The Conflict at Siachen The human and economic costs of sustaining a two-decade long bloody conflict ove r the

possession of the geographically remote and climatically inhospitable Siac hen Glacier continues to bleed both Pakistan and India dry despite several round s of talks between two nuclear-armed neighbours to resolve the dispute, variedly described as a war on the rooftop of the world.The two-day Islamabad talks betw een Indian and Pakistani defence secretaries on resolving the Siachen issue have again ended inconclusively. This was the third dialogue session since the Janua ry 6, 2004 Islamabad Declaration that kicked off the normalization process betwe en the two sides. But at the end, a bald statement merely repeated the diplomati c doublespeak for deadlock: that the two sides held "frank and constructive disc ussions" and would continue to talk without specifying any new date. In real ter ms, therefore, the position, if it has not actually regressed, remains the same as the one that prevailed when the then Indian premier, Mr Rajiv Gandhi, had com e to Islamabad for talks with Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in July 1989. Originally known as Saicher Gharni, the Siachen means the place of roses (Sia-ro se, chen-place of). Since April 1984, when the Indian army carried out a clandes tine operation code-named "Meghdoot" and established permanent posts at the Siac hen Glacier, the two nuclear-armed neighbours have confronted each other militar ily for control over the icy wasteland and its approaches in the eastern Karakor am mountain range, adjacent to the borders of India, Pakistan and China. The lon gest-running armed conflict between two regular armies in the twentieth century, the Siachen conflict has resulted in thousands of casualties from both sides, p rimarily because of adverse climatic conditions and harsh terrain. This is despi te the fact that the leaderships in India and Pakistan acknowledge the human and economic costs of the Siachen dispute. According to careful estimates by Pakistani defence experts, to maintain three battalions at the icy wasteland of Siachen, Islamabad spends Rs. 15 million a da y, which makes Rs. 450 million a month and Rs. 5.4 billion a year. On the other hand, the deployment of seven battalions at the Glacier costs India Rs. 50 milli on a day, Rs. 1.5 billion a month and Rs. 30 billion a year. On average, the exp erts say, one Pakistani soldier is killed every third day on the Glacier, showin g approximately 100 casualties every year on average. Similarly, one Indian sold ier is killed every other day on the Glacier, at an annual average of 180 casual ties. According to unofficial figures, over 2,200 Pakistani soldiers lost their lives on the Glacier between 1984 and 2004 as against over 4,000 Indian casualti es. The cost of a loaf of bread that would be less than a rupee in the Kashmir Vall ey is estimated by the Times of India to be worth Rs10,000 (US$217) by the time it reaches Indian soldiers on Siachen. The fight for the Siachen Glacier involve s territory claimed by both states but not controlled by either until the mid-19 80s. In twenty years of fighting, India and Pakistan have chosen to keep the war almost entirely out of the press. It is a war neither side wants to fight. Yet, it has lasted for two long decades. Thousands of soldiers from Pakistan and Ind ia stand muzzle to muzzle all along the Glacier, the disputed ice chunk between two hostile neighbours. India controls about two-thirds of the Glacier besides c ommanding two of the three passes while Pakistan occupies the Gyong La Pass, whi ch overlooks Shyok and Nubra river valleys and India's access to the Glacier fro m the Leh district in Ladakh. At 5,472 meters above sea level, the Siachen Glacier is located in the Karakoram mountain region, which has some of the highest peaks in the world. The northern mountains of the Glacier mark the watershed between the Central Asia and the In dian sub-continent. Bereft of vegetation, the Glacier happens to be one of the w orld's most inhospitable regions where temperature hovers around minus 40 degree

centigrade. If bare skin touches metal, it bounds as if with glue and can be to rn off. In winters, strong winds from Central Asia can further bring down the te mperature to minus 50 degrees. The Glacier receives 6 to 7 meters of the annual total of 10 meters of snow in winter alone. Blizzards can reach speeds up to 150 knots (nearly 300 kilometers per hour). The Indian army controls Siachen heights, holding on to the tactical advantage o f high ground. But the Pakistan army is slightly better off since it occupies sm aller portion of the Glacier, and its road-head is only 20 km away from the fart hest post. Indian troops on the other hand are stationed about 80 km away from t he road-head and have to be maintained entirely by air, which is not only cost p rohibitive but also risky because of the adverse weather conditions most of the times. Interestingly, the Pakistani soldiers cannot go up to the Glacier and the Indian forces cannot come down. While the Pakistani troops stationed on the Glacier are confronted with a less forbidding terrain as compared to their Indian adversaries, their military prese nce forces Indians to retain their troops on the more elevated and hazardous mou ntain passes, resulting in higher attrition rates because of the dangerous altit ude, weather and terrain. Daily existence at the Glacier is simply agonizing due to frostbiting and other such tribulations. Over 95 per cent of the casualties at the Glacier are because of extremely cold weather and forbidding terrain whil e only five percent fall in combat. The Indian casualty rate is a staggering 63 of every two soldiers sent up to the Glacier, one will be a casualty. per cent The Pakistanis are no better off since they lose fewer men to the hostile eleme nts and more to the Indian firing. Pakistani authorities had admitted in 1994 th at their non-combat casualties since 1984 accounted for over 80 per cent of tota l attrition. Pakistani positions are, for the most part, at a lower altitude in the Glacier area, ranging between 9,000 to 15,000 feet (some are at a much highe r altitude such as Conway Saddle, at 17,200 feet, which controls doorway to the Glacier). Over the last two decades, Pakistan has tried many times to displace t he Indian forces, but had to retreat each time. The Indian troops have to do not hing but sit tight and periodically repel a Pakistani assault. Despite wearing five layers of clothing, paratroopers shiver as they wait to bo ard an air force transport at the world's highest air base at Leh. The AN-32A pl anes approach the stark runway at Leh in snowy mist, pushed by tail winds. The p ilots navigate the steep mountains by sight. Higher on the icy Himalayan peaks, helicopter pilots battle downdrafts as they land on helipads to deliver precious supplies or rescue injured soldiers. The pilots stay on the ground no more than 30 seconds for fear of being shot by the enemy troops. Soldiers brought down to base camp often suffer hearing, eyesight and memory loss because of prolonged u se of oxygen masks. Many lose eyes, hands or feet to frostbite. The roots of the conflict over Siachen lie in the non-demarcations on the weste rn side of the map beyond a grid point known as NJ 9842. Hostilities between Ind ia and Pakistan over ownership of the Glacier date back to the first Indo-Pak wa r of 1948, over the territorial dispute of Jammu & Kashmir. A Cease-Fire Line (C FL) was established as a result of the 1949 Indo-Pak agreement that concluded th e war in Jammu & Kashmir. The CFL ran along the international Indo-Pak border an d then north and northeast until map grid-point NJ 9842, located near the Shyok River at the base of the Saltoro mountain range. Because no Indian or Pakistani troops were present in the geographically inhospitable northeastern areas beyond NJ 9842, the CFL was not delineated as far as the Chinese border. Both sides ag reed, in vague language, that the CFL extends to the terminal point, NJ 9842, an d "thence north to the Glaciers". After the 1965 India-Pakistan war, the Tashkent agreement resulted in troop with drawals to positions along the 1949 CFL. No attempt was made to extend the CFL f

urther. Following Pakistan's defeat in the 1971 war with India, the Simla Agreem ent of 1972 established a new Line of Control (LoC) as a result of the December 1971 cease-fire. The Siachen Glacier region, where no fighting had taken place, was left un-delineated, and no attempt was made to clarify the position of the L oC beyond NJ 9842. The LoC was merely described as moving from Nerlin (inclusive to India), Brilman (inclusive to Pakistan), up to Chorbat La in the Turtok sect or. Since the Siachen Glacier region falls within the un-delineated territory be yond the last defined section of the LoC, map grid-point NJ 9842, Indian and Pak istani territorial claims are based on their respective interpretations of the v ague language contained in the 1949 and 1972 agreements. Pakistan draws a straig ht line in a northeasterly direction from NJ 9842 up to the Karakoram Pass on it s boundary with China. India instead draws a north-northwest line from NJ 9842 a long the watershed line of the Saltoro Range, a southern offshoot of the Karakor am Range. As things stand today, neither of the two sides is ready to alter the status quo on Siachen. Pakistan claims the Siachen Glacier is a part of the country's nort hern areas, over which it enjoyed continued administrative control since her ind ependence from the British Raj in 1947. On the other hand, India stresses that t he un-demarcated area was never in the Pakistani control as per the Simla agreem ent wording of 1949. But Pakistan cites the boundary agreement of 1963 with Chin a to support its case. India is determined to keep the Glacier since its northern mountains divide the Central Asia and the Indian sub-continent. Whoever owns the Glacier controls th e Shyok and Nubra valleys, as well as the region bordering China. India fears th at Pakistan's control of the Glacier would endanger the security of Ladakh in pa rticular and the state of Jammu & Kashmir in general. The Indians further believ e that China and Pakistan want to occupy the Siachen to secure a common border w ith China to facilitate a closer military link. Although Islamabad had affected its control over the Siachen Glacier since the 1960s, it did not establish any p ermanent post because of the harsh climatic conditions there. However, scouting missions kept climbing to the Glacier from time to time. The Indians were first to deploy their troops and establish permanent posts at the Siachen Glacier in A pril 1984, through a major air-mobile operation, code-named "Meghdoot". The Indi an army quietly moved an advance unit from the Kumaon regiment to occupy key mou ntain Passes and successfully established permanent posts at the Siachen heights in violation of all the previous agreements reached between the two countries. As a result of operation "Meghdoot", two out of three passes on the Siachen Sia La and Bilfond La -- came under India's control, while the third pass -- Gyong L a remained under Pakistan's control. The Indian army is permanently stationed al l along the 110-km long Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL), backed by a formidab le array of surface weapons, including anti-aircraft guns, missiles and artiller y. The Pakistani arsenal is comparable: sniper rifles, machine guns, anti-tank a nd anti-aircraft missiles, rocket launchers and artillery pieces. Though the two armies used to clash on the Glacier quite often, Pakistan announced a ceasefire in November 2003 as part of a border truce with India. With the installation of the Congress-led coalition government in India, both the countries are once aga in talking to each other on all the contentious issues, including that of the Si achen. For the first time in the past twenty years, the two countries decided last year to discuss the Siachen issue at the defence secretaries' level. Pakistan's defe nce secretary Lt. Gen. (retd) Hamid Nawaz Khan visited India in August 2004 to m eet his Indian counterpart Ajai Vikram Singh, who led his country's team at the negotiations in Hyderabad House of New Delhi. During these talks, which remained inconclusive, members from both the teams reportedly questioned the terrible wa ste of human lives in a so-called war of prestige and urged that it must be brou ght to an end. During the second round of talks held in Islamabad on May 26-27,

2005, the Indian delegation was headed by Defence Secretary Ajay Vikram Singh wh ile Defence Secretary Lt Gen (retd) Tariq Wasim Ghazi led the Pakistani side. While Pakistan proposed a negotiated withdrawal of troops from the disputed reg ion to the 1980 position, the Indian side was keen to get the whole area declare d as demilitarised zone before vacating it. Yet, no agreement could be reached b etween the two sides, primarily because India's six-point proposal, starting wit h cessation of "cartographic aggression" and culminating in the "withdrawal of f orces", was dramatically in conflict with Pakistan's two-point formula of first withdrawing forces and then delineating an extension of the Line of Control (LoC ) beyond NJ 9842 (Latitude 98 degrees East and Longitude 42 degrees north). So d ivergent were the views on both sides that no meeting point was possible. Analysts say one way to look at the problem is to shrug one's shoulders and say this un-declared war can go on even as India and Pakistan normalise on other fr onts. Fair enough. But does this logic take into account the plight of the troop s on both sides and even the bigger logic of normalisation itself? No. There are various proposals, including some very good non-official ones, on the table. It is time both sides got out of the old grooves and began to look at the issue in the larger political context rather than simply in the narrow military sense. A more earnest attempt should be made to at least agree on withdrawal to less har sh and more civilized positions and to pledge that no patrols in uncharted terri tory will be carried out by either side. This too should be seen as a confidence -building measure.