Interpleader

Rule 62 IAC dismissed the petition. It however later reversed its decision, and ordered ETERNAL to deposit whatever amounts are due from it under the Land Development Agreement with a reputable bank to be designated by the respondent court to be the depository trustee of the said amounts to be paid to whoever shall be found entitled thereto. ETERNAL moved for a reconsideration of the above decision but it was denied for lack of merit. Issue: Whether or not respondent CA abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in reconsidering its resolution and in requiring instead that ETERNAL deposit whatever amounts are due from it under the Land Development Agreement Held: NO. Petitioner admitted among others in its complaint in Interpleader that it is still obligated to pay certain amounts to private respondent; that it claims no interest in such amounts due and is willing to pay whoever is declared entitled to said amounts. As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, the essence of an interpleader, aside from the disavowal of interest in the property in litigation on the part of the petitioner, is the deposit of the property or funds in controversy with the court. It is a rule founded on justice and equity: "that the plaintiff may not continue to benefit from the property or funds in litigation during the pendency of the suit at the expense of whoever will ultimately be decided as entitled thereto." The case at bar was elevated to the Court of Appeals on certiorari with prohibitory and mandatory injunction. Said appellate court found that more than twenty million pesos are involved; so that on interest alone for savings or time deposit would be considerable, now accruing in favor of the ETERNAL. Finding that such is violative of the very essence of the complaint for interpleader as it clearly runs against the interest of justice in this case, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for finding that the lower court committed a grave abuse of discretion which requires correction by the requirement that a deposit of said amounts should be made to a bank approved by the Court.

1. ETERNAL GARDENS MEMORIAL PARKS CORPORATION vs. IAC, et. al (165 SCRA 439) the essence of an interpleader, aside from the disavowal of interest in the property in litigation on the part of the petitioner, is the deposit of the property or funds in controversy with the court. It is a rule founded on justice and equity: "that the plaintiff may not continue to benefit from the property or funds in litigation during the pendency of the suit at the expense of whoever will ultimately be decided as entitled thereto." Facts: ETERNAL Gardens Memorial Parks Corporation (ETERNAL) and North Philippine Union MISSION Corporations (MISSION) executed a Land Development Agreement (Agreement) over the property owned by the latter into a memorial park. The lot will be subdivided into and sold as memorial plot lots. In said agreement, MISSION is entitled to receive 40% of the net gross collection. Under the implementation of the agreement, MISSION received initial payment as part of its share under the above Agreement. However, MAYSILO Estate (MAYSILO) asserted its claim of ownership over the property in question. In view of the conflicting claims of ownership of the defendants over the properties, petitioner filed a complaint for interpleader against MISSION and MAYSILO. MISSION then presented a motion for the placing on judicial deposit the amounts due and unpaid from ETERNAL. The trial court denied the motion. MISSION filed a petition for certiorari with the then IAC praying that the aforementioned Orders of trial court be set aside and that an order be issued to deposit in court or in a depositor trustee bank of any and all payments, plus interest thereon, due the private respondent MISSION under the Land Development Agreement, said amounts deposited to be paid to whomever may be found later to be entitled thereto.

2. WACK-WACK vs. WON (70 SCRA) The reasonable time to have filed the interpleader suit was after dispute had arisen without waiting to be sued by any of the claimants, otherwise he may be barred by laches. Facts: Wack-wack Golf and Country Corporation issued certificates of stock to its members. A problem arose when its membership fee certificate 201 was being claimed by two parties. Although the Corporation officially recognized one Bienvenido Tan as the owner of the stocks in question, another person, Lee Won also claimed ownership. Instead of compelling claimants Won and Tan to settle their dispute amongst themselves so that the Corporation could validly recognize the rightful owner of the stocks, Wack-Wack Corportion chose to do nothing. And so, Mr. Won filed a civil case against the corporation for the issuance of stock certificates wherein the Court ruled in favor of Won. Later on, even when the decision in the above-stated case had already become final, the Corporation still went on to file an Interpleader suit against both Won and Tan. This suit was dismissed because defendant Won claimed res judicata. And so, the Corporation appeals its case arguing that its interpleader suit was proper as there were two conflicting claims against its issued stock certificate and that the corporation itself wasn t claiming ownership of said certificate. It also argued that with regards to res judicata, the same is not applicable to its interpleader suit because there is no identity of the parties, subject-matter, and cause of action with the earlier case filed by Mr. Won.

Issues: Should the interpleader suit be dismissed on the ground of res judicata? Was the interpleader suit filed by Wack-wack proper as there were in fact two claimants to its certificate? Held: The interpleader suit should really be dismissed but not on res judicata but because the interpleader suit was filed out of time. Upon its knowledge that two parties were battling for the ownership of membership Certificate of Stock 201, Wack-Wack should have already filed an interpleader suit in order two compel the conflicting parties to settle as to whose claim Wack-Wack should recognize. In other words, the reasonable time to have filed the interpleader suit was after dispute had arisen without waiting to be sued by any of the claimants, otherwise he may be barred by laches. And so, the corporation s action is deemed to late when it was filed only after judgment against it had already been rendered by one of the claimants in an independent suit. Or, when Mr. Won filed a case against it, it should have immediately impleaded Mr. Tan. And because Wack-Wack has offered no explanation as to why it wasn t able to file an interpleader suit much sooner, nor as to why it didn t implead Tan in the suit against it, the Corporation has already become independently liable. Note: In this case, it was also mentioned that the difference between an interpleader suit in the Rules of Court and the Code of Civil Procedure is that in the latter, an interpleader suit is available regardless the nature of the subject-matter while in the rules of court, only personal property and those which relate to the performance of an obligation can be deemed as the proper subjects of an interpleader suit. 3. PASRICHA, et. al v. DON LUIS DISON REALTY, INC. (548 SCRA) an action for interpleader is proper when the lessee does not know to whom payment of rentals should be made due to conflicting claims on the property.

Facts: Petitioners are lesees of nine rooms in a building owned by lessor Don Luis Dison Realty, Inc. of the San Luis Building, located at Ermita, Manila. It was clear in their contract that all the rooms may be occupied right away except for three rooms, which may be occupied only when the tenants vacate said premises. The lease of three rooms however did not materialize leaving only six rooms as subjects of the lease contracts. While the contracts were in effect, petitioners dealt with Francis Pacheco (Pacheco), then General Manager of private respondent. Thereafter, Pacheco was replaced by Roswinda Bautista (Ms. Bautista). Petitioners religiously paid the monthly rentals until May 1992. After that, however, despite repeated demands, petitioners continuously refused to pay the stipulated rent. Because petitioners still refused to comply, a complaint for ejectment was filed by private respondent through its representative, Ms. Bautista, before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila. Petitioners admitted their failure to pay the stipulated rent for the leased premises starting July until November 1992, but claimed that such refusal was justified because of the internal squabble in respondent company as to the person authorized to receive payment. The MeTC rendered a decision dismissing the complaint because of Ms. Bautista s alleged lack of authority to sue on behalf of the corporation. It ruled however, that the non-payment of the rental fee was unjustified. The RTC on appeal adopted the MeTC s finding on petitioners unjustified refusal to pay the rent, which is a valid ground for ejectment. It, however, faulted the MeTC in dismissing the case on the ground of lack of capacity to sue. Instead, it upheld Ms. Bautista s authority to represent respondent notwithstanding the absence of a board resolution to that effect, since her authority was implied from her power as a general manager/treasurer of the company.

The CA affirmed the RTC s decision. Hence the present appeal. Issue: WON petitioners are justified in withholding payments of rental fee on the ground that there is confusion as to whom shall payment be made. Held: NO. If it were true that they were allowed to use only one of the nine rooms subject of the contract of lease, and considering that the rooms were intended for a business purpose, we cannot understand why they did not specifically assert their right. If we believe petitioners contention that they had been prevented from using the rooms for more than a year before the complaint for ejectment was filed, they should have demanded specific performance from the lessor and commenced an action in court. With the execution of the contract, petitioners were already in a position to exercise their right to the use and enjoyment of the property according to the terms of the lease contract. As borne out by the records, the fact is that respondent turned over to petitioners the keys to the leased premises and petitioners, in fact, renovated the rooms. Thus, they were placed in possession of the premises and they had the right to the use and enjoyment of the same. They, likewise, had the right to resist any act of intrusion into their peaceful possession of the property, even as against the lessor itself. Yet, they did not lift a finger to protect their right if, indeed, there was a violation of the contract by the lessor. What was, instead, clearly established by the evidence was petitioners non-payment of rentals because ostensibly they did not know to whom payment should be made. However, this did not justify their failure to pay, because if such were the case, they were not without any remedy. They should have availed of the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines on the consignation of payment and of the Rules of Court on interpleader. Article 1256 of the Civil Code provides:

If the creditor to whom tender of payment has been made refuses without just cause to accept it, the debtor shall be released from responsibility by the consignation of the thing or sum due. Consignation alone shall produce the same effect in the following cases: xxxx (4) When two or more persons claim the same right to collect; x x x x. Consignation shall be made by depositing the things due at the disposal of a judicial authority, before whom the tender of payment shall be proved in a proper case, and the announcement of the consignation in other cases. In the instant case, consignation alone would have produced the effect of payment of the rentals. The rationale for consignation is to avoid the performance of an obligation becoming more onerous to the debtor by reason of causes not imputable to him. Petitioners claim that they made a written tender of payment and actually prepared vouchers for their monthly rentals. But that was insufficient to constitute a valid tender of payment. Even assuming that it was valid tender, still, it would not constitute payment for want of consignation of the amount. Well-settled is the rule that tender of payment must be accompanied by consignation in order that the effects of payment may be produced. Moreover, Section 1, Rule 62 of the Rules of Court provides: Section 1. When interpleader proper. Whenever conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or may be made against a person who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter, or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants, he may bring an action against the conflicting claimants to compel them to interplead and litigate their several claims among themselves. Otherwise stated, an action for interpleader is proper when the lessee does not know to whom payment of rentals should be made

due to conflicting claims on the property (or on the right to collect). The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against double liability but to protect him against double vexation in respect of one liability. Notably, instead of availing of the above remedies, petitioners opted to refrain from making payments. Neither can petitioners validly invoke the non-delivery of three Rooms as a justification for non-payment of rentals. Although the two contracts embraced the lease of nine rooms, the terms of the contracts - with their particular reference to specific rooms and the monthly rental for each - easily raise the inference that the parties intended the lease of each room separate from that of the others. There is nothing in the contract which would lead to the conclusion that the lease of one or more rooms was to be made dependent upon the lease of all the nine (9) rooms. Accordingly, the use of each room by the lessee gave rise to the corresponding obligation to pay the monthly rental for the same. Notably, respondent demanded payment of rentals only for the rooms actually delivered to, and used by, petitioners. Declaratory Relief Rule 63

1. MERALCO v. PhilS. Consumers Foundation, Inc. (374 SCRA 262) Declaratory relief may be entertained only before the breach or violation of the statute, deed, contract etc., to which it refers. Facts: Pres. Marcos, with the objective of enabling the grantees of electric franchises to reduce their rates "within the reach of consumers , promulgated PD No. 551, providing for the reduction from 5% to 2% of the franchise tax paid by electric companies, thus: Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc., (PCFI) filed with the Board of Energy (BOE) a petition for Specific Performance, Damages

and Violation of P.D. 551 against the Manila Electric Company (MERALCO). PCFI sought for the immediate refund by MERALCO to its customers of all the savings it realized under PD No. 551, through the reduction of its franchise tax from 5% to 2%, with interest at the legal rate; and for the payment of damages and a fine in the amount of P50, 000.00 for violating PD 551. It moored its petition on Section 4 of PD No. 551 which provides that all the savings realized by electric franchise holders from the reduction of the franchise tax under Section 1 and tariff reductions and tax credits under Sections 2 and 3, shall be passed on to the ultimate consumer. The Secretary of Finance shall promulgate rules and regulations and devise a reporting system to carry out the provisions of this Decree. In its Answer, MERALCO alleged that it was authorized by BOE through its Order to retain the disputed savings which has long become final. BOE ruled in favor of MERALCO confirming the order cited. PCFI filed a motion for reconsideration with BOE which was denied. Hence, PCFI filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court which was dismissed for lack of merit which became final and executory. Four years thereafter, PCFI and Edgardo Isip, filed with RTC, Quezon City a petition for declaratory relief praying for a ruling on who should be entitled to the savings realized by MERALCO under PD 551. PCFI insist that the savings belong to the ultimate consumers. MERALCO, in its Answer, moved to dismiss on the ground of res judicata. RTC declared the Supreme Court s decision NULL AND VOID on the basis of J. Claudio Teehankee s dissenting opinion holding that the disputed savings belong to the consumers as clearly stated in the same law. MERALCO filed MR but was denied.

Issue: Whether or not the remedy of petition for declaratory relief was no longer available to PCFI. Held: Yes. The elements of res judicata are all present in this case. First, a final judgment was rendered by the Court in its October 22, 1985 decision in G.R. No. 63018 sustaining the BOE s Decision dated November 25, 1982. Second, the court/BOE who rendered the decision has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. Third, the judgment was on the merits. Fourth, there is identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action between the two cases. Clearly, the test of identity of causes of action lies not in the form of an action. The difference of actions in the aforesaid cases is of no moment. The doctrine of res judicata still applies considering that the parties were litigating for the same thing and more importantly, the same contentions. As can be gleaned from the records, private respondents arguments in Civil Case No. Q-89-3659 bear extreme resemblance with those raised in BOE Case No. 82198. Respondent RTC's Decision granting PCFI and Isip's petition for declaratory relief is in direct derogation of the principle of res judicata. Twice, it has been settled that MERALCO is duly authorized to retain the savings it realized under P.D. No. 551 as long as its rate of return falls below the 12% allowable rate. The pronouncement of the BOE in BOE Case No. 82-198 finding such fact to be "beyond question" is clear and not susceptible of equivocation. This pronouncement was sustained by this Court in G.R. No. 63018. In finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the BOE, this Court [SC] saw the wisdom of its assailed Decision. Thus, this Court held: "[I]n dismissing the petition for specific performance, the BOE authorized MERALCO, in lieu of increasing its rates to get a more reasonable return on investments while at the same time refunding to consumers the benefit of P.D. No. 551, to instead defer the passing on of benefits but without the planned increases. Instead of giving back money to consumers and then taking back the same in terms of increased rates, MERALCO was allowed by the BOE to follow the more simplified and rational procedure."

Corollarily, let it not be overlooked that the purpose of an action for declaratory relief is to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, contract etc. for their guidance in the enforcement thereof, or compliance therewith, and not to settle issues arising from an alleged breach thereof. It may be entertained only before the breach or violation of the statute, deed, contract etc., to which it refers. The petition gives a practical remedy in ending controversies which have not reached the stage where other relief is immediately available. It supplies the need for a form of action that will set controversies at rest before they lead to repudiation of obligations, invasion of rights, and the commission of wrongs. Here, private respondents brought the petition for declaratory relief long after the alleged violation of PD No. 551. The RTC also violated the hierarchy of courts when it declare the Resolution of the Court null and cannot be considered as a valid judgment that will be a bar to the present action. In fine, the Supreme Court stressed that the rights of MERALCO under PD No. 551, as determined by the BOE and sustained by the Court, have acquired the character of res judicata and can no longer be challenged. 3. TAMBUNTING vs. SUMABAT Where the law or contract has already been contravened prior to the filing of an action for declaratory relief, the court can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action. Facts: Spouses Sumabat and Baello were the registered land owners of a parcel of land in Caloocan. In May 1973, and in order to obtain a P7,727.95 loan from petitioner Tambunting, the spouses mortgaged said land to the former. Subsequently, Tambunting assigned his rights to the mortgaged to Commercial House Finance (CHFI). And because respondent spouses

have not been paying their monthly amortizations, they were informed that their indebtedness has ballooned to P15k. And so, CHFI and Tambunting filed a case for foreclosure but was restrained by Branch 33 of the RTC of Caloocan. The reason for the restraint was because the respondents were able to file an action for declaratory relief with said RTC. In their action, respondents were praying that the court rule on the extent or amount of their actual indebtedness. In said RTC case, which was filed March 1979, herein petitioners were declared in default. Thus, even when the Tambunting, et al moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that mortgaged deed/contract had already been breached prior to the action , said motion was denied for having been filed out of time. On Jan. 1981, the RTC rendered a decision finding that respondents liability, by virtue of their mortgage deed/contract, was P15,743.83. Pursuant to this decision, the respondents made a consignation with the RTC in said amount. After almost 14 years, or on Feb 1995, CHFI again foreclosed on the contested land. The respondents came to know of this because they received a notice of foreclosure sale, to be conducted by the sheriff, of the land in question. This time, the petitioners filed an action with Branch 120 of the RTC of Caloocan for injunction against the foreclosure sale. But, the sale still pushed thru, with CHFI being declared the highest bidder. A new TCT was then issued to CHFI . Thus, respondent spouses amended their complaint to an action for nullification of the foreclosure/sheriff s sale, the new TCT of CHFI, as well as reconveyance. On Feb 2000, Branch 120 of the RTC declared the foreclosure sale as void. It likewise ruled that reconveyance of the property should be made to the respondents. This decision was grounded on the fact

that consignation of P15k has already been made by CHFI pursuant to the earlier decision of the Branch 33 of the RTC After a denial of petitioner s MR, they filed petition for review on certiorari with the SC. The petitioners argued that RTC, Branch 33, erred when it ordered the consignation of P15k. As earlier pointed out, the action in first case was for declaratory relief. But petitioner points out the fact that respondents are not entitled anymore to file an action for declaratory relief because there had already been a violation of the mortgaged contract when the spouses defaulted on their amortizations. Furthermore the action for foreclosure by CHFI on 1995 has already prescribed Issues: Was the decision of Branch 120 of the RTC wrong when it ordered the nullification of the foreclosure sale on the ground that consignation has already been made in a previous case? Was the foreclosure action in 1995 and subsequent sale of the property already barred by prescription? Thus, should the action for nullification and reconveyance filed by the respondents be dismissed? Held: The trial court erred when it affirmed the validity of the consignation. The RTC should have been barred from taking cognizance of the action for declaratory relief since petitioners, being already in default in their loan amortizations, there existed a violation of the mortgage deed even before the institution of the action. Hence, the CFI could not have rendered a valid judgment in Civil Case No. C-7496, and the consignation made pursuant to a void judgment was likewise void. An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order, regulation or ordinance before breach or violation thereof. The purpose of the action is to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed,

contract, etc. for their guidance in its enforcement or compliance and not to settle issues arising from its alleged breach. It may be entertained only before the breach or violation of the statute, deed, contract, etc. to which it refers. Where the law or contract has already been contravened prior to the filing of an action for declaratory relief, the court can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action. Nonetheless, the petition must fail. Article 1142 of the Civil Code is clear. A mortgage action prescribes after ten years. Here, petitioners right of action accrued in May 1977 when respondents defaulted in their obligation to pay their loan amortizations. It was from that time that the ten-year period to enforce the right under the mortgage started to run. The period was interrupted when respondents filed Civil Case No. C-6329 sometime after May 1977 and the CFI restrained the intended foreclosure of the property. However, the period commenced to run again on November 9, 1977 when the case was dismissed. 4. Almeda v. Bathala Mktng. Intdusies, Inc. (542 SCRA 470) The requisites of an action for declaratory relief, as follows: 1) the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance; 2) the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction; 3) there must have been no breach of the documents in question; 4) there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one between persons whose interests are adverse; 5) the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and 6) adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding. Facts: Bathala Marketing Industries Inc., as lesee, entered into a contract of lease with Ponciano L. Almeda, as lessor. The contract is

for a term of four (4) years from May 1, 1997 unless sooner terminated. Under Paragraph 6 of their contract, they have agreed that the rental fee shall be based on the present rate of assessment on the property and may subsequently be increased or reduced depending on the new assessed value of the property imposed by tax authorities. On the other hand, Paragraph 7 of their contract provides that in case an extraordinary inflation or devaluation of Philippine Currency should supervene, the value of Philippine peso at the time of the establishment of the obligation shall be the basis of payment. During the effectivity of the contract, Ponciano died. As a result, Bathala now dealt with petitioner Eufemia, the wife of the late Ponciano and his father Almeda. On the same year, Bathala received two letters from petitioner. The first one proposed the imposition of VAT on the rental fee. It was opposed by Bathala based on its belief that the rental fee it was paying already included VAT as their contract was executed when VAT law had long been in effect. The second letter demanded for the increase of the rental fee by 73% based on the alleged extraordinary inflation which was opposed by Bathala which insisted that there was no extraordinary inflation to warrant the application of Article 1250. Despite all of these, Bathala continued paying the stipulated amount of rental fee in the contract. In due time however, it availed of its right to file an action for declaratory relief for purposes of determining the correct interpretation of condition Nos. 6 and 7 of the lease contract to prevent damage and prejudice. In turn, petitioner filed a complaint for ejectment, recission and damages but later on withdraw said complaint and instead moved for the dismissal of the declaratory relief case for being an improper remedy considering that respondent was already in breach of the

obligation and that the case would not end the litigation and settle the rights of the parties. The trial court favored Bathala s contentions. When the case was elevated to the CA, it affirmed the decision of the trial court but with modification. The appellate court agreed with the conclusions of law and the application of the decisional rules on the matter made by the RTC. However, it found that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in granting affirmative relief to the respondent, particularly the restitution of its excess payment. Issue: WON the action for declaratory relief was proper. Held: YES. Declaratory relief is defined as an action by any person interested in a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, executive order or resolution, to determine any question of construction or validity arising from the instrument, executive order or regulation, or statute, and for a declaration of his rights and duties thereunder. The only issue that may be raised in such a petition is the question of construction or validity of provisions in an instrument or statute. Corollary is the general rule that such an action must be justified, as no other adequate relief or remedy is available under the circumstances. Decisional law enumerates the requisites of an action for declaratory relief, as follows: 1) the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance; 2) the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction; 3) there must have been no breach of the documents in question; 4) there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one between persons whose interests are adverse; 5) the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and 6) adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding.

It is beyond cavil that the foregoing requisites are present in the instant case, except that petitioners insist that respondent was already in breach of the contract when the petition was filed. We do not agree. After petitioners demanded payment of adjusted rentals and in the months that followed, respondent complied with the terms and conditions set forth in their contract of lease by paying the rentals stipulated therein. Respondent religiously fulfilled its obligations to petitioners even during the pendency of the present suit. There is no showing that respondent committed an act constituting a breach of the subject contract of lease. Thus, respondent is not barred from instituting before the trial court the petition for declaratory relief. Petitioners claim that the instant petition separate action for rescission, ejectment commenced before another court; thus, subject contractual provisions should be forum. We are not convinced. It is true that in Panganiban v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, we held that the petition for declaratory relief should be dismissed in view of the pendency of a separate action for unlawful detainer. However, we cannot apply the same ruling to the instant case. In Panganiban, the unlawful detainer case had already been resolved by the trial court before the dismissal of the declaratory relief case; and it was petitioner in that case who insisted that the action for declaratory relief be preferred over the action for unlawful detainer. Conversely, in the case at bench, the trial court had not yet resolved the rescission/ejectment case during the pendency of the declaratory relief petition. In fact, the trial court, where the rescission case was on appeal, itself initiated the suspension of the proceedings pending the resolution of the action for declaratory relief. is not proper because a and damages had been the construction of the ventilated in the same

We are not unmindful of the doctrine enunciated in Teodoro, Jr. v. Mirasol, where the declaratory relief action was dismissed because the issue therein could be threshed out in the unlawful detainer suit. Yet, again, in that case, there was already a breach of contract at the time of the filing of the declaratory relief petition. This dissimilar factual milieu proscribes the Court from applying Teodoro to the instant case. Given all these attendant circumstances, the Court is disposed to entertain the instant declaratory relief action instead of dismissing it, notwithstanding the pendency of the ejectment/rescission case before the trial court. The resolution of the present petition would write finis to the parties' dispute, as it would settle once and for all the question of the proper interpretation of the two contractual stipulations subject of this controversy.

5. Reyes, et. al v. Ortiz, et al. (G.R. No. 137794); Sps. Embores, et al. v. Vallega, et al. (G.R. No. 149664). August 11, 2010 a court order is not a proper subject matter of a petition for Declaratory Relief. Facts: The instant cases are consolidated Petitions for Declaratory Relief, Certiorari and Prohibition. In G.R. No. 137794 (1st case), petitioners Reyes et. al seek to declare null and void the proceedings in an ejectment case before MeTC, Caloocan and another case for Recovery of Possession and Ownership before RTC, Caloocan. On one hand, petitioners Sps. Embores et. al in G.R. No. 149664 (2nd case) seek to nullify of four ejectment proceedings in different MTC/RTC branches in Caloocan. By court resolution the 2nd case was terminated on Aug. 30, 2006. The parcels of land which are the subject matter of these cases are part of the TALA ESTATE, situated between the boundaries of Caloocan City and Quezon City and encompassing an area of about 7,007.9515 hectares.

G.R. No. 137794 Sps. Bautista, Sps. Perl sought the ouster from the contested lots of Erlinda Reyes, Sps. Matienzo and Sergio Abejero, who are occupants of separate homelots in Camarin. The first case was initiated by Segundo Bautista, as the registered owner, he filed a complaint against land occupants Sps. Matienzo in RTC, Caloocan (RECOVERY CASE). Shortly thereafter, a separate but related action for annulment of title/reversion, was initiated by the Republic (Rep: Dir. of Lands) on Dec. 27, 1996 against Biyaya Corp and RD of Cities Pasig, Caloocan and Quezon, the City of Manila and Admin of LRA involving the TALA Estate before QC-RTC. The case sought to declare the transfer titles issued by Biyaya Corp. null and void; revert the patrimonial portions of the property to the State and the same be awarded to actual occupants (ANNULMENT/REVERSION CASE). One of the intervenors were petitioners Erlinda Reyes and Rosemarie Matienzo, members of Samahan ng Maliliit na Magkakapitbahay (SAMAKABA). The QC-RTC issued Preliminary Injunction freezing all ejectment cases in the MeTCs of QC involving TALA Estate. Believing the said Injunction beneficial to them, Sps. Matienzo filed a motion to suspend the proceedings of the Recovery Case which was denied; likewise, the MR was denied. Trial on merits started on Dec. 2, 1998. The second case, an ejectment case, was filed by Sps. Bernard and Florencia Perl against Reyes before MeTC, Caloocan. Thereafter, Sps. Perl also filed an ejectment case against Sergio Abejero. These two cases were consolidated (EJECTMENT CASES), Reyes, in her Answer and during Preliminary Conference, moved for suspension/dismissal of these cases citing the Injuction case; the court ignored and require a position paper instead. The court s Decision ordered Reyes to vacate the contested property. The Recovery and Ejectment cases were joined when petitioners Matienzo and Reyes filed the instant petition as Declaratory Relief, Certiorari and Prohibition assailing the denial of their respective motions for suspension.

This case is docketed as G.R. No. 137794. During the pendency of this case, certain events supervened when the Ejectment cases ran their course and Reyes appealed the MeTC decision to the RTC; meanwhile, Sps. Perl moved for execution pending appeal which was granted and accordingly a writ of execution was issued by the RTC. Thus, Reyes et. al moved for suspension of the RTC proceedings to the SC. The Court issued TRO for the implementation of the writ. G.R. No. 149664 This case emanated from four (4) distinct ejectment complainst filed against petitioners Corazon Laurente, Sps. Alberto and Lourdes Embores, Sps. Roberto and Evelyn Palad, and Dennis Henosa. Petitioners were sought to be evicted in Camarin and are members of Alyansa ng Mga Naninirahan Sa Tala Friar Lands (ALNATFRAL). They are also intervenors in the Reversion Case. These cases were filed prior to the issuance of Injunction Order by the QC-RTC. Petitioners separately invoked the said injunction for the dismissal of the current ejectment cases against them. They directly filed their petitions with the SC. On April 28, 2003, this Court resolved to consolidate the two cases. Since the first case was withdrawn, only the issues in the second case remain to be resolved. ARGUMENT/s: As to petitioner: (1) The refusal of the Caloocal s MeTC and RTC to suspend the Ejectment cases despite the Injunction is tantamount to grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; if so, the Decision in the Ejectment and Recovery cases must be annulled. (2) The petition is mainly for Declaratory Relief. As to respondent: The petition for relief is not a proper remedy for the following reasons: (1) the action for petition for relief will only prosper if the statute, deed or contract has not been violated but in this case, the violation of the Injunction Order has already been

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made prior to the filing of the petition; thus, to rule on the petition now would only serve as an authoritative guidance for its implementation. (2) petitioners recourse was merely a ploy to substitute the filing of certiorari under Rule 65 which 60-day period already lapsed. (3) the petition was directly filed with SC in violation of Hierarchy of Courts; it should have been filed with the CA first. (4) Caloocan RTC did not err in not suspending the Recovery Case since QC-RTC is a co-equal court

for the reformation of an instrument; (2) an action to quiet title; and (3) an action to consolidate ownership in a sale with a right to repurchase. In Lerum v. Cruz (1950), the Supreme Court held that the subject matter of the petition for relief must only refer to a deed, will, contract or other written instrument or to a statute or ordinance. Any other matter not mentioned therein is deemed excluded. Expressio unius est exclussio alterius. The Court further ruled in succeeding jurisprudence that a Judge s query or a court decision is not a proper subject matter of a petition for relief. In this case, petitioners Reyes and Matienzo assailed via Declaratory Relief under Rule 63 of ROC, the orders denying their motions to suspend proceedings. This cannot be countenanced since a court order is not a proper subject matter of a petition for Declaratory Relief. The proper remedy of Erlinda Reyes from the denial of a motion before the Caloocan MeTC was to file a motion for reconsideration and, if it is denied, to file a petition for certiorari before the RTC pursuant to Rule 65 of ROC; Whereas, the proper remedy of Matienzo should have been to file a special civil action on certiorari also under Rule 65 with CA from the denial of her motion by the Caloocan RTC. The necessity of filing the petition to the RTC in the case of Erlinda Reyes and to the Court of Appeals in the case of Matienzo is dictated by the principle of the hierarchy of courts. Both petitions must be filed within 60 days from receipt or notice of denial of the motion as provided under Section 4, Rule 65. This procedural faux pas proves fatal. The case not being one of exceptional circumstance to warrant the Supreme Court to exercise primary jurisdiction. Matienzo obviously filed the declaratory relief as a substitute for certiorari, a remedy she lost by inaction. To recall, Matienzo received a copy of the Order of denial for her motion for reconsideration on June 9, 1998 but it was only on March 25, 1999 that she assailed the said order via this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the petition is one for Declaratory Relief under Section 1 of Rule 63; whether or not the petition should be granted as a proper remedy for the lower court s denial of petitioner s motion for suspension of the Ejectment case while an Injunction Order was being enforced in another court. Held: Section 1, Rule 63 of the 1997 Rules of Court provides: SECTION 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder. An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought under this Rule. The section can be dissected in two parts. The first paragraph concerns declaratory relief, which has been defined as a special civil action by any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument or whose rights are affected by a statute, ordinance, executive order or regulation to determine any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument, executive order or regulation, or statute and for declaration of rights and duties thereunder. The second paragraph pertains to (1) an action

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The Caloocan City RTC and MeTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion upon denying petitioners motion. It is clear from its Order, that the preliminary injunction was addressed to the MTC of QC and Caloocan City; not with the Caloocan City RTC. The order merely mentions the Caloocan City MeTCs. Nothing more. But more importantly, the Quezon City RTC could not have validly enjoined the Caloocan City RTC without violating the doctrine that no court has the power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or decrees of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. Hence, petitioners posture that the Ejectment cases should be suspended due to the pendency of the Annulment/Reversion case is not meritorious. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. The Temporary Restraining Order dated October 25, 2000 issued by this Court is LIFTED. 6. Malana v. Tappa (600 SCRA 189) an action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the instruments involved or of rights arising thereunder. Facts: Petitioners alleged that they are the owners of a parcel of land situated in Tuguegarao City, Cagayan as they inherited the subject property from late Anastacio Danao. During the lifetime of Anastacio, he had allowed Consuelo Pauig to build on and occupy the southern portion of the subject property on agreement that the latter would vacate the said land at any time that Anastacio and his heirs might need it. Averring that they already needed it, petitioners demanded that respondents vacate the same. Respondents, however, refused to heed petitioners demand. The petitioners referred their land dispute with respondents to the Barangay. During the conciliation proceedings, respondents asserted that they owned the subject property and presented documents ostensibly supporting their claim of ownership, enough to create clouds on their title. Thus, petitioners filed before the RTC of Tugegarao City Complaint for Reivindicacion, Quieting of Title, and Damages.

The RTC dismissed petitioners complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners filed two pleadings. A Motion for Reconsideration and another simply designated as motion. They argued, among others, that their principal cause of action was for quieting of title; the accion reivindicacion was included merely to enable them to seek complete relief from respondents. Their complaint should not have been dismissed, since Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court states that an action to quiet title falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC. Both Motions were denied by the RTC. The RTC differentiated between the first and the second paragraphs of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. The first paragraph refers to an action for declaratory relief, which should be brought before the RTC. The second paragraph, however, refers to a different set of remedies, which includes an action to quiet title to real property. The second paragraph must be read in relation to Republic Act No. 7691, which vests the MTC with jurisdiction over real actions, where the assessed value of the real property involved does not exceed P50,000.00 in Metro Manila and P20,000.00 in all other places. It reasoned that an action to quiet title is a real action under second paragraph of the Sec.1, Rule 63 and since the assessed value of subject property per Tax Declaration was P410.00, the real action involving the same was outside the jurisdiction of the RTC. Issue: Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Held: No. The RTC correctly made a distinction between the first and the second paragraphs of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. As the provision states, a petition for declaratory relief under the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 may be brought before the appropriate RTC.

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And to determine which court has jurisdiction over the actions identified in the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, said provision must be read together with those of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended. Furthermore, an action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the instruments involved or of rights arising thereunder. Where the law or contract has already been contravened prior to the filing of an action for declaratory relief, the courts can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action. In other words, a court has no more jurisdiction over an action for declaratory relief if its subject has already been infringed or transgressed before the institution of the action. Since petitioners averred in the Complaint that they had already been deprived of the possession of their property, the proper remedy for them is the filing of an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, not a case for declaratory relief. An accion publiciana is a suit for the recovery of possession, filed one year after the occurrence of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty. An accion reivindicatoria is a suit that has for its object one s recovery of possession over the real property as owner. Petitioners Complaint contained sufficient allegations for an accion reivindicatoria. Jurisdiction over such an action would depend on the value of the property involved. Given that the subject property herein is valued only at P410.00, then the MTC, not the RTC, has jurisdiction over an action to recover the same. The RTC, therefore, did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing, without prejudice, petitioners Complaint in Civil Case No. 6868 for lack of jurisdiction. Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus 1. Mallari vs.GSIS (611 SCRA 32) Rule 65

It is worth emphasizing that the 60-day limitation is considered inextendible, because the limitation has been prescribed to avoid any unreasonable delay that violates the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their cases. Facts: In 1968, the petitioner obtained two loans totaling P34,000.00 from respondent GSIS. To secure the performance of his obligations, he mortgaged two parcels of land. However, he paid GSIS about ten years after contracting the obligations only a total of P30,000.00. For failure of petitioner to pay his loans despite several demands, GSIS finally commenced extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings against him in 1986. Thereafter, the petitioner sued GSIS and the Provincial Sheriff of Pampanga ostensibly to enjoin them from proceeding against him for injunction. The RTC decided in his favor, nullifying the extrajudicial foreclosure and auction sale and canceling TCTs already issued in GSIS name. GSIS appealed the adverse decision to the CA, which reversed the RTC. The petitioner elevated the CA decision to this Court via petition for review on certiorari. This Court denied his petition for review and turned down his motion for reconsideration. As a result, the CA decision dated March 27, 1996 became final and executory, rendering unassailable both the extrajudicial foreclosure and auction sale. GSIS thus filed an ex parte motion for execution and for a writ of possession; the RTC issued a writ of execution cum writ of possession ordering the sheriff to place GSIS in possession of the properties. The sheriff failed to serve the writ, however, partly because of the petitioner s request for an extension of time within which to vacate the properties. It is noted that GSIS acceded to the request. Yet, the petitioner did not voluntarily vacate the properties, but instead filed a motion for reconsideration and/or to quash the writ of execution. Also, the petitioner commenced a second case against GSIS and the provincial sheriff ostensibly for consignation.

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RTC dismissed it. He sought reconsideration, but the same was denied. By petition for certiorari dated March 15, 2002 filed in the CA, the petitioner assailed the orders of February 11, 2002, July 30, 2001, October 21, 1999, and October 8, 1999. On March 17, 2003, however, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit. Issue: Whether the CA gravely erred in refusing to accept the nullity of the subject orders of the RTC. Held: NO. The petition for review on certiorari absolutely lacks merit. Petition for Certiorari in CA was filed beyond reglementary period. The petition assailed before the CA on certiorari the following orders of the RTC: (1) The order dated October 8, 1999 (granting the ex parte motion for execution and/or issuance of the writ of execution cum writ of possession of GSIS); (2)The order dated October 21, 1999 (directing the issuance of the writ of execution cum writ of possession in favor of GSIS); (3) The order dated July 30, 2001 (requiring the Branch Clerk of Court to cause the re-implementation of the writ of execution cum writ of possession, and dismissing the motions to hold GSIS, et al. in contempt); and (4) The order dated February 11, 2002 (denying the motion for reconsideration dated August 17, 2001 seeking the reconsideration of the order dated July 30, 2001). The July 30, 2001 order denied the petitioner s motion for reconsideration and/or to quash writ of execution, and motion to hold GSIS, Tony Dimatulac, et al. and Arnulfo Cardenas in contempt; and declared GSIS s motion for issuance of break open order and for designation of special sheriff from GSIS Legal Services Group as premature. In turn, the motion for reconsideration and/or to quash writ of execution denied by the order of July 30, 2001 had merely challenged the orders of October 8, 1999 and October 21, 1999 (granting the writ of execution cum writ of possession as a matter of course).

Considering that the motion for reconsideration dated August 17, 2001 denied by the order dated February 11, 2002 was in reality and effect a prohibited second motion for reconsideration vis-vis the orders dated October 21, 1999 and October 8, 1999, the assailed orders dated July 30, 2001, October 21, 1999, and October 8, 1999 could no longer be subject to attack by certiorari. Thus, the petition for certiorari filed only in March 2002 was already improper and tardy for being made beyond the 60-day limitation defined in Section 4, Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which requires a petition for certiorari to be filed "not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution," or, in case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, "the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of the said motion." It is worth emphasizing that the 60-day limitation is considered in-extendible, because the limitation has been prescribed to avoid any unreasonable delay that violates the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their cases. 2. Gonzales v. Tolentino (611 SCRA 129) a petition for certiorari shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further proceeding with the case. This rule must be strictly adhered to by appellate and lower courts notwithstanding the possibility that the proceedings undertaken by them tend to or would render nugatory the pending petition before this Court. Facts: After being charged by the Board with having falsified proxy forms for the 2004 election of Board members and then later disqualified as a candidate and ousted as a member of the Alabang Country Club Inc. (ACCI), Ramon Gonzales, filed a complaint for damages against said corporation and all the members of its Board. Branch 256 of the Muntinlupa, RTC decided the civil case in complainant s favor, and issued a writ of execution allowing him to resume his rights as a member of ACCI.

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The defendants in the civil case assailed the trial court s decision before the Court of Appeals via petition for review with application for temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction. It was granted by said court. When the TRO expired, the Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals composed of Associate Justices Roberto A. Barrios, Vicente S.E. Veloso, and Justice Amelita Tolentino as ponente directed the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction as in fact one was issued on July 11, 2005. Complainant challenged the appellate court s issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction via petition for certiorari filed before the Supreme Court on September 8, 2005. The SC however dismissed it for failure to show that the resolution directing the issuance of the writ of injunction was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. In the meantime, complainant, through counsel, filed on September 29, 2005 before the appellate court a Motion for Inhibition of respondent because, by his claim, the issuance of the writ was against the law. It appears however, that it was only on October 8, 2008 when respondent inhibited herself from the said case when he was ordered by another judge of the CA. Said order was issued pursuant to the letter-complaint (administrative) sent by petitioner before the Supreme Court complaining about the undue delay in the resolution of his Motion for Inhibition filed before the CA under the sala of Tolentino. For her defense respondent claimed that in view of complainant s filing (on September 8, 2005) of the petition for certiorari before this Court, she deemed it appropriate to defer any action on the motion (which was filed on September 29, 2005) in deference to the authority of the Supreme Court to resolve the issues raised before it. Issue: WON respondent is correct in postponing the resolution of the Motion for Inhibition filed within her sala due to petitioner s pending petition for Certiorari filed before the Supreme Court.

Held: NO. Respondent s justification for the delay in resolving the motion for inhibition in deference to the authority of this Court to resolve the issues raised in the petition for certiorari does not impress. Section 7 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for certiorari shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further proceeding with the case. This rule must be strictly adhered to by appellate and lower courts notwithstanding the possibility that the proceedings undertaken by them tend to or would render nugatory the pending petition before this Court. But even gratuitously crediting respondent s justification for the delay, since the Court resolved complainant s petition for certiorari on April 11, 2007, still, given the nature and history of the cases, respondent unduly delayed the resolution of a mere motion for inhibition only on October 8, 2008, after the Court referred the present complaint to the appellate court and after complainant filed a reiterative motion. Under Section 9 (1) of Rule 14016 of the Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering a decision or order is a less serious charge. Under Section 11 (B) of the same rule, the following sanctions may be imposed on judges of regular and special courts and justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan who commit less serious offenses: (1) Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one nor more than three months; or (2) A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00. Under the circumstances, this Court deems it appropriate to impose a fine of P15,000 on respondent. 3. Pineda v. CA (635 SCRA 274)

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Permitting a resort to the special civil action for certiorari without first filing a motion for reconsideration when there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interest of the government or where public interest is involved. Facts: Pineda entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with Lakandula High School represented by its principal for a five-year lease of the school canteen. The faculty and personnel of the school sent a letter to the Division School Superintendent questioning the validity of the May-MOA. Respondent DepEd declared the MOA "null and void ab initio" and ordered it "cancelled." Pineda was also ordered to "cease and desist" from further managing and operating the canteen. DepEd made clear that the management and operation of the canteen should revert to the Home Economics Department of the School. This prompted Pineda to file a petition for certiorari with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC. The RTC ordered the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction enjoining the enforcement of cease and desist order. DepEd sought the dismissal of Pineda s petition before the RTC. The trial court denied its motion. DepEd, without filing a motion for reconsideration, filed a petition for certiorari before the CA seeking to set aside the orders of the RTC. CA affirmed the order of the RTC denying DepEd s motion to dismiss but reversed its order granting the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction. Pineda filed petition for certiorari before SC questioning DepEd s failure to move for reconsideration before going to the CA on certiorari.

Issue: Whether MR is a condition sine qua non in filing a petition for certiorari. Held: The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non before a petition for certiorari may lie, its purpose being to grant an opportunity for the court a quo to correct any error attributed to it by a re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case. There are, however, recognized exceptions permitting a resort to the special civil action for certiorari without first filing a motion for reconsideration. These exceptions are: where the order is a patent nullity because the court a quo had no jurisdiction; where the questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question, and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner, or the subject matter of the action is perishable; where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; where the petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the grant of such relief by the trial court is improbable; where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved. The present case concerns the implementation or application of a DepEd policy which had been enjoined by the RTC. Certainly, there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interest of the government. Moreover, the subject matter of the case involves the operation of the canteen of a public secondary school. This is of public interest for it affects the welfare of the students, thus, justifying the relaxation of the settled rule.

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7. Torres, Jr. vs. Aguinaldo (461 SCRA 599) It is only where the decision of the Justice Secretary, or the trial court, as the case may be, is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction that the Court of Appeals may take cognizance of the case in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. By grave abuse of discretion is meant, such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law. Facts: Spouses Edgardo and Nelia Aguinaldo filed before the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Manila, a complaint against Artemio T. Torres, Jr. for falsification of public document. They alleged that Torres forged a Deed of Sale in transferring their titled lands without their knowledge in favor of Torres. Torres denied the allegations. Finding probable cause, the OCP recommended the filing of the information; hence, the filing of the information with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MTC). Torres moved for reconsideration (MR) but was denied. On appeal, the Sec. of Justice reversed the findings of the OCP and ordered the withdrawal of the information. Aguinaldo filed a MR but was denied. A Motion to Withdraw Information was filed, which the MTC granted on June 11, 2003. It should be noted that Torres, Jr. had not been arraigned.

Meanwhile, Aguinaldo filed before CA a petition for certiorari which was granted. The CA reversed the Sec. of Justice s decision and reinstated the OCP s finding of probable cause. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari filed by Torres, Jr. assailing the CA s decision and its denial of the motion for reconsideration thereof.

Issues: (1) Whether the order of the MTC-Manila granting the motion to withdraw the information rendered moot the petition for certiorari filed by Aguinaldo for the purpose of reinstating the April 30, 2001 resolution of the OCP of Manila; and in the alternative, whether the rule on provisional dismissal under Section 8, Rule 117 applies. (2) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the Sec. of Justice gravely abused his discretion in reinstating the April 30, 2001 order of the OCP of Manila finding of probable cause against Torres, Jr. Held: 1. No. A motion to withdraw information differs from a motion to dismiss. While both put an end to an action filed in court, their legal effect varies. The order granting the withdrawal of the information attains finality after 15 days from receipt thereof without prejudice to the re-filing of the information upon investigation. On the other hand, the order granting a motion to dismiss becomes final 15 days after receipt theory, with prejudice to the re-filing of the same case once such order achieves finality. Baares II v. Balising case being cited by Torres is not applicable since, here, what was filed was a motion to withdraw the information; not a motion to dismiss. Unlike a motion to dismiss, a motion to withdraw information is not time-barred and does not fall within the ambit of Sec. 8, Rule 117 which provides that the law on provisional dismissal becomes operative once the judge dismisses, with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party: (a) a case involving a penalty of imprisonment not exceeding 6 years or a fine of any amount or both where such provisional dismissal shall become permanent 1 year after issuance of the order without the case having been revived; (b) a case

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involving a penalty of imprisonment of more than 6 years, where such provisional dismissal shall become permanent 2 years after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. There is provisional dismissal when a motion filed expressly for that purpose complies with the following requisites, viz: (1) It must be with the express consent of the accused; and (2) There must be notice to the offended party. Section 8, Rule 117 contemplates the filing of a motion to dismiss, and not a motion to withdraw information. Thus, the law on provisional dismissal does not apply in the present case. Even assuming that the Motion to Withdraw Information is the same as a Motion to Dismiss, we do not find that it complied with the above requisites. The Motion to Withdraw Information was filed by the Assistant City Prosecutor and approved by the City Prosecutor without the conformity of the accused, herein petitioner Torres. Thus, it cannot be said that the motion was filed with his express consent as required under Section 8, Rule 117. (2) In Ledesma v. Court of Appeals (1997), when a motion to withdraw information is filed on the ground of lack of probable cause based on a resolution of the Secretary of Justice, the bounden duty of the trial court is to independently assess the merits of the motion. The judge is not bound by the resolution of the Justice Secretary but must evaluate it before proceeding with the trial. While the ruling of the Justice Secretary is persuasive, it is not binding on courts. In sum, prosecutors control and direct the prosecution of criminal offenses, including the conduct of preliminary investigation, subject to review by the Secretary of Justice. While his resolution is persuasive, it is not binding on the courts. The trial court must at all times make its own independent assessment of the merits of each case. Thus, it is only where the decision of the Justice Secretary, or the trial court, as the case may be, is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction that the Court

of Appeals may take cognizance of the case in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure whose decision may then be appealed to this Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari. In determining the existence or absence of probable cause, the investigating officer shall examine the complaint and documents in support thereof as well as the controverting evidence presented by the defense. Hence, the Court of Appeals erred in relying solely on the affidavit-complaint and the NBI report and disregarding totally the counter-affidavit and documentary evidence of the petitioner. Prescinding from these premises, the Supreme Court find that the Justice Secretary did not abuse his discretion in examining both the evidence presented by the complainant and the accused in determining the existence or lack of probable cause. There is a basis in his finding that no probable cause exists. The complaint and the 1979 Deed of Sale do not connect Torres with the crime of falsification. While the NBI report showed that the 1979 Deed of Sale was falsified, there is no showing that Torres, Jr. was the author thereof. In D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. Esguerra (1996), grave abuse of discretion is defined: By grave abuse of discretion is meant, such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law. Petition is granted. The CA s decision is reversed. 10. Angeles v. Secretary of Justice (614 SCRA 478)

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Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or to which a substantial doubt exists. Facts: Submitted for Decision is a petition for mandamus seeking respondents Secretary of Justice, the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority (LRA), and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to comply with the Order of RTC of Caloocan City in a civil case which granted petitioner s request partition and accounting of the subject property. Petitioner claims to be one of the heirs of a certain Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, and thus, is entitled to inherit her proportional share in the parcels of land. 1. Petitioner alleges that the RD of Caloocan City and Quezon City refused to comply with the RTC Order because they were still awaiting word from the LRA Administrator before proceeding. The LRA, however, contended that the request cannot be granted in view of the directive of the Department of Justice finding that there is only one OCT No. 994 which was issued by the Rizal Register of Deeds on 3 May 1917 (and not on 19 April 1917). Petitioner anchors her claim on OCT No. 994 which was dated earlier but which according to the Senate Committee Report is actually non-existent and was a fabrication perpetrated by the former Deputy Registrar of Deeds of Caloocan City. As found by the Senate Committees, this fabrication has resulted in the double, if not multiple, issuance of transfer certificates of title covering the subdivided portions of the Maysilo Estate, including the parcels of land mentioned in the subject Order. Petitioner alleges that compliance with a final judicial order is a purely ministerial duty, that she and her co-plaintiffs in the civil case cannot avail of the benefits granted to them by the Order, and that she has no "plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, other than this action. Issues: (1) Whether public respondents unlawfully neglected to perform their duties by their refusal to issue the questioned transfer certificates of title to petitioner and her co-plaintiffs or have unlawfully excluded petitioner from the use and enjoyment of

whatever claimed right, as would warrant the issuance of a writ of mandamus against said public respondents. (2) Did public respondents have sufficient legal basis to refuse to grant petitioners request. Ruling: (1) NO. Considering the factual background and recent jurisprudence related to this controversy, we find that it was not unlawful for public respondents to refuse compliance with the RTC Order, and the act being requested of them is not their ministerial duty; hence, mandamus does not lie and the petition must be dismissed. It is settled that mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, but not to compel the performance of a discretionary duty. Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or to which a substantial doubt exists. It is nonetheless likewise available to compel action, when refused, in matters involving judgment and discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of either. 1. YES. In this regard, we find our discussion in Laburada v. Land Registration Authority instructive, to wit: 2. That the LRA hesitates in issuing a decree of registration is understandable. Rather than a sign of negligence or nonfeasance in the performance of its duty, the LRA's reaction is reasonable, even imperative. Considering the probable duplication of titles over the same parcel of land, such issuance may contravene the policy and the purpose, and thereby destroy the integrity, of the Torrens system of registration. x x x Likewise, the writ of mandamus can be awarded only when the petitioners' legal right to the performance of the particular act which is sought to be compelled is clear and complete. Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a clear legal right is a right which is indubitably granted by law or is inferable as a matter of law. If the right is clear and the case is meritorious, objections raising merely technical questions will be disregarded. But where the right sought to be

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enforced is in substantial doubt or dispute, as in this case, mandamus cannot issue. As can be gleaned from the above discussion, the issuance by the LRA officials of a decree of registration is not a purely ministerial duty in cases where they find that such would result to the double titling of the same parcel of land. In the same vein, we find that in this case, which involves the issuance of transfer certificates of title, the Register of Deeds cannot be compelled by mandamus to comply with the RTC Order since there were existing transfer certificates of title covering the subject parcels of land and there was reason to question the rights of those requesting for the issuance of the TCTs. Neither could respondent LRA Administrator be mandated by the Court to require the Register of Deeds to comply with said Order, for we find sufficient basis for public respondents to refuse to comply with the RTC Order, given the finding, contained in the cited documents, that OCT No. 994 dated April 19, 1917, on which petitioner and her co-plaintiffs in the civil case clearly anchored their rights, did not exist. The requirements under Rule 65 for the issuance of the writ of mandamus not having been proven by petitioner to exist, we dismiss the petition for lack of merit. 11. De Castro vs JBC Facts: On January 20, 2010, JBC announced in the newspaper that it was already beginning to screen applicants and recommendations for the position of SC CHIEF JUSTICE. The reason for this is the impending retirement of SC Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010. The move of JBC elicited several controversies. Some sectors believed that by beginning the process for selection and eventual appointment of the President of a new chief justice, it would enable then incumbent PGMA to appoint a chief justice within the period barred by the Constitution on midnight appointees (no appointment within the preceding 2 months of a presidential election shall be made by the incumbent president.)

Meanwhile, several groups considered the ban on midnight appointments applicable only to executive appointments. To beef up the argument that the outgoing President cannot appoint a chief justice within the 2 month period preceding the next election, those opposed to the appointment of a new justice by GMA points to the Valenzuela case (an earlier case) in 1998 whereby the SC en banc held that the outgoing president cannot make appointments to the judiciary within the election ban period in Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution (BAN ON MIDNIGHT APPOINTMENTS). Several petitions were filed with the SC regarding the action of the JBC. All those petitions were consolidated. And among those petitions were: Petitioners Arturo M. De Castro and John G. Peralta respectively commenced G.R. No. 191002 and G.R. No. 191149 as special civil actions for certiorari and mandamus, praying that the JBC be compelled to submit to the incumbent President the list of at least three nominees for the position of the next Chief Justice. In G.R. No. 191032, Jaime N. Soriano, via his petition for prohibition, proposes to prevent the JBC from conducting its search, selection and nomination proceedings for the position of Chief Justice. In G.R. No. 191057, a special civil action for mandamus, the Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) wants the JBC to submit its list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice to be vacated by Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement on May 17, 2010, because the incumbent President is not covered by the prohibition that applies only to appointments in the Executive Department. In G.R. No. 191002, De Castro submits that the conflicting opinions on the issue expressed by legal luminaries one side holds that the incumbent President is prohibited from making appointments within two months immediately before the coming presidential elections and until the end of her term of office as President on June 30,

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2010, while the other insists that the prohibition applies only to appointments to executive positions that may influence the election and, anyway, paramount national interest justifies the appointment of a Chief Justice during the election ban has impelled the JBC to defer the decision to whom to send its list of at least three nominees, whether to the incumbent President or to her successor. He opines that the JBC is thereby arrogating unto itself the judicial function that is not conferred upon it by the Constitution, which has limited it to the task of recommending appointees to the Judiciary, but has not empowered it to finally resolve constitutional questions, which is the power vested only in the Supreme Court under the Constitution. As such, he contends that the JBC acted with grave abuse of discretion in deferring the submission of the list of nominees to the President; and that a final and definitive resolution of the constitutional questions raised above would diffuse (sic) the tension in the legal community that would go a long way to keep and maintain stability in the judiciary and the political system. In G.R. No. 191032, Soriano offers the view that the JBC committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of its jurisdiction when it resolved unanimously on January 18, 2010 to open the search, nomination, and selection process for the position of Chief Justice to succeed Chief Justice Puno, because the appointing authority for the position of Chief Justice is the Supreme Court itself, the President s authority being limited to the appointment of the Members of the Supreme Court. Hence, the JBC should not intervene in the process, unless a nominee is not yet a Member of the Supreme Court. Peralta states in his petition in G.R. No. 191149 that mandamus can compel the JBC to immediately transmit to the President, within a reasonable time, its nomination list for the position of chief justice upon the mandatory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, in compliance with its mandated duty under the Constitution in the event that the Court resolves that the President can appoint a Chief Justice even during the election ban under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution.

The petitioners in G.R. No. 191342 insist that there is an actual controversy, considering that the JBC has initiated the process of receiving applications for the position of Chief Justice and has in fact begun the evaluation process for the applications to the position, and is perilously near completing the nomination process and coming up with a list of nominees for submission to the President, entering into the period of the ban on midnight appointments on March 10, 2010, which only highlights the pressing and compelling need for a writ of prohibition to enjoin such alleged ministerial function of submitting the list, especially if it will be cone within the period of the ban on midnight appointments. Issues: (1) Is the Presidential ban on midnight appointments applicable to the Judiciary specifically the appointment of a new Chief Justice? (2) Considering the above issue, are the petitions premature in the sense that JBC has only announced the names of prospective appointees and has not even trimmed down the list to three, as provided by the Constitution? (3) Were the several petitioners (this case involves the consolidation of several petitions) devoid of locus standi as they have not suffered any injury as a result of JBC s acts? (4) Can an action for mandamus be considered proper to force the JBC to give the President the list of 3 nominees from whom the latter can choose from immediately? (4) Can an action for prohibition be valid to prevent the JBC from continuing the selection process for a new SC Justice? Held: The SC held that the issue is already ripe for controversy. This is because even though the position is not yet vacant, it is very sure that on the May 17, 2010, SC Chief Justice Puno will retire. And the fact that JBC has started the selection process, which caused a large furor, shows the ripeness of the case. With regards to locus standi, as the SC held in several cases, the locus standi requirement can be waived when the issue of the case is of transcendental importance. This controversy certainly falls within the ambit of transcendental importance .

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Now, to the merits. The constitutional ban on midnight appointments are only applicable to executive positions. To simplify, the SC ruled that the reason that appointments to the executive position and appointment of an SC Justice belong in different Articles of the Constitution (the former in Sec. 15, Art VII, while the latter is found on Sec 4, Art VIII) is because the framers intended that each act is not bound by the same rules. The framers could have EXPRESSLY provided in Sec. 4 ART VIII that appointments to vacancies in the SC should be banned within two months preceding an election if THAT WAS THEIR TRUE INTENT. And because of the above stated reasons, it was proper for the JBC to start the section process even before the vacancy occurred. The sooner the JBC presents its list of three prospective nominees, the better it is because it would enable the President the whole 90-days to carefully choose the next SC Justice. IT IS ALSO FOR THE ABOVE STATED REASONS THAT A PETITION FOR PROHIBITION TO PREVENT THE JBC FROM STARTING AND EVENTUALLY NAMING THREE NOMINEES TO THE POSITION IS NOT PROPER. Writ of mandamus does not lie against the JBC May the JBC be compelled to submit the list of nominees to the President? Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act that the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It is proper when the act against which it is directed is one addressed to the discretion of the tribunal or officer. Mandamus is not available to direct the exercise of a judgment or discretion in a particular way.

For mandamus to lie, the following requisites must be complied with: (a) the plaintiff has a clear legal right to the act demanded; (b) it must be the duty of the defendant to perform the act, because it is mandated by law; (c) the defendant unlawfully neglects the performance of the duty enjoined by law; (d) the act to be performed is ministerial, not discretionary; and (e) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Section 8(5) and Section 9, Article VIII, mandate the JBC to submit a list of at least three nominees to the President for every vacancy in the Judiciary: Section 8. xxx (5) The Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the Judiciary. xxx Section 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation. For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days from the submission of the list. However, Section 4(1) and Section 9, Article VIII, mandate the President to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy, and within 90 days from the submission of the list, in the case of the lower courts. The 90-day period is directed at the President, not at the JBC. Thus, the JBC should start the process of selecting the candidates to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court before the occurrence of the vacancy. Under the Constitution, it is mandatory for the JBC to submit to the President the list of nominees to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court in order to enable the President to appoint one of them within the 90-day period from the occurrence of the vacancy. The JBC has no

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discretion to submit the list to the President after the vacancy occurs, because that shortens the 90-day period allowed by the Constitution for the President to make the appointment. For the JBC to do so will be unconscionable on its part, considering that it will thereby effectively and illegally deprive the President of the ample time granted under the Constitution to reflect on the qualifications of the nominees named in the list of the JBC before making the appointment. The duty of the JBC to submit a list of nominees before the start of the President s mandatory 90-day period to appoint is ministerial, but its selection of the candidates whose names will be in the list to be submitted to the President lies within the discretion of the JBC. The object of the petitions for mandamus herein should only refer to the duty to submit to the President the list of nominees for every vacancy in the Judiciary, because in order to constitute unlawful neglect of duty, there must be an unjustified delay in performing that duty. For mandamus to lie against the JBC, therefore, there should be an unexplained delay on its part in recommending nominees to the Judiciary, that is, in submitting the list to the President. The distinction between a ministerial act and a discretionary one has been delineated in the following manner: The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well delineated. A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. Theduty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment. Accordingly, we find no sufficient grounds to grant the petitions for mandamus and to issue a writ of mandamus against the JBC. The

actions for that purpose are premature, because it is clear that the JBC still has until May 17, 2010, at the latest, within which to submit the list of nominees to the President to fill the vacancy created by the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno. Quo Warranto Rule 66 1. Mendoza v. Allas (302 SCRA) A judgment in quo warranto does not bind the respondent's successor in office, even though such successor may trace his title to the same source. Facts: Petitioner Pedro Mendoza joined the Bureau of Customs in 1972. He held many positions in the BOC. In 1989, the position of Customs Service Chief was reclassified by the Civil Service as "Director III" in accordance with RA 6758 and National Compensation Circular No. 50. Petitioner's position was thus categorized as "Director III, CIIS" and he discharged the function and duties of said office. On April 22, 1993, petitioner was temporarily designated as Acting District Collector, Collection District X, Cagayan de Oro City. In his place, respondent Ray Allas was appointed as "Acting Director III" of the CIIS. Despite petitioner's new assignment as Acting District Collector, he continued to receive the salary and benefits of the position of Director III. In September 1994, petitioner received a letter from Deputy Customs Commissioner Cesar Z. Dario, informing him of his termination from the BOC, in view of respondent Allas' appointment as Director III by President Fidel V. Ramos. Petitioner wrote the Customs Commissioner demanding his reinstatement with full back wages and without loss of seniority rights. No reply was made. On December 2, 1994, petitioner filed a petition for quo warranto against respondent Allas before the RTC. The court found that petitioner was illegally terminated from office without due process of law and in violation of his security of tenure, and that as he was

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deemed not to have vacated his office, the appointment of respondent Allas to the same office was void ab initio. The court ordered the ouster of respondent Allas from the position of Director III, and at the same time directed the reinstatement of petitioner to the same position with payment of full back salaries and other benefits appurtenant thereto. Respondent Allas appealed to the CA. On February 8, 1996, while the case was pending, Allas was promoted by President Ramos to the position of Deputy Commissioner of Customs for Assessment and Operations. As a consequence of this promotion, petitioner moved to dismiss respondent's appeal as having been rendered moot and academic. The CA granted the motion and dismissed the case accordingly. On May 9, 1996, petitioner filed with the court a quo a Motion for Execution of its decision. On July 24, 1996, the court denied the motion on the ground that the contested position vacated by respondent Allas was now being occupied by respondent Godofredo Olores who was not a party to the quo warranto petition. Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari and mandamus with the CA questioning the order of the trial court. On November 27, 1997, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. Issue: WON the CA grossly erred in holding that a writ of execution may no longer be issued, considering that respondent Olores, who was not a party to the case now occupies the subject position Held: What was threshed out before the trial court was the qualification and right of petitioner to the contested position as against respondent Ray Allas, not against Godofredo Olores. The Court of Appeals did not err in denying execution of the trial court's decision. Ordinarily, a judgment against a public officer in regard to a public right binds his successor in office. This rule, however, is not applicable in quo warranto cases. A judgment in quo warranto does not bind the respondent's successor in office, even though such successor may trace his title to the same source. This follows from

the nature of the writ of quo warranto itself. It is never directed to an officer as such, but always against the person-- to determine whether he is constitutionally and legally authorized to perform any act in, or exercise any function of the office to which he lays claim. In the case at bar, the petition for quo warranto was filed by petitioner solely against respondent Allas. Respondent Allas cannot be held personally liable for petitioner's back salaries and benefits. He was merely appointed to the subject position by the President of the Philippines in the exercise of his constitutional power as Chief Executive. Neither can the Bureau of Customs be compelled to pay the said back salaries and benefits of petitioner. The Bureau of Customs was not a party to the petition for quo warranto. Quo warranto is a demand made by the state upon some individual or corporation to show by what right they exercise some franchise or privilege appertaining to the state which, according to the Constitution and laws of the land, they cannot legally exercise except by virtue of a grant or authority from the state. A petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to the use or exercise of a franchise or office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim is not well-founded, or if he has forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege. The action may be commenced for the Government by the Solicitor General or the fiscal against individuals who usurp a public office, against a public officer whose acts constitute a ground for the forfeiture of his office, and against an association which acts as a corporation without being legally incorporated. The action may also be instituted by an individual in his own name who claims to be entitled to the public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another. Where the action is filed by a private person, he must prove that he is entitled to the controverted position, otherwise respondent has a right to the undisturbed possession of the office. If the court finds for the respondent, the judgment should simply state that the respondent is entitled to the office. If, however, the court finds for the petitioner and declares the respondent guilty of usurping, intruding into, or unlawfully holding or exercising the office, judgment may be rendered as follows:

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"Sec. 10. Judgment where usurpation found.-- When the defendant is found guilty of usurping, intruding into, or unlawfully holding or exercising an office, position, right, privilege, or franchise, judgment shall be rendered that such defendant be ousted and altogether excluded therefrom, and that the plaintiff or relator, as the case may be, recover his costs. Such further judgment may be rendered determining the respective rights in and to the office, position, right, privilege, or franchise of all the parties to the action as justice requires." If it is found that the respondent or defendant is usurping or intruding into the office, or unlawfully holding the same, the court may order: (1) The ouster and exclusion of the defendant from office; (2) The recovery of costs by plaintiff or relator; (3) The determination of the respective rights in and to the office, position, right, privilege or franchise of all the parties to the action as justice requires. Petition denied. 2. Calleja v. Panday (483 SCRA) Rule 66 only applies to actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp a public office, position or franchise; public officers who forfeit their office; and associations which act as corporations without being legally incorporated despite the passage of R.A. No. 8799. Facts: This case involved intra-corporate controversies. On May 16, 2005, respondents filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Camarines Sur for quo warranto. Respondents alleged that from 1985 up to the filing of the petition with the trial court, they had been members of the board of directors and officers of St. John Hospital, Incorporated, but sometime in May 2005, petitioners, who are also among the incorporators and stockholders of said corporation, forcibly and with the aid of armed men usurped the powers which supposedly belonged to respondents.

The Motion to Dismiss filed by the herein petitioner was denied. RTC-Br. 58 issued an order and remanded the case to the Regional Trial Court Branch 23, Naga City which has been designated as special court to try and decide intra-corporate controversies under R.A. 8799. Issue: (1) Whether a branch of the RTC which has no jurisdiction to try and decide a case has authority to remand the same to another co-equal court in order to cure the defects on venue and jurisdiction. (2) Whether quo warranto is applicable against person who usurps an office in a private corporation. Held: (1) Based on the allegations in the petition, the case was clearly one involving an intra-corporate dispute. The trial court should have been aware that under R.A. No. 8799 and the aforementioned administrative issuances of this Court, RTC-Br. 58 was never designated as a Special Commercial Court; hence, it was never vested with jurisdiction over cases previously cognizable by the SEC. Such being the case, RTC-Br. 58 did not have the requisite authority or power to order the transfer of the case to another branch of the Regional Trial Court. The only action that RTC-Br. 58 could take on the matter was to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction. (2) R.A. No. 8799 provides that an actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp an office in a corporation, which were formerly cognizable by the SEC under PD 902-A, have been transferred to the courts of general jurisdiction. But, this does not change the fact that Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure does not apply to quo warranto cases against persons who usurp an office in a private corporation. The present Rule 66 only applies to actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp a public office, position or franchise; public officers who forfeit their office; and associations which act as corporations without being legally incorporated despite the passage of R.A. No. 8799. It is, therefore, The Interim Rules of Procedure

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Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies Under R.A. No. 8799 (hereinafter the Interim Rules) which applies to the petition for quo warranto filed by respondents before the trial court since what is being questioned is the authority of herein petitioners to assume the office and act as the board of directors and officers of St. John Hospital, Incorporated. 3. Lokin, Jr. vs. COMELEC (621 SCRA385) A special civil action for quo warranto refers to questions of disloyalty to the State, or of ineligibility of the winning candidate. The objective of the action is to unseat the ineligible person from the office, but not to install the petitioner in his place. Any voter may initiate the action, which is, strictly speaking, not a contest where the parties strive for supremacy because the petitioner will not be seated even if the respondent may be unseated. Facts: The Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) was one of the organized groups registered under the party-list system, which manifested their intent to participate in the May 14, 2007. CIBAC, thru its president Joel Villanueva, submitted a list of 5 nominees from which its representatives would be chosen should CIBAC obtain the required number of qualifying votes. The nominees are: Villanueva, herein petitioner Lokin, Jr, Cruz-Gonzales, Tugna, and Galang. Prior to the elections, however, CIBAC, through Villanueva, filed a certificate amending the list of its nominees whereby it withdrew the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang. The amended list includes: Villanueva, Cruz-Gonzales and Borje. Villanueva even sent a letter to COMELEC transmitting signed petitions of 81% of the CIBAC members in order to confirm the withdrawal of the nomination of the three. After the election, CIBAC was proclaimed entitled to two seats. CIBAC, supposedly thru its counsel, filed with COMELEC en banc a motion seeking the proclamation of Lokin as its second nominee. This was opposed by Villanueva and Cruz-Gonzales. It appears that

COMELEC failed to act on the certificate filed by Villanueva indicating the amended list of nominees. Thus, he filed a petition to confirm the certificate of nomination, substitution and amendment. Consequently, COMELEC en banc approved the withdrawal of the nominees Lokin, Tugna and Galang. As a result, COMELEC proclaimed Cruz-Gonzales as the official second nominee of CIBAC. Lokin seeks through mandamus to compel respondent COMELEC to proclaim him as the official second nominee of CIBAC and he likewise assails Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 and the issued approving CIBAC s withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang. In its comment, the COMELEC asserts that a petition for certiorari is an inappropriate recourse in law due to the proclamation of CruzGonzales as Representative and her assumption of that office; that Lokin s proper recourse was an electoral protest filed in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); and that, therefore, the Court has no jurisdiction over the matter being raised by Lokin. Issues: Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the controversy; Whether or not a special civil action for quo warranto is the proper remedy. Held: An election protest proposes to oust the winning candidate from office. It is strictly a contest between the defeated and the winning candidates, based on the grounds of electoral frauds and irregularities, to determine who between them has actually obtained the majority of the legal votes cast and is entitled to hold the office. It can only be filed by a candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for in the preceding elections. A special civil action for quo warranto refers to questions of disloyalty to the State, or of ineligibility of the winning candidate. The objective of the action is to unseat the ineligible person from the office, but not to install the petitioner in his place. Any voter may initiate the action, which is, strictly speaking, not a contest where

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the parties strive for supremacy because the petitioner will not be seated even if the respondent may be unseated. The controversy involving Lokin is neither an election protest nor an action for quo warranto, for it concerns a very peculiar situation in which Lokin is seeking to be seated as the second nominee of CIBAC. Although an election protest may properly be available to one party-list organization seeking to unseat another party-list organization to determine which between the defeated and the winning party-list organizations actually obtained the majority of the legal votes, Lokin s case is not one in which a nominee of a particular party-list organization thereby wants to unseat another nominee of the same party-list organization. Neither does an action for quo warranto lie, considering that the case does not involve the ineligibility and disloyalty of Cruz-Gonzales to the Republic of the Philippines, or some other cause of disqualification for her. Lokin has correctly brought this special civil action for certiorari against the COMELEC to seek the review of the September 14, 2007 resolution of the COMELEC in accordance with Section 7 of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution, notwithstanding the oath and assumption of office by Cruz-Gonzales. The constitutional mandate is now implemented by Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for the review of the judgments, final orders or resolutions of the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit. As Rule 64 states, the mode of review is by a petition for certiorari in accordance with Rule 65 to be filed in the Supreme Court within a limited period of 30 days. Undoubtedly, the Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over Lokin s petitions for certiorari and for mandamus against the COMELEC. Petitions for certiorari and mandamus granted. COMELEC ordered to proclaim petitioner Luis K. Lokin, Jr. as a Party-List Representative representing CIBAC in the House of Representatives.

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