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THE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY DIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO
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SYMBOLIC LOGIC
AND
ITS
APPLICATIONS
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
AND
ITS
APPLICATIONS
HUGH MacCOLL
B.A. (London)
LONGMANS, GREEN, AND

39
CO.
PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON

NEW YORK AND BOMBAY
1906
All rights reserved
PREFACE
.
This
little
volume may be regarded

of
as the final con-
centrated outcome of a series
researches
begun
in
1872 and continued (though with some long breaks)

until to-day,
My
article entitled
"
Probability Notation
No.
2,"
which appeared
of the
in
1872
in the Educational Times,

"
and was republished

tains
in the
mathematical
Reprint," conI
the germs
more developed method which

the
Proceedings
of the
in Mind.
afterwards explained
in
London
Mathematical Society
and
But the most impor-
tant developments from the logical point of view will be
found in the
eight
articles
which
contributed within the last
or nine years to various magazines, English
and
have
French.
in
Among
these I
may
especially
mention those
Mind and
in the Athenceum, portions of
which
(with the kind permission of these magazines) copied into

this brief epitome.
Readers who only want

of symbolic logic
to obtain a clear general
view
and
its
applications need only attend to

1 to 18,
the following portions:

53, 7G to 80,
22
to 24,
46
to
112
to 120,
to
144
to 150.
Students
in ordinary logic
who have may restrict

62
to 0Q,
pass elementary examinations

their reading to
to 109, 112.
1
to 18,
46
to 59,
76
Mathematicians
last five
will
be principally interested in the
chapters,
from
114
to
156; but readers
vi
PREFACE
to obtain
its
who wish
a complete mastery of
my
its
symbolic
system and
applications should read the whole.
They
will find that, in

it
the elastic adaptability of
notation,
bears very much the same
relation to other systems
(including the ordinary formal logic of our text-books)

as algebra bears to arithmetic.
tional adaptability that enables
it
It is
mainly this nota-
to solve with ease
and
simplicity
many
important problems, both in pure logic

(see
and
in
mathematics
75
and
15 7), which
lie
wholly beyond
within
the reach of any other symbolic system
my
knowledge.
HUGH
August 17 th, 1905.
MacCOLL.
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
SECS.
1-3. General principles
Origin of language
CHAPTER
I
...
of propositions
PAGE
1
4-12. Definitions of symbols
Classification
Examples and formulae
......
II
CHAPTER
13-17. Logic of Functions
Application to grammar
CHAPTER
III
...
higher
. .
18-24. Paradoxes
Propositions of the second, third, and

.
degrees
.12
CHAPTER IV
25-32. Formulae of operations with examples worked
problem
.........
CHAPTER V
Venn's
20
33-38. Elimination
Solutions
of implications
and equations
27
Limits of statements
CHAPTER VI
39-43. Jevous's " Inverse Problem
"
;
its
complete solution on
the principle of limits, with examples
...
33
CONTENTS
CHAPTER
SECS.
VII
PAGE
of
.
44-53. Tests of Validity
Discourse
No syllogism valid as usually stated

CHAPTER
VIII
of
Symbolic Universe, or Universe
39
54-63.
The nineteen
words
'
traditional syllogisms all deducible from
one simple formula

distributed
'
Criticism
'
the technical
'
usual syllogistic simpler tests proposed
The undistributed and Canons unreliable other and

'
'
49
CHAPTER IX
64-66
(a).
Enthymemes Uiven one

the
conclusion,
to
premise of a syllogism and the missing premiseStrongest conclusion from given premises
find
66
CHAPTER X
67-75.
To
find the weakest data
from which we can prove a
given complex statement, and also the strongest conclusion deducible from the statement Some Existential Import of Procontested problems
'
positions
'
Comparison of
symbolic methods
70
CHAPTER XI
76-80.
The nature
because
of inference The words Causation and discovery of causes

if,
therefore,
.
and
.
80
CHAPTER XII
81-89. Solutions of
tions
some questions
set at
recent examina.
86
CHAPTER
XIII
90-113. Definitions and explanations of technical terms often used in logic Meaningless symbols and their uses Induction: inductive mathematical examples
reasoning not absolutely reliable
mathematics
a curious case in
'
.
'
Infinite
'
and
'
infinitesimal
.91
CONTENTS
CALCULUS OF LIMITS
CHAPTER XIV
SECS.
PAGE
114-131
Application to elementary algebra, with examples
106
CHAPTER XV
132-140. Nearest limits
Table of Reference
CHAPTER XVI
.117
141-143. Limits of two variables
Geometrical illustrations
123
CHAPTER XVII
144-150. Elementary
probability
'
Meaning
in
.
of
and
'
independent
probability,
.
.
'dependent' with geo. .
metrical illustrations
.128
CHAPTER XVIII
151-157. Notation
for
Multiple Integrals
Problems
. .
that re'
quire the integral calculus
132
ALPHABETICAL INDEX
(The numbers indicate the sections, not the pages.)
41
Alternative,
7,
Induction, 112
Inference, nature
Infinite
of, 76-80 and infinitesimal, 113 Jevons's 'inverse problem,' 39-43
Anipliative, 108
Antecedent, 28 Cause, 79 Complement, 46 Connotation, 93 Consequent, 28

Contraposition, 97
Limits of statements, 33
Limits of
143
Major, middle, minor, 54
Material,
variable
ratios,
114
Contrary, 94
Conversion, 98
Couturat's notation, 132 (footnote)
distinguished
from
Dichotomy, 100
Dilemma, 101-103
Elimination, 33-38
Entliymeme, 64
Equivalence, 11, 19 Essential, 108
Formal, 109 Meaningless symbols, 110 Mediate inference, 91 Modality, 99 Multiple, 28 Particulars, 49 Ponendo ponens, &c, 104-107
Product, 7
Excluded Middle, 92 Existential import

tions, 72,
of
proposi-
73
Factor,
7,
28
Formal, 109 Functions, 13-17
90 Strong statements, 33, 34 Subalterns and subcontraries, 95, 96 Syllogisms, 54

Sorites,
Transposition, 56
Universals, 49
Grammar,
17
Illicit process,
63 (footnote)
Immediate inference, 91
Implication, 10, 18
Universe of discourse, 46-50 Venn's problem, 32 Weak statements, 33, 34
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
INTRODUCTION
1.
In the following pages
have done
my
best to
explain in clear and simple language the principles of

useful and widely applicable method of research. Symbolic logic is usually thought to be a hard and abstruse subject, and unquestionably the Boolian system and the more modern methods founded on it are hard and abstruse. They are, moreover, difficult of application and of no great utility. The symbolic system explained in this little volume is, on the contrary, so simple that an ordinary schoolboy of ten or twelve can in a very short time master its fundamental conceptions and learn to apply its rules and formulas to practical problems, especially in elementary mathematics (see 114, 118). Nor is it less useful in the higher branches of mathematics, as my series of papers published in the Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society abundantly There are two leading principles which separate prove. my symbolic system from all others. The first is the principle that there is nothing sacred or eternal about symbols that all symbolic conventions may be altered when convenience requires it, in order to adapt them
to
new
conditions, or to
new
classes of problems.
The
symbolist has a right, in such circumstances, to give a
new meaning
by a fresh
to
any old symbol, or arrangement of and provided the nature of the
symbols, provided the change- of sense be accompanied

definition,
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
[ 1, 2
problem or investigation be such that we run no risk The of confounding the new meaning with the old. second principle which separates my symbolic system from others is the principle that the complete state-
ment
or proposition
is
the real unit
of all
reasoning.
Provided the complete statement (alone or in connexion with the context) convey the meaning intended, the words chosen and their arrangement matter little. Every intelligible argument, however complex, is built up of individual statements and whenever a simple elementary
;
symbol, such as a letter of the alphabet, is sufficient to indicate or represent any statement, it will be a great saving of time, space, and brain labour thus to represent
2.
it.
The words
as
statement
and
In
proposition
are
usually
regarded
synonymous.
my
symbolic
system,
however, I find it convenient to make a distinction, albeit the distinction may be regarded as somewhat I define a statement as any sound, sign, or arbitrary. symbol (or any arrangement of sounds, signs, or symbols)
employed
into two
to give information
and
I define a proposition
as a statement which, in regard to form,
may
;
be divided
predicate.
parts respectively called subject

is
and
Thus every proposition

affirm
a statement
but we cannot
A nod, that every statement is a proposition. a shake of the head, the sound of a signal gun, the " national flag of a passing ship, and the warning " Caw of a sentinel rook, are, by this definition, statements but
The nod may mean " I see him " the not propositions. shake of the head, " I do not see him " the warning " Caw " of the rook, " A man is coming with a gun," or
;
;
"
Danger approaches "
and
so on.
These propositions
express more specially and precisely what the simpler statements express more vaguely and generally. In thus
taking statements as the ultimate constituents of symbolic reasoning I believe I am following closely the gradual evolution of human language from its primitive
2,
3]
INTRODUCTION
forms to
its
complex developments in the we have knowledge now. There can be little doubt that the language or languages of primeval man, like those of the brutes around him, consisted of simple elementary statements, indivisible into subject and predicate, but differing from
prehistoric
languages, dead or living, of which
highest order of brutes in being being more or less conventional and therefore capable of indefinite development. From their grammatical structure, even more than from their community of roots, some languages had evidently a common origin; others appear to have started independently; but all have sooner or later entered the propositional stage and thus crossed the boundary which separates all brute languages, like brute intelligence, from the
those of
even
uninherited
the
in
human.
Let us suppose that amongst a certain prehistoric the sound, gesture, or symbol S was the understood representation of the general idea stag. This sound or
3.
tribe,
symbol might also have been used, as single words are often used even now, to represent a complete statement or proposition, of which stag was the central and leading idea. The symbol S, or the word stag, might have
vaguely and varyingly done duty for "It is a stag," or " I see a stag," or " A stag is coming," &c. Similarly, in the customary language of the tribe, the sound or symbol B might have conveyed the general notion of bigness, and have varyingly stood for the statement " It
is
big" or " I see a big thing coming," &c.
By
degrees
primitive
or signs
men would
into
learn to combine two such sounds compound statement, but of varying
form or arrangement, according to the impulse of the moment, as SB, or BS, or S B or S B &c., any of which might mean "I see a big stag," or "The stag is big" or " A big stag is coming," &c. In like manner some varying arrangement, such as SK, or S K &c, might mean " The stag has been killed," or " I have killed the stag" &c.
,
4
Finally,
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
[ 3,
and after many tentative or haphazard changes, would come the grand chemical combination of these linguistic atoms into the compound linguistic molecules which we call propositions. The arrangement S B (or some other) would eventually crystallize and permanently K would signify " The stag is big," and a similar form S permanently mean " The stag is killed" These are two complete propositions, each with distinct subject and predicate. On the other hand, S B and S K (or some " other forms) would permanently represent " The big stag and " The killed stag." These are not complete propositions they are merely qualified subjects waiting
;
for their predicates.
On
these general ideas of linguistic
development
have founded
my
symbolic system.
CHAPTER
4.
The symbol A B
denotes a proposition of which the
individual
if
is
the subject and
the predicate.
"
Thus,
brown-
represents
my
aunt,
and B represents brown-haired,
then
AB
represents the proposition
My
aunt
;
is
haired."
Now
the word aunt
is
a class
term
a person
may have
several aunts, and any one of
them may be
,
represented by the symbol A.
To distinguish between them we may employ numerical suhixes, thus A 1} A 2 A 3 &c, Aunt No. 1, Aunt No. 2, &c. or we may distinguish between them by attaching to them different
,
would mean my brown-haired aunt, and so on. Thus, when A is a class term, A B denotes the individual (or an individual) B For of whom or of which the proposition A is true. " " the horse example, let H mean let w mean " it won and let s mean " I sold it," or " it has been sold the race " Then H, which is short for (H w ) s represents by me." the complex proposition " The horse which won the race has been sold by me," or " I have sold the horse which
attributes, so that
AB
AR my
red-haired aunt,
4-6]
EXPLANATIONS OF SYMBOLS
race."
are supposed to have a series &c, of which H vv is one; and we 2 3 are also supposed to have a series, S 1; S 2 S &c, of things 3 which, at some time or other, I sold and the proposition of horses,
won the
Here we
,
Hr H H
H*
is
asserts that the individual w of the first series H, belongs also to the second series S. Thus the suffix w
,
adjectival; the exponent s predicative. If we interchange suffix and exponent, we get the proposition H^, which asserts that "the horse which I have sold won the race." The symbol H w without an adjectival suffix, merely asserts that a horse, or the horse, won the race without specifying which horse of the series
,
H H
x
,
&c.
small minus before the predicate or exponent, or an acute accent affecting the whole statement, indicates
5.
Thus if H means " The horse has been caught " then H~ or (H c )' means " The horse has not been caught." In accordance with the principles of notation laid down, the symbol H_ c will, on this understanding, mean " The
denial.
;
which has not been caught" or the " uncaught horse " minus suffix, like a suffix without a minus, is adjectival. The symbol H c (" The caught horse ") assumes the statement H c which asserts that " The horse has been caught." Similarly H_ c assumes the statement H~. 6. The symbol denotes non-existence, so that 2 &c, denote a series of names or symbols which 3
horse
;
so that a
to nothing in our universe of admitted Hence, if we give and C the same meanings as before, the symbol H will assert that " The horse caught does not exist," which is equivalent to the statement that "No horse has been caught." The symbol H~ which denies the statement H, may therefore be read
realities.
correspond
Some horse has been Following the same principle of notation, the symbol Hc may be read "An uncaught horse does not exist," or " Every horse has been caught," The context would, of course, indicate the particular totality of horses
caught."
as "
The
horse caught does exist," or "
6
referred
to.
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
6-8
For example, H c may mean " Every horse that escaped has been caught," the words in italics being understood. On the same principle H: denies Hc and may therefore be read " Some uncaught horse does exist" or " Some horse has not been caught." B D or its usually more convenient 7. The symbol A x C B synonym A -C or (without a point) A B C D asserts two things namely, that A belongs to the class B, and that C
,
,
r>
belongs to the class

it,
or, as
logicians
"
more
D."
briefly express
that
"
is
B " and
that
AB + CD
asserts
an alternative
namely,
to
is
The symbol
that
"
Either
belongs to the class B, or else
the class
D"
or, as it is
more usually and The or C is D."

imply that the
exclusive
;
" Either A is B, A B + C D does not necessarily B and C D are mutually propositions A
briefly expressed, that
alternative
example,
imply that they are not. For D is a barrister," and C B D means "Charles is a doctor"; then A C asserts that " Alfred is a barrister, and Charles a doctor" while AB + C D asserts that "Either Alfred is a barrister, or Charles a doctor," a statement which (apart from context)
neither does
it
if
AB
means
"
Alfred
B D does not necessarily exclude the possibility of A C that B Similar conventions hold and C D are true. # both A r p B D F B From these con&c. for A C E and A + C + E good
, ,
ventions
we
B
get
)'
various
;
self-evident
B
(
formulae,
;
such
(3)
as (1) (A C (A B C- D )' = A" B

8.
= A-B + C- D
;
+ CB
(4)
+ C p )' = A- B C- D (2) B = A" B C D + C^)'

.
by
single
In pure or abstract logic statements are represented letters, and we classify them according to
attributes as true, false, certain, impossible, variable, respectively
denoted by the
T
l
five
e
r
Greek
9
letters
t,
i,
e,
>/,
9.
Thus the symbol

that
*
A B C D 'E
C
asserts
that
is
true,
is false,
that
is certain,
that
is impossible,
that
may be called factors To preserve mathematical analogy, A B and A B C D and terms of the sum A B +C D though, of course, these words have quite different meanings in logic from those they
of the product
, ;
bear in mathematics.
8-10]
is
T
(possible
variable
but
is
uncertain).
The
symbol
this:
it
only asserts that
true in a particular case or

e
instance.
The symbol
asserts
more than
asserts that
A A
is
certain, that
is
always true (or true
in every case)
tions,
that
within the limits of our data and definiThe symbol A' only its probability is 1.
is
asserts that
it
false in a particular
case or instance
says nothing as to
instances.
the truth or falsehood of
in
other
this
tion,
;
more than it asserts that A contradicts some datum or definiT that its probability is 0. Thus A and A are simply
The symbol
71
asserts
assertive;
each refers only to one case, and raises no
general question as to data or probability.
The symbol
;
(A
is
a variable)
is
equivalent to
-7,
A~'
6
it
is,
asserts
that
is
neither impossible nor certain, that
that
is p>ossible
but uncertain.
fraction
9.
the probability of A is between the two.
In other words, A asserts that nor 1, but some proper neither

it
The symbol
B
A BC
means (A B ) C
asserts* that the
statement A belongs to the class C, in which C may Similarly A BCD means denote true, or false, or possible, &c. BC D (A ) and so on. From this definition it is evident that A VL is not necessarily or generally equivalent to
,
A" nor A" equivalent to A' B C D is called an implication, and 10. The symbol A B D D B It may be means (A C" )^, or its synonym (A" + C )
1 ,
.
:
read in various ways, as (1) belongs to the class B, then

(3) It either
is
A
C
implies
CD
(2)
If
A
;
impossible that
belongs to the class D can belong to the class B

;
belonging to the class D (4) It is certain that does not belong to the class B or else C belongs Some logicians consider these four to the class D. but all equivalent, while others do not propositions
without
ambiguity
may
be avoided by the convention, adopted

,
* The symbol A BC must not be confounded with the symbol A BC which sometimes use as a convenient abbreviation for A B A C nor with the symbol A" r which I use as short for A B + c I
; , .
8
here,
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
that
e
[ 10,
11
synonyms, and that each, like (A B C" D )' or its synonym Each therefore usually asserts more than (A" B + C D ) e (A B C- D )' and than (A- B + C D ) T because A" and A (for T any statement A) asserts more than A' and A respecthey
are
,
the
symbol
.
A B C D means
:
tively (see
8).
be denoted by a single B B then a will denote its denial A~ or (A ) letter a When each letter denotes a statement, the symbol A B C is short for (A B)(B C). It asserts that A
11. Let
;
the proposition
AB
implies
B and
:
that
:
implies C.
The symbol (A = B)
means (A B)(B
;
A).
The symbol
A B
! :
(which
may
be called an inverse implication) asserts that A. in B it is therefore equivalent to B
is
implied
The symbol
A B C
! !
is
short
for
:
(A B)(B
!
equivalent to
to
C B
:
A.
When
therefore is it C) we thus use single letters

!
;
denote statements, we get numberless self-evident or To proved formulae, of which I subjoin a few. avoid an inconvenient multiplicity of brackets in these and in other formulae I lay down the convention that the sign of equivalence ( = ) is of longer reach than the sign of
easily
implication ( ), and that the sign of implication ( ) is of longer reach than the sign of disjunction or alternat ion( + ).
:
:
Thus the equivalence a = ft y means a = (ft: y), (a = ft):y, and A + B x means (A + B) x, not A + (B
:
not
:
x).
(I) x(a
(3)
(a
+ ft)=xa + xP;
f
f
-
(2) (aft)'
+ ft)' = a
ft
(4) a:ft (6)
(5) (x:a)(x:ft) (7)

(9)
= x:aft;
= a' + ft' = ft':a'; + ft x = ( x)(ft :x)

;
:
: !
(A:B:C):(A:C); (A!C)!(A!B!C);
r
e
(8)
(A
B
;
C)
(A C)
!
(10) (A: C) !(A:B: C)

T
f
(II) (A
(14)
(16)
(19)
(22)
+A (13) (AA )\ (12) (A + A') (A + A + A") (15) A :A A": A (17) A = (A'y; (18) A" = (A A = (A') (20) e A = A (21) A = A" Ae = A; (23) A*i =
r
r,
*i.
11_U]
These
LOGIC OF FUNCTIONS
formulae,
like
all
9
in
valid
formulae
.symbolic
logic,
hold good whether the individual
letters represent
certainties, impossibilities, or variables.
12.
The following examples
will illustrate
the working
of this symbolic calculus in simple cases.
A + B'C)' = A'(B'C)' = A'(B + C) - A'B + A'C. + B C = A^B-'C / = A-(B* + C~ ) (2) = (A" + A XB + C + C). A B = A (A e B Y = A (A" e + B' ) (3) (A" + = A A" 9 + A B- = A (B< + B") e e (an impossibility), and B = B + B". for A A- =
( 1 )
(
e
f
)'
e f )
r]
CHAPTER
13.
II
the forms F(x), f(x), (p(x), &c, are A function of x means an expression called Functions of When a symbol <p(x) denotes a symbol x. containing the
Symbols
of
x.
function of
x,
the symbols
(p(a),
(j)(P),
&c, respectively
denote what <p(x) becomes when a is put for x, when /3 As a simple mathematical exis put for x, and so on.
ample,
(p(u)
<p(
denote 5a; 2 denotes 5a 3 a + 1

let (p(x)
Sx +
;
Then, by definition, 1 any tyro in mathematics and

.
can see that <(4)
69, that cp(l)
3,
that <(0)
1,
that
As an example in symbolic logic, 1) = 9, and so on. let (p(x) denote the complex implication (A B) (A* B*). Then 0(e) will denote (A B) (A e B ), which is easily while (f)(6) will denote seen to be a valid # formula
: :
(A B B ), which is not valid. 14. Symbols of the forms F(x, y), (f)(x, y), &c, are Any of the forms may be called functions of x and y. employed to represent any expression that contains both the Let <p(x, y) denote any function of x symbols x and y. and y then the symbol (p(a, /3) will denote what (p(x, y)
(A
:
B)
Any formula
<f>{x)
ar
x
is
,
called valid
when
it
is
true for
all
admissible
values (or meanings),
x-2 ,
x 3 &c
,
of x.
10
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
14-16
becomes when a is put for x and /3 for y. Hence, <p{y, x) denote what cp(x, y) becomes when x and y interFor example, let B = boa-constrictor, let change places. R = rabbit, and let (p(B, R) denote the statement that
will
"
The
boa-constrictor
that the
symbol
(p(R,
swallowed the rabbit." B) will assert that
It
"
follows
rabbit
The
swallowed the boa-constrictor." 15. As another example, let t (as usual) denote true, and let p denote probable. Also let <p(r, p) denote the
implication (A T B T f
probable that
:
(AP B P ) T which
,
asserts that " If

it
it
is
and
are both true,
is
true that
and
B are both probable." Then <p(p, t) will denote the converse (or inverse) implication, namely, " If it is true that
and B are both probable, it is probable that A and B are both true." A little consideration will show that <(t, p) is always true, but not always <p(p, t). 16. Let <p denote any function of one or more constituents that is to say, let (p be short for <p(x), or for
;
(p(x, y),
&c.
The symbol
all
;
<p
asserts that (p is certain,

v
that
its
is,
true for
admissible values (or meanings) of

(p
constituents
that
is,
the symbol
asserts that
e
<p
is
impos-
sible,
false for all admissible values (or

;
of its constituents
the symbol
<p
meanings) means cp^cp' which

71
,
asserts that <p is neither certain nor impossible

asserts that (p
is
while
is
(p
a meaningless statement which
neither
true nor false.

c
For example,
Also
let
let
w = whale,
denote the
= herring,
statement
= conclusion.
"
(p(w, h)
that get
small whale can swallow a large herring."

e
We
(p
(w, h)
<p\h, w)
(p\w,
c),
a three-factor statement
which
asserts (1) that
it is
certain
that a small whale can swallow a large herring, (2) that it is impossible that a small herring can swallow a large
whale, and (3) that

<p(x, y),
it
is
unmeaning
to say that a small
whale can swallow a large conclusion.
F(x, y), &c, are really blank forms of
Thus we see that more or less
16, 17]
APPLICATION TO
GRAMMAR
11
complicated expressions or statements, the blanks being represented by the symbols x, y, &c, and the symbols or words to be substituted for or in the blanks being u, /3,
&c, as the case may be. containing the <p(x, y) be any proposition words x and y and let <(, z), in which z is substituted for y, have the same meaning as the proposition (p(x, y). Should we in this case consider y and z as necessarily In languages which, like of the same part of speech ? English, are but little inflected, the rule generally holds good and may be found useful in teaching grammar to beginners but from the narrow conventional view of grammarians the rule would not be accepted as absolute. Take, for example, the two propositions " He talks nonThey both mean the sense " and " He talks foolishly." same thing yet grammarians would call non-sense a Here noun, while they would call foolishly an adverb. conventional grammar and strict logic would appear to The truth is that so-called " general part company. grammar," or a collection of rules of construction and
a/3,
/3,
17.
Let
classification applicable to all
languages alike, is hardly unit of all possible. is the reasoning the manner in which the separate words are combined to construct a proposition varies according to
The
complete
proposition
the particular bent of the language employed.
In no Consider the two languages is it exactly the same. following example. Let S = His son, let A = in Africa, let K = has been killed, and let (p(S, K, A) denote the By proposition " His son has been killed in Africa!' our symbolic conventions, the symbol (p(S, A, K), in which the symbols K and A have interchanged places, denotes the proposition " His son in Africa has been Do these two propositions differ in meaning? killed." Clearly they do. Let S A denote his son in Africa (to distinguish him, say, from S c his son in China), and let KA denote has been killed in Africa (as distinguished from K c has been killed in China). It follows that
, ,
12
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
[17,18
<p(S, A, K) must mean S*, whereas (f)(S, K, A) must mean S K \ In the former, A has the force of an adjective
referring to the
noun
S,
whereas, in the
latter,
A
,
has
the force of an adverb referring to

in general,
&c., the
the verb K.
And
2
,
as regards symbols of the
form
Ax Ay A
,
denotes the leading or class idea, the point of resemblance, while the subscripta x, y, z, &c., denote the points of difference which distinguish the
letter
separate
it
members of the general or class idea. Hence when A denotes a noun, the subscripta denote adjectives, or adjective-equivalents; whereas when A
is
that
denotes a verb, the subscripta denote adverbs, or adverbWhen we look into the matter closely, the equivalents.
inflections
of verbs,
to
indicate
moods
or tenses, have
logical point
really the force of adverbs, and,
from the
of view,
may
if
be regarded as adverb-equivalents.
For
example,
spoke,
S denote the word speak, & x may denote may denote will speak, and so on just as when Sy
;
S denotes He
spoke French,
spoke
may denote He spoke well, may denote He spoke slowly, and S y

spoke,
S^
or
or
He He
So in the Greek expression ol totc avOpunroi (the then men, or the men of that time), the adverb Tore has really the force of an adjective, and may be considered an adjective- equivalent.
Dutch,
and so
on.
CHAPTER
1
III
cause of symbolic paradoxes is the 8. The main Take, for ambiguity of words in current language. When we say, " If example, the words if and implies. in the centigrade thermometer the mercury falls below zero, water will freeze," we evidently assert a general law which is true in all cases within the limits of tacitly This is the sense in which the understood conditions. It word if is used throughout this book (see 10). is understood to refer to a general law rather than to
18, 19]
PARADOXES AND AMBIGUITIES
13
So with the word implies. Let M z F denote " The mercury will fall below zero',' and let The preceding conditional denote " Water will freeze." z F which statement will then be expressed by M
a particular case.
asserts
that the proposition
implies
the proposition
to
F
.
But
this
convention
forces
us
>/
:
accept some
:
x and x e, which hold good whether the statement x be true or false. The former asserts that if an impossibility be true any statement x is true, or that an impossibility implies any The latter asserts that the statement x statement. (whether true or false) implies any certainty e, or (in The paradox other words) that if x is true e is true. will appear still more curious when we change x into e in the second. We in the first formula, or x into e, which asserts that any imthen get the formula The reason why the possibility implies any certainty. last formula appears paradoxical to some persons is e to probably this, that they erroneously understand mean Q^ Q e and to assert that if any statement Q is But impossible it is also certain, which would be absurd.
paradoxical-looking formulas, such as
rj r\
:
>/
by definition it e does not mean this (see 74) / simply means (>/e )'', which asserts that the statement Similarly, t]e is an impossibility, as it evidently is. x means {qx'J*, and asserts that nx is an impossibility, which is true, since the statement r\x' contains the im}}
:
r\
possible factor
n.
We prove x e as follows x\e (xe'y = (x>i) = if

: ri
e.
For
=>],
since
the
e
denial of any certainty
is
some
impossibility (see
20).
is
implication
for
it
Q Q
:
That, on the other hand, the not a valid formula is evident
clearly fails in the case Q?.
Taking
Q=
>/.
/,
we get
Q"
19.
Q = rp
e
>f
=
).
'/
= (/)" = (0" =
Other paradoxes
(
arise
sign
of equivalence
from the ambiguity of the In this book the statement
14
(a
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
[|
9,
20
not necessarily assert that a and /3 are /3) does synonymous, that they have the same meaning, but only that they are equivalent in the sense that each implies
the other, using the word 'implies' as denned in
10.
In this sense any two
certainties,
e
x
and
are equivalent,
however
different in
meaning
\ .
and
so are
any two im-
possibilities, n l
and n 2 and 6 2 variables, B x definition, we have

(e
l
but not necessarily two different We prove this as follows. By
= e = (e
2
)
:e )(e :e
l
=(vi) (Vt) for the denial of any certainty Again we have, by definition,
,
= (e/ ne/ y = w=V4= e;

2
1)
ex
is
some
impossibility
r\
= *K = Vi=
But we
are
cannot assert that

equivalent.
necessarily
any two variables, 6 X and # 2 For example, 6 2 might be

,
the denial of 6 V in which case

(
we should
.
get
(
e
l
= (0 = e\) = (0
X
e\)(6\
ej
0A)Wi)"
statements,
The symbol used

a and
/3,
to
assert
that
any two
are not only equivalent (in
the sense of each
implying the other) but also synonymous, is (a = /3); but this being an awkward symbol to employ, the symbol (a = /3), though it asserts less, is generally used instead. 20. Let the symbol it temporarily denote the word possible, let p denote probable, let q denote improbable, and have 6, t, let u denote uncertain, while the symbols e,
r\,
i
by definition, A and A 5 will = A" ) and ), have (A respectively assert that the chance of A is greater than These conventions give us the \, that it is less than \. nine-factor formula
their usual significations.
7r
)
We (A u = A'
shall then, p while
(*V)W(^WV)W
20]
PARADOXES AND AMBIGUITIES

asserts (1,
15
2) that the denial of a truth is an and conversely; (3, 4) that the denial of a probability is an improbability, and conversely; (5, G) that the denial of a certainty * is an impossibility, and con-
which
untruth,
versely
(8, 9)
(7
that the denial of a variable

is
is
a variable
that the denial of a possibility
an uncertainty,
and conversely.
The
first
four factors are pretty evident
the other five are less
so.
Some
(tt')
persons might reason,

w
for example, that instead of
we should have
(-n-'y
that the denial of a possibility *

tainty
will
is
not merely an uncer-
A single concrete example but an impossibility. show that the reasoning is not correct. The statement " It will rain to-morrow " may be considered a
;
possibility
but
its
denial " It will not rain to-morrow,"

is
denote any statement taken at random out of a collection of statements containing certainties, impossibilities, and variables. To
as follows
:
u {tt')
though an uncertainty may be proved
not an impossibility.
The formula
Let
prove
get
{ir')
is
equivalent to proving
77
:
(Q')
M
.
Thus we
(Tr'y
= Qe
,
+ Q (Q'r + (Q7 = Q + Q :Q + Q = e;
e
: :
(Q'f = Q
e
for
(Q y = Q
,
l
Q.
and (Q f = Q, whatever be the statement To prove that (^y, on the other hand, is not valid,
/
we have only
to instance a single case of failure.
Giving
is
Q the same meaning as before, a case for we then get, putting Q = 6 V
of failure
8
;
=e
;r
1
1i
= (e/ y = (e y =
i 1
l2
* By the " denial of a certainty " is not meant (A e )', or its synonym A-*, which denies that a particular statement A is certain, but (A e )' or its synonym A' e the denial of the admittedly certain statement A e This statement Ae (since a suffix or subscriptum is adjectival and not predicative) assumes A to be certain for both A x and its denial A'x assume the truth of A* (see 4, 5). Similarly, "the denial of a possibility" does not mean A-"' but AV, or its synonym (Att)', the denial of the admittedly possible
,
.
statement
An-.
16
21. It
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
may seem
paradoxical
to
[21
the pronor A' with position A is not quite synonymous with A yet such is the fact. Let A It rains. Then A' =
say that
It does not rain ;

is
A T = it
is
true that
it
rains
The two propositions false that it rains. equivalent in the sense that each implies the other
and A' = it and AT are

;
but
they are not synonymous, for we cannot always substitute In other words, the equivalence the one for the other. (A A T ) does not necessarily imply the equivalence e then For example, let (p(A) denote A (p(A T ). (p(A)
T Sup<p(A T ) denotes (A ) or its synonym A" (see 13). pose now that A denotes 6 T a variable that turns out
, ,
true, or
it is
happens
to
be true in the case considered, though
not true in
all cases.
ct>(A_)
We
get
T
,
= A< = e;=(e y = r
for a variable is
never a certainty, though
it
may
turn out
true in a particular case.
Again,
we
get
^(AT ) = (AT )e = (^) = e = e;

e
for 6 T
means
(0 T )
case, therefore,
which is a formal certainty. In this T though we have A = A yet (p(A) is not

, ,
T equivalent to (p(A ).
Next,
suppose
denotes
variable that happens to be false in the case considered, get though it is not false always.
We
0(A')
for
= (A') = A* = 0? =
e
7;
no
get
variable
(though
it
may
turn out false in a parti-
cular case) can be an impossibility.
On
the other hand,

e
we
</)(A')
= (A') = A" = 6[ = (d[y = e = e;
for 6[
case, therefore,
means (Oy, which is a formal certainty. In this though we have A' = A\ yet <(A') is not
</>(A
l
equivalent to
).
It is a
remarkable fact that nearly
all civilised languages, in the course of their evolution, as if impelled by some unconscious instinct, have drawn
21, 22]
DEGREES OF STATEMENTS
,
17
between a simple affirmation A and the statement A T that A is true ; and also between a simple denial A' and the statement A that A is false. It is the first step in the classification of statements, and marks a
this distinction
1
,
faculty which
man
alone of
all terrestrial
animals appears
to possess (see 22, 99).
22. As already remarked, my system of logic takes account not only of statements of the second degree, such a/3y as A" but of statements of higher degrees, such as A
13
,
,
meant by statements of the second, third, &c, degrees, when the primary subject is itself a statement ? The statement A a/iy or its a/3 7 synonym (A ) is a statement of the first degree as regards its immediate subject A a/3 but as it is synonymous with (A a ) Py it is a statement of the second degree as regards A and a statement of the third degree as regards A, the root statement of the series. Viewed from another
,
afiyS
&c.
But,
it
may
be asked, what
is
tt
standpoint,
A a may
be calledâ revision of the

it
judgment
A, which (though here
is
the root statement, or root

itself laave
judgment, of the
of
3
series)
may
been a revision
some previous judgment here unexpressed. Similarly, a (A")* may be called a revision of the judgment A and so on. To take the most general case, let A denote any complex statement (or judgment) of the ntb degree.
,
(a/3
neither a formal certainty (see 109), like nor a formal impossibility, like (a/3 af, it may be a material certainty, impossibility, or variable, according
If
it
:
be
e
,
a)
If it follows data on which it is founded. from these data, it is a certainty, and we write A* if it is incompatible with these data, it is an impossibility, and we write A'' if it neither follows from nor is incompatible with our data, it is a variable, and we write A". But whether this new or revised judgment be A or A^ or A", it must necessarily be a judgment (or statement) of the (w+l) th degree, since, by hypothesis, the statement A is of the w th degree. Suppose, for ex-
to the special
necessarily
;
ample,
denotes a functional statement
<p(x,
y,
z)
of
18
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
th
22-24
which may have m different meanings &c, depending upon the different meanings x., x2 x y &c, y v yz y y &c, zv z 2 zy &c., of x, y, z. Of these m different meanings of A, or its synonym <p, let If A, or its synonym <p(x, y, z), one be taken at random. be true for r meanings out of its m possible meanings, then the chance of A is rjm, and the chance of its denial When r = m, the chance of A is one, A' is (m r)lm. e and the chance of A' is zero, so that we write A (A )''. When r = o, the chance of A is zero, and the chance of A' , When r is some number is one, so that we write A (A ) less than m and greater than o, then r/m and(??i r)/ra / e e But, as are two proper fractions, so we write A (A ) e this revised or A or A before, whether we get A judgment, though it is a judgment of the first degree as th regards its expressed root A, is a judgment of the (n + l) For degree as regards some unexpressed root ^{x, y, z). 99 so then A" will denote x/^ instance, if A denote \J/ (or statement) of the fourth that it will be a judgment
the n
degree,
(or values) <p v (p 2 (p 3
,
11
eT,e
degree as regards \Ja 23. It may be remarked that any statement A and T its denial A' are always of the same degree, whereas A synonyms (see and A', their respective equivalents but not The statement SS 19, 21), are of one degree higher.
and confirmation of the judgment A; and reversal of the judgment A. We suppose two incompatible alternatives, A and A' to be placed before us with fresh data, and we are to decide which is true. If we pronounce in favour of A, we conT if we profirm the previous judgment A and write A nounce in favour of A', we reverse the previous judgment A and write A\ 24. Some logicians say that it is not correct to speak of any statement as " sometimes true and sometimes that if true, it must be true always and if false, false "
T
is
a revision
while
is
a revision
',
it
must be
false always.
To
this I reply, as I did in
my
seventh paper published in the Proceedings of the London
24]
VARIABLE STATEMENTS
Society,
19
is
Mathematical
that
when
say
is
"
sometimes
true and sometimes
false," or "
a variable," I merely
mean that the symbol, word, or collection of words, denoted by A sometimes represents a truth and someFor example, suppose the symbol A times an untruth. denotes the statement " Mrs. Brown is not at home." This is not a formal certainty, like 3 > 2, nor a formal impossibility, like 3<2, so that when we have no data out the mere arrangement of words, " Mrs. Brown is not at home," we are justified in calling this proposition, that is to say, this intelligible arrangement of words, a variable, and
in asserting
6
.
If at the
is
that
"
Mrs.
Brown
not at
moment the servant tells me home " I happen to see

e
,
Mrs.
fresh data
Brown walking away in the distance, then / have and form the judgment A which, of course,
In this case I say that " A is certain" because its denial A' (" Mrs. Brown is at home ") would But if, contradict my data, the evidence of my eyes. instead of seeing Mrs. Brown walking away in the distance, I see her face peeping cautiously behind a curtain through a corner of a window, I obtain fresh
implies
data of an opposite kind, and form the judgment Av which implies A'. In this case I say that " A is impossible,"
because
Mrs.
the
is
statement
represented
by A,
namely,
dicts
"
my
a
medium
not at home," this time contradata, which, as before, I obtain through the of my two eyes. To say that the proposition
different
Brown
A
is
is
'proposition
when
is
it
is
false
from
what
a
it is
when
is out.
it is true, is
like saying that Mrs.
Brown
is
different
person
when
she
in from
what she
when she
20
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
[25
CHAPTER IV
25.
The
following three rules are often useful:

(1) A'</>(A) (2)
(3)
= A'tf>(e). A"4>(A) = A*0(>;). A <p(A) = A. <j)(O x

e
).
In the
last of these formulae, 6 X
denotes the
first
variable
&c, that comes after the last-named For example, if the last variable that in our argument. has entered into our argument be 6 then X will denote 6 In the first two formulae it is not necessary to state which of the series e e2 e y &c, is represented by the e in (p(e), nor which of the series &c, is represented y 2 in (p(>i); for, as proved in 19, we have always by the e ), and (t] x = (ex whatever be the certainties ex and y y ), e and whatever the impossibilities x ana % Suppose,
of the series 6
rj
rj
r\
r]
rj
"
for
example, that
\j/
denotes
:
A'B'C^C AB + CA).
We
get
=AB
T,
fl
= A B"C
e
9
;
so that the fourth or bracket factor of
be omitted In this without altering the value or meaning of \f/. operation we assumed the formulas
\j/-
may
(1)
(ariz=r]);
(2) (ae
= a);
(3)
(*i
+ a==a).
Other formulae frequently required are

(4) (AB)'
(6)
e
= A' + B';
+ A = e;
/ = *,;
(9)
(5) (A + B)' = A'B'; AA' = >7; (8) A + A' = e; (7) (10) >/ = *; (11) A + AB = A;
(12) (A
+ B)(A + C) = A + BC.
26, 27]
FORMULAE OF OPERATION
we
21
26. For the rest of this chapter
shall exclude the

T
,
consideration of variables, so that A,

this
A*
will
be conA''.
sidered mutually equivalent, as will also A', A',
On
understanding we get the formulas

(1)
A<(A) = A<p(e)
(2)
Aty( A) = Aty(i)
(3) A<(A')
= A<^);
(4)
A^(A') = A'(/)(e).
others, such as
rj)
;
From
these formulas
we derive
(5) AB'(/)(A, B)
(6) AB'<J>(A', B) (7) AB'<(A',
= AB'<(e,
= AB'^)(;, n)\ B') = AB'<(>/,

;
e),
/
and so on; like signs, as in A(p(A) or A / ^)(A ), in the same letter, producing (p(e) and unlike signs, as in / B'(p(B) or B^>(B ), producing <jf>(>/)The following examples will show the working of these formulas
:
Let
</)(A,
B) = AB'C
+ A'BC'.
/
Then we
get
Next,
Then,
= AB'(AB'C + A'BC) = AB (-C + wC') = AB'(C + >/)=AB'C. A'B0'(A, B) = A B(AB C + A BC / = A B( w C + eeC y = A'B(C')' = A'BC. let cp(B, D) = (CD' + CD + B C B'D'0(B, D) = B'D'(CD' + CD + B'C')' = B D (Ce + C + eC'/ = B'D'(C + C)' = B D'e = B'D'>i =
AB'<( A, B)
/
/
>;
>
].
The
of course,
application of Formulas (4), (5), (11) of 25 would, have obtained the same result, but in a more
troublesome manner. 27. If in any product
ABC
any statement-factor
is
implied in any other factor, or combination of factors, If in any sum (i.e., the implied factor may be omitted.
2%
alternative)
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
sum
of
27, 28
the
These
A + B + C, any term implies any other, or any others, the implying term may be omitted. rules are expressed symbolically by the two
(A:B):(AB = A);
(2)
:
formulae
(1)
(A:B):(A + B = B).
:
By
virtue of the formula (x a)(x
/3)
=x
a/3,
these two
formulae
may
be combined into the single formula
(3)
(A:B):(AB = A)(A + B = B).

of
As the converse of each holds good, we get

(4)
these three formula?
also
A:B = (AB = A) = (A + B = B). Hence, we get A + AB = A, omitting the term AB, because and we also get A(A + B) = A, it implies the term A; omitting the factor A + B, because it is implied by the
factor A.
28. Since
factor of
A B
:
is
equivalent to
(AB = A), and B

any implication
is
AB,
it
follows that the consequent
B may
be
:
called a factor of the antecedent A, in
B,
and
of
that, for the
same
reason, the antecedent
A may
:
be
called a multiple of the consequent B.
The equivalence
A B
:
and (A = AB)
:
may
:
be proved as follows
:
(A = AB) = (A AB)(AB A) = ( A AB)e = A:AB = (A:A)(A:B) = e(A:B)
= A:B.
be proved
The equivalence
as follows
:
of
A B
:
and (A
+ B = B) may
(A
+ B = B) = (A + B:B)(B:A + B) = (A + B:B)e = A + B:B = (A:B)(B:B) = A:B.

in these
:
The formula? assumed

(x
:
two proofs are
aft)
= (x
If
a)(x
/3),
and a
+ /3
x = (a
x)(fi
x),
both of which
assert that
"
may
x
is
true,
For to be considered axiomatic. then a and /3 are both true " is

" If
equivalent to asserting that
is
true a
is
true,
and

if
28, 29]
REDUNDANT TERMS
/5 is
is
23
x
is
is
true
true."
Also, to assert that " If either a
or
|8 is
true x
is
true
" is

true x
is true."
" If
true x
true,
and
if /3 is
29. To discover the redundant terms of any logical sum, or alternative statement. These redundant terms are easily detected by mere inspection when they evidently imply (or are multiples of) single co-terms, as in the case of the terms underlined in
the expression
a fty
+ a'y + aft/ + ft/,
which therefore reduces to a!y + fiy'. But when they do not imply single co-terms, but the sum of two or more co-terms, they cannot generally be thus detected by inspection. They can always, however, be discovered by the following rule, which includes all cases. Any term of a logical sum or alternative may be omitted as redundant when this term multiplied by the denial of the sum of all its co-terms gives an impossible product the term must not but if the product is not be omitted. Take, for example, the alternative statement
rj
;
rj,
CD' + C'D
Beginning with the
first
+ B'C' + B'D'.
term we get
7
CD'(C'D
+ B'C + B'D')' = CD'(w + B' + B'e)'
= CD (B = BCD
/
)'
/
.
Hence, the first term CD' must not be omitted. next the second term CD, we get
Taking
CTKCD' +
B'C/
+ B'D'/ = C'D( w + B'e + B',,)'
= C D(BY=BC D.
/ /
must not be omitted. Hence, the second term next take the third term B'C, getting
CD
We
B^CD
-I-
C/D
+ B'D'/ = B'C'(>iI)' + eD + eD'/ = B'C'(D + D / = B C'>/ =

,
/
>/.
This shows that the third term
B'C
can be omitted as
24
redundant.
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
29-31
last
Omitting the third term, we try the
term B'D', thus
B'D'(CD'
+ CD)' = B'D'(Ce + C>,)' = B'D'C.
This shows that the fourth term B'D' cannot be omitted But if we retain as redundant if we omit the third term. fourth term B'D', the third term B'C, we may omit the
for
we then get
B'D'(CD'
+ CD + B'C7 = B'D'(Ce + C'n + eC')' = B D (C + C ) =B D

)'
/ ,
/ ,
J?
i7.
Thus, we may omit either the third term B'C, or else the fourth term B'D', as redundant, but not both. 30. A complex alternative may be said to be in its simplest form* when it contains no redundant terms, and none of its terms (or of the terms left) contains any redundant factor. For example, a + ab + m + m'n is reduced
form when we omit the redundant term ab, out of the last term strike out the unnecessary factor m' and For a + ab a, and m + m'n m + n, so that the simplest
to its simplest
(See 31.) n. form of the expression is a reduce a complex alternative to its simplest 31. To a'/3' to the denial of form, apply the formula (a + /3)'
= +m+
the alternative. Then apply the formula (a/3/ = a' + ft' to the negative compound factors of the result, and omit Then develop the redundant terms in this new result. product by the same formulae, and go the denial of this through the same process as before. The final result
will
be the simplest equivalent of the original alternative. Take, for example, the alternative given in 30, and We get denote it by (p.
(p'
= a + ab + m + m'n = a + m + m!n. = (a + m + m'n)' = a'm'(m'n)' = a'm'(m + nf) = a'm'n'. = (cp')' = (a' m'n')' = a + m + n. <P
cp
"
;
here call its " simplest form " I called its " primitive form in my third paper in the Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society but the word " primitive" is hardly appropriate.
*
What
31,32]
METHODS OF SIMPLIFICATION
alternative
25
As another example take the
AB'C + ABD + A'B'D' + ABD' + A'B'D,

and denote it by (p. Then, omitting, as we go along, all terms which mere inspection will show to be redundant, we get
r/>
= AB'C + AB(D + D') + A'B'(D' + D) = AB'C + ABe + A'B'e = AB'C' + AB + A'B'.

/
/
=(AB C ) (AB)'(A B ) = (A' + B + C)(A' + B')(A + B) = (A' + B'C)( A + B) = A'B + AB'C. p = p')' = (A'B + AB'C)' = (A + B')(A' + B + C) = AB + AC' + A'B' + B'C.
/ , / , /
<
Applying
terms,
B'C')
the
test
of
29
to
discover
we
find
that the second or fourth
redundant term (AC or
may
be omitted as redundant, but not both.
We
thus get
(p
= AB + A'B' + B'C = AB + AC + A'B',

which may be
taken
as
either
of
the simplest
form
of
(p.
32. We will now apply the preceding principles to an interesting problem given by Dr. Venn in his " S} mbolic Logic" (see the edition of 1894, page 331). Suppose we were asked to discuss the following set of rules, in respect to their mutual consistency and
T
brevity.
Financial Committee a. The amongst the General Committee.
shall
be
chosen
from
No one shall be a member both of the General /3. and Library Committees unless he be also on the Financial Committee. y. No member of the Library Committee shall be on the Financial Committee.
26
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
Solution.
[32
Speaking of a member taken at random, let the symbols F, G, L, respectively denote the statements " He will be on the Financial Committee," " He will be on the General Committee," " He will be on the Library as usual, for any statement that Putting Committee." contradicts our data, we have
>;,
a
so that
= (F:G);
a/3
.
/3
= (GLF'
>,)
7 = (LF:#,);
7 = (F:G)(GLF
/
:i?)(FL:i7)
= (FG':*i)(GLF':T,)(FL:r,) = FG' + GLF + FL:>/.

FG'
we get
Putting
(J>
for the antecedent
+ GLF' + FL, ^(F' + GXG' + L' + FXF' + I/)

(See
25, Formulae (4) and (5))
= (F' + GL')(G' + L' + F) = F'G' + F'L' + GL' + FGL' = F'G' + GL';

term FGL', being a multiple of the term GL', is / / redundant by inspection, and F L is also redundant, because, by 29,
for the
F L (F G + GL')' = F'L'(eG' +
/ / ,
G<)'
= F'L'(G' + G)' = n
Hence,
finally,
:ri= (FG' + GL
"
rf)
= (F
:
G)(G
u,
(3,
L')-
That
is
to say,
the three club rules,
replaced by the two

assert, firstly, that
simple rules
If
F G
7
:
may
be
and
L',
which
any member is on the Financial Committee, he must be also on the General Committee," which is rule a in other words and, secondly, that " If any member is on the General Committee, he is not to be on the Library Committee."
;
33]
SOLUTIONS, ELIMINATIONS, LIMITS
27
CHAPTER V
33.
From
the formula
(a
:
b)(c
d)
= ah' + cd'
number of implications can always be expressed in the form of a single implication,

the product of any
+ fi + 7 + &c
is
i],
of which the antecedent
a logical
sum
(or alternative),
and the consequent an impossibility. Suppose the implications forming the data of any problem that contains the statement x among its constituents to be thus reduced to the form
Ax + B,v' +
in
C:tj,
x,
which
is
the coefficient or co-factor of
the co-
efficient of x',
and C the term,

x'.
or
sum
of the terms,
contain neither x nor
It is easy to see that the
which above
data
may
also be expressed in the
form
J
(B:asX:A')(C!:9)
which
is
equivalent to the form
(BîA'XCm).
When
the data have been reduced to this form, the îven

is
implication, or product of implications,
said to be solved
x ; and the statements B and A' (which are generally more or less complex) are called the limits of x; the antecedent B being the strong * or superior limit and Since the the consequent A', the weak or inferior limit.
with respect
to
;
*
|8
:
When from
our data
el
we can
infer a:
/3.
/3,
but have no data for inferring
we say that AB:A:A + B, we say

u,
is
stronger than
that
AB
is
For example, since we have stronger than A, and A stronger than
A+B.
28
factor
: :
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
:
33,
34
the factor (C
(B x A') implies (B A'), and our data also imply >j), it follows that our data imply
:
(B:A')(C:>,),
which
is
equivalent to
AB + C
: *).
Thus we get the
formula of elimination
(Ac
+ B,/ + C:>,):(AB + C:>;),
which asserts that the strongest conclusion deducible from our data, and making no mention of x, is the implication
AB + C
>/.
As
this conclusion
it
is
equivalent to
the two-factor statement

impossible.
34.
CÂBy,
asserts that the state-
ment C and the combination
of statements
AB
arc both
From
this
we deduce the
solution of the follow-
ing more general problem.
Let the functional symbol or simply the symbol (p, denote data z, a, b), <J)(x, y, which refer to any number of constituent statements x, y, z, a, b, and which may be expressed (as in the
problem of
a
18
less
x, y,
33) in the form of a single implication + y + &c. rj, the terms a, /3, y, &c, being more or complex, and involving more or less the statements
z,
a,
b.
It is required,
firstly, to find
(i.e.,
successively in
any and strongest consequent) of x, y, z; secondly, to eliminate x, y, z in the same order and, thirdly, to find the strongest implicational statement (involving a or b, but neither x nor y nor z) that remains after this
desired order the limits
;
the weakest antecedent
elimination.
z, y, x.
Let the assigned order of limits and elimination be Let A denote the sum of the terms containing the factor z let B denote the sum of the terms containing the factor z and let C denote the sum of the terms Our data being (p, we get containing neither z nor z
; ,
.
(j,
= kz + B/ + C = (B = (B z A')(C = (B
:
17
z)(z
)(C
:
r,)
>;)
A')(B A')(C
>/).
34]

Bz'
29
The expression represented by Az +

to
+G
is
understood
(see
have been reduced
to its simplest
form
30,
The 31), before we collected the coefficients of z and z'. and the result after limits of z are therefore B and A'
;
the elimination of
:
z is
>/),
(B A')(C
which
= AB + C
To find the limits of y from the implication AB + C we reduce AB + C to its simplest form (see 30, 31), We thus get, which we will suppose to be By + Ey' + F.
:
>/,
as in the previous expression in
z,
AB + C
The
r\
= By + E/ + F
r,
= (E
y D')(E D')(F
:
:
>/)
limits of y are therefore
E and
D',
and the result

is
after the successive elimination of z
and y
(E D')(F
:
>,),
which
= ED + F
>/.
To find the limits of x from the implication ED + F we proceed exactly as before. We reduce ED + F to its simplest form, which we will suppose to be Gx + Hx + K, and get
:
>/,
ED + F
The
= Gx + Ha/ + K
r,
= (H
x G')(H G')(K
:
:
>;).
limits of x are therefore
and
z,
G',
and the
result
after the successive elimination of
y,
is
(H G0(K
:
>/),
which
= HG + K
>,.
x having thus been successively +K eliminated, there remains the implication connecting the which indicates the relation (if any) Thus, we remaining constituent statements a and b.
The statements
z,
y,
GH
}j,
finally get
(/)
(B
A')(E
//
D')(H x G')(GH
:
+K
,,).
in
which A and mention of z)

;
do not contain z (that is, they make no D and E contain neither z nor y G and and the expression K contain neither z nor y nor x
;
30
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
be destitute of
(i.e.,
34, 35
in the last factor will also
will
make
no mention of) the constitutents x, y, z, though, like G and H, it may contain the constituent statements a and b. a and a e are In the course of this process, since
>)
: :
whatever the statement a may be (see 18), we can supply for any missing antecedent, and e for any missing consequent.
certainties
>/
35. To give a concrete example lem and solution discussed in 34,

e
:
of the general problet (p

z
denote the data

.
xyza
+ xyb +xy z +y
We
get, putting (p for these data,


get
:
= (y'+ ab)z + (]jy)z + {x'y + ax')
putting
in 34,
for y'
+ ab, B
for by,
and C
for x'y
+ ax'.
As
we get
(B:s:A')(AB + C:>7),
so that the limits of z are
B and
A',
:
and the result
after
the
elimination of
is
AB + C
/.
Substituting their
values for A, B, C, this last implication becomes

{ab
+ ,c)y + ax'
?/,
which we
ab
will
for
n,
denote by *Dy
+ Ey' + F
n,
putting
J)
for
+ x, E
and F
for ax.
z
:
Thus we get
(f>
= (B
=
(B
A')(Dy
+ E/ + F
y D')(ED
:
>/)
:z
A0(E
+F
;).
Having thus found the
limits
{ix.,
the weakest ante-
35,36]
31
cedents and strongest consequents) of z and y, to find the limits of x from the implication
we proceed
ED + F
n,
the strongest implication that remains after the Substituting for D, E, F the elimination of z and y.
which
is
values which they represent,
we
:
get
n
DE + F
in
{ah
+ J)n + J
= Gx + BJ + K
>/,
n,
which G, H,
K
:
respectively denote
a,
n-
We
;
thus
get
DE + F
>i
= (H
x G')(HG
:
+K
tj)
so that our final result is

<$>
= (B
= =
(by
z
:
A')(E
:
//
D')(H
:
a;
(/>//
+ b y){n :z:a'y + b'y)(y

z
a'y
y
:
; rt ;
G0(HG + K e)(>/ + b'x){a

: :
i,)
/)
a'x
+ b'x)(a
x).
To obtain
G, H, K in the second factor, omitted the redundant antecedent the redundant consequent e in the third factor, and the
;
we first substituted for A, B, D, E, then we the values we had assigned to them

this result
>/
redundant certainty
factor.
(/
/),
which constituted the fourth
the fourth factor (HG + K:>/) reduces to the form (n rj), which is a formal certainty (see 18), indicates that, in this particular problem, nothing can be implicationally affirmed in terms of a or
The
fact
that
z) except formal f &c, which such as (ab a), (aa >;), ab(a + b') are true always and independently of our data (p. 36. If in the preceding problem we had not reduced the alternative represented by As + Bz' + C to its simplest form (see 30, 31), we should have found for the not a'y + b'y, but inferior limit or consequent of z, From this it might be supposed that the b'y). x(a'y + strongest conclusion deducible from z (in conjunction with, or within the limits of, our data) was not A' but But though xh! is formally stronger than A', that xk'.
(without mentioning either x or y or

:
:
certainties
>i,
32
is
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
to
36-38
say, stronger
definitions,
than A' token we have no data but our here we have other data, namely, <p and <p
;
implies (as
lent
we
shall prove) that A'
is
in this case equivais
to xA', so that materially (that
to say, within the
limits of our particular data <p) neither of the two statements can be called stronger or weaker than the other.
This
we prove
<p
:
as follows
(z
7
:
D' x)
:
(A'
x)
(A'
= x A')
a proof which becomes evident when for A' and D' we substitute their respective values a!y + b'y and a'x + b'x for it is clear that y is a factor of the former, and x a
;
factor of the latter.
37. In the problem solved in 35, in which our data, namely, the implication
e
:
(p
denoted
xyza'
+ xyb' + xy'z' + y'z'a',
we took
z,
Had we
been
y, x as the order of limits and of elimination. taken the order y, x, z, our final result would have
(j>
= (z:y:
b'x
+ xz)(z + a
is
x){z
a'
+ b').
I call
to,
38.
The preceding method
of finding
what
the
" limits "
of logical statements
closely allied
and
was suggested by,

Proc. of the
my method
(published in 1877, in the
Lond. Math. Soc.) for successively finding the integration for the variables in a multiple limits of In the next chapter the method integral (see 138).
will be applied to the solution (so far as solution is possible) of Professor Jevons's so-called
"
Inverse Problem,"
which has given
rise
to
so
among
logicians but also
much discussion, not among mathematicians.
only
39]
JEVONS'S "INVERSE
PROBLEM"
33
CHAPTER VI
Briefly stated, the so-called "inverse problem" of Professor Jevons is this. Let tp denote any alternative, It is required to find an imsuch as abc + a'bc + aVV
39.
'.
plication,
or product of implications,* that implies this
alternative.
Now, any implication whatever

implications) that
of
or
e
(or
any product
is
of
is
equivalent to <p% or
e
:
a multiple
:

&c, must necessarily imply the given

that the
alternative
is
cp,
so
number
is
of possible solutions
as enunthus indeterminate, the number of possible solutions may be restricted, and the
really unlimited.
But though the problem
ciated
by Professor Jevons
useful
problem rendered far more interesting, as well as more and instructive, by stating it in a more modified form as follows Let cp denote any alternative involving any number of
:
constituents,
a,
b,
c,
&c.
It
is
required to resolve the

that
it
implication
cp
into factors, so
will
take the
form
(M a N)(P
: :
Q)(R
S),
&c,
which the limits M and N (see 33) may contain &c, but not a; the limits P and Q may contain the limits R and S may neither a nor b c, d, &c, but contain d, e, &c, but neither a nor b nor c and so on When no nearer limits of a conto the last constituent. and e stituent can be found we give it the limits the former being its antecedent, and the latter its conin
b,
c,
; ;
>;
sequent (see
* Professor
18, 34).
calls these implications
Jevons
"laws," because he arrives
at
them by a long tentative inductive
tific
by which scien" investigators have often discovered the so-called " laws of nature
process, like that
(see 112).
34
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
As a simple example, suppose we have
(p *
[39
= abc + a'bc + ab'c',

Reducing
<p
/.
This alternative equivalent of

31) by omitting either the not both so that we get
;
cp'
may
be simplified (see
first
or the third term, but
(p
= b'c + a'c' + be'

first
it
rj
= a'b' + b'c + be
e
:
17.
Taking the
equivalent of
<fi,
the limits of a) arranging
in the
and (in order form Aa + Ba'
to find
+C
tj,
we
get (see 33, 34)

e
:
(p
= tja + c = (c a
7
:
V+
:
(6'c
:
+ W)
c)(t]
:
e)(c
e).
Thus, we have successively found the limits of
a, b, c
e)
(see
all
34, 35).
But
since (a
e),
(>;
c),
and
(c
are
formal certainties, they

that
may
6
c)
be omitted as factors, so
we get
e
:
<p
= (c'
)(c
= (c'
a)(c
b).
two factors asserts that any term of the given alternative (p which contains c' must also contain a. The second asserts that any term which contains c must also contain b, and, conversely, that any term which con-
The
first
of these
tains b
must
(p will
also contain
c.
glance at the given alter-
native
*
verify these assertions.
alternative.
denotes an Observe that here and in what follows the symbol denotes a given implication, which In 34, 35 the symbol may take either such a form ase:a + /3 + 7 + &c. or as a + /3 + 7 + &c. 7/.
<j> <j>
,
:
39,40]
JEVONS'S "INVERSE
now take
PROBLEM"
e
:
35
We
will
the second equivalent of

a'b'
<jj }
namely,
+ b'e + be'
tj,
and resolve
the limits of
it
into three factors

c.
by successively rinding
a, b,
Proceeding as before, we get

t
-:^ =
(6
:rt )( c
= &).
different
is
At
first
sight
e
:
it
might be supposed that the two ways of

into factors gave
results,
resolving
<p
:
since
the factor
factor (b'
(c
:
(c
a) in the former result
replaced by the
since the second factor informs us that b and c are equivalent, it follows that the two implications c a and b' a are equivalent also.
a) in the latter.
to
But
= b), common
:
both
results,
If we had taken the alternative equivalent of <p', namely, a'b' + b'c + a'c' + be in its unsimplified form, we should have found
,
e:(p
in
= (p':>] = (b' + c': a)(c = b) = {1/

(b'
:
a)(c'
a)(c
{c
:
= b),
a)
which either the factor

(c
a) or the factor
may
:
be omitted as redundant, but not both.

the factor yet
(b
r
For though
:
(c' implies This redundancy of factors in the result is a necessary consequence of the redundancy of terms in the alternative equivalent of <ft' at the starting. For the omission of the term a'b' in the alternative leads to the
{b' :a)(c
= b) alone neither implies = b) implies a), and

(c'
:
(b'
a) nor
(</
a),
:a)(c
= b)
a).
omission
equivalent
of
(b'
the
:
implicational
in the result
;
factor
(a'b'
>/),
or
its
term
a'c'
and the omission of the in the alternative leads, in like manner, to the
a),
(a'c'
:
omission of the factor

the result.
rf),
or
its
equivalent
(c'
a),
in
40. I take the following alternative from Jevons's "Studies in Deductive Logic" (edition of 1880, p. 254, No. XII.), slightly changing the notation,
abed
+ abe'd + ab'cd' + a'bed' + a'b'c'd'.

let it
Let
(p
denote this alternative, and
be required to
36
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
y
[40
In other words, form
:
find successively the limits of a, b
c,
d.
we
are required to express
<fi
in the
:
(M a N)(P
:
Q)(R
S)(T
d
;
U),
in
which
M
By
and
N
c
;
are not to contain a

;
P and Q
are
neither to contain a nor b

tain a nor b nor
n
and S are neither to conand T and U must be respectively
and
M.
e.
the process of 34, 35,
we
get
>,,
=d +
b</
b'c,
N = bd + S= T=
e,
b'c,
r,,
V = d, Q = c + d, R =
U=
6.
Omitting the last two factors R c S and because they are formal certainties, we get
: :
T d
:
(p
= (d + be' + b'c
)
bd
+ b'c){d
<>
:b:c
+ d).
glance at the given alternative

asserts
will verify this result,
we have either d or be' or ( 1 that whenever we have a, then we b'c, then we have a (2) have either bd or b'c (3) that whenever we have d, then we have b (4) that whenever we have b, then we have either c or d; and (5) that from the implication e (p we can infer no relation connecting c with c without making
which
that whenever
;
;
-.
mention of a or b or, in other words, that c cannot be e is a expressed in terms of d alone, since the factor c formal certainty and therefore true from our definitions The final factor is alone apart from any special data. for only added for form's sake, for it must always have In other words, when antecedent and e for consequent. we have n constituents, if x be the n th or last in the
;
>/
>/
order taken, the last factor
must
necessarily be
>;
e,
and therefore a formal certainty which

understood.
of n
:
may
be
left
Others of the factors
may
(as in
the case
here) turn out to be formal certainties also, but
not necessarily. We have found the limits of the constituents
a, b,
c,
d,
taken successively in alphabetic order. reverse order d, c, b, a, our result will be

e
:
If
we take the
a
(p
= (ab + ac' + bd
ab)(ab'
+ a'b
+ b),
40, 41]
ALTERNATIVES
>)
: :
37
>;
:
b e and a e omitting the third and fourth factors There is one point because they are formal certainties. Since every double in this result which deserves notice.
:
implication a
(3
always implies a
/3,
it
follows that
(in the first bracket) ab
+ ac' + he
implies ab.
Now, the
formally stronger than the former, since any statement x is formally stronger than the alternative
latter
is
x + y. But the formally stronger statement x, though it can never be weaker, either formally or materially, than x + y, may be materially equivalent to x + y; and it must be so whenever y materially (i.e., by the special data of Let us see the problem) implies x, but not otherwise. whether our special data, in the present case, justifies the
inferred implication ab
tion
(/3
:
+ ac + be
ab.
Call this implica-
\J/-.
By
:
virtue of the formula a
+ (3 + y
= (a
x)
(3,
x)(y
be
x),
we
get (putting ab for a and for
x,
ac for
and
for y)
\|z
= (ab al)){ac' = (ac a)(ac = e(ac' b)(bc'

:
ab)(bc
b)(bc
:
ab)
= e(ac
:
ab)(bc
ab)
a)(bc
:
b)
:
a)e
= (ac
b)(bc
a).
This asserts that (within the limits of our data in this
problem) whenever we have ac we have also b, and that whenever we have be we have also a. A glance at the given fully developed alternative <p will show that this is Hence, the inferred implication a fact (see 41).
ab
+ ac + be
41.
ab
is,
in this problem, legitimate, in spite of
the fact that
its
antecedent
is
is
formally weaker than
its
consequent.
An
alternative
it
said to be fully developed when,
and only when,
satisfies
the
following
conditions
Firstly, every single-letter constituent, or its denial,

;
must
be a factor of every term secondly, no term must be a formal certainty nor a formal impossibility thirdly, all the terms must be mutually incompatible, which means that no two terms can be true at the same time. This last condition implies that no term is redundant or repeated.
;
38
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
For example, the
fully
41, 42
+ aft' + aft. To obtain this we and strike factors a + a and ft + because it is equivalent to (a + As another given alternative a +
aft
/3',
developed form of a+ft is multiply the two

out the term
aft',
ft)',
the denial of the
ft.
required
to
first
find
the
fully
example, let it be developed form of a + ft'y.
Here we
ft +
ft',
find the product of the three factors a
+ a,
is
and
7 + 7'.
a' (ft'y)',
We
next
is
find
that
{a -{-ft'y)'
a'(ft
equivalent to
which
equivalent to
+ y'),
Then, out of the therefore, finally, to aft + ay'. eight terms forming the product we strike out the three terms a'fty, a'fty, a'/S^', because each of these contains
and
either aft or a'7',

will be
which are the two terms
of aft
+ ay',
result
the denial of the given alternative a
+ ft'y.
The
aft'y
+ a'fty + a fty + a ft'y' + a fiy'i

form of the given
which
is,
therefore, the fully developed
alternative a
+ ft'y.
denote
a'cclc
42. Let
(p
+ Veil + cd'e + a (Ye.

a,
b,
c,
Here we
so that the
have 5 elementary constituents

product of the
five factors (a
d, e
&c, will contain 5 terms, 11 terms will Of these 32 (or 32) terms. 2 constitute the fully developed form of <p, and the remaining 21 will constitute the fully developed form of its Let \|a denote the fully developed form of (p. denial (p\
b'),
+ a), (b +
Then the
in
alternatives
<p
and
\J/
will,
of course, only differ
Suppose the they will be logically equivalent. alternative \f/ to be given us (as in Jevons's " inverse problem "), and we are required to find the limits of the
form
constituents in the alphabetic order

e
:
a, b,
c,
d,
e,
from
(p.
the data
\Jr
\^.
When we
we
have reduced the alternative

shall find the result to be
to its simplest form,
Thus we get
e:ylr
= e:
7
= <p' :t] = ac + bde + c'd + d'e + abe b'c + ce')(>; b d' + c)(d c e)(e d e)(r) :e:e).
:
the final result with every limit expressed.
Omit-
42-44]
UNRESTRICTED FUNCTIONS
>/
39
ting the superior limit
and the
inferior limit e
>j
:
wherever
it is
they occur, and also the final factor formal certainty (see 18), we get
e
:
because
\Jr
= (a
&'c
+ ce')(b
ri'
+ e)(d
c)(e
rf).
Suppose next we arc required to find the limits in the

order
e
:
d,
e,
c,
a. b.
&'c b'c
Our
:
final result in this case will

e
:
be
:b:e)
y$r
= (e
= (e
d
d
+ <v)(/
a'c
+ b'c){a
:
e)(>7
e)(>/
+ ce)(e
a'c
+ b'c)(a
c).
number
an alternative <p contains n constituents, the permutations in the order of conIn an alterstituents when all are taken is 1.2. 3.4... n. native of 5 constituents, like the one in 42, the number of possible solutions cannot therefore exceed 1.2.3.4.5, For instance, in the example of 42, the which = 120.
43.
of possible
When
solution
in
the order
d,
e,
c,
a,
(the
last
given),
e, c, b,
is
virtually the
same
as the solution in the order d,
the only difference being that the last first case are (as given), n a e and r\
: :
a two factors in the while in the b e

:
that is to say, a e second case they are tj:b:e and the order changes, and both, being certainties, may be It will be observed that when the order of omitted.
>/
: :
limits
is
prescribed, the exact solution
is
prescribed also
no two persons can (without error) give different solutions, though they may sometimes appear different in
form
(see
39,
40).
CHAPTER
44.
VII
Let
~F u (x, y, z),
or
its
abbreviated
constituents
present
the functional proposition F(x,

its
synonym F, rey, z), when the

x, y, z
values or meanings of
stricted
;
are unre-
while the symbol
F r (x,
the
of x,
y, z),
or its abbreviated
synonym
F( i
l
Fr
if
represents
functional
y, z
proposition
, )
y; z)
when the values
are restricted.
x,
2
example,
x can have only four values. xy
x.
For x4 y
;
40
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
,
,
44, 45
z z
the four values y y2 z. then we write v s

;
yz
,
and
z
.
the three values
the three symbols
x,
F r and not FM But if each of y, z may have any value (or meaning)
,
whatever out of the infinite series x v x2 x3 &c, y v y 2 y 3 &c., z , z &c. then we write F M and not F r The suffix v r is intended to suggest the adjective restricted, and the The symbols F F n F e suffix u the adjective unrestricted.
,
,
as usual, assert respectively that

impossible, that
is
.<,
is certain,
that
is
is
variable
but here the word
certain
understood to
y,
mean
every
true fur all the admissible values of

;
in the functional statement F(x, y, z)

false for
y,
impossible
means
admissible value of
x,
y, z
in
the
statement F(x,
nor impossible.
z);
and
variable
means
is
neither certain
y, z) is
Thus F e
asserts that Fix,

;
neither
always true nor always false it F _e F~", which is synonymous with

45.
synonymous with
(F^F"/.
we get the three
From
:
these symbolic conventions
formulae
(1)(F-F<); (2)(F?
:F?.);
(3)(F?:F? );
f
but the converse (or inverse) implications are not necessarily true, so that the three formulae would lose their validity if we substituted the sign of equivalence ( The first two formulae for the sign of implication (:). need no proof; the third is less evident, so we will prove
it
as
follows.
Let
formulae respectively.
we assume
 2
denote the above three two being self-evident, to be a certainty, so that we get the
 2 :(F-F;:)(F:F?)
:
(F;
e
:
F-)(F7 1?)
: :
[for a
:
/3
= /3'
:
']
(F-F7 FfFJ)
(F*: F*) [for
[for
(A a)(B
,
b)
(AB
ah)]
A-'A^ = A e by
,
definition].
<p 3 when we assume the and <p 2 To give a concrete illustration of first <p x the difference between F M and F r let the symbol H
This proves the third formula
two
45, 46]
SYLLOGISTIC REASONING
let
41
state-
represent the word horse, and
F(H) denote the
ment
that
"
The
;
horse
has been caught."

)
Then F (H)
l
,
asserts
caught
&c., has been r 2 the symbol F' (H) asserts that not one horse of and the symbol the series &c., has been caught r 2 e F*(H) denies both the statements F (H) and F"(H), and
every horse of the series
H H
;
H H
is
therefore equivalent to
briefly
F _e (H)
6
F" (H), which

r,
may
be
more
expressed by F~ E^, the symbol (H) being left This &c. ? understood. But what is the series H^ 2 universe of horses may mean, for example, all the horses owned by the horse-dealer ; or it may mean a portion only of these horses, as, for example, all the horses that had
escaped.
If
we
write F*
we
assert that every horse

if
owned
F*
by
the horse-dealer
has been caught;
we
write
we
only assert that every horse of his that escaped lias been Now, it is clear that the first statement implies caught.
the second, but that the second does not necessarily imply the first so that we have F' F*, but not necessarily F;:F;. The last implication F;:F; is not
;
all the horses that not necessarily imply had escaped were caught would that all the horses owned by the horse-dealer had been caught, since some of them may not have escaped, and of these it would not be correct to say that they had
necessarily true
for
the fact
that
been caught.
,
The symbol F M may

.,
,
refer
to
the series
V v F2 F3 F 60 i\, F F8 F 10 2 make evident the

,
while
F,.
may
refer only to the series
.,
The same concrete illustration will truth of the implications F^:F? and
:
F*
F*
F* and also that the converse implications F?

,
F? and
t
Ff.
are not necessarily true.
46. Let us
called
is
now examine
syllogistic.
Every valid syllogism, as
the special kind of reasoning will be shown,
a particular case of
(a
:
my
general formula
:
(3)((3
y)
(a
y),
or, as it
may
be more briefly expressed,

(a
:
/3
y)
(a
y).
42
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
Universe,
46, 47
of
Let S denote our Symbolic

Discourse," consisting of
unreal, existent, tacitly understood, in
all
or
"
Universe
,
the things S v S 2 &c, real, or non-existent, expressly mentioned or
our argument or discourse. Let denote any class of individuals X X 2 &c, forming a portion of the Symbolic Universe S then 'X (with a grave accent) denotes the class of individuals 'X 'Xg, &c, that do not belong to the class X so that the individuals
&c, of the class X, plus the individuals X 'X 2 2 &c, of the class X, always make up the total Symbolic Universe S S 2 &c. The class 'X is called the complement of the class X, and vice versa. Thus, any class A and its complement 'A make up together the whole Symbolic Universe S each forming a portion only, and both forming the whole. 47. Now, there are two mutually complementary classes which are so often spoken of in logic that it is convenient to designate them by special symbols these are the class of individuals which, in the given circumstances, have a real existence, and the class of individuals which, in the given circumstances, have not a real existXj,
X
, ,
.
ence.
The
e
first
class
is
the class
e,
made up
of the
individuals
truly say
"
e,
&c.
"
To
this class belongs every indi-
vidual of which, in the given circumstances, one can

It exists
that
To
e,
is
to say, not
bolically but really.

horse,
this class therefore

vice.
merely symmay belong

place
"
town, triangle, virtue,

vice
We may
asserts
virtue
and
in the class
because the statement

really
;
Virtue
exists "
or
"
Vice
exists "
that
virtuous
persons, or vicious persons, exist
a statement which every
one would accept as
true.
is
The second
class
,
the
class
0,
made up
of
the
individuals 0^ To this class belongs every in&c. 2 dividual of which, in the given circumstances, we can
truly say not exist
exists
" It
does not exist
"
that
is
to say, " It does
though (like everything else named) it symbolically." To this class necessarily belong
really,
47-49]
centaur,
REALITIES AND UNREALITIES
48
mermaid, round square, fiat sphere. The Symbolic Universe (like any class A) may consist wholly of realil ies or wholly of unrealities Oj, e &c, or it may 2 v e 2 &c.
,
be a mixed universe containing both.
When
is
the
members
Av A 2
class least
;
&c, of any
class
consist wholly of realities, or
wholly of unrealities, the class
A
a
v
said to be a pure
when A
e
contains at least one reality and also at

it
one unreality,
is
called
mixed
class.
Since
and are mutually complementary, it is clear that V is synonymous with 0, and with e. 48. In no case, however, in fixing the limits of the class e, must the context or given circumstances be overlooked. For example, when the symbol H|! is read " The horse caught does not exist," or " No horse has been caught" (see 6, 47), the understood universe of realities, e v e 2 &c, may be a limited number of horses, H H 2 &c, that had escaped,, and in that case the statement Hj! merely asserts that to
the classes
,
that limited universe the individual

or a horse caught, does not belong;
possibility of a horse being
it
the horse cauyht,
does not deny the
caught at some other time, Symmetry and conor in some other circumstances. venience require that the admission of any class A into our symbolic universe must be always understood to imply the existence also in the same universe of the complementary class *A. Let A and B be any two classes that are not mutually complementary (see 46) if A and B are mutually exclusive, their respective complements, A and 'B, overlap; and, conversely, if 'A and 'B are mutually exclusive, A and B overlap. 49. Every statement that enters into a syllogism of the traditional logic has one or other of the following four forms
;
(1) Every (3)

It is
X
is is
is
Y
;
(2)
No
Some
(4)
Some
X is Y X is not
;
Y.
evident that (3)
simply the denial of
(2),
and (4)
44
the denial of (1). get
(1)
(3)
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
From
[ 49,
G,
50
the conventions of
47,
we
X Y = Every
is
(2)
;
X Y
= No X
is
(4)
XT = Xy = Some X is Y X! = X: = Some X is not

Y
Y.
The
first two are, in the traditional logic, called universals ; the last two are called particulars ; and the four are respectively denoted by the letters A, E, I, 0, for reasons
which need not be here explained, as they have now only
The following is, however, a simpler more symmetrical way of expressing the above four and standard propositions of the traditional logic and it has
historical interest.
;
the further advantage,
as will
appear
later,
of
showing
how
all the syllogisms of the traditional logic are only
particular cases of
more general formulae
in the logic of
pure statements. 50. Let S be any individual taken at random out of our Symbolic Universe, or Universe of Discourse, and let
x, y, z
respectively denote the three propositions

x',
y',
z'
Sx SY
,
,
z
.
Then
.
must
respectively
f
,
denote S~ x
S~
Y
,
S~
By
;
the conventions of
,
46, the three propositions

are all possible but un-
x, y, z,
like their denials x'
y', z
certain
v
that
v
is
to say, all six are variables.

,
Hence, we
71
must always have xe y e

e
z\
e
(x\
{y'y, (z)e
and never x
nor y nor z nor x nor y nor z\ respectively denote the propositions

tions (x
:
Hence, when
,
x, y, z
S x S Y S z the proposi,
,
iff,
(y
1
>/)',
(z
)
>/)'
(which are respectively synony-
mous with x*
:
must always be considered to form and their part of our data, whether expressed or not denials, (x /), (y n), ( ?), must be considered impossible. With these conventions we get
,
y'1*, z"
(A) Every (or
X is Y = S x S Y = (x y) = {xy'f x S Y / = (x y)' = (xy'y (0) Some X is not Y = (S Y x S- = x y = (xyY (E) No X is Y = S x T S" )' = (x y')' = {xyj*. (1) Some X is Y = (S
all)
: :
50]
this
GENERAL AND TRADITIONAL LOGIC

way we can
logic
45
the
In
express
every syllogism
of
terms of x, y, z, which represent three propositions having the same subject S, but different predicates X, Y, Z. Since none of the propositions x, y, z (as already shown) can in this case belong to the class or e, the values (or meanings) of x, y, z are restricted. Hence, every traditional syllogism expressed in terms of x, y, z must belong to the class of restricted functional statements Fr (x, ?/, z), or its abbreviated synonym Fr) and not to the class of unrestricted functional statements
traditional
in
r\
FJx, y, z), or its abbreviated synonym F w as this last statement assumes that the values (or meanings) of the propositions x, y, z are wholly unrestricted (see 44).
,
The proposition Fw
constituent
>/
(x, y, z)
assumes not only that each

z
belong to the class but also that the three statements x, y, z need not even have the same subject. For example, let F (x, y, z), or its abbreviation F, denote the formula
x, y,
statement
may
9,
or
e,
as well as to the class
(x
y)(y
z)
(x
z).
This formula asserts that

z,
" If
x implies
y,
and y implies
then x implies z." be the statements

in
The formula holds good whatever

x, y,
(as
the traditional logic) the
whether or not they have same subject S and

;
whether or not they are certainties, impossibilities, or variables. Hence, with reference to the above formula, 6 it is always correct to assert F whether F denotes F M When x, y, z have a common subject S, then or F r F e will mean F^. and will denote the syllogism of the traditional logic called Barbara ;* whereas when x, y, z are wholly unrestricted, F will mean F^ and will therefore be a more general formula, of which the traditional Barbara will be a particular case.
.
Barbara asserts that " If every
is
Y, and every
:
is Z,
then every
X is Z,"
which
is
equivalent to (S x S v ) (S v
:
Sz)
(S x
S z ).
46
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
But now
let F, or Y(x, y,
z),
[50,51
denote the implication

:
(y
z)(y
x)
(x
z')'.
suppose the propositions x, y, z to be limited by It' we the conventions of 46, 50, the traditional syllogism called Darapti will be represented by F r and not by
formula of 45, we have F,' F, e e e but not necessarily F~ F; and, consequently, F; F~ Thus, if F u be valid, the traditional Darapti must be We find that F w is not valid, for the above valid also. implication represented by F fails in the case f(xzy, as it
FM
Now, by the
first
6
.,
then becomes
(>1
:
z){ri
x)
:
(xz)~ v ,
:
which is equivalent to ee if, and consequently to e But since (as just shown) F; which = {er/f = (ee) = 6 does not necessarily imply F; this discovery docs not justify
/,
7
'
rj.
us in concluding that the traditional Darapti
is
not valid.
y\xz)n and this case cannot occur in the limited formula Fr (which here represents the traditional Darapti), because in Fr the pro-
The only
case in which
fails
is
x, y, z are always variable and therefore possible. In the general and non-traditional implication F M the case x yv zr since it implies [piiczf, is also a case of failure; but it is not a case of failure in the traditional logic. 51. The traditional Darapti, namely, "If every Y is Z, and every Y is also X, then some X is Z," is thought by
positions
yi
',
some
real
logicians (I formerly thought so myself) to fail
when
the class
is
non-existent, while the classes
and Z are
but mutually exclusive.
But
this is a mistake, as the
following concrete example will show.
Suppose we have
4>
Y = (0
1(
),
;i
Z = (e v
3 ),
X = (
a,
6 ).
Let P denote the Q the second, and
first
premise of the given syllogism,
R
is
the conclusion.
and
Y R = Some X
P = Every
is
Z= h Z= 3
>
We Q = Every Y
get
is
X=
>/
>;
>/
three statements,
2,
51,52]
TRADITIONAL SYLLOGISMS
17
each of which contradicts our data, since, by our data in this case, the three classes X, Y, Z arc mutually Hence in this case we have exclusive.
PQ R =
:
>i,)
(>i,
*1
= {%n^ = e
so
that,
when presented
fail
in
the
form of an
implication,
Darapti does not

52. Startling
in the case supposed.

it
as
may
sound,
(But see however, it
52.)
is
demonstrable
logic
fact that not one syllogism of the traditional
valid in the form in
is neither Darapti, nor Barbara, nor any other which it is usually presented in our
it
text-books, and in which, I believe,
has been always
presented ever since the time of Aristotle.
In this form,
:
every syllogism makes four positive assertions it asserts it asserts the it asserts the second the first premise
;
conclusion
the
i.e.
and, by the
follows
word
'
therefore,'
it
asserts
that
conclusion
necessarily
from
the
premises,
true
that if the premises be true, the conclusion must be Of these four assertions the first three may be, also.
are, false
;
and often
Barbara
"
a formal certainty.
the fourth, and the fourth alone, is Take the standard syllogism Barbara.
text-book form) says this every B is C therefore every A is C." Every A is If valid it Let \f/(A, B, C) denote this syllogism. values (or meanings) we give to must be true whatever
(in the usual
camel. bear, and let C ass, let B Let the following syllogism must If \J/(A, B, C) be valid, " Every ass is a bear ; every bear is a therefore be true Is this concrete camel; therefore, every ass is a camel." not it contains three Clearly syllogism really true ?
A, B, C.
A
:
Hence, in the above form, Barbara (here denoted by \|/) is not valid for have we not just adduced a case of failure ? And if we give random values to A, B, C out of a large number of classes taken
false
statements.
haphazard
(lings, queens, sailors, doctors, stones, cities, horses,
French, Europeans, white things, black things, &c, &c), we shall find that the cases in which this syllogism will
48
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
will turn out true.
[ 52,
53
turn out false enormously outnumber the cases in which

it
But
it is
always true in the following

:
form, whatever values we give to A, B, C " If every A is B, and every B is C, then every
is
C."
Suppose as before that A = ass, that B = bear, and that C = camel. Let P denote the combined premises, " Every ass is a bear, and every bear is a camel," and let Q denote the conclusion, " Every ass is a camel." Also, let the symbol denote the word therefore. as is customary The first or therefore -form asserts P Q, which is
.'.
,
,
.".
equivalent* to the two-factor statement P(P:Q); the second or if-form asserts only the second factor P Q. The therefore-form vouches for the truth of P and Q, which are both false the if-form vouches only for the
:
truth
of
the
implication
is
means (PQ'y. and

53. Logicians
P Q, which, by definition, (See 10.) a formal certainty.

:
may
say (as some have said), in answer
to the preceding criticism, that
my
objection to the usual

;
form of presenting a syllogism is purely verbal that the premises are always understood to be merely hypothetical, and that therefore the syllogism, in its general form, is not supposed to guarantee either the truth of the
premises or the truth of the conclusion. This is virtually an admission that though (P ' Q) is asserted, the weaker
statement (P
Q)
is
the one really meant

therefore Q,"
that though
"
logicians assert "
commonIn ordinary speech, when sense linguistic convention ? we say " P is true, therefore Q is true," we vouch for the truth of P but when we say " If P is true, then Q is true," we do not. As I said in the Athenmum, No. 3989
then Q."
depart from the ordinary
;
:
P But why
they only mean
If
should the linguistic convention be different in logic ? ? Where is the advantage 1 Suppose a general, whose mind, during his past university days, had been over-imbued with the traditional logic, were in war time to say, in speaking of an
. .
"
Why
is
Where
the necessity
untried and possibly innocent prisoner,

* I pointed out this equivalence in
'
He
is
a spy
therefore
he
Mind, January 1880.
53,
54]
TRADITIONAL SYLLOGISMS
49
must be shot,' and that this order were carried out to the letter. Could he afterwards exculpate himself by saying that it was all an unfortunate mistake, due to the deplorable ignorance of his subordinates that if these had, like him, received the inestimable advantages of a logical education, they would have known at once that what he really meant was If he is a spy, he must be shot'? The argument in defence of the traditional wording of the syllogism is exactly parallel."
; '
It
is
no exaggeration
to
say that nearly

little
if
all fallacies
If.
are due to neglect of the
conjunction,
Mere
hypotheses are accepted as
they were certainties.
CHAPTER
54. In the notation of
VIII
50, the following are the nine-
teen syllogisms of the traditional logic, in their usual As is customary, they are arranged into four order.
divisions, called Figures, according to the position of the
middle term " (or middle constituent), here denoted by y. This constituent y always appears in both pre"
mises, but not in the conclusion.
The constituent
z,
in
the traditional phraseology,
is
called
the " major term,"
Similarly, minor term." " major premise," and the premise containing x the " minor premise." Also, since the conclusion is always of the form " All
and the constituent x the

the premise containing
z is
"
called the
X X
is
Z," or "
Some
it
is
" or "
No X
is
Z," or "
'
Some
is
not Z,"
is
'
usual to speak of
as the
subject
and of Z as the predicate.' As usual major premise precedes the minor.
in text-books, the
Figure
Barbara
Celarent
Darii
=(y
z)(x
z'){x
:y):(x:z)
:
Ferio
= (y = (y = (y
y)
y')'
(x
:
z)
:
z)(x
z')(,
(x
:
z
:
)'
f
y')'
(x
z)
50
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
Figure
Cesare
:
54
2
:
= (z y'){x y) (x z*) y\x y') (x z) Camestres = Festino = (:/)( :/)':(*: z)' z)' = (a y)(x y)' Baroko
: :
(:
(a:
Figure
Darapti
3
:
= (y Disamis = (y = (y Datisi Felapton = (y Bokardo = y Ferison = (y

(
z)(y
,
x)
:
(x
:
z')'
:
z )\y
z)(y
z')(y
:
x)
(x
(a;
z')'
a/)'
:
z'f
z)'
z)'
:
) x)
(x
z)\y
z'){y
{x
:
x')'
(x
z)'
Figure 4
Bramantip = (z y)(y
:
x)
x')
:
(x
:
z
:
)'
Camenes
Dismaris
Fesapo
Fresison
= (z = {z = (z = (z
y)(y
(x
:
z')
:
y')\y
y')(y
:
x)
(x
(x
:
:
z)'
z)'
:
x)
y')(y
x')'
(x
z)'
the symbols (Barbara),,, (Celarent) M &c. denote, in conformity with the convention of 44, these nineteen functional statements respectively, when the values of
Now,
let
their constituent statements
x. y, z
are unrestricted
while
the symbols (Barbara),., (Celarent),., &c, denote the same functional statements when the values of x, y, z are restricted The syllogisms (Barbara),., (Celarent),., &c, as in 50. with the suffix r, indicating restriction of values, are the
real
syllogisms
of
the traditional logic
and
all
these,
within the limits of the without exception, are valid The nineteen syllogisms of general understood restriction*. logic, that is to say, of the pure logic of statements,
54-5 0]
GENERAL LOGIC
(Celarent),,, &c., in
51
namely, (Barbara),,,
a n restricted
which
x, y, z
are
in values, are
the traditional
in 5 in
;
more general than and imply nineteen in which x, y, z are restricted as
(Darapti),,, (Felapton),,, (Bramantip),,,
and four of these unrestricted syllogisms, namely, and (Fesapo),,, fail

cases.
certain
(Darapti) w
fails
in
the
case
/
y '(".:)\
TI
(Felapton),,
and (Fesapo) w fail in the case y%ez ) and (Bramantip u fails in the case &(x'yf. 55. It thus appears that there are two Barbaras, two Celarents, two Dai'ii, &c, of which, in each case, the one
,
of
belongs to the traditional logic, with restricted values its constituents x, y, z; while the other is a more
is
general syllogism, of which the traditional syllogism

particular case.
Now,
as
shown
in 45,
when
a general
law
if
Fw
a general law
with unrestricted values of its constituents, implies F,., with restricted values of its constituents,
is
the former
true absolutely and never

latter.
fails,
the same
may
be said of the
:
This
is
expressed by the
formula F F*. But an exceptional case of failure in F does not necessarily imply a corresponding case of failure
in
F,.
e
: ;
for
e
though
e
F,
e
,
:
F;. is
a valid formula, the implication
FM
F;
(which
:
is
equivalent to
the converse implica-
For example, the general and non-traditional syllogism (Darapti),, implies the less general and traditional syllogism (Darapti),..
tion
is
F r F ,)
e
not necessarily valid.
but y\xzj in the traditional syllogism this case cannot occur because of the restrictions which limit the statement Hence, though this case of y to the class 6 (see 50).
fails
The former
in
the exceptional
case
failure necessitates the conclusion (Darapti);;*,
we
cannot,
from
this
conclusion,
infer
.
the
further,
conclusion
(Darapti);
Similar
but incorrect, reasoning applies to
the unrestricted non-traditional and restricted traditional
forms of Felapton, Bramantip, and Fesapo. 56. All the preceding syllogisms, with many others not recognised in the traditional logic may. by means of the formulae of transposition a j3 = /3 r a! and a/3' \y' ay:f$,
:
:
52
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
[ 56,
57
(x'.y)(y:z):(x:z),
be shown to be only particular cases of the formula Two or which expresses Barbara.
three
examples
will
make
this
clear.
Lut
<j)(x, y,
z)
denote this standard formula.
Referring to the
list
in
54,
we get
:
Baroko = (z
y)(x
:
//)'
(x
:
z)'
which, by transposition,
(f)(x, z, //).
(.
z){z
y)
(x
y) =
obtained from the general standard is formula <p(x, y, z) by interchanging y and z. Transposing as before, Next, take the syllogism Darii.
Thus Baroko
we
get
= (y z)(x z) (x if) x). z){z x) (y x') = (p(y, We get (see 54) Next, take (Darapti) = (y:zx): (xz n)' z)(y x) (x (Darapti),. = = (y xz){xz = xz)(xz n (y = since, by the for, in the traditional logic, (y:rf)
Darii
= (y = (y
z)(x
yj
(x
z)'
z,
r.
(//
z')'
(//
>j)
>/)
/)
/,
con-
vention of
lore,
S 5 0, y must always be a variable, and, thereThus, finally (Darapti),. = (f)(y, xz, n). always possible. We get Lastly, take (Bramantip),..
(Bramantip),
= (z = (z = (z
y)(y x)
:
y){z
x')(y
:
yx')(yx'
>i) :i]
for, in
the traditional logic,
= (z y)(y x ){x z) n = (z yx)(y x) = (z: yx')(yx (z (z:r]) = since z must be

(x
:
z")'
:
i]
x)
>i
r,)
//)
r),
variable
and therefore
possible.
Hence,
yx\
finally,
>/).
we
get
(Bramantip),.
57.
= <p(z,
By
similar reasoning the student can verify the

list
following
(p(x, y, z)
(see
;
54-56):
z')
:
ip(y z
y
= Barbara (p(x, y, = Celarent = Cesare y') = Ferio = Festino (p{x, x') = Darii = Datisi = Ferison = Fresison (p(z, y, x) = Camestres = Camenes
;
z,
57-59]
<p(y, x,
TESTS OF SYLLOGISTIC VALIDITY

z)
v)
;
53
:
(p(y
= Disamis = Dismaris <p(x, y) = Baroko = (Darapti),. = Bokardo; xz,

z,
<f>(y,
/)
(p(y, xz,
<p(z, yx',
58. It
is
= (Felapton) = (Fesapo) n) = (Bramantip),.. evident (since x y = y' x)

/)
that
(f)(x, y, z)
in the preceding list cb(z,' y', x) syllogisms remain valid when we change the order ot their constituents, provided we, at the same time, change
;
so
that
all
these
For example, Camestres and Camenes may each be expressed, not only in the form cp(z, y, x'), as in the list, but also in the form (p(x, y, z). 59. Text-books on logic usually give rather complicated rules, or " canons," by which to test the validity These we shall discuss further of a supposed syllogism. on (see 62, 63); meanwhile we will give the following rules, which are simpler, more general, more reliable, and
their signs.
more
easily applicable.
Let an accented capital letter denote a non-implication (or " particular "), that is to say, the denial of an impliwhile a capital without an accent denotes a cation Thus, if A denote simple implication (or " universal ").
:
Now, let A. B, C denote x y, then A' will denote (x y)' denote their any syllogistic implications, while A', B', Every valid syllogism must have respective denials. one or other of these three forms
: :
(1)
AB:C;
(2)
AB C
r
:
(3)
AB
that
are
is
to say, either the
two premises and the conclusion
three implications (or " universals ") as in (1); or one premise only and the conclusion are both nonimplications (or "particulars") as in (2); or, as in (3), both premises are implications (or " universals "), while
all
the
conclusion
is
a non-implication
(or
"
particular
").
If any supposed syllogism does not come under form (1) nor under form (2) nor under form (3), it is not valid that is to say, there will be cases in which it will fail.
54
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
to
59
The second form may be reduced

; :
the
first
form by
transposing the premise B' and the conclusion C, and is equivalent to AC B, changing their signs for AB' When thus transto AB'C >?. each being equivalent C, that is, of AC B, may be formed the validity of AB' The tested in the same way as the validity of AB C. conclusion C to be x z, in Suppose the test is easy. which z may be affirmative or negative. If, for example,
He
C,
is
a soldier; then
not
z'
= He
is
not a soldier.
is
zHe
is
conclusion
a soldier; then z' being, by hypothesis, x:z,
He
soldier.
But it The
the syllogism
AB
if valid,
becomes
z),
(see 11) either
(x in
"
:y:z):(x:
or else {x
y'
z)
(x
z),
which the statement y refers to the middle class (or term ") Y, not mentioned in the conclusion x z. If any supposed syllogism AB C cannot be reduced to either if it can be reduced of these two forms, it is not valid To take a concrete example, form, it is valid. to either
:
:
be required to test the validity of the following implicational syllogism

let
it
:
If
no Liberal approves
it
of Protection,
of fiscal Retaliation,
of fiscal Retaliation
follows that some person or persons

Protection.
though some Liberals approve who approve
do not approve of
Speaking of a person taken

a
Liberal;
let
at
random,
let
L = He
is
P = He
approves
of Protection;
R = He
approves of
fiscal Retaliation.
Also, let
and let Q denote
the syllogism.
We
get
Q=(L:P')(L:R'/:(R:P)'.
To get
(see
rid of the non-implications,
we transpose them
from negative
to
56)
and
thus
change
their
signs
affirmative,
transforming them into
implications.
This transposition gives us
Q = (L:P
)(R:P):(L:R').
59, 00]
55
Since in this form of Q, the syllogistic propositions are all three implications (or " universale "), the combination of premises, (L P')(R:P), must (if Q be valid) be equi:
valent
either to
in
L P R'
: :
or else to
P'
R'
which P
:
is
the letter
left
out in the
factors
or conclusion
R'.
Now, the
of
L P R' are not R P in the second

: :
equivalent to the
new consequent L P and P R' premises L P' and

:
: :
or transposed form of the syllogism but the factors L P' and P' R' (which is equivalent to R P) of L P' R' are equivalent to the premises in the second or transformed form of the syllogism Q.
Hence Q is valid. As an instance of AB C, we may give

:
a non-valid syllogism of the form
(x:y')(y:z'):(x:z');
for since the y's in the
two premises have different signs, one being negative and the other affirmative, the combined premises can neither take the form x:y:z nor
the the form x y'
: :
z'
which are respective abbreviations

:
for
(x>\y){y:z) and (x t y')(y' /).

fore not valid.
The syllogism
for
is
there-
00.
The preceding process

:
testing the validity of

:
apply to all syllogisms of the forms AB C and AB' syllogisms without exception, whether the values of their
constituents
logic,
x,
y,
be restricted, as in the
traditional
or unrestricted, as in
my
general logic
of state-
ments.
But
:
as regards syllogisms in general logic of the
form
(a form which includes Darapti, Felapton, Bramantip in the traditional logic), with Fesapo, and two implicational premises and a non-implicational con-
AB
clusion, they can only be true conditionally

logic
(as
for in general
logic)
distinguished from the

is
traditional
no
syllogism of this type
a formal certainty.
It therefore
becomes an interesting and important problem
to deter-
56
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
conditions
[ GO,
61
mine the
the
be held valid.
iveakest
on which syllogisms of this type can We have to determine two things, firstly,
(see
premise
33, footnote)
which,
when
joined to the two premises given, would render the syllogism a formal certainty ; and, secondly, the weakest condition which, when assumed throughout, would render
As will be seen, the the syllogism a formal impossibility. general one, which may method we are going to explain is a be applied to other formulae besides those of the syllogism.
The given implication

implication
cations (see
AB
is
equivalent to the
ABC
y,
in
which A, B, C are three impli-
59) involving three constituents x, y, z. Eliminate successively x, y, z as in 34, not as in finding the successive limits of x, y, z, but taking each
variable independently.
Let a denote the strongest con-
clusion deducible from ABC and containing no reference Similarly, let /3 and y respectively to the eliminated x.
denote the strongest conclusions after the elimination of y alone (x being left), and after the elimination of z alone Then, if we join the factor a or /3' (x and y being left). or y' to the premises (ix. the antecedent) of the given implicational syllogism AB C, the syllogism will become
:
a formal certainty,
and therefore
valid.
;
That
will
is
to say,
:
ABa'
C will be a formal certainty

:
and so
(a
AB/3'
:
and AB?' C.
formal certainty
Consequently,
;
AB
+fi'+ y)
C
is
C
a
is
so that, on the one hand, the weakest
premise needed
syllogism
to
be joined to
valid
{i.e.
AB
to render the given

certainty)
AB
C
to
a formal
the
alternative a'
+ fi' + y',
make
and, on the other, the weakest
datum needed
the syllogism
AB
that
a formal
a(3y.
impossibility is the denied of a
+ /?' + y
the
is,
an example 61. Take as Here we have an implication
syllogism
Darapti.
AB
C in which
:
A, B,
z),
C
z).
respectively denote the implications (y By the method of 34 we get
x),
(y
(x
ABC = yx + yz' + xz
>;
= M* + N./ + P
r,,
say,
61]
in
CONDITIONS OF VALIDITY
57
which M, N, P respectively denote the co-factor of x, The %', and the term not containing x. in which strongest consequent not involving x is MN + P hero M = z, N = y, and P = yz' so that we have
the co-factor of
:
*),
MN + P
= zy + yz' = ye = y
n
:
= //( + z')
-
>/
v\.
Thus we get a = y: we eliminate x is (y

(
>/,
so that the premise required

>;/
;
when
and therefore
f
r.x)(y.z)(y.ri)
by
-(x:z
is
should be a formal certainty, which

rid of the non-implications
a fact
for,
getting
transposition, this
complex
implication becomes
(y
:
x)(y
z){x
:
z)
:
(y
17),
which
= (y
xz)(xz
n)
(y
n)
and
this is a formal certainty, being a particular case of

(f)(x, y, z),
the standard formula
which represents Barbara
both in general and in the traditional logic (see 55). Eliminating y alone in the same manner from AB C, = x z' so that the complex we find that (3 = xz
:
*i
implication
{y:x)(y:z)(x:zy:(x:z')'
That it is so is evident by should be a formal certainty. inspection, on the principle that the implication PQ Q, Finally, for all values of P and Q, is a formal certainty. we eliminate z, and find that y = y: n- This is the same
:
result as
we obtained by the elimination of x, as might have been foreseen, since x and z are evidently inter-
changeable.
Thus we obtain the information sought, namely, that
+ /3 + 7
/
,
the weakest
premise
to
be joined
syllogism
a
to
premises of Darapti to
certainty in general logic
/
make
is
this
the formal
(y
>/)
+ (xz
>/)'
+ (//
?)',
which
= y*> + (xz)-
"
;
58
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
[ 61,
62
and that a/3y, the Aveakest presupposed condition that would render the syllogism Darapti a logical impossibility,
is
therefore
/
,p
'
(,,.,)--;
w hich = y\ocz)\
logic,
fails
Hence, the Darapti of general

values of
its
with
unrestricted
constituents
x, y,
z,
in the case
y\xzy
but in the traditional logic, as shown in 50, this case The preceding reasoning may be applied cannot arise. to the syllogisms Felapton and Fesapo by simply changing
z into z!
Next, take the syllogism Bramantip.
Here we get
>i,
ABC = yx' + zy' + xz

and giving
get
u,
/3
/3,
y the same meanings

r
'.
as
before,
we
= z\ y = (x'y)\ Hence, a^y z\xyf, and Thus, in general logic, Braa' + ft' + y' = z~ + (c'y)~
a
=z
>,
mantip is a formal certainty when we assume z~ v + {x'yY*, and a formal impossibility when we assume &{x'yf but
;
in the traditional logic the latter

sible,
assumption
is
inadmisis
since
z v is
inadmissible by
it
50, while the former
obligatory, since
tion 2f.
62.
is
implied in the necessary assumpof
The
'
validity
tests
the
traditional
logic
turn
mainly upon the question whether or not a syllogistic In undistributed.' or distributed term or class is language these words rarely, if ever, lead to ordinary any ambiguity or confusion of thought but logicians have somehow managed to work them into a perplexing
' '
'
'
tangle.
In the proposition
'
"
All
is
Y," the class
is
said to be
distributed,'
"
and the
class
'
undistributed.'
In the proposition
class
No
is
'
Y," the class

distributed.'
and the
Y
to
are said to
"
be both
In the proclass
position
said
Some
Some
X X
is
Y," the class
X
'
and the
are
be
"
both 'undistributed.'
is
Finally, in
the pro-
position
'
not Y," the class

the class
is
said to be
undistributed,'
and
distributed.'
2]
<
DISTRIBUTED
UNDISTRIBUTED
<
59
Let us examine the consequences of this tangle of Take the leading syllogism Barbara, the technicalities. validity of which no one will question, provided it bo
expressed in
its
conditional form, namely, "
If
all
is
Z,
Y, then all X is Z." admittedly valid, this syllogism must hold good whatever values (or meanings) we give to its conIt must therefore hold good when stituents X, Y, Z. X, Y, and Z are synonyms, and, therefore, all denote the In this case also the two premises and the same class.
and
all
is
Being, in this form
(see
52),
conclusion will be
dream
say
1
of denying.
three truisms which no one would Consider now one of these truisms,
the class
X is Y." Here, by the usual logical convention, X is said to be distributed,' and the class Y But when X and Y are synonyms they undistributed.'
"
All
'
denote the same class, so that the same class may, at the same time and in the same proposition, be both disDoes not this sound like tributed' and 'undistributed.'
'
a contradiction
Speaking of a certain concrete
collec-
tion of apples in a certain concrete basket, can we consistently and in the same breath assert that " All the
apples are already distributed

are
'still
"
and that
"
All the apples
undistributed "
Do we
get out of the
dilemma
and secure consistency if on every apple in the basket we Can we then constick a ticket X and also a ticket Y ?
sistently assert that all the
that
all
the
apples are undistributed

is
apples are distributed, but Clearly not for ?

;
every
apple.
apple
also a
apple,
and every and
apple an
In ordinary language the classes which we can

as
distributed
respectively qualify
undistributed
are
mutually exclusive
is
in the logic of
case.
evidently not the
our text-books this Students of the traditional

'
'
logic
minds of the idea and undistributed necesthat the words distributed sarily refer to classes mutually exclusive, as they do in everyday speech or that there is anything but a forced and fanciful connexion between the distributed and
should
therefore disabuse their
'
'
'
'
60
'
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
'
02
undistributed
distributed
'
of
'
'
and
current English and the undisturbed of logicians.

' '
technical
Now, how came the words tributed to be employed by

'
distributed
'
and
'
undis-
logicians in a sense
which
plainly does not coincide with that usually given
them
Since the statement
"
No X
is
Y"
is
equivalent to the
statement "All
class
X Y
is
"Y," in
which
(see
46-50) the
and since
is
'
Y (or non-Y) contains all Symbolic Universe excluded from the

Some
the individuals of the

class Y,
"
is
not
'
" is
equivalent
'
to "
Some
*Y," the
definitions of
distributed
and
'
undistributed
in text-
books virtually amount to this that a class X is distributed with regard to a class Y (or *Y) when every individual of the former is synonymous or identical with
:
some individual
or other of the latter
and that when
then the class X is undistributed with Hence, when in the stateregard to the class Y (or'Y). ment " All X is Y " we are told that X is distributed with regard to Y, but that Y is undistribided with regard to X, this ought to imply that X and Y cannot denote exactly
this is not the case,
the
"
In other words, the proposition that to imply that " Some Y is not X." But as no logician would accept this implication, it is distributed clear that the technical use of the words
same
class.
All
is
Y"
ought
'
and
'
undistributed
in
'
to
lacking
linguistic
consistency.
be found in logical treatises is In answer to this
criticism, logicians introduce psychological considerations
and say that the proposition " All X is Y " gives us information about every individual, X 1; X 2 &c, of the class X, but not about every individual, Y v Y 2 &c, of the class Y and that this is the reason why the term X is said to be To this 'distributed' and the term Y 'undistributed.'
,
,
explanation it may be objected, firstly, that formal logic that its forshould not be mixed up with psychology mulae are independent of the varying mental attitude of individuals and, secondly, that if we accept this information-giving or non-giving definition, then we should
'
'
'
'
62]
'DISTRIBUTED' UNDISTRIBUTED
<
fil
say, not that
is
distributed,
and
undistributed, but
that
not
is
known or
inferred to be distributed, while
known
to be distributed
is
that the inference requires
further data.
proceed as follows.
To throw symbolic light upon the question we may With the conventions of 8 50 we
(1) All
have
X is Y = x:y;
Y = (x
:
(2)
(4)
')
(3)
Some X
is
//)';
No X is Y = x // Some X is not Y = (x
:
//)'.
The
the
'
positive class (or

as
'
term
is
usually spoken of by
logicians
the subject'; and the positive class

It
as
predicate.'
will
be noticed that, in the above
examples, the non-implications in (3) and (4) are the respective denials of the implications in (2) and (1). The
definitions of
follows.
(a)
'
distributed
'
and
'
undistributed
'
are
as
cedent of
be
'
term ') referred to by the antean implication is, in text-book language, said to distributed and the class referred to by the conseclass
The
(or
'
'
quent
(/$)
is
said to be
'
undistributed.'
to
'
The
class referred
is
by the
antecedent of a non;
implication
said to be
undistributed
is
and the
'
class
referred to by the consequent
said to be
distributed.'
to (1) and (2); definition and (4). Let the symbol X d assert that X is distributed' and let X u assert that X is undistributed.' The class 'X being the complement of the class X, and vice versa (see 8 46), we get (*X)* = XM and (X)" = X d From the definitions (a) and (/3), since (Y) d = Y", and ( Y) u = Y d we therefore draw the following
Definition
applies
'
(a)
applies
(/3)
to
(3)
'
four conclusions
In
(1)
.
X d Yu
in
.
in
(2)
Xd Y d
in (3)
XUY U
in
r
(4)
XY
u
For
and CY) u = Y d (/3) gives us X u CY) d and ( Y)d = YM If we change y into x in proposition (1) above, we
,
,
.
(2) the definition (a) gives us Similarly, in (3) the definition
Xd Yf
(
62
get " All
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
[ 62,
63
X is X "=x:x. Here, by definition (a), we have which shows that there is no necessary antagonism between X and X" that, in the text-book sense, the same class may be both distributed and undistributed at the same time. X dX"
;
rf
'
'
'
'
63. The six canons of syllogistic validity, as usually given in text-books, are (1) Every syllogism has three and only three terms, namely, the major term,' the minor term,' and the
:
'
'
middle term (see 5 4). (2) Every syllogism consists of three and only three propositions, namely, the major premise,' the minor premise,' and the 'conclusion' (see 54). (3) The middle term must be distributed at least once in the premises and it must not be ambiguous. (4) No term must be distributed in the conclusion, unless it is also distributed in one of the premises.* (5) We can infer nothing from two negative pre'
'
'
'
mises.
(6) If one premise be negative, the conclusion must be so also and, vice versa, a negative conclusion requires one negative premise. Let us examine these traditional canons. Suppose The syllogism \//('', y, z) to denote any valid syllogism. being valid, it must hold good whatever be the classes to which the statements x, y, z refer. It is therefore valid when we change y into x, and also z into x that is to
; ;
say,
\|/(.'",
,/',
:>-,)
is
valid
13,
footnote).
a case
which Canon (1) appears
lessly to exclude.
requires no
applies to
Canon (2) is comment. The second part of Canon (3) all arguments alike, whether syllogistic or not.
Canon
(4) is called
Yet this is and needsimply a definition, and

arbitrarily
Violation of
"Illicit Process."
is
When
the term
illegitimately distributed in the conclusion

is
the major term, the fallacy the term illegitimately disis
called " Illicit Process of the Major "

is
when
tributed in the conclusion
the minor term, the fallacy
called " Illicit
Process of the Minor " (see
54).
63]
It
is
'CANONS
evident that
OF TRADITIONAL LOGIC
we want
to
63
if
avoid fallacies,
first
also avoid The rule about cannot be accepted without reservation. middle-term distribution does not apply the necessity of to the following perfectly valid syllogism, " If every X is Y, and every Z is also Y, then something that is not X Symbolically., this syllogism may be expressed is not Z."
ambiguities.
The
part of
we must Canon (3)
in either of the two forms
(x-.y){z:y):{x :z)'
(1)
(2)
;
{xy'nzyj'.ix'z'r
Conservative logicians who still cling to the old logic it impossible to contest the validity of this syllogism, refuse to recognise it as a syllogism at all, on the
finding
ground that
has four (instead of the regulation three) the last being the class containing all the individuals excluded from the class X. Yet a mere change of the three constituents, x, y, z, of the syllogism Darapti (which they count as valid) into their denials x', //, z' makes Darapti equivalent to the
it
terms, namely, X, Y, Z,
above syllogism.
_
For Darapti
is
{y:x\y:z):{x:zy
and by virtue of the formula a (l) in question becomes
:
(3);
(3
= /3'
a, the syllogism
(/:*')(/ :*'):(*':*)'
Thus,
will
if
\^(f;, y, z)
(4).
denote
Darapti,
then
y\s(x', //', ;')
denote the contested syllogism (1) in its form (4); and, vice versa, if ^(x, y, z) denote the contested syllogism, namely, (1) or (4), then ^(a/, y z') will denote
',
Darapti.
class
To
is
assert
that
any individual
if
is
not
in the

class 'X.
it is
in the
com-
plementary
Hence,
we
call
the class 'X the
non-X
class,
the syllogism in question, namely,

:(,/:*)'
(4),
is
(/:./)(/:/)
may
be read,
"
If every
non-Y
a non-X, and every non-
64
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
is
03
For then some non-X is a non-Z." , z )' which asserts that it is possible for an individual to belong at the same time In both to the class non-X and to the class non-Z. Thus other words, it asserts that some non-X is non-Z.
also a non-Z,
is
(x':z)'
equivalent to (./
r>
read, the contested syllogism
becomes a case of Darapti,
being replaced by their respective It is evident that complementary classes 'X, 'Y, 'Z. when we change any constituent x into x in any syllothe classes X, Y,
gism, the words
'
distributed
'
and
'
undistributed
'
inter-
change
places.
Canon
(4)
of the traditional logic asserts that "
No
term' must be distributed in the conclusion, unless it is This is another also distributed in one of the premises."
canon that cannot be accepted unreservedly. syllogism Bramantip, namely,

(z
:
Take the
y)(y x)
:
(x
z')'
is
and denote
within
50),
it
it
by
\f/(V).
Since the syllogism

of
valid
(see
the
restrictions
the
traditional
logic
should be valid when we change z into /, and We should then get consequently z into z.
>},{/)
= (*' :y)(y:x):(x:z)'.
in the first premise,
Here
in
(see 02)
we get Z w
and Z
rf
canon.
the conclusion, which is a flat contradiction to the Upholders of the traditional logic, unable to deny the validity of this syllogism, seek to bring it within the application of Bramantip by having recourse to distortion of language, thus " If every non-Z is Y, and every Y is X, then some X
:
is
non-Z."
Z" in d premise and Z in the conclusion, which would contradict the canon, would have ( Z)'' in the first premise and ( Z) u in the conclusion, which, though it means exactly the same thing, serves to "save the face" of the canon
Thus
treated, the syllogism, instead of having

V
the
first
and
to hide its real failure
and
inutility.
G3]

(5) asserts that "
65
Canon
We
two negative premises."

unreliability of the canon.
(2,
single instance will
can infer nothing from show the

is
The example
:0(^*') :(*':*)',
z
Avhich
into
z',
is
obtained from Darapti by simply changing

.
and x into x
It
may
be read,
"
If
no
is
X,
and no Y is Z, then something that is not X is not Z." Of course, logicians may " save the face " of this canon " If also by throwing it into the Daraptic form, thus all Y is non-X, and all Y is also non-Z, then some non-X is non-Z." But in this way we might rid logic of all negatives, and the canon about negative premises would then have no raison d'etre. Lastly, comes Canon (6), which asserts, firstly, that " if one premise be negative, the conclusion must be
:
negative
and,
secondly,
that
negative
conclusion
requires one negative premise."
The
objections to the
preceding canons apply to this canon also. In order to give an appearance of validity to these venerable syllogistic tests, logicians are obliged to have recourse to distortion of language, and by this device they manage to
make
their negatives look like affirmatives.
But when
seeming
logic has thus converted all real negatives into
affirmatives the canons about negatives
must disappear
through
refer.
want of negative matter to which they can The following three simple formulae are more
all
easily
applicable and will supersede

:
the
traditional
canons
(1) (a: (2)

(z
:
:z):(x:z)
Barbara.
y x)
:
(x
z)'
Bramantip.
(3) (y:x)(y:z):(x:z')'
....
Darapti.
The
first
of these is valid both in general logic

;
and
in
the traditional logic

all
the second and third are only valid
in the traditional logic.
Apart from
this limitation, they
three hold good whether any constituent be affirmaE
66
tive
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
or negative,
[ 03,
64
and
in
whatever order we take the
syllogism that cannot, directly or by the /3' a and a/3' y' ay fi, formulae of transposition, a /3
letters.
:
Any
be brought to one or other of these forms
is invalid.
CHAPTER IX
Given one Premise and the Conclusion, to find the missing Complementary Premise.* 64. When in a valid syllogism we are given one premise and the conclusion, we can always find the
weakest
complementary premise which, with the one imply the conclusion. AVhen the given conclusion is an implication (or " universal ") such as x z or x z\ the complementary premise required is found For example, suppose we readily by mere inspection. f have the conclusion x:z and the given major premise The syllogism required must be z y (see 5 4).
given,
will
:
: :
either {x:y :z'): (x
z')
or (x y
:
r
:
z')
(x
z'),
The major prethe middle term being either y or y'. is y z' which is not equivalent mise of the first syllogism
',
:
Hence, the first syllomajor premise z y. The major premise of the gism is not the one wanted. y' z', and this, by transposition and second syllogism is change of signs, is equivalent to z y, which is the given major premise. Hence, the second syllogism is the one wanted, and the required minor premise is x y'
to the given
: : : :
the conclusion, but not the given premise, is a non-implication (or " particular "), we proceed as follows. Let P be the given implicational (or " universal ") premise, and
conclusion.
*
When
C the given non-implicational (or "particular")

Let
W be the required weakest premise which,

is
syllogism with one premise thus left understood
called an
enthymeme.
G4,
05]
TO FIND A MISSING PREMISE

C.
67
:
joined to P, will imply
We
shall then
have
PW
C,
which, by transposition, becomes
PC W.
:
strongest conclusion dcducible from PC. have both PC S and PC W'. These two implications having the same antecedent PC, we suppose their consequents S and W' to be equivalent. We thus get S = = S'. The weakest 'premise required W', and therefore
:
Let S be the We shall then
is
therefore
the
denial of the strongest conclusion dedueible
from
PC
{the given premise
and
the
denial
of the given
conclusion).
For example,
let
:
the given premise be y

z )'
r
.
x,
and the
given conclusion (x
We
are to have
(y:x)W:(x:z'y.
Transposing and changing signs, this becomes
\{y:x){x:z')'.W.
But, by our
also (see 5G)
fundamental
syllogistic
formula,
we have
(y:x)(x:z'):(y:z').
We
(y
(y
:
therefore assume
f f
W=
%)(y
y:z' and, consequently,

)
W=
The weakest premise required

is
is
therefore
//, and the required syllogism

(//
*')'
')'
:
The only formulae needed complementary premise are

65.
in finding the weakest
(1)
a:(3
= (3':a'.
7 ):(a: 7 ).
7 ):(/3 7 r\
(2)
(a:/3)(/3:
(3) (a:/3)(a:
The
ments
two are true universally, whatever be the statethe third is true on the condition a*, (3, y that a is possible a condition which exists in the
first
a,
;
* The implication y , since would also answer as a premise footnote, and 73).
:
in the traditional logic

;
it
implies (y
s')',
but
it
would not be the weakest
(see 33,
68
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
[ 65,
66
traditional logic, as here
any of the statements
a, (3,
represent any of the three statements x, y, z, or any every one of which six stateof their denials x y', z ments is possible, since they respectively refer to the six
may
Z, every one of which classes X, Y, Z, stood to exist in our Universe of Discourse.
%Y
',
is
under-
conclusion (x
Suppose we have the major premise z:y with the z')' and that we want to find the weakest complementary minor premise W. We are to have
:
(z:y)W:(x:z'y,
which, by transposition and change of signs, becomes
(z:y)(x:z'):W.
This,
by the formula a
/3
= ft'
becomes
(z:y)(z:x'):W.
But by Formula
(3)
we have
also
(z:y)(z:x'):(yx'y.
We therefore assume W' = (yz')' and consequently W = (yx'y = y:x. The weakest minor premise required
71
,
is
therefore y x
:
and the required syllogism

:
is
y)(V
.')
('
: :
-')'-
As the weakest which is the syllogism Bramantip. premise required turns out in this case to be an implication, and not a non-implication, it is not only the weakest complementary premise required, but no other complementary premise is possible. (See 64, second footnote.) 66. When the conclusion and given premise are both non-implications (or " particulars "), we proceed as follows. Let P' be the given non-implicational premise, and
denotes the the non-implicational conclusion, while shall required weakest complementary premise.
We
or then have P'W transposition. obtain by

:
its
equivalent
WC
P,
which we
The consequent P
of the second
66, 66
(a)]
THE STRONGEST CONCLUSION
69
being an implication (or " universal ") we have only to proceed as in 64 to find W. For example, let the given non-implioational premise be (// z)'\ and
implication
:
the given non-implicational conclusion {x

to
z)'.
We
are
have
(yri/W :(*:)'.
By
transposition this
becomes
W(x:z):(y:z).
The
letter
syllogism
WC
missing in the consequent y P must therefore be

: :
is
x.
The
either (y x z)
:
(y
z)
or else (y:x':z):(y:z);
of
one or other of which must contain the implication C, which the given non-implicational conclusion C, representing (x
:
z)',
is
the denial.
first
The syllogism
WC
must therefore denote the

and not the second
that
;
of these two syllogisms,
for it is the first
and not the second

its
contains
the implication
:
C,
or
Hence
W=y
to
synonym x
z.
x.
:
Now,
WC
is
equivalent, b}r trans-
position,
Substituting for
to be
WP' C, which is the syllogism required. W, P', C, we find the syllogism sought
(//
:
'<)(>/
*)'
(?
*)',
and the required missing minor premise to be y x. 66 (a). By a similar process we find the strongest conclusion derivable from two given premises. One Suppose we have the combination example will suffice. Let S denote the strongest of premises (z y)(x y)'
:
'.
conclusion required.
(z
:
We
get
/
y){x
//)'
S,
which, by transposition,
is
(z
//)S
(x
y).
The
letter
missing in the implicational consequent of the

is
z,
second syllogism must be
so
that
its
antecedent
z'
(z
y)S
either x z y or else x
: :
>/.
70
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
first
6G
(a),
G7
The
z
:
antecedent
is
y,
so that its other factor x

S'.
the one that contains the factor z must be the one denoted
:
by
Hence, we get S'=x:z, and S

is
= (#:)'.
:
The
strongest * conclusion required
therefore (x
z)''.
CHAPTER X
will now introduce three new symbols, Wcp, which we define as follows. Let A v A 2 A 3 A m be m statements which are all possible, but of which Out of these m statements let it be one only is true. A r imply (each sepaunderstood that A r A 2 A 3 A s imply that A r+1 Ar+2 A.,. +3 rately) a conclusion cp cp' and that the remaining statements, A s+1 As+2 A m neither imply cp nor cp'. On this understanding we
6 7.
We
Yep, Sep,
lay
down
(1)
(2) (3)
(4)
the following definitions

W(/)
. .
(5)
(6)
=A +A +A + +A W^) = Ar+1 + Ar+2 + ... +A V4> = V<' = A s+1 + Ag+2 + ... +A m S^ = W^ + V^ = W</) + V</) Sep' = W(p' + V<p' = W$' + Y(p.
.
r
S
W'cp means
S'</>
(W(f>)',
the denial of W</>.
(7)
means
(S<)', the denial of Sep.
The symbol Wcp denotes the

cp
;
weakest statement that implies

strongest
while
Sep
denotes
the
is
statement
that
<p
implies (see
than
A+
33, footnote). B, while A + B
As
is
stronger formally
formally
stronger
calling
than
A + B-f-C,
and
so
on,
we
are justified in
cp,
Wcp
Sep
the weakest statement that implies

strongest statement
and
in calling S(p the
that (p implies.
Generally
Wcp and
:
* Since here the strongest conclusion is a non- implication, there is no other and weaker conclusion. An implicationcU conclusion x z would also admit of the weaker conclusion (x z')'.
:
67,
68]
;
71
but, in
present themselves as logical sums or alternatives
exceptional cases, they

terms.
formulae,
r
may
present themselves as single

definitions
S4>'
From
(1)
().
the
preceding
(2)
we
(3)
get
the
W^S'0;
The
= W'<;
&c,
is
V<
(\\ (^
= S< =
last of these three formulas asserts
that to deny the existence of Y(p in our arbitrary uni-
verse of admissible statements,

to affirming that W<^>, Sep,
A A2
,
equivalent
and
(p
are
all
three equivalent,
The statement Y<ft, which each implying the others. means (V(f)f, is not synonymous with V^> the former asserts that Y<p is absent from a certain list A v A 2 A OT which constitutes our universe of intelligible statements whereas Y^cf), which means (Ycpy, assumes the existence of the statement Y(p in this list, and asserts
;
, . . .
that
it
is
an
;
impossibility,
or,
in
other words,
that
it
contradicts our data or definitions.
may be
true
the statement
Y
.
<p
The statement Ycp The cannot be true.
statement Y<p is true when, as sometimes happens, every A m either implies (p or term of the series A A 2 The statement Y v (p is necessarily false, implies <p'. because it asserts that Yep, which by definition neither whereas implies /
every statement of the class

(as
tj
implies both /
:
and
</>',
since
a is always true, proved in 18) the implication The statewhatever be the statement represented by a. ment Y^cp also contradicts the convention laid down that
all
the statements
68.
A A2
,
we may have W<
or
A w are
possible.
Similarly,
^/.
will illustrate
The following examples
the mean-
Suppose our ings of the three symbols Wcp, Y(p, Sc. " universe hypotheses to consist total (or ") of possible of the nine terms resulting from the multiplication of 9 The the two certainties A' + A^ + A and B + B" + B product is
fl
.
A B + A^ + A B" + A^B' + A"B" + A"B* + A*B + A B" + A B

e e
e e
72
Let
(p
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
e denote (AB)
68
We
fl
get
e
.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
W(AB)* = A B + A B S(AB) e = A*B 9 + A*B + A e B* = A""B e + A e B"". W(AB) e = S , (AB) 9 = A" + B + A B (See 9 9 e S( AB)- = W'(AB) = A" + B" + A'B' + A B
f
T
'
69.)
fl
(See
69.)
The
is
first
of the above formulae asserts that the weakest
data from which
we can conclude
that
AB
is
a variable
the alternative
is
AB +A B
e
certain
and
variable, or
which affirms that either else A variable and B certain.

,
The second formula asserts that the strongest conclusion we can draw from the statement that AB is a variable
is
the alternative
is possible
A B + A^^,
_T?
which
asserts that either
and B possible. Other formulae which can easily be proved, when not evident by inspection, are the following and
variable, or else
variable
(5
W<
(p
S(f>.
<j>).
(6
(8
(9
(10
(11
(12
(13
(14
(15
(16
(1<
(18
= Sep) = (Wdj = <p)(S(p = W(AB) = A B = S(ABy. W(A + B) = A + B S(A + B) = A + B + A B W(A + B)" = A"B'' = S(A + B)" = (A + By. W(A + B) = A"B + A B". S(A + B) = A- B + A B^. W(AB)" = A" + B". S(AB) = A" + B' + A B W(A B) = W(AB')" = A" + B\ S(A B) = S( AB')" = A" + B + A B". W(A B/ = S'(A B) = A B + A"B". S(A BY = W'(A B) = A-"B"
(W(j>
e e
I)
The formulae (15) and (16) may evidently be deduced from (13) and (14) by changing B into B'. Formula (17) asserts that the weakest data from which we can
68,
G9]
APPLICATIONS OF SYMBOLS
73
conclude that
either
does not imply
is
the alternative that
A
:
is
certain
impossible.
and B uncertain, or else A possible and The formula may be proved as follows
e
fl
W(A
for,
B)'
= S'(A B) = (A" + B + A BV = (A") (B') = A-^B-Â" + B' = A*B + A-"B"

,
:
(A e B e )
evidently,
AÂ^M and B
W(AB)
fl
69. All the formulae of

principles,
from first 68 though some may be deduced more readily

Take, for example,
fl
B = B". may be proved

e
from others.
required
to
(1), (2), (3).

,
We
fl
are
We first S(AB) W(AB)" 9 the nine terms which constitute the product write down
find
,
and B' + B" + B as done, we underdot every term that implies This in 68. (AB) 9 which asserts that AB is a variable we underline 5 every term that implies (AB)" which asserts that AB is not a variable; and we enclose in brackets every term 9 We thus get that neither implies (AB) nor (AB)of the two certainties
e
fl ,
A + A" + A
A B + A'B' + A B + A"B + AB* + A"B + A B + A B" + (A B

e e
1
).
By our
definitions in 67
we thus have
9
e
W(AB) 9 = A B + A B
9
(1)
By
definition also Ave
9 have V(AB) 9 = A B 9 and therefore

,
S(AB) 9 = W(AB) 9
e
+ V(AB) = A B + AB + A B = A B + A B + A B + A B for a = a + a = + A )B + A*(B' + B = A"B (2). + A B-"

9
f
fl
(3) and (4) from first principles, deduced more easily from the two but they may be
We may similarly deduce

W((
formulae
+ ^) = W( + Wxfr S(<f>+x|O = S0 + S^
....
(a)
()>
74
as follows
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
[ 69,
70
W(AB)-" = W{(AB)
C
S( AB)-
+ AB)" = W(AB) + W(AB/> = A B + A" + B", from 08, Formulae 7, 13. = S { AB) + AB)" } = S( AB) + S(AB) = A B + A" + B" + A B from 08, Formulae
f
7,
14.
is
70.
The
following
an example of inductive, or rather

true
:
inverse, implicational reasoning (see 11, 112). The formula (A x) + (B x) (AB x) is always
:
:
when (if ever) is the

(B
:
converse, implication
<p
(AB
x)
(A
x)
x), false <p c
Let
while
denotes
its
denote the first and valid formula, converse formula to be examined.
We
get
'
!
(a/3)Xa"
+ /3")'
(a/3)"a-"/3~"
!
(a/SjV/S*
(Ax'
Bx')\kxy(Bxy (ABxy(Ax') (Bxy

implication
(p c
Thus,
(a{$)
r,
the
r, 7,
converse
fails
in
the
case
fir
which represents the statement
(ABa/yCAa/r^V
and
it
1 );
therefore also fails in
the case (afiy>a
fi
which
represents the statement

(ABa/)"(A#')"(Ba/)6
for the
....
(2)
of <p c in the second
The failure second statement implies the first. may be illustrated by a diagram as
on opposite page.
Out
of the total ten points
marked
let
in this diagram,
take a point A, B, x
at
random, and
(as
assert
respectively
the three symbols propositions) that the
70,
71]
CERTAIN DISPUTED PROBLEMS
75
point
be in the circle A, that P will be in the It is evident circle B, that P will be in the ellipse x. chances of the four propositions A, B, that the respective 2 all variables. x, AB are T T%, >> T o so that they are respective chances of the three It is also clear that the
will
statements AB./,
Axe',
Bx', are 0,
9
,
have (ABx'y(Axy(Bx') we found to be insr,

failure.
2 so that we also iG by pure symbolic reasonwhich,

,
case
of
this
We may
appeal
that the
also
to
show
by
as
direct
follows.
the
diagram,
The implication
point
AB
asserts
P cannot be
and
in both the circles
B
x,
without
a statecertainty,
being also in the ellipse
ment which
as
it
is
material
from the The implication diagram (see 109). A x asserts that P cannot be in A without being in x, a statement which is a material impossibility, as it is and B x is inconsistent with the data of our diagram Thus we have AB x = e, impossible for the same reason.
follows
necessarily
special data of our
:
x = v\,
=
:
/,
so that
:
we
:
get
ip
cf) c
= (A x) + (B = AB x) (A
(
:
x)
:
(AB
x)
x)
+ (B
= + v *= e x) = e n + n = h
>i
:
>
The Boolian
and (p c equivalent, because they draw no distinction between the true (t) and the certain (e), nor between the false (i) and the Every proposition is with them either impossible (>/). propositions which I call or impossible, the certain
logicians
consider
<ft
variables (6)
being treated as non-existent.
The preceda serious
ing illustration
makes
it
clear that this
is
and
fundamental error. 71. The diagram above will also illustrate two other propositions which by most logicians are considered
equivalent, but which, according to
my
interpretation of
are the
the word
if,
arc not equivalent.
They
complex
76
conditional, " If
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
[ 71,
72
is true,
"
then if
is
true
is
true" and
the simple conditional,

is true!'
If
and
are both true, then
Expressed in
of the
my
notation,
and with
my
inter-
pretation
conjunction if (see
:
:
10), these con-
ditionals are respectively

to the propositions A, B,
A (B x) and AB x. Giving x, AB the same meanings as in

to
70
(all
having reference
it is
the
same
subject,
the
random
that
point P),
evident that
x,
which
asserts
the
random point P cannot be
in
the circle
without being also in the
ellipse x, contradicts our data,
and
is
therefore impossible.
The statement A, on the

;
other hand, does not contradict our data
neither does
its
denial A', for both, in the given conditions, are possible
though uncertain. Hence, A is a variable, and B x being impossible, the complex conditional A (B x) becomes which is equivalent to 0", and therefore an im6 But the simple conditional AB x, instead of possibility.
: : :
1},
being impossible,
for
is,
in the given conditions, a certainty,
(B x) always implies AB x, the latter does not always imply the former, so that the two are not, in all cases,
:
: :
A A
it is clear from the figure that P cannot be in both Hence, though and B without being also in x.
equivalent.
72.
question
much
Import
discussed amongst logicians

of
is
the
"
Existential
Propositions."
B
,
When we
make an
affirmation
AB
or a denial A"
do we, at the
same time,
sitions of
"
implicitly affirm the existence of
Do we
is
affirm the existence of
Do
B,"
"
the four technical propo"
the traditional logic, namely,

B,"
"
All
B,"
No A
is
Some A
is
Some A
is
not B," taking
each separately, necessarily imply the existence of the Do they necessarily imply the existence of the class A ? My own views upon this question are fully class B ? explained in Mind (see vol. xiv., N.S., Nos. 53-55); here The convention a brief exposition of them will suffice.
of a
"Symbolic Universe"
(see
:
46-50)
necessarily
leads to the following conclusions
72,73]
Firstly,
EXISTENTIAL IMPORT
77
;
then,
when any symbol A denotes an individvM any intelligible statement <p(A.), containing the symbol A, implies that the individual represented by A has a symbolic existence but whether the statement (jf>(A) implies that the individual represented by A has a real
;
existence depends
upon the
context.
a
class,
Secondly,
when any symbol A denotes
then,
statement <(A) containing the symbol A implies that the whole class A has a symbolic existence but whether the statement (p(A) implies that the class
any
intelligible
is
wholly
real, or
wholly unreal, or partly real and partly

"
unreal,
depends upon the context.

this question of
As regards
Existential Import," the

I
one important point in which

other symbolists
is
appear to
differ
from
0,
the
following.
The
null class
which they define as containing no members, and which

I,
for convenience of symbolic operations, define as con-
sisting of
is
the null or unreal

to
members
2,
3,
&c,
understood by them
;
or unreal
whereas I Their convention of universal inclusion leads real class. " Every to awkward paradoxes, as, for example, that triangle," because round squares form round square is a a null class, which (by them) is understood to be contained in every
class.
be contained in every class, real consider it to be excluded from every
My
convention leads, in this case,
to the directly opposite conclusion, namely, that "No round square is a triangle," because I hold that every
purely unreal class, such as the class of round squares, is necessarily excluded from every purely real class, such
as the class of figures called triangles.
73. Another paradox which results from this convention of universal inclusion as regards the null class 0,
is
paradox that the two universals " All X is Y " No X is Y " are mutually compatible that it is and possible for both to be true at the same time, and that
their
;
"
this is necessarily the case
when
the class
"
is
null or
"
non-existent.
My
convention of a
Symbolic Universe
78
leads,
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
on the contrary,
to
[ 73,
74
the common-sense conclusion

"
of the traditional logic that the two propositions
All
and " No X is Y " are incompatible. This may be proved formally as follows. Let (p denote the proposition to be proved. We have
is
Y"
(t>
= (x:y)(x:y ):v = (xy )\xyy:f = (V + xy = {,/(/ + y) = (x = (xe (6

/ /
]
:
>])
>/
>/}
>/
tj)
t]
tj)
tj
tj)
In this proof the statement x
is
assumed
to
be a variable
It will
is
by the convention
noticed that
lent to {x y)
:
of
46.
See also
5 0.
be
(p,
:
the proposition just proved,

y')'
:
equivais
(x
',
which
asserts that
"
All
Y"
implies
74.
"
Some
is
Y."
Most symbolic logicians use the symbol A~< B, or some other equivalent (such as Schroeder's A= B), to
assert that the class
is
wholly included in the class
and they imagine that this is virtually equivalent to my symbol A B, which asserts that the statement A implies That this is an error may be proved the statement B.
:
easily
as
follows.
If
the
statement
A B
:
be always
e.
equivalent to the statement
-< B, the equivalence
hold good when

the statement
(ye'y,
r\e
>/
:
A
e,
denotes
>;,
and
B
is
denotes
must Now,
by
definition,
synonymous with
which only asserts the truism that the impossibility (For the compound statement yja, an impossibility. whatever a may be, is clearly an impossibility because But by their definition it has an impossible factor tj.)
is
the statement
n -< e
asserts that the class

e;
>?
is
wholly
that
>;
included in the class
that
tj
is
>/
to say,
,
it
asserts
every individual impossibility. v 2 3 &c, of the class e or e &c.) of the is also an individual (either e 3 r or 2 e is a Thus, which is absurd. class of certainties e
>;
,
>j
formal certainty, whereas (See 8 18.)
y -< e is a
formal impossibility.
75]
75.
CLASS INCLUSION
Some
AND IMPLICATION
have
also
79
logicians (see 74)
endeavoured
to
drag
my
formula
(1)
(A:B)(B:C):(A:C)
into their systems
under some disguise, such as
(A -< B)(B -< C) -< (A -< C)
....
(2).
The meaning
of (1)
is
clear
and unambiguous; but how
can we, without having recourse to some distortion of The symbol language, extract any sense out of (2) ? -< B (by virtue of their definition) asserts that every A individual of the class A is also an individual of the
class B.
Consistency, therefore, requires that the complex statement (2) shall assert that every individual of the class (A -< B)(B -< C) is also an individual of the
class
(A -<
statement
class
But how can the double-factor compound C). (A -< B)(B < C) be intelligibly spoken of as a
the single-factor statement (A-<C)? compound statement (A -< B)(B -< C)
implication
contained in
It is true that the
implies
the single statement (A-<C), an expressed, not by their formula (2) but by
(A-<B)(B-<:C):(A-<C)
but that
(3);
The two formulae (1) is quite another matter. and (3) are both valid, though not synonymous; whereas their formula (2) cannot, without some arbitrary departure from the accepted conventions of language, be made to convey any meaning whatever. The inability of other systems to express the new ideas xy kxyz &c, may be shown represented by my symbols A This Take the statement A 80 by a single example. T (unlike formal certainties, such as e and AB A, and
,
unlike formal
such as 6 and 6 >/) may, in system, be a certainty, an impossibility, or a variable, my according to the special data of our problem or investiimpossibilities,
:
But how could the proposition gation (see 22, 109). 09 In these it could expressed in other systems ? A be
80
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
all,
[ 75,
76
not be expressed at
for its recognition
the abandonment of
their
erroneous and
hypothesis
with
certain,
(assumed always) that true and false with impossible. If they ceased
would involve unworkable is synonymous

to
consider
their
(when
it
denotes
their
a proposition)
as
equivalent to their
(A=
1),
and
A'
(or
their corre-
sponding symbol for a denial) as equivalent to their (A = 0), and if they employed their symbol (A=l) in the sense of my symbol A and their symbol (A=0) in the sense of my symbol A v they might then express my but the expression statement A ee in their notation extremely long and intricate. would be Using (in accordance with usage) as the denial of (A = B), my statement A e would then be expressed by (A=/=0)(A=/r l),
e
,
,
A^B
and
my A
80
by
{(A^0)(A^l)^0}{(A^0)(A=/=l)=l}.
This example of the difference of notations speaks for
itself.
CHAPTER XI
76.
Let
denote the premises, and
the conclusion,
of any argument.
true true
"),
"),
/
r
Then A .\ B (" A is or its synonym B v A (" B is each of which synonyms

denotes the
asserts,
true, therefore
is is
true because
is
equivalent
is
to
A(AB
tion
',
argument.
is
That
to
say,
the
argument
firstly,
that the statement (or collec-
true, and, secondly, that the coupled with the denial of B constitutes an impossibility^ that is to say, a statement that is incomWhen the person patible with our data or definitions. to whom the argument is addressed believes in the truth / of the statements A and (AB )' he considers the argument
of statements)
affirmation of
valid
if
he disbelieves
either,
he considers the argument

dis-
invalid.
This does not necessarily imply that he
76,77]
'BECAUSE
AND
<
THEREFORE'
;
81
may
A or the conclusion B he be firmly convinced of the truth of both without accepting the validity of the argument. For the truth of
believes either the premises
17
,
coupled with the truth of B does not necessarily imply the truth of the proposition (AB') though it does that
of (AB')'.
(see 23)
The statement (AB')

and therefore
to
is
equivalent to (AB')'
A'
B.
Hence we have
T
A(AB')
= A(A' + B) = AB = A B\
synonym A(AB / )
>
But
A
T
.
.-.
B, like
its
/
',
asserts
is
more than
AB
T
Like
it
A(AB
it
asserts that
true, but, unlike
AB' is false, but that it incompatible with our data or definitions. For example, let k He turned yah, and let B Ife is guilty. Both statements may happen to be true, and then we have A T B T which, as just shown, is equivalent to A(AB') yet the argument A B (" He
asserts not only that
is
A(AB')\
impossible
that
it
is
.-.
turned
therefore he is guilty ") is not valid, though the weaker statement A(AB')' happens on
pale
for
this
occasion to be true, the stronger statement A(AB')'' is not true, because of its false second factor (KB'f. I call
merely (AB') that it is false that he turned pale without being guilty, an assertion which may be true, but also (AB')'', that it is impossible he should turn pale without being guilty, an assertion which is not true.
it
this factor false,
because
asserts not
77.
equivalent
obliges
valid,
The convention that to A(A:B), and
.-.
B
its
shall
be considered
to
synonym A(AB'y,
us however to accept the argument A ,\ B as even when the only bond connecting A and B is the fact that they are both certainties. For example, let A denote the statement 13 + 5 = 18, and let B denote the statement 4 + = 10. It follows from our symbolic
conventions that in this case A .\ B and B A are both valid. Yet here it is not easy to discover any bond of connexion between the two statements A and B we know the truth of each statement independently of
.-.
;
82
all
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
consideration of the other.
[ 77,
78
give the
follows
:
appearance of
logical
We might, it is true, deduction somewhat as
By our data, 13 + 5 = 18. From each of these equals take away 9. This gives us (subtracting the 9 from the 13) 4 + 5 = 9. To each of We then, finally, get these equals add 1 (adding the 1 to the 5). 4 + G = 10 quod end demonstrandum.
;
the unreality (from a psychoyet much logical point of view) of the above argument demonstrations rigorous mathematical of our so-called
Every one must

'
feel
'
are on lines not very dissimilar.
striking instance is
Euclid's demonstration of the proposition that any two sides of a triangle are together greater than the third
proposition which the Epicureans derided as patent even to asses, who always took the shortest cut to any place
they wished to reach.
As marking the
implied factor
:
difference beB,
it
tween
A A
.-.
B and
its
is
to
be
noticed that though

(see 18), neither of
A are formal certainties and the two other and stronger statee
>/
:
ments,
first
.-.
and
evidently
;
fails
false
for
its
is
i]
.: x,
The A, can be accepted as valid. and the second is always when A = like its synonym >?(>/ x), is false, because,
/ .*.
j/,
though
factor
7]
second factor
>j
is
necessarily true,
its first
necessarily false by definition.

in purely formal or symbolic logic
it is
78.
Though
generally best to avoid,
when
possible, all psychological
considerations, yet these cannot be wholly thrust aside
when we come
to the close discussion
of first principles,
and of the exact meanings of the terms we use. The In ordinary speech, words if and therefore are examples.
when we
true,
say, " If
A
is
is
true,
then
is
true,"
if
or "
is
therefore
true,"
we
suggest,
we do not
positively affirm, that the
some way
or other
knowledge of B depends in upon previous knowledge of A. But

it is
in formal logic, as in mathematics,
convenient,
if
not
absolutely necessary, to
work with symbolic statements
78,
79]
CAUSE AND EFFECT
83
whose truth or falsehood in no way depends upon the mental condition of the person supposed to make them. Let us take the extreme case of crediting him with absolute omniscience. On this hypothesis, the word therefore, or its symbolic equivalent would, from the
.-.
,
be as meaningless, in no matter what argument, as we feel it to be in the argument (7x9 = G3) therefore (2 + 1 = 3); for, to an omniscient mind all true theorems would be equally selfevident or axiomatic, and proofs, arguments, and logic
generally would
lay
aside
subjective or 'psychological standpoint,
have no raison
d'etre.
psychological
considerations,
.*.
,
But when we and define the
word
'therefore,' or its
synonym
as in
7G,
it
ceases
to be meaningless,
ment, (7 x
definite,
and the seemingly meaningless argu63)/. (2 + 1 = 3), becomes at once clear,

certainty.
and a formal
order to
opinions,
79. In
make our symbolic

we
will
formula?
lay
and
the
operations as far as possible independent of our changing individual

arbitrarily
'
down
'
following definitions of the word

tion.'
cause
'
and
explana-
Let A, as a statement, be understood to assert the existence of the circumstance A, or the occurrence of the event A, while asserts the posterior or simul-
taneous occurrence of the event V and let both the statement A and the implication A V be true. In these circumstances A is called a cause of V V is called
; : ;
the
effect
of
and the symbol A(A V), or

:
its
synonym
A.*. V,
is
called an explanation of the event or circum-
V. To possess an explanation of any event or phenomenon V, we must therefore be in possession of two pieces of knowledge we must know the existence or occurrence of some cause A, and we must know the law or implication A V. The product or combination of these two factors constitute the argument A/. V, stance
:
:
which
call
..
an explanation of the event V. We do not the cause of V, nor do we call the argument the explanation of V, because we may have also
is
84
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
V,
in
[ 79,
80
..
which case
cause of V, and the argument

explanation of V.
80. Suppose
B would B
to
be
.-.
another
sufficient
another sufficient
cause of an
we want
x.
is
discover the
first
event or phenomenon or otherwise) that x

certain
We
notice (by experiment
invariably found in
each of a
C.
number
of
circumstances, say A, B,
(till
We
therefore provisionally
an exception turns up) regard
x, so
each of the circumstances A, B, C as a sufficient cause of that we write (A x)(B x)(C x), or its equivalent A + B + C x. We must examine the different circum:
stances A, B,
cumstance
account for
or
whether they possess some circommon which might alone Let us suppose that they the phenomena.
to see
factor
in
do have a
common
factor /.
We
thus get (see
28)
(A:/)(B:/)(C:/),wmch=A + B + C:/.
We
before possessed the knowledge
A+B+C
x,
so that
we have now
A + B + C:/,'.
be not posterior to x, we may suspect it to be Our next step should be to alone the real cause of x. seek out some circumstance a which is consistent with that is to say, some circum/, but not with A or B or C stance a which is sometimes found associated with /, but
If
If we find not with the co-factors of / in A or B or C. that is to say, if we that fa is invariably followed by x
then our suspicion is condiscover the implication fa x firmed that the reason why A, B, C are each a sufficient
:
cause of x is to be found in the fact that each contains the factor /, which may therefore be provisionally considered as alone, and independently of its co-factors, a moreover, we discover that If, sufficient cause of x.
while on the one hand fa implies x, on the other f'a that is to say, if we discover (fa %){fa x' our suspicion that / alone is the cause of x is confirmed
implies x'
;
80]
CAUSE AND EFFECT
85
more strongly. To obtain still stronger confirmation we vary the circumstances, and try other factors, (3, y, S, consistent with /, but inconsistent with A, B, C and with If we similarly find the same result for each other.
still
these as for a
(fa
so that
which =/a x :/+ a (//3 x)(fp x'), which = /]8 x :f + /3' (/? x )(f'y x ')> which =fy x :/+ y' (/<M(/'<S: <'), which =fS:x:f+S'
:
x)(f'a
x'),
:
'
our conviction that / alone is a sufficient cause of x reBut by no ceives stronger and stronger confirmation.
we reach absolute certainty that / when (as in the investigation of natural laws and causes) the number of hypotheses or
inductive process can
is a sufficient cause of x,
possibilities logically consistent
with
/ are
unlimited
for,
eventually, some circumstance q may turn up such that fq does not imply x, as would be proved by the actual Should this comoccurrence of the combination fqx'. and in natural phenomena it is bination ever occur always formally possible, however antecedently improbable the supposed law f:x would be at once disproved.
For,
since,
by hypothesis, the unexpected combination

;
fqx' has actually occurred, we may add this fact to our data e e e &c. so that we get
,
e:fqx' :(fqx'r
:(fx'r
'(/'*)'.
This
may
be read,
" It is
certain that fqx' has occurred.
The occurrence fqx' implies that fqx is possible. The possibility of fqx' implies the possibility of fx' and the possibility oifx' implies the denial of the implication /: x."
;
The inductive method here described will be found, upon examination, to include all the essential principles of the methods to which Mill and other logicians have given the names of Method of Agreement and Method
' ' '
of Difference
'
(see 112).
86
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
[SS 81,
82
CHAPTER
XII
We
will
now
give symbolic solutions of a few miscel-
laneous questions mostly taken from recent examination

papers.
81. Test the validity of the reasoning, "All fairies are
mermaids, for neither fairies nor mermaids exist." Speaking of anything S taken at random out of our a symbolic universe, let/= It is a fairy" let m = "it is a " it exists." The implication of the mermaid," and let e = argument, in symbolic form, is
(f:e){m :/):(/: m) which = (/: e')(e m') (/:

:
:
ra).
Since the conclusion /: m is a "universal" (or implication), the premises of the syllogism, if valid, must (see 59) be either f:e:m or /: e m. This is not the case, so that
:
the syllogism
is
not valid.
Of
course,
may
replace
"
Most symbolic
logicians, however,
would consider
:
this
syllogism valid, as they would reason thus

;
By
our
therefore /= m. Hence, all fairies and m = data, /= mermaids, and all mermaids are fairies" (see 72). are " It is not 82. Examine the validity of the argument compounds, and it is inthe case that any metals are correct to say that every metal is heavy it may therefore be inferred that some elements are not heavy, and also that some heavy substances are not metals." Lete "it is an element" = " it is not a compound"; " it is a metal " and let h = " it is heavy." let m The above argument, or rather implication (always supposing the word " If " understood before the pre: ;
mises)
is
(m e)(m
:
K)'
:
(e
h)\h
:
m)'.
Let
A=m
e,
let
B=m
h, let
C=e
h, let
D h: m
and
82,
let

= AB' CD' = (AB' C')(AB' since x yz = (x y) (x

:
D'),
z).
In
order
:
that
<p
:
may
be valid, the two implications

valid.
AB'
C and AB'
AB
7
:
D' must both be
Now, we have
(see 59)
C = AC
B = (m :e)(e: h) (m
.
h),
which
Hence, C, which asserts (e:h)', is valid by 56. some elements are not heavy " is a legitimate conWe next examine clusion from the premises A and B'.
that "
the validity of the implication
AB
:
7
:
D'.
: :
We
have
AB' D' = (m
:
e)(m K)' (h m)'.
Now, this is not a syllogism at all, for the middle term m, which appears in the two premises, appears also in Nor is it a valid the conclusion.
implication,
will
as
the
subjoined
figure
show.
the circle
let
Let the eight points in constitute the class m
the twelve points in the circle e and let the constitute the class e
;
five
points in the circle h constitute

h.
the class
m
is
is
not h
"
Here, the premises " Every m is e, and some are both true yet the conclusion, " Some h
;
not m" is false. Hence, though the conclusion
is
legitimate, the
conclusion
83.
for
is
not.
Examine the argument,
"
No young man
is
wise;
only experience can
give wisdom,
and experience
comes only with age." Lety = "he is young") letw = "he is wise" and let Also, let (p denote the has had experience." e = "he We have implication factor of the given argument.
;
cj>
= (/
w'){y
e')
(y
w')
= (y
f
:
w')
(y
w').
88
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
is
83-85
The given implication

59).
therefore valid (see 11, 56,

correct,
Examine the argument, " His reasoning was but as I knew his conclusion to be false, I was led to see that his premises must be false also."
84.
at once
Let
clusion
P="
was
his premises
were true," and

:
let
C = "his
con-
true."
Then P C =
Let
(p
"
his reasoning (or rather
implication) was valid."
denote the implication of
the argument to be examined.

<
We
get (see
105)
= (P:C)C':P'
= the
valid form of the
Modus
tollendo tollens.
"
Thus interpreted (p is valid. But suppose the word premises " means P and Q, and not a single compound
statement P.
We
then get
<=(PQ:C)C:P'Q'
6
an interpretation which fails in the case CP'Q1 and also in To prove its failure in the latter case, the case C^P^Q
, .
we
substitute for C, P,
r\,
their respective
exponential
values
t},
e,
and thus get

(>/e
:
/
rj.
"
in the argument: mistakes are culpable for mistakes are sometimes quite unavoidable." "it is culpable," let Let "it is a mistake," let c u " it is unavoidable," and let <p denote the implication Putting Q for the missing premise, of the argument.
85.
Supply the missing premise

;
Not
all
m=
we get
(see 59,
cp
64)
:
= (m
m')'Q
(m
x
:
c)
= (m
c)Q
(m
u').
For this last implication to be valid (see 64), we must have its premises (or antecedent) either in the form
m
The
first
vf or else in the form

,
form contains the antecedent premise
c;
the
85-87]
MISCELLANEOUS EXAMPLES
89
The first form is therefore the second form does not. one to be taken, and the complete syllogism is
(m
the missing premise
"
u) (m
:
n),
,
Q being c vf which asserts that The original reasoning nothing culpable is unavoidable." in its complete form should therefore be, " Since mistakes are sometimes unavoidable, and nothing culpable is un:
avoidable,
86.
some mistakes
are not culpable."
Supply the missing promise in the argument, " Comets must consist of heavy matter for otherwise they would not obey the law of gravitation."
;
"it consists of heavy let A obeys the law of gravitation." Putting <p for the implication of the argument, and Q for the missing premise understood, we get
Let
= "it
is
a comet"
matter" and
let
# = "it
by
= (h':g')Q:(c:h)=:(c:g:h):(c:h), application of 64; for g:h = h':g', so

(P
:
that
the
missing minor premise Q understood is c g, which asserts The full that " all comets obey the law of gravitation."
reasoning
is
therefore (see
11)
(c:h)\(c:g)(g:h),
or its equivalent (see
(c
11)
:
g){g :h):(c: h).
In
the
first
;
form
for
it
may
comets
be
read,
"
Comets consist of
obey the law of gravitation, heavy matter that obeys the law of gravitation consists and everything
all
of heavy matter."
87.
Supply the missing proposition which
will
make
the
"
following
enthymeme
into
valid
syllogism:
Some
Let
professional
men
are not voters, for every voter
is
a householder."
P = "he
*
is
a professional man," let

is
V = "he
is
An enthymeme
a syllogism incompletely stated.
90
voter"
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
and
let
87-89
H = " he
is
a householder."
the implication of the argument, and additional premise required to justify
W
:
Let <p denote the weakest

conclusion.
the
We
have
<
(see 11)
:
= (P = (P
We
V)' !(V
:
H)W = (V H)W
: : :
(P V)'
:
V)(V H)
W' = (P V H) W.
: :
: : :
The
:
deducible from P V H is assume P H = W', and conse= (P H)', which is therefore the weakest quently The complete argument is therefore premise required.
strongest
conclusion
P H.
therefore
:
this
"
Some
professional
men
are not voters, for every
voter
is
a householder, and
some professional men are
not householders." 88. Put the following argument into syllogistic form, and examine its validity " The absence of all trace of
:
paraffin and matches, the constant accompaniments of arson, proves that the fire under consideration was not
due
" it
Let
to that crime." F " it was the fire
under consideration
"
;
let
A=
was due to arson and matches " and

;
"
;
let
<fi
T="
it left a trace of paraffin
let
denote the implication of the
given argument.
<P
We
:
get
:
= (
T')(A
T)
(F
A')
= (F T')(T' A (F A = (F:T' :A'):(F: A

7
:
).
The implication of the given argument is therefore valid. The argument might also be expressed unsyllogistically (in the
modus
fire
Let T = " the let A = " the

let
(p
tollendo tollens) as follows (see 105).

left
fire
was due
a trace of paraffin and matches " and to the crime of arson "
;
denote the implication of the argument.
We
get
(see
105)
(j)
= T'(A
T)
A'
which
89.
'
is
How
the valid form of the Modus tollendo tollens. Put the following argument into syllogistic form can any one maintain that pain is always an evil,
89,
90]
TECHNICAL WORDS EXPLAINED

that remorse involves pain, and yet
real
91
who admits
Let
may
"
;
sometimes be a
good
;
R = " It
is
is
remorse "
;
let
P = " it
causes pain
let
E = " it
an the argument.
evil "
We < = (R:P)(R:E) :(P:E) = (R:P)(P:E):(R:E),

,
denote the implication of (f) get (as in Figure 3, Bokardo)

let
/
and
which
is
a syllogism of the Barbara type.

"
the reasoning to syllogistic form

consider the premise,
good," as equivalent to the
But to reduce we have been obliged to

:
Remorse may sometimes be a real weaker premise (R E)', which only asserts that " Remorse is not necessarily an evil." As, however, the reasoning is valid when we take the weaker premise, it must remain valid when we substitute
the stronger premise
strictly syllogistic.
;
only in that case
it
will not
be
CHAPTER
In this chapter
will
XIII
be given definitions and explanations of some technical terms often used in treatises on
logic.
90. Sorites.
This
is
an extension of the
syllogism
Barbara.
Thus, we have
Barbara =
(Sorites)!
= (A B (Sorites), = (A B
: :
(A:B:C):( A: C) C D) (A D) C D E) (A
:
E)
&c, &c.
Taken
in the reverse order (see 11)

Sorites,
we get what may
be called Inverse
thus
Barbara=(A!C)!(A!B!C) (Sorites^ = (A D) (A B C
!
!
D).
&c.
92
91. Mediate
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
and Immediate
Inferences.
(p(x, y, z)
[91-94
When
from a
we infer another proposition \j/(a?, z) in which one or more constituents of the first proposition are left out (or " eliminated "), we call it Mediate Inference.
proposition
If all the constituents
of the first proposition are also
found in the second, none being eliminated, we have For example, in what is called Immediate Inference. Barbara we have mediate inference, since from x y z we infer x z the middle term y being eliminated. On the other hand, when from x y we infer y' x', or ax y, we have immediate inference, since there is no elimination of any constituent.
: :
:
92.
to
Law
the certainty
This is the name given of Excluded Middle. B + A~ B or its equivalent a a. The
individual
either belongs to the class
belong to the class a formal certainty.

93. Intension
an
or
it
does not
evidently
alternative
which
is
and
Extension, or Connotation
and Denota-
Let the symbols (AB), (ABC), &c, with brackets, tion. in 100, denote the collection of individuals, (AB)^ as (AB) 2 &c, or (ABC) r (ABC) 2 &c, common to the classes (AB) so that S will not be synonymous inside the brackets (ABC) AB With this interwith S ABC (see 9). nor S with S be any individual pretation of the symbols employed, let S taken at random out of our universe of discourse, and X let S S (AB) be our definition of the term or class X. The term X is said to connote the properties A and B, and to denote the individuals X 1> X 2 &c, or (AB) r (AB) 2 &c, possessing the properties A and B. As a rule the greater the number of properties, A, B, C, &c, ascribed to X, the fewer the individuals possessing them or, in other words, the greater the connotation (or intenIn A a sion), the smaller the denotation (or extension).
,
the symbol a connotes as predicate, and in

as adjective.
Aa
(or
it
denotes
94.
"
Contrary and Contradictory.

is
The two
propositions
All
Y"
(or x
y)
and
"
No
is
Y"
f
:
are
94-98]

"
93
called
contraries,
each being the contrary of the other.

All
Some is not Y," respectively represented by the implication x y and its denial (x y)' are called Contradictories, each being the contradictory or denial of the other (see 50). Similarly
is
The propositions
:
Y"
and
"
"No X
is
Y"
and "Some
:
X
y'
is
Y," respectively repreits
sented by the implication x

called Contradictories.
95. Subcoutraries.
and
denial (x
y')
f
,
are
The propositions "Some

: :
is
Y"
not Y," respectively represented by the r non-implications (x y') and (x y)' are called Subcontraries. It is easily seen that both may be true, but that both cannot be false (see 73).
"
and
Some
is
',
96. Subalterns.
The
universal proposition "All

"
is
Y," or x
(x
:
y,
implies the particular

"
Some
:
X
:
is
Y," or
y')
f
;
and the universal

"
No
is
Y," or x
y)
y'
' ,
implies
the particular
of these
Some
is
not Y," or (x
f
.
In each
is
cases
the implication, or universal,
called
the Subalternant, and the non-implication, or particular, is called the Subalternate or Subaltern. That x y implies {x:y')' is proved in 73; and by changing y into y'
:
and
vice versa, this also
proves that x
r
:
implies (x
y)'
This is the name given by some logicians to the formula x y ?/ x, which, with the conventions of 46, 50, asserts that the proposition
97.
Contraposition.
:
"
All
X
is
is
Y"
is
equivalent to
the
proposition
" All
non-Y
98.
non-X."
But other
Let
logicians define the
word
differently.
Conversion.
I,
(p(x, y)
denote any proposition,
A, E,
let
or O, of the traditional logic (see

x) denote
letters
\j/(y,
implies, the
50); and any other proposition which the first x and y being interchanged. The im-
plication
<p(x,
y)
y]/(y,
x)
is
called
Conversion.
When
and in
Con-
the two implications
<p(x,
y)
and
in
\|/(y,
x) are equivalent,
r
each
implying
the
other,
as
x\y
is
y:x,
(x:y'y = (y:x'y, the conversion

version.
called
Simple
When
the proposition
(p(x,
y) implies but is not
94
implied by
conversion
accidens.
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
\^(v/, x),
[
:
98-100
:
as in the case of (x
y)
(y
.')',
is
called
all
Conversion
cases,
;
by
Limitation
or
the Per
is
In
these
the antecedent
<p(x,
y) is
x)
called
the
Convertend
and the consequent ^{y,
called the Converse.

99. Modality.
In the traditional logic any proposition
AB
of the first degree is called a pure proposition, while any of my propositions A BC or A BCU &c, of a Mr/her degree
,
would generally be considered a modal proposition ; but upon this point we cannot speak with certainty, as logicians are not agreed as to the meaning of the word For example, let the pure proposition A B modal.' " then A Be might assert that " Alfred will go to Belgium be read " Alfred will certainly go to Belgium" which would Again, the proposition be called a modal proposition. A" B which asserts that " Alfred will not go to Belgium" would be called a pure proposition whereas A B or its synonym (A B )\ which asserts that A B is false, would, by most logicians, be considered a modal proposition (see 21, 22, and note 2, p. 105). 7 100. Dichotomy. Let the symbols (AB), (AB ), (ABC),
' ; ,
;
',
&c.,
with brackets, be understood to denote classes (as in 7 Boolian systems) and not the statements AB, AB ABC, &c.
,
We
get*
)(C + C) = &c. = (AB) + (AB = (ABC) + (ABC + (AB = &c.
7
A = A(B + B ) = A(B + B
7
C)
+ (AB C
may be mutually exclusive divisions then, by similar subdivision of each of these, into four This process mutually exclusive divisions and so on. of division into two, four, eight, &c, mutually exclusive
Thus any
divided,
class
in our universe of discourse
first,
into
two
The symbol (AB) denotes the
total of individuals
common
to
A and
;
the symbol (AB') denotes the total
number
in
but not in
and
so on.
100-10:.]
is

called Dichotomy.
95
of
divisions
The
celebrated
Tree
Porphyry, or
Bamean
"
Tree, affords a picture illustration
of this division
by Dichotomy.
Jeremy Bentham wrote
enthusiastically of
Tree."
the matchless beauty of the
Ramean
101. Simple
symbolically,
is
Constructive
Dilemma.
This,
expressed
the implication
(A aO(B x)(A
:
:
+ B)
x,
x.
It
may
be read,
or
" If
implies
is
and B implies
This
is
x,
and
either
is
true, then x
true."
102. Complex Constructive Dilemma.

plication
the im-
(A:aOCB:yXA + B):s + y.
103. Destructive Dilemma.
This
is
(A:;r)(B:
It
y)(
/ + //):A' + B'.
x,
may
be read,
" If
implies
and
implies
y,
and
then either A or B is false." 104. Modus ponendo ponens (see Dr. Keynes's "Formal There are two forms of this, the one valid, the Logic "). other not, namely,
either x or y
is false,
(A B)A
:
and (A B)B A.
:
the second form fails in e e for, denoting the the case A^B"' and in the case A~ B
The
first
form
is
self-evident
second form by
<p,
we
get (see
/
r
>
'
6769)
e
Wc
105. Modus tollendo
= A 'B- + A- B
tollens.
e
.
Of this
also there are
two
forms
the
first valid,
the second not, namely,

:
: :
(A B)B' A' and (A B)A'

:
B'.
The
case
first
is
evident
the second
fails,
as before, in the
A^B"*,
and
in
the case A~
e
.
For, denoting the
96
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
105-108
.
A^B" + A" 6 B (See second form by (p, Ave get Wc// 67-69.) This also has two forms; 106. Modus tollendo ponens. They are the first valid, the other not.
(A
+ B)A
:B and (AB)'B':A.
:
The
first
may
be proved formally as follows

:
(A
+ B)A' B = A'B'( A + B)
r,
= +
(,,
>,)
,/
=
The second
is
>j
:>]
e.
not valid, for

:
(AB)'B'
A = A'B'(AB)'
= A'B'
= (A + B)
e
;
which fails both in the case (A + By and (A + B)". To prove its failure in the last
denote the given implication.
(p
in the case
case, let
(p
We
get
e
,
AB)'B'
A = (A + B)
as already proved.
(p
Therefore, putting
A + B = 0,
we
get
= e* = n
107. Modus poncndo
tollens.
This also has a valid and
an invalid form, namely,
(AB)'A B' and (A

:
+ B)B
A'.
The
first is valid, for
(AB)'A B' = AB(AB)'

:
=1 1=
:
e.
The second
is
not valid, for
(A
+ B)B:A' = AB(A + B):>/ = AB:>,,

e
.
:
which
In
also
fails
the
which =
t]
both in the case (AB) and in the case (AB) the given implication becomes e first case which and in the second case it becomes 6
>;,
:
;
>/,
>].
Let x 108. Essential (or Explicative) and Ampliative. be any word or symbol, and let <p(x) be any proposition
108-110]

13).
97
containing x (see
When
(p(x)
is,
or follows neces-
sarily from, a definition
which explains the meaning of the

;
word
<p(x)
(or
is
collection
of words) x
then the proposition

109).
,
called an essential, or an explicative, proposition.

certainties
Formal
are essential propositions (see

,
have a proposition, such as xa or x~ a or a x + vf, which gives information about x not contained in any definition of x such a proposition is called
;
When we
ampliative.
109. Formal and Material A proposition is called a formal certainty when it follows necessarily from our definitions, or our understood linguistic conventions, without further data and it is called a formal impossi;
bility,
when
it
it
is
inconsistent
It is
with
our
definitions or
linguistic conventions.
called a material certainty
when
follows necessarily from
some
it
special data not
necessarily contained in our definitions.

called a material impossibility
special
Similarly,
it is
when
contradicts
some
datum or data not contained in our definitions. In this book the symbols e and n respectively denote certainties and impossibilities without any necessary implication as to whether formal or material. When no special data are given beyond our definitions, the
and impossibilities spoken of are understood be formal when special data are given then e and n respectively denote material certainties and impossibilities. 110. Meaningless Symbols. In logical as in mathematical researches, expressions sometimes turn up to
certainties
to
;
which we cannot,
for
a time, or in
the circumstances
are
considered, attach any meaning.
Such expressions
not on that account to be thrown aside as useless. The meaning and the utility may come later; the symbol
^/
in
mathematics
is
a well-known instance.
From
the fact that a certain
simple
or
complex symbol x
happens to be meaningless, it does not follow that every statement or expression containing it is also meaningless. For example, the logical statement A^ + A'*, which
98
asserts that
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
[110
A
is
either belongs to the class x or does not

a formal certainty
also
belong to
it,
ingless or not,
Suppose
whether A be meanwhether x be meaningless or not. meaningless and x a certainty. We get
and
A*
Next, suppose
+ A" x =
+ (P = + e =
>/
e.
a certainty
r
and x meaningless.
>;
.
We
get
A x + A- = e + t- = + e = f
Lastly, suppose
and x both meaningless.

0-
We
get
A x + A"* = 0 +
=e+ =
>/
e.
Let A x denote any function of x, that is, any expression containing the symbol x and let <p(A- x ) be any statement containing the symbol A x so that the statement <p(A x ) is a function of a function of x (see 13). Suppose
;
;
now
values (or meanings) of
though intelligible for most happens to be meaningless when x has a particular value a, and also when x has a Suppose also that the statement particular value /3.
that
the symbol
Ax
x,
<p(A. x ) is
true (and therefore intelligible) for
all
values of
x except the values a and /3, but that for these two values of x the statement <p(A. x ) becomes meaningless, and Suppose, thirdly, that therefore neither true nor false.
<p(A x )
the exceptional cases x
becomes true (and therefore intelligible) also for = a and x = ft provided we lay
or
definition
down the convention

meaningless symbol
less
that
the
hitherto
Aa
shall
have a certain
intelligible
meaning m., and that, similarly, the hitherto meaningsymbol A^ shall have a certain intelligible meanThen, the hitherto meaningless symbols A a and ing m 2 Ap will henceforth be synonyms of the intelligible symbols m1 and m2 and the general statement or formula <p(A x ), which was before meaningless in the cases x = a and x = (3, will now be true and intelligible for all values
. ,
of x
without exception.
It
is
on
this
principle
that
110,111]
MEANINGLESS SYMBOLS
99
originally
mathematicians have been led to give meanings to the meaningless symbols a and a n the first of which is now synonymous with 1, and the second
,
with
an
Suppose we have a formula, <p{x)=^^r(x), which holds good for all values of x with the exception of a certain meaningless value ?. For this value of x we further suppose (p(x) to become meaningless, while \J/(.r) remains
still
intelligible.
In this case, since
(p(?)
is,
thesis,
meaningless,
we
are
at
liberty
to
give
meaning that does not conflict previous definition or established formula. In order, therefore, that the formula <p(x) \j/(x) may hold good for all values of x without exception (not excluding even
convenient
by hypoit any with any
the meaningless value 9), we may legitimately lay down the convention or definition that the hitherto meaningless expression ((?) shall henceforth be synonymous with the always intelligible expression yf(s). With
this convention,
the formula,
(j)(x)
y(s(x),
which before
true in
had only a
all cases.
restricted validity, will
now become
111. Take, for example, the formula, s/x >/x x in mathematics. This is understood to be true for all
positive
values of x; but
the
symbol
^/x,
and conse-
quently also the symbol Jxjx, become meaningless when x is negative, for (unless we lay down further conventions)
fractions
the
are
square
roots
non-existent.
of negative numbers or Mathematicians, therefore,
have arrived tacitly, and, as it were, unconsciously, at the understanding that when x is negative, then, Avhatever
meaning may be given combination y/x^x, like synonymous with x and,

;
to
its
the symbol
Jx
itself,
the
synonym {^/xf,
shall
be
further, that whatever
meaning
it
may
in future be
that meaning
must not
found convenient to give to */ 1, conflict with any previous formula
100
or definition.
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
*J which we have given merely
the
111, 112
algebraic
Those remarks bear solely on the

1,
symbol
as a concrete
illustration
of
wider
general
principles
discussed
previously.
In geometry the symbol *J
now conveys
by
in
itself a clear
and
no way
conflicts
intelligible meaning, and one which with any algebraic formula of which
it is
a constituent.
112. Induction.
The reasoning by which

is
we
infer, or
rather suspect, the existence of a general law by observation of particular cases or instances called Induction.
Let us imagine a little boy, who has but little experience of ordinary natural phenomena, to be sitting close to a clear lake, picking up pebbles one after another, throwing them into the lake, and watching them sink. He might
reason inductively as follows: "This
throw
it
into
the water"
(/3)
is a stone" (a); "I "It sinks" (7). These

it
three propositions he repeats, or rather tacitly and as
were mechanically thinks, over and over again, until finally he discovers (as he imagines) the universal law a/3 y, that a/3 implies y, that all stones thrown into ivatcr sink. He
:
continues the process, and presently, to his astonishment,

discovers that the inductive law a/3
true.
:
An
exception has occurred.
y is One
not universally
of the pebbles
which he throws in happens to be a pumice-stone and Should the lake happen to be in the crater of an extinct volcano, the pebbles might be all pumice-stones, and the little boy might then have
does not sink.
arrived inductively at the general law, not that all stones
sink,
but that
all stones float.
So
it
is
with every so-
called " law of nature."
The whole
collective experience
mankind, even if it embraced millions of ages and extended all round in space beyond the farthest stars that can ever be discovered by the most powerful telescope, must necessarily occupy but an infinitesimal portion of infinite time, and must ever be restricted to a mere Laws founded upon infinitesimal portion of infinite space. data thus confined, as it were, within the limits of an
of
2]
"
LAWS OF NATURE "

;
101
in
infinitesimal can never be regarded (like

logic
most formulae
mathematics) as absolutely certain they should not therefore be extended to the infinite universe of time and space beyond a universe which must necessarily remain for ever beyond our ken. This is a
in
and
truth which philosophers too often forget (see
80).
Many theorems
in mathematics, like
most
of the laws
of nature, were discovered inductively before their validity
could be rigorously deduced from unquestionable premises. In some theorems thus discovered further researches have
shown that
limits than
in
their validity
is
restricted
within narrower
Taylor's
was
at first supposed.
Theorem
the
Differential
Calculus
is
a well-known example.
Mathematicians used to speak of the " failure cases " of Taylor's Theorem, until Mr. Homersham Cox at last investigated and accurately determined the exact conditions of its validity. The following example of a theorem discovered inductively by successive experiments may not be very important but as it occurred in the course of my own researches rather more than thirty years ago, I venture to give it by way of illustration. Let C be the centre of a square. From C draw in a
;
random
direction a straight line CP, meeting a side of
the square at P.
What
is
is
the average area of the circle
whose variable radius
CP ?
The question is very easy for any one with an elementary knowledge of the integral calculus and its applications, and I found at once that the average area required is equal to that of the given square. I next took a rectangle instead of a square, and found that the average area required (i.e. that of the random circle) was
equal to that of the rectangle. This led me to suspect that the same law would be found to hold good in regard
result
symmetrical areas, and I tried the ellipse. The was what I had expected taking C as the centre of the ellipse, and CP in a random direction meeting the curve at P, I found that the average area of the variable
to all
:
102
circle
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
whose radius
[112
ellipse.
is CP must be equal to that of the Further trials with other symmetrical figures confirmed my opinion as to the universality of the law. Next came the questions Need the given figure be symmetrical ? and might not the law hold good for any point C in any area, regular or irregular ? Further trials again confirmed my suspicions, and led me to the discovery of the general theorem, that if there be any given areas in the same plane, and we take any point C anywhere in the plane (whether in one of the given areas or not), and draw any random radius CP meeting the
:
boundary
of any given area at a variable point P, the average area of the circle whose radius is CP is always
equal to the
exit
sum
of the given areas, provided
we conpoint
of
sider the variable circle as positive
from
any
area,
negative
is
when P when P is
non-existent,
is
a point of
entrance, and zero
when P
:
because the
random radius meets none Next came the question

theorem be extended
to
of the given boundaries.
Might not the same general any number of given volumes
instead of areas, with an average sphere instead of
Experiment again led
an affirmative answer that is to say, to the discovery of the following theorem which (as No. 3486) I proposed in the Educational Times as follows
to
:
circle
Some
lie about matter where they be Within such solid, or without,
shapeless solids
No
Let's take a centre C.
From
centre C, in countless hosts,
Let random radii run, And meet a surface each at P,

Or,
may
be,
meet with none.
Those shapeless solids, far or near, Their total prove to be The average volume of the sphere Whose radius is CP.
112, 113]
FINITE, INFINITE, ETC.

sphere, beware,
out at
is
103
The
positive
fly
When
they
'tis
But, changing sign,
negative
you spy. One caution more, and I have done

entrance there
When
The sphere
is
naught
when P
there's none.
In proposing the question in verse instead of in plain prose, I merely imitated the example of more distinguished
folk,
contributors.
Mathematicians,
of
like
other
have their
moments
exuberance,
burst forth into song just to relieve their theorem thus discovered inductively was
when they The feelings.

proved
de-
ductively by Mr. G.
clearer
S.
Carr.
fuller
and therefore
editor
of
proof was afterwards

Miller
as
given by Mr. D. Biddle,
who succeeded Mr.
mathematical
the Educational Times.

ideas
is
those words used in different senses, especially by mathematicians. Hence arise most of the strange and inadmissible paraTo doxes of the various non- Euclidean geometries. avoid all ambiguities, I will define the words as follows. The symbol a denotes any positive quantity or ratio too large to he expressible in any recognised notation, and any
Much 113. Infinite and Infinitesimal. is caused by the fact that each of
confusion of
such ratio
ratios,
is
called a positive infinity.
As we may,
in the
course of an investigation,
have
to
speak of several such
the symbol a denotes a class of ratios called infinities, the respective individuals of which may be designated by a a 2 a g &c. An immensely large number is not
,
necessarily infinite. M
The symbol
is
For example, let M denote a million. which denotes the millionth power of a
million,
number
so inconceivably large that the ratio
which a million miles has to the millionth part of an inch would be negligible in comparison yet this ratio M M is too small to be reckoned among the infinities a a a y &c, of the class a, because, though inconceivably
; ,
104
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
[113
large, its exact value is still expressible
in our decimal nota-
tion ; for we have only to substitute 10 or 1,000,000 The for M, and we get the exact expression at once. its synonym a, denotes any negative insymbol /3, or finity ; so that fi v j3 2 /33 &c, denote different negative ratios, each of which is numerically too large to be Mathematicians expressible in any recognised notation.
, ,
often use the symbols oo
sense here given

also
to a
and co pretty much in the and /3 but unfortunately they

;
employ
oo
and
oo
indifferently to denote expresratios at

all,
sions such
1 3 as -, -,
&c. which are not

class
but mire
non-existences of the
consider oo and
equivalent.
oo
Mathematicians equivalent when they are employed

(see
6).
in this sense; but
it
is
clear
that a and
parallel
;
a
is
are not
lines
They speak
a point
at
of all
infinity
straight
meeting
at
but this
only an
abbreviated
which &c, or fi v or /33 &c, can never be distinguished by any or /8 and possible instrument from parallel straight lines may, therefore, for all practical purposes, be considered
way
,
of saying that all straight lines
meet
at
any
infinite distance
av or a 2 or
,
a,,
parallel.
The symbol
any
7c,
h,
called a positive
too
infinitesimal,
denotes
to
positive
quantity or ratio
small numerically
be
expressible
in a
any
recognised
notation;
called
negative
too
infinitesimal,
and the symbol denotes any negative

to
quantity or ratio
in
small numerically
be
expressible
any
recognised
finite
notation.
Let
or
temporarily
any positive
sible in
number
ratio
denote
to
say,
that
to
is
a ratio neither
too large nor
too small
our ordinary notation; and let forms xy, x + y, x y, &c have their customary mathematical meanings. From these conventions we get various self-evident formula?, such as
be expressymbols of the
113]
FINITE, INFINITE, ETC.

(2) (ch)\ (ckf
((3
;
105
(1) (cay, (c(3f;

(4) (,/0
c
;
(3) (
- c)\
fl
;
(5)
+ cf;
(6)
2
(f)",
(|)
(7)
Q\
of
:
()*;
;
(8)
(Y,
(/S )";
(9) (aflP;
(10)
afar*
( 1 1 )
+ s^
ar
(12) (M)*.
positive
The
finite
first
formula asserts that the product of a

positive infinite is a positive infinite
if
;
and a
the tenth
finite, it
formula asserts that

is
any
ratio
is
a positive
neither
a positive nor a negative infinite.

difference
The
third
formula asserts that the

infinite
between
a positive
and a
positive finite is a positive infinite.
and the infinieighth article on " Symbolic Reasoning" in Mind. The article will probably appear next April. Note 2. The four " Modals " of the traditional logic are the four terms f T This proin the product of the two certainties A + A' and A + A' + A".
Note 1. A
fuller discussion of the finite, the infinite,
tesimal will be found in
my
necessarily true
A^ + A^ + AÂ^ + A'A"; it asserts that every statement A is either (A ), or necessarily false (A''), or true in the case considered but not always (A T A"), or false in the case considered but not always (A'A"). See 99. duct
is
CALCULUS OF LIMITS
CHAPTER XIV
We will begin by applying this calculus to problems in elementary algebra. Let A denote simple number, ratio, or fraction. The symbol A x asserts any that A belongs to the class x, the symbol x denoting some such word as positive, or negative, or zero* or The symbols A*B, A^ + B A* B y A~ x imaginary, &c. &c, are to be understood in the same sense as in 4For example, let Y= positive, let N = negative, and 10.
114.
2
',
let
= zero*
of
3),
while
all
numbers
or ratios not included
in one or other of these three classes are excluded from
our Universe of Discourse out

(3
that
is
to
say, left entirely
consideration.
Thus we get
(3PJi*
(6
4)
p
,
(4
6)
N
,
(f),
,3, p
(3
0),
(P^/,
(W,
(N^f
for-
(P 1
+ P2
),
(N 1
+ N 2)N
and many other self-evident
mulas, such as
(1)
+ AN B N N P P N N (2) (AB) = A B + A B (3)(AB) = A + B.

(4)
(AB) P = A P B P
{Ax
- B) p =
B Ux - A/J = k{x - ?Y + A*(x - B )Y A A) \

I
* In this chapter and after, the symbol 0, representing zero, denotes not simple general non-existence, as in G, but that particular nonexistence through which a variable passes when it changes from a (See 113.) positive infinitesimal to a negative infinitesimal, or vice verm.
106
114, 115]
CALCULUS OF LIMITS
107
(5)(A
,-B,={4-B)^4-By + 4_By.
= ah) = (ax - ab) = { a(x -b)} = a" + (x - b).
The words
,
(7) (ax
greater and less have a wider meaning In algebra, when than in ordinary speech. we have (. a) p we say that " x is greater than a," whether a is positive or negative, and whether x is Also, without any regard to the positive or negative. sign of x or a, when we have (x ctf, we say that " x Thus, in algebra, whether x be positive is less than a!' or negative, and whether a be positive or negative, we have
115.
in algebra
(x
of = (x > a),
follows,
and
(x
) N = (x < a).
a,
From
this
(x
it
by changing the sign of

and
(x
that
;
+ af = (x > - a),
> and <
let
+ af = (x < - a)
the symbols
being used in their customary
algebraic sense.
For example,
a -
3.
We
get
(x
(,r-sy = (x>3), and

In other
assert
- 3f = (x < 3).
x
words,
to
assert
that
is
is
positive
;
is
equivalent to asserting that x

that x
is less
greater
than 3
while to
is
negative
is
equivalent to asserting
that x
than
3.
Next,
let a
= - 3. We get x - a y = (x + 3) = (x > - 3 N = (x < - 3 (x - af = (x + 3

p
( )
).
Let x
(x
= 6,
we
3)
get
p
)
> > -
= (x + 3) = (6 + 3 p = e
get
p
) )
(a certainty).
Let
x= 0,
we
3)
(x
= {x + 3 p = (0 + 3 = e
(a certainty).
108
Let
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
115-117
x= 1, we get p (x > - 3) = (x + 3) = - 1 + 3) = e
p
( a?
)''
(a certainty).
= 4, we get p = (x > - 3) = (x + 3) = - 4 + 3
Let
(
>/
(an impossibility).
(e)
It
is
evident that
of
x,
;
(,/;
>
3)
is
a certainty
for all
positive values
between
(>?)
for all
and for all negative values of x and 3 but that x> 3 is an impossibility negative values of x not comprised between
and 3. With (x< 3) the case is reversed. The statement (x< 3) is an impossibility (>?) for all positive values of x and for all negative values between and 3 while (x < 3 ) is a certainty (e) for all negative values of x not comprised between Suppose, and 3. for example, that x= 8 we get
; ;
(x< - 3) = (x + 3) N = - 8 + 3) N = e (a certainty). Next, suppose x= 1 we get (x< - 3) = - 1 + 3) N = (an impossibility).

(
;
>?
116.
From
the conventions explained in
115,
we
get
the formulas
(A>B) = (-A)<(-B), and (A<B) = (- A)>( -B);
= {(-A)-(-B)} N = (-A + Bf = (A-B) = (A>B), and{(-A)>(-B)} = {(-A)-(-B)} p = (-A + B) p = (A-B) N = (A<B).

for{(-A)<(-B)}
P
117. Let x be a variable
number
or
fraction, while
is
a constant of fixed value.
When we
have
(x
) p
synonym (x > a), we say that a is an inferior limit oix\ and when we have (x cif, or its synonym (x<a), we say that a is a superior limit of x. And this definition holds good when we change the sign of a. Thus
or its
+ a) p (x + cif
(x
asserts that
asserts that
a is a is a
an
inferior
limit of x,
x.
and
superior limit of
118,119]
118. For
CALCULUS OF LIMITS
example,
let
it
109
to
be required
find
the
superior or inferior limit of x from the given inequality
Sx
Let
get
x
2
x >x+ + 6
3
denote this given statement of inequality.
We
= i6
Hence,
7
_
-
)\
= (tx3y=(x
x.
is
an inferior limit of
In other words, the
given statement
of x lower
A
3
-,
is
impossible for any positive value

also impossible for all negative
than
and
values of
x.
119. Given the statements
and
B, in
which
denotes Sx
<
2
and B denotes
3
3x
4'
Find the limits
of x.
We
1
have
A = Ux-^- -j = (12x-l() + 2x-lf
=(^-n>4-liy=(*<n).
\i
= (6
-3x--j = (24-4x-36x-3)
= (21-4tor = (4te-2ir' =
Hence we get 8
=
(.,-^J
(
a;
>|l).
AB =
\14
>x> 40/
1.
110
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
11
119, 120
Thus x may have any value between the superior

limit
-
and the
inferior
....
limit
21 --
14
40
but any value of J
x not comprised within these limits would be incompatible with our data. For example, suppose x = 1
We
get
a -(s
\
*=i - 1Y Ya - 2 - 1 Y- /3 V '\
2
(an
'
im ~
>?
4/
3
4/
'U/
;
possibility).
6
:
Â
/
:
- ij Y| - 30
is
(a certainty).
Thus the supposition (#=1) though not with B.

Next, suppose
incompatible
with
x=0.
^
1
We
N
]
:
get
(a certainty).
(an impossibility).
Thus, the supposition (x=0) is incompatible with though not with A. 120. Next, suppose our data to be AB, in which
A
B
denotes ox
- > 4a; + -.
4
3
denotes Qx
- < 4 + -.
2
We
get
3 ^-4.
4;/:
IV = / 13\ p / 13 = (^12 (^12 -3J

)
/
120, 121]
get
CALCULUS OF LIMITS
5
111
Hence we
AB = ->> =
13
,
>i
(an impossibility)
/5
t01
>aJ>
13\
:
/5
\8
In this
case
T2J
our
(8
>
13\
:
'
/-
l2J
therefore
incompatible.
Each datum,
for
by
itself;
but the
data AB are mutually A or B, is possible taken combination AB is impossible.
121. Find
positive,
and
for
what what
positions
positions
of
x the ratio
is
negative,
when
denotes
2x-l x 6
1
28 x
2x2 -29a;
+ 84
2(x-
4)(x
10)
x(x-3)
x(x - 3)
As
in 113, let a denote positive infinity, and let /3 Also let the symbol (to, n) denote 'negative infinity. assert as a statement that x lies between the superior limit m and the inferior limit n, so that the three
n),
symbols (to, synonyms.

a,
(m>x>ri), and
have
(3,
(m
six
x)\x nf
limits,
are
We
0,
to
consider
namely,
in descending order, and the five corresponding to the five statements intervening spaces Since x must lie (a, 10i), (10J, 4), (4, 3), (3, 0), (0, (3).
10i, 4,
3,
in
one or other of these

e
five spaces,
we have
= (a,
0+)
:
10)
+ (10l,
1
p
4)
+ (4,
3)
+ (3,
0)
+ (0,
(3).
Taking these statements separately,

(a, 1
(
:
Ave get
p
Oh
4)
(4, 3)
(3,
- 1 0|)> - 4)> - 3) V F FK - 1 0|-)> - 4) p (z - 1 Offix - 4) p - 3 ) (x N N - 3)V F p (x - 10i) (fl - 4) (x - )"(x - S) N 0) (x - 3)V (x - 10|)> - f(x - 3)V F N N Fp /3) x" x\x - 3 f{x - 4) (sc - 1 0i) (
(x
0|)
(x
(;v
V
:
(.v
Thus, these
five
statements respectively imply
p
,
FN Fp
,
112
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
,
121, 122
F N Fp
,
the ratio or fraction F changing its sign four times as x passes downwards through the limits 1 Oi, 4,
3, 0.
Hence we get
F p = (, 10*)+(4, 3) + (O,0); F N = (10i 4) + (3, 0).

That
is
to say, the
statement that
is
is 'positive is
equivastate-
lent to the statement that x
either between a
and 10 \,
or between 4
and
is
3,
or between
is
and
ft
and the
else
ment that F
that x
3
is
0.
negative
equivalent to the statement
either between
10i and 4 or
between
and
2-l_28
122. Given that
to
find
the value or
values of
It is
x.
evident by inspection that there are two values of

;
x which do not satisfy this equation
m x=0, When
n
they are
and
.
;
3.
.
we get 6
2a;
x-3
-1 = 1
3'
...
while
28
= x
28
and
evi-
dently a real ratio - cannot be equal to a meaningless

o
ratio or unreality
28
...
(see 113).
Again when x=3, we

fl and evidently J
,
2re-l
-
get 6
5 = x-S
28
while
= 28
x
3
.,
cannot
be equal to
28
Excluding
therefore
the suppositions
(x=0) and (x=o) from our
universe of possibilities, let
denote our data, and
let
F=
- x x
3
:
We
get
A Fo
.
/ 2a-
28\.
2(x-<k)(x-10b) \
x(x-'S)
J
\x-3
:
xj'l
+ (x=10i).
- 4)(^-10i)} {(X
(x- 4f + (x-10if
:(x
4:)
122-124]
CALCULUS OF LIMITS
we conclude
.
113
From our
^ n
data, therefore,
that x
3
must be
6
either 4 or 10i.
123. Suppose
we nave given
13j;
>
3
4
7%
8
8
to find the limits of x.
Let
denote the given statement.

3
We
have
,
A=
.
/13a;
\ 8
3x
|
7.A
1'
8/
=
l
'
1Q B = (13# - B - 6x + 6
,
_ XP p 7)
v.
If in the given statement
we
substitute the sign

N
<
.
for
the sign >,
we
8
shall get
A=
,
>/.
Thus, the state6
ment that
sible,
,,
,13a;
is
greater
than
,i
3x
4
7x
8 Q
is
is
4
the statement that
13a;
nnposl
and so
Q
is
'tQ,--,
less
than
4
,
J
3%
7x
.
TT
Hence
must be
is
ox
7a?
, '
4
2,x
8
to x.
whatever value we give

that -6
This
4 8 evident from the fact

simplest form, r
is
is
equal to *
7x
.
when reduced
for
all
to its
8
,
\2x
which,
values
of
x,
equivalent
to
13x
8
3
4'
If in the given b
for the sign
statement we substitute the

shall get
sign
> we
,
/13a_3_3.
\
G-7,y =
4
is
8/
()0
so that, in this case,
a formal certainty, whatever be
the value of
x.
124. Let
the limits of
A
x.
denote the statement
x}
+ 3>2>x\
1
)
to find
We
have
2
A = (x2 -
2x + 3) p
= { (x - 2x + = {{x- l) + 2}" =
2
e.
+ 2 }p
H
114
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
A
is
124-128
x,
Here
If
a formal certainty whatever be the value of
so that there are
no
real
we put the
sign
limits of x (see 113). for the sign > we shall get

finite
A={(,e-l)
+ 2} =
>
Here A is a formal impossibility, so that no real value of 2 It will be remem2x. x satisfies the equation x + 3 bered that, by 114, imaginary ratios are excluded from our universe of discourse. 125. Let it be required to find the value or values of
x from the datum x
We get (x -Jx=2) = (x - Jx - 2) = (x + x* + x) _ J x _ 2 ) = x\x - Jx - 2) = x {(x - 2)(xi + 1)} = A (^ - 2) = (x = 4) N for (x = 4) implies x and x and are incompatible the datum (x - Jx - 2).
s/x= 2.
v
;>J
'
with
126. Let
the
it
be required to find the limits of x from
datum (x Jx>2).
i
(x-Jx>2) = (x-Jx-2y = (c '+x"+x)(x-Jx-2y
=
for
p
cc
{(x
= x (x-Jx-2y -2)(x + 1)}^ = ,^- 2) =

p
i
(.> ;
>4)
the
(v>4) implies x and datum (x Jx 2)

, 1
and
N
re
are incompatible with
'.
127. Let
the
it
be required to find the limits of x from
datum (x Jx<2).
(x-
Jx<2) = (x- Jx- 2) N = (.^+^-M')<>- Jx= (x + x)(x - Jx - 2) N = of(x - Jx - 2) N + x = x {^ - 2)(x$ + 1)} N + x=x*(xi - 2f+x = x\x* < 2) + x = x\x < 4) + x = (4>^>0) + O=0).
v
2)
Here, therefore, x
may have any

gm
value between 4 and
zero, including zero, but not including 4.
128. The symbol
denotes any
number
or
ratio
128, 129]
CALCULUS OF LIMITS
115
greater
than m, while Im denotes any number or ratio less The symbols gx m g2m, g3m, &c., than m (see 115). denote a series of different numbers or ratios, each greater Similarly, than vi, and collectively-forming the class gm. the symbols l-{m, l2 m, l3m, &c, denote a series of different numbers or ratios, each less than m, and collectively forming the class Im. The symbol xgm asserts that the number or ratio x belongs to the class gm, while x '" asserts that x belongs to the class Im (see 4). The symbol xgm gn is short for xgm z gn the symbol xP mln is short iorxgm x ln ; and so on (see 9, footnote). These symbolic conventions give us the formulae
} 1
'
(1) x^ (2)
(
m = (x>m) = (x-my.
lm
3) x
gm
= (x<m) = (x- mf. = x mx = (x > m)(x < n) = (x mY(x iif = (n> x > m).
ln
ln
129. Let
and n be two
different
numbers
or ratios.
We
get the formula

(
,,:<""
9*
= X^V + Xa n = (x > m > n) + (x > n > m).

71
To prove numbers)
af
this
we have
(since
and n are different
m.gn
_ ^m.gn^jn + ^m^ for ^jn + ngm _ g = xgmx*nm9n + xgmx n9m = {x9mm9W)x + nnam)xm = xgmmgn + x9 ngm = (x > m > n) + (x > u > m
ffn
<)n
{,:P
),
for
in each
it
term the outside

implied in the
factor
may
be omitted,
compound statement in the bracket, since x>m>n implies x>n, and x>n>m implies x>m. Similarly, we get and prove the formula
because
is
(2) x
lm ln
= J mm + aV = (x < m < n) + (x < n < m).

ln
This formula
may
be obtained from (1) by simply sub-
116
stituting
I
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
for g
;
129-131
and the proof

n,
is
obtained by the same
substitution.
130. Let m,
ratios.
(
be the three different numbers or
We
1)
get the formulae

fi -
2)
aT m rf
gn gr
ln
lr
= m n Jr + Jm ni m + x
,<?
7>iP
in
lr
,/;?
W'" + aWV*.
lm
. ;
ln
ln
n nlr + J r r lm r ln
These two formulae are almost self-evident but they may be formally proved in the same way as the two for since m, n, r are, by hypothesis, formulas of 129 numbers or ratios, we have different
;
while
mgn or + ngm gr + ^m gn _ ^ m + nlm.lr + rlm.ln = ^ jf n -9n.gr = x gm.gn.gr e ^ by fas formula

. .
ln.lr
im.in.i r=.
im.in.ir
o:
multiplied
e^ j 9n -' r
and ^q same formula. When we have by the alternative ev and omitted

a
= ae,
implied factors, as in
129,
-
we
we have multiplied xlm

The same
r, s,
ln
lr
omitted implied factors, as in
When get Formula (1). by the alternative e 2) and 129, we get Formula (2).
principle evidently applies to four ratios, m, n,
and
so
If,
on
to
any number.
131.
in 130,
r
limits of x, the three
we suppose m, n, r to be inferior terms of the alternative ev namely,

,
mgn-ir
m,
ngm - r
is
gm an
-
respectively assert that <m

is
is
the
nearest inferior limit, that n that r

n, r to
the nearest inferior limit,
And if we suppose be superior limits of x, the three terms of the ln lr n lmAr r lmAn respectively alternative e2 namely, m assert that m is the nearest superior limit, that n is the
the nearest inferior limit.
-
nearest superior limit, that r
is
the nearest superior limit.

of a variable
x,
For of any number of
inferior limits
the
nearest to x is the greatest; whereas,
of
least.
any number of
superior limits, the nearest to x
is
the
And
since in
each case one or other of the limits m, n, r must be the nearest, we have the certain alternative e1 in the former case, and the certain alternative e2 in the latter.
131-133]
CALCULUS OF LIMITS
be replaced by (m
117
It is evident that
mPn may be replaced by (mn) v
that
m may
ln
?i) N
that
mlnAr may
be
replaced by (m
n)"(m r)
N
;
and
so on.
CHAPTER XV
we have to speak often of several limits, &c, of a variable x, it greatly simplifies and shortens our reasoning to register them, one after another, as they present themselves, in a tabic of reference. The * symbol m>, n asserts that xm is a siêrior limit, and x n an inferior limit, of x. The* symbol xm n rs asserts that xm and xn are superior limits of x, while x r and xs
132.
,
When
,
x x x2 x3
,
are inferior limits of
x.
Thus
),
aW.n means
xm'.n'.r.
(x
means
(x
- m f{x - n J or (xm >x>xn - mf(x - xn f{x - r) p(x .
f,
and
so on.
numerical
(with an acute accent on the osm m) always denotes a proposition, and is synonymous with (x xm y, which is synonymous with
133.
The symbol
suffix
It affirms that the mth limit of x our table of reference is a superior limit. xm (with no accent on the numerical suffix), a proposition, asserts that the mth limit of x
(x<xm ).
registered in
The symbol
when used
as
registered in
our table of reference xm means (x-xm ) p

.
is
an
inferior limit of x.
Thus
on La Logique Symbulique et ses applications in the du Congres International de Philosophic, I adopted the symbol x (suggested by Monsieur L. Couturat) instead of iy, and .vm " instead ofxm n rs The student may employ whichever he finds the more conBibliotheque
r
>
t .
* In
my memoir
From long habit I find the notation of the text easier but the other occupies rather less space, and has certain other advantages in the process of finding the limits. When, however, the limits have been
venient.
;
found and the multiple integrals have to be evaluated, the notation of the text is preferable, as the other might occasionally lead to ambiguity (see
151, 150).
118
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
134, 135
134. The employment of the symbol xm sometimes to denote the proposition (x x,m) v and sometimes to denote the simple number or ratio xm never leads to any
, ,
ambiguity
for the context always
makes the meaning
perfectly evident.
For example, when we write

X
\x x x
z)
3,
it
is
clear
that
the xs inside
is
the
bracket denotes the
fraction -,
which
as
supposed
to
be marked in the table

,
of
reference
the third limit of x; whereas the x3

is
outside the
bracket,
affirmed to be equivalent to the

is
statement
(x
x3 Y,
2
and
write
therefore
statement
also.
Similarly,
when we
( 2,,;
A=
we
+ 8 4 > 2 9x) = (x - 1 0|) + (x - 4)N = {x x^f + (x x2 Y = x + Xg,

p
l
assert that the statement
is
equivalent to the alterfirst
native statement x l
(as a statement)
+ x^,
of which the
term x1
10|)
_,
asserts
is
that the limit x1 (denoting
an
inferior limit of x,
and the second term

>
asserts that
Thus, the limit x 2 (denoting 4) is a superior limit of x. the alternative statement x -\-x2 asserts that "either xl
is
an
x.
inferior limit
of
x,
or else x 2
this
is
a superior limit
135. The
operations of
calculus
of
limits
are
mainly founded on the following three formula? (see
129-131):
(
xm
,
(Z)
\ )
xm n
x m'.n
= xm ~ x n) xn\xn ~ xm) = xm \xm xn + xn \xn xm

''m\
""
>
''-
m' .n\'
vi
''
n)
'
In the
/,./,
first
of the above formulae, the
and
asserts that xm
symbol xm n means and xn are both inferior limits
135, 136]
CALCULUS OF LIMITS
119
The statement (xm - xn f asserts that Xm is greater x. than xn and therefore a nearer inferior limit of x while the statement (xn -xmY asserts, on the contrary, that xn and not xm is the nearer inferior limit (see 129, In the second formula, the symbol xm n asserts 131). The statethat xm and xn are both superior limits of x. ment (xm - xj" asserts that xm is less than xn and therewhile the statement fore a nearer superior limit of x xm ) K asserts, on the contrary, that xn and not xm is (x
of
;
>
the nearer superior limit.

lent to
'
The
third formula
is
equiva-
m
is
.n
xm
xn)
>
and
asserts that
limit, of x,
xm then xm must be greater than xw

if
a superior limit, and xn an inferior

three inferior limits,
13G.
of
When we
have
Formula
(1)
135 becomes
%m .n.r = xm
+ Xnfi + X y,
r
in which a asserts that xm

inferior limits,
ft
is
the nearest of the three
asserts that
xr
is
asserts that xn is the nearest, In other words, the nearest.

\
\
and y
xm ~ xn) xm ~ X p = {xn xm (xn xr y=(xr -xmf(xr -xny.

a
r)
)
)
When we
becomes
have
three superior limits,
Formula
(2) of
135
xm'. W. ?
= xm' a + x
n'ft
+ xr'7>
is
in which, this time, a asserts that xm
the nearest of the
three superior limits,
asserts that
xr
ft asserts that x n is the nearest, In other words, is the nearest.
and
xr ) xn \Xm ft=(xn- Xmf(xn- xrY

a
)
= (xm
y = (xr xm f(xr xn )
Evidently the same principle
s
.
may
be extended to any
number
of inferior or superior limits.
120
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
137, 138
137. There are certain limits which present themselves so often that (to save the trouble of consulting the Table of Limits) it is convenient to represent them by special
These are positive infinity, negative infinity, and Thus, when we have zero (or rather an infinitesimal). any variable x, in addition to the limits x v x 2 x 3 &c, registered in the table, we may have always understood
symbols.
, ,
the superior limit xa which will denote positive infinity, the limit xQ which will denote zero (or rather, in strict logic, a positive or negative infinitesimal), and the always
,
,
understood inferior limit xp

infinity (see 113).
which
will
denote negative
Similarly with regard to any other

three understood limits ya
,
,
variable
,
y,
we may have the
&c. y yp in addition to the registered limits yv y 2 y 3 Thus, when we are speaking of the limits of x and y, we
,
have xa y a = a
- a. x (or dx or dy) x yp y the other hand, the statement xa m asserts that x lies between positive infinity xa and the limit xm registered in the table of reference; whereas xm p asserts that x lies
;
= =
fi
= =
On
,_
Simibetween the limit xm and the negative infinity xp larly, xm tQ asserts that x lies between the superior limit while ;% n asserts that x lies xm and the inferior limit and the inferior limit xn the superior limit between implies that x is positive, and statement m Thus, the Also, the statement xQ is xff n implies that x is negative. s and the statement x is statement X synonymous with the p As shown in 134, statement x synonymous with the symbol xQ sometimes to denote a the employment of the limit, and sometimes to denote a statement, need not lead
.
,.
to
any ambiguity.
138. Just as in finding the limits of statements in pure logic (see 33-40) we may supply the superior limit n when no other superior limit is given, and the inferior
limit
e
when no other
inferior limit is given, so in find-
ing the limits of variable ratios in mathematics, we may supply the positive infinity a (represented by xa or y a or z &c, according to the variable in question) when no
,
138, 139]
CALCULUS OF LIMITS
is
121
infinity
(3
other superior limit
given,
,
and the negative
(represented by .^ or yp or zp &c.) when no other inferior Thus, when xm denotes a statement, limit is given.
namely, the statement (x x^f, it may be written xa m and, in like manner, for the statement xn which denotes (x xn y, we may write xn tP (see 137). 139. Though the formulae of 135 may generally be dispensed with in easy problems with only one or two variables, we will nevertheless apply them first to such
,
;
>,
problems, in order to
clearer
make
to
their
meaning and object
apply them afterwards to more complicated problems which cannot dispense with their aid. Given that 7a? 53 is positive, and 67 9a; negative;
when we come
required the limits of
x.
Let
get
denote the
first
datum, and
the second.
We
TABLE
A = (7x-5Sy = (x-~X=x1 =xa
,,
B = (67-9*) N = (9,:-G7) p = (^-y

Hence, we get
AB = av.
By Formula
a5j
_
xa
,,
=x
a ._
(1) of 135,
p 2) 2
2
we get
,67
= Xjlfa x + x (x x^f
53_67
53V
p
Y
t
9~
p p
t
= r (477-469) + r (469-477) p ,forQ = (63Q) = x1e + aw = x (see 11, Formula? 22, 23). From tne aata AB thereThus we get AB = a 12 =
1
,i'
.r
.i-
fore
we
infer
that
lies
between positive
greater than
infinity
,_4
between xa and ,i\ that 53 In other words, x and

;
is.
is
53
or 7-.
122
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
139, 140
wanted
Now, here evidently the formula of 135 was not for it is evident by mere inspection that u\ is
;
greater than
,r 2
so
that a\ being therefore the nearest

,r
2
inferior limit, the limit
is
superseded and
may
be
left
out of account.
In fact
that
A
53
implies B, so that
we get
07
AB = A =
positive
;
,r aU 140. Given
.
7x
is
negative
and
9*
required the limits of
x.
Let
denote the
first
datum, and
the second.
We
get
A = (7-53) N = (x-
53
x
x,
141]
CALCULUS OF LIMITS
123
CHAPTER XVI
141. We will now consider the limits of two variables, and first with only numerical constants (see 156). Suppose we have given that the variables x and y are both positive, while the expressions 2y 3# 2 and 3^ + 2^ 6 are both negative; and that from these data we are required to find the limits of y and x in the order
y, x.
Table op Limits.
Let
data.
A denote We have
r
our whole
o
2/i
A=y
x p (2y
3x
N
.
2) (3?/
+ 2x
=^+ l
-6)
Beginning
bracket
with
the
get*
first
factor,
we
(2y
3x
N -2Y = (y-^x-lJ = (y- A ) = Vv

?
Then, taking the second bracket
factor,
we get
124
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
2
.
[141
Substituting this alternative for y v A, we get
in the expression for
A = (y rx v + y^\)y^. o = (yv. 0% + feiftK-.o
= VV. VC
omitting in the
a.
y<H. ti
C a'. 1.
==
2/l'.
0^1'.
'
2/2'.
Oâ'.
'1
first term the superior limit xa because it by the nearer superior limit x x and omitis superseded ting in the second term the limit x because it is superThe next step is to apply seded by the nearer limit x v We the ^-factors yvo and yz Formula (3) of 135 to
; , .
get
yv.
= Vv.
0(2/1
- y<>Y = yv. 0(2/1)* = yv. d

1
'
= yv.o(3x + 2) = yvJx + ^ =
J
yi'.
(*
- x^f
y%.
2/1'.
0^2
P
2 - -x = = = J = y (6 - 2^ = ^,0(3 -xf = y^ Q(x- 3) N = 2/2'.0<%2/2'.
0(2/2
?7o)
2/2'.
o(2/ 2 )
2/2'.
o(
Substituting these equivalents of
?y
and
0^1'.
?/ 2
in A,
we get
>
A=
for
}Jx. cftv.
2.0
"J~ 2/2'.
Oâ'.
3'.
2/l'.
2/2'.
O'^V. 1
evidently
is
a nearer inferior limit than

,v
,r
and
therefore supersedes
limit than
while
x3
is
a nearer
superior
xa (which denotes positive infinity), and thereWe have now done with the ?/-statesupersedes xa fore only remains to apply Formula (3) of 135 ments, and it It is evident, however, to the ^'-statements xvo and xsi of the table, that this is needless, as by mere inspection it would introduce no new factor, nor discover any inconsistency, since x x is evidently greater than x that is, than The process zero, and x3 is evidently greater than xx
.
therefore here terminates, and the limits are fully deter-
141]
mined.
CALCULUS OF LIMITS
25
have found that either x varies between xx and zero, and y between y1 and zero or else x varies between xB and xv and y between y2 and zero. The figure below will illustrate the preceding process The symbol x denotes the and table of reference.
;
We
distance of any point
the shaded figure) from the
(taken at random out of those in line x and the symbol y

,
denotes the distance of the point The first equivalent of the data
P from
the line y
is
the statement
xz xo x
llv
2-
ox o>
which
of
y,
that y
asserts that y1 and y 2 are superior limits (or zero) is an inferior limit of y, and that
(or zero) is
an
inferior limit of x.
It is evident that
this
compound statement
A
A
is
true for every point

is
in
the shaded portion of the figure, and that it for any point outside the shaded portion.
equivalent
of
not true
final
_
The
the
first
data
is
the
term of which is P in the quadrilateral contained by the lines yv y x v xQ and the second term of which is true for the triangle contained by the lines y 2 y0) xv
tl
+ Vv. o
V.
i>
the
y v% x r true for every point

alternative
,
126
142. Given
;
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
tliat
[142
We = = -4 N (y-yi)"; tf - xy = {(y-2 JxXy + 2 Jx)Y = {y-2 s/xr(y+2 sfxy

t
2 2x 4 y 4./.' is negative and y required the limits of y and x. positive get Let A denote our data. Table of Limits. (v/-4 r)-\y + 2,,;-4) p A
(7/
tt-)
for (y
s/^YiV
+ 2 x/^) N
*s
impossible.
We
therefore
get
a=
By Formula
2/ 3 i
.
2/2'.
3(2/
- 2/i) p =
2/2'. s2/i
y-2.3. i
(1) of
135 we get
- Vif + y/yi - 7hY = - 4) + Vl{2x -2jx- 4)* = y (2tf - 2 = y (# - x/ - 2 + yâ? - s/x - 2 N (see
2/3(2/3
126,
127)
^X ~~l)
p
?/3
~i*
slx-l
-"(("-D-lM^-i)-!}'
= (.j-4) +2/i(*-4) n - N = 2/3î + 2/r*r= y (# ~ i)P +
3
^'i)
Therefore
A = 2/2'.3^1+//2'.l^l'-
We
!h.
3
now apply Formula
(3) of 135, thus
2/2'. 1
= =
2/2'.
2/2'.
- VsY = Ik. s( 2 */ + 2 xA')'' = y*. 3 e P r 1(2/2 - 2/i) = i(2# + 2 V'/' - 4)

3(2/2
2/2'.
= yr. i(* + /* - -)" = V*. i{( V* + 2J (2) } - 1 = h: M' ~ x -zY = i#2= i(

r
2/2'.
2/2'.
142, 143]
CALCULUS OF LIMITS
127
,
Thus the application of Formula (3) of 135 to y2 3 introduces no new factor, but its application to the other compound statement y2 introduces the new statement Hence we x2 and at the same time the new limit x 2 finally get (since Form 3 of 135 applied to xa and Xy 2 makes no change)
,
A^y.,.3^+^1%.2
This result informs us that
(positive
infinity)
(see
137, 138).
" either x lies between x a and x., and y between the superior
oc
jcz
and the inferior limit y 3 or else x lies beand x2 and y between y2 and y v The above figure will show the position of the limits. With this geometrical interpretation of the symbols x, y, &c., all
limit y2
;
tween
&,
the points marked will satisfy the conditions expressed by the statement A, and so will all other points
bole, with the exception of the
bounded by the upper and lower branches of the parablank area cut off by the
line
yv 2 143. Given that y x is negative, and y also negative required the limits of y and x.
;
+ 2x 4
be found
Here the required
limits (though they
may
128
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
may
143-145
independently as before)
the diagram
this
in
142.
The only
142
is
be obtained at once from difference between

that in the present
problem and that of
case y
+ 2x 4
is
negative, instead of being, as before,
Since y 2 4a; is, as before, negative, y.2 will be, as before, a superior limit, and y 3 an inferior limit of y so that, as before, all the points will be restricted within But since y + 2x 4 the two branches of the parabola.
positive.
;
has now changed sign, all the admissible points, while still keeping between the two branches of the parabola, The result will be that the only will cross the line y v points will now be restricted to the blank admissible
portion of the parabola cut off by the line y v instead of being, as before, restricted to the shaded portion
and extending indefinitely A towards positive infinity. in the positive direction will show that the glance at the diagram of 142
within
the
two
branches
required result
now
is
1J-2'.
3'%.
'
V\'. 3^1'. 2>
with, of course, the
same
table of limits.
CHAPTER XVII
144.
The symbol
when
the
numerator and denomi-
nator denote statements, expresses the chance that A is true on the assumption that B is true; B being some state-
ment compatible with the data

necessarily implied by the data.
of our problem, but not
145.
The symbol
A
e
denotes the chance that
is
true
when nothing is assumed but the data of our 'problem. This is what is usually meant when we simply speak of the
"
chance of A."
146, 147]
146.
CALCULUS OF LIMITS
B
or
its
129
The symbol^,
and
synonym
S(A, B), denotes
A A
this is called the dependence* of the statement
upon
the statement
B.
It
indicates
the
increase,
or
(when negative) the

chance
decrease,
undergone by the absolute
when
<5
the supposition
is
added
to our data.
The symbol
D B
or
its
synonym
is zero.
S(A, B), asserts that the
dependence of
upon B
In this case the state-
Fig.
1.
Fig.
2.
Fig.
3.
ment
is
said
to
be independent
oj
the
statement
which implies,
as will be seen further
on
(see S 149), that
is
147.
independent of A. The symbols a,
represent the
ABC chances,
-,
b, c,
&c. (small italics) respectively

,
&c. (see
145); and the
symbols
,
a!',
I/,
',
&c, respectively denote the chances
&c, so that we get

1
= n + a' = b + b' = c + c' = &c.

'
' ' '
Obscure
ideas about
bability have led
dependence and independence in prosome writers (including Boole) into serious errors. The
I
definitions here proposed are,
believe, original.
130
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
[148
148. The diagrams on p. 129 will illustrate the preceding conventions and definitions.
Let the symbols A,
assert respectively as propositions
that a point P, taken at

will
random out
of the total
number
it
of points in the circle E, will be in the circle A, that
be in the circle B. Then AB will assert that P will be in both circles A and B AB' will assert that P will be in the circle A, but not in the circle B and similarly
;
;
for the statements
A'B and
A'B'.
In Fig.
we have
149, 150]
149.
CALCULUS OF LIMITS
are easily verified
133
The following formulae
<>-*-?(>
*-}&
The second of the above eight formulae shows that if any statement A is independent of another statement B,
independent of A for, by Formula (2), it is B) implies S(B, A). To the preceding eight formulae may be added the following
then
is
;
clear that <S(A,
AB = A B B A =
e
"
*A
e"B
(10)
AB_A B _B A Q^~Q'AQ~QBQ
A+B
let
B A B (11)^ = + _ AB
(12)
= A + B _^?
150. Let A be any statement, and proper fraction; then A x is short
for
x be any positive the statement

of
=%), which
/
asserts
that
the
\
chance
is
x.
Similarly,
(AB)* means
the
AB
x);
and so
formulae,
on.
This
convention gives us a and

b (as
following
in
which
A
before) are short for
e
and
B
-.
e
(1)
A^:^=^- A V
= (A + B)
a+&
;
(2)
A-BÂB/Â + B)-*-;
(4) S(A, B)
(3)
(AB)x(A + By>:(x + y = a + b);
= (AB)
';
(5) (AB)"
132
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
<6
[150,151
>(s4)=(s=f)=*( A
/A B\ /A = [B = A) \B
:
B >;
-
(7)
\
!
+ {a = b):(AB)V + (a = h)
It is easy to
may
prove all these formulae, of which the last be proved as follows
A_B\
/A_Z> A\ /K_b A\ (A/ 6\) B~Ay' \B~a'B/ \B a'B/ \ B\ X ~ a/

; :
:
jjj(a-&)|
/A
:(
0J
+ (-^):(ABr+(a = &).
some knowledge
of the
The following chapter

integral calculus.
requires
CHAPTER XVIII
151. In applying the Calculus of Limits to multiple
integrals,
it
will
be
convenient
to
use
the
following
which I employed for the first time rather more than twenty years ago in a paper on the " Limits of
notation,
Multiple Integrals " in the Proc. of the Math.
Society.
The symbols
meaning.
tion
^>{x)xm!n
and x m
n (p(x),
which
n
,
differ
in
the relative positions of <p(x) and
xm
>.
differ
also in
The symbol
xn
<J>(%)%
>.
n is short for the integra-
(p(x)dx,
taken between the superior limit xm and

\
the inferior limit
an integration which would be

the form
n <p(x),
commonly expressed
fX
'
either in
ex m
'
dx(p(x) or
<p(x)dx.
The symbol xm
left, is
with
the
symbol
'
vm\n to the
short for
(j>(x
m)
j
<p(%n )-
For example, suppose we have
<p(x)dx
l
= ^(x).
,
Then,
,
by substitution of notation, we get
= #m.' K#) = ^GO - ^G'')

v
so
xn p{ that we can thus

l
'
m<
') (
\ J
p{x)x m n
entirely
151-153]
CALCULUS OF LIMITS
/,
133
as in
dispense
with the symbol of integration,

be required to evaluate the integral
the
following concrete example.
Let
it
Cz
I
'
C'
C' 1
Table op Limits.
dx,
za
"'-I
dy
Ja
JVi
J-'o
=X V2 = h
Vl
!
h'o
=
=0
the limits being as in the given table. The full process is as follows, the order of variation being z, y, x.
Integral zr
2
= (z - z )yv x r = - c)y v xv = (k - ^/>% = { (hA -cy-d- (hvl ~ cy } xv = { (I.* - b) - (W - cb) x v = (h^ - ex - \tf + bc)x r = #i\ o(^^ ikr 2# + &') = a lea \b + bca.
.
yv
&.
(//
?/r 2
.
2)
iH>
ci
152.
The
:
following formulae of integration are
self-
evident
(
1)
(3)
(5)
(
6
'
\
'.
/ /
//?'
= - %n' m (2) #>*V = ~ <OX'. m *W. <() = -Xn'.rn<t>{z)\ (4) m n + Xn = Xni = 0(^>m' #()(#' n + * fe n + #' )<<>) = m ,#*') n^s'
*W
.
^'
<.
mt
r)
a?
n'
'
r'
i/n'
rnfir'
s
2/m'
>
2/'
mP^s' r
.
''
m'
71
~r"
"V
s
, .
"m'
s
"
J >
n
.
'
(9)
(xm
.
.
+ xr
>
.
)(p(x)
.
<p(x)(xm n ( 1 0)
+ *V
s)
= (xm + ^ n )(p(x) = 0(#)(#m< + <?V.

.
153.
As already
stated, the
symbol
when
and
are propositions, denotes the chance that
assumption that
is
true.
Now,
-
let
A is true on the x and y be any

-
numbers
or ratios.
The symbol
means
is
3/B
and
when
either of these two

1
numbers
missing, Ave
may
suppose the number

r
understood.
PU Ihus,
x A xA - means - x B
IB
and
xB
A A means x x B
1
V34>
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
154, 155
xx
=l
155]
CALCULUS OF LIMITS
135
Substituting these results in our expression for Q,

shall
we
have
Multiplying by the given certainty xv -0 (see table), we get
XV. oH == lV i\
1'. 3.
0^2'
+ -'V.
r. 2.02/-2-
Applying Formulae 137)
(1)
and (2) of
135,
we
get (see
#3.
t% r
_
X2. we
get
= ^3 + % = XlX + *oK = xs - xj* + ar^ - x n = Xê + xv n = x + = X2* + ^ = * = ffte Z
'<0 )"
(3C
^
31/2'
.
?,
o(''
^ V
3)
.
Substituting these
results in our
expression for x v
Q,,
#r. oQ
= %(%2/3 + AW3')y2' +
== X2'
.
'3'
.
2^/2
"r ^2' 0^3'

.
2' ""
#3
'.
2^2'
We
now apply Formula

''3'. 2'
(3) of
135
to the
statements
"*2\ 3' ^2'.o'
**nUS
'2'
.
=V
'
-l' .
3(^2
Q\
*2' .0
"^3'
.
== ^2'
=%
= r $%' X ^0) = ''V e = XS 2V^3

Xi)
<
-2'
,?,
2)
iVl-
This shows that the application of 135, Form 3, introduces no new statement in y so that we have finished with the limits of x, and must now apply the formulas of 135 to find the limits of y. Multiplying the expres;
sion found for

#i'.o 7/i'<r*
tr ro
by the datum yv
Q,
we
*
get
==, ''2
.
s/Ar. r. 3.0
'''2
.
0//3
2'.r.
x3. 2?/i'.2.
o-
By applying
y.2
the formulae of
135, or by simple inspecy.y

;
.
tion of the table,
= y20
y3 and substituting these results
we get y%
v=
=y
in the
Vz' y$ 2 r right-hand
<
. .
'>
side of the last equivalence,

<'V.2yi\oQ
we get
= ''V.3y2'.3 + <>2\oy3\o + <'V.2/'r.2
136
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
application of
155, 156
The
135,
Form
3,
to the y-statements
will introduce
no fresh statements in z, nor destroy any showing that it contains an impossible factor term by We have therefore found the nearest limits of y and it Multiplying the last only remains to find the limits of z. the datum z ro we get expression by
tj.
;
QA = Q,?v
The
effect
yv
oZ r
= Ov
3y 2
+ dfe
o2/ 3
+%
s#r 2>r
.
o-
application of
135,
Form
is
3, to
the factor
zr
will
_
no change, since
{z z x
p is a certainty. )
The
and
it
pro-
cess of finding the limits
therefore over
only
remains
to evaluate the integrals.
We
get
A
Int
Int
A
.
^
3
. .
for
= Int(/e.r. $2 + x* ys + %? =l. The A = Int xv ,&v

o
.
Hl\-
2K'
. f
fs l..
integrations
are
is
easy,
and the
result
5
is
-
log 2 (Naperian base),
which
a little above -.
9
156. Given that a is positive, that n is a positive whole number, and that the variables x and y are each taken at random between a and a, what is the chance that
- } positive ? {(x + y'T - a} is negative and {{x + y) x r#2 (see Table); let Q deLet A denote our data y Y 2 s n note the proposition {(x+y) -a} and let R denote the n+1 a} p in which the exponent N proposition {(.? + y) denotes negative, and the exponent P positive.
_
n+1
We
have
, , to find the
chance
QR ^-,
which =
,
.
Int
QRA
.
In this problem we have only to find the limits of integration (or variation) for the numerator from the
compound statement QRA,
the limits of integration for ?/ 1 .2^1.2. the denominator being already known, since A
156]
CALCULUS OF LIMITS
Table of Limits
Vtf
y1 a ~a y2 =
i
y3 = a
yi
7i
J
X
1
= an x
i
=a n + x
1 1
y,
= - n+l - x
138
#5
3
.
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
[156
.
'
<'V. 5
=1
an impossibili ty)
(
and Xg
=
1
.r 3 ,
For
when a>
a"+i
(
we have
so that
2a
an
a;
and when ct<

always positive.
we have
Tl
x6
is
We
in
y.
must now apply
135,
Form
3, to
the statements
Vv.^
z get ys 2 y&. &#\ yz>. 5 =yv.5 ai> Substituting these results, we get
.
We
yv.^n-
Q%1'. 2 = VS. 2<?6\ 5
+ y&. 5%. 31 + y V
5%. 7-
Having found the limits of the variable y, we must apply the three formulae of 135 to the statements in x. Multiplying by the datum xVti we get
,
Q%V. gl'. = 3fa.

2
2''
V.
6'
5. 2
+
;
2/ 3 '.
B1'.
Z'.
5'.
21
?/l'.
5'?V.
1'.
for
xx
= =
2/3'.
5^1'. 3 ft l
ajj/ 5
-
llv. b
ajji
X V. 7 xZm 2 =
'''3
#7.
,:
^7*
We
135
obtain
these results immediately by simple in-
spection of the Table of Limits, without having recourse Applying the formulae of to the formulae of 13 5.
to the statements in
x which remain, we get

,
xVm v = ./v",,
%.
7
+ xr a
a
\
#r
.
iV 3'. n
iV i'
=x =
3
'''v.
Vi 3 a.2
a 3-
Substituting these values,
we
.
get
.
Q%r
for ai.2
2 Xy. 2
= QRA =
==
// 3
XV
?,
3 . !
//r. 5 (#3'.
72
"1
#1'.
?"*. 3>
? /3'.5'
l'.3
al
3
"I"
r VM.ffiv.'fl \
(6
l
J
= i = a2.i3
is
(Vb'.S^V. + an an( %.3 =

i
> ?
yv.sfls'. 7/
impossibility).
This
limits,
the final step in the process of finding the

result informs us that,
(
and the
a.
when n
is
even,
QRA
is
only possible
limit of
when a x which =1) is an inferior In other words, when n is even and a is not
1,
greater than
the chance of
is
QR
is zero.
To
1,
find the
chance when n
even and a
is
greater than
we have
L56]
CALCULUS OF LIMITS
139
only to evaluate the integrals, employing the abbreviated

notation of
151.
Thus
2
,?;
Integral
A = Int
Integral
yv r = (y y )^v. = x v {2ax) = 2cuc 2ax = 4a QRA = yw # + y # = - y^ v + (Vi - y )'%.7

2
2a)#r> 2
r< 3
Vm 6
3,. 7
5
(y-s
v. 3
a Tl
1l
+ l W,_ 3
+
'
+i+
*"
,i
= V.
=
an
a?l
3
~ aH + F +
1
r3'-7
~ an+1 V + i^
)(a? 8
- a**
(^j
- ^3 ) +
- aw +*
- x7 ) + (#?, - ^)
1
'(
an a n + l Y 2a
- a" - |a+
2
QR = Int QRA _ Int QRA A 7w A 4a
=
We
have now
a"
_ a^+i Y 4a - a - a"* 1
Tl
to find
the chance
when %
is
odd.
By
the same process as before
we
.
get
5(
QR A = (y
Here we have wo
so that the
,/'
r- 3
+ yv
%. 7
K +y
& &&. 23.
inferior limits of a,
is
namely, a x and a3
process
different possible
To separate the not yet over. cases, we must multiply the result
(a 1
obtained by the certainty
+a r )(a + a$),
3
which here
bracket co-
reduces to a x
+a v + %,
3
since a x
let
is
For shortness sake

efficient (or co-factor) of
greater than ay
denote
the
for
QRA;
and
let
a x in the result already obtained denote yc 2 <% 2. tne coefficient of

.
.
a3
We
get
QRA = (M A + M 3a3 )(a1 + av + %) = (M + M 3 )a + M 3ar>3

.
140
for
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
a 13
156, 157
Hence, (an impossibility). and a9tl = cases when n is an odd there are only two possible number, the case a 1 (that is to say, a>a v which here For the latter, a r -3 means a>l) and the case a r 3
= ar
rj
we
get
OR = Lit M, 1 J/_ ?= 2a jL_ ira* A 8a' \ A

2
4, n+1 we
get
For the
first case,
namely, the case

1
a>
8)
1,
QR_ 7^(M + M
[
A ~
7w*
When
will
the integrals in this case are worked out, the result be found to be
9? = _L( o - a+i Y 2a - a" + a^ - a^+i A 8a\ / A 4a \

)
\2
1
+ _
The expression
for the
it
2a
a+
chancein the
case
a>l
and
the expression for

give the
in the case a
<1
evidently ought to
same
result
easily seen to be the
when we suppose a=l. This is fact; for when we put a=l, each
expression gives - as the value of the chance

8
157. The great advantage of this

is
"
Calculus of Limits
"
that it is independent of all diagrams, and can therefore be applied not only to expressions of two or three variables, but also to expressions of four or several variables. Graphic methods are often more expeditious when they
only require
straight
;
lines or easily traced
and
well-
known curves
three
but graphic methods of finding the limits
of integration are, in general, difficult

variables, of
when
there are
surfaces.
because
this
involves
the perspective
representation
the intersections of curved
157]
CALCULUS OF LIMITS
there are four or
141
When
more
all.
cannot be employed at
bability I
variables, graphic methods For other examples in pro-
my sixth paper in London Mathematical Society (June the Proceedings of the and to recent volumes of Mathematical 10th, 1897),
may
refer the student to
Questions
and
Solutions
from
the
Educational
Times.
It
may
interest
some
readers to learn that as regards the
problems worked in
155, 150, I submitted my results to the test of actual experiment, making 100 trials 1 and in each case, and in the latter case taking a The theoretical chances (to two figures) are re3. 7i spectively -56 and -43, while the experiments gave the
close approximations of *53
and 41
-
respectively.
THE END
Printed by Ballantyne,
Hanson
&
Co.
Edinburgh &* London
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MacColl - Symbolic Logic and Its Applications (Versone 2)

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F

BC 135 M129 OF CALIFORNIA

CALIFORNIA SAN DIEGO

THE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY DIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO

LONGMANS, GREEN, AND

PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON

All rights reserved

volume may be regarded

as the final con-

centrated outcome of a series

1872 and continued (though with some long breaks)

in the Educational Times,

and was republished

more developed method which

But the most impor-

tant developments from the logical point of view will be

contributed within the last

or nine years to various magazines, English

in the Athenceum, portions of

(with the kind permission of these magazines) copied into

Readers who only want

to obtain a clear general

applications need only attend to

the following portions:

who have may restrict

pass elementary examinations

be principally interested in the

156; but readers

applications should read the whole.

will find that, in

the elastic adaptability of

bears very much the same

relation to other systems

(including the ordinary formal logic of our text-books)

mainly this nota-

to solve with ease

important problems, both in pure logic

the reach of any other symbolic system

1-3. General principles

4-12. Definitions of symbols

Examples and formulae

Propositions of the second, third, and

the principle of limits, with examples

44-53. Tests of Validity

No syllogism valid as usually stated

Symbolic Universe, or Universe

traditional syllogisms all deducible from

one simple formula

usual syllogistic simpler tests proposed

The undistributed and Canons unreliable other and

Enthymemes Uiven one

find the weakest data

from which we can prove a

of inference The words Causation and discovery of causes

reasoning not absolutely reliable

Application to elementary algebra, with examples

141-143. Limits of two variables

'dependent' with geo. .

quire the integral calculus

Antecedent, 28 Cause, 79 Complement, 46 Connotation, 93 Consequent, 28

Excluded Middle, 92 Existential import

Formal, 109 Functions, 13-17

90 Strong statements, 33, 34 Subalterns and subcontraries, 95, 96 Syllogisms, 54