Securitisation theory The Story so far: Theoretical inheritance and what it means to be a post-structural realist1

Rita Taureck
University of Birmingham, UK ritataureck@hotmail.com Paper for presentation at the at the 4th annual CEEISA convention University of Tartu, 25 -27 June 2006 Abstract: Writing/telling the history of Ole Wvers securitisation theory is important because it has become part of the mainstream of security studies, and yet is often misused. In focusing on the theoretical inheritance that underpins the theory, I aim to show not only with what in mind the theory was developed, but also the limitations of the theory that apply as a consequence of this heritage. The key influences on Wvers thinking are identified as John L. Austin, Jacques Derrida, Carl Schmitt and Kenneth Waltz. The diversity of thought inherent to securitisation theory - evidenced by its peculiar joint theoretical inheritance - also serves as a basis from which to analyse and explain the concept of post-structural realism (Wvers self description), and importantly as the means - theoretically by which securitisation theory becomes methodologically possible.

1.1 Introduction Much has been written on the application and the theoretical qualities/problems of securitisation theory2, but nothing really on the theorys intellectual roots. The reason
1

For helpful comments on previous versions of this article I would like to thank Mike Williams, Paul Williams, and especially Stuart Croft and Ole Wver. A previous draft was presented at the 2006 International Studies Association in San Diego. My thanks also to participants at that session, in particular to Anna Leander.
2

Alker, Hayward (2005) Emancipation in the Critical Security Studies Project In Ken Booth (edi.) Critical Security Studies and World Politics (Boulder: Lynne Rienner) pp.189-214; Behnke, Andreas (1999) Postmodernising Security Paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions, Mannheim, 26-31 March; Eriksson, Johan (1999) Observers of Advocates? One the Political Role of Security Analysis. Cooperation and Conflict. 3 pp.311-330; Hansen, Lene (2000) The little Mermaids Silent Security Dilemma Millennium: Journal of International Studies. 29 (2) pp.285-306; Huysmans, Jef (2002) Defining social constructivism in security studies. The normative dilemma of writing security. Alternatives 27 supplement pp.41-62, Huysmans, Jef (1998) The Question of the Limit: Desecuritisation and the Aesthetics of Horror in Political Realism. Millennium: Journal of International Studies 27 (3) pp.569-589;

for this negligence may (in part) be that these intellectual roots are somewhat unclear and difficult to unravel. In order to do this, it is useful to begin by turning to its originator - Ole Wver - and analyse in detail what he has written/said about aforementioned roots. Such an analysis is the purpose of this article. The analysis offered in this article is seen as necessary not only because it fills an important gap in the literature, but also because it contributes to the intellectual history of critical security studies, wherein securitisation theory is one of, if not the most important approach to date. Moreover, this article aims to set out the conceptual boundaries of the securitisation approach, clarifying what can and what can not be done with the theory, thereby helping to clear up common misreadings and misinterpretations of the theory. Before beginning with this analysis it is necessary to briefly summarise what is securitisation theory. The main argument of securitisation theory is that security is a speech act, that alone by uttering security something is being done. It is by labelling something a security issue that it becomes one.(Wver 2004a, 13) A securitising actor by stating that a particular referent object is threatened in its existence claims a right to extraordinary measures to ensure the referent objects survival. The issue is then moved out of the sphere of normal politics into the realm of emergency politics, where it can be dealt with swiftly and without the normal (democratic) rules and regulations of policy making. For the content of security this means that it has no longer any given meaning but that it can be anything a securitising actor says it is. Security - understood in this way - is a social construction, with the meaning of security dependent on what is done with it.
Huysmans, Jef (1998) Revisiting Copenhagen: Or, On the Creative Development of a Security Agenda in Europe European Journal of International Relations 4(4) pp.479-506; McSweeney, Bill (1996) Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School Review of International Studies 22(1) pp.81-94; Werner, Wouter G. (1998) Securitisation and Legal Theory, COPRI Working Paper no.27/1998; Williams, Michael C. (2003) Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics. International Studies Quarterly 47, pp.511-531; Aradau, Claudia (2004) Security and the democratic scene: desecuritization and emancipation Journal of International Relations and Development (7) pp.388-413 ;Aradau, Claudia (2001) Beyond Good and Evil: Ethics and Securitization /Desecuritization Techniques Rubikon E-journal. ISSN 1505-1161. December 2001. http://venus.ci.uw.edu.pl/~rubikon/forum/claudia2.htm; Diez, Thomas & Higashino, Atsuko (De)Securitisation, Politicisation and European Union Enlargement Paper for presentation at the BISA 29th Annual Conference, University of Warwick, 20-22 December 2004; Huysmans, Jef (1995) Migrants as a Security Problem: Dangers of Securitizing Societal Issues, in R. Miles and D. Thraenhart (eds) Migration and European Integration: The Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion (London: Pinter) pp.53-72; Strizel, Holger (2006) Towards a Theory of Securitisation: Copenhagen and Beyond Paper for presentation at the 47th ISA convention San Diego 22-25 March; Balzacq, Thierry (2005) The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context European Journal of International Relations 11(2) p.171-201; Williams, Michael C. (1998) Modernity, identity and security: a comment on the Copenhagen controversy Review of International Studies 24 (pp.435-339)

Throughout his many writings Wver makes references to many important theoretical thinkers mainly from within philosophy and from within the discipline of International Relations. In his 2004 ISA conference paper entitled Aberystwyth, Paris, Copenhagen New Schools in Security Theory and the Origins between Core and Periphery - a comparison between the three prevalent European critical security theories - however, Wver makes the to-date most conclusive remark about the theoretical origins of his theory in that he identifies the works of John L. Austin, Jacques Derrida, Carl Schmitt and Kenneth Waltz as the joint intellectual inheritance of securitisation theory. (2004a, 13)3 In what follows, section 1.2, this article will analyse the impact of each of these four thinkers work upon securitisation theory. Due to the preclusion of space, this article does not allow for elaborate discussions on each of the theorists work, outside of their respective relevance for securitisation. However, in the case of the three non IR specific thinkers short overviews of varying lengths will be provided. The paper begins by looking at the role of Austins work on speech act theory, followed by that of Derrida, Schmitts - and finally Waltzs influence upon the theory. In addition, this article aims to unravel what it means to be a post-structural realist, which is the unusual and at least in his published work ill- defined label that Wver has given himself. Such an analysis is seen as necessary for two reasons: first, the explanation for what post-structural realism is, is believed to partly lie with the theoretically diverse intellectual roots of securitisation theory; and second, poststructural realism is the methodological approach behind securitisation theory. Section 1.3 of this paper thus constitutes an attempt to analyse the meaning of post-structural realism; here understood as an approach to the study of IR informed by the objective to study the social and political construction of security with post-structural methods, whilst making allowances for realist concepts, and treating them as constructed givens. An approach, so it will be argued that resembles much of mainstream
It should be noted here that Ole Wver has been influenced by many more thinkers than the four that have influenced his thinking regards securitisation theory. According to Wver the following thinkers and works have influenced him the most: 1. Karl Marx, Das Kapital (1867-1894); 2. Friedrich Nietzsche, Zur Genealogie der Moral (1887); 3. Ole Karup Pedersen, Udenrigsminister P. Munchs opfattelse af Danmark stilling i international politik (1970); 4. Henry A. Kissinger, A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problem of Peace, 1812-22 (1957); 5. Hannah Arendt, Men in Dark Times (1968); 6. Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Democratic Politics, (1985); 7. Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference (1967); 8. Robert O. Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and its Critics (1986) as a way to include Waltz, Ashley and Ruggie; 9. Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations (1983); 10. Czeslaw Milosz, New and Collected Poems : 1931-2001 (2003). Furthermore, many readers may wonder why Barry Buzan is not listed as one of the intellectual influences on securitisation theory. The reasons for this are twofold: First of all, although undoubtedly Wver and Buzan have greatly influenced each others work (see for example, the introduction to Buzans 2004 book The United States and the Great Powers World Politics in the Twenty-First Century and/or Ole Wvers early engagements with Buzan some of his early papers) the core to securitisation theory was laid down before any cooperation ensued and thus remains (largely) unaffected by Buzans influence. Furthermore, although it is true that securitisation theory has been shaped in certain ways as a result of this cooperation, this shaping has not affected the structure of the theory, but rather the realm or reach of the theory. The second reason why Buzan is left out of this analysis is that such an analysis would simply exceed the word limit of this paper many times over; and a third reason is that a (follow up) paper to this one that picks up on these themes is in the planning.
3

moderate constructivism, in that both mainstream constructivism4 and poststructural realism - sit somewhere halfway between mainstream IR theory (the inter paradigm debate) and post-structuralism. The conclusion summarises the findings of this paper, and briefly examines whether this label accurately describes Wvers analytical position. 1.2 Securitisation theory and its intellectual inheritance a.) John L. Austin Given that in securitisation theory, security is understood as a speech act, and given that John L. Austin is the father of speech act theory, there is almost a natural link between Austins work and securitisation. As it will become clear during the remains of this paper none of the other theorists are as obviously linkable with securitisation as is Austin. Besides, and as we will see, Wver himself is most forthcoming on this link and not much research is required to establish this link for oneself. To begin, it is necessary to have a closer look at Austins work. During his lifetime the Oxford educated philosopher Austin published little and it is only in the posthumously published lecture notes -How to do things with words (1955) where the theory of speech acts, developed over many years of teaching, is put to paper. There, inspired by Wittgensteins language games, Austin argues that until his time of writing philosophy had only been concerned with statements (constatives) that can either be true or false and are necessarily descriptive, whilst statements outside of the true/false dichotomy, namely those used to perform an action, have been ignored. (Austin, 1962, 1ff) Austin calls these performative5 utterances or performative speech acts.
The name is derived, of course, from perform, the usual verb with the noun action; it indicates that the issuing of the utterance is the performing of an action it is not normally thought of as just saying something. (Austin, 1962, 6-7)

In other words, performatives describe those speech acts whereby: by saying something, something is being done. An example often used by Austin to show the working of the performative speech act is that of the marriage ceremony. He argues that the I do uttered by bride and groom during the lawful marriage ceremony constitutes a performative speech act. Here in saying I do something -the marriageis being done. The utterance of the sentence is, or is a part of, the doing of an action. (Austin 1962, 5) Another often used example by Austin is betting. Here, alone by uttering the words I bet something is being done - the bet has come into action. Austin distinguishes between three different types of speech acts, namely, the locutionary act, the illocutionary act and the perlocutionary act. The most basic one is the locutionary act, whereby meaning is given to a certain utterance. An example of this would be: He said to me Shoot her! meaning by shoot, shoot and referring by her to her. (Austin 1962, 101) An illocutionary act goes beyond this and constitutes a meaningful utterance coupled with a performative force. An example of this would be: He urged (or advised, ordered, & c.) me to shoot her. (ibid) Third, a
4

Mainstream constructivism is notoriously difficult to define. Here, I simply mean a middle ground constructivism of the kind Alexander Wendt stands for. 5 Please note that later on in the lecture series, published as How to do things with words, Austin revises this initial performative- constative distinction. After thorough analysis of the behaviour of different kind of utterances he concludes: [] there is no purely verbal criterion by which to distinguish the performative from the constative utterance, and that the constative is liable to the same unhappiness as the performative. (Austin in Searle, 1971,20) In short, all utterances are performatives.

perlocutionary act is a meaningful utterance coupled with a certain force that brings about an un-conventional effect. An example would be He persuaded me to shoot her. (ibid) Perhaps an easier way to illustrate these distinctions is made with this: We can [] distinguish the locutionary act he said that from the illocutionary act he argued that and the perlocutionary act he convinced me that. (Austin 1962, 102) Securitisation theory makes use solely of the illocutionary speech act. Wver defines the relationship between security and the illocutionary speech act as follows:
It is to define the particular case as one belonging to a specific category (security) where the state tends to use all available means to combat it. It is partly a threat but also a kind of promise since more is staked on the particular issue. The sovereign himself (the regime) is potentially put into question. (1989b, 42)

As already mentioned, performatives can neither be true nor false. They are, however, subject to take place in appropriate circumstances and follow appropriate rules and regulations. Austin calls these felicity conditions. Felicity because during the utterance things [] can be or go wrong that make the speech act, not false but unhappy (infelicitous). With regards to what is required for performative speech acts to be felicitous Austin lists six conditions. In summary, these are: first, the speech act must be in line with the accepted conventional procedure referring to the utterance itself. (1962, 14) Second, the particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked. (1962, 15) Third, the procedure must be executed by all participants both correctly and [fourth] completely. (ibid) Fifth, a person participating in a speech act must be sincere in his/her utterance6, and sixth, the enunciator of the speech act must live in accordance with the utterance subsequently. Already with this brief overview covers all that is important in Austins work for securitisation theory. The first is the idea of security being an illocution, whereby security is achieved by uttering security; whilst the second reason for Austins importance lies with the so-called facilitating conditions of security as a speech act, derived directly from Austins felicity conditions. These are:
1. The demand internal to the speech act of following the grammar of security and constructing a plot with existential threat, point of no return and a possible way out; The social capital of the enunciator 2. The securitising actor, who has to be in a position of authority, although this should neither be defined as official authority nor taken to guarantee success with the speech act; and 3. Conditions historically associated with a threat: it is the more likely that one can conjure a security threat if there are certain objects to refer to which are generally held to be threatening-be they tanks, hostile sentiments, or polluted waters. In themselves they never make for necessary securitisation, but they are definitely facilitating conditions. (2003,14-15)
6

It should be noted here that sincerity and/or its opposite insincerity can have important repercussions for the instrumental usage of securitisation speech acts. This is so because the absence of felicity condition five and six - unlike the absence of the first four - does not render the speech act void. In other words, securitisations can be successful even when the securitising actor is insincere. This is important for the existence of positive and negative securitisation. Conceptual models I have developed elsewhere, in an attempt to bridge the gap between the Welsh Schools and the Copenhagen Schools approaches to security.

The theoretical importance of Austins formulation of performative speech acts for securitisation theory is therefore important on two levels: first, for the formulation of speech acts per se, and second, for how and when they work/ fail. b) Jacques Derrida The French philosopher Jacques Derrida, (in)famous for his ardent attack on all works within western Philosophy, or more generally the history of metaphysics, analysed Austins work on performatives in some detail in his 1982 essay, Signature Event Context. In this essay Derrida argues that Austins theory of performative speech acts, although innovative, falls short in the crucial aspect that it takes context as a fixed given. According to Derrida, such a fixed context and the presence of being is impossible, because every utterance and every context is subject to a diffusion of meaning, a process in which the original context changes. In the terminology of Derrida, all contexts are subject to irreducible polysemia, in short dissemination. (Derrida 1982, 322) Context can therefore never be fixed, but is always in flux. For the success or failure of performative speech acts, this then means that the performance of a speech act cannot be judged on experience, as with context in flux experience is irrelevant. Wver is aware of this, and in his view there are the following consequences for securitisation theory:
[] it is necessary always to keep open the possibility of failure of an act that previously succeeded and where the formal resources and position are in place (the break down of communist regimes in Eastern Europe) and conversely that new actors can perform a speech act they previously were not expected to (the environmental movement). [] Therefore, the issue of who can do security? and was this a case of securitisation? can ultimately only be judged in hindsight. [] It can not be closed off by finite criteria for success. (2000a, 10)

With regards to the previous discussion, it is important to note that Derridas influence is also visible in the facilitating conditions. Thus, condition number two explicitly states that the success of the speech act can never be taken for granted, whilst the careful circumscription of condition number three points to the Derridean/post-structuralist influence, which makes it obligatory to avoid causality, essentialism and naturalism.7 This is but one of, as will be argued three ways, how Derrida matters for securitisation theory. Unlike with Austins work, however, these links are not very obvious in Wvers writings and it takes considerable effort to draw out the argument. What takes no effort and is easy to see from most of Wvers writings is that Wver has a certain fascination with Derrida; what form this takes, becomes the difficult question. In this authors opinion, Derrida is important for securitisation theory on a metatheoretical level, because securitisation theorys fundamental premise that security is what it does is derived from Derridas idea that a text matters more for what it does than for what it says. (Wver 1997, 163 & 1989a, 64; Derrida 1998) In Derridas words:
[] reading [] cannot legitimately transgress the text toward something other than it, toward a referent (a reality that is metaphysical, historical, psychobiographical, etc.) or toward a signified outside of the text whose content could take place, could have taken place outside of language, that is to say, in the sense that we give here to that word, outside of writing in general. (1998, 158)

It is for this reason that recent efforts to problematise the lack of contextualisation within the existing framework of securitisation theory (e.g. Strizel 2006, Balzacq 2005) are misguided.

For securitisation theory this is important because it limits what kind of analysis can be done with the theory. Important here are the theoretical constraints that result from this Derridarian standpoint. These theoretical constraints lie with the interpretation of an authors meaning and intention in the writing of a text. Considering the infamous statement, Il ny a pas de hors texte (there is no outside-text Derrida, 1998, 1588), it becomes clear that for Derrida meaning is only in the sentence itself, and not above and beyond that. (Skinner, 2002, 93) The justification for this has been summarised powerfully by Quentin Skinner as follows:
[] by far the most damaging campaign [against the idea that intention can be known from texts] was opened in the late 1960s and early 1970s by Jacques Derrida when he began to argue that the very idea of textual interpretation is a mistake, since there is no such reading to be gained. There are only misreadings, since it is an error to suppose that we can ever arrive unambiguously at anything recognisable as the meaning of texts. (2002, 91)

To exemplify the limits of textual interpretation, Skinner refers to Derridas analysis of Nietzsches sentence: I have forgotten my umbrella. Here Derrida claims everyone knows what I have forgotten my umbrella means (Skinner 2002, 121), still, Derrida continues, we have no means of knowing for sure what Nietzsche wanted to do or say in noting those words. (ibid) In other words, we have no means of knowing what Nietzsche meant.
Was he [Nietzsche] merely informing someone that he had forgotten his umbrella? Or was he perhaps warning them, or reassuring them? Or was he instead explaining something, or apologising, or criticising himself. Or simply lamenting a lapse of memory? Perhaps, as Derrida suggests, he meant nothing at all. Derridas point is that we shall never know. (ibid, emphasis added)

In the more unusual language of Derrida himself:

The crisis of meaning (nonpresence in general, absence as the absence of the referent of perception or of meaning of the actual intention to signify) is always linked to the essential possibility of writing; and this crisis is not an accident, a factual and empirical anomaly of spoken language, but also a positive possibility and internal structure of spoken language, from a certain outside. (1982, 319)

Wver agrees with Derridas assertion that it is impossible to ascertain an actors intentions from textual analysis.
Discourse analysis works on public texts. It does not try to get to the thoughts or motives of the actors, their hidden intentions or secret plans. [] What interests us is neither what individual decision makers really believe, not what are shared beliefs among a population, but which codes are used when actors relate to each other. (2001, 26-27)

For securitisation theory this means the following:

[] security thinking does not mean how actors think, which would be rather difficult to uncover - and not all that interesting. What is up for discussion here is how and what they think aloud. That is, the thinking they contribute to the public debate/political process; public logic. (Wver, 1997, 116)

Given this finding, it seems that Derrida is crucial for securitisation theory in so far as his thought forms the basis behind Wvers claim that: the meaning of security is what it does, (Wver, 2004b, 56) as in an analogy to Derrida- meaning is only in the concept itself and not above and beyond that. He elaborates:
8

Although this is the actual wording found in Gayatri Chakravorty Spivaks popular translation of Of Grammatology, many readers may be happier with the widely used translation there is nothing outside the text.

In my case, some of the most important areas where this general philosophy [Derridas idea whereby the original (transcendental) signified is never presented, except for in the interplay of differences; also known as the iterability of the sign] worked out by Derrida was in relation to speech act theory and not least in relation to discourse analysis. It points to the centrality of studying in a text, how it produces meaning, rather than relating it to a context, which is a doubtful concept because it tends to imply the traditional sender-receiver view of communication where an original meaning can be retrieved if only put in the proper context . (Wver, 2004c, 11, first and third emphasises mine)

It should be noted here that, although Derrida has been singled out here as the central influence behind this logic of securitisation theory much of it can actually be attributed to the influence of Wvers teacher and mentor Ole Karup Pedersen- on Wvers own thinking. (Wver 2004c) This is because Karup Pedersen in his key work Foreign Minister P. Munchs Conceptions of Denmarks Position in International Politics (1970) highlights precisely above logic, by denying the possibility of studying what politicians really think. (Wver 1989a, 73) For Wver, who cites Karup Pedersons 1970 book as one of the ten books that influenced his own development as a theorist the most (2004c), this was to become a significant revelation, later incorporated into his own theory.
[] Karup Pedersen was particularly conscious to steer free of individual psychology. He took the full consequence and did not even try to ask what P. Munch really thought deep inside, but what he found it opportune to state his perception. (39, 615) The dissertation did not ask behind this to either what P. Munch really thought, nor to check it against reality [] To use texts as a source to P. Munchs private perceptions would demand a nonexistent psychological theory there can be no valid analysis of individual psyche on the basis of the available sources. Therefore, Karup Pedersen elaborated a whole theoretical structure around the usefulness of understanding the presented conceptions as important in their own right. (2004c)

Nonetheless, it is the link to Derrida, and Wvers indisputable fascination with the former, which later puts the philosophical edge to this observation, and the second reason why Derrida is important for understanding securitisation theory. Ole Karup Pederson on the other hand is not singled out here as an individual intellectual root for securitisation theory, because Wver never does so himself, and furthermore because it is only with Derrida that this thought takes a concrete theoretical form. Derrida, and the third reason for his influence will be returned to below, for purposes of structure and the coherence of the argument, however, it is necessary to continue with the remaining two theorists first. c) Carl Schmitt The 20th century legal theorist Carl Schmitt is the third theorist Wver identifies as important for securitisation theory. This said it is important to note that although the link between the securitisation aspect of the Copenhagen School and Carl Schmitt is now commonly acknowledged, Wver from what he remembers did not formulate the speech act argument back in 1988- with Schmitt in mind. He argues that: I only read Schmitt in detail later and found him very convincing, noticing naturally the similarities [.]. (2004c) However, since Wver himself includes Schmitt into the list of theorists behind the logic of securitisation (see above) it is imperative to include the latter into this study. Given what has been said it here, it is not surprising that the most important work on Schmitt and his relevance for securitisation theory has not been written by Wver himself and that little reference to Schmitt can be drawn from his writings. Instead, the perhaps best work on this has been done by Michael C. Williams, whose article Words, Images, Enemies: Securitisation and International Politics (2003) 8

will serve as the primary source of my own analysis of the link between Schmitt and securitisation. Before proceeding to do so, however, it will be necessary to briefly explain the essence and background of Schmitts political theory. Writing during the time of the Weimar Republic, the legal theorist Schmitt argues contra to the then current orthodox legal positivists that the state could not be regulated by law alone, but rather by the political in form of power and decision. The political is defined as:
[] the most intense and extreme antagonism, and every concrete antagonism becomes that much more political the closer it approaches the more extreme point, that of friend-enemy grouping. (1996, 37)

The reasons for this viewing of the political in terms of Freund - Feind (friend enemy) can only be fully understood against the backdrop of the Weimar Republic, when government was made up of an array of political parties, including communist parties, which Schmitt regarded as extremist. In light of the representation of the extremist parties in government, Schmitt saw the stability of the law + parliamentary democracy at risk - as without his concept of the political - in a system based on law alone, extremists could make government unworkable, or worse the constitution could simply be destroyed by a vote, should the wrong party come into power. In order to obviate this, Schmitt advocated a strengthened position for the chancellor Paul von Hindenburg. Here his concept of the political comes into play, in that he wanted Hindenburg to name the extremists as the enemy of the state. In Schmitts view, Hindenburg was in a position to do just that, because as sovereign it is he who decides upon exception (cited in Williams 2003, 516) He believed that the decision to name the extremists as the enemy of the state would catapult the chancellor on a long term basis into a stronger position, with the rise of the political forming a stronger basis for the continuation of parliamentary democracy. Schmitts concept of the political conflicts with views such as Hegels, who believed that law alone although only upon completion of the full passage of historical development - can regulate the state. In his influential work, The Concept of the Political (1932), Schmitt gives three reasons why this cannot be the case, all of which emphasise the social construction that is law: first, laws are (hu)man made, who will put in the laws? Second, who, if not humans should interpret them? And third, because the laws in existence can not possibly cover every eventuality, the question arises, who should put in new laws? Thus, according to Schmitt, something above and beyond law, i.e. the political, will always be relevant. For Williams, the decisive connection between securitisation theory and Schmitts thought is given through casting an issue in terms of an existential threat in order to make it a security issue. (2003, 514) To reiterate, for Wver, to present an issue as an existential threat is to say that: If we do not tackle this problem, everything else will be irrelevant (because we will not be here or will not be free to deal with it in our own way) (Wver in Buzan et al 1998, 24) Here, it is important to note that the identification of an issue as an existential threat is the first conceptual step for any process of securitisation, notably the other two steps being emergency action and effects on inter unit relations, breaking free of rules. (Buzan et. al, 1998, 6) For Williams this existential threat requirement of securitisation means that:

[] security is not just any kind of speech- act, not just any form of social construction or accomplishment. It is a specific kind of act [because it] calls for extraordinary measures beyond routines and norms of everyday politics. (2003, 514)

Williams goes as far as to argue, that Wvers focus on the identification of an existential threat as a necessity, for securitisation mirrors the intense condition of existential division, of friendship and enmity that constitutes Schmitts concept of the political. (2003, 516) In other words, just as the nature of the political is determined by the division between friend and enemy, the nature of security is determined by the division between normal democratic rule obeyed politics and extraordinary politics beyond rules and regulations. In addition to this, Williams sees a second connection between securitisation and Schmitts thought in what he calls Schmitts decisionist theory of sovereignty. (2003, 516) He argues that for Schmitt, the political i.e. the distinction between friend and enemy - is strongest in the case of emergency, when the decision making powers of the sovereign elevate he who is sovereign above the rules and regulations of the legal system. In Williams words, it is in the realm of emergency that the essence of sovereignty as decision is most clearly illustrated. (2003, 517) This line of thought is, according to Williams, clearly present in the process of securitisation, where a securitising actor is at its most efficient exactly because of operating legitimately beyond otherwise binding rules and regulations. The securitising actor, however, only achieves the status of securitising actor by setting itself apart from an existential threat - the other. This is so for two reasons: first, because security is always relational in the sense that one actors insecurity/security hinges on another actors insecurity/security the classic formulation of the security dilemma; and, second, it makes little sense to speak of one actors security (the self) without recognising the source of the threat (the other), as in the absence of the other there is no need for security. (Wver 1997, 353) With security situated at the interface of the us vs. them (self vs. other) dichotomy, the underlying idea of securitisation theory is tantamount to Schmitts enemy and friend distinction of the political. To make this point even clearer, it is worthwhile to cite Williams own words here:
It is when identities are securitised that their negotiability and flexibility are challenged, denied or suppressed. Under the conditions of existential threat (i.e., attempts at a securitising speech-act by certain actors) to identities, a Schmittian logic of friends and enemies is invoked, and with it the politics of exclusion. (2003, 519)

Whilst Williams second correlation between Schmitt and securitisation theory is clearly valid, it is necessary to insert a word of caution here. This is because there are not only correlations between Schmitts and Wvers work, but also distinctions, with perhaps the most important one of these differences concerning the process of decision making. Hence, whilst in Schmitts writings, decision truly refers to decision; securitisation/desecuritisation is not so much a decision, but rather a social event.
[Securitisation theory] is not causal in the traditional sense, because securitisation is conceptualised as a performative act never exhaustively explained by its conditions. It not only realises already given potentials but also produces genuine novelty; in what Bourdieu (1991) calls an act of social magic, something happens at this exact point and therefore the act can never be reduced to a transmission belt of casual chains. (Buzan et.al 2003, 72)

d) Kenneth Waltz

10

The fourth theoretical thinker said to have influenced securitisation theory is Kenneth Waltz. Like Derrida, Waltz is important for securitisation in several ways. Furthermore, like before, for purposes of structure not all of the relevant points can be outlined at once, but rather one of them, along with Derridas third relevance, will only be dealt with in the next section. To begin with, Wver recognises the way in which Waltz has fundamentally changed the face of IR in that Waltz
By emphasising the demands of social science and especially of theory, and by taking a systemic-structural approach, realism was reformulated in a systematic and minimalist way, where previous broad speculations were replaced by a precise argument. The resulting theory was theory to a previously unknown degree of theory. (Wver, 2004c, 11; my emphasis)

For Wver, who believes that one has to engage with traditions of thought, [as] theory works on theory (2004c) this is important as much of his own critical thinking grew from a close engagement with Waltz and his critics, most notably Ashley, Ruggie and Walker.9 Wver thus recognises a critical engagement with Waltz as the starting point as much of his own analysis. Besides this, it seems that the way how Waltz defines theory has influenced Wver significantly, in particular Waltzs explanation of what a theory needs to entail and what is by definition outside of a particular theory, is of importance here. In other words, Wver following Waltz prescribes to the idea that a theory cannot encompass everything and that a theory has boundaries10. That Wver is fond of Waltzian boundaries to theory becomes clear in the following statement:
To some security analysis functions as a map of complexity. One includes more sectors in order to be able to say that the military story is too simple, too narrow. And more actors serve to counter a state based argument. [] It becomes a kind of check list, a large matrix where one can put sectors along one side and units along the other, and then say: there are all these matrixes see how the establishment only look at the small corner up there (at best 4 boxes), but there are 25. In contrast, the focus on constellations and dynamics is aimed at reduction, at finding the turning points that might decide the way the future unfolds and thus function as a political analysis even one that could be help for political choices. [ A focus on complexity], I am generally quite sceptical of (as I am of much liberalist IR theory that only complicates matters in an attempt to give detailed 1:1 maps of the world instead of trying to simplify as realist theories at least are (more than) willing to. (Wver, 1997, 366-367)

In addition to this metatheoretical level, it could be argued that Waltzs reading of security has two further repercussions for securitisation theory. First, in the relationship between survival and security, whereby for Waltz [survival] is taken as a ground for action in a world where the security of states in not assured.(1979, 92), and similarly for Wver security means survival in the face of existential threats. (Buzan et.al, 1998, 27) Second, it is feasible to suggest that Wvers restrictions on who is likely to succeed with a successful securitisation the social conditions regarding the position of authority for the securitising actor (Buzan et.al. 1998, 33) are modelled on a Waltzian - or more generally speaking realist - notion of the distribution of capabilities and powers within the system. In other words, the more capabilities a
9

Indeed, it should be noted here that for Wver - drawing on Arendt - not only politics is an intersubjective process, but also the discipline of IR, whereby every thinkers work grows out of an engagement with other thinkers. 10 Context is but one example of what is by definition outside of securitisation theory (see above).

11

securitising actor has the more likely will this actor be in succeeding in an attempted securitisation.11
Size or scale seems to be one crucial variable in determining what constitutes a successful referent object of security. At the micro end of the spectrum, individuals or small groups can seldom establish a wider security legitimacy in their own right. They may speak about security to and of themselves, but few will listen. (ibid, 36)

It is at this point where this discussion must turn to the infamous role of the audience in the process of securitisation. Infamous, because the majority of critics and also proponents of securitisation - have written about the role of the audience for securitisation theory, mainly about the fact that the audience is insufficiently theorised, with critics honing in on this, as one of the fundamental shortfalls of the theory. Moreover, in the last few years Wver himself has openly admitted to the theoretical weaknesses regards the audience within his theory and called for more work on the issue. (2003, 26) Anyway, although it seems true that the role of the audience within securitisation is undertheorised this does not create a major problem, because the audience is not always and not necessarily that important. Indeed, I quibble with Wvers argument that securitisation is an intersubjective process between the securitising actor and the audience, for it at odds with the theoretical roots namely with the role of Waltz and the role of Austin - of the theory. Let me explain. Considering above statement that the success of a securitisation is dependent on power and capabilities of the securitising actor, it must be asked what does this mean for the role of the audience? One way to argue would be that more capabilities equal more persuading power over the audience on part of the securitising actor. Whilst this would be the harmless, perhaps even nave interpretation of the situation, it could also be argued that the more capabilities on part of the securitising actor, the less important becomes the audience. After all, securitisation must not always be a free process, but can also be pushed by powerful securitising actors, who use security to pursue their own ends. Moreover, it is difficult to ascertain who exactly the audience is supposed to be. Most certainly, the audience is not made up of the entire population - which would be the democratic ideal in situations regarding national security but rather, it actually varies according to the political system and the nature of the issue. (Wver 2003, 12) The more likely groups to be involved or rather to be convinced are (in cases of National Security that is) the political elite and military officials, who are part of the securitising actor already, which blurs the intersubjectivity even more.
11

It is for this reason that the French poststructuralist thinker Didier Bigo is wrong to argue that Wver focuses only on political discourse, and that he ignores power struggles and power positions within the field. (Bigo, Didier (2002) Security and Immigration: Toward a critique of the governmentality of unease Alternatives vol.27; supplement, Feb. 2002, p. 73ff & Bigo, Didier (2000) When two become one: Internal and External securitisations in Europe, in Morten Kelstrup and Michael C. Williams, International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration, Routledge, 2000, p.196) Indeed, Wver, by emphasising the importance of capabilities for the success or failure of security as a speech act, covers what Pierre Bourdieu (whose work Bigo draws on to make the above claim) sees as major weakness in Austins work, which is that the success of speech acts is always tied to the social position of the enunciator. Bourdieu refers to this social position by the term institution, which is not necessarily a particular organisation this or that family or factory, for instance but it is any relatively durable set of social relations which endows individuals with power, status and resources of various kinds. It is the institution, in this sense that endows the speaker with the authority to carry out the act which his or her utterance claims to perform. (Thompson, John B. (1991) Editors Introduction to Pierre Bourdieus Language and Symbolic Power Cambridge: Polity Press, p.8, emphasis added) The social position of the enunciator (institution) is not the same as context.

12

Secondly, it is in the context of the importance of the audience that it is useful to consider Thierry Balzacqs recent claim that the process of securitisation is better captured by a perlocutionary speech act over an illocutionary one. Balzacq in his 2005 article The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context (2005) criticises Wver for actually using a different type (the wrong type) of speech act than he really does. Hence according to Balzacq, Wver who claims that security is an illocutionary speech act a one-directional performative whereby by saying something, something is being done - is wrong, because by using this type of speech act, Wver undermines another logic inherent to securitisation theory, namely that security is an intersubjective process, conceived in the interaction between securitising actor and audience. (2005, 175) This logic can, according to Balzacq, be captured with a different type of Austins speech act, the socalled perlocutionary speech act, whereby the performative is duo-directional in that something is being brought about in someone/ something else by the utterance. (ibid.) The example used above to capture the perlocutionary speech act was: He persuaded me to shoot her. Given this argument, it appears to me that if the intersubjectiveness really matters so much, then Balzacq has got a point, as only through perlocution can the significance of the audience be captured fully. All of Wvers writings suggest, however, that he is and always was (since the naissance of securitisation in 1988 that is) familiar with the writings of Austin, which suggests that he knows the different types of speech acts, and that therefore he must have purposefully chosen the illocutionary over the perlocutionary act. Although, this does not automatically suggest that Balzacq is wrong and Wver is right to have done so, however, what it does suggest is that there are reasons for this choice, reasons that are vital for the theory. The question then becomes, why did he pick the illocutionary act over the perlocutionary act? The only sensible answer here seems to be that the intersubjectiveness comes second to the role of the securitising actor. Again, to recap, the illocutionary act constitutes a meaningful utterance coupled with a performative force. He ordered me to shoot her, was one of the example used above. Since ordering opposed to persuasion requires neither consensus nor active input on part of the audience, my point of the one sidedness of the illocutionary speech act appears confirmed, and by extension my second point that for the working of securitisation intersubjectiveness is secondary too. 1.3 How to be a poststructural realist? Given these diverse philosophical underpinnings of securitisation theory it is perhaps not surprising that Wver refers to himself as something as fancy as a postmodern or post-structural realist. However, instead of simply referring to a mere amalgamation of labels that make up the philosophical underpinnings of securitisation theory, this label seeks to offer a distinct approach to IR altogether.
The aim of post-structuralist realism is to develop a theory that can be political. It does not want to find a new place to stand outside realism. Instead it tries to be at the limit of the tradition. [] The method will be to work with realist concepts in order to mark them so that they are not able anymore to function in the harmonious self-assured standard-discourse of realism. (Wver 1989b, 38, emphasis added)

According to Wver this objective is achieved by a double meaning of post-structural realism, as a post-structuralist reading of realism (ibid.) on the one hand, and as a theory that is post (i.e. after) Waltzian structural realism (ibid.) on the other. The first of these meanings does not need much explanation as it is obviously compatible with much of contemporary postmodern security studies, which takes the 13

deconstruction of structural realism as its focal point, suggesting a third way in which Derridas work has been influential for securitisation theory. Deconstruction is an event within, or occurring to, a given text, whereby it is the objective of the person examining the text for the deconstruction to show:
[] how texts based on binary oppositions themselves violate both the principle of exclusion and the principle of priority. Thus, a deconstructive reading of a text reveals points at which it introduces one of the opposing terms into the definition of the other or reverses the order of priority between the two terms. (Gutting 2001, 294)

Wver certainly is interested in, and has been influenced by, critical readings of mainstream IR literature such as for example the work of Richard Ashley. However, as it will shortly be shown, this influence has first and foremost amounted to the possibility of thinking critical about IR in general, rather than Wver siding with poststructuralism completely. Be that as it may, this is not really the question here, rather the question is: Is deconstruction12 really what is being done when using securitisation theory? And, therefore, is securitisation theory a post modernist tool of analysis? For reasons to be explained in a moment, the answer to both questions must be no. Only by analysing the second meaning of post-structural realism is it possible to explain why this is so and, by extension, why Wver is not a poststructuralist in the common sense. Hence, in the second reading of poststructural realism Wver defines the approach as a structural realism after [as in: later in time] Waltz. (1989b, 38) Meaning this post-structural realist theory refers to a theory whereby core realist concepts are kept as important elements for the analysis (with the first meaning that would be impossible as everything is deconstructed), and whereby poststructural methods such as discourse analysis are applied to (or to the interaction of) these concepts. For example, under this approach it is possible to analyse national security policies (states behaviour under anarchy) by studying discourse and political constellations. (Buzan et.al, 1998, 25) In other words, it is the objective of poststructural realism to study the social and political construction of security, whilst retaining realist (materialist) concepts, with post-structural methods. An approach once unravelled - that appears to have much resemblance with the mainstream or moderate constructivist project in International Relations theory, particularly in that both, constructivism and the Copenhagen School claim a middle ground position in IR or rather security theory. (Wver, 1999, 4; Buzan et.al, 1998, 243) Furthermore, this suggests that the Copenhagen School as a whole at least with regards to those writings where securitisation matters operates using the post-structural realist method. The following quote should make clear why this is
We [Wver and Buzan] do take identities as socially constituted but not radically moreso than other social structures. Identities as other social
12

It should be noted here that Ole Wver has used deconstruction for example in the article Ideologies of Stabilization Stabilization of Ideologies: Reading German Social Democrats [article five in his 1997 PhD thesis], which attempts to deconstruct the German SPDs security literature in the years before 1988. The aim of this deconstruction is not to create an explanatory, predictive model for SPD policy, but to learn something about the relationship between security, politics and text (language). (1997 ,9) Moreover, what is important here, is Wvers observation towards the end of the article which reads: What have we learnt from this deconstruction? It is impossible to enclose a specific arena of security and make unpolitical arguments from this basis. Security is always drowned out by politics. (1997, 133) A finding that leads Wver to conclude that security is always a political choice.

14

constructions can petrify and become relatively constant elements to be reckoned with. At specific points this inert constructivism enables modes of analysis very close to objectivist for example, Waltzian neorealism, as long as one remembers that in the final instance the ontology is not Waltzs naturalism and atomism but some form of constructivism. (ibid, 205 second emphasis added)

Another way to ascertain what post-structural realism is; is to ask for what can be done/not done with it, or by extension with securitisation theory? In using securitisation theory, the analyst must not focus on what security is, but rather on what it does because what security does is tantamount to the meaning of security. In Wvers words: What we can study is [] who can do security on what issues under what conditions and with what effects? (1997,14) Importantly by using securitisation theory the analyst cannot directly struggle against the (de)securitisation in question, even if s/he disagrees with the particular (de)securitisation analysed.13 Therefore, just like post-structural realism specifies, the analyst by using the securitisation approach begins by taking certain entities as socially constructed givens the securitising actor (often the state) for example and then sets out to analyse the discursive formation of the securitisation process in question, which in turn is regarded as a social construction. Wver and by definition everyone using securitisation theory does not begin by questioning everything, neither does he look for binary oppositions in any given text; nor does he act from an antifoundational point of view. Taken together, all of these are proof that a Derrida style deconstruction is neither the aim of, nor is it what is being observed by the usage of securitisation theory in a given text. This is why, it can be argued that securitisation theory (or rather Wver) has been influenced by the idea/possibility of deconstruction only in so far as the possibility of the event of deconstruction made him think beyond the horizon of mainstream IR theory, namely realism/liberalism. Nonetheless he offers no theory on how to do this; or rather on how to spot the event that is deconstruction. At this point, it is important to note that Wver differs from other poststructuralists in that he argues that the utility of the poststructuralist research project - in its predominant version - is ultimately unsatisfactory. (Wver 2000, 285; 1995, 76 & 86; 1989c, 37) This is so, because poststructural analysis is informed by the overarching insistence on the ethical goal opening up, making possible and freeing (Wver 1995, 86), however, without anyone taking responsibility for what we are opening up to. (ibid. also 2004c, 4) What if, so Wver, we are opening up to something that is worse than what we had before? How can we possibly make opening up the overarching aim, if we cannot know that opening up will make way for something that is good or better than what we had before? Because we cannot, and because we as human beings are inescapably part of politics (Arendt 1958), we have to exercise a Nietzschean will to power (Wver 2004c, 4) and act more responsible than this and curtail our theorising in line with (learning from) the past and recognising what we are moving into (the possible future). (Wver, 1989c, 40) Moreover, unlike the predominant form of poststructuralism, which exhibits a guarantee of being politically good and progressive with its anchorage in a specific meta-theoretical position, Wver argues that any position has to be judged by the
13

I have written about this in detail elsewhere, namely in Securitisation Theory and Securitisation Studies published in the March 2006 edition (9/1) of the Journal of International Relations and Development

15

effects it gains in interaction with others, and therefore it can not be good all on its own. In short, others have to be taken into account. This being said, and as Hannah Arendt made clear, it is important to note that there can be no guarantee that our actions will be correct, nor can it be guaranteed that our actions will be understood, at least in the way we wanted them to be understood. (1998 [1958], 192) Wver echoes this sentiment in arguing that:
Acting politically can, consequently never be risk-free, and progressiveness is never guaranteed by ones political or philosophical attitude. Theoretical practices, as well as any political ones, have to risk their own respectability and leave traces, letting posterity tell the story about the meaning of an act. (1995, 76)

Or even earlier in 1989

In the political, directions are not marked with road-signs indicating what is critical or progressive. In politics one cannot just be against: on the contrary one does something. Also, as theory, the critical practice moves into the political. It places its own respectability at risk in acts of which one cannot know whether posterity will re-tell them as confirmation or transcendence as power politics or power criticism. Meaning comes after hand when the life story is told. (1989c, 38)

Given what has been said here, it should have become clear that the poststructural realist approach to IR combines normally conflicting structural realism with elements of poststructuralism into a coherent whole. Given how elements of the two theories are combined, it can be argued that this mix and match approach works well, and that there is no inconsistency between Wvers early and his more recent work as has recently been argued by Holger Strizel, who separates out the poststructural and the constructivist element within securitisation into two [] autonomous readings of securitisation, based on two separate [and at times incompatible] metatheoretical convictions. (2006, 2) To conclude, post-structural realism does not only entail balancing on the edge of realism (Wver 1989b, 39 & 1989a, 89) but also a balancing on the edge of post-structuralism. In the end, this balancing act is equivalent in many respects to a form of moderate constructivism (notably without rigorous Wendtian social theory). It is a third way between two extremes and must be understood as such. 1.4 Conclusion For some, this paper may have been nothing but yet another paper on an exhausted topic; nonetheless, I hope that what has been offered here is a little different than the average paper on securitisation. Thus, it was the aim of this paper to go behind securitisation theory and to analyse the theorys theoretical underpinnings and what they mean. Following Wver the theoretical roots have been taken to be with four distinguished thinkers, namely: Austin, Derrida, Schmitt and Waltz, who interestingly enough, are positioned at different ends of the theoretical spectrum. This paper has shown how under the securitisation approach different elements from the work of these thinkers are combined into a coherent and new approach that resembles midway or moderate constructivism but goes by the provocative label: post-structural realism. Labels in the social sciences are a tricky thing, and it is hard, if not impossible, to summarise most scholars work with but one label. Someone like Wver, who has some Derridarian elements in his work, is not automatically a poststructuralist, nor needs his theory comply with everything the theoretical inspiration stands for.

16

Wver himself is sceptical of dichotomising the discipline of International Relations in terms of paradigms and promotes a person based approach instead. Inspired once more by Arendt, who focused in her book Men in Dark Times on people versus the establishment or the system (Arendt, 1973 [1955], 8), Wver, in the 1997 book The Future of International Relations Masters In The Making, puts forward an approach to IR whereby focus is placed on persons and not on paradigms. With a focus on persons, so he argues, it becomes possible to show that there is a certain existential dimension to doing IR, whereby he means that:
Usually someone working in IR aims at some kind of coherence at the same time as striving to make complex and novel moves across the established lines. All theorists make personal choices and the ability to retain an integrated academic persona(lity) is not secured once and for all by picking a position. The traditional presentation of IR in terms of paradigms or schools obscures this since the writings of complex authors are often cut up and treated in separate sections. Only those who fit unequivocally into one box will be treated as whole persons and most writers see themselves as operating within one of the boxes. As an academic person one would therefore learn more from tracing other unboxable persons in their trajectories through the discipline. (1997, 2)

A diverse and rich theory like securitisation that draws on so many different, and even opposed, theorists cannot possibly comply with everything uttered by its theoretical leaders. Rather, and as this paper aims to show, theorists utilise bits and pieces from existing work and mix them up into something new. For the - if not for his own label unboxable Wver the motto clearly appears to be not how to remain true to a given, or even within a label, but rather what works in practice counts.

Bibliography Arendt, Hannah (1973) Men in Dark Times (Harmondsworth: Pelican Books) Arendt, Hannah (1998 [1958]) The Human Condition second edition (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press) Austin, J.L. (1962) How to do Things with words? (Oxford: Clarendon Press) Balzacq, Thierry (2005) The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context European Journal of International Relations 11(2) p.171-201 Buzan, Barry & Wver, Ole (2003) Regions and Powers-The Structure of International Security. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) Buzan, Barry; Wver, Ole; de Wilde, Jaap (1998) Security - A New Framework for Analysis. (London: Lynne Rienner)

17

Derrida, Jacques (1998) Of Grammatology corrected edition translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press) Derrida, Jacques (1982) Margins of Philosophy. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press Gutting, Gary (2001) French Philosophy in the Twentieth Century. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) Schmitt, Carl (1996 [1932]) The Concept of the Political, translated by G. Schwab. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press) Skinner, Quentin (2002) Visions of Politics I. Regarding Method. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) Strizel, Holger (2006) Towards a Theory of Securitisation: Copenhagen and Beyond Paper for presentation at the 47th ISA convention San Diego 22-25 March Wver, Ole (2004a) Aberystwyth, Paris, Copenhagen New Schools in Security Theory and the Origins between Core and Periphery. Paper presented at the ISA Conference Montreal March Wver, Ole (2004b) Peace and Security Two concepts and their relationship In Guzzini, Stefano, Jung, Dietrich (2004) Analysis and Copenhagen Peace Research. (London: Routledge), pp.51-65 Wver, Ole (2004c) 'The Ten Works', Tidsskriftet Politik Vol.7:4 (web version) Wver, Ole (2003) Securitisation: Taking stock of a research programme in Security Studies Unpublished Manuscript Wver, Ole (2001) Identity, communities and foreign policy in Lene Hansen & Ole Wver (eds.) European Integration and National Identity: The challenge of the Nordic States, London: Routledge 2001, s. 20-50. Wver, Ole (2000a) Security Agendas Old and New - And How to Survive them, Buenos Aires: Paper presented for a workshop on The Traditional and the New Security Agenda: Inferences for the Third World, Universidad Torcuato di Tella Buenos Aires, 11-12 September Wver, Ole (1999) The English Schools Contribution to the Study of International Relations Paper prepared for the Panel: A Reconsideration of the English School: Close or Reconvene? At the 24th Annual Conference of the British International Studies Association Manchester Conference Centre (UMIST) December 20th-22nd 1999 Wver, Ole (1995) Securitization and Desecuritization. In Lipschutz, R.D. On Security. (New York: Columbia University Press) Wver, Ole (1997) Concepts of Security. PhD Dissertation University of Copenhagen

18

Wver, Ole (1997a) Figures of International Thought In Ole Wver & Iver B. Neumann (1997a) The Future of International Relations Masters in the Making London: Routledge pp. 1-37 Wver, Ole (1989a) Beyond the Beyond of Critical International Theory (Preliminary Version) Paper prepared for the Joint Annual Conference of the British International Studies Association and the International Studies Association, London, 28 March -1 April 1989 Wver, Ole (1989b) Security, the Speech Act Analysing the Politics of a word (2nd draft) Paper presented at the Research Training Seminar, Sostrup Manor, June 1989. Revised, Jerusalem/Tel Aviv June 25-26,1989 Wver, Ole (1989c) Tradition and Transgression in International Relations as postAshleyan position Paper presented at the annual conference of the British International Studies Association at the University of Kent in Canterbury 18-20 December 1989 Waltz, Kenneth (1979) Theory of International Relations (New York: Random House) Williams, Michael C. (2003) Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics. International Studies Quarterly 47, pp.511-531 Wyn Jones, Richard (1999) Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner)

19