Constitutional Constraints on Executive Lawmaking Zachary Elkins Tom Ginsburg James Melton 1

January 6, 2012

Abstract: What determines the success by which heads of government can enact their legislative proposals? Presumably, constitutional rules governing the relationship between executives and legislatures should be part of the answer. We suggest that in order to understand an executives leverage in legislative bargaining, one must consider a broad set of formal powers, even those that are not directly related to the normal legislative process. Many of these ancillary powers function effectively as outside options, in that they provide substitute channels of legislating or serve as punitive devices with which to discipline the opposing party. Either way, these powers can increase leverage in bargaining by increasing the costs for the opposing party of failing to reach agreement. We test aspects of this theory with recently collected cross-sectional historical data on bill passage and on the constitutional powers of executives and legislatures. Our findings suggest that the legislative clout of executives is significantly enhanced by the presence of such outside options. An important reference point in this debate is the classic conceptualization of executives and legislative systems as either presidential or parliamentary. In this respect, we find that the effect of outside options significantly outweighs any effect of presidentialism and parliamentarism on the legislative success of executives.

James Melton, IMT Institute, Lucca Italy; Zachary Elkins, University of Texas, Austin; Tom Ginsburg, University of Chicago Law School. Thanks to Terry Chapman and Stephen Joyce for helpful suggestions and Anita Dutta for research assistance.

The heated standoff in the summer of 2011 over raising the debt limit in the United States led many citizens, political elites, and bond raters to question anew the efficiency of lawmaking in the United States. Faced with a determined opposition that gained a majority of the House of Representatives in 2010, President Obama has since struggled to pass much of his legislative agenda. To be sure, the tension between efficiency and representation is a persistent theme in democratic theory, with little consensus on the optimal balance between the two. But for some, the U.S. system appears to be broken, such that even consensual pieces of legislation go unpassed (Levinson 2011). Yet we do not know that other systems perform any better. It is even difficult to judge systematically whether the U.S. president is structurally weak or strong in comparative terms. One way to think about this problem is to review the impact of formal powers on the ability of the executive to enact legislation. There is, it turns out, substantial variation in the degree to which executive-proposed legislation is enacted across countries. While only 3 out of 28 laws proposed by President Len Febres Cordero in Ecuador were passed in 1986, the Indian Congress passed 55 out of 58 bills proposed by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi that same year. Of course, one could account for these differences with any number of non-structural factors, such as the attributes of particular leaders and their political environment. So, for example, some partisan commentators have suggested that President Obama has not showed enough political acumen (something heard on the left) or leadership in finding common ground (the view from the right). But these are often self-serving explanations and ones that are likely inconsequential. More consequential, we suspect, are cross- constitutional differences in institutional structure, particularly with respect to the relationship between executives and legislatures. Do some constitutions make it comparatively difficult for executives to pass their legislative program? If so, which aspects of constitutions matter in this respect?

Almost reflexively, we look to presidentialism versus parliamentarism that classic conceptualization of executive-legislative relations to explain some of the variance. And certainly, prime ministers should be more likely, on average, to have the support of their legislatures than would presidents and, therefore, should be able to push their agenda through more easily. In fact, some initial analyses in the small empirical literature on the topic of executive lawmaking, if we can call it that, have found exactly that (Saiegh 2011; Cheibub et al. 2004). But it also seems likely that political scientists have been asking too much of the parliamentary-presidential concept over the years. Indeed, once one reflects upon the many and varied powers vested (or not vested) in executives and legislatures, one realizes that there is much more to the executive-legislative relationship than just the origin and survival of executives, as important as those features are. What is more, many of these other powers of executives and legislatures happen to be uncorrelated with presidentialism and parliamentarism and so not subsumed by those systems (Cheibub, Elkins, and Ginsburg 2011). A call for political scientists to look beyond the dominant categorization of executive-legislative systems as presidentialism and parliamentarism surfaces periodically (Shugart and Carey 1992, Tsebelis 1995; Cheibub 2007; Cheibub, Elkins, and Ginsburg 2011) and this present article is very much in line with that notion. Indeed, we suspect that these other powers of executives and legislatures matter with respect to the bargaining over legislation and matter in a very specific and intuitive sense. Simply put, executives that are vested with a substantial amount of institutional power over and above the power over legislation itself should be have more legislative success than will others. The rationale will be second-nature to anyone who has ever bargained over anything and, indeed, the idea is an explicit part of most bargaining models. The ability to resort to other means to get things done alternatives we conceptualize as outside options following common terminology provides executives with increased leverage in negotiations with their legislatures. So, to continue the case of the U.S. debt standoff, some have argued that if President Obama had at least threatened to take the unilateral actions that were

arguably available to him, his bargaining position would have strengthened substantially and he would have gotten more out of the bargain. In our view, scholars who analyze the legislative bargaining process largely do not call attention (or at least, enough attention) to the role of outside options in this sense. Also, and for more understandable reasons, scholars have not tested propositions related to this argument empirically. We do so in this article, making use of a novel set of data on legislative efficiency collected by Saiegh (2011) together with original data on formal executive and legislative powers. We test the basic hypothesis that executives with more alternative reservoirs of power will be more effective in passing their legislative agenda. Our results are strongly consistent with a theory of bargaining in which outside options provide executives considerable bargaining power. What is more, much of our evidence suggests that the distinction between presidentialism and parliamentarism is relatively inconsequential once one incorporates into the model a larger and more differentiated set of institutional powers. This latter conclusion is not directly related to our theoretical interests, but it is perhaps of broad interest to those in comparative politics who have begun to rethink and elaborate conceptualizations of executive legislative relations. I. Institutional Approaches to Executive-Legislative Bargaining a. Presidentialism and Parliamentarism Executives depend upon willing legislatures in order to pass agendas, a basic premise that explains the relevance of presidentialism and parliamentarism to legislative efficiency. One might assume that if an executive is selected by, and serves at the pleasure of, the legislature then the two branches will be relatively unified in their programmatic interests. Or, if they are not, then the legislature or the executive, in the case of legislative dissolution would presumably see to it that unity obtains. In any event, a prime minister should not be thwarted at least regularly -- by a

legislature run exclusively by an opposing party (though other parties may well join a governing coalition). Presidentialism, on the other hand, presents the possibility of divided government and, therefore, gridlock. This logic seems relatively unproblematic (though see Cheibub 2002). Diermeier and Vlaicu (2011) suggest another explanation for executives success in parliamentary systems. They argue that the legislatures acquiescence has to do with the governing partys prioritizing government survival over short-term policy goals. Regardless, the origin and survival of executives is not itself directly related to the legislative process. For one thing, prime ministers are selected and retained by their supporters in the legislature for reasons other than just their programmatic and ideological fidelity. It could be, of course, that the defining feature distinguishing presidentialism from parliamentarism is associated with a host of other features that are related to the executives legislative efficiency. However, research suggests that the parliamentary and presidential categories are surprisingly heterogeneous in this respect (Cheibub, Elkins, and Ginsburg 2011). Even powers that are thought stereotypically to be elective features of one or the other system are often not so. So, for example, executive decree power and cabinet appointment power are almost equally prevalent in presidential regimes as they are in parliamentary ones. Even veto power, the quintessential power of presidential regimes, is about as common in one as it is in another. In short, the categories of presidentialism and parliamentarism do not necessarily stand in for a set of lawmaking properties that reinforce the defining property. In that sense, the effects of presidentialism and parliamentarism on lawmaking efficiency may be limited to those related to the origin and survival distinction, and not on other presumed aspects of the two categories. b. Veto Players A more general framework for thinking about the strategic interaction among executives and legislatures in making law is the veto player approach (Tsebelis 1995; 2002). One premise of this

approach is that the passage of legislation involves cooperation between an executive and a legislature (Eskridge and Ferejohn 1992). One body proposes legislation that requires the agreement of others to secure passage. The preferences of each actor determine the scope of bargaining; only positions that are preferred to the status quo by all veto players will be part of the win set (Shepsle and Weingast 1987), defined as the exhaustive set of viable alternatives to the status quo. This basic approach, modeled variously in two or three dimensions, has been used to analyze legislative processes, judicial decision-making and the power of administrative agencies, and it has been evaluated across a large set of empirical tests, of various types and samples. The key institutional factors that come out of this framework are the ability to initiate legislation and, of course, the ability to veto. The power, to initiate or to set the agenda, is of great importance, particularly when there is more than one other actor required to approve new legislation. For example, the agenda-setter has the exclusive ability to try to shift the outcome away from the status quo, and if she has sufficient information on the preferences of other actors, can choose a point within the win-set that makes her maximally better off; as long as no other veto player is worse off than the status quo the proposal will succeed. Conversely, the ability to veto a proposal means that one can preserve the status quo over any new proposal. Actors with vetoes must have their preferences taken into account in legislative bargaining. The nature of the veto matters as well. For example, Aleman and Tsebelis (2005) develop an ordinal index ranking the veto powers of 18 Latin American countries, emphasizing what they call the conditional agenda setting power that flows from the ability to suggest changes to vetoed legislation. In the case of an executives ability to shape legislation, the classic veto-player approach focuses on a proposal made by the president to a legislature, which is sometimes a bicameral one. Because the president controls the agenda, he can choose a proposal that improves on the status quo from his own

point of view, but also leaves both houses at least as well off as they are now. We would expect, in a world of perfect information, that the president would have a high success rate in this setup. Conversely, if the president does not control the agenda but has a veto power, other actors will have to take his preferences into account in making their own proposals. In the real world, of course, perfect information does not obtain. What other factors might influence an executives ability to successfully navigate the lawmaking process? Saeigh (2011) introduces imperfect information in his party-based account. He describes the prospects of executive-sponsored legislation as highly uncertain, but dependent upon the executives degree of support in the legislature. Saiegh first notes that with perfect information, the success of executive-sponsored legislation should be very high indeed: the executive would only propose bills that were sure to be accepted. However, because of the unpredictability of legislative behavior, we do not observe perfect batting averages. Instead, we see a wide range of success rates, which Saiegh explains through what he calls a partyaugmented model of random behavior. In Saieghs model, legislators vote randomly, but these votes are aggregated by party; a partys position is determined by the majority of (random) votes of its members. Legislative outcomes, in turn, are determined by the positions taken by the parties in the governing coalition. Saiegh uses the relative size of the ruling executives party to predict the percentage of its preferred legislative policies that will prevail. (Saiegh thus does not model the dynamics of legislativeexecutive relations directly, assuming that ruling party preferences are the same in both branches.) The model, though abstracted from the institutional dynamics of lawmaking, is plausible and predicts actual legislative performance of the executive well (Saiegh 2011). c. Outside Options One wonders, however, about the role of formal institutional powers, which play only a supporting role in Saeighs account. Saeigh estimates the effect of presidentialism and parliamentarism

(and the intermediate category, semi-presidentialism) and finds, perhaps not surprisingly, that executives in presidentialist systems are significantly less successful in enacting legislation. In addition, he controls for several other country-level predictors, such as the number of houses of the legislature and the type of electoral system, which might affect the number of veto players in the system. But there is little discussion of broader institutional features of executive-legislative relations beyond this set. We reason that aspects of executive power besides the direct role in bargaining with the legislature should matter as well. Consider the Obama v. House of Representatives standoff again. Each side in that negotiation needed the approval of the other to shape a budget bill and each, presumably, preferred an agreement to none at all (i.e., a disagreement outcome was pareto inefficient). Critical to the content of the agreement was the location of the disagreement point, the value that each side would expect to receive in the case of non-agreement. 2 Given the ultimate content of the agreement, which was widely viewed as a victory for House Republicans, it is clear that the Houses disagreement point was higher than that of the President. Some influential Republican House members, whether sincerely or not, signaled that disagreement (no approval to raise the debt ceiling but also no spending cuts) would have been a palatable outcome. Not so for the President and perhaps privately for a fair number of Republicans for whom non-agreement meant potential economic catastrophe. More relevant to our purposes, however, is another wrinkle to this story, which surfaced late in the negotiations when some Democratic leaders (and observers) raised the possibility that the President could under one interpretation of the 14th amendment of the constitution raise the debt ceiling unilaterally. Importantly, the President considered and rejected this option as inconsistent with his interpretation of the constitution a responsible position, perhaps, but one which reduced his
2

Note that the disagreement point is similar to the reservation price in the bargaining literature. The former is the utility that players receive from the status quo, and the latter is the minimum utility players are willing to accept in a negotiation to make a deal.

bargaining power dramatically. Had the President retained the option of acting unilaterally, his disagreement point would have been considerably higher and that of Republican House members considerably lower. That calculation, of course, takes into account only the policy dimension it is possible that unilateral action would have resulted in substantial political costs for the President. Still, some Democratic observers were dismayed that the President did not at least reserve the possibility of using the constitutional option. Paul Krugman (2011) saw this move as one of a series of blunders by Obama that amounted to a systematic destruction of his own bargaining power. Obamas constitutional option in that case which we can think of as an example of an outside option, following the standard parlance of bargaining theory is our focus. Outside options come in many forms, but the basic idea is that alternatives to an agreement determine each bargainers disagreement points, and can be used to induce the opposing side to make a better inside offer (Fearon 1995, Voeten 2001, Gruber 2000). Depending upon the scenario, outside options can be offers from other parties, alternative means to settling disputes (e.g., war), or some other unilateral action. In our case, the outside options that we have in mind come in two flavors: legislative substitutes and collateral punishments. Legislative substitutes are alternatives to ordinary legislation for effecting policy outcomes, such as the so-called constitutional option that President Obama considered and rejected. In typical cases of lawmaking, there are several non-cooperative (unilateral) constitutional options available. The most direct course of action is executive decree power, by which the executive is empowered to enact legislation unilaterally, typically subject to some set of conditions such as sunset clauses. An important set of studies focused on decree power has suggested that the power enhances a Presidents bargaining power in the way we describe here (Shugart and Carey 1992; Figueiredo and Limongi 2002; Aleman and Calvo forthcoming). Another option, though only available in extreme circumstances, is the use of

emergency powers. In that alternative, executives retain the prerogative to act outside of constitutional limits conditional upon some understanding ideally a consensual one of a crisis. A third is to initiate an amendment to the constitution, which can substitute for ordinary legislation. A fourth outside option is the ability to propose referenda, which allows the executive to work around the legislature and appeal directly to the people. These various alternative mechanisms operate as substitutes for legislation and, if available, should enhance executive bargaining power. Another set of outside options involve punitive measures that one side can impose on the other and that also effectively decrease the value of disagreement for the opposing side. Though formally outside the bargaining process, these collateral tools can shape the primary legislative game. One way to think of these powers is as analogous to war or sanctions in the context of interstate bargaining models (Fearon 1995). In the context of bargaining over legislation, such measures include the executives power to dissolve the legislature, her formal power to issue challenges to the constitutionality of legislation, and of course, her power to veto legislation. (This last power is not, in a strict sense, an outside option since it would be central to any legislative bargaining model. Nevertheless, its bargaining function is similar to those of the other punitive powers.) In turn, the legislature can impose punitive costs on executives by initiating investigations of the executive branch, a power that can be somewhat muted by corresponding provisions for executive immunity from prosecution. 3 These two sets of outside options substitute and punitive imply a set of testable hypotheses. The presence of any one of them should, ceteris paribus, increase or decrease the likelihood that an executives legislative proposal passes the legislature depending upon the direction of
3

It is not absolutely clear to us that these set of powers should be considered outside options, since they do not represent true alternatives to the bargain. Whether we group them under the label of outside option or not, we expect them to have the same effect.

the power (toward more or less executive power). More power for the executive, for example, should result in a legislative outcome that is comparably closer to an executives ideal point. We return to these variables below, in the discussion of the specifics of our statistical model.

II.

An Analysis of Executive Lawmaking Power a. Econometric Strategy The dependent variable in our analysis is drawn from Saiegh (2009, 2011), who produces what

he describes as an executive batting average of legislative proposals across 43 countries and between 2 and 48 years. Saieghs score is the percentage of legislative bills proposed by the executive that are enacted as law by the legislature. The distribution of this batting average is illustrated in figure 1. There are obvious challenges to the use of this dependent variable, most notably the problem of selection. Clearly, an executives decision about whether to initiate a bill -- as well as the actual content of the bill - will depend to a large extent on his expectation of its passage. Understandably, Saiegh assumes that executives introduce legislation only when they believe it will pass (that is, the only proposals introduced are those the executive believes to be in the win-set). In his theory, variance in passage rates results largely from differences in executives ability to estimate success as well as random variation due to cross-pressured legislators. In the analysis below, we start by replicating Saeighs analysis. We then modify Saeighs econometric strategy in order to model both the bill initiation process and the bill passage process. Instead of analyzing the rate of bill passage, we analyze the number of executive-initiated bills and the number that pass the legislature. So, to continue with Saeighs baseball analogy, we are concerned with both plate appearances and hits, under the theory that those totals speak to an executives leverage

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over and above of his batting average. Analyzing these two quantities separately also helps us untangle the selection problem, to a certain extent. We should also note that, like Saeigh, we are not able to analyze the content of legislation with respect to the actors ideal points. This omission undoubtedly leaves us with an incomplete measure of legislative success. Recall the content of Obamas debt ceiling bill, whose passage would look like legislative success by our score (and Saeighs). Certainly, no Democratic strategist would likely have used the term success given the extensive budget cuts that Democrats ultimately accepted in the bill. To belabor the baseball analogy just a bit further, we are not able to differentiate singles from home runs in our analysis. b. Specification of the model and measurement In terms of model specification, our approach is to replicate Saieghs model and, then, to supplement the model with particular institutional attributes that should affect the executives legislative success, if outside options are indeed consequential. Saieghs model already includes binary variables for two categories of the trichotomous classification of presidentialism, parliamentarism, and semi-presidentialism. We use additional data from the Comparative Constitutions Project (CCP) to measure aspects of executive lawmaking power that relate to the hypotheses sketched above. We focus on nine powers: five that represent alternative mechanisms for the executive to enact legislation (the powers to initiate legislation, issue decrees, propose referenda, approve or initiate constitutional amendments, and declare states of emergency) and four elements of power that have the effect of imposing costs on the opposing branch (executive power to veto legislation, executive power to challenge the constitutionality of legislation, legislative power to investigate the executive, and executive immunity from prosecution). 4

As mentioned above, the executive can also punish the legislature by dismissing it. We ignore this power here because it is highly collinear with presidentialism in the present sample.

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We should also note our inclusion of a measure of the executives power to initiate legislation, which may give pause. By definition, every bill and law in the data for the dependent variable has been initiated by the executive. Our inclusion of this variable reminds us that our measures of executive and legislative authority are strictly formal. Were formal and informal powers one and the same, our measure of formal power of initiation would exhibit no variation in this dataset. That there is variance suggests that executive agenda setting is only sometimes articulated in the constitution. Furthermore, the deployment of this variable allows us to test the proposition that formal provision of such power commands some sort of extra degree of authority that influences passage rates. All of the variables used in the analysis, including their operationalization and sources, are listed in Table 1. Summary statistics for these variables are listed in Table 2. Many of these variables are sourced from the CCP, and for these variables, we include detailed information about their operationalization in the appendix. III. Results a. Replication of Saiegh Our replication and adaptation of Saieghs model is reported in Table 3. 5 These are singleequation models estimated with OLS in which the dependent variable is the natural log of the percentage of bills passed. The first two columns represent the closest replication of the analysis

Our replication is based on table 3, column 3 of Saiegh (2009). We do not report the results from models that omit the regional dummies and use clustered, robust standard errors. When we have tried to estimate those models, the results change dramatically (e.g. decreases in statistical significance and even some sign changes), possibly due to the fact that there are so many more observations. Since our main goal to start was to replicate Saeigh, we opted for the modeling approach that best matched his analysis. The results from the alternative models are available from the authors upon request.

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performed by Saiegh (2009, 2011). 6 Notably, the variables in our re-analysis are slightly different from those used by Saiegh, so one should consider ours an enhanced replication (a straight replication reproduces Saieghs results identically). Saieghs analysis is challenged by missing observations for three variables electoral rules, average district magnitude, and seats from national district. A reasonable and in some ways preferable substitute for these variables is the count of the effective number of political parties, which is available for far more observations and is highly correlated with Saieghs three electoral variables. 7 Using this proxy variable increases the number of observations from 272 (Saieghs N) to 741, an altogether different sample. We also expand the coverage of Saieghs dependent variable with 58 observations from Cheibub (2007). In addition, we add variables indicating the years of legislative and presidential elections, since at least in some contexts (e.g., the United States), it is well-known that politicians attention is diverted from lawmaking in election years. Lastly, we drop the variable indicating Westminster-style parliamentary systems, because this distinction within parliamentary systems is of no theoretical interest to us. Despite these changes, Saieghs central results are confirmed in our re-analysis (Model 1). Executives from both presidential and semi-presidential systems of government are significantly less productive lawmakers than are executives from parliamentary systems, and executives are significantly less productive when their party holds fewer seats in the legislature. The only finding that is not upheld is that regarding bicameralism. Saiegh reports a positive, statistically significant effect for a twochamber legislature, while we find a negative, statistically significant effect. From a veto-player

We follow Saiegh and perform a logarithmic transformation of the dependent variable before analyzing it. This ensures that any predictions made fall between zero and one. We also restrict our analysis to country-years classified as democratic by Cheibub et al. (2009), but unlike Saiegh, we do not drop the United States from the analysis. None of these decisions affects the substantive conclusions we draw from the analysis below.
7

The number of effective parties is, arguably, a mediating variable that transmits most, if not all, of the causal power of the electoral system variables that Saiegh specifies.

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perspective, the negative finding reported in Table 3 seems more theoretically plausible to us than does the effect reported by Saiegh, since two hurdles should be harder for the executive to jump than one. Model 1 also suggests that executive-initiated legislation is more likely to pass when there are more parties in the legislature and less likely to pass in years in which there is a legislative election. Models 2 through 4 explore the effect of selected sets of executive powers that correspond to the outside-option hypotheses identified above. Notably, many of these executive powers appear to be strong predictors of bill passage, though admittedly not always in the hypothesized direction (more on that below). Conversely, in models 3 and 4, presidentialism and semi-presidentialism (both compared with parliamentarism) appear to be unrelated to bill passage, which suggests that some of the institutional elements that we identify here may be more relevant for understanding executive power than is even the important origin-and-survival distinction captured by the concepts of presidentialism and parliamentarism. That combination of consequential effects for the outside option powers, together with a weak showing for the presidentialism-parliamentarism distinction, constitutes one of the principal stories from our analysis. We should also note in passing that Saieghs linchpin variable, seat differential, remains highly predictive in each model. As we note, the institutional power variables behave as we would expect, with some notable exceptions. Recall that, in general, we expect that variables that indicate increased power for the executive will provide the executive with more leverage in bargaining and will yield high bill passage rates. Each of the coefficients lend support to this theory with the exception of three: the powers to call referenda, initiate legislation, and declare emergencies. The coefficient of the first is signed in the direction contrary to our expectation and statistically significant, and the coefficients for the latter two are statistically insignificant. Of course, we are not in a position at this point in the analysis to jump to conclusions regarding any of these effects. Recall that we harbor doubts regarding the estimation

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strategy of the model represented in this table (see below). Also, the executive power variables exhibit a fair degree of collinearity. Still, the data suggests the potential power of the outside options, albeit with several puzzling exceptions. b. Predicting the number of executive-initiated laws Table 4 presents coefficients from a model of bill passage in which the dependent variable is the number of executive-proposed laws enacted in a given year. It is very likely that the distribution of this variable resembles that for other event counts, in which case a count model seems appropriate to accommodate non-normality. Also, further evaluation of the distribution of the dependent variable reveals significant over-dispersion, and we therefore fit a negative binomial model instead of a poisson. Since the data are time-series-cross-sectional (TSCS), we follow the advice of Beck and Katz (1995) and use robust standard errors and the lagged dependent variable in the equation. Lastly, we include the number of executive-initiated bills in the model as a measure of exposure, since only those bills can become executive-initiated laws. The coefficients from Table 4 tell a story largely similar to that described by the estimates of passage rates. Two important exceptions are (1) the coefficients for presidentialism and semipresidentialism, which suggest that these variables are, to a moderate degree, consequential, and (2) the seat differential variable, which is no longer significant. More importantly at least from our perspective the results suggest that nearly all of the executive power variables under consideration (except one) have a decided effect on bill passage. The power to propose referenda is the only executive prerogative that is not associated with increased success in passing legislation. The more notable story is the remarkable degree to which the other variables support the theory. Executive power, presumably through increased leverage, appears to result in an increased ability for the executive to pass legislation.

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Figure 2 illustrates the expected impact of these outside options using the estimates from Model 8. In the figure, the points indicate the estimate of the marginal effect of each executive power, and the bars indicate the 95% confidence interval around that effect. Veto power is clearly important; on average, executives with the ability to veto legislation are expected to usher sixteen more of their bills through the legislature than they would if they did not have that power. However, it is also clear that other executive powers are just as important, if not more so. For example, if an executive has only limited veto powers (for example, if the legislative threshold for over-ride is a simple majority), his bargaining clout appears to be more than compensated by the exercise of decree power the power to propose a constitutional amendment. These substitute legislative powers are expected to increase the number of executive-initiated laws by about eleven. Even if executives have none of these alternative law-making powers at their disposal, they may be able to punish legislatures that are reluctant to pass their legislation by challenging the constitutionality of laws initiated in legislature. In fact, of the powers available to executives, the threat of challenging the constitutionality of legislation is the most potent, increasing the expected number of executive-initiated laws by 22, on average. Our sense from these findings, then, is that any one of these collateral powers to make law may loom over the formal legislative bargaining process, even when they are not exercised. Of the two categories of outside option substitute and punitive powers -- it appears that punitive powers tend to have a slightly larger substantive effect. For instance, in the average parliamentary system, if none of the powers evaluated here is provided, the legislature is expected to pass only nineteen of the executives bills. If in the same system the executive possesses only substitute legislative powers (e.g. the powers to initiate legislation, to issue decrees, and to propose constitutional amendments) then the number of executive-initiated bills passed by the legislature increases to 82. Conversely, if the executive is given only the ability to punish the legislature (e.g. the powers to veto legislation and to challenge the constitutionality of legislation), then the number of executive-initiated

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bills passed by the legislature is estimated at 88. One could envision some sort of supreme executive who is given the full set of powers, in which case the legislature would be expected to pass 182 of the executives bills assuming that the effects are additive. With these estimates in hand, it is interesting to return to the office of the U.S. presidency, some of whose holders have appeared ineffectual in enacting legislative priorities. How much lawmaking power does the office of the President of the United States possess compared to other executives? According to these data, on average and holding all other variables at their means, Congress is expected to pass 71 bills initiated by the President each year. 8 This places the President in the bottom 27th percentile when compared to the 116 other executives for which data is available in 2008. It appears, then, that those frustrated with the delay in implementing the Presidents agenda can attribute the delay to structural constraints. Countries with more powerful executives include Argentina, Brazil, France, and Mexico, while Canada, Italy, and Germany have weaker executives than the United States President. One of the interesting findings from the analysis is a null one. The categorization of constitutional systems into presidentialism, parliamentarism, and the intermediate category of semipresidentialism dominates scholars understanding of executive-legislative relations. It is no surprise, then, that the predominant institutional story coming out of the small literature on bargaining over legislation features this categorization. Actually, it turns out that compared with other institutional variables, the distinction between Presidents and Prime Ministers is inconsequential. In fact, if anything, the models in Table 4 suggest that Presidents are more effective than are Prime Ministers at advancing legislation once we control for the presence of other powers.

Based on this measure, the most powerful executive is from Mongolia and the weakest is from the Czech Republic. The executives in these countries are expected to pass 260 and 32 executive-initiated laws, respectively.

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c. Robustness Checks The results from Tables 3 and 4 suggest that executives are able to enhance their law-making power using a variety of outside options that are granted to them in the constitution. Moreover, these results suggest that these powers might be even more important than are the procedures governing the origin and removal of executives (i.e., presidentialism versus parliamentarism). Still, one worries that these results might be an artifact of the statistical strategies employed in Tables 3 and 4. Furthermore, the results from Tables 3 and 4 leave some unanswered questions. We take up these concerns in table 5. One of the open questions has to do with the difference in sample size between Tables 3 and 4. The number of observations from these two sets of regressions drops from 739 (Table 3) to 407 (Table 4), due to missing data for the dependent variables. 9 These represent vastly different samples and we wanted to ensure that any systematic differences between the samples were not driving differences in the estimates between Tables 3 and 4. To assess this possibility, Model 9 reports the estimates from a model that is identical to Model 4 from Table 3 but whose sample matches that from Model 8 in Table 4. The results between Models 4 and 9 are remarkably similar. The only three differences are that, in Model 9, the variables indicating the executive can be investigated by the legislature and the presence of a legislative election year are statistically insignificant, and the variable indicating Presidential systems is statistically significant. Thus, the differences in estimates across these samples seem to be minimal, but when those differences affect the analysis, they run counter to our claim about the importance of substitute executive power over and above presidentialism-parliamentarism.

Although Saieghs batting average is clearly calculated with an estimate of the number of bills (numerator) and laws (denominator), his data on at least one of these two components is missing in some cases.

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Another difference between Tables 3 and 4 is the dependent variable and its estimator passage rate estimated with OLS versus a count of laws estimated with MLE, respectively. The diminution in the sample size combined with a shift in estimator might worry some, because maximum likelihood estimators are only efficient asymptotically. As a result, the standard errors reported in Table 4 might be incorrect. We are not too concerned about this because there are still more than 400 observations. However, to be safe, we re-estimated Model 8 and bootstrapped the standard errors. The estimates from this model are displayed in Model 10. The standard errors between these two models are virtually identical. Another concern with the results from all of the previous models is that the number of executive-initiated bills is almost certainly endogenous. If executives do not expect a bill to pass, then, as noted above, we expect them to act strategically and decline to introduce that bill in the legislature. As a result, the coefficient estimated for the number of executive-initiated bills is almost certainly biased. This might also bias the estimates for our variables of interest, because executives will take all of their powers into account when making the decision to submit bills to the legislature, or not. To correct for the bias that might be introduced by endogeneity, we estimate a two-stage equation. In the first stage we predict the number of executive-initiated bills and in the second, the number of executiveinitiated bills that become law. Modeling the first stage is, of course, interesting in its own right. For one thing, it allows for an explicit test of Saieghs logical assumption that executives introduce legislation only when they believe it will pass. If this assumption is sound, many of the variables that indicate executive bargaining power should predict both the number of bills initiated and the number passed. To estimate the model, we use Wooldridges (1997) two-stage quasi-maximum likelihood estimator for count data. In the first-stage, we estimate the number of executive-initiated bills using an

19

ordinary least squares regression. 10 We then add the residual (not the predicted score) from the firststage equation as a regressor in the second-stage equation, in which the dependent variable is the number of executive-initiated bills that become law. In order to identify the model, we need to specify a set of instruments that predict bill introduction but not bill passage. Our first instrument is the number of executive-initiated bills introduced in the previous year. Given the high degree of serial correlation in this variable, we reason that the lag captures a number of characteristics of the legislative system of each country that are associated with the scale of bill introduction. Moreover, small fluctuations in the number of executive-initiated bills from year to year suggests that the lagged number of bills is not correlated with number of those bills that become laws in a given year. We recognize that a one-year lagged dependent variable from the first-stage is not ideal. After all, depending on the degree of serial correlation, the proportion of the variance in the lagged term not associated with the trend in that variable can be small. One solution to this problem is to increase the length of the lag, but given the small number of observations in the present study, this option is not feasible. Instead, we use a second set of instruments. 11 Specifically, we add several variables associated with crises: involvement in a civil or inter-state war, an economic crisis, or a regime transition. In all of these circumstances, one would expect crises to distract the executive from law-making. However,

Wooldridge (1997) explicitly argues that an OLS model should be used in the first-stage, even though it involves count data . Wooldridges approach is to use the residual from the first stage as an explanatory variable in the second-stage count model. The main assumption of this model is that the first-stage residuals are linearly related to the composite error term in the second-stage. One might wonder why we simply do not use this second set of instruments. The reason is twofold. First, these instruments turn out to be relatively weak (F is equal to only about 3), which introduces all of the problems associated with weak instruments (e.g. inefficiency and possible inconsistency). Second, given that the first-stage equation also uses TSCS data and we are interested in the results from that model too, we wanted to estimate that equation correctly by introducing the lagged dependent variable. However, it makes little sense to add the lagged dependent variable from the first-stage into the second-stage equation.
11

10

20

these crises should not necessarily affect the legislative success of the executives, since they still have the same powers at their disposal to get legislation approved. The first stage results are reported in Model 11.1 and are worth noting more for analytic reasons than theoretical ones. Recall that our intent was to specify a model that predicts the volume of bill proposals with a set of variables that we exclude from the second stage. The first stage also includes all right-hand side variables from the second stage, since they are assumed to be exogenous to bill proposal. The high R2s of the various models tell us that we have predicted the observed scores well, admittedly in part because the equations include a lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side. However, it also appears that we have identified at least two variables civil war and regime transition that, at least in some specifications, are significant (negative) predictors of bill proposal. The second stage results are reported in model 11.2. The biggest difference between this model and Model 8 is that the variables for presidential and semi-presidential systems are no longer statistically significant. Furthermore, the only substitute power not statistically significant in Model 8 the power to declare states of emergency is statistically significant in model 11.2. Another difference is that both the power to propose referenda and to declare states of emergency exhibit signs in the direction opposite of what we predict. The estimates for all of the other substitute executive powers are remarkably similar across the two models. Our last concern with the results reported in Table 4 has to do with the structure of the data. The data are TSCS, but they are highly unbalanced. Some countries have data available for as few as two years (e.g. Colombia, Spain, and Sri Lanka) while India has data available for 39 years. This imbalance creates the possibility that a small number of countries might be driving our results. To help eliminate this possibility, we move to a generalized estimating equation (GEE), which focuses on between-unit variance (Zorn 2001). Not only does this help to reduce the possibility that countries that

21

are overrepresented in the data drive our results, but since constitutions do not change much over time, focusing on between-unit variation seems appropriate. The specific GEE model that we estimate is a negative binomial with a log link function and an exchangeable correlation structure. 12 These results are reported in Models 12 and 13. Model 12 has the same specification as model 8, and model 13 has the same specification as model 11.2. Once we move to the GEE framework, a number of variables lose statistical significance, including the powers to initiate legislation, propose amendments, and propose referenda. This leaves the powers to veto legislation and to challenge the constitutionality of legislation as well as executive immunity as those that are statistically significant in both Models 12 and 13, and the power to issue decrees and the possibility of being investigated by the legislature as those that are statistically significant in Model 13 only. The other notable change when moving to a GEE estimator is that the seat differential, Saieghs linchpin variable, becomes statistically significant again. The final model assesses the importance of the executive power to dissolve the legislature. As noted in footnote 4 above, in the present sample, few Presidents are given the power to dismiss the legislature, and as a result, we have generally not included this variable in equations that also incorporate dummy variables for presidentialism and semi-presidentialism. Nevertheless, enough presidential systems do include this power such that the two are not perfectly collinear and one might expect that dissolution would be a particularly strong stick that executives could wield to their advantage. Model 14 assesses this possibility by including the executives power to dissolve the

We have also estimated this equation using an AR1 correlation structure. There are some substantive differences in the effects implied by the two models. For instance, if Model 13 is re-estimated using an AR1 correlation structure, the powers to propose referenda, to declare emergencies, and to propose constitutional amendments become statistically significant and the power to veto legislation as well as the possibility of being investigated by the legislature lose statistical significance. Nonetheless, these changes would not change the overall conclusion that we reach: executives granted more substitute powers have more law-making power.

12

22

legislature and excluding the presidentialism and semi-presidentialism dummy variables. Contrary to our expectation, the ability to dissolve the legislature does not have a statistically significant effect and its sign is actually opposite of the direction we predict. In summary, a number of the de jure executive powers analyzed here have a robust effect on an executives law-making ability. Regardless of the estimator or model specification, executives with the powers to issue decrees, to veto legislation, to challenge the constitutionality of legislation, and those that are immune from prosecution have significantly greater law-making power. All of the other executive powers analyzed here are statistically significant in some models and not others. Furthermore, in many models, the inclusion of these substitute powers trumped the importance of the presidential and semi-presidential variables. We identify some important implications of these findings below. IV. Conclusion In this article we explore some of the institutional bases of executive lawmaking clout. We elucidate the basic insight from bargaining theory that actors that have alternative means to achieve their ends or to punish non-cooperative partners enjoy considerably more leverage than those that do not. We conceptualize these alternatives as outside options and identify a set of executive powers that either substitute for ordinary legislation or punish the opposing branch in certain ways. A principal contribution of our study is a thorough re-analysis of a set of novel cross-national data on executive success in the legislative arena, paired with a comprehensive set of data on the powers of executives and legislatures. We show that executive powers across a rather broad spectrum, including those not directly related to the legislative process, have a strong effect on executive success in enacting a legislative agenda. We view this finding as compelling evidence of a dynamic that many scholars and

23

observers must already suspect: that the availability of outside options enhances an executives bargaining power substantially. One of the interesting parallel findings from the analysis is a null one. The categorization of constitutional systems into presidentialism, parliamentarism, and the intermediate category of semipresidentialism dominates scholars understanding of executive-legislative relations. It is no surprise, then, that the predominant institutional story coming out of the small literature on bargaining over legislation features this categorization. We are told that assembly-confidence executives (i.e., Prime ministers) are more effective at advancing legislation than are directly-elected executives (i.e., Presidents). The effect of presidentialism and parliamentarism, therefore, serves as an important empirical reference point by which to compare the effect of outside options. Our evidence here suggests that, compared with other institutional variables, the distinction between Presidents and Prime Ministers is relatively inconsequential. In fact, if anything, the bulk of the statistical evidence suggests that Presidents are more effective than are Prime Ministers at advancing legislation once we control for other institutional powers. Together, these findings suggest that the conceptualization and measurement of executive authority deserve more consideration and more empirical testing. The attributes that distinguish presidentialism from parliamentarism as important as they are represent only one dimension of executive and legislative authority. A number of scholars have begun, incrementally, to identify other dimensions and even to measure and analyze these dimensions. Shugart and Carey 1992 and Tsebelis 1995 represent two cornerstones of this research agenda. Our analysis (along, undoubtedly, with that of others) represents another worthwhile direction for this agenda: an analysis of outcomes that are widely viewed to be associated with these institutional elements. Among other contributions, such analyses have the potential to inform our understanding of the relative power of the worlds executives.

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Certainly, one could scan constitutions and, in an a priori fashion, assess the relative amount of de jure power vested in an executive. Once we can connect behavioral phenomena like bill passage to their institutional bases, however, we can begin to draw more valid inferences about the sources of executive authority. That research directive the assessment of the reliability and validity of elements of institutional power and the construction of more meaningful indices is at least one valuable by-product of the kind of analysis represented above.

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REFERENCES Aleman, Eduardo and Ernesto Calvo. Forthcoming. Unified Government, Bill Approval, and the Legislative Weight of the President. Comparative Political Studies. Beck, Nathaniel, and Jonathan Katz. 1995. What To Do (and Not To Do) with Time-Series CrossSectional Data. American Political Science Review. 89.3: 634-647. Cheibub, Jos Antonio. 2002. Minority Governments, Deadlock Situations, and the Survival of Presidential Democracies. Comparative Political Studies 35 (3): 284312 Cheibub, Jos Antonio. 2007. Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cheibub, Jose, Zachary Elkins, and Tom Ginsburg. 2011. Latin American Presidentialism in Comparative and Historical Perspective. Texas Law Review 89: 1707-39. Cheibub, Jose Antonio, Adam Przeworski and Sebastian M. Saiegh. 2004. Government Coalitions and Legislative Success Under Presidentialism and Parliamentarism. British Journal of Political Science 34: 565-87. Diermeier, Daniel and Razvan Vlaicu. 2011. Executive Control and Legislative Success. Review of Economic Studies 78(3): 846-871. Fearon, James. 1995. Rationalist Explanations for War. International Organization 49: 379-414 Figueiredo, Argelina and Fernando Limongi. 2002. Presidential Power, Legislative Organization and Party Behavior in Brazil. Comparative Politics 32 (2): 15170. Eskridge, William and Ferejohn John. 1992. Making the deal stick: Enforcing the original constitutional structure of lawmaking in the modern regulatory state. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 8: 165-189. Gruber, Lloyd. 2001. Power Politics and the Free Trade Bandwagon. Comparative Political Studies 34: 703-741. Krugman, Paul. July 29, 2011. Mystery Man. New York Times (online). http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/07/29/mystery-man/ [from Krugmans NYT blog, Conscience of a Liberal]. Levinson, Sanford. 2011. America the Ungovernable. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Payne, Mark J. Daniel Zovatto G., Fernando Carrillo Flrez, and Andrs Allamand Zavala. 2002. Democracies in Development: Politics and Reform in Latin America (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. Saiegh, Sebastian M. 2009. Political Prowess of Lady Luck? Evaluating Chief Executives Legislative Success Rates. Journal of Politics 71: 1342-56. ____. 2011. Ruling by Statute: How Uncertainty and Vote-Buying Shape Lawmaking. New York: Cambridge University Press. Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Weingast, R. Barry. 1987. The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power. The American Political Science Review, 81 (1): 85-104.

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Shugart, Mathew Soberg and John Carey. 1992. Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tsebelis, George. 1995. Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism. British Journal of Political Science:25: 289-325. Tsebelis, George 2002. Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press. Tsebelis, George and Aleman, Eduardo. 2005. Presidential Conditional Agenda Setting in Latin America. World Politics 57 (April 2005), 396420. Voeten, Erik. 2001. Outside Options and the Logic of Security Council Action. American Political Science Review: 95 (4): 845-858. Wooldridge, Jeffrey. 1997. Quasi-Likelihood Methods for Count Data." in Handbook of Applied Econometrics. M. Hashem Pesaran and Peter Schmidt (eds.). Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. p. 352-406. Zorn, Christopher J.W. 2001. Generalized Estimating Equation Models for Correlated Data: A Review With Applications. American Journal of Political Science. 45(2): 47990.

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TABLES AND FIGURES Table 1 Description of Variables Variable Leg. Effectiveness Executive Bills Executive Laws Initiate Leg. Issue Decrees Declare Emergencies Propose Amendments Propose Referenda Veto Leg. Operationalization Logarithmic transformation of the percentage of bills initiated by the executive that are passed by the lower house of the legislature Number of bills initiated by the executive in a given year Number of bills initiated by the executive that are approved by the legislature in a given year Binary variable coded 1 if the head of state, head of government, or government can initiate legislation Binary variable coded 1 if the head of state or head of government can issue decrees Binary variable coded 1 if the head of state, head of government, or government can declare states of emergency Binary variable coded 1 if the head of state, head of government, or government can propose amendments to the constitution Binary variable coded 1 if the head of state, head of government, or government can propose referenda Binary variable coded 0 if no vetoes are possible or if vetoes are possible but able to be overridden by a majority in the legislature and 1 if vetoes are possible but either can be overridden by a supermajority of the legislature or cannot be overridden Binary variable coded 1 if the head of state, head of government, or government can challenge the constitutionality of legislation Binary variable coded 1 if the executive can either be interpellated or be investigated by the legislature Binary variable coded 1 if the head of state or head of government have absolute immunity Binary variable coded 1 if the head of state, head of government, or government can Source Saiegh (2009, 2011); Cheibub (2007) Saiegh (2009, 2011) Saiegh (2009, 2011) CCP CCP CCP CCP CCP CCP

Challenge Leg. Investigation by Leg. Immune Dissolve the Leg.

CCP CCP CCP CCP

28

dissolve the legislature Parliamentary Presidential Semi-Presidential Seat Differential Coalition Gov. Number of Parties Bicameral Leg. Leg. Election Year Pres. Election Year Civil War War Economic Crisis Regime Transition Democracy Region Binary variable coded 1 for Parliamentary systems) Binary variable coded 1 for Presidential systems (Parliamentary systems are the reference) Binary variable coded 1 for Semi-presidential systems (Parliamentary systems are the reference) Difference between the number of seats held by the effective executives party and the average number of seats held by the executives party in a given country Binary variable coded 1 for years of coalition government Effective number of political parties in the lower house of the legislature Binary variable coded 1 for bicameral legislatures Binary variable coded 1 for legislative election years Binary variable coded 1 for presidential election years Binary variable coded 1 if the country was involved in a civil war Binary variable coded 1 if the country was involved in an interstate war Binary variable coded 1 if the countrys GDP shrunk by more than 5% Binary variable coded 1 if the country experienced a regime-change Binary variable coded 1 if the country is democratic in a given year Binary variables coded 1 to indicate countries located in Latin America, Eastern Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, East Asia, and Oceania (Western Europe, the U.S., and Canada is the reference category) Cheibub et al. (2009) Cheibub et al. (2009) Cheibub et al. (2009) Saiegh (2009, 2011) Cheibub (2007); Saiegh (2009, 2011) Cheibub (2007) CCP; Cheibub (2007) Cheibub (2007) ; Keefer et al. (2010) Cheibub (2007) ; Keefer et al. (2010) Gleditsch et al. (2002) Gleditsch et al. (2002) Heston et al. (2009) Cheibub et al. (2009) Cheibub et al. (2009) CCP

29

Table 2 Summary Statistics Variable Mean Standard Deviation Range Observations Leg. Effectiveness 1.28 1.16 (-2.44 - 5.61) 823 Executive Bills 126.93 85.47 (9 - 440) 552 Executive Laws 98.61 75.69 (2 399) 571 Initiate Leg. 0.70 0.46 (0 - 1.00) 860 Issue Decrees 0.64 0.48 (0 - 1) 860 Declare Emergencies 0.49 0.50 (0 - 1) 857 Propose Amendments 0.24 0.43 (0 - 1) 860 Propose Referenda 0.20 0.40 (0 - 1) 860 Veto Leg. 0.63 0.48 (0 - 1) 860 Challenge Leg. 0.33 0.47 (0 - 1) 857 Investigation by Leg. 0.83 0.37 (0 - 1) 860 Immune 0.15 0.35 (0 - 1) 860 Dissolve the Leg. 0.59 0.49 (0 - 1) 860 Parliamentary 0.57 0.50 (0 - 1) 860 Presidential 0.34 0.47 (0 - 1) 860 Semi-Presidential 0.09 0.29 (0 - 1) 860 Seat Differential -0.01 0.12 (-0.53 - 0.24) 825 Coalition Gov. 0.52 0.50 (0 - 1) 826 Number of Parties 3.43 1.52 (1.23 - 11.07) 793 Bicameral Leg. 0.69 0.46 (0 - 1) 857 Leg. Election Year 0.30 0.46 (0 - 1) 846 Pres. Election Year 0.09 0.29 (0 - 1) 860 Civil War 0.12 0.33 (0 - 1) 860 War 0.03 0.18 (0 - 1) 860 Economic Crisis 0.03 0.16 (0 - 1) 797 Regime Transition 0.04 0.21 (0 - 1) 860

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Table 3 The Determinants of Legislative Effectiveness

Variables Initiate Leg. Issue Decrees Declare Emergencies Propose Amendments Propose Referenda Veto Leg. Challenge Leg. Investigation by Leg. Immune Presidential Semi-Presidential Seat Differential Coalition Gov. Bicameral Leg. Number of Parties Leg. Election Year Pres. Election Year R Observations
2

(1)

(2) 0.04 (0.14) 0.09 (0.10) -0.03 (0.13) 0.46*** (0.11) -0.40*** (0.14)

(3)

-0.39*** (0.13) -0.36** (0.15) 1.92*** (0.37) -0.09 (0.10) -0.23** (0.11) 0.07* (0.04) -0.16* (0.09) -0.09 (0.15) 0.25 739

-0.44*** (0.15) -0.36** (0.16) 1.77*** (0.36) -0.19* (0.11) -0.28** (0.11) 0.03 (0.04) -0.17* (0.09) -0.09 (0.15) 0.27 739

0.31*** (0.11) 0.19** (0.09) -0.49*** (0.13) 0.55*** (0.14) -0.24 (0.17) -0.05 (0.15) 1.78*** (0.36) 0.05 (0.10) -0.08 (0.11) 0.02 (0.04) -0.14 (0.09) -0.12 (0.15) 0.29 739

(4) -0.01 (0.15) 0.27** (0.11) -0.00 (0.16) 0.21* (0.12) -0.35** (0.14) 0.22* (0.12) 0.30** (0.14) -0.57*** (0.17) 0.53*** (0.14) -0.17 (0.20) -0.12 (0.16) 1.67*** (0.36) -0.06 (0.11) -0.12 (0.14) 0.00 (0.04) -0.14* (0.09) -0.11 (0.15) 0.30 739

Notes: Estimates are from four ordinary least squares regression models with robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable in each model is the legislative effectiveness of the executive. Region fixedeffects and the constant are omitted from the table. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: *** = p<0.01; ** = p<0.05; * = p<0.1.

31

Table 4 The Determinants of Executive-Initiated Laws

Variables Initiate Leg. Issue Decrees Declare Emergency Propose Amendments Propose Referenda Veto Leg. Challenge Leg. Investigation by Leg. Immune Presidential Semi-Presidential Seat Differential Coalition Gov. Bicameral Leg. Number of Parties Leg. Election Year Pres. Election Year Executive Bills Executive Laws (t-1) Log-Pseudolikelihood Observations -0.13 (0.19) 0.01 (0.05) 0.06 (0.17) -0.02 (0.05) 0.17*** (0.05) -0.00 (0.02) -0.04 (0.04) -0.07 (0.08) 0.01*** (0.00) 0.00*** (0.00) 0.12 (0.01) -1918 407 -0.43 (0.28) -0.10 (0.07) 0.11 (0.15) -0.04 (0.05) 0.28*** (0.06) -0.04** (0.02) -0.05 (0.03) -0.05 (0.07) 0.01*** (0.00) 0.00*** (0.00) 0.09 (0.01) -1867 407 (5) (6) 0.55*** (0.09) -0.01 (0.08) -0.09 (0.08) 0.25*** (0.08) -0.42*** (0.08) (7) (8) 0.23*** (0.07) 0.23*** (0.05) -0.02 (0.07) 0.25*** (0.07) -0.41*** (0.07) 0.33*** (0.06) 0.45*** (0.06) -0.35*** (0.07) 0.67*** (0.06) 0.51*** (0.13) 0.29*** (0.08) -0.08 (0.13) -0.10** (0.04) 0.34*** (0.05) -0.09*** (0.02) -0.03 (0.03) -0.09 (0.06) 0.01*** (0.00) 0.00*** (0.00) 0.05 (0.01) -1785 407

0.49*** (0.06) 0.34*** (0.05) -0.19*** (0.06) 0.78*** (0.06) 0.66*** (0.14) 0.52*** (0.08) -0.06 (0.14) -0.05 (0.04) 0.38*** (0.06) -0.06*** (0.02) -0.04 (0.03) -0.09 (0.06) 0.01*** (0.00) 0.00*** (0.00) 0.07 (0.01) -1829 407

Notes: Estimates are from four negative binomial models with robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable in each model is the number of executive-initiated laws. Region fixed-effects and the constant are omitted from the table. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: *** = p<0.01; ** = p<0.05; * = p<0.1.

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Table 5 Robustness Checks

Variables Initiate Leg. Issue Decrees Declare Emergencies Propose Amendments Propose Referenda Veto Leg. Challenge Leg. Investigation by Leg. Immune Dissolve Leg. Presidential Semi-Presidential Seat Differential Coalition Gov. Bicameral Leg. Number of Parties Leg. Election Year Pres. Election Year Executive Laws (t-1) Executive Bills Executive Bills (t-1) Civil War War Economic Crisis (9) -0.18 (0.22) 0.66*** (0.23) 0.17 (0.24) 0.58*** (0.20) -0.58*** (0.20) 1.11*** (0.17) 0.67*** (0.20) -0.13 (0.31) 2.37*** (0.24) 1.96*** (0.39) -0.08 (0.23) 2.21*** (0.44) -0.24 (0.16) 0.27 (0.18) -0.06 (0.05) -0.09 (0.11) -0.22 (0.21) (10) 0.23*** (0.07) 0.23*** (0.06) -0.02 (0.08) 0.25*** (0.08) -0.41*** (0.08) 0.33*** (0.05) 0.45*** (0.05) -0.35*** (0.08) 0.67*** (0.06) 0.51*** (0.13) 0.29*** (0.09) -0.08 (0.14) -0.10** (0.05) 0.34*** (0.06) -0.09*** (0.02) -0.03 (0.02) -0.09 (0.08) 0.00*** (0.00) 0.01*** (0.00) (11.1) 11.27 (10.20) 11.20* (5.75) -23.83** (9.28) 22.94*** (7.71) -13.27 (8.38) -11.25 (8.05) 5.22 (7.40) 13.14 (8.50) -12.83 (9.47) -12.97 (21.60) -29.32** (11.87) -30.74 (19.09) 6.96 (5.30) -8.26 (5.24) -4.15* (2.45) -8.28** (3.92) -1.74 (7.28) -0.01 (0.10) 0.82*** (0.09) -26.24*** (10.00) -3.84 (6.35) -15.71* (8.56) (11.2) 0.37*** (0.06) 0.30*** (0.05) -0.23*** (0.07) 0.24*** (0.06) -0.44*** (0.07) 0.15*** (0.06) 0.43*** (0.06) -0.33*** (0.07) 0.42*** (0.07) 0.16 (0.15) 0.10 (0.08) -0.13 (0.12) 0.02 (0.04) 0.32*** (0.05) -0.10*** (0.02) -0.06** (0.03) -0.09* (0.05) 0.01*** (0.00) 0.00*** (0.00) (12) 0.01 (0.19) 0.09 (0.06) 0.16 (0.25) 0.28 (0.19) -0.19 (0.20) 0.36*** (0.14) 0.38*** (0.10) -0.23 (0.16) 0.61*** (0.12) 0.38*** (0.13) 0.22 (0.14) 0.39*** (0.14) -0.07* (0.04) 0.20 (0.19) -0.01 (0.02) -0.03 (0.03) -0.08* (0.04) 0.00** (0.00) 0.01*** (0.00) (13) 0.20 (0.15) 0.17*** (0.05) -0.08 (0.22) 0.21 (0.17) -0.23 (0.17) 0.19* (0.11) 0.32*** (0.09) -0.23* (0.13) 0.40*** (0.10) 0.13 (0.14) 0.06 (0.12) 0.22* (0.13) 0.01 (0.04) 0.22 (0.17) -0.03* (0.02) -0.07** (0.03) -0.08* (0.05) 0.00*** (0.00) 0.00*** (0.00) (14) 0.22 (0.15) 0.18*** (0.05) -0.11 (0.19) 0.23 (0.15) -0.23 (0.17) 0.17* (0.10) 0.33*** (0.08) -0.24* (0.13) 0.36*** (0.08) -0.07 (0.09)

0.20 (0.13) 0.01 (0.04) 0.20 (0.16) -0.03* (0.02) -0.07** (0.03) -0.07 (0.05) 0.00*** (0.00) 0.00*** (0.00)

33

Variables Regime Transition 1st Stage Res. Log-Pseudolikelihood 2 R F( = 0) -LAG F( = 0) Dependent Variable Estimator Countries Observations

(9)

(10)

(11.1) -14.27 (8.86)

(11.2) 0.01*** (0.00) 0.04 (0.01) -1682

(12)

(13) 0.01*** (0.00)

(14) 0.01*** (0.00)

0.62 Batting Avg. OLS 379

0.05 (0.01) -1785

Laws NB 407

0.86 24.40*** 3.11** Bills OLS 392

Laws NB 392

Laws GEE 30 407

Laws GEE 30 392

Laws GEE 30 392

Notes: Estimates assess the robustness of the results from tables 3 and 4. Each model is different. Model 8 replicates model 8 from table 4. Model 9 replicates model 4 from table 3 when reducing the sample to that used in model 8 from table 4. Model 10 replicates model 8 from table 4 using bootstrapped standard errors. Model 11 replicates model 8 from table 4 using a two-stage negative binomial estimator, where 11.1 is the first-stage estimates and 11.2 is the second-stage estimates. Model 12 replicates model 8 from table 4 using a generalized estimating equation. Model 13 replicates model 11.2 using a generalized estimating equation. Model 14 replicates model 8 from table 4, excluding the binary variables indicating presidential and semi-presidential systems and adding a binary variable indicating that the executive has the power to dissolve the legislature. The dependent variable for models 8, 10, 11.2, 12, 13, and 14 is the number of executive-initiated laws. The dependent variable in model 9 is the executive batting average, and the dependent variable for model 11.1 is the number of executive-initiated bills. Region fixed-effects and the constant are present in each model but omitted from the table. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: *** = p<0.01; ** = p<0.05; * = p<0.1.

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Figure 1 Histogram of Legislative Effectiveness and Executive Laws

Legislative Effectiveness
20 0 Percent of Observations 5 10 15

-2

2 Legislative Effectiveness

Executive Laws
20 0
0

Percent of Observations 15 5 10

100

200 Executive Laws

300

400

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Figure 2 Marginal Effects of De Jure Executive Powers on Executive-Initiated Laws

Initiate Leg. Issue Decrees Declare Emergencies Propose Amendments Propose Referenda Veto Leg. Challenge Leg. Investigation by Leg. Immune -40 -20 0 20 Change in Number of Executive-Initiated Laws Point Estimate 95% Confidence Interval 40

Notes: The predicted marginal effects illustrated in the figure are from model 8 in table 4

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Figure 3 Histogram of Predicted Number of Executive-Initiated Laws by System of Government

Parliamentary Systems
60 0 Percent of Constitutions 20 40

100 200 300 Predicted Number of Executive-Initiated Laws

400

Presidential Systems
60 0 Percent of Constitutions 20 40

100 200 300 Predicted Number of Executive-Initiated Laws

400

Semi-Presidential Systems
60 0 Percent of Constitutions 20 40

100 200 300 Predicted Number of Executive-Initiated Laws

400

Notes: The predictions illustrated in the figure are from model 8 in table 4.

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APPENDIX: CCP VARIABLES USED AND CODING RULES Variable Initiate Leg. Issue Decrees Declare Emergencies Propose Amendments Propose Referenda Veto Leg. Challenge Leg. Investigation by Leg. Immune Dissolve the Leg. Coding Rule coded 1 if LEG_IN_1, LEG_IN_2, or LEG_IN_3 equals 1 coded 1 if HOSDEC or HOGDEC equals 1 coded 1 if EMDECL equals 1, 2, 3, or 4 coded 1 if AMNDPROP_1, AMNDPROP_2, or AMNDPROP_3 equals 1 coded 1 if REFERENP_1, REFERENP_2, or REFERENP_6 equals 1 coded 1 if LEGAPP equals 1, 2, 3, or 4 and OVERRIDE either does not equal 1 or equals 1 and OVERPCT is greater than or equal to 3 coded 1 if CHALLEG_1, CHALLEG_2, or CHALLEG_3 equals 1 coded 1 if INTEXEC equals 1, 2, or 3 or INVEXE equals 1 coded 1 if HOSIMM or HOGIMM equals 1 coded 1 if LEGDISS equals 1, 2, 3, or 4

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