American Geographical Society

The Mediterranean Problem Author(s): Gordon East Reviewed work(s): Source: Geographical Review, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Jan., 1938), pp. 83-101 Published by: American Geographical Society Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/210568 . Accessed: 29/01/2012 18:33
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THE MEDITERRANEAN
Gordon East
University of London
A

PROBLEM

T the present time, when the Mediterranean problem has

become a "major focal point of international relations and international dispute,"'" it would seem opportune to review the relevant and widely scattered literature of geographical interest. Attention will be centered here mainly on questions of political geography; but it is important to examine first studies within the broad field of regional geography, past and present, which constitute the geographer's chief contribution.
THE GEOGRAPHICAL BACKGROUND

Although much remains to be done to extend our knowledge of the Mediterranean world, the main outlines of its structural, physical, and human history are clearly known, so that it has become possible in recent years to prepare regional syntheses of its constituent parts. Notable advance has been made since I lis6e Reclus2 wrote his geography of Mediterranean countries. The deficiencies in his work would be found to lie chiefly in matters of structure, climate, and geomorphology, and many of his data relating to cultural conditions have, of course, little more than historical value today. Of interest, too, in retrospect, is the presidential address3 given to the Geographical Section of the British Association by Lieutenant Colonel Sir Lambert Playfair in I890. By this time, as Playfair recorded, the major exploration of the Mediterranean world, even including Morocco, was already virtually complete and those scientific investigations were in progress that are necessary as a basis for regional interpretation. Theobald Fischer's pioneer work on the Mediterranean climate had already appeared and was soon followed by his two descriptive studies.4 The first successful attempt to depict the Mediterranean lands as a region, defined by physiography and climate, was Philippson's monograph5 that appeared in 1904. Inevitably he could not treat with equal competence all parts of the basin, but his bold generaliza1 W. L. Langer: Tribulations of Empire: The Mediterranean Problem, Foreign Affairs, Vol. is.

Vol. i, L'Europe meridionale, Paris, I876; Vol. 9, L'Asie ant6rieure, Paris, I884; Vol. iI, L'Afrique septentrionale, Part 2, Paris, I886. 8 Sir Lambert Playfair: The Mediterranean, Physical and Historical, Scottish Geogr. Mag., Vol. 6, reprinted in the Ann. Rept. Smithsonian Instn., 589o, Washington, I89I, pp. 259-276. 1890, pp. 526-541; 4 Theobald Fischer: Studien uber das Klima der Mittelmeerl ander, Petermanns Mitt. Ergainzungsheft No. S8, I879; idem: Mittelmeerbilder: Gesammelte Abhandlungen zur Kunde der Mittelmeerlander, Leipzig and Berlin, I9o6 (2nd edit., under the care of Alfred Rufhl, Leipzig and Berlin, I9I3); idem: Mittelmeerbilder . . . , Neue Folge, Leipzig and Berlin, I908. 6 Alfred Philippson: Das Mittelmeergebiet: Seine geographische und kulturelle Eigenart, Leipzig, 1904; 4th edit., Leipzig and Berlin, I922.

I936-I937, pp. 646-660; reference on p. 660. 2 ltlis6e Reclus: Nouvelle geographie universelle,

83

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THE GEOGRAPHICAL

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tions threw down a challenge to further research. There now exists at least one good regional survey of the Mediterranean lands in English, French, and German. M. I. Newbigin's well known "Southern Europe" (I932) is an authoritative and soundly based study of the peninsulas and most of the islands of the Mediterranean. Dr. Newbigin's work summarizes critically a wide, and chiefly German, literature and calls attention to unsettled problems (for example, in the structural field) and to unfilled gaps. A full account of the Mediterranean region can now be found, too, in the spacious and well illustrated "G6ographie Universelle." Unfortunately, inasmuch as this great work adopts, as its basis, the old continental divisions, the reader must seek his quarry in no fewer than four volumes6 (Vol. 7, Part I contains a valuable introduction to the whole region). Otto Maull's "Landerkunde von Siudeuropa,"7particularly full on Italy and the Balkan Peninsula, is the best German account, but only the strictly European parts of the Mediterranean are included. Finally, Charles Parain's readable and well illustrated book,8 which reviews briefly the particular features of Mediterranean life and its background, may be recommended to those about to study or visit the Mediterranean lands. There is no need to tabulate here the available large-scale maps of Mediterranean countries, since such lists can be found in "Southern Europe." at least for the European peninsulas. There are elaborate atlases of some parts of North Africa, notably Egypt and French North Africa.9 Valuable aid is provided for the geographer by the remarkable air photographs of Mittelholzer'0 and by a useful small volume covering the French Midi." These works bring home vividly to the student who cannot go and see for himself the realities of the Mediterranean landscape, including its vegetation types and its urban patterns. Finally, the three standard surveys noted above contain ample bibliographical guidance to the literature on the various aspects of Mediterranean geography.
6 GCographieUniverselle, publi6e sous la direction de P. Vidal de la Blache et L. Gallois: Vol. 7 (in 2 volS.): M&1iterran6e,P6ninsules mkditerranhennes,Part i, GCn6ralit6s,by Max. Sorre and Jules Sion, Espagne-Portugal, by Max. Sorre; Part 2, Italie, by Jules Sion, Pays balkaniques, by Y. Chataigneau and Jules Sion; Paris, I934. Vol. 8: Asie occidentale, by R. Blanchard; Haute Asie, by F. Grenard; Paris, I929. Vol. ii: Afrique septentrionale et occidentale, Part I, G6ndralit6s, Afrique du Nord, by Augustin Bernard, Paris, 1937. "Otto Maull: Llinderkunde von Sudeuropa (Enzyklop4die der Erdkunde, herausgegeben von Oskar Kende), Leipzig and Vienna, I9s9. Les hommes et leurs travaux, 8th edit., Paris, I936. See 8 Charles Parain: La MWditerran6e: extended review by J. C6l1rier in Hespiris: Archives Berbares et Bull. de l'Insl. des Hautes-Atudes Marocaines, Vol. 24, I937, pp. II9-I30. 9 Atlas of Egypt . . . , Presented to the International Geographical Congress at Cambridge 1928 by Command of His Majesty King Fouad I, Survey of Egypt, Giza, I928; Atlas des colonies francaises, published under the direction of G. Grandidier, Paris, I934. 15 Walter Mittelholzer: Mittelmeerflug, with text by Gustav Ehrhardt, Leipzig, etc., I930. 11Emmanuel de Martonne, with the collaboration of Paul Feyel and Maurice Teissier: egion mkditerran6enne (Les Grandes R6gions de la France . . . : Dix Albums), Paris, I925.

THE MEDITERRANEAN

PROBLEM

85

From a study of the standard works and from maps the geographer's conception of the Mediterranean region takes definite shape. The midland sea and its bordering lands, in their present familiar form, originated only in late Tertiary time, when the former Tethys Sea contracted and the land areas underwent folding, fracturing, and vertical movements. Concurrently with these physical events went changes in climate and a redistribution of vegetation types and animal forms :12 as a result, the stage was set for, and occupied by, human groups. The genesis of the Mediterranean basin in relation to the initial and early phases of human culture has been ably summarized by Professor John L. Myres.'3 The precise limits that should be assigned to the Mediterranean region present a nice academic question. Should physiographic or climatic or other criteria be adopted? Certainly the limits of the Mediterranean climatic type, the "climate of the olive," as the Arab geographer Edrisi called it as early as the twelfth century, do not always correspond, as in Dalmatia and in the Atlas region, to the physical limit presented by the young fold mountains; nor do they include, of course, the more elevated areas in the peninsulas of the basin. But if the boundaries are uncertain, it is abundantly clear that nature has set bold physical frontiers to the Mediterranean region. Oriented toward the midland sea and characterized by a great variety of landforms, the Mediterranean region, in its climate, topography, and, above all, its modes de vie conditioned by the physical environment, contrasts sharply with the surrounding lands, alike of Europe, Africa, and Asia. In the south, in Africa, as in the east, in Arabia, it impinges on unyielding crust blocks and on lands of (hot) desert climate. East of Tunisia, in fact, the African coastlands, which lie much lower in latitude than the western basin, are, with marginal exceptions, Mediterranean only in position, not in structure, climate, or vegetation. Also, if the Mediterranean region is bordered by desert or steppe in Asia Minor, Arabia, and Africa, it is similarly bounded elsewhere by the fold ranges of the Alpid and the Dinarid systems, which enclose it almost completely, so that intercourse has been restricted throughout prehistoric and historical times to a small number of land and water gaps. This aspect of the region has been vividly illuminated by Dr. Ellen Churchill Semple.14 The Mediterranean region, then, is marked by physical detachment, though not by sheer isolation, from the neighboring continental lands. A Grenzraum between Europe, Asia, and Africa, it should be
12See Johannes Walther: Mediterranis, Petermanns Mill. ErganzungsheflNo. 225, 1936 (reviewed in this number of the GeographicalReview). 13J. L. Myres: Primitive Man, in Geological Time, in The Cambridge Ancient History, Vol. x, New York, 1923, pp. I-56; idem: Neolithic and Bronze Age Cultures, ibid., pp. 57-III. 14 E. C. Semple: The Geography of the Mediterranean Region: Its Relation to Ancient History, New York, 1931.

86

THE GEOGRAPHICAL
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JAN. 1938 GEOGR.REVIEW,

FIG. s-Map of the Mediterranean showing the places mentioned in the text, including aeronaval stations of Britain, France, and Italy. Important railways are shown. Libya's strategic highroad, the Strada Litoranea, lately completed, is not shown, but it closely borders the littoral (see account by Christian de Caters: Une route africaine nouvelle: La Litoranee libyque La Nature, No, 3osr, : s8,ooo,ooo. Oct. oo hartd And 36,3-,368). Scale about i onlnTndsafr iS5, I937, pp. s ontinal Seftort no too poi tabla

regarded in its entirety-as Dr. Newbigin argued ifl a stimulating book','-as part of the continent of Europe, with which its relationships, physical and human, have been closest. Its remarkable individuality, determined by structure and climate, is most clearly expressed in its broadly uniform agricultural economy. Essentially a victim of semiaridity, poor soils, and scanty lowland, the region should be regarded as one of difficulty, which challenged man and stimulated him to hard and continual effort on land and sea for not too profitable rewards. Very few of the characteristic Mediterranean plants were, like the fig tree, indigenous: the cultivated olive, the mulberry tree, bread wheat, the vine, the citrus fruits, maize, and sugar cane were
16 M. I. Newbigin: Frequented Ways, London, 1922, p. I5.

THE MEDITERRANEAN
20 3 40

PROBLEM

87

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A convenient map for study of the Mediterranean problem is Sheet 31A, Mediterranean, I: 4,000,000 series of Europe and Asia, G.SPG.S. No. 2957, War Office, London, '937. Roads and ralys are shown, and the use of hypsometric tints is helpful.

all introduced there from outside. Irrigation, drainage works, and terracing, the need for which underlines the diflficulty of farming, are traditional features of its life. Malaria has been continually, though with varying force, an environmental fact, and so it still remains.'6 And the Mediterranean lands have not been generously endowed with those natural resources-minerals, forests, and fish-that condition extractive industries. Agriculture or, more strictly, horticulturegardening rather than farming as it is understood in North Americais and has always been the economic basis of Mediterranean life.
16 See L. W. Hackett: Malaria in Europe (with maps), London, I937. This is the work of a medical expert. He recalls how three fine armies in Macedonia were paralyzed by malaria during the Great War and notes that, although malaria is losing its hold, its distribution in Italy, as in California, has not changed-during the last half a century. The effect of malaria on Greeks repatriated from Turkey after I925 is discussed by J. H. Schultze: Greek Frontier Colonisation in Thrace and Macedonia (translated from the German text), Scottish Geogr. Mag., Vol. 53, I937, pp. 8I-89.

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THE GEOGRAPHICAL

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This is not the place even to sketch the historical aspects of the geography of the Mediterranean region. It is not surprising, in view of the part that region has played throughout history (and prehistory) as the homeland of European (and American) culture and as the battlefield of rival peoples, religions, and states, that attention has been turned to its historical geography, many phases of which, however, await investigation. It must suffice here to recall Sir George Adam Smith's "The Historical Geography of the Holy Land," now in its twenty-fifth edition; the work of Glotz17 on early Aegean culture in relation to its physical setting; Dr. Newbigin's stimulating introduction ,18 which all students should read; and Dr. Semple's well documented and revealingstudy,19which has direct bearings on presentday geography, though primarily concerned with the period of ancient Greece and republican Rome. For later periods, adequate geographical studies are harder to find :20 monographs in historical geography have yet to be written, for example, on the Arab phase (though reference should be made to the works of Gautier, Le Strange, and Levi-Proven?al21) and its relation to Byzantium,22 on that of the Italian cities, and on that of Turkish-Christian rivalry. On the classical period there is an abundant literature, in part geographical: Charlesworth's book on Roman trade routes23and Holland Rose's readable narrative24 may be noted, and a number of maps of the Roman Empire have now been reconstructed.26 On the medieval commerce of the sea, the studies26 of Heyd and Schaube remain the most valuable contributions.
THE POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE MEDITERRANEAN

It is important to see the present international problem of the Mediterranean in its right perspective as one phase of a recurrent
17G. Glotz: La civilisation egeenne (L'l9volution de l'Humanit6, Vol. 9), Paris, I923. 18 M. I. Newbigin: The Mediterranean Lands: An Introductory Study in Human and Historical Geography, London, I924. of the Mediterranean during the Roman and medieval periods, together with selected bibliographies, may be found in Gordon East: An Historical Geography of Europe, London, I935; New York, I936. 21 E. F. Gautier: L'Islamisation de l'Afrique du Nord: Les siecles obscurs du Maghreb, Paris, Guy Le Strange: PalesI927; idem: Le passe de l'Afrique du Nord: Les siecles obscurs, Paris, I937. tine under the Moslems, London, i890. E. Levi-Provencal: L'Espagne musulmane au Xeme sikcle,
Paris, I932.
19 Op. cit. 20 An account

22See the suggestive article by Alfred Philippson: Das byzantinische Reich als geographische Erscheinung, Geogr.Zeitsch., Vol. 40, I934, pp. 44I-455. 2a M. P. Charlesworth: Trade-Routes and Commerce of the Roman Empire, 2nd edit., Cambridge,
I926.

Holland Rose: The Mediterranean in the Ancient World, Cambridge, I933.. "International Map of the Roman Empire" are now available for the whole of Italy and Egypt; for France and Britain, the Lyons and Edinburgh sheets respectively are available. 2 W. Heyd: Histoire du commerce du Levant au Moyen-Age, French edit. (reprinted), by Furcy Raynaud, 2 vols., Leipzig, I923; Adolf Schaube: Handelsgeschichte der romanischen Volker des Mittelmeergebiets bis zum Ende der Kreuzzilge (Handbuch der mittelalterlichen und neuergn Geschichte, herausgegeben von G. v. Below und F. Meinecke, Abteilung III: Verfassung, Recht, Wirtschaft),
24 J.

26 Sheets of the I: I,000,000

Munich and Berlin, i9o6.

THE MEDITERRANEAN

PROBLEM

89

phenomenon. The problem, in so far as it is unitary, concerns the control of the Mediterranean and the use of its ways. At all times this sea has been more than a local waterway linking up the broadly uniform lands of the basin; in addition it has formed part of an intercontinental route connecting lands of contrasting climates and complementary products. Intercourse with India and, via India, with the monsoon lands of Asia was already established by the time of the Roman Empire, chiefly by means of overland passages, marked out by nature, across Egypt to the Red Sea and across Syria and 'Iraq to the Persian Gulf.27 The opening of the Suez Canal, in I869, and the development of intercontinental communication by air and by road have served only to increase the world importance of the Mediterranean Sea and, particularly, its eastern basin.28 Moreover, although penetration southwards from the Mediterranean shores into inner Africa. west of Egypt, was historically minimal, owing to the desert belt, nowadays, owing to aircraft and motor traction, much closer contact can be and will be made; nor has France abandoned its project of a trans-Saharan railway. Long before the Roman Empire came into existence, the "wet ways" of the inland sea had become politically, commercially, and strategically important. The political condition of the sea today, compared with that under the Roman Empire, is greatly changed. Mare internum and Mare Nostrum, the Mediterranean of the Romans contained, and was bordered by, the territories of a single, multinational state. Today, in contrast, as we know only too well, the lands of the basin form the independent and dependent territories of many nation-states. The midland sea is clearly important, locally and as a thoroughfare, to extra-Mediterranean countries, especially Great Britain, and its free and secure use is a matter of general, and particularly of European, interest. The history of the Mediterranean is one of continual struggle for sea power and all that depended thereon. Today, mastery of the whole sea is obviously not in the hands of any single state, though particular states control inner waters and essential entries. The recent rise of Italy as a strong, unified, and ambitious power, mindful of the achievements of ancient Rome, has introduced a new and ominous element into the Mediterranean situation. This significant development receives special attention in three introductory studies29 of the Mediterranean prob27 See, on this topic, E. H. Warmington: The Commerce between the Roman Empire and India, Cambridge, I928. 28 For a full and useful study see J. Lozach: L'aviation commerciale dans le Proche-Orient: Etude de g6ographie economique, Bull. Soc. Royale de Geogr.d',tgyple, Vol. i9, No. 2, I936, pp. 157-236. 29 Count Antonio Cippico: Italy: The Central Problem of the Mediterranean (The Inst. of Poli. tics Publs., Williams College, Williamstown, Mass.), New Haven and London, 1926. (This is a vivacious and interesting statement of the Fascist viewpoint.) E. W. Polson Newman: The Mediterranean and Its Problems, London, I927. (The work of a journalist appreciative of Fascism, this is a compilation, interspersed with travel description.) George Slocombe: The Dangerous Sea: The Mediterranean and Its Future, New York, I937. (This is a useful and up-to-date compilation by a journalist, but its introduction and conclusion scarcely merit serious attention.)

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lem, which may be recommended as readable and useful, if not authoritative. In an illuminating article,30 which bears directly on the present problem, Professor W. L. Langer reviews historically the recent and continued tensions in the Mediterranean which he rightly regards as the outcome of imperialism. During the last sixty years Britain, France, and Italy, for motives of prestige, strategy, and trade, have gained political control over extensive areas of the basin. "Politically, strategically and commercially, " Langer concludes, "the Mediterranean is far more important for England and France now than it was twenty years ago," and the development of air power has given a great advantage to riparian states. The recent international situation in the Mediterranean in its diplomatic and strategic aspects has been ably and briefly summarized by David H. Popper.3' A useful and well illustrated study32 of the Mediterranean as a scene of imperialistic rivalry has just appeared, the work of two able exponents of Geopolitik, Hans Hummel and Wulf Siewert. In order to unravel the tangle of national interests in the Mediterranean, it is best to examine briefly, in relation to the geographical background, the interests of the three chiefly interested great powers.
GREAT BRITAIN AND THE MEDITERRANEAN

Before the opening of the Suez Canal the Mediterranean was both economically and politically important to Britain. On the one hand, it was a field of commercial activity from the sixteenth century on; on the other, it enabled Britain, by means of naval power, to pursue its policy of maintaining the "balance of power" in Europe. In the eighteenth century especially the midland sea became the scene of Anglo-French conflicts.33 As results of wars waged there Britain acquired Malta in I8I5 and Gibraltar, which was won by "accident" or as "an after-thought " in the campaign of I 704.31 Both Malta and Gibraltar became useful stations for naval and merchant shipping. After the opening of the Suez Canal (I869) the Mediterranean hecame of much greater importance to Britain, as part of the shortest sea route to India: only then did the notion arise that for the British Empire it was a "vital route." In order to secure this route and by " the happy coincidence of idealism with profit,"35
30Langer, op. cit.
31

D. H. Popper: Strategy and Diplomacy in the Mediterranean, Foreign Policy Repts., Vol. I3,

I937, pp. 66-76.

Hummel and Wulf Siewert: Der Mittelmeerraum: Zur Geopolitik eines maritimen Grossraumes, Schriften zur Geopolitik No. II, Heidelberg and Berlin, 1936. This comprises papers that appeared in the Zeitschriftfur Geopolitik, Vols. I2 and I3, I935 and I936. 33 On part of this historical phase see J. S. Corbett: England in the Mediterranean, 2 vols., London, I904. (This covers the period I603-I7I3.) 34 W. C. Abbott: An Introduction to the Documents Relating to the International Status of Gibraltar, I704-I934, New York, I934. (The bibliography occupies the greater part of the book.) 35 Luigi Federzoni: Hegemony in the Mediterranean, Foreign Affairs, Vol. I4, I935-1936, pp. 387-397; reference on p. 389.
32 Hans

THE MEDITERRANEAN

PROBLEM

9I

Britain established itself in Egypt, in the Sudan, in Aden and Perim, Cyprus, and, by mandate, in Palestine, potentially useful together with Egypt in the defense of the Suez Canal. Britain has succeeded, thus, in holding the oceanic entries to the Mediterranean by its strongholds at Gibraltar, Malta, and Aden and by military, naval, and aircraft stations in and around the eastern basin-in Egypt, Palestine, 'Iraq, and the Sudan. Present British interests in the midland sea can be summarized briefly. Economically, that sea is a sphere of trade and a useful short cut for freight carried between Britain and India, Burma, Malaya, and East Africa, but it offers less advantage over other routes to Australasia. Politically, it is important chiefly in relation to India, Burma, Ceylon, and British East Africa, the defense of which rests on Britain; to Palestine, a mandatory obligation; to Egypt, to the defense of which Britain is committed by the treaty of I936; and to the Sudan and the Arabian states. Finally, the Mediterranean has a great strategic value: through it passes the direct route for warships bound for the Indian Ocean and for Singapore, the only fully equipped British naval base east of Malta, and for aircraft bound for South and East Africa, India, and Australasia. It is a striking fact that around the Indian Ocean lie about half of the area and fivesevenths of the population of the British Empire.36 Furthermore, the Mediterranean furnishes a direct route for the transport of petroleum, now necessary for the British navy as well as for military and civil purposes. Oil is carried from 'Iraq, by way of Haifa and Tripoli, which are termini of pipe lines, from Iran, from Rumania, and from the East Indies: from these sources Britain gets almost three-quarters of its supply.37 In short, although the Mediterranean contains within itself British political, economic, and cultural interests, it is important primarily as a thoroughfare to places beyond; hence, superficially at least, Mussolini's taunt that for Britain the sea is only a "short cut" seems justified. It may well be an exaggeration to regard it as a "jugular vein " or even as a " vital route '38 of the British Empire; officially it is regarded as " an arterial way. "
ITALY AND THE MEDITERRANEAN

The Italian peninsula, together with Sicily, situated in the middle of the Mediterranean basin, extends like a great mole dividing the basin into two, almost enclosed parts. Italy is so placed as to control the narrow Strait of Messina, and Sicily occupies a strategic position at the "waist " of the sea that connects the western and eastern
36 See C. B. Fawcett: A Political Geography of the British Empire, London, I933, pp. I2 and 5o; and D. H. Cole: Imperial Military Geography, 7th edit., London, I933, p. ii6. 37 Langer, op. cit., p. 655. 38 H. C. Bywater: The Changing Balance of Forces in the Mediterranean, Internatl. Affairs, Vol. i6, I937, pp. 36I-387; reference on p. 366.

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basins. Midway between Sicily and (French) Tunisia stands the small Italian island of Pantelleria, the fortification of which has been decreed: although harborless, it clearly has a positional value as a submarine and aircraft station. On both sides of the Italian peninsula lie inner, semienclosed seas: on the east the Adriatic and Ionian Seas and on the west the Tyrrhenian Sea, which extends to (Italian) Sardinia and to (French) Corsica. Italy is clearly powerful in the Adriatic: it has ports on the Istrian peninsula-for example, at Pola-and at Zara, on the Dalmatian coast, and an offshore group of islands-Lussino, Cherso, and others. Furthermore, it commands the narrow entry of the Adriatic by its port of Otranto and its virtual control of the Albanian harbor of Valona. Italy's "special interest" in Albania has been recognized by the powers: that kingdom is virtually a political, financial, and economic dependency of Italy.39 It is, too, a foothold in the Balkan Peninsula from which attacks could be launched against Yugoslavia and Greece.40 Yugoslavia, the only other naval power with territories in the Adriatic, possesses a coast line so formed by nature that it is much better for ships and seaplanes than is the east coast of Italy; but, compared with Italy, it is a small and weak power. The Ionian Sea is bounded by Italian territory (there is a naval base at Taranto) and by Albanian and Greek lands, from which little or no danger to Italy is to be expected. On the Tyrrhenian Sea Italy has bases at La Spezia in the north and in Sardinia and Sicily. On this side, however, it touches France, which has aeronaval stations at and near Toulon (see Fig. i). But Italy, unified only in I870, has become, if recently, an imperial power and, as an Italian writer puts it,41"an irrepressible political reality." It has extended its political, commercial, and cultural activities into the eastern basin of the Mediterranean. Rhodes and the other Dodecanese islands, the population of which is mainly Greek, were won from Turkey in I9I I-I9I2 and formally recognized as Italian in I923. They lie across the narrow passage between Crete and Asia Minor, through which shipping passes en route from the Black and Aegean Seas to Syria, Palestine, and Egypt; and on one of them, the small island of Leros, Portolago has been equipped as a base for aircraft and warships. Furthermore, the Italian colony of Libya commands a long frontage on the sea, and at its east end, near the Egyptian frontier, stands the strongly fortified harbor of Tobruk, which in some measure controls the relatively wide passage between Crete and North Africa. Moreover, a iooo-mile highway, which was constructed during the Italo-Abyssinian war, runs the whole length of the Libyan
(Ch. 8). op. cit., pp. I04-IIO Alexander believed that, if Italy attacked Yugoslavia, it would be via Albania, referaccording to William Miller: The Balkan Pact, ContemporaryRev., Vol. I45, I934, pp. 53I-539; The Roman Via Egnatia led through Albania to Salonika, in Greece. ence on p. 532. 41 Federzoni, op. cit., p. 397.
3' See Slocombe, 40 The late King

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PROBLEM

93

littoral and has obvious strategic value as a means of advance against Tunisia or Egypt, at either end. Finally, if on the whole the Libyan coast is poor in harbors, it could serve usefully for aircraft, and the town of Tripoli, in about the same longitude as Malta, is a fortified port. Italian territories in Africa also include Eritrea, which fronts the Red Sea, where Assab is being fortified; Somaliland, which fronts the Indian Ocean; and, de facto, the greater part of Ethiopia, which commands the sources of the White Nile and the Atbara River and whence aerial attacks could be launched on the Sudan, Kenya, and the Red Sea. The dependent territories of Italy, Libya, East Africa, and Albania, if not Ethiopia, are peopled largely by Moslems, and we may recall that Mussolini has proclaimed himself a champion of Islam. The geographical layout of the Italian empire is striking: if, compared with other empires, it is remarkably compact, it depends for its cohesion on the Mediterranean-Suez-Red Sea route. By founding and extending its African empire, Italy has weakened its strategic position and has given "hostages to fortune."42 Aircraft may to some extent mask this dependence on sea routes and sea power; but, if the sea communications were cut, only the control of Egypt and the Sudan could offer alternative transit to and from East Africa for supplies and men. On the other hand, the central position of Italy itself confers the great strategic advantage of "inner lines." From Italy and from Italian bases elsewhere almost all of the Mediterranean can be reached rapidly by aircraft: heavy bombers have at present an effective range of rather less than 500 miles from their base. Furthermore, Italy, unlike France, can specially construct its warships to meet the conditions of the midland sea. But there are other important questions of political and international interest that arise from the geography of Italy and its dependencies. The international importance of Italy's "demographic problem" is very evident: "population pressure" has been cited by both Italian and German writers as a justification of Italian imperialism. Relatively and absolutely the most populous of Mediterranean states, Italy, it is asserted, has insufficient resources at home, in a country of small area and limited potentialities. This view has been discussed at some length by Count Cippico43 and by Major Polson Newman,44 but the statistics that they employ need critical scrutiny. More recently, a German geographer, Hermann Overbeck,45 has argued the same case. As he puts it, in the phraseology of the Geopolitik school, Italy is, like Germany, " ein Volk ohne Raum ": popu42 Bywater, op. cit., p. 379. 43 Cippico, Op. Cit.

44Newman, op. cit. 4Hermann Overbeck: Politisch-geographische Probleme des Mittelmeergebietes, Geogr.Anzeiger,
Vol. 3I,
I930, pp. 3I5-3I9

and 337-345.

94

THE GEOGRAPHICAL

REVIEW

lation numbers are maladjusted to the territory and resources of the state, and, not unnaturally, Italians experience Raumhunger. How far this argument is valid and how far the conquest of Ethiopia may potentially ease this demographic situation cannot be discussed here. The counterarguments, however, should be considered, and these have been advanced effectively by an able and trenchant critic of Fascist Italy, Salvemini.46 He is unwilling to accept as either sound or reasonable the Fascist contention that Italy must either "expand or explode." He shows that the Italian birth rate has fallen steadily since 1927 and that the official rate of increase, accepted by most writers, is exaggerated. He argues that population pressure could be reduced by employing capital at home on reclamation schemes that have so far been spectacular rather than adequate in scale; that Abyssinia offers no real scope for Italian settlement; and that restrictions on emigration only accentuate Italy's internal difficulties. It is perhaps not generally realized that Italians at home and abroad number some sixty millions, a number comparable with that of Britons living within the British Empire-73 millions. Only very small numbers live in Italian colonies, which offer few possibilities; but, as sizable minorities, others live under foreign rule in the Mediterranean basin-a potential cause of friction. According to Count there were (in 1926) more than 150,000 Italians in Algeria Cippico,47

and Morocco, more than

IOO,OOO in

Tunisia, more than

50,000

in

Egypt, and many in Palestine and Syria. It is in Tunisia that this expatriation of Italians has caused, and may cause again, acute difficulties, since they formerly outnumbered, and are now almost as numerous as, the French themselves. Occupied by France in I88I, for reasons of prestige rather than of strategy, Tunisia was described by Poincare48 as a contiguous and indivisible part of French territories in Africa. In accordance with a French law of I889, foreigners living in French territories will become French citizens at the third generation! Italians, however, can also, like Poincare, quote geography to their purposes: for them Tunisia is " the natural continuation of Sicily"49 and also, potentially, a terra irredenta. It must be admitted that in many respects the geographical position of Italy is unenviable. Italy possesses insufficient coal, iron, copper, and potash and must import from abroad its whole supply of petroleum, cotton, rubber, and phosphates; it is self-sufficient in aluminum, sulphur, and mercury and almost so in chemicals and nitrates; but it has to import some of its foodstuffs, especially meat
pp. 243Foreign Affairs, Vol. I4, I935-I936, Can Italy Live at Home? 46 Gaetano Salvemini: 258. For a Fascist account of recent reclamation see C. Longobardi: Land Reclamation in Italy, London, I936. op. cit., p. 45. See also the maps and figures given by Wulf Siewert: Italiens Kampf 47 Cippico, Zeitschr. fur Geopolilik, Vol. I2, I935, pp. 770-78I. um die Mittelmeerherrschaft, op. cit., p. 338. 48 Quoted by Overbeck, 49 Quoted by Overbeck, op. cit., p. 339.

THE MEDITERRANEAN

PROBLEM

95

and fish.50 Even more striking is the fact that 8o per cent or more of Italy's imports come by sea.51 For Italy, therefore, the safety of its maritime communications in the midland sea, if not on the oceans, is a matter of paramount importance. Italy professes to find itself " a prisoner in . . . [its] own sea, " the gates of which are " hermetically closed by a nation whose shores are not bathed by its waters. "52 British sea power might become, in Italian eyes, a barrier between Italy and the oceans and thus a menace to the country's food supply, its supply of raw materials, and its imperial communications. (Similarly, it has been held that the geographical position of Britain is such as to obstruct Germany's access to the oceans.) In the light of this, a sketch map reproduced by Overbeck53 has interest, if only as a high flight of Geopolitik: it depicts, in very general terms, the concept of an "Italian corridor" across Africa from Tripoli via Lake Chad and the Cameroon mandated territory to the Gulf of Guinea. If only on paper, this corridor would command an alternative, if remote, window on the ocean.
FRANCE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

The third great power deeply interested in the security of the Mediterranean seaways is France. Like Britain and Italy, France has commercial and political interests both within and outside the Mediterranean. Although, like Italy, it has a Mediterranean coast to defend, unlike Italy, it has alternative ports on the Atlantic and the English Channel. France has dependent territories outside the Mediterranean-in particular, Indochina, French Somaliland, and Madagascar-which can be reached most directly by way of the Suez Canal. But its most important dependencies lie in the Mediterranean, namely the protectorates of Morocco and Tunisia and Algeria, the greater part of which is administered by the Ministry of the Interior.54 These form a continuous area with a long frontage on, and some of their best lands along, the Mediterranean. Morocco possesses, too, Atlantic harbors-a fact of some importance. Furthermore, beyond these lands, and accessible by air and by motor transport, French West and Equatorial Africa extend to the Atlantic. Not only does the security of the French African empire depend in part on the safety of the transverse routes across the Mediterranean, but-and this is much more important-the safety of France itself depends also, in some measure, on these routes. France, like
op. cit., p. 243. 51Langer, op. cit., p. 658, says 80 per cent; Popper, op. cit., p. 76, says 86 per cent. 52 Cippico, op. cit., pp. 32 and 25 respectively. r3 Overbeck, op. cit., Fig. I (p. 340). 54 On French colonial development see Georges Hardy: Histoire de la colonisation francaise, Paris, 1928. For a short German study see Wulf Siewert: Frankreichs Stellung im Mittelmeer, Zeitschr. fiur Geopolitik, Vol. I2, I935, pp. 682-69I and 748-757.
50 Salvemini,

96

THE GEOGRAPHICAL

REVIEW

Italy, has a serious demographic problem. Whereas the population of France is decreasing, that of Italy is still increasing; although the populations of France and Italy are now almost equal, Germans outnumber Frenchmen in the ratio of 3 :2.5 These facts have an obvious political bearing: with a view to maintaining and strengthening its man power, France has trained a native army in Africa, which it may need to share in the defense of its land frontiers. Troops stationed in French Africa form a considerable part of its peacetime effectives-one-third according to Langer,56 nearly one-quarter according to Montagne.57 The safety of the French African ferry was menaced in I914 by German cruisers. It would be much less safe today if attacked by a Mediterranean power, and passage across Spain cannot be relied on as a possible alternative. The interest of France in the fate of the Spanish Balearic Islands, which could afford excellent bases for aircraft and submarines, springs from its need to safeguard its communications with Africa. Hence France has developed its Moroccan ports on the Atlantic, especially Casablanca and Rabat, and these are linked up by rail with Algiers and Tunis. Thus it commands alternative routes to those across the Mediterranean ;58 and, although this route is much longer, it would be easier to defend, because resort could be had to "evasive routing" almost impossible in the enclosed sea. France has cultural, economic, and political interests in the Levant also; and, even when its mandatory obligations in Syria and Lebanon have been "liquidated," it will remain allied to these states and will retain military and other privileges, especially in Lebanon. France imports at present one-half of its petroleum from 'Iraq via Tripoli and Haifa. Like Britain and Italy, too, France has perforce to be closely interested in those parts of the Moslem world that extend from Arabia through North Africa to the Atlantic.59 Arab nationalism and all that it implies remain one of the present and future problems of the Mediterranean. The French policy of assimilation in Algeria and Tunisia, which has not been pursued in Syria, may ultimately run counter to nationalistic aspirations within the Moslem world. Recent unrest in French Morocco presents to France a new and serious difficulty. In short, some of the major interests of France are focused on the
See the map (p. 25) in R. R. Kuczynski: The Balance of Births and Deaths, Geography, Vol. 22, For a discussion of these demographic problems see D. V. Glass: The Struggle for Population, London, I936. 56 Langer, op. cit., p. 655. 57 Robert Montagne: French Policy in North Africa and in Syria, lInternatl. Affairs, Vol. i6, i937, pp. 263-279; reference on p. 266. 58 For a discussion of this topic see Ren6 la Bruyere: Les routes imperiales francaises, Revue des Deux Mondes, 8th Per., Vol. 35, I936, pp. 286-304, and the map in Siewert, Frankreichs Stellung im Mittelmeer, p. 749. S9 On the background to this see Isaiah Bowman: The Mohammedan World, Geogr.Rev., Vol. I4,
5'

I937, pp. 22-28.

I924,

pp. 62-74.

THE MEDITERRANEAN

PROBLEM

97

western basin of the Mediterranean, where it has established aeronaval bases at Toulon and Bizerte and is developing Mers-el-Kebir (near Oran) as a naval and aircraft base. However, as its interests extend also, but less vitally, into the eastern basin, it has been argued recently with some force that France should no longer neglect its position there and should create at Tripoli (Syria) at the terminal of the oil pipe line, a strong naval base.60
PARTICULAR PROBLEMS AND KEY POINTS OF THE MEDITERRANEAN

The international problem of the Mediterranean concerns, then, the command of the sea, shared precariously at present by three great powers and a few small states, notably Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey, which the great powers seek to attach to their interests. Overshadowed by this prime issue, yet inevitably related to it, are many secondary problems that can at least be stated here. In the western basin, the political destiny of Spain remains undecided and introduces a new and disturbing element into the Mediterranean situation. International interest turns to the insular territories of Spain, to the Canaries and the Balearic Islands,6" which, owing to their positions, offer strategic possibilities out of all proportion to their areas and resources. Neither France nor Britain nor Italy could view without alarm the cession of the Balearics to another great power. But the danger lies not so much in any cession as in the grant to potential enemies of privileges for naval, military, or aerial purposes.62 At the oceanic gateway to the western basin, Britain's control of the strait, dependent hitherto on its naval base at Gibraltar and on the internationalized and neutral zone of Tangier,63 seems scarcely as secure now as the Rock of Gibraltar. The future security of Gibraltar64 is menaced by air power, by the increased range of guns, and by the uncertainties of the Spanish situation. Although it has powerful defenses above and below ground, Gibraltar lacks space for airports and is dependent on supplies from outside. In the eastern basin, many politico-geographical changes are
60See the discussion by General Weygand: La France en Mediterranee orientale, Revue des Deux
Mondes, 8th Per., Vol. 38, I937, pp. 5I5-536.
61 Admiral Mahan believed that Port Mahon in Menorca was the strongest position in the Mediterranean (cited by Langer, op. cit., p. 659, footnote i). 62See "The Balearic Islands in Mediterranean Strategy," (with map), Foreign Affairs, Vol. IS, I936-I937, pp. 384-385. See also, on the geographical background, the valuable papers by E. W. Gil-

bert, "The PP. 375-390.

Human

Geography

of Mallorca,"

Scottish Geogr. Mag., Vol. 50, 1934, pp. 129-147,

52,

and

"Influences of the British Occupation on the Human Geography of Menorca," ibid., Vol.

I936,

63 On Tangier see G. H. Stuart: The International City of Tangier, Stanford University, Cal., and London, I93I; C. E. Hobhouse: The International Status of Tangier, ContemporaryRev., Vol. I48, I935, pp. 156-i63; and Pedro Vives y Vich: Un punto de vista sobre el problema de Tanger, Bol. Soc. Geogr. Nacional, Vol. 75, I935, pp. 387-405. Vich argues, on geographical and economic grounds, that the Tangier zone should be united to Spanish Morocco as a neutral and demilitarized area. 64 See Fawcett, op. cit., pp. 334-337.

98

THE GEOGRAPHICAL

REVIEW

taking place. The French mandate in Syria and Lebanon, which has been severely criticized,65 is about to disappear in favor of two independent states. Alexandretta,66 the maritime and frontier province of Syria, is destined to become an autonomous, demilitarized province of Syria, with its integrity guaranteed jointly by Turkey and France. Syria, although greatly divided by religion and sects, has a common language (Arabic) and claims a distinct nationality. Like 'Iraq, it will form another independent Arab state, allied to the former mandatory power, which will retain certain privileges. Lebanon, in contrast, is Christian and will remain more closely associated with France. Similarly, remarkable changes in the political geography of Palestine seem foreshadowed in the recent and much criticized report of the Royal Commission.67 If, in contrast with the mandate over Syria, that over Palestine has been successful in the economic sphere,68 it seems, as in Syria, to have failed politically. If partition is effected on the lines suggested by the report, it will create another "corridor," enclaves, and more than one frontier of contact and friction. In any case, the former mandatory will probably retain, as in 'Iraq, certain rights to the use of aerodromes, ports, railways, and roads and also the right to station armed forces at specified points. The two "water gates " to the eastern basin of the Mediterranean have great, if unequal, international importance. The narrow waters that connect the Aegean Sea with the Black Sea lie entirely within Turkey. In accordance with the Treaty of Lausanne (I923) zones along the shores of the Dardanelles and the Bosporus, as well as certain Aegean islands off the coasts of Asia Minor, were demilitarized and an international commission was set up to ensure the observance of the treaty. The recent Convention of Montreux (I936)69 assigned to Turkey full sovereignty over the straits and the right to fortify them; it reenacted that these should remain open to merchant shipping in peace and in war and prescribed under what conditions they should be open to ships of war. The Suez Canal,70 according to
56 For what amounts to an indictment of French policy in Syria see G. F. Hourani: Syria under French activity there has been the French Mandate, Contemporary Rev., Vol. I48, I935, pp. 59I-598. centered, not on irrigation and afforestation, the chief local needs, but on the pipe line for oil, on airports, roads, and harbors! See also Weygand, op. cit. 66The population of Alexandretta contains a large Turkish element, variously estimated at 39 per cent to 8o per cent. For a note on the report see 67 Palestine Royal Commission Report, Cmd. 547_, London, I937. Geogr. Rev., Vol. 27, I937, pp. 566-573. 68 On the amazing economic transformation of Palestine, consequent on Jewish immigration and outlay of capital, see Julius Braunthal: Arabs and Jews in Palestine, ContemporaryRev., Vol. I49, I936, despite the world Palestine's percentage of world trade doubled during I93I-I933, pp. 466-474. depression. See also Jean Gottmann: The Pioneer Fringe in Palestine: Settlement Possibilities South and East of the Holy Land, Geogr. Rev., Vol. 27, I937, pp. 550-565. 69 See H. N. Howard: The Straits after the Montreux Conference, Foreign Affairs, Vol. I5, I936I937, pp. I99-202. 70 See George

357-368; and H. L. Hoskins: The Suez Canal in Time of War, Foreign Affairs, pp. 93-IOI.

Glasgow: The Sudan and the Suez Canal, ContemporaryRev., Vol. Vol.

I49, I4,

I936, I935-I936,

pp.

THE MEDITERRANEAN

PROBLEM

99

international law, must remain open to the vessels of all nations in peace and in war; and it shall not be blockaded. Actually, it remains under the protection of Britain, which still retains military forces and aircraft stations in Egypt, although that country became formally independent by the treaty of I936. The future of Malta, situated in the "waist" of the Mediterranean halfway between Gibraltar and Port Said, has attracted much attention since the Italo-Ethiopian war. There is both an internal and an external problem. The Maltese language is derived from Arabic; there is only a small Italian minority, and some Maltese speak Italian. Constitutional difficulties in Malta have been due in part to alleged Italian propaganda and to the policy of its proItalian church.7' Externally, the problem is whether, in the event of an Anglo-Italian conflict, the Maltese Islands, including the naval base of Valletta, could be or should be retained, owing to the menace of aerial warfare. Clearly, this problem, which is both strategic and political, calls for expert handling, and Admiral Sir Herbert W. Richmond, who, as an admiral and former professor of naval history, can speak with authority on the strategic aspect, is, on the whole, reassuring. In an important paper72 he argues that the air weapon is not so much "a gun with an extended range" as a torpedo boatsmall and swift, but inaccurate in its aim, except at close range. Others73 take a more "defeatist" view on the tenability of Malta but argue that its loss would not necessarily prove fatal to British sea power in the Mediterranean. The insecurity of Malta, which can be reached in twenty minutes by air from Sicily, where aircraft were concentrated during the Abyssinian war, has called attention to the strategic possibilities of Cyprus, long neglected by government, by tourists, and by capitalists. As a result of the growth of Italian power, its position and resources now acquire a geographical value formerly unsuspected.74 Cyprus is relatively remote from the home area of any great power, but it is near, though not uncomfortably near, Rhodes and the other Dodecanese islands. Furthermore, it is not much more than an hour's flight from Haifa and Port Said. Recently it has been linked up by steamship with Egypt and Syria, and Imperial Airways has decided to use it as a junction for their lines to Asia and South Africa. Its best harbor, Famagusta, can at present accommodate cruisers and is capable of improvement. Parts of the great dry and treeless plain of Mesaoria, in the heart of the island, provide ample sites for airports, and Lake Akotiri and storage reservoirs afford ideal landing
71

See E. W. Polson Newman: The Malta Situation, Contemporary Rev., Vol.

I45,

I934,

pp. I5I-

'57.
pp.

H. W. Richmond: The Strategy of the Mediterranean, Foreign Affairs, Vol. I4, I935-I936, 274-282; references on pp. 278 and 279. 7 Bywater, op. cit. 74 Frederick Walker: The Development of Cyprus, Scottish Geogr.Mag., Vol. 52, I936, pp. 39I-402.

72 Sir

I 00

THE GEOGRAPHICAL

REVIEW

places for seaplanes in stormy weather. Although its irregular and scanty rainfall is a critical factor, Cyprus is, compared with Malta, very productive and could probably be made self-supporting in foodstuffs. Moreover, although its population is largely Greek, and although it has had internal difficulties, there is no suggestion that Greece cherishes any irredentist claims. Finally, reference may be made to a question of considerable importance to Britain that was thrown into sharp relief by the recent Italo-Ethiopian war: in the event of a war with a major Mediterranean power would Britain be able to maintain its sea power and commerce in the Mediterranean? This problem, which clearly involves considerations of "high policy," strategy, diplomacy, and even prestige, has attracted much recent attention.75 One striking conclusion emerges from this discussion. In all probability, British merchant shipping would have to be diverted to the Cape route.76 The seaway from Gibraltar to Port Said is more than I900 miles long, and the sea is relatively narrow, so that there is little scope for "evasive routing. " This east-west route is a long, thin thread that could be easily snapped at any point. The great depth of the Mediterranean favors submarines ;77 furthermore, the use of aircraft, which gives a great advantage to local states, presents a serious danger.78 The food and raw materials that reach Britain from the Mediterranean amount to 20 per cent of the tonnage that it receives, and the use of convoys, which would be necessary to safeguard them, would impose an extremely heavy strain on the navy. Diversion of this traffic around the Cape would lessen risks but increase the demands on merchant shipping, for considerable delays would be incurred, especially by oil tankers from the Persian Gulf and by vessels from India.79 In the event of such a war, British strategy might concentrate on controlling the entries to the Mediterranean; and, even if Malta should be lost, the sea might be blockaded. At any rate, it is significant that efforts are being made (for example, at Simonstown, near Capetown) to strengthen the strongholds on the Cape route; and it is worth noting that the Benguela-Beira railway might be used as a short cut to relieve the strain on merchant shipping. This is not the place to analyze grimly hypothetical situations.
75Richmond, op. cit. Bywater, op. cit. (This is a stimulating, if somewhat alarmist, discussion of the problem by a naval and shipping correspondent.) John de la Valette: Eastern Trade Routes and the Middle Sea, Asiatic Rev., Vol. 32 (N.S.), I936, pp. 653-658. 76 Such a deviation of merchant shipping, in the event of war, was discussed even in I890: see Playfair, op. cit., p. 540. Losses of merchant shipping in the Mediterranean during the World War were very heavy: see Bywater, op. cit., p. 371. 77 Cole, op. cit., pp. II3-II4. 78 On the dangers of aerial warfare to British commerce in the Mediterranean see E. J. KingstonMcCloughry: Winged Warfare, London, I937. See also C. Rougeron: L'Angleterre, l'Italie et le probl6me naval en Mediterranee (with map), L'Illustration, Vol. 95, I937, pp. 522-524. 79 The Cape route to Britain, as compared with the Suez route, is 50 per cent longer from the Persian Gulf, 51-77 per cent longer from Indian ports, 44 per cent longer from Singapore, but only l0 per cent longer from Australia.

THE MEDITERRANEAN

PROBLEM

10I

It is enough to suggest, in conclusion, that the familiar comparison between the Mediterranean and the Caribbean Seas is, from the political viewpoint, misleading. No single power controls the midland sea of Europe as the United States controls that of America. In the Caribbean the "balance of power" does not arise: the entries to that sea, including the Panama Canal, are strongly held, unchallenged, by a single great power. But if Britain holds the keys to the Mediterranean, as the United States holds those to the Caribbean, it holds them less surely; and "the dangerous sea" that lies beyond the gates falls under the divided dominion of three great powers. There was a time, we are told, when, during the summer season, yellow fever and typhoons swept shipping from the Caribbean; it is man, not nature, that threatens to sweep it from the Mediterranean.