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StrategicRelationsinAsia:AnOverview

CarlyleA.Thayer

Presentation to 4 East Asia Security Outlook Seminar Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies Ministry of Defence Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam February 2, 2012
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StrategicRelationsinAsia:AnOverview CarlyleA.Thayer*
Introduction
Thispaperaddressesthetopicsetbytheconferenceorganizersanoverviewof strategicrelationsinAsiaandthechallengesfacedandtheimplicationsforBrunei Darussalam.Thepaperisdividedintosixparts.Part1providesabroadstrategic outlookforAsia.Part2addressesChinasmilitarytransformation.Part3considers regionalnavalmodernisation.Part4discussesU.S.regionalengagementinlightof therecentlyannouncednewU.S.militarystrategy,SustainingU.S.GlobalLeadership: Prioritiesfor21stCenturyDefense.Part5focusesonthekeychallengestofuture securitycooperation.Finally,Part6assessesthesecurityimplicationsforBrunei Darussalam.

StrategicOutlookforAsia

Eight major trends are currently shaping the security environment in Asia.1 These are discussedinturn. 1. Global financial and economic crisis. The global financial crisis is the single most importantdriverofinterstatedynamicsinAsiaPacificregion.Theglobalfinancialcrisis hasacceleratedthepowershiftfromNorthAmericaandEuropetoEastAsia.Themost dramaticmanifestationofthispowershifthasbeentoreinforceChinasriseasamajor power in all dimensions of national power. China now has an enhanced global and regionalleadershiprolethroughtheGroupofTwentyandASEANPlusThree(APT). China has used its new position to press for strengthened supervisory and regulatory arrangements over international financial institutions and greater influence for newly emerging economies in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Chinas leadership on these issues has found widespread support in the region. Chinas challenge to the regional order established under United States leadership after the Second World War will continue to generate tensions that will be transmitted to Southeast Asia. The dynamics of SinoAmerican relations will have a continuing major impactonthesecurityenvironmentinSoutheastAsia.
*

Emeritus Professor, The University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra.Email:c.thayer@adfa.edu.au.
1

ThesearedrawnfromCarlyleA.Thayer,SoutheastAsia:PatternsofSecurityCooperation,ASPIStrategy Report(Canberra:AustralianStrategicPolicyInstitute,2010),712.

The global financial crisis has driven home to Southeast Asia its interdependence and vulnerabilitytoglobalforces.Italsotriggeredaregionalpowershiftthatcontributedto the rise of Indonesia and, to a lesser extent, Vietnam as major regional players. Both countriesemergedfromtheglobalfinancialcrisisinastrengthenedpositionduetotheir domestic recovery programs and maintenance of internal stability. Indonesia and Vietnam can be expected to play an increasingly important role in shaping Southeast Asiassecurityenvironment. 2. Chinas military modernization. There is a direct link between Chinas phenomenal economic growth and rising defence budgets to support the modernisation and transformation of its military forces. This has both strategic and regional implications. ChinasPeoplesLiberationArmyNavy(PLAN)isdevelopingrolesandmissionsthatwill permit it to project power beyond its territorial sphere of interest into the Western PacificandSouthChinaSea.AdmiralMikeMullen,ChairmanoftheU.S.JointChiefsof Staff, has stated that the strategic intent behind Chinas development of new capabilitiesseemedtobeveryfocusedontheUnitedStatesNavyandourbasesthat areinthatpartoftheworld. In sum, Chinas military modernisation and transformation, especially naval modernisation, has created a security dilemma for regional states. Chinas efforts to safeguard its security by developing what it considers a reasonable force structure to deter the United States has created insecurity in several neighbouring states due to Chinaslackoftransparency. 3. United States steppedup engagement. There can be no doubt that the global financial crisis has dented the authority of the United States and undermined the attractionofitsfreemarketcapitalisteconomyasamodelofdevelopment.InFebruary 2009,DennisBlair,thenDirectorofU.S.NationalIntelligence,observedintestimonyto the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that the global financial crisis has worsened questioning of US stewardship of the global economy and international financialstructureanddamagedAmericasreputationforworldleadership. InbroadstrategictermstheglobalfinancialcrisishasforcedareductionofU.S.defence spendinginacquisitionaccounts,procurement,andresearchanddevelopmentthatare vital if the United States is to maintain its commanding technological superiority. Despite the declaration by U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta that the defence budgetfortheAsiaPacificwillnotbeaffected,inthelongtermtheUnitedStateswill have fewer resources to shape strategic developments in the AsiaPacific, including SoutheastAsia.Inthecomingdecades,theUnitedStateswillrelyevenmoreheavilyon itsalliesandstrategicpartnerstocooperatetoensureregionalsecurity. The change in power relativities between China and the United States has prompted somestrategicanalyststowriteaboutthepossibleerosionofUSpowerandlossofUS strategic primacy. The United States has responded by beefing up its military muscle andrenewingitspoliticalengagementwiththeregion.Overthenextseveraldecades,

the United States will retain its role as the worlds leading country in all measures of nationalpoweranditwillalsoremaintheprimemaritimepowerintheAsiaPacificand SoutheastAsia. TheglobalfinancialcrisisoccurredduringatransitionperiodinU.S.politics.TheObama AdministrationhasbroughtrenewedenergytoUSengagementwithSoutheastAsia.As U.S.SecretaryofStateHillaryClintonexclaimedinaJanuary2010speechtotheEast WestCenter,theUnitedStatesisbackinAsia.SecretaryClintonincludedIndonesiaon herfirsttriptotheAsiaPacific.ShehasattendedconsecutiveARFmeetingssincetaking officeandatherfirstmeetinglaunchedtheLowerMekongInitiative.TheUnitedStates hasaccededtotheTreatyofAmityandCooperation,appointedaresidentambassador to ASEAN and joined the East Asia Summit. The Obama Administration has also promotedfreetradeagreementswithselectedregionalstates,suchasVietnam,under the TransPacific Partnership program. More significantly, President Obama has attendedallthreeASEANU.Sleadersmeetings. More recently the Obama Administration has signaled a step up in its engagement in the AsiaPacific once it draws down its commitments to Iraq and Afghanistan. As SecretaryofStateClintonhasnotedonseveraloccasionstheUnitedStateswillpivot to the AsiaPacific region. The 2012 U.S. national defense strategy state that of necessity[theUnitedStates]willrebalancetowardstheAsiaPacificRegion[emphasisin original].2 In sum, steppedup US engagement will play a major role in shaping the securityenvironmentintheAsiaPacific. 4. Increased arms procurements. As noted above, Chinas defence modernisation and transformationhasgeneratedasecuritydilemmaforregionalstates.ASEANstateshave been circumspect in public statements but their concerns can be discerned in the significantriseindefenceexpendituresandthekindsofweaponsystemsandplatforms that they have acquired. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute,[arms]deliveriestoSouthEastAsianearlydoubledin20052009compared to20002004.DeliveriestoMalaysiaincreasedby722percentin20052009compared to 20002004, for Singapore by 146 percent and for Indonesia by 84 percent.3 Southeast Asias arms procurements go beyond force modernisation and include the introduction of new capabilities that can be operated at extended ranges. In other words, Southeast Asias arms buying spree, although largely intended for defensive purposes,mayhaveadestabilisingimpactonregionalsecurity. 5.Heightenedimportanceofthemaritimedomain.Themaritimedomainwillcontinue togrowinimportanceinthecomingdecadeasSoutheastAsiaandEastAsiacontinueto recover from the global financial crisis and resume economic growth. This will underscorethegeostrategicimportanceoftheseadomainstretchingfromtheGulfof 2SustainingU.S.GlobalLeadership:Prioritiesfor21stCenturyDefense(January2012),2.
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P.Holtometal.,Trendsinarmstransfers,2009,SIPRIFactSheet,March2010,4.

Arabia and the Indian Ocean through archipelagic Southeast Asia and the South China SeatotheWesternPacificforcommerceandthetransportofenergyresources. Therearebothpositiveandnegativefeaturesofthistrend.Ontheonehand,allnations intheAsiaPacificwillhaveavitalcommoninterestinmaintainingthesecurityoftrade routesonwhichtheireconomicprosperityandnationalsecuritydepend.Thiswillbethe case especially for the East Asian economies that depend on sea lanes of communication(SLOC)thatpassthroughSoutheastAsiafortradeandfortheimportof vital energy resources.The heightened importance of the maritime domain raises the possibilityofincreasedmultilateralcooperationtoguaranteemaritimesecurity. Ontheotherhand,vitalSLOCspassthroughtheSouthChinaSea,whereChina,Taiwan, Vietnam,thePhilippines,MalaysiaandBruneihaveconflictingsovereigntyclaims. Itis noticeable that the current military modernisation and transformation programs contain elements of a naval arms race embedded in competitive rather than cooperativemaritimestrategies. 6.Increasingsalienceoftransnationalissues.AllASEANstatesstressthesalienceofnon traditionalsecurityissuesasamajorfactorshapingtheregionalsecurityenvironment. Because nontraditional security issues are transnational in nature and beyond the ability of any state to resolve, they are more amenable to multilateral cooperative security approaches. It is unsurprising, then, that Southeast Asian states have given prioritytosecuritycooperationtoaddressnontraditionalthreats. Itisdebatablewhethereachandeverynontraditionalissueshouldbesecuritizedand treated as a threat to national security. Submissions to the ARFs Annual Security Outlook2009,forexample,identifiedtwelvenontraditionalsecuritythreats:terrorism, piracy,transnationalcrime,smallarmsandlightweaponssmuggling,moneylaundering, drugtrafficking,peoplesmuggling,illegalmigration,illegallogging,illegalfishing,avian influenzaandswineflu,andclimatechange. The extent to which the armed forces, as distinct from law enforcement, customs, immigrationandpublichealthofficials,shouldbeinvolvedinaddressingnontraditional issues is a matter of debate within individual countries. But it is clear from evolving trends that armed forces will be increasingly involved in addressing these security challenges, especially in responding to largescale natural disasters, terrorism, and piracyandarmedrobberyatsea. 7. Persistence of everyday domestic security challenges. At least seven of Southeast Asias eleven states are affected by domestic security challenges of varying orders of magnitude in which violence has been used to advance the interests of a particular groupornonstateactor.Inrecentyears,Malaysia,Indonesia,LaosandVietnamhave allexperiencedsporadicoutbreaksofsectarianorethnicviolence.Attheotherendof the scale, Thailand, Myanmar and the Philippines continue to experience political instability and ethnonationalistinsurgency,ethnicconflict,andcommunistinsurgency and armed separatism, respectively. Cambodia and Thailand were embroiled in an

unseemlylowlevelconflictoverdisputedlandsurroundingatemplecomplexontheir border. These everyday domestic security challenges will persist over the next decade. The ongoing conflicts in southern Thailand and the southern Philippines, and the unstable domestic political situation in Myanmar, if unaddressed, all have the potential to spill overandaffectthesecurityofneighbouringstates.Humanrightsabusesandviolations ofreligiousfreedominstatesexperiencingdomesticstriferaisethequestionofwhether humanitarian intervention might be invoked if a state fails to meet its obligation to protectitscitizens. 8. Evolution of the Regions Security Architecture. From the very inception of the ARF, ASEAN has insisted on being in the drivers seat. Nearly eighteen years after its foundation, the ARF remains a security dialogue forum that primarily advances confidencebuilding measures (CBMs) on the basis of consensus and at a pace comfortabletoallitsmembers.Thishasledtotheinitiationofadhocefforts,suchas theProliferationSecurityInitiative,tocounterpossibleproliferationrelatedtrafficking, andtheShangriLaDialoguetodiscussspecificsecuritychallenges. Southeast Asia lacks an overarching security body to effectively address the range of currentandemergingsecuritychallenges.InordertomaintainitscentralityASEANhas setforitselfthegoalofcreatinganASEANCommunityby2015basedonthreepillars, one of which is the Political Security Community pillar. In 2010 the ASEAN Defence MinistersMeeting(ADMM)heldthefirstmeetingwithitseightdialoguepartners.The ADMMPluswillmeetnextin2013andthenannuallythereafter.Therecentexpansion of the East Asia Summit to include the Russian Federation and the United States may emerge as an overarching body to manage regional security issues. This development may result in tensions between ASEANs assertion of its centrality and the leadership roleplayedbymajorpowers.

ChinasMilitaryTransformation
Chinas military transformation is the product of several factors. First, Chinas spectacular economic rise has provided the basis for increased defence spending that hasledinturntothemodernizationofallmilitaryservices.Second,Chinaisfixatedon Taiwan and national reunification and therefore seeks to develop antiaccess/area denialcapabilitiesbeyondthefirsttothesecondislandchaintoforestallinterventionby theUnitedStatesinTaiwancontingencies.4Third,Chinasrisehasraisedthesalienceof protecting its major SLOCs from the Gulf of Arabia to its eastern seaboard. Fourth,
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The first island chain refers to the line of islands that runs northsouth from the Kuriles, Japan, the Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Indonesia. The second island chain extends further east of Chinas coast and includes a line running northsouth from the Kuriles through Japan, the Bonins, the Marianas, the Carolines, and Indonesia. The first second island chain embraces an area 1,800 nautical milesfromChinascoastandincludesmostoftheEastChinaSeaandEastAsianSLOCs.

Chinese resource nationalism has raised the importance of the South China Sea with respecttooil,gasandmineralresourcesandsovereigntyclaims.Fifth,asChinabecomes aglobalpowerwithwidespreadeconomicandpoliticalinterests,itwillneedtodevelop abluewaternavytoprotectitsinterestsfurtherafield. Several of the factors promoting Chinas military buildup intersect with respect to Southeast Asias maritime domain and the South China Sea in particular. This is most evident in the modernization of the South Seas Fleet and the construction of a major naval base at Yalong Bay on Hainan Island. Yalong is located on the southern coast of Hainan on the upper reaches of the South China Sea. The South Seas Fleet has the important mission of securing the Strait of Qiongzhou to protect southern China and HainanIsland. ThefacilitiesatYalongBayincludepiers,docksandundergroundsubmarinepens.The PLANstationsseveralmajorsurfacecombatants,amphibiouslandingcraft,conventional submarines,andasinglenuclearsubmarineatYalong.Continuedconstructionindicates thatYalongwillbeabletoaccommodatelargersurfacecombatantssuchasassaultships andeventuallyoneormoreaircraftcarriers. Chinaregularlyconductsmajornavalexercisestoshowcasethegrowingprowessofthe PLAN.Chinaconductedthreemajornavalexercisesin2010andonemajorexercisein 2011relatedtotheSouthChinaSea.5ThefirstexercisewasheldinearlyApril2010and involvedthelongrangedeploymentofsixteenwarshipsfromthePLANdrawnfromthe NorthSea,EastSeaandSouthSeaFleets.ThePLANflotillasailedpastOkinawathrough the Bashi Channel and conducted live firing exercises north of the Philippines before steamingtowardtheMalaccaStraits.UpuntilthisexerciseChinasSouthSeaFleetwas theonlyfleettooperateintheSouthChinaSea. ThesecondnavalexercisewasconductedinlateJuly2010.Itwasthelargestofitskind and once again involved ships from the North Sea, East Sea and South Sea Fleets. At leastadozenwarshipstookpartincludingallfourSovremennydestroyersfromtheEast SeaFleet,aswellasthemostmodernshipsinthePLANorderofbattlesuchastheType 051CLuzhou,Type052BLuyangI,Type052CLuyangII,Type054AJiangkaiII,andKilo classsubmarines.JH7/7Afighterbombersprovidedaircover.Thisexercisewasnotable for the Chinese media coverage of live missile firings and the presence of senior commandersfromtheCentralMilitaryCommissionandthePLAChiefofStaff,General ChenBingde.6

The PLAN conducted a naval exercise in early July 2010 in response to a combined United States RepublicofKoreanavalexerciseintheYellowSea.
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PLA Navy Conducts liveammunition training in South China Sea, Xinhua, July 29, 2010 and China conductsnavaldrillinSouthChinaSea,AgenceFrancePresse,July30,2010.InAugust2010,aChinese submersiblevesselplantedaChineseflagatbottomofSouthChinaSeatodemonstratesovereignty.

InNovember2010thePLAMarineCorpsheldthethirdmajorexercise,Jiaolong2010,in the South China Sea. This exercise involved more than 100 ships, submarines and aircraft and 1,800 marines. According to military analyst Li Jie, the exercises were conductedpartlyinresponsetotheinterventionofunnamedcountriesinrecenttimes, soitstimetoopposethoseinterventionswithpowerpolitics.7 More recently, in November 2011, China conducted naval exercises in the Western Pacific. Japanese defence sources reported that six ships an intelligence collector, threeguidedmissilefrigatesandtwosupplyshipspassedthroughthewatersbetween OkinawaandMiyakoislandson2223November.8 These four PLAN exercises were viewed as a demonstration by China that it was now capable of deploying beyond the first island chain to the second. The implications are clear:ChinaisdevelopingthecapacitytosustainlargernavaldeploymentsintheSpratly archipelagoandfurthersouthforlongerperiods. ThedevelopmentofanavalbaseinYalongBayhasstrategicimplicationsforthebalance of power in the region. Analysis of construction activities indicates Yalong will be capable of housing nuclear submarines capable of launching intercontinental ballistic missiles. Portions of the base are being built underground to provide facilities that cannotbeeasilymonitored.WhenthesefacilitiesarecompletedtheywillprovideChina withthepotentialcapabilitytostationasubstantialproportionofitssubmarinebased nucleardeterrentcapabilitiesthere. Satellite imagery has confirmed the presence of a single Chinese Type 094 Jinclass nuclear submarine since late 2007. The Type094 is a secondgeneration nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) and represents Chinas most lethal naval strikeweapon.UpuntilnowallnuclearsubmarineswereunderthecommandofChinas NorthSeaFleet.ThismarksthefirstpermanentdeploymenttoChinasSouthSeaFleet. According to the U.S. Defense Department five more Chinese SSBNs are expected to becomeoperationalincomingyears.YalongBayisexpectedtobecomethehomebase forChinasJinclasssubmarineforce.ThereisevenspeculationthatChinamightcreate afourthfleetbasedinHainan. Chinasmostmodernstrategicnuclearsubmarineisnotyetfullyoperationalbutwhenit isthesubmarineisexpectedtocarrytwelveSeaLaunchedBallisticMissiles.Thisclassof submarine will be even more potent if China succeeds in equipping the missiles with multiplewarheads.Chinesenuclearsubswillbeabletopatrolandfirefromconcealed positions in deep waters off Hainan island if China can develop the necessary operationalskills.
7 8

MichaelWines,ChinaStagesNavalExercises,TheNewYorkTimes,November3,2010.

Xinhua,ChinaannouncesnavaldrillsamidSouthChinaSeatensions,TheEconomicTimes,November 23,2011;CameronStewart,ChinaraisestensionwithPacificwargames,TheAustralian,November25, 2011;andWuZhong,ChinasnavydeliversThanksgivingspoiler,AsiaTimesOnline,November29,2011.

At the same time, China has extended the airfield on Woody Island in the Paracel islands, consolidated its facilities at Fiery Cross Reef in the Spratly archipelago, and maintains a continuing naval presence at Mischief Reef off the west coast of the Philippines. In sum, China has developed an enhanced capability to exercise its sovereignty claims overtheSouthChinaSeaandprotectitsvitalSLOCsthroughtheMalaccaandSingapore Straits as well as the capacity to surge expeditionary forces into the South China Sea from these bases with a considerably shortened logistics tail. By extension, China will alsohavethecapacitytointerdictthesameSLOCsonwhichJapan,Taiwan andSouth Koreaaredependent.ThesedevelopmentsportendagreaterChinesecapacitytoassert regionalleadershipandtochallengeU.S.militarysupremacy. The deployment of nuclear submarines, including ballistic missile submarines, has introduced a new geostrategic dimension to the regional balance of power. Chinese nuclearsubmarinedeploymentswillattractthecontinuingattentionoftheU.S.Navyin conducting military survey/intelligence gathering in the waters off Hainan.9 New developmentsinU.S.militarytechnologywillseetheintroductionofmoresophisticated underseadronesandunmannedsystemsforintelligencegathering,reconnaissanceand surveillance such as Large Diameter Unmanned Underwater Vehicles and Persistent LittoralUnderseaSurveillanceSystems.AccordingtoMarkValencia,thedeploymentof thesenewsystemswillgeneratetensionsandmorefrequentcrises;theywillproduce defensive reactions and escalatory dynamics; and they will lead to less stability in the mostaffectedregions,especiallyinAsia.10

RegionalNavalModernisation
Chinasrapidmilitarymodernization,coupledwithitsassertivebehaviourintheSouth China Sea, has led several Southeast Asian states to undertake force modernization programsoftheirownaimedatdevelopingantiaccess/areadenialcapabilitiesdirected against China. This section will reviews developments in the Philippines, Vietnam and elsewhereintheregion. The Philippines. In 1995 the Philippines passed into law The Armed Forces ModernizationActwiththeaimofmodernizingtheAFPinfifteenyearswithatotalfund of Pesos 331 billion. The Philippines Congress failed to follow through and the Armed ForcesofthePhilippines(AFP)wasstarvedoffunds.
9

MarkValencia,TheImpeccableIncident:TruthandConsequences,ChinaSecurity,5(2),Spring2009, 24.
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MarkJ.Valencia,TheSouthChinaSea,MilitaryActivitiesandtheLawoftheSea,Paperpresentedto the International Conference on Major Law and Policy Issues in the South China Sea: European and AmericanPerspectives,cosponsoredbytheInstituteofEuropeanandAmericanStudiesandtheCenter forAsiaPacificStudies,AcademiaSinica,Taipei,Taiwan,October78,2011.

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In2011,inresponsetoChineseassertivenessinitsEEZandKalayaanIslandGroup,the Philippinesdrewupanewdefencestrategyfocusedonbothinternalsecurityoperations and external territorial defence. The Aquino Administration allocated P11 billion to supportforcemodernisationoftheArmedForcesofthePhilippines(AFP).Ofthisfigure P8billionwillcomefromtheproceedsoftheMalampayaNaturalGasandPowerProject and the remaining P3 billion will come from the AFPs current modernisation funds.11 Starting in 2012, the government will implement a fiveyear modernization program totallingP40billion(orP8billionannually). InMarch2011,AFPChiefofStaffGeneralEduardoObanannouncedplanstoupgrade Rancudo Air Field on PagAsa island.12 Two months later a Philippine navy study recommended the acquisition of submarines as a deterrent against future potential conflicts.13InSeptember2011,immediatelyafterPresidentBenignoAquinosstatevisit toBeijing,heannouncedthat4.95billionpesos(US$118million)wouldbeallocatedto top up the defence budget.14 These funds were earmarked for the purchase a naval patrol vessel, six helicopters and other military equipment in order to secure the MalampayaprojectlocatedindisputedwatersoffthecoastofPalawan. The Philippines has taken delivery of a former U.S. Coast Guard Weather Endurance Cutter (rechristened Gregario del Pilar) and will assign it to operate from Palawan in WesternCommandwiththemissionofprotectingthePhilippinesEEZ.Theshipwillbe fittedwithmoremodernradarsystemsandconsiderationisbeinggiventoequipitwith antiship missiles. The Philippines also expects to take delivery of three new Taiwan manufacturedMultiPurposeAttackCraftandprocuretwoadditionalU.S.CoastGuard Cutters.15 In September 2011, during President Aquinos visit to Tokyo, he and Prime Minister Nodaagreedtostrengthenmaritimesecuritytiesbyholdingfrequenthighleveldefence discussionsandbysteppingupcooperationbetweentheirCoastGuardsanddefence relatedauthorities.PrimeMinisterNodaagreedtoincreasetheinvolvementofJapans CoastGuardintrainingtheirFilipinocounterparts.16 At present Philippines officials have floated a wish list of new equipment including: coastalradar,longrangepatrolaircraft,strategicsealiftvessels,offshorepatrolboats,
11 12 13

AlexisRomero,SubmarineforNavy?NoybaresAFPshoplist,ThePhilippineStar,August24,2011. JaimeLaude,AFPtomaintainpresenceinSpratlys,ThePhilippineStar,March29,2011.

Katherine Evangelista, Philippines eye submarines to boost navy, Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 17, 2001.TheprospectofthePhilippinesacquiringsubmarinesisveryunlikely.
14 15

AgenceFrancePresse,PhilippinesUpsSpendingToGuardSouthChinaSea,September7,2011.

Reuters, Philippines says will spend $255 min on military helicopters, boats, April 13, 2011 and AgenceFrancePresse,PhilippineshopesseadisputewithChinashouldease,September3,2011.
16

Yore Koh, Tokyo and Manila Strengthen Defense Ties with an Eye Toward China, The Wall Street Journal,September28,2011.

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naval helicopters, air defence radar, six jet trainers, surface attack aircraft, antiship missiles,andasubmarine.17FollowingavisitbySouthKoreasPresidentLeeMyungbak to Manila in November 2011, President Aquino announced that the Philippines would purchase military equipment form Seoul. The Department of National Defense was reportedtobedrawingupalistincludingaircraft,helicopters,boatsandothermilitary equipment. Vietnam.In2009,inamajordevelopment,Vietnamannouncedthatitwouldprocuresix conventionaldieselpoweredKiloclasssubmarinesfromRussia.Thesearescheduledto be delivered in 2014. They are expected to be based at facilities to be constructed by RussiaatCamRanhBay.TheKiloclasssubmarinesarelikelytobeequippedwithsea skimming3M54Klubantishipmissileswitharangeof300kilometres.18 In2011Vietnamsteppedupitsforcemodernizationprogramwhenittookdeliveryof four additional Su30MK2 multirole jet fighters. These are expected to be equipped withtheKh59MKantishipcruisemissilewitharangeof115km.Vietnamcurrentlyhas on order sixteen more Su30MK2 jet fighters.19 Vietnam also took delivery of two GephardclassguidedmissilefrigatesarmedwithKh35Eantishipmissileswitharange of130kmandtwoSvetlyakclassmissilePatrolBoats.20Inaddition,Vietnamlaunched its first indigenously built gunship.21 In October, while on a tour of the Netherlands, PrimeMinisterNguyenTanDunggavehisapprovalforthepurchaseoffourSigmaclass corvettes,twoofwhichareslatedforconstructioninVietnam.22 In 2011, Vietnam beefed up it landbased coastal defences by acquiring its second Bastion landbased antiship ballistic missile system. Vietnam reportedly has also acquiredIsraeliExtendedRangeArtilleryMunitionsaballisticmissileeffectivebeyond 150 km. In October 2011, during President Truong Tan Sangs visit to New Delhi, the local media reported that India was prepared to sell Vietnam its BrahMos supersonic cruise missile.23 President Sang requested Indian assistance in four areas: submarine training,conversiontrainingforpilotstoflySukhoi30s,transferofmediumsizedpatrol
17 18

AlexisRomero,SubmarineforNavy?NoybaresAFPshoplist,ThePhilippineStar,August24,2011.

The author would like to thank Robert Karniol for an advance copy of his Vietnams Strategic Challenge,TheStraitsTimes(forthcoming).
19 20

RussiatosupplyVietnamsixsubmarinesin2014,ThanhNienNews,July3,2011.

RussiaexportsaircrafttoVietnam,TheVoiceofRussia,June22,2011;BBC,HaiquanVietNamnhan tauchienNga,August24,2011;RussiadeliverssecondcoastalmissilesystemtoVietnam,InterfaxAVN militarynewsagency,October11,2011;andBBC,NgagiaotiephaitautuantrachoVN,October25, 2011.


21 22 23

BBC,VietNamtudongtauchien,October3,2011. BBC,VNdamphanmua4tauchiencuaHaLan,October18,2011.

Robert Johnson, India is Preparing To Sell BahMos Supersonic Cruise Missiles to Vietnam, Business Insider,September20,2011.

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boats,andmodernizationofportfacilitiesatNhaTrang.24 In November 2011, Vietnam announced a $3.3 billion defence budget for 2012, a reported rise of 35% over 2010.25 According to IHS Janes Vietnams annual naval procurementbudgethasincreasedby150%since2008toUS$276millionin2011.The budgetisprojectedtoriseto$400millionby2015.26 Regional. According to one noted regional security analyst, naval acquisitions in Asia havebecomeespeciallydisturbing,withundeniablesignsofactionreactiondynamics, and Northeast Asia in particular is witnessing an emerging naval arms race.27 In Southeast Asia the conventional submarine has been the new hallmark of naval acquisitions.Defenceanalystsestimatethat86submarineswillbeaddedtothefleetsin theAsiaPacificby2020ofwhich30willbeChinese.28ThisprospecthasledAustralia, Malaysia,thePhilippines,SingaporeandtheUnitedStatestostepupinvestmentintheir antisubmarine warfare capabilities. Security analysts warn that the proliferation of submarine fleets may be destabilizing in times of tensions and crises due to the complexitiesofcommandandcontrol. Vietnams purchase of Kiloclass submarines is part of a regional trend in naval modernisation. China has the largest submarine fleet (more than sixty) and most extensiveplanstoexpanditsnumbersincludingtheType095nuclearattacksubmarine (SSN)andType094(JINclass)nuclearpoweredballisticmissilesubmarine(SSBN).China isexpectedtobasebothattackandballisticmissilesubmarinesatYulinNavalBaseon HainanIsland.

24 25 26

SandeepDikshit,VietnamspleaputSouthBlockinapredicament,TheHindu,November9,2011. TreforMoss,ChineseAftershock,TheDiplomat,November26,2011.

AgenceFrancePresse,ChinatensionsstokeVietnamnavalambitions,TheEconomicTimes,November 14,2011.
27

Desmond Ball, Asias Naval Arms Race, Paper presented to the 25 AsiaPacific Roundtable, ISIS Malaysia,KualaLumpur,May29June1,2011.
28

th

IHS Janes quoted by Sabine Pirone, Chinas Pacific Push Spurs U.S. Spending on AntiSub Warfare, BusinessWeek,November25,2011.

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Indonesia,thefirstcountryinSoutheastAsiatoacquiresubmarines,hasindicateditwill replacethemwithnewerSouthKoreanmodels.Indonesiareportedlywillboostdefence spendingby35%in2012.29 SingaporehasupgradeditssubmarinefleettoincludetwoArcherclasssubmarines.The first of which, the RSS Archer, was commissioned in December 2011.30 Singapore reportedlyisalsointhemarketforfourorfiveP3COrionmaritimepatrolaircraft.31 Malaysia has acquired two Scorpeneclass submarines. Both the Singaporean and MalaysiansubmarinesareequippedwithAirIndependentPropulsionsystems. Thailandiscurrentlyconsideringacquiringitsownconventionalsubmarines. Australias 2009 Defence White Paper set out plans to construct twelve new conventionalsubmarines.Recently,itwasreportedthatvisitingU.S.Navyofficialshave repeatedlyraisedtheissueofthelackofavailabilityofAustraliastroubledCollinsclass submarines, as well as the lack of progress on Australias planned new class of submarines. This pressure has prompted the Gillard Government to place the matter beforeCabinet.32 Regional force modernization has and will continue to result in the introduction of increasednumbersofwarshipsequippedwithnewtechnologiesandweaponssystems. A recent review of regional force modernization over the last decade highlights the introductionofnewcapabilitiessuchasstandoffprecisionstrike,longrangeairborne and undersea attack, stealth, mobility and expeditionary warfare and, above all, new capacities when it comes to greatly improved command, control communications, computing, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) networks.33 This review concludes that new types of armaments promise to significantly upgrade and modernize the manner of war fighting in the region [and] fundamentally change the conceptandconductofwarfare.34 AccordingtoViceAdmiralScottSwift,CommanderU.S.SeventhFleet,hisprimeconcern is not the outbreak of a major conflict but any tactical trigger with strategic implicationsIdohaveconcernsaboutaspecificbrushupthatcouldresultinatactical
29 30 31 32 33

StepVaessen,Indonesiatoincreasemilitaryspending,AlJazeera.net,November7,2011. JermynChow,RSSArchersubmarinenowoperational,TheStraitsTimes,December3,2011. CraigHoyle,SingaporeinterestedinexUSNavyP3s,FlightGlobal,December15,2011. JohnKerin,GillardbowstoUSonsubmarines,TheAustralianFinancialReview,November24,2011.

Richard A. Bitzinger, A New Arms Race? Explaining Recent Southeast Asian Military Acquisitions, ContemporarySoutheastAsia,31(1),April2010,6364.
34

Richard A. Bitzinger, A New Arms Race? Explaining Recent Southeast Asian Military Acquisitions, ContemporarySoutheastAsia,31(1),April2010,64.

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miscalculation35 In sum, regional sea lanes are set to become more crowded, contestedandvulnerabletoarmedstrife.36

UnitedStatesRegionalEngagement
Oncomingtoofficein2009,ObamaAdministrationofficialsquicklydeclaredthatthe UnitedStatesisbackinAsia.TheUnitedStatesaccededtotheASEANTreatyofAmity and Cooperation, appointed a permanent ambassador to the ASEAN Secretariat and revivedtheannualASEANUnitedStatesleadersmeeting.WhenChineseassertiveness intheSouthChinaSearaisedregionalsecurityconcerns,boththeU.S.SecretaryofState and Secretary of Defense declared that the United States had a national interest in safetyofnavigationandoverflightintheSouthChinaSea. Morerecently,theUnitedStatesalsohasannouncedthatwithitswithdrawalfromIraq and eventual withdrawal from Afghanistan, it will pivot to the AsiaPacific and quarantine defence cuts from the Pacific Commands Area of Responsibility. The heightened importance of the AsiaPacific was underscored in January 2012 with the releaseofanewnationaldefensestrategy,SustainingU.S.GlobalLeadership:Priorities for21stCenturyDefense.Thisdocumentstated:
U.S. economic and security interests are inextricably linked to developments in the arc extending fromtheWesternPacificandEastAsiaintotheIndianOceanregionandSouthAsiacreatingamixof evolvingchallengesandopportunities.Accordingly,whiletheU.S.militarywillcontinuetocontribute to security globally, we will of necessity rebalance toward the AsiaPacific region. Our relationships withAsianalliesandkeypartnersarecriticaltothefuturestabilityandgrowthoftheregion.Wewill emphasize our existing alliances, which provide a vital foundation for AsiaPacific security. We will expand our networks of cooperation with emerging partners throughout the AsiaPacific to ensure 37 collectivecapabilityandcapacityforsecuringcommoninterests[emphasisinoriginal].

The United States has responded to Chinas naval buildup and development of anti access/area denial capabilities by strengthening its posture on Guam, stepping up weapons and equipment sales to the Philippines, negotiating new arrangements with Australia giving the U.S. greater access to training facilities near Darwin, and basing CombatLittoralShipsinSingapore.38
35

QuotedbyStephenCoates,USPacificcommanderwarnsoftacticalerrors,TheChinaPost,November 10,2011.AdmiralSmithalsonotedthatheexpecteddiplomacytoprevailintheeventofabrushupand compromisetoprevail.


36

RoryMedcalfandRaoulHeinrichs,CrisisandConfidence:MajorPowersandMaritimeSecurityinIndo PacificAsia(Sydney:LowyInstituteforInternationalPolicy,June2011),3andSamBateman,Solvingthe WickedProblemsofMaritimeSecurity:AreRegionalForumsuptotheTask?,ContemporarySoutheast Asia,33(1),2011,1517.


37 38

SustainingU.S.GlobalLeadership:Prioritiesfor21 CenturyDefense(January2012),2.

st

CraigWhitlock,NavysnextstopinAsiawillsetChinaonedge,CheckpointWashington,November18, 2011

15

IndirectresponsetoChinesenavalmodernisation,theU.S.alsohasdeployedthirtyone ofitsfiftythreefastattacksubmarinestothePacificandsteppedupitsantisubmarine warfareprogram.EighteenoftheU.S.subsarehomeportedinPearlHarbor;theothers arebasedinGuam.39Additionally,theUnitedStateshasalsodeployedthreeOhioclass nuclearsubmarinestotheAsiaPacificIndianOceanregion.Eachhasbeenmodifiedto carry 154 conventional Tomahawk cruise missiles. In late Juneearly July 2010, in a calculateddemonstrationofnavalpower,theUSSFlorida,USSMichigan,andUSSOhio submarines, simultaneously surfaced in Diego Garcia (Indian Ocean), Busan (South Korea) and Subic Bay (the Philippines), respectively.40 The United States has stationed thefifthgenerationRaptoraircraftinHawaii. Finally, the United States is developing an airsea battle concept to counter Chinas developmentofareadenial/antiaccesscapabilities.Theairseabattleconceptisbeing drawn up to enable the United States to prevail in conflicts where areadenial/anti accesscapabilitiesarewelldeveloped.AccordingtothenewU.S.defensestrategyone of the ten main missions for U.S. armed forces is to project power despite anti access/areadenialchallenges.41InresponsetoChinasuseofasymmetriccapabilities, including electronic and cyber warfare, ballistic and cruise missiles, advanced air defences,miningandothermethods,tocomplicateouroperationalcalculus,theU.S. military
willinvestasrequiredtoensureitsabilitytooperateeffectivelyinantiaccessandareadenial(A2/AD) environments. This will include implementing the Joint Operational Access Concept, sustaining our underseacapabilities,developinganewstealthbomber,improvingmissiledefenses,andcontinuing efforts to enhance the resiliency and effectiveness of critical spacebased capabilities [emphasis in 42 original].

At the same time the United States has repeatedly sought to engage with China to manage their relations. The U.S. and China currently have in place fortyeight mechanismsforcoordinationandcollaborationonstrategicpolicyissues.43TheObama AdministrationhassoughttomanageitsrelationswithChinathroughnewmechanisms suchastheStrategicandEconomicDialogueandtherecentlyestablishedConsultations on AsiaPacific Affairs. The Pentagon consistently has sought to keep channels of communication open with China through their joint Military Maritime Consultative
39 40

OyaolNgirainki,GuamGetsNewSubBuildings,NavyTimes,July21,2010.

U.S. Posts Pictures of Nuclear Sub in Show of Force, The Chosun Ilbo, July 8, 2010 and Mark Thompson,U.S.MissilesDeployedNearChinaSendaMessage,TimeMagazine,July8,2010.
41 42 43

SustainingU.S.GlobalLeadership:Prioritiesfor21 CenturyDefense(January2012),4. SustainingU.S.GlobalLeadership:Prioritiesfor21 CenturyDefense(January2012),45.


st

st

Bonnie Glasser and Brittany Billingsley, USChina Relations: Friction and Cooperation Coexist Uneasily,ComparativeConnections,September2011.

16

Council(established1998,suspendedbyChinain2001andresumedinFebruary2009) andotherbilateraldefencemechanisms. TheObamaAdministrationsnewdefensestrategystateswithrespecttoChina:


Overthelongterm,ChinasemergenceasaregionalpowerwillhavethepotentialtoaffecttheU.S. economyandoursecurityinavarietyofways.Ourtwocountrieshaveastrongstakeinpeaceand stability in East Asia and an interest in building a cooperative bilateral relationship. However, the growthofChinasmilitarypowermustbeaccompaniedbygreaterclarityofitsstrategicintentionsin 44 ordertoavoidcausingfrictionintheregion.

Nevertheless it is clear that continued U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and U.S. intelligence gathering in Chinas Exclusive Economic Zone remain major irritants. In addition, U.S. diplomatic intervention in the South China Sea issue has provoked a negative if not hostile reaction by China. Tensions in ChinaU.S. relations have been transmitted to SoutheastAsia.ManilaandWashingtonhavebreathednewlifeintotheir1951Mutual Defense Treaty through arms and equipment sales and military exercises. The United States and Vietnam have stepped up defence cooperation activities to include a new senior leaders dialogue, signing of a Memorandum of Understanding on defence cooperationandtheinitiationoflowlevelnavalexchangeactivities.Chinahascriticized U.S.Philippines naval exercises as untimely and warned both Manila and Hanoi that theyareplayingwithfirebyencouragingU.S.intervention.ChinaviewstheU.S.asan outsidepowerwhoseinterventionwillonlycomplicatematters.

ChallengestoFutureSecurityCooperation
There are four major interrelated security challenges that confront the AsiaPacific region: how to prevent disputes in the South China Sea from erupting into armed incidents;howtomanagemajorpowerrivalryandpreventitfrompolarizingtheregion; how to prevent force modernization from destabilizing regional security; and how to improve the capacity of regional security architecture to deal with traditional security issues East Asias security architecture is in a state of flux. Six major multilateral mechanism have been created that could facilitate regional cooperation in addressing maritime securityissues.Theseare:
44

ASEANRegionalForumInterSessionalMeeting(ISM)onMaritimeSecurity ADMMprocess ADMMPlusprocess ASEANChinaagreementofGuidelinestoImplementtheDOC ExpansionoftheEastAsiaSummittoincludetheUnitedStatesandRussia


st

SustainingU.S.GlobalLeadership:Prioritiesfor21 CenturyDefense(January2012),2.

17

ASEANMaritimeForum

In2009theASEANRegionalForumestablishedtheISMonMaritimeSecurity.The44th ASEANMinisterialMeetingapprovedtheWorkPlanfortheISMonMaritimeSecurityin July2011.45TheWorkPlanfocusesmainlyoninformationsharing,capacitybuilding,and training. InMay2006,ASEANDefenceMinistersmetforthefirsttimeandbegantheprocessof institutionalizing defence cooperation on a regional basis. They approved a structure includingasubordinateASEANDefenceSeniorOfficialsMeeting(ADSOM).TheADSOM in turn oversees a structure involving ASEAN service chiefs (army, navy and air) and heads of intelligence. The ASEAN Defence Ministers now form part of the ASEAN PoliticalSecurityCouncilestablishedunderASEANsCharter.Atthe4thADMMinMay 2010, it was agreed that ASEAN navies would cooperate to patrol their maritime boundaries.Asnotedabovewithrespecttonavychiefs,progressonpracticalactivities toaddresssecuritychallengesisatanascentstage. At the inaugural meeting of the ADMM Plus in October 2010, the ministers approved the establishment of five Expert Working Groups: maritime security, humanitarian assistanceanddisasterrelief,counterterrorism,peacekeepingoperations,andmilitary medicine. Each group is to be cochaired by an ASEAN and nonASEAN member. The terms of reference for these Expert Working Groups were approved in October 2011. The Expert Working Groups will report their deliberations to the ADMM Plus Senior OfficialsMeeting.Progressonaddressingsecurityissuesislikelytoremainslowbecause the 2nd ADMM Plus meeting is not scheduled until 2013. It is possible, however, that ADMMPlusministerswillmeetonanannualbasisthereafter. In July 2011, China and ASEAN member states adopted Guidelines to Implement the DOC.TheysetuptheASEANChinaJointWorkingGrouptoImplementtheseGuidelines. China is scheduled to host the first meeting in January 2012.46 This process holds the promise that confidencebuilding measures included in the 2002 DOC may now be adopted and implemented. In November 2011, in a separate process, ASEAN Senior Officials began discussions on what activities and projects to include in a Code of Conduct for the South China Sea. Once agreement is reached, the draft COC will be presented to China to determine what, when, where and how the project would be

45

ASEANRegionalForum,DraftOutlineofaWorkPlanonMaritimeSecurity:ATemplateforDiscussion, nd 2 ARFISMonMaritimeSecurity,Auckland,March2931,2010;CoChairsSummaryoftheThirdARF th InterSessional Meeting on Maritime Security, Tokyo, Japan, 1415 February 2011; and 44 th th AM/PMC/18 ARF, Indonesia 2011, Chairs Statement, 18 ASEAN Regional Forum, 23 July 2011, Bali, Indonesia,Point41.
46

Antonio Siegfrid O. Alegado, ASEAN, China to set ground rules on sea issues in January, Business World,November29,2011.

18

carriedout,accordingtoanIndonesianofficial.47 In 2010 ASEAN established the ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF) under the terms of the ASEANPoliticalSecurityCommunity(APCS)Blueprint.48ThesecondmeetingoftheAMF washeldinThailandinAugust2011andproposedexpandingitsmembershiptoinclude dialogue partners in a separate meeting (or AMF Plus). The AMF is focused on a comprehensiveapproachtomaritimeissuesandhassofarnotdealtwithSouthChina Seaissuesindetail.49 In2011theEastAsiaSummitmetwithanexpandedmembershipincludingtheUnited States and the Russian Federation. At the EAS informal leaders retreat sixteen of the eighteen leaders raised maritime security issues. China was the only dissenting voice arguingthattheEASwasnotanappropriatevenue.NeverthelessIndonesia,asASEAN Chair,notedthatmaritimesecurityhadnowbeenputontheagenda. Each of these six multilateral arrangements holds the promise of contributing to regionalsecuritycooperation.Thereisanobviousoverlapintheirareasofconcernand responsibility. A major step forward in regional cooperation could be made if government leaders could agree that the EAS should be the peak body to oversee regional security cooperation. The next step would be for government leaders to instruct their defence and foreign ministers to propose ways to streamline the work programs of these various subordinate bodies to maximize their effectiveness with a view to ensuring the timely flow of policy advice to senior officials prior to the conveningoftheEastAsianSummit.

ImplicationsforBruneiDarussalam
ThissectionreviewstheimplicationsforBruneioftheeightmajortrendsshapingthe regionalsecurityenvironmentidentifiedinthefirstsection. 1. Global financial and economic crisis. Although Southeast Asia appears to be recovering from the global economic and financial crisis, the current crisis in the Euro zone portends a period of volatility in the capital market. Countries that depend on exports are likely to be affected and see their growth rates decline. In 2010 Bruneis economyshowedsignsofrecoveringafteradeclineingrowthratesin2008and2009. Bruneis economy is projected to average 1.4 percent annual growth to 2015. Brunei, which has made slow progress in diversifying its dependency on oil and gas, may find new opportunities if the price of oil and gas remains high. This may spur new investment in deep offshore drilling. The downside is that increase oil and gas
47 48

Antara,ASEANreadytodiscusscontinuationofdocwithChina,November14,2011.

HanoiPlanofActiontoImplementtheASEANRegionalForumVisionStatement,May20,2010,Point 3.
49

Chairs Statement of the 19 ASEAN Summit, Bali, 17 November 2011, Points 1417 (Maritime Cooperation).

th

19

explorationanddevelopmentintheSouthChinaSeacouldsparktensionsamongstates with overlapping maritime and territorial claims and spill over and affect Bruneis security. 2. Chinas military modernization. Brunei conducts lowkey defence cooperation with China. Bruneis interests would be affected if Chinas naval power projection in the South China Sea was not balanced by the United States. Brunei is relatively insulated frommajorpowerrivalry,butitcouldimpactnegativelyonASEANunityandcohesion. ThesedevelopmentscouldimpactduringBruneistenureasASEANChair.Bruneiwould havetodecidewhethertoplaytheroleofconsensusmakerwithinafrayedASEANorbe moreproactiveinexertingleadershipfollowingtheexamplesofpastChairs,Indonesia (2011)andVietnam(2012) 3.UnitedStatessteppedupengagement.BruneissecuritywillbeenhancedastheU.S. rebalancesitsmilitarytotheAsiaPacific.Thiscouldlead,however,togreaterpressures onBruneitoplayalargerroleinU.S.theaterengagementactivities. 4. Increased arms procurements. The impact of force modernization programs in the region could introduce an actionreaction arms cycle as newer and more lethal technologiesmaketheirappearance.ThiscouldcomplicateBruneisdefenceplanningas power relativities change. These developments also raised the question of defence spending. Bruneis defence spending has steadily declined since 2004 and the introductionofnewtechnologiesintheregionwillputpressureonBruneitofollowsuit. 5. Heightened importance of the maritime domain. Brunei will have an enhanced interestinbeingabletoexertjurisdictionoveritsExclusiveEconomicZoneandprotect itsoffshoreoilplatforms.ThisisnotanewrequirementandBruneiseemswellplaced with the recent acquisition of four German manufactured UHTIHADclass patrol boats and two offshore patrol vessels. Brunei will need to develop cooperation with neighbouringstates. 6. Increasing salience of transnational issues. These are continuing security concerns that do not pose a major direct threat to Brunei. But Brunei must be ever vigilant in counteringarms,drugandpeopletrafficking;fisheriespoaching;andpiracy.Bruneiwill haveacontinuingrequirementtoensuretheintegrityofitslandandmaritimeborders. 7.Persistenceofeverydaydomesticsecuritychallenges.Bruneidoesnotfaceany majorinternalsecuritychallenges.ButBruneimustkeepwatchonsignsofdomestic instabilityandextremisminneighbouringstatesandtheirpossiblespillovereffects. 8. Evolution of the Regions Security Architecture. Bruneis 2011 Defense White Paper noted, incidents testing the strength of the emerging powers cannot be ruled out. A

20

stable relationship amongst the major powers is essential in ensuring the continued economicprogressanddevelopmentforthewiderAsiaPacificregion.50 In2013,BruneiwillassumetheChairofASEANandhostaseriesofASEANandASEAN relatedsummits.ASASEANChairin2013,Bruneiwillbechallengedtosupporteffortsto build a stable relationship among the major power, especially China and the United States. Some regional security analysts have already concluded that ASEAN faces a major challenge to its selfproclaimed role as being in the drivers seat with respect to setting the region security agenda. There is wide speculation that ASEAN is about to enterthedoldrumswithaseriesofweak(orlessproactivechairs)chairs:Cambodia (2012),Brunei(2013),Myanmar(2014)andLaos(2015).ClearlyBruneiwillbeplacedat thecentreofsecuritydialogueandconsultationsasASEANseekstocreateaneffective ASEANPoliticalSecurityCommunityaspartoftheASEANCommunityby2015.

50Brunei,DefendingtheNationsSovereignty:ExpandingRolesinWiderHorizons,DefenceWhitePaper

2011,6.

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