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Chapter 7.1 ETCI Barbara MacKinnon Ethics and Contemporary Issues Professor Douglas Olena Philippa Foot (2002)
Thesis One
113 [I]t seems that virtues are, in some general way, benecial. Human beings do not get on well without them. Nobody can get on well if he lacks courage, and does not have some measure of temperance and wisdom.
113 Does the benet of the virtue go to the person with the virtue or to the people who are affected by that person?
Wisdom
115 Wisdom is not cleverness, but rather is related only to good ends and to human life in general. Wisdom is available to any person, not just those with special training or innate cleverness.
Wisdom
115 For the rst part of wisdom, the man who is wise does not merely know how to do good things but must also want to do them. The second part of wisdom, having to do with values, is much harder to describe.
Wisdom
115 What we can see is that one of the things a wise man knows and a foolish man does not is that such things as social position, and wealth, and the good opinion of the world, are too dearly bought at the cost of health or friendship or family ties.
Wisdom
115 So we may say that a man who lacks wisdom has false values, and that vices such as vanity and worldliness and avarice are contrary to wisdom in a special way.
Wisdom
115 Wisdom in this second part is, therefore, partly to be described in terms of apprehension, and even judgment, but since it has to do with a mans attachments it also characterizes his will.
Virtue
116 Virtue is not, like a skill or an art, a mere capacity: it must actually engage the will.
It is at this point that we can see how the concept of natural law and natural rights plays into our discussion of virtue.
She responds by citing Kants philanthropist who though distracted from the purpose of doing charity, nonetheless does it out of duty. This to Foot increases the moral worth of the act.