Ottoman Empire and Germany (1871-1908)

Military-economic relationship Trade Activities of German Armaments Industry In the Ottoman Market
By Naci Yorulmaz Free University, Berlin-Germany

Abstract
At the beginning of the 19th century Ottoman Empire was self-sufficient in its armaments production but afterwards by the middle years of the nineteenth century the empire could not escape the consequences of the technological change in the defense industry and had become completely dependent on foreign arms suppliers. Because of dependency of the Ottomans on imports increased the financial burden, and opened another door to economic penetration by the European Powers.

In the eve of the World War I the Ottoman favored the Germans for the army orders. The reasons for this preference were, as indicated in many other researches as well, not due to the higher quality or lower price of their products compared to the other companies. Instead, the political relationships between the two Empires, along with some forms of private acquaintances, were decisive in the relative inclination towards German companies.

The expansion of German military influence in Turkey went hand in hand with commercial influence. At this point it is briefly worth examining the claim that the trade related military technological associations on the eve of the First World War triggered in a closer economic and political relationship between two countries after the war until today.

Introduction
Ottoman-German economic relations were barely perceptible until the end of 19th century, far behind England and France. While there are no historical evidence that deal directly with the commencement of the bilateral trade relations between German states and Ottoman, nsoy indicates that many German garment/textile centres, including those at Leipzig, Dresden, Augsburg, Regensburg, and Nuremberg, were since 15th century among the main export destinations of Ottoman cotton, silk, and wool products.1 But these products were sold through intermediation of Venetian, Geneva, Spanish, French, English, and Austrian tradesmen. In various fairs in Ottoman Balkans, German products were preferred as quality products and they were reaching to as far as inner Anatolia. 2

The first friendship and trade agreement between the Ottoman Empire and Germany has been signed only on March 22, 1761 and extended for 50 years in 1790. Nevertheless, this or other similar endeavours did not contribute seriously developing trade relations. In October 1840, based on 1838 Ottoman-British trade agreement, Prussia signed a new agreement on behalf of the Zollverein states (customs union)3 with Babiali (The High Porte). Thus the Zollverein members have been privileged to trade as most favoured Nation.4 As nsoy gives details based on a report of Bavarian Ministry of Economy dated back to April 11, 1848, trade volume between the southern German states and Ottoman Empire were very low until the mid of 19 th century. According to the author, report was also stating that Ottoman Empire was imposing preferential treatments to other country products.5

In order to observe any improvement in direct trade relations between the German states and Ottoman Empire, we had to wait the late 19th century to come, especially the policy of Drang nach Osten (Drive to the East) to be realized.6 Because in Ottoman foreign trade, where
1 nsoy, p. 5. 2 Yorulmaz, pp.86 -91. 3For detailed inforation see: Dumke, (1981) 4 nsoy, p .6. 5 nsoy, pp. 5-9. 6 Dvornik, pp.129-145.

France and England were dominant in every aspect, Germany was also behind by comparing to Austro-Hungarian, Russia, Italy, Spain, and Scandinavian states. Germany could enter to Ottoman market only later than above mentioned countries. The late industrialization and unification could be mentioned as the reasons for being late in the Ottoman market. 7 However, this delay was in fact related both to the domestic socio-economic situation of the Germany and to the choice of the policy makers.8

The following figure shows the percentage of the Ottoman total export to the different Countries. As seen below that the share of Germany rose dramatically after the year of 1880. 9

Figure 1. Ottoman Export (in %)

30,9 29,1 19,8 16,6 29,9 23,5 14,3 13,3 2,1
1 830-2 1 840-2

28,0 20,1 15,8

27,2 25,3 14,3

28,0 23,5

25,9 24,5

25,9 19,2 17,9 14,1 11,4 8,0

16,8

6,1 1,9
1 850-2

5,9 4,3
1 890-2 1 900-2

7,8 7,2

1,1
1860 -2

0,5
1 870-2

0,4
1 880-2

0,5
1909 - 11

England

France

Austro_Hungarian

Germany

Source: Pamuk, (1995).

The unification of Germany introduced a new aspect of the combination of circumstances during the late 19 th century in the Ottomans economic situation. Wilhelm II (1859-1941), as the young Kaiser of united Reich, with an economy looking for new markets for raw materials and products necessary for its industry, paid his first visit with his wife to stanbul in 1889 and later

7 See also: Jerussalimske (1954). 8 The following quotation by Bismarck, who was the German Imperial Cancellor (1871-1890), makes more clear the orientation of the German eastern policy: it is not worth the bones of a single Po merian grenadier. Compare with Kssler, p. 102 and Sherer p. 526. 9 See Pamuk (1995), Aybar (1939).

in 1898 to bring to realization his policy.10 In effect, Reise nach Osten (Travel to the East) has prepared a profitable basis for the policy of Drang nach Osten (Drive to the East). Without any doubt, these two visits are the old framework of todays picture, even if it appears from time to time in different colours.

Many authors, like Feis, agree rightly on the bilateral trade relations to be intensified only after 1880.11 Because when we consider Deutscher Handelsverein founded in 1880, which declared its area of interest as Turkey and Greece, Export-Verband deutscher Maschinen Fabriken und Httenwerke founded in 1890, which aimed at marketing German industrial products to Balkan and Ottoman markets, and finally Export-Gesellschaft Deutscher Industieller founded in 1898 and Deutsche-Orientalische Exportgesellschaft founded in 1899, we can say that 1880s deserve to be considered at least as statistical start dates. Nevertheless, these institutions and firms were not successful as Krupp and Mauser armament firms and they left the Ottoman markets after a short period.12

The most important development improving the trade relations between Germany and Ottoman Empire was granting exclusive rights to Deutsche Bank on October 4, 1888 for Anatolian Railways project. 13 Sultan Abdul Hamid II (1842-1918) granted the Deutsche Bank the right to buy the existing railroad from the Bosporus to Izmid, and to build new line from Izmid to Ankara. This railway line, completed in 1893 and in 1896 was extended to Konya. As Scherer mentioned, that this line was the first step of the Bagdad Railway.14 The building of the railroad was financed by the sale of Ottoman bonds which issued by the Government to the Anatolian Railway Company and guaranteed by the kilometric basis and were sold by the Deutsche Bank.15 Government income sources, like the agricultural taxes, were held in reserve for payment of these guarantees.16 Quataert points out, that the cost of this payment for the Ottoman economy was very high. Between the years of 1893-1909 paid the Ottoman
10 Wilhelm II visited to Istanbul three times during his rule; 1889, 1898, and 1917. See also: Richter, (1997), Gencer, pp. 53-59. 11 Feis, pp.318-320. 12 nsoy, pp. 20 -25. 13 For the economic impact of this railroad on the Ottoman economy see Quaertert, (1977). 14 Scherer, p. 490 and see Holborn (1926). 15 For the detailed information see Earle, (1923) , Wolf, (1935), Issawi, (1966) pp. 91-93. Franzke ( 2003) 16 Quataert, p.143.

Government totally 3,500,000 Turkish pounds, which exceeded the total agricultural tax revenues from Ankara province during the same years.17 Locomotives and wagons for Anatolian Railways and later for Baghdad Railways, whose exclusive rights are obtained on November 1899, have been almost completely provided by Henschel, Borsig, and Maffei and these were transported by the Deutsche Levante Linie which is founded on September 6, 1889; one year later the privileged rights for Anatolian Railway is granted.18 However, the period after 1880 also is the most remarkable period to explain the explosion of the German influence on the Ottoman Market. German economic influence in the Ottoman Empire increased significantly. Between 1890 and 1910, Germanys share in Turkeys trade volume increased from 6 per cent to 21 percent. As in the Table 1 below: Ottoman exports to Germany rose from a value of 9,610,000 to 67,400,000 Mark during the years of 1890-1910. German exports to the Ottoman Empire rose from 34,100,000 in 1890 to 104,900,000 Mark in 1910.19

17 Quataert, p.159. 18 nsoy, p. 26. 19 Birken, p.176,

Table 1. Ottoman Trade with Germany 1880-1913 (in Mark)

Year Export to Germany Import from Germany Year Export to Germany Import from Germany

1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893 1894 1895 1896

1,910,000 1,620,000 1,290,000 2,250,000 2,710,000 3,610,000 2,190,000 3,210,000 2,360,000 7,090,000 9,610,000 13,900,000 27,900,000 16,600,000 18,800,000 22,000,000 25,900,000

6,710,000 8,060,000 6,020,000 7,020,000 8,260,000 7,900,000 9,150,000 12,000,000 11,700,000 29,900,000 34,100,000 37,000,000 39,700,000 40,900,000 34,400,000 39,000,000 28,000,000

1897 1898 1899 1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913

30,500,000 29,500,000 28,900,000 30,200,000 30,100,000 36,600,000 37,600,000 43,500,000 51,600,000 55,100,000 55,100,000 47,600,000 57,300,000 67,400,000 70,100,000 77,600,000 73,900,000

30,900,000 37,100,000 32,600,000 34,300,000 37,500,000 43,300,000 50,200,000 75,300,000 71,000,000 68,500,000 81,700,000 64,000,000 78,900,000 104,900,000 112,800,000 112,800,000 98,400,000

Source: Birken, p.176. In order to get a better picture of the commercial policy and the emotional agitation prevailed at that time in the Germany of Wilhelm II, the following quotation from Chancellor von Caprivi in 1891 seems to be remarkably good: 20 We must export either goods or men.

This mandatory increase in goods exports a la Caprivi has led to a swift decrease in the gap between Germany and its competitors in Ottoman market and as indicated by many authors they have become after a while the most important provider in many product groups, especially in the army products. On this topic, Chirol states his opinion as follows: 21 The Growth of German influence at stanbul is one of the most remarkable political phenomena of the closing years of the nineteenth century. Never has a
20 Richberg, p.33. See Ripley,(1982). 21 Chirol, p.186.

great European Power acquired so rapidly and with so little apparent effort a position of authority and privilege in a decadent Oriental state with which its previous connections and actual community of interests seemed so slender. Military relations between Germany and Ottoman has improved during the mid 18th century, as the King of Prussia Frederick the Great (1712-1786) tried to sign a common defense agreement with Ottoman Sultan Mustafa III (1717-1774) during the Seven Years War (1756-1763).22 But this plan could not be carried out. As in his study, which is the most important reference book in the field, Wallach points out, towards the end of 18th century, Selim III (1762-1808) requested from Germany their military officials to inspect ottoman military forces and in 1798 Prussian colonel von Goetze has inspected the Ottoman land forces.23

The active role of Prussian/German officers in Ottoman Army started with Frederick III (17701840) when he accepted the pertinent request of Mahmud II (1785-1839). In this way, in 1835 ten colonels in command of captain Moltke have been sent to stanbul. Military missions under Khler (1883-85) and von der Goltz (1885-1895) reformed the Turkish army and achieved great power at stanbul both from economic and army point of view. These military missions have contributed, in addition to military relationships, directly or indirectly to the improvement of economic relations and they sometimes worked even as trade officers.24 Kntzer has in his work published in 1897 described the effect of the German officers on the armaments order as follows: 25 The profit, which the German armament company especially the Mauser, Ludwig Lwe and Krupp made, was around 80 million Mark. [] Goltz Pasha succeeded in opening the fruitfully field to the German armament industry.

22 Kssler, p.106. 23 Wallach, p. 15. 24 See Wallach (1976), Griffiths (1966).

25 Kntzer, S.22.,see : Rathman (1962), Hallgarten (1963), Griffiths (1966), Wallach (1976), Kssler (1981), Schllgen (1984)

German Armament Industry and State: An Alliance for Penetration Pacifique

During the mid 19th century, when Germany was in a situation to import its military materials from France and England due to domestic production shortages, both state and private entrepreneurs were active in military industrial production. Public sector was largely producing rifle and private sector on the other hand was mainly manufacturing cannon.26 Armament industry in other Great Powers of Europe was by and large the same. In Austria, for example, Hintenberg was a state enterprise, while Skoda-Werke and sterreichesche WaffenfabrikGesellschaft in Steyr were private enterprises. In England, besides state enterprises like Enfiled and Woolwich, private enterprises, like Small Arms & Co. and Armstrong and Vickers, were among the most important industries in the country. There was a similar circumstance prevailing in France as well. State had production facilities in St. Etienne and Tulle and private sector was flourishing in Paris, Lille, and Maubeuge. Schneider-Creuzot was among the most prominent firms in French arms industry.27 In Russia, where state traditionally controls arms production to a large extent,28 Tula, Ishewsk, and Sestrorek were among the most important cities in arms production.29

The war between Prussia and France paved the way for the German unification but at the same time a great marketing opportunity for the armaments companies like the Krupp and Mauser. The situation in American weapons industry arisen after American internal conflicts has occurred similarly for German armaments companies after the wars of Germany against France, Denmark, and Austro-Hungarians. 30 After the wars there remained in the hand of many German defense firms a great deal of stock.31 That was because of working in overcapacity to deliver the necessitated arms. In this way, Germany gained through the replacement of the French and English armament company, as an overpowering rival at the Ottoman Weapon
26 Ortenburg, p. 28. 27 Ortenburg, p. 28. 28 Grant, p. 16. 29 Ortenburg, p.28. 30 See for more detail Sander/Fisek, (1977). 31 Lehmann, p.21.

Market. In the length of time, the arms traders of Wilhelmine Germany especially Krupp and Mauser achieved a monopoly position in the Ottoman Market both for cannon and for rifle. As Grant points out German armament companies achieved to a position of virtual hegemony, as part of broader expansion of the German role in ottoman economic relations.32

There were fervent discussions in German parliament and press concerning the investments in weapons technology and their socio-economic costs. We think these discussions to be important in determining German-Ottoman foreign trade policy parameters and therefore to be useful to mention here. According to the government, military authorities, leading bourgeois and conservative parties defending the necessity and advantages of arms production and indispensability of the export promotion of military technology were summarized as follows:33

1. Armament exports were a key step to achieve to successful penetration in the countries where political, strategic, or economic interests had to be defended. 2. From a macroeconomic point of view armament exports were considered to be quite important. A huge number of people were directly or indirectly depended on armament industry and its survival. 3. Thanks to competition, German military would benefit in both peace and war. To timely deliver the necessary weapons in case of a war, local arms producers had to produce better and higher quality arms models than France and England, which would led German armed forces to gain access to the latest model weapons whenever they wish. Even Krupp Company has spent 5 million marks for research and development just between 1901 and 1903. Even if Germany stay out of a conflict or it is a peace time, where domestic demand decreases compared to war time, by exporting these products, local producers would be able to continue producing without lowering their capacity.

When we concentrate on the first advantage, we can defend the thesis that, as financial aid and favourable commercial treaties, arms exports strengthen the bilateral trade relations. In fact,
32 Grant, pp.20-29. 33 Epkenhans (2003), pp. 13-17.

when we consider the case of Turkey, we can simply articulate that the group claiming that arms export is indispensable for Germany were right. 34 The population increase in Essen, where Krupp is located, is without any doubt a good example for the second benefit mentioned above. From a medium-sized town of approximately 10,000 inhabitants in 1854, it developed into a large city with 182,000 of inhabitants within a few decades in 1901.35 As an example for the third benefit, we can refer to arms sales by Krupp to Turkey, Romania, and Bulgaria during the Balkan war. 36

In emergence of the exclusive position of Krupp and Mauser in Ottoman market, the interrelationship mentioned by Epkenhans was really of crucial importance and this could not be regarded as a process started only with Wilhelm II, as often cited. In 1861, when Wilhelm I (1797-1888) was still prince regent (Prinzregent), he hinted at that he will support Krupp against other German arms producers. 37 That was 1866, when the Krupp Company received a credit in millions from the state, in order to equip Germany for a possible war against France, whereby it was supported by Chancellor Bismarck.38 Epkenhans, probably inspired from these examples, stated the following claim:39 The best-known and most notorious case of military-industrial relations in Imperial Germany remains the relationship between the military and the firm of Krupp in Essen.

Another detailed case study, in the form of discussion of the interrelationship between the Government and armament firms in the Germany of Wilhelm II was offered by Richard Owen in the construction of the German battle fleet.40 Owens quotation from the Hofmarshall (Marshal of the Imperial Court) Count Robert Zedlotz-Trtzschler, who was according to him
34Ottoman import from Germany rose from 7,020,000 to 40,900,000 Mark between 1888 and 1893 and the war materials were the biggest in demand. Birken, p.176. 35 Boelcke, p. 69. 36 Boelcke, p. 64. 37 Trk,pp. 160-163. 38 Bontrup, p.53 39 Epkenhans (2000), p. 335. 40 Owen, pp.71-90.

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an observer of the internal workings of government, offers a very different view of this relationships41 . The power of the steel barons weighs heavily and their concern for their business and their desire to see their shares rise on the Stock Market has often been served up to us as a matter of national importance. [] it would be very interesting to find out the many relationships which exist between the pro-fleet fanatics and those who actually build the fleet.

Discovery of Turkish Bazaar by German Arms Traders

Does every supply create its own demand?

The expansion of German military influence in Turkey went hand in hand with commercial influence. To be able to estimate the impact of Krupps armament exports to stanbul on the economic convergence between Germany and Ottoman Empire, we need collect the data from the archival sources. From previous works a satisfactory and correct measure of the volume of arms trade, which is discussed directly or indirectly in many studies only by mostly focusing on its political-military role, appears to be quite difficult. Neither Krupp Historical Archive in Germany nor the Prime Ministry Ottoman Archive in Turkey was researched adequately as they deserve. The discrepancy in the numbers on the volume of arms trade reported in the literature is not to overlook and they do sometimes not comply with foreign trade data. Even worse, the data in the works, which are relevant to the armament imports from Germany to Ottoman Empire, are as seen below in Table 2, in contradiction each other.42
41 Owen, pp. 71-72. 42 By looking at the data provided for the year 1893, for instance, we can see how ambiguous the subject still is. Epkenhans (20 03, p.22) reports the value of total export of war materials to Ottoman Empire only 9,575 Mark, but in his dissertation, Trk (2006, p. 168), documents the number as large as 19,813,740 Mark. Furthermore, Trk (2006, pp.171-173) comes to an interesting conclusion from his numbers. He claims that in Ottoman-Russian war, where Ottomans are heavily defeated, Krupp looked as if it was closer to Russia, so it has in some sense favoured them, and he links the failure of Ottoman to this special relationship. The (wrong) conclusion Trk rea ched, which we think to be quite contrary to the nature of armaments industry, was largely due to the data he obtained. Because, according to the data reported by Epkenhans (2003, p.22) the value of Ottoman arms purchases from Krupp was 7,075,740 mark in 1875/1876, 8,548,825 mark in

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Table 2. Krupps Export of war materials to Ottoman Empire (in Mark) Year 1861 1863 1864 1867 1868 1870 1871 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 Epkenhans Trk 14,066 112,528 748,056 675,168 1,532,636 1,081,964 2,487,764 123,354,312 2,891,527 3,101,659 Year 1892 1893 1894 1895 1896 1897 1898 1899 1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914 Epkenhans 25,695 9,575 13,795 2,030,800 7,390 237,985 1,213,045 19,585 51,735 22,160 1,395 2,765 125,010 8,098,825 8,719,840 21,029,750 18,707,375 1,260,100 631,670 4,155,425 3,539,050 4,623,170 5,287,650 Trk 19,813,740

237,776 11,530

7,075,740 8,548,825 1,071,000 5,270 16,720 14,895 6,555 2,540 3,915 3,651,845 5,139,270 4,887,940 5,656,040 1,410,680 7,590

5,589,790 1,229,940 662,870 9,506,876 22,752 22,752

39,965,707 10,365,936

1,200,036 1,045,384 475,860

Sources: Epkenhans (2003), p.22, Trk (2006), p.168.

1876/1877, and 1,071,000 mark in 1877/1878, but Trk (2006, p.168) does not give any numbers for these dates and argues that there was no order from Krupp at these dates because of the Ottoman financial problems. However, Epkenhans (2003, p.22) calculates the tot al sales of Krupp to Ottoman Empire for the years 1875-1878 as 16,695,565 Mark. Trk (2006, p.154) gives only quantitative numbers for the sales from Krupp to Russia for the years 1877 and 1878 as totally 1,650 cannons. Epkenhans (2003, p.22), on the other hand, documents the value of sales from Krupp to Russia 3,193,015 Mark for 1876/1877 and 10,712,110 Mark for 1877/1878.

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If we want to say like Richard Owen43 we will say that In the plethora of works which deal with the socio-political and economic relationship between Ottomans and Germans the name of Krupp is never far distant. As an armament company the influence of Krupp on the forming of the economic relationship between Ottoman Empire and Germany is indispensable. When looked at the total trade volumes, arms traders including Krupp and Mauser appear to be the most important players both in Germany and Ottoman borders.44 In this period where the course of German-Ottoman bilateral relations is determined, when we take political as well as economic parameters into account, we can see that Krupp family was in the centre of design of the relationship. In the last quarter of 19th century, the increasing role of Krupps armaments factory, with strong relations with the Reich and its institutions, in Ottoman foreign trade cannot be overlooked. Nonetheless this has caused from time to time serious disturbances in German foreign affairs.45 As an example for these intimate relations between political decision makers and military and economic actors, Epkenhans points out the Ottoman-German relationships. He summarizes his proposition as follows:46 A somehow paradigmatic example of the interrelationship between political, military, and commercial interest is, of course, Turkey.

43 Owen starts his essay by saying that In the plethora of works which deal with the socio -political and economic structure of Wilhelmine Germany the name of Krupp is never far distant. Owen, p.71. 44 Epkenhans gives some important example. He argues that Krupps exports to Romania in the years of 190607, were equivalent to 33.4% of all German exports to this country in 1906, while the deliveries to Turkey represented 30% of Germanys exports in the same year.(Epkenhans (2003), p.16) 45 On November 30, 1899 wrote Marschall to Mhlberg as follows: [...] Diese Leute (Kruppleuten) wrden mich im gegenwrtigen Augenblicke nur in Verlegenheit setzen. Wir mssen jetzt unser ganzen Bestreben dahin richten, die Angelegenheit der Bagdadbahn definitiv zu regeln und das Eisen schmieden, solange es heiss ist. Die einzige ernste Frage ist noch die jenige der Garantieen. In dem Augenblicke, wo wir uns nach s olchen umsehen, handeln wir gegen unser Interesse, wenn wir gleichzeitig beim Sultan auf Schiffbestellungen hinwirken. Ausgaben zu solchen Zwecken, so ntzlich und nothwendig sie anderwrts sind, kann man hier ohne weiteres als unproduktiv bezeichnen. Denn die Schiffe werden nicht bentzt, sondern einfach sich selbst berlassen werden, bis sie allmlig verderben. Fr die Landesverteidigung haben dieselben unter diesen Umstnden gar keinen Werth. Dabei hat sich an derartige Bestellungen eine so unglaublich schmutzige Bahschischwirtschaft geknpft, dass ich auch aus diesem Grunde eine gewisse Enthaltsamkeit unsererseits wenigstens fr die n chste Zeit wnschen mchte. Politisches Archiv des Auswrtiges Amtes Berlin,[Hereafter cites as PA.] Trkei: 142- Bd.17-18; R 13297 46 Epkenhans, (2003) p.14.

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Appearing as a poor country from socio-economic point of view at the beginning of the century, Feis points by looking at the new picture of Germany at the end of the century, as anyone else seeing this picture, as follows:47 By the end of the century the industrial organization of a unified Germany had taken massive form. Its foreign commerce was rivaling that of the British. Its highly concentrated banking system was finding the means not only to finance the impulsion of industry at home, but also implant offshoots abroad In the eighties, the state interested in Turkey mostly was, Great Britain that was only occasionally exceeded by Russia. For the 90's, however, the interest of Italy and AustroHungarians in particular became increasingly larger. France showed interests only little above the average and that remained alike during the whole period. Up to 1882 there was virtually no German capital in Turkey48 but that would not be true for German arms giant Krupp. Krupp had already discovered the Ottoman market in 1860s and opened a financial and commercial gate for other German investors. In 1861 it has been delivered 48 field cannon from Krupp for trial purposes to stanbul, and then in turn, in 1863, 64 and in the year of 1868, 127 cannon have been ordered from Krupp.49 Through Ottoman Embassy in Berlin on June 4, 1868, Alfred Krupp (1812-1887) sent a letter to Sultan Abdul Aziz (1830-1876) to inform him on new types of cannon manufactured by him and requests an appointment from the palace to introduce them.50 The Ambassador in Berlin conveyed this request to stanbul as follows: Mr. Krupp asks for sovereign permission to be allowed to present a newly breech-loading steel cannon developed by him.

47 Feis, p. 60. 48 Feis, p. 318. 49 Trk, p.168. 50 Ba bakanlOsmanl ivi, Hariciye Nezareti Tercme Odas k Ar Evrak [Hereafter cites as: BOA, Hr. To. 30/11 (02 Shaban 1285/18 November 1868), BOA, Hr.To.30/9 (11 Djumada al-akhira 1285/29 September 1868).

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When Krupp opened a representative agency in stanbul in 1869,51 Ottoman army had already in hand 284 cannon (1861-1868) produced by Krupp.52 Until 1880s, Krupp has sold totally 1,816 cannons to Ottoman army.53 The value of the total purchases from 1876 to 1879 was according to Epkenhans 16,695,565 Mark.54

Grant puts up the argument that the Ottoman import strategy yielded a significant qualitative advantage for the Ottoman Army over the Russian before the Turkish-Russian war. According to his statement Ottoman achieved superior firepower and longer range with their American repeater rifles and German breech-loading steel artillery and when war came in 1877, the Turks undoubtedly held the advantage in quality of arms. 55

As mentioned previously, there were factories other than Krupp producing military materials in Germany. Important firms in steel, machine-building, chemical, and electrical industries now engaged in the manufacture of arms. The more important ones among them were the Bochumer Verein, the Dillinger Httenwerke, the Grusonwerk, Krupp, the Mauser AG, the Deutsche Waffen-und Munitionsfabriken, the Kln-Rottweiler powder factories, Schwartzkopff and Polte.56 But occasionally Krupp Company was not restraining from spreading information against its rivals in order to maintain its market share. According to a document in the Prime Ministry Ottoman Archives (Ba bakanlOsmanl ivi), for instance, after director of Krupp k Ar disparaged the goods of a firm called Max von Frster, the Palace did not purchase this firms products.57 Similarly, representative of Krupp in stanbul, August Huber laid information against the products of one factory manufacturing shrapnel and this later affected the decisions

51 The representative agencies were Otto Dingler (1869.1889) and Huber Frers (1889-1914). Huber Frers was at the same time the representative agency of the firm Mauser. 52 Deutschen Handelsarchiv, Reichsamt des Inneren, Jg.1898, Bd.2, p.512. 53 Trk, p.168. 54 Epkenhans (2003), p. 22. 55 Grant, p.16. 56 Epkenhans (2003), p. 4. 57 BOA, Y z Perakende Askeri Maruzat: Y.Prk.Ask.127/85 (14 Muharram 1315/15 June 1897) ld

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of army considerably.58 Griffiths draws the attention to the monopoly position of the German armaments companies in the Ottoman Market as follows:59

After 1885 the German firms obtained and held an almost virtual monopoly on the supply of arms and ammunition to the Ottoman army.

Conclusion
In investigating the developments in the economic relations between Ottoman Empire and Germany in the years of 1871 and 1908, we argue that the arms trade was the triggering factor in this process and we tried to explain this in two separate sections. After a short introduction to economic-military relationship between two empires, we studied the interrelationship between the armament companies and government, and their collaboration in the case of Krupp and Mauser, in the first section. We focused in the second section, on the active role of German armaments industry, by departing from the case of Krupp and Mauser, in the Ottoman market.

In conclusion, the German armament companies (Krupp and Mauser) had been the major army supplier in the Ottoman weapon market in the late 19th century. The reason for this striking influence of the German armaments companies in the Ottomans armament market was, as indicated in many other researches as well, not due to the higher quality or lower price of their products compared to the other companies. Instead, the political relationships between the two Empires, along with some forms of private acquaintances, were decisive in the relative inclination towards German companies.

Still at the beginning of the year 1860s, Krupp and Mauser were representing his Vaterland in the Middle East, in Turkey. Therefore the German armament companies especially Krupp and Mauser deserve called as the pioneers of the bilateral relations between two countries, and finally a penetrative agencies in the Ottoman Market.
58 BOA, Y z Esas Evrak: Y.. EE. 109/18 (02 Shawwal 1316/13 February 1899) ld 59 Griffiths, S. 67

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