Philosophy as Extention of Science (coined by M.

Matthen): We have transparently objective methods for the investigation of reality (including moral and aethetic realities) and use them to discover the truth about reality. The only criticism of such transparently objective methods should be with the aim of making them genuinely transparently objective through the use of other (putatively) transparent objective methods. These methods include deductive reasoning, comparing the plausibility of philosophical claims to the plausibility of scientific claims, and the analysis (broadly understood) of common and scientific concepts, on the basis of all information available, including historical and psychological. Philosophy as the Investigation of Normativity: Our best or favored methods for the investigation of reality are not necessarily transparently objective; it is the work of philosophy to investigate the conditions under which we can have grasp of the world in concepts, the conditions under which we can form judgments, and make arguments that are transparently objective. The method of this investigation is often transcendental and does not necessarily aim at settling issues such as whether or not such-and-such a phenomenon is real as would be understood by a practictioner of PES. It can be open to comparing such claims to what we know from the psycho-social, biological, and physical sciences and from conceptual analysis. Examples: Gauthier and Rawls inspired constructivism in moral/political philosophy; quasi-neo-Kantian asperations in the philosophy of science; Brandoms inferentialism; McDowells quietism. Philosophy as Discovery of Reasons Modesty: Our belief in the human capacity to know the world (PES) itself (PIN) itself must be interrogated. We draw on the cognitive and biological sciences, as well as the the study of indeterminacy in texts, the role of power relations in shaping the institutions, discourses, and subjectivities (e.g., the objective scientist) that that PESers and PINers take for granted in their inquiries in studying issues as t, raising doubts about the unity of reason: that its putative unity depends upon unjustly making certain matters irrelevant, that it is insufficiently sensitive to the way in which scientific and philosophical work are texts that themselves open up indeterminacies and other problems undetectable under the work conditions of PIN and PES, and that experimental results about our capacities to reason practically and theoretical supports must more modest claims that PES and PIN would seem to allow. Examples: Derridean work on deconstruction, Foucauldian geneaologies, Freudianism, moves to transcendental empiricism, the strong programme in sociology of science, some of Williams reflections on moral knowledge, practical reasons, and relativity, bounded rationality (a la Kahneman and and ecological rationality (Gigerenzers ABC group).