Pp v.

Godoy Facts:

Mia Taha, a 17 year old girl, accused Danny Godoy who was her Physics teacher at Palawan National School of kidnapping and raping her. She alleged that at 7PM while she was visiting the boarding house of her cousin she was grabbed by her teacher. He poked a knife on her neck, dragged her by the hand and told her not to shout. She was then forced to lie down on the floor where she was allegedly raped. She felt pain because it was her first experience and she cried. Throughout her ordeal, she could not utter a word. She was very frightened because a knife was continually pointed at her. She also could not fight back nor plead with appellant (Godoy) not to rape her because he was her teacher and she was afraid of him. She was threatened not to report the incident to anyone or else she and her family would be killed. She also alleged that a day later she was kidnapped by Godoy and was taken to Sunset Garden where they stayed for three days. During the entire duration of their stay at the Sunset Garden, she alleged that she was not allowed to leave the room which was always kept locked. She was continuously guarded and constantly raped by Godoy. She was, however, never drunk or unconscious. Nonetheless, she was forced to have sex with appellant because the latter was always carrying a knife with him. She was then taken to Edward s Subdivision, a friend of Godoy s house, where she was allegedly raped by Edward three times. She was likewise detained and locked inside the room and tightly guarded by Godoy. After two days, they left the place because Godoy came to know that Mia had been reported and indicated as a missing person in the police blotter. They went to see a certain Naem from whom Godoy sought help. On that same day, she was released but only after her parents agreed to settle the case with Godoy. Helen Taha, the mother of complainant (Mia), testified that when the latter arrived at their house in the morning of January 22, 1994, she noticed that Mia appeared weak and her eyes were swollen. When she asked her daughter if there was anything wrong, the latter merely kept silent. That afternoon, she allowed Mia to go with appellant (Godoy) because she knew he was her teacher. However, when Mia and appellant failed to come home at the expected time, she and her husband, Adjeril, went to look for them at Ipilan. When they could not find them there, she went to the house of appellant because she was already suspecting that something was wrong, but appellant's wife told her that he did not come home. Early the next morning, she and her husband went to the Philippine National Police (PNP) station at Pulot, Brooke's Point and had the incident recorded in the police blotter. The following day, they went to the office of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) at Puerto Princess City, then to the police station near the NBI, and finally to the radio station airing the Radyo ng Bayan program where she made an appeal to appellant to return her daughter. When she returned home, a certain Naem was waiting there and he informed her that Mia was at Brooke's Point. He further conveyed appellant's willingness to become a Muslim so he could marry Mia and thus settle the case. Helen Taha readily acceded because she wanted to see her daughter. Later, Fruit Godoy, the wife of appellant, went to their house and offered P50,000.00 for the settlement of the case. On their part, her husband insisted that they just settle, hence all three of them, Adjeril, Helen and Mia Taha, went to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor where they met with the mother of appellant who gave them P30,000.00. Adjeril and Helen Taha subsequently executed an affidavit of desistance in Criminal Case No. 7687 for kidnapping pending in the prosecutor's office, which was sworn to before Prosecutor II Chito S. Meregillano. Helen Taha testified that she agreed to the settlement because that was what her husband wanted. Mia Taha was dropped from the school and was not allowed to graduate. Her father died two months later, supposedly because of what happened. Godoy, a married man, denied the claim of Mia and raised the sweetheart theory as defense. Although he did not court her, he fell in love with her because she often told him "Sir, I love you." What started as a joke later developed into a serious relationship which was kept a secret from everybody else. The defendant Godoy presented many witnesses to prove that indeed they were lovers. He also presented two letters (Exhibits 1 and 2) supposedly written by Mia which proves their relationship to each other.

RTC judged in favor of Mia and found Godoy liable for kidnapping and rape. Hence, this appeal. Issues: 1. Whether or not the trial court erred by its failure to give any credence to Exhibits "1" and "2" as evidence of the defense (I think this is not the main issue, this is just ancillary but somehow related to evidence) 2. Whether or not the trial court erred in concluding that there was implied admission of guilt on the part of the accused-appellant in view of the offer to compromise (this is the main issue) Held: The SC set aside the decision of the RTC and ruled in favor of Godoy. While the "sweetheart theory" does not often gain favor with this Court, such is not always the case if the hard fact is that the accused and the supposed victim are, in truth, intimately related except that, as is usual in most cases, either the relationship is illicit or the victim's parents are against it. It is not improbable that in some instances, when the relationship is uncovered, the alleged victim or her parents for that matter would rather take the risk of instituting a criminal action in the hope that the court would take the cudgels for them than for the woman to admit to her own acts of indiscretion. 1. Yes, it was wrong when it failed to give credence to Exhibits "1" and "2". Complainant's denial that she and appellant were lovers is belied by the evidence presented by the defense, the most telling of which are her two handwritten letters, Exhibits "1" and "2", which she sent to the latter while he was detained at the provincial jail. (The letter is quite long but interesting. In sum, the 2 letters show that Mia was madly in love with Godoy. She said she was pregnant and she was only forced by her parents to go on with the suit. She was also told to abort the baby. She said that she missed him so much and wanted to meet with him but she can t since she was constantly guarded. She wants to elope with Godoy) The letters eloquently speak for themselves. It was complainant's handwriting which spilled the beans, so to speak. Aside from appellant, two other defense witnesses identified the handwriting on the letters as belonging to Mia Taha. They are Filomena Pielago and Erna Baradero who were admittedly the former teachers of complainant and highly familiar with her handwriting. The greatest blunder committed by the trial court was in ignoring the testimonies of these qualified witnesses and refusing to give any probative value to these two vital pieces of evidence, on the dubious and lame pretext that no handwriting expert was presented to analyze and evaluate the same. Well-entrenched by now is the rule that resort to questioned document examiners, more familiarly called handwriting experts, is not mandatory. Handwriting experts, while probably useful, are not indispensable in examining or comparing handwriting. This is so since under Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person, because he has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person. The said section further provides that evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. The defense witnesses were able to identify complainant's handwriting on the basis of the examination papers submitted to them by her in their respective subjects. This Court has likewise carefully examined and compared the handwriting on the letters with the standard writing appearing on the test papers as specimens for comparison and, contrary to the observations and conclusions of the lower court, we are convinced beyond doubt that they were written by one and the same person. More importantly, complainant herself categorically admitted that the handwriting on the questioned letters belongs to her.

2. There was no implied admission of guilt as to both the proposal of marriage by Naem (imam) and by her mother (paying 30,000). (In sum, as to the proposal of marriage, it was the imam who devised it even with his refusal and as to the compromise by her mother, it was without his knowledge.) The prosecution insists that the offer of compromise made by appellant is deemed to be an admission of guilt. This inference does not arise in the instant case. In criminal cases, an offer of compromise is generally admissible as evidence against the party making it. It is a legal maxim, which assuredly constitutes one of the bases of the right to penalize, that in the matter of public crimes which directly affect the public interest, no compromise whatever may be entered into as regards the penal action. It has long been held, however, that in such cases the accused is permitted to show that the offer was not made under a consciousness of guilt, but merely to avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment or for some other reason which would justify a claim by the accused that the offer to compromise was not in truth an admission of his guilt or an attempt to avoid the legal consequences which would ordinarily ensue therefrom. A primary consideration here is that the evidence for the defense overwhelmingly proves appellant's innocence of the offense charged. Further, the supposed offer of marriage did not come from appellant but was actually suggested by a certain Naem, who is an imam or Muslim leader and who likewise informed appellant that he could be converted into a Muslim so he could marry complainant. As a matter of fact, when said offer was first made to appellant, he declined because of the fact that he was already married. On top of these, appellant did not know, not until the trial proper, that his mother actually paid P30,000.00 for the settlement of these cases. Complainant's own mother, Helen Taha, testified that present during the negotiations were herself, her husband, Mia, and appellant's mother. Appellant himself was never present in any of said meetings. It has been held that where the accused was not present at the time the offer for monetary consideration was made, such offer of compromise would not save the day for the prosecution. 77 In another case, this Court ruled that no implied admission can be drawn from the efforts to arrive at a settlement outside the court, where the accused did not take part in any of the negotiations and the effort to settle the case was in accordance with the established tribal customs, that is, Muslim practices and traditions, in an effort to prevent further deterioration of the relations between the parties.