nuclear technology and fuel from other countries.[16] The implementation of this waiver makes India the only known country with nuclear weapons which is not a party to the NPT but is still allowed to carry out nuclear commerce with the rest of the world.[17] Since the implementation of NSG waiver, India has signed nuclear deals with several countries including France,[18] United States,[19], Mongolia, Namibia[20], and Kazakhstan[21] while the framework for similar deals with Canada and United Kingdom are also being prepared.[22][23] Delivery systems Below is the list of missiles currently in India's inventory or under development that can carry Nuclear Warheads. Information on the missiles is given below. Agni missile range.
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Ballistic missiles
Prithvi I AAD and PAD Under former president Dr. Abdul Kalam India pursued the Integrated Guided Missile Development Program (IGMDP) which was an Indian Ministry of Defense program for the development of a comprehensive range of missiles, including the intermediate range Agni missile (Surface to Surface), and short range missiles such as the Prithvi ballistic missile (Surface to Surface), Akash missile (Surface to Air), Trishul missile (Surface to Air) and Nag Missile (Anti Tank). Other projects such Indian Ballistic Missile Defense Program have derived from the IGMDP. In 2005, India became only the fourth country to have Anti Ballistic capability when India tested two systems the AAD and PAD.[24] India has methodically built an indigenous missile production
capability, using its commercial space-launch program to develop the skills and infrastructure needed to support an offensive ballistic 134 | P a g e

missile program. For example, during the 1980s, India conducted a series of space launches using the solid-fueled SLV-3 booster. Most of these launches put light satellites into near-earth orbit. Elements of the SLV-3 were subsequently incorporated into two new programs. In the first, the new polar-space launch vehicle (PSLV) was equipped with six SLV-3 motors strapped to the PSLV's first stage. The Agni IRBM technology demonstrator uses the SLV-3 booster as its first stage. Prithvi The Prithvi (Sanskrit: "Earth") I is mobile liquid-fueled 150 kilometer tactical missile currently deployed with army units. It is claimed that this missile is equipped only with various conventional warheads (which stay attached to the missile over the entire flight path). The missile is of particular interest to the United States (and potential buyers) in that has the capability of maneuvering in flight so as to follow one of several different pre-programmed trajectories. Based on the same design, a modified Prithvi, the Prithvi II, is essentially a longer-ranged version of the Prithvi I except that it has a 250kilometer range and a lighter payload. It is suspected that any nuclear missions will be executed by the Prithvi II. Currently, the Prithvi II has completed development and is now in production. When fielded, it will be deployed with air force units for the purpose of deep target attacking maneuvers against objectives such as air fields. Prithvi I Army Version (150 km range with a payload of 1,000 kg) Prithvi II Air Force Version (250 km range with a payload of 500 kg) Prithvi III Naval Version (350 km range with a payload of 500 kg) The Prithvi missile project encompassed developing 3 variants for use by the Indian Army, Indian Air Force and the Indian Navy. The initial project framework of the Integrated Guided Missile Development Program outlines the variants in the following manner. in October 135 | P a g e

2009 India conducted 2 simultenous user trials of 350 km extended range Prithvi II to be used for strategic purposes.
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Dhanush Dhanush (Sanskrit: Bow) is a naval variant of the Prithvi missile.[25] It can fire either the 250 km or the 350 km range missiles. Supposedly it is a customised version of the Prithvi and that the additional customizations in missile configuration are to certify it for sea worthiness. Dhanush has to be launched from a hydraulically stabilized launch pad. Its low range acts against it and thus it is seen a weapons either to be used to destroy an aircraft carrier or an enemy port. Indian Navy's K-15 Sagarika submarine-launched ballistic missile is reported to be a variant of the Dhanush missile.[26] The ship launched Dhanush Ballistic Missile was tested from INS Subhadra of the Sukanya class patrol craft in 2000. INS Subhadra is a vessel which was modified and the missile was launched from the reinforced helicopter deck. The 250 km variant was tested but the tests were considered partially successful.[27] In 2004, the missile was again tested from the INS Subhadra and was this time successful.[28] Then the following year in December the missile's 350 km version was tested from the INS Rajput and hit the land based target.[29] Agni The Agni (Sanskrit: Fire) missile system comprises three missiles: Agni I, Agni II Agni III
Agni-I uses the SLV-3 booster (from India's space program) for its first stage and a liquid-fueled Prithvi for its second stage.[30] Nuclear-capable Agni-II missiles have a range of up to 3,000 km and can carry a payload of 1,000 kg.[31] Unlike the Agni-I, the Agni-II has a solid-fueled second stage.[32] In July 2006, India successfully test-fired Agni-III,[33] a two-stage nuclear-capable ballistic missile with a range of 3,000 km.[34] Both 137 | P a g e

stages of the Agni-III utilizes solid-fuel propellants and its range can be extended to 4,000 km.[35] The missile is capable of carrying a nuclear payload within the range of 600 to 1,800 kg including decoys and other anti-ballistic counter-measures.[36] India's DRDO is also working on a submarine-launched ballistic missile version of the Agni-III missile, known as the Agni-III SL. This missile is expected to provide India with a credible sea-based second strike capability. According to Indian defense sources, Agni-III SL will have a range of 3,500 km.
[37]
In addition, the 5,000 km range Agni-V ICBM is
expected to be tested by 2010-11.[38] Surya The report of Surya ICBM has not been confirmed by officials of the Indian government and have repeatedly denied the existence of the project.The Surya ICBM is an ICBM program that has been mentioned repeatedly in the Indian press .[39] Surya (meaning Sun in Sanskrit and many other Indian languages) is the codename for the first Intercontinental Ballistic Missile that India is reported to be developing. The DRDO is believed to have begun the project in 1994. As the missile is yet to be developed, the specifications of the missile are not known and the entire program continues to remain highly speculative.[40] Estimates of the range of this missile vary from 5,000 kms[41] to 10,000 kms.[42] It is believed to be a three-stage design, with the first two stages using solid propellants and the third-stage using liquid. In 2007, the Times of India reported that the DRDO is yet to reveal whether India's currently proposed ICBM will be called Agni-V (or Surya-1).[41] As of 2009 it was reported that the government had not considered an 8,000-km range ICBM.[39] Four decades of investments in a missile-related design, development, and manufacturing infrastructure have also made this sector less vulnerable to long-term disruption by technology denial regimes. More significantly, India's sophisticated civilian satellite launch capability
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makes it one of the few developing states theoretically capable of building an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).[43] Shaurya is India's first hypersonic missile. Shaurya The Shaurya missile (Sanskrit: Valour) is a short-range surface-tosurface ballistic missile developed by DRDO of India for use by the Indian Army. It has a range of 600 km and is capable of carrying a payload of one-tonne conventional or nuclear warhead. The Shaurya missile provides India with a significant second strike capability[44]. Shaurya Missile is considered a land version of the Sagarika. This missile is stored in a composite canister just like the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile. The composite canister makes the missile much easier to store for long periods without maintenance as well as to handle and transport. It also houses the gas generator to eject the missile from the canister before its solid propellant motors take over to hurl it at the intended target. Shaurya missiles can remain hidden or camouflaged in underground silos from enemy surveillance or satellites till they are fired from the special storage-cum-launch canisters. DRDO Defence scientists admit that given Shaurya's limited range at present, either the silos will have to be constructed closer to India's borders or longer-range missiles will have to be developed. The Shaurya system will require some more tests before it becomes fully operational in two-three years. Moreover, defense scientists say the high-speed, two-stage Shaurya has high maneuverability which also makes it less vulnerable to existing anti-missile defense systems.[45]. When Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems AAD and PAD are to be tested again, the Shaurya invulnerability to anti-missile systems will be tested. The DRDO scientists also have said that if Shaurya is successful and manages to avoid anti ballistic missile radars then the missile can even be used to improve the AAD and PAD systems.
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Sagarika Sagarika (Sanskrit: Wave / Born from the Ocean) is a nuclear capable submarine-launched ballistic missile with a range of 750 km. This missile has a length of 8.5 meters, weighs seven tonnes and can carry a pay load of up to 500 kg.[46]. The development of this missile started in 1991. The first confirmation about the missile came in 1998 [47]. The development of the underwater missile launcher know as the Project 78 (P78) was completed in 2001. This was handed over to the Indian Navy for trials. The missile was successfully test fired thrice. The Indian Navy plans to introduce the missile into service by the end of 2010. Sagarika missile is being integrated with the Advanced Technology Vessel that is expected to begin sea trials by 2009. [48] Sagarika will form part of the triad in India's nuclear deterrence and will provide with retaliatory nuclear strike capability.[49] Sagarika has already been test-fired from an underwater pontoon, but now DRDO is planning a full-fledged test of the missile from a submarine and for this purpose may use the services of a Russian submarine.[50]. Eventually it could be introduced into as many as 5 ballistic missile submarines.
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India's Nuclear Capable Missiles Name Agni-I Agni-II Class SRBM MRBM Range 850 km 2,500 km 3,500 km 5,500 km 5,000 km 6,000 km 5,200 km 11,600 km 350 km 1,000 km Payload 1,000 kg 500 kg 1,000 kg 2,490 kg Status Operational Operational
Agni-III
IRBM
In Testing Under Development - Under Development Operational Under Development Operational
Agni-V
ICBM
3,000 kg+
Agni 3SL ICBM Dhanush SRBM Nirbhay Subsonic Cruise Missile Supersonic Cruise Missile Anti-shipping Missile Supersonic Cruise Missile ASM SRBM SRBM
- 700 kg 1,400 kg 500 kg ?
Brahmos P-70 Ametist P-270 Moskit Popeye Prithvi-I Prithvi-II
290 km
300 kg
65 km
530 kg
Operational
120 km 78 km 150 km 250 km 350 km 700 km 2,200 km 700 km 2,200 km
320 kg 340 kg 1000 kg 500 kg 500 kg - 150 kg 1000 kg - 150 kg 1,000 kg
Operational Operational Operational Operational Operational - Under Development - Under Development 141 | P a g e
Prithvi-III SRBM Sagarika SLBM
Shaurya
TBM

Surya-I ICBM 9,000 km 12,000 km >12,000 km 3,000 kg+ Under Development Under Development
Surya-II
ICBM
Cruise missiles India has a number of Moskit supersonic nuclear capable cruise missile P-70 Ametist cruise missile Nirbhay
Nirbhay (Sanskrit "Fearless") is a long range, subsonic cruise missile being developed in India. The missile will have a range of 1,000 km and will arm three services, the Indian Army, Indian Navy and the Indian Air Force.[51] The Nirbhay will be able to be launched from multiple platforms on land, sea and air. The first test flight of the missile is expected in the year 2009.[52] Nirbhay will be a terrain hugging, stealth missile[53] capable of delivering 24 different types of warheads depending on mission requirements and will use inertial navigation system for guidance.[54]. There are plans to arm the IL76MDs with the aerial version of the missile.[55] 3M-54 Klub
India has acquired around 200 3M-54 Klub for arming Talwar class frigate, Shivalik class frigate, Kolkata class destroyer and Sindhughosh class submarine[56]. The Russian 3M-54 Klub is a multi-role missile system developed by the Novator Design Bureau (OKB-8) with a range of 250 km-300 km and an average speed of .8 Mach with a maximum of 2.9 Mach.[57] India has both the Klub-N and Klub-S variant to be used for Ships and Submarines respectively.[58]. Both the Klub-N and Klub-S have been tested successfully. India currently has the 3M-54E, 3M54E1, 91RE1 and 91RE2 variants. In addition the Navy has plans to arm the Tu-142 and Tu-22M with an air-launched version. Due to Klub's longer range than BrahMos it may also be used in the Mirage 142 | P a g e

2000 and Su-30 MKI too. The Navy has shown interest in buying more Klubs which would be incorporated on to the S-1000 submarine if bought by India. India is also keen on other Former Soviet cruise missile such as the P-700 Granit and P-500 Bazalt. Popeye
India imported a large number of Israel's Rafael made Popeye Missile in late 1999.[59]. Popeye II, an air launched cruise missile capable of carrying nuclear warheads with a range of 80 km can be launched from planes was given to India along with missile defence radars in a deal.[60]. At that time the United States was wary of this due to its close relations with Pakistan. But due to recent military and strategic dealings between the Israel, India and the United States, it is thought that the United States has little or no objection now. The exact number transferred to India is unknown, but possibly 20 missiles to perhaps 50 missiles could have been given with possibly more being built in India. It is still not known which planes are armed with these missiles but it is thought to be the Tu-142 and Sukhoi Su-30MKI, which incorporate some Israeli technology. P-70 Ametist
India has Soviet P-70 Ametist submarine-launched cruise missiles.[61]. The missile were mostly probably bought in the early 90s and may be used today as canistered launched land based cruise missiles instead of submarine launched cruise missiles. The missiles can carry nuclear warheads and have a range of 5065 km. Although they are extremely old and incompetent due to their low range and speed, there are still reports that they are kept in reserve and can still be used due to their upgrades in the late 90s.[62]. Moskit
India has a number of operational Moskits.[61] The P-270 Moskit is a Russian supersonic ramjet powered cruise missile capable of being launched from land and ships. India has most probably bought both land and ship variants which have a range of 120 km. India bought 143 | P a g e

around 200 Klub missiles and now it is believed that the Moskit have been kept in reserve but can still be used. Brahmos
This section does not cite any references or sources. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (December 2009) BrahMos is a supersonic cruise missile that can be launched from submarines, ships, aircraft or land. It is a joint venture between India's Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and Russia's NPO Mashinostroeyenia who have together formed the BrahMos Aerospace Private Limited. The acronym BrahMos is perceived as the confluence of the two nations represented by two rivers, the Brahmaputra of India and the Moskva of Russia. It travels at speeds of Mach 2.5 to 2.8 and is the world's fastest cruise missile. It is about three-and-a-half times faster than the U.S.A's subsonic Harpoon[2] cruise missile. A hypersonic version of the missile is also presently under development (Lab Tested with 5.26 Mach Speed).[3] BrahMos claims to have the capability of attacking surface targets as low as 10 meters in altitude. It can gain a speed of Mach 2.8, and has a maximum range of 290 km.[1] The shiplaunched and land-based missiles can carry a 200 kg warhead, whereas the aircraft-launched variant (BrahMos A) can carry a 300 kg warhead. It has a two-stage propulsion system, with a solid-propellant rocket for initial acceleration and a liquid-fueled ramjet responsible for sustained supersonic cruise. Air-breathing ramjet propulsion is much more fuel-efficient than rocket propulsion, giving the BrahMos a longer range than a pure rocket-powered missile would achieve.[citation needed] The high speed of the BrahMos likely gives it better target-penetration characteristics than lighter subsonic cruise-missiles such as the Tomahawk.[5] Being twice as heavy and almost four times faster than 144 | P a g e

the Tomahawk, the BrahMos has almost 32 times the initial kinetic energy of a Tomahawk missile (although it pays for this by having only 3/5 the payload and a fraction of the range despite weighing twice as much, suggesting a different tactical paradigm to achieve the objective). Although BrahMos is primarily an anti-ship missile, it can also engage land based targets. It can be launched either in a vertical or inclined position and is capable of covering targets over a 360 degree horizon. The BrahMos missile has an identical configuration for land, sea, and sub-sea platforms. The air-launched version has a smaller booster and additional tail fins for added stability during launch. The BrahMos is currently being configured for aerial deployment with the Su-30MKI as its carrier Surface to air missile
Akash SAM Akash
Akash (Hindi: Sky) is India's medium range surface-to-air missile defense system The missile can target aircraft up to 30 km away, at altitudes up to 18,000 m.[63] Akash can be fired from both tracked and wheeled platforms.[64] Akash is said to be capable of both conventional and nuclear warheads, with a reported payload of 60 kg.[65] A nuclear warhead could potentially give the missile the capability to destroy both aircraft and warheads from ballistic missiles. The missile is described as being able to strike several targets simultaneously, which could mean either separate, independently targetable warheads, or a sufficient blast to destroy a number of them. 145 | P a g e

Along with India, a limited number of other countries including the US and Russia have developed operational multi-target handling surfaceto-air missile systems capable of carrying a nuclear warhead. Delivery mechanisms Former leased Charlie-Class submarine
6 Sindhughosh Class submarines can fire nuclear capable cruise missile, 3M-54 Klub INS Sindhuvijay
The INS Tabar and other Talwar class frigates are armed with the Nuclear capable 3M-54 Klub cruise missiles The Shivalik class frigates are armed with the 3M-54 Klub and may also incorporate the nuclear capable Nirbhay missile in the future. Seen here is the INS Shivalik when under sea trials.
IAF Sukhoi Su-30 MK 146 | P a g e

Nuclear submarines According to some accounts, India plans to have as many as 20 nuclear submarines capable of carrying missiles with nuclear warheads. Currently, India has built one and is building two more nuclear submarines under the Advanced Technology Vessel plan. India currently maintains six submarines of the Sindhughosh Class that can launch the nuclear-capable 3M-54 Klub cruise missiles. Former Leasing of Soviet submarines
In 1988 INS Chakra (Sanskrit: Wheel), a Charlie-class submarine was leased by the Indian Navy for three years from the Soviet Union, until 1991. The submarine was leased to India between 1988 and 1991 mainly for India to gain experience in the operations of a nuclear submarine. It was later decommissioned in 1991. Arihant class submarine
The Arihant class submarines (Sanskrit: Slayer of Enemies) are a class of nuclear-powered Ballistic Missile submarines being constructed for the Indian Navy at Visakhapatnam, India under the Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) Project armed with ballistic missiles. The first of these, INS Arihant was launched on 26 July 2009. The vessel, which will undergo sea-trials for up to two years, will then be equipped with an unknown number of K-15 Sagarika SLBMs[68]. The second and third submarines of the class may incorporate the Nirbhay as well. As of July 2007, the Sagarika missile as well as Dhanush had undergone three successful tests each. INS Cruise Missile Submarines
[66][67]
The ATV is an SSBN and will be
The INS Sindhuraj(Sanskrit: King of the Ocean), INS Sindhuvir(Sanskrit: Warrior of the Ocean), INS Sindhuratna(Sanskrit: Gem of the Ocean), INS Sindhushastra (Sanskrit: Lion Conqueror Weapon of of the the of the Ocean) Ocean) are Ocean), and capable INS INS of Sindhukesari(Sanskrit: Sindhuvijay(Sanskrit:
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launching 3M-54 Klub and BrahMos nuclear-capable cruise missiles.[69]. India bought 10 Kilo class (in India known as Sindhughosh Class) submarine of which 6 have been refitted by the Russian Navy so that the they can launch cruise missiles such as nuclear capable 3M-54 Klub. Leasing of Russian Akula and Amur Submarines
In 2000, negotiations between India and Russia were conducted into the leasing of two incomplete Akula class. The Akulas were to be delivered to the Indian Navy in 2008 on a lease of at least seven years and up to ten years, in which at the end of the lease, it has an option to buy them. The acquisition was to help the Indian Navy prepare for the introduction of the ATV. The cost to India of acquiring two Akula submarines and their support infrastructure along with training of the crews had been estimated at $2 billion.[70]. The Indian version was reportedly armed with the 300 km range 3M-54 Klub nuclear-capable missiles.[71]. Supposedly on 9 November 2008 one of the two submarines was conducting tests, when an accident on board killed 20 sailors but no damage occurred to the submarine. Though this deal fell apart for some time in due to the of its Indians demanding an upgrade/improvement some safety features, Russia's
President Dmitry Medvedev on his official trip to New Delhi said that the deal was back on track and that "The talk is not about selling submarines into India's property, but about their rent by India's navy".
[72]
However, unlike the earlier deal the modified deal states that India
can only rent and not buy the subs, but defence experts state that the so-called lease agreement is only to divert international attention and that it would be eventually modified and India would inevitably keep the subs. The first submarine will be named INS Chakra.[73]. Russia has also offered the advanced Amur Class Submarine, known as the S1000. According to GlobalSecurity India is already building the S1000 cruise missile submarines in Mazagaon Docks.[74] The Amur will be most probably fitted with P-700 Granit or the Klub cruise missile capable of carrying nuclear warheads. 148 | P a g e

Frigates, destroyers and aircraft carriers Other than submarines, India also maintains ships such as destroyers, modified patrol crafts and frigates which can launch nuclear capable ballistic and cruise missiles. Talwar class frigate and Shivalik class frigate are frigates of the Indian Navy that can fire nuclear capable cruise missiles. INS Tabar and INS Trishul are Talwar class vessel armed with supersonic nuclear 3M-54 Klub cruise missiles while INS Shivalik was the first vessel of the Shivalik class to incorporate the 3M-54 Klub. Other vessels of the Shivalik Class and Talwar Class are to be armed with the BrahMos and 3M-54 Klub missiles by 2009 and 2010 respectively. All these frigates are also equipped with Barak missiles or other SAMs and harbour helicopters such as the HAL Dhruv. In years to come, the Nirbhay missile is also to be incorporated into Talwar class frigates and Shivalik class frigates. Rajput Class, Kolkata Class and Delhi Class are Destroyers of the Indian Navy that may be armed with nuclear capable missile-Nirbhay. In addition Kolkata Class will also incorporate the Russian nuclear 3M54 Klub cruise missile.[56] The ship launched Dhanush Ballistic Missile was tested from INS Subhadra of the Sukanya class patrol craft in 2000. INS Subhadra is a patrol vessel which was modified and the missile was launched from the reinforced helicopter deck. The 250 km variant was tested but the tests were considered partially successful.[27] In 2004, the missile was again tested from the INS Subhadra and was this time successful.[28] Then the following year in December the missile's 350 km version was tested from the INS Rajput and hit the land based target.[29]. INS Vikramaditya Aircraft Carrier (formerly known as Admiral
Gorshkov) was fitted with P-500 Bazalt nuclear capable cruise missiles of the range of 550 km.[75] The Vikramaditya could still be armed with this after its refit. India is also a potential customer for a Slava class cruiser which also incorporates the P-500 Bazalt 149 | P a g e

Nuclear-capable aircraft India currently has Fourth generation jet fighters capable of launching nuclear weapons. Nuclear-capable aircraft are also seen as a less expensive way of dropping nuclear warheads as well as being as effective. Fighter Jets Indian Air Force Mirage 2000H. The Sukhoi Su-30MKI,[76] Dassault Mirage 2000
[77]
, and MiG-29[78] serve
in the Indian Air Force and are also seen as a means to deliver nuclear weapons. In addition India maintains SEPECAT Jaguar and MiG-27M which can be used to drop gravity bombs.[79] However, these planes would be considered useless in the 21st century as gravity bombs have little chance of accomplishing a task.[citation
needed]
On the other
hand, the Su-30MKI, capable of carrying nuclear weapons and tailormade for Indian specifications, integrates Indian systems and avionics.
[76]
is one of the best air superiority fighters and also consists of French Israeli subsystems.[80] The MKI variant features several
and
improvements over the basic K and MK variants and is classified as a 4.5 generation fighter.[81][82] Due to similar features and components, the MKI variant is often considered to be a customized Indian variant of the Sukhoi Su-35. The Mirage 2000Hs were heavily customised during the Kargil War and is the only other version, other than the French 2000N, to be able to be armed with nuclear weapons. However, the air force doesn't really see the Mirage as a nuclear strike aircraft. Though MiG-29 like the HAL Tejas after many test flights have not been tested to use nuclear weapons, they have the capacity to be armed with them. Both the HAL Tejas and Su-30MKI can travel excess of 3,000 km without refueling; this allows India to attack targets far away in an effective manner only using planes rather than delivery systems such as the Agni. The HAL Tejas is India's only indigenous plane to be armed with nuclear weapons, thus making India less dependent on Russia. 150 | P a g e

India has leased four Russian Tupolev Tu-22M3 bombers, which could carry air-launched cruise missiles. India has reportedly upgraded its Russian-built Tu-142 maritime patrol aircraft to carry air-launched cruise missiles.[83] Ballistic missile defense India's Advanced Air Defense (AAD) interceptor missile Main article: Indian Ballistic Missile Defense Program India has an active ABM development effort using indigenously developed and integrated radars and locally designed missiles.[84] In November 2006, India successfully conducted the PADE (Prithvi Air Defence Exercise) in which an Anti-ballistic missile, called the Prithvi Air Defense (PAD) an Exoatmospheric (outside the atmosphere) interceptor system intercepted a Prithvi-II ballistic missile. The PAD missile has the secondary stage of the Prithvi missile and can reach altitude of 80 km. During the test the target missile was intercepted at an 50 km altitude.[85] India became the fourth nation in the world to acquire such a capability and the third nation to develop it through indigenous effort.[86] On 6 December 2007 the Advanced Air Defence (AAD) missile system was tested successfully.[87] This missile is an Endo atmospheric interceptor with an altitude of 30 km. According to scientist V K Saraswat of DRDO the missiles will work in tandem to ensure a hit probability of 99.8 percent.[88] Induction of the system into services is expected to be in 2010. Two new anti ballistic missiles that can intercept IRBM/ICBMs are being developed. These high speed missiles (AD-1 and AD-2) are being developed to intercept ballistic missiles with the range of 5,000 km.[89] India also has Russian S300PMU-2 and it is used as an interceptor for Ballistic missiles. An indigenous nuclear tipped surface to air missile, Akash Missile is used to destroy low range missiles and is capable of destroying various targets and is one of the few of its kind systems in the world. India has also shown interest in the Russian S-400, the most advanced anti-ballistic missile. 151 | P a g e

Chemical weapons In 1992 India signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), stating that it did not have chemical weapons and the capacity or capability to manufacture chemical weapons. By doing this India became one of the original signatories of the Chemical Weapons Convention [CWC] in 1993[90], and ratified it on 2 September 1996. According to India's ex-Army Chief General Sunderji, a country having the capability of making nuclear weapons does not need to have chemical weapons, since the dread of chemical weapons could be created only in those countries that do not have nuclear weapons. Others suggested that the fact that India has found chemical weapons dispensable highlighted its confidence in the conventional weapons system at its command. India informed the United Nations in May, 2009 that it had destroyed its stockpile of chemical weapons in compliance with the international Chemical Weapons Convention. With this India has become third country after South Korea and Albania to do so.[91] This was crosschecked by inspectors of the United Nations. India has an advanced commercial chemical industry, and produces the bulk of its own chemicals for domestic consumption. It is also widely acknowledged that India has an extensive civilian chemical and pharmaceutical industry and annually exports considerable quantities of chemicals to countries such as the United Kingdom, United States, and Taiwan.[92] Biological warfare India has a well-developed biotechnology infrastructure that includes numerous pharmaceutical production facilities bio-containment laboratories (including BSL-3 and BSL-4) for working with lethal pathogens. It also has highly qualified scientists with expertise in infectious diseases. Some of Indias facilities are being used to support research and development for BW defense purposes. India has ratified the BWC and pledges to abide by its obligations. There is no clear 152 | P a g e

evidence, circumstantial or otherwise, that directly points toward an offensive BW program. New Delhi does possess the scientific capability and infrastructure to launch an offensive BW program, but has chosen not to do so. In terms of delivery, India also possesses the capability to produce aerosols and has numerous potential delivery systems ranging from crop dusters to sophisticated ballistic missiles.
[93]
In 2001, after Indian Postal Services received 17 suspicious letters believed to contain Bacillus anthracis spores, a Bio-Safety Level 2 (BSL-2) Laboratory was established to provide guidance in preparing the Indian government for a biological attack. B. anthracis is one of many pathogens studied at the institute, which also examines pathogens causing tuberculosis, typhoid, hepatitis B, rabies, yellow fever, Lassa fever, Ebola, and plague.[93] The Defense Research and Development Establishment (DRDE) at Gwalior is the primary establishment for studies in toxicology and biochemical pharmacology and development of antibodies against several bacterial and viral agents. Work is in progress to prepare responses to threats like Anthrax, Brucellosis, cholera and plague, viral threats like smallpox and viral hemorrhage fever and biotoxic threats like botulism. Most of the information is classified. Researchers have developed chemical/biological protective gear, including masks, suits, detectors and suitable drugs. India has a 'no first use' policy. India has ratified the BWC and pledges to abide by its obligations. There is no clear evidence, circumstantial or otherwise, that directly points toward an offensive BW program. New Delhi does possess the scientific capability and infrastructure to launch an offensive BW program, but has not chosen to do so. In terms of delivery, India also possesses the capability to produce aerosols and has numerous potential delivery systems ranging from crop dusters to sophisticated ballistic missiles. However, no information exists in the public domain suggesting interest by the Indian government in delivery of biological agents by these or any other means. To reiterate the latter point, in 153 | P a g e

October 2002, Indian President A.P.J. Abdul Kalam asserted that "we [India] will not make biological weapons. It is cruel to human beings..."[
154 | P a g e
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty
Signed Location
10 September 1996 New York City
Not yet in force 180 days after it is ratified by all 44 Annex 2 countries: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Effective Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Israel, Condition Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Romania, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Vietnam, Zaire Signatori 182 es Ratifiers 153 (including 35 of 44 Annex 2 states) Participation in the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Annex 2, signed and ratified Not Annex 2, signed and ratified Annex 2, only signed Annex Not Annex 2, only signed Not 2, non-signatory Annex 2, non-signatory The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) bans all nuclear explosions in all environments, for military or civilian purposes. It was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10 September 1996 but it has not yet entered into force.[1]
155 | P a g e

Status Further information: List of parties to the Comprehensive NuclearTest-Ban Treaty The Treaty was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10 September 1996.[2] It opened for signature in New York on 24 September 1996,[2] when it was signed by 71 States, including five of the eight then nuclear-capable states. As of May 2010, 153 states have ratified the CTBT and another 29 states have signed but not yet ratified it.[3] The treaty will enter into force 180 days after the 44 states listed in Annex 2 of the treaty have ratified it. These "Annex 2 states" are states that participated in the CTBTs negotiations between 1994 and 1996 and possessed nuclear power reactors or research reactors at that time.[4] As of April 2009, nine Annex 2 states have not ratified the treaty: China, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Israel and the United States have already signed the Treaty, whereas India, North Korea and Pakistan have not yet signed it. On 3 May 2010, Indonesia stated it had initiated the CTBT ratification process[5]. Obligations (Article I):[6] 1. Each State Party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control. 2. Each State Party undertakes, furthermore, to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion. History Arms control advocates had campaigned for the adoption of a treaty banning all nuclear explosions since the early 1950s, when public 156 | P a g e

concern was aroused as a result of radioactive fall-out from atmospheric nuclear tests and the escalating arms race. Over 50 nuclear explosions were registered between 16 July 1945, when the first nuclear explosive test was conducted by the United States at Alamogordo, New Mexico, and 31 December 1953. Prime Minister Nehru of India voiced the heightened international concern in 1954, when he proposed the elimination of all nuclear test explosions worldwide. However, within the context of the Cold War, skepticism about the capability to verify compliance with a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty posed a major obstacle to any agreement. Partial Test Ban Treaty, 1963 Limited success was achieved with the signing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963, which banned nuclear tests in the atmosphere, underwater and in space. Neither France nor China signed the PTBT. However, the treaty was ratified 80 to 19, and signed by President JFK.
[7]
Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, 1968 A major step towards non-proliferation of nuclear weapons came with the signing of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968. Under the NPT, non-nuclear weapon states were prohibited from, inter alia, possessing, manufacturing or acquiring nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. All signatories, including nuclear weapon states, were committed to the goal of total nuclear disarmament. However, nations like India have not ratified the NPT on grounds that such a treaty is fundamentally discriminatory as it places limitations on states that do not have nuclear weapons while making no efforts to curb weapons development by declared nuclear weapons states. Negotiations for the CTBT Given the political situation prevailing in the subsequent decades, little progress was made in nuclear disarmament until 1991. Parties to the PTBT held an amendment conference that year to discuss a proposal to convert the Treaty into an instrument banning all nuclear157 | P a g e

weapon tests; with strong support from the UN General Assembly, negotiations for a comprehensive test-ban treaty began in 1993.
158 | P a g e

Adoption of the CTBT, 1996 Intensive efforts were made over the next three years to draft the Treaty text and its two annexes. However, the Conference on Disarmament, in which negotiations were being held, did not succeed in reaching consensus on the adoption of the text. Under the direction of Prime Minister John Howard and Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, Australia then sent the text to the United Nations General Assembly in New York, where it was submitted as a draft resolution. [8] On 10 September 1996, the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) was adopted by a large majority, exceeding two-thirds of the General Assembly's Membership.[9] US ratification of the CTBT The US has signed the CTBT, but not ratified it. There is ongoing debate whether or not the US should ratify the CTBT. The CTBT for the United States is conditioned on: A: The conduct of a Science Based Stockpile Stewardship Program program to ensure a high level of confidence in the safety and reliability of nuclear weapons in the active stockpile, including the conduct of a broad range of effective and continuing experimental programs. B: The maintenance of modern nuclear laboratory facilities and programs in theoretical and exploratory nuclear technology which will attract, retain, and ensure the continued application of our human scientific resources to those programs on which continued progress in nuclear technology depends. C:The maintenance of the basic capability to resume nuclear test activities prohibited by the CTBT should the United States cease to be bound to adhere to this treaty. D: Continuation of a comprehensive research and development program to improve our treaty monitoring capabilities and operations. E: The continuing development of a broad range of intelligence gathering and analytical capabilities and operations to ensure accurate and comprehensive information on worldwide nuclear arsenals, nuclear weapons development programs, and related nuclear programs. F: The understanding that if the President of the United States is informed by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy (DOE) -- advised by the Nuclear Weapons Council, the Directors of DOE's nuclear weapons laboratories and the Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command -- that a high level of confidence in the safety or reliability of a nuclear weapon 159 | P a g e

type which the two Secretaries consider to be critical to the U.S. nuclear deterrent could no longer be certified, the President, in consultation with Congress, would be prepared to withdraw from the CTBT under the standard "supreme national interests" clause in order to conduct whatever testing might be required.
[10]
Proponents of ratification claim that it would : 1. Establish an international norm that would push other nuclearcapable countries like North Korea, Pakistan, and India to sign. 2. Constrain worldwide nuclear proliferation by vastly limiting a country's ability to make nuclear advancements that only testing can ensure. 3. Not compromise US national security because the Science Based Stockpile Stewardship Program serves as a means for maintaining current US nuclear capabilities without physical detonation. On 13 October 1999, the United States Senate rejected ratification of the CTBT. President Barack Obama stated during his 2008 election campaign that "As president, I will reach out to the Senate to secure the ratification of the CTBT at the earliest practical date."[11] Monitoring of the CTBT Geophysical and other technologies are used to monitor for compliance with the Treaty: seismology, hydroacoustics, infrasound, and radionuclide monitoring. The technologies are used to monitor the underground, the waters and the atmosphere for any sign of a nuclear explosion. Statistical theories and methods are integral to CTBT monitoring providing confidence in verification analysis. Once the Treaty enters into force, on site inspection will be provided for where concerns about compliance arise. The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), an international organization headquartered in Vienna, Austria, was created to build the verification regime, including establishment and provisional operation of the network of monitoring stations, the creation of an international data centre, and development of the On Site Inspection capability. The monitoring network consists of 337 facilities located all over the globe. As of September 2009, close to 250 facilities have been certified. The monitoring stations register data that is transmitted to the international data centre in Vienna for processing and analysis. The data is sent to states that have signed the Treaty.
160 | P a g e

India's War & Defense System

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The Sino-Indian War occurred between India and China.

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