Journal of the International Association of

Buddhist Studies
Volume 23 Number 1 2000
JIKIDO TAKASAKI
In memoriam Prof. Hajime Nakamura
DANIEL BOUCHER
On Hu and Fan Again: the Transmission
of "Barbarian" Manuscripts to China
ANNHEIRMAN
What Happened to the Nun MaitreYl?
CHARLES B. JONES
Mentally Constructing What Already Exists:
The Pure Land Thought of Chan Master
Jixing Chewu (1741-1810) .
JAN NATTIER
The Realm of A Missing Piece
in the History of Pure Land Buddhism
REIKO OHNUMA
The Story of Rupavatl:
A Female Past Birth of the Buddha
BHIKKHU pASADIKA
A Hermeneutical Problem in
1
7
29
43
71
103
SN 42, 12 (SN IV, 333) and AN X, 91 (AN V, 178) 147
OSKAR VON HINOBER
Report on the XIIth Conference of the lABS
Accounts of the XIIth lABS Conference
155
161
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EDITORIAL BOARD
Cristina A. Scherrer-Schaub
Tom J.F. Tillemans
Editors-in-Chief
Robert Buswell
Steven Collins
Collett Cox
Luis O. G6mez
Paul Harrison
Oskar von Hinuber
Roger Jackson
Padmanabh S. Jaini
Shoryu Katsura
Donald S. Lopez, Jr.
Alexander Macdonald
D. Seyfort Ruegg
Robert Sharf
Ernst Steinkellner
Erik Zurcher
Editorial Assistant:
Yves Ramseier
nABS 23.1
Contributors to this issue:
Jikid6 TAKASAKI was Professor of Buddhist Studies at the University
of Tokyo from 1977 to 1987 and is now Professor Emeritus. Since
1992, he has been President of the University of Tsurumi in Yokohama.
Daniel BOUCHER is currently Assistant Professor of East Asian
religions and Buddhism at Cornell University (Ithaca, NY). His special-
ization is early Mahayana siitra litterature and the process of its trans-
lation into Chinese in the first half of the first rnillenium.
Ann HEIRMAN is Assistant Professor in the Department of Eastern
Languages and Cultures (Chinese Language and Culture) at Ghent
University, Belgium. Ph.D. 1998 (Ghent University): Disciplinary Rules
for Nuns According to the Dharmaguptakavinaya. Main fields of interest:
early monastic discipline; early Buddhist monastic history in China.
Charles B. JONES, Assistant Professor, Dept. of Religion and Religious
Education, and Director, Institute for Interreligious Study and Dialogue,
Catholic University of America; Washington DC, USA. Interests:
religion in Taiwan, post-Song dynasty Chinese Pure Land Buddhism,
Buddhist-Christian interchange.
Jan NATTIER is Associate Professor of Buddhist Studies at Indiana
University (Indiana, U.S.A.). Her past research has dealt with the
transmission of Buddhism from India to China across the so-called "Silk
Road" through Central Asia. Her current work is focused on early
Mahayana Buddhism in India and its reception in China, especially' as
conveyed in the translations of Zhi Q i a n : X ~ (3rd c. CE). She is also
the editor of Buddhist Literature, a new journal devoted exclusively to
the publication of Buddhist texts in translation.
Bhikku pASADIKA is Hon. Professor in the Department of Indology
and Tibetology at Philipp's University, Marburg, teaching Buddhist
philosophy, PaIi and classical Tibetan. He is currently serving as a
temporary replacement professor in the Department of Orientalism and
Indology at the Ruhr University of Bochum, teaching Sanskrit. He is a
member of the editorial board of The Tibet Journal (Dharamsala) and
assistant editor of Buddhist Studies Review, the semi-annual journal of
JIABS 23.1
the UK Association for Buddhist Studies. His main research interests
are: a) early Mahayana texts, Nagarjunian studies; b) comparative study
of the Pali nikayas and Chinese agamas.
Reiko OHNUMA is an Assistant Professor in the Department of
Religion at Dartmouth College, New Hampshire. She is interested in
Indian Buddhist narrative literature preserved in Sanskrit, Pali and
Tibetan.
Oskar v. HINUBER is Professor for Indology at the
Seminar, University of Freiburg (Germany). Main fields of interest:
history of middle Indo-Aryan languages and Pali literature, Gilgit
manuscripts, epigraphy of the Upper Indus, South-east Asian Buddhism.
In memoriam
Professor Hajime Nakamura
nKIDO TAKASAKI
Professor Hajime Nakamura, one of the great authorities in Indian
Philosophy and Buddhist Studies, passed away on the 10th of October
1999 at the age of eighty-six. Professor Nakamura, an Honorary Member
of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, was world-renowned
for his works, including Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples: India,
China, Tibet, Japan see below), a comparative essay
on Eastern civilisations viewed through their ways of thinking.
*
* *
Born in Matsue, Shimane prefecture, on the 28th November, 1912, Prof.
Nakamura entered in 1933 the Faculty of Letters (Department of Indian
Philosophy and Sanskrit Literature) of Tokyo Imperial University (now
the University of Tokyo). After completing his undergraduate courses in
1936, he went on to the Graduate School of Tokyo Imperial University,
studying "The History of Early Vedanta Philosophy" under the supervision
of Prof. Hakuju Ui. In 1943 he succeeded Prof. Ui and was appointed
Associate Professor of Tokyo Imperial University; at the same time he
received the degree of D. Litt. for the above-mentioned study of Vedanta
Philosophy.
Prof. Nakamura enjoyed a highly successful academic career: he was
promoted to full professor in 1954; he also took on the position of the
Dean of the Faculty of Letters from 1964 until 1966. For thirty years,
until his retirement in March 1973, Prof. Nakamura supervised the work
of young scholars in the Department of Indian Philosophy. Throughout
his career Prof. Nakamura's innovative ideas and philological rigor enabled
him to make innumerable contributions, not only to virtually the entire
domain of Indian Philosophy and Buddhist Studies, but also to the
comparative study of philosophy, as is witnessed by his Ways of Thinking
of Eastern Peoples. His works, which were widely appreciated not just in
Japan but internationally, secured a worldwide reputation for Prof.
Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies
Volume 23. Number 1 .2000
-JIABS 23.1 2
Nakamura. His academic achievements were rewarded by the Order of
Culture in 1977 and a nomination to the Japan Academy (B
in 1982.
Besides his brilliant academic career, what deserves special mention is
Prof. Nakamura's founding of the Eastern Institute (ToM Kenkyukai, M
1Ilf.t:.A*1J1iJf9\:W{). Instead of taklng a new position in another university
after his retirement from the University of Tokyo, Prof. Nakamura chose
to establish an institute that would give untenured young scholars, fresh
from graduate schools, the opportunity to putsue their own research. At
the same time, Prof. Nakamura founded the ToM Gakuin
which he himself called a terakoya. I In this college, open to the public,
he regularly gave lectures on a wide variety of subjects in Buddhism and
Indian philosophy with the help of young members of the Eastern Institute.
He thus anticipated, by twenty years, the idea that one should pursue
"lifetime education," an idea which is so widely accepted today. Here too
is clear evidence of Prof. Nakamura's extraordinary foresight and
organisational abilities, not just in scholarly research but also in the field
of education.
* * *
It is far from easy to describe, or even outline, Prof. Nakamura's scholarly
achievements, as they comprise more than 170 monographs, both in
Japanese and in Western languages, and over a thousand articles. Let me,
however, summarize a few of his principal works and discuss some of
their features.
(1) Prof. Nakamura's area of expertise was Indian Philosophy, including
Buddhist Studies, if we adopt the current way of classifying academic
fields in Japan. The core of his work was largely focussed on the Vedanta
school, which one might call "the most authentic of the authentic Hindu
philosophies." And the publication which best testifies to his expertise in
this area is The History of Early Vedanta Philosophy/ a slightly revised
version of his doctoral thesis. For this publication, Prof. Nakamura was
honored with an Imperial Award of the Japan Academy (B
The History of Early Vedanta Philosophy chronologically reconstructs
1. in the Edo period reading, writing and arithmetic were taught to children
in these small schools attached to Buddhist temples.
2. fnAA7'.:r. 4 vols., 1951-1956, Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten.
TAKASAKI 3
the history of the formation of the Vedanta school from the
period on, using internal sources as well as external sources, such as
Bl,lddhist and Jain literature. It was highly appreciated by Western scholars
for its English.translations, and was considered to be the world's first
historical study of Vedanta schoo1.
3
Besides Vedanta studies, the area of research to which Prof .. Nakamura
contributed most extensively is that of Early Buddhism. Prof. Nakamura
discussed the life of Gautama Buddha, the teaching of early Buddhist
scriptures and the social background of Early Buddhism, basing himself
primarily on Pali literature, but also very significantly upon Chinese and
Tibetan translations, Jain literature and that of other Indian schools of
philosophy, as well as the available inscriptional sources. He consecrated
great energy to translating Buddhist scriptures, thus furthering modern
readers' understanding. Prof. Nakamuravigourously defended the opinion
that, in examining the history of the composition of the scriptures, the
older stratum of the scriptures, which was closer to the original teaching,
was to be found in the texts composed in verse rather than in those
composed in prose.
Furthermore, Prof. Nakamura played a pioneering role in studying
Buddhist and Indian Logic from a modern viewpoint, as is well brought
out by his "Some Clarifications of the Concept of Voidness from the
Standpoint of Symbolic Logic".4 His historical study on Indian society,
i.e., the context for Indian philosophy, was the starting point for Japanese
research on ancient Indian society: this work is remarkable for being the
initial impetus for later full-scale studies on Indian history.
(2) However, it was Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples (2 vols., Misuzu
ShobO), published in 1948-9 before his doctoral dissertation, that led to
the wide recognition and fame of Prof. Nakamura. This book is said to
have been originally conceived of as being a part of a collaborative work
destined to contribute to war-time policy making by furthering the
understanding of Asian nations. That said, only the part under Prof.
Nakamura's responsibility was ever brought to completion and the contents
3. See, for example, "Dpanishadic Tradition and the Early School of Vedanta as
noticed in Buddhist Scripture", Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 18.1, 2
(1955): 74--104
4. Indogaku Bukkyogaku Kenkya 3.1 (1954): 223-23l.
See also "Buddhist Logic Expounded by means of Symbolic Logic", Indogaku
Bukkyogaku Kenkya 7.1 (1958).
JIABS 23.1 4
of the book itself bear no political overtones whatsoever. It was and
continues to be the exemplary work for the comparative study of Indian,
Chinese, Japanese and Tibetan cultures, initially because of its coherent
methodological framework in which the formal aspects of inference and
judgement were examined in the various cultures, but also because it
carefully delimited the scope of the analysis of Chinese and Japanese
cultures by taking Buddhism as the key common cultural substratum
upon which comparison could be focussed.
5
This work attracted the
attention of American scholars and led to Prof. Nakamura's fIrst invitation
to lecture abroad, in Stanford in 1951. The work came to be internationally
known through its translations into English
6
and other languages. It can
be safely said that Prof. Nakamura's later essays on Japanese culture, in
which he took Buddhism as the axis, are extensions of his approach in
Ways o/Thinking.
(3) The preceeding discussion enables us to see Prof. Nakamura's
fundamental standpoint, namely, that various nations' cultures and
civilizations are essentially manifestations, in different geographical
locations, of the human philosophical and intellectual heritage. In that
sense, there is nothing particular that we could call "Indian Philosophy."
Indeed, as the title of one of his monographs shows, Indian Philosophy
is, according to Prof. Nakamura, simply the Indian development 0/
philosophical thinking.7 Prof. Nakamura thus never abandoned the
comparative perspective in approaching different philosophies and cultures.
When discussing, for example, religion, he also did not limit himself to
doctrinal aspects, but always took into account the social background, be
it the history, belles-lettres, politics or economics. This methodological
perspective was expressed in his An Essay on Comparative Philosophl
5. Note that the part on inference and judgement is omitted in the current edition,
in response to criticisms made by specialists in Indian, Chinese and Japanese
studies.
6. The fIrst two English translations: 1960, Tokyo: The Japanese National Commis-
sion for UNESCO; 1964, Honolulu: East-West Center Press. See also The Ways
of Thinking of the Chinese as Revealed in Chinese Buddhist Thought, edited by
Arthur. F. Wright, 1952, Aspen, CO: The Committee for Chinese Thought.
7. 1949.
8. 1960. There is no mention of an English title in the book itself.
But the author says there that Japanese 'shisi5' (,Ijl;(;tt!) in this context means
'philosophy' in a broad sense (p. 1). Hence we have translated the Japanese title
in this fashion.
TAKASAKI 5
and led to the foundation of The Japanese Association for Comparative
Philosophy His ultimate aim was to write a
comprehensive "history of world thought" (ittW}&,;m5t:),9 based on a
quadruple chronological division in terms of what was ancient, universal,
medieval or modern.
(4) Prof. Nakamura's thinking went well beyond disciplinary boundaries
and led him to criticize, already from an early age on, the tendency to
specialize in narrowly delimited domains such as that of Indian Philosophy.
Another criticism which he made was to argue that Buddhist Studies
should not follow the model of fields such as Egyptology and deal only
with the past: Indian and Buddhist philosophies are of contemporary
relevance; Prof. Nakamura's message was that we should emphasize their
philosophical implications for our future. It was his firm conviction that
scholarly knowledge should provide us with directions on how to lead
our lives.
* * *
It is virtually impossible to imagine anyone equalling the wide-ranging
achievements of Prof. Hajime Nakamura. We, who were students of Prof.
Nakamura, have only a superficial glimpse of what he accomplished. We
should, however, explore new problems and undertake new study projects,
all the while bearing in mind the whole domain of Prof. Nakamura's
accomplishments and his methodological standpoint. Let us close this
obituary by expressing our resolution to pursue this ideal.
(Except for those in English, those published by Iwanami Shoten, translational works,
and editorial works such as dictionaries, all the principal publications by Prof. Nakamura
are now included in Selected Works of Hajime Nakamura (i5IclE)\jj .
32+8 vols., Tokyo: Shunjusha), which has been brought to its completion in July
1999.)
translated from the Japanese by Toru Tomabechi
9. Prof. Nakamura explained what he meant by the phrase 'Sekai Shisoshi' in the
following way: "[T]o be precise these four volumes entitled Sekai Shisoshi
constitute a treatise aiming at a presentation of common philosophical problems
as seen through their parallel development stages in cultural traditions in various
spheres in the world." (Selected Works ofHajime Nakamura (i5IclE)\jj . $;ft5t;
supplementary volume I (Ancient Philosophy, p.l)
DANIEL BOUCHER
On Hu and Fan Again: the Transmission of "Barbarian"
Manuscripts to China*
In a recent contribution to this journal, YANG Jidong argued that early
Chinese Buddhists typically referred to incoming Buddhist scriptures and
the languages in which they were composed as hu Ml This label, con-
tends YANG, carried a "strong racist sense," a sense that has led many
Western writers to translate the term as "barbarian." It was not until the
beginning of the SuilTang period (sixth-seventh cents.) that Buddhist
bibliographers, buoyed by the improved fortunes of Buddhism, its
domestication within Chinese culture, and its support from the highest
levels of society, systematically replaced instances of hu in the canon
with fan ::\t. Such a shift, YANG argues, reflects an attempt by native
exegetes to dignify Buddhism as originating from the respectable
civilization of India, thereby expressing a previously lacking self-confi-
dence in the cultural capital that Buddhism was able to command in the
early medieval period.
Although a seemingly small issue, the signification of hu and fan in
early Chinese Buddhist usage raises several complex and interrelated
problems vis-a.-vis both Indian and Chinese Buddhism. And since YANG
has conflated and, in my opinion, confused these issues, I would like to
readdress this problem with a different body of evidence. It. is neither
the case, it seems to me, that hu and fan were merely interchangeable in
the early period of Chinese Buddhism nor that hu necessarily had "a
very strong racist sense and signified something uncivilized and inher-
ently contradictory to Chinese culture."2 On the contrary, hu and fan
appear in many contexts to refer to specific kinds of Indian Buddhist
texts. The importance of exposing this more technical usage lies in
making available data on Indian Buddhist textual history centuries
* I would like to thank Profs. Victor H. Mair and Jan Nattier for their helpful
comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Their suggestions saved me from a
number of infelicities.
1. YANG 1998.
2. YANG 1998: 167.
Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies
Volume 23. Number 1 .2000
JIABS 23.1 8
before our first extant manuscripts. Moreover, as the Chinese attempted
to make sense ofIndian scripts and languages, they revealed not so much
a discomfiture with things foreign, but a deeply ingrained, more funda-
mental frame of reference, one constrained by the weight of the Chinese
writing system. It is only in looking at the problem from both sides, the
Indian and the Chinese, that we are likely to understand the early use of
these terms, and in the process, the difficulties the Chinese encountered
in engaging a significant linguistic other for the first time.
One of the first things a reader of the prefaces and colophons to the
early Chinese Buddhist translations notices is a certain inconsistency in
the way the Indian source texts are identified. To illustrate this point, let
me begin with a couple of short examples from the records contained in
Sengyou's early sixth-century Chu sanzang ji ji il- [A Collec-
tion of Notices on the Translation of the Tripitaka, hereafter CSZJJ].
The first is a record concerning one of the translations of (fl.
168-189 C.E.):
The Daoxing jing m:1l'* in one fascicle.
During the reign of Han Emperor Huan (r. 146-167), the Indian sramalJa Zhu
Shuofo (var. Foshuo) brought the Hu text (huben tj}j:2(s::) to China. During the
reign of Emperor Ling (r. 168-189), it was translated in Luoyang.
3
Even such a short notice raises several questions. First, it is curious that
a translation of the A.J!asahasrika, to which the translated title Daoxing
jing is known to correspond, is described as consisting of one fascicle
(juan ;ff) immediately before the mention of another in
corpus (Bore daoxing pin in ten fascicles (var. eight fas-
cicles). This latter translation is almost certainly the version that has
come down to us (T 224).4 Secondly, although the relationship between
Zhu Shuofo,who brought the Hu text to China, and who is
not even mentioned here, is unstated, we know from other colophons,
3. CSZJJ (T.2145) 55: 6b.
4. One might speculate, as, for example, Edward CONZE has, that the one-fascicle
Daoxing jing here refers to a verse summary, perhaps of only the first two
chapters (41 verses) of the Prajiiilpilramitil-ratnagulJa-sa7J7cayagilthii (cf.
CONZE 1973: x). These two chapters, CONZE suggests, constitute a coherent
individual text, united by the recurring refrain, "the practice of wisdom, the
highest perfection," hence the Chinese title daoxing (the practice of the Way).
Some Japanese scholars have called the existence of a one-fascicle version into
question, though their arguments are unconvincing (cf. HlKATA 1958: xxxvi-
xxxviii).
BOUCHER 9
e.g., that to their translation of the Pratyutpannabuddha-sa1J1-mukhava-
sthita-samadhi-siitra (T 418), that Zhu Shuofo was sometimes respon-
sible for reciting the Indic text after which would
orally translate. his recitation (lit., chuan yan "transfer the words")
for Chinese scribes (bishou "who receive with the brush").5 Even
if these latter roles were exercised in the translation of the Daoxing jing
as well, the relationship between Zhu Shuofo's oral recitation, Loka-
oral translation, and its transformation into a semi-literary
Chinese text by the native scribes remains far from clear and suggests at
the very least a rather complicated process. Let us look at another
colophon from about a century later.
The following is a colophon to translation of the
Chixin jing ;f-!H:,,#-m:
Chixin jing;6 on the tenth day of the third month of the seventh year of the
Taikang reign period [=ApriI20, 286], the Dunhuang bodhisattva (kaishi i7fJ)
5. CSZJJ, 55: 48c.9-16; see also HARRISON 1990: 259-61.
6. s rendering of the name of the bodhisattva after whom
this text is named, is unexpected. Sengrui, an eminent monk of the late fourth-
early fifth century and the principal translation assistant to the great Kuchean
translator KumarajIva, wrote a preface to Kumarajiva's translation of this sutra
that contains some interesting remarks concerning the title of s text:
The title of this sutra according to the correct Indian phones (yin 11f) is
pishisha zhenti Ef.f.il1i?:9Jiifrif. This is the name of a bodhisattva with
surpassingly marvelous thoughts, who is a brahma god in another realm.
I [Sengrui] listened carefully to Kumarajiva's translation of this name
[i.e., siyi and, vacillating, turned it over in my mind repeatedly, but
the meaning [of his translation] seems not to have captured the sense.
Surely this is because he [KumarajIva] was not fully conversant with the
variations between words and their referents (mingshi zhi bian iS1{z.
in Chinese. I have examined the significance of this term, matching
its name to its purport, [and have determined that] it should be [translated
as] chiyi ("taking hold of thought"), not as siyi ,WH ("[whose]
thoughts are extraordinary"). It is simply because he [KumarajIva] did
not realize the meaning of 'to hold' (chi fif) and accordingly used 'to
augment' instead. The word yi is defined as 'to surpass' (chao
jue 'extraordinary' (shuyi or 'marvelo1!lsly superior (miao-
ba ft9iW). As for si ,W, it designates 'advancing a task to the highest
excellence' (jin ye gaosheng 'to push oneself without rest'
(ziqiang buxi ElS:$ l' }ill,). The old designation, "taking hold of the mind"
(chixin J'lf{,.), best captures its reference (CSZJJ, 55:57c.23-29).
Sengrui's defense of the "old designation" (jiuming If is) is, of course, a prefer-
ence for translation of the proper name as
JIABS 23.1 10
Dharmarak.\la expounded (shuoehu ill) the brahmf text (fanwen 3'tjO in
Chang'an, conferring it upon [Nie] Chengyuan
7
These two short records alert us to all manner of interesting problems.
For the purposes of this paper, I would like to highlight one particular
point of contrast: the original lndic text behind Daoxing
jing translation is styled huben M*; the source manuscript of Dharma-
translation of the Chixin jing is calledfanwen Before one
concludes that such a difference reflects the idiosyncratic terminology of
the respective translation committees (members of which must have been
responsible for our anonymous colophons), I should point out that
within translation corpus we find some source texts
designated as hu, others as fan. lndic originals identified as hu among
the colophons to s translations include the Saddhanna-
pUIJr;larfkasutra (hujing M#&0, the Paiicavi1!lsatisahasrika-prajiiapara-
mitasutra (huben),8 the Sura1!lgamasamadhisutra (hujing),9 the Tatha-
opposed to the rendering proposed by KumarajIva. This preference is noteworthy
for several reasons. First of all, Sengrui is wrong. apparent chixin
fi!H:" is a non-sensical rendering of which has the sense of "one
possessed of surpassing thoughts." For this reason GOSHIMA Kiyotaka has
proposed regarding s chi :f!f ("to hold") as a mistake for te !/'if
("extraordinary, distinguished") (GOSHIMA 1988: 60, note 1). If GOSHIMA is
correct, Sengrui's discussion indicates that this mistake is quite old (i.e., not due
to later transmission mistakes). One might also speculate that chi was used as a
lexical variant for te by Dharmarak.\la and his translation committees, since there
are other instances in s corpus where he appears to u.se chi :f!f to
render At SaddharmapU/:ujarfka 9: 66a.l0 he renders the name of one of
the Buddha CandrasiiryapradIpa's sons, as chiyi At
SuvikrantacintidevaputraparipTceha 15: 97b.8 we
fr;9:f!f; the Tibetan renders this as follows: gang-la ehos bii rgya-chen khyad-par
de yod-pa, "one who possesses the four exalted, superb qualities."
KumarajIva takes this bodhisattva's name as a bahuvrfhi compound: siyi }i$\i;i
"(whose) thoughts are extraordinary"; this, despite Sengrui's criticism, is clearly
to be preferred to ehixin.
7. CSZJJ 55: 57c.19-21.
8. The principal evidence we have conceming source text is
contained in Dao'an's (312-385) "Preface to the Concise Commentary to the
Synoptic Edition of the Fangguang and Guangzan" (CSZJJ, 55: 47c.29-48b.21).
In his description of the translations by and respectively,
Dao'an describes text as huben. Though he may be relying here
upon a notice that is no longer available to us, it is highly unlikely that Dao'an
himself saw the Indic manuscript. Also, in the "Preface to the lianbei jing
[Dasabhiimikasiitra]" (CSZJJ, 55: 62b.22-c.14), the author (in all probability
BOUCHER 11
gatamahiikarulJii-nirde.sasutra (hujing), and the Lalitavistarasutra
(huben). By contrast, four texts held by are labelled as fan:
the Avaivartikacakrasutra (janshu :ltii), the
PTcchiisutra (fanwen), the Maiijusrfvikurvii"fwparivartasutra (janshu),
and the Dasabhumikasutra (janben ?).I 0
It would seem then that among at least some of the early colophon
writers, translation assistants, and native exegetes, hu and fan were
distinguished as two different kinds of Indic texts. The underlying
referent of fan (probably *b(r)jam in Eastern Han pronunciation
ll
) is
evident; it almost certainly must be a transcription of briihmf, one of the
principal scripts of north India from at least the third century B.C.E.
While the sense of huben is not as immediately obvious, the logical,
indeed, the only remaining alternative is to see it as referring to
manuscripts. Such a supposition, however, will require addi-
tional support from independent sources.
It is, of course, neither new nor startling to suggest that Buddhist texts
in script were transmitted to China in the first few centuries of
the common era. However, this thesis, despite being widely held, has
seldom been explicitly demonstrated. John BROUGH has been one of the
few scholars to address this point, attempting to show that several mis-
translations of Indian proper names in a third-century translation of the
Sukhiivatfvyuha can best be explained on the basis of a misreading of a
Dao'an again) discusses the circumstances of translation of the
Guangzan jing [PaiicavilJ'lsati] and here again describes the Indian sutra as
huben. Stefano ZACCHETTI has recently completed an impressive thesis on
Guangzan jing, including an edition, translation, and extensive
annotation of the fIrst six chapters. See ZACCHETTI 1999.
9. Information on this translation is preserved in Zhi Mindu's "Colophon to the
Synoptic Edition of the Shoulengyan jing" (CSZJJ, 55: 49b.15-17). See also
LAMOTTE 1965: 81-87.
10. The information for the source text Dasabhumika translation is
somewhat ambiguous. The colophon at the end of the translation states that
"holding the briihmf text (fanben J.t:::zts:) in his hands, orally
translated it himself into Chinese at the Shixi Monastery in Chang'an" (T 285,
10: 497b.18-20). However, a variant recorded from the Old Song (1104-1148)
and Song (1239) editions of the canon replaces fan with hu j1j)3. Also, in the
"Preface to the Jianbeijing," which can probably be attributed to Dao'an or one
of his close disciples, is reported to have held a huben in translating
the DasabkUmika into Chinese (CSZJJ, 55: 62b.5-7).
11. See COBLIN 1983: 241 (6).
JIABS 23.1 12
text.
12
Although there is nothing objectionable about
BROUGH's conclusion, a conclusion I will attempt to buttress in this
paper, it is less certain that his examples support such a position. This is
especially so given his - and most scholars' - failure to appreciate the
impact of the translation process in China. Moreover, assumptions about
manuscripts are inevitably tied to questions concerning the role
of Gfuldharl Prakrit, so much so that they are generally presumed to
entirely overlap.
Because the problems involved in discerning the relationship between
our extant Chinese translations and their underlying Indic source texts
are complex, layered, and difficult to control, I will bracket for the time
being the problem of the relationship between script and language and
offer instead examples of disparities between the early Chinese render-
ings of particular passages and the extant Sanskrit manuscripts that
appear to reflect graphically-induced rnisreadings of a text written in
script.
What I would like to do then is to present two examples from
Dharmaral.q;a's translation of the Saddharmapu1Jarfkasutra, completed
in the year 286,13 that suggest confusions in the Chinese renderings that
can not be described as free or loose interpretations of the Indic original.
That is, these are cases where the early Chinese translation departs from
our extant Sanskrit manuscripts as well as later Chinese translations of
the same text in ways that are neither predictable nor in most cases even
sensible.
In the first chapter there are several instances in which the bodhisattva
Maitreya is referred to by his alternative name Ajita in both transcription
(ayi Early Middle Chinese: ?a jit) (Dh 9:66a.17) and in translation
12. BROUGH 1965: 609-611.
13. The date as well as the circumstances of this translation are known from a
colophon preserved in the CSZIJ, 55: 56c.16-24; see BOUCHER 1998: 485-89
for a translation and discussion of this interesting piece of data. a
Yuezhi monk from Dunhuang (modem Gansu province), is the fIrst we hear of
Buddhism at this western Chinese military and mercantile outpost,' where he is
reported to have studied under an Indian teacher from an early age.
translation career spanned over 40 years during the latter half of
the third century and saw the production of over 150 texts into Chinese, many of
which were sizeable and influential. On the life and translation career of
see TSUKAMoTOIHURvnz 1985: 193-230 and more recently
BOUCHER 1996: 22-43.
BOUCHER 13
(moneng sheng "whom none can surpass") (Dh 9:66b.21).14
There is, it appears, also a confusion related to this name in close
proximity with this translation:
KN 18.3-6: iti hy ajitaitena paraf!lparodahiiref.la candrasiiryapradfpa-niima-
kiiniif!! tathiigatiiniim arhatiif!l samyaksaf!lbuddhiiniim ekaniima-
dheyiiniim ekakulagotriif.liif!l yad idaf!l bharadviija-sagotriif.liif!l
vi1J1iatitathiigatasahasriif.ly abhiivan I tatriijita ....
Thus, Ajita, there were successively 20,000 tathiigatas who had
the same name and the same family - namely, Bharadviija - as the
Tathiigata, Arhat, Candrasiiryaprachpa. Then,
Ajita ... ;
Dh 65c.29-66a.l: S *"WTz.l:t=
.:tzO*
Thus there were 80 tathiigatas all having the same name Candra-
siiryapradIpa, all inheriting the same family name. If we were to
line them up, there would be 20,000 tathiigatas. The Buddha said
to Ajita ....
We have two instances of the name Ajita in the Sanskrit passage but
only one in the Chinese. Moreover, we have a rather strange state of
affairsin the Chinese: describes the number of tathiigatas
who have successively appeared as CandrasiiryapradIpa to be eighty,and
then immediately following, to be twenty thousand. There is, of course,
no mention of "eighty" in our Indic text. But if we suppose Dharma-
ralqa to have been working from a manuscript that read
*ayita, with the common Prakritic development of intervocalic j
replaced by y, and, moreover, reflecting the pronunciation of the tran-
scription occurring in close proximity, then we could speculate that he
misread the P as sa J] - two of the most graphically similar .
in this script - and understood asrti ("eighty").15 Even though
read this name correctly both in transcription and in trans-
14. For the following textual excerpts, Dh will refer to translation of
the Saddharmapuf.lrJarfkasiitra (T 263, 9:63-134) and KN will designate the
KERN-NANllO edition of the Sanskrit text.
15. The ya and sa are clearly distinct in our earliest records and only
become difficult to distinguish in inscriptions of ca. first century C.E. and later;
see KONOW 1929: cxxill; RAPsoN and NOBLE 1929: 308; and SALOMON 1998:
55. Cf. also FUSSMAN 1989: 465: "Dans une inscription ecrite
rapidement ou peu soigneusement, des confusions entre alqara de forme voisine
sont possibles (tl dlr Iv; a/h; y I s, etc.)."
JlABS 23.1 14
lation several times in nearby passages, here he not only misread the
text, but produced a translation that is overtly incoherent.l
6
The second example from the Saddharmapw:u;larfkasiitra is drawn
from the brilliant study of translation by Seishi KARA-
SHIMA.17 In the first chapter, in an address by Maitreya requesting of
Manjusn an explanation for the Buddha's miraculous display of light,
we find this verse:
KN 10.5-6:
Dh 64b.5-8:
ye ciipi anye sugatasya putrii anuttariil[! jfiiina I
vividhiil[! kriyiil[! sarvakiilal[! pi bodhfya vadanti
va0al[! II
And those other sons of the Accomplished One, seeking highest
knowledge, carry out their various tasks at all times; them also [the
buddhas] commend toward enlightenment.
JiI. fffi fiJT
-:f?JtltF,,'JiI.:ET*
Having encountered the Buddha's extraordinary sutras, there are
others who are determined to seek the highest knowledge; the
whole world
l9
sees his manifold forms and these sentient beings
extol the Buddha's virtues.
There are several problems with s rendering which seem to
have inspired a rather different verse than that found in the Sanskrit text;
16. See also BOUCHER 1998: 499-500. There is another possible yalsa confusion in
translation of the Lotus. At KN 363.13 we find: viniiSadharma
(subject to the law of decay); renders this (9: 120c.11): M/:(v.l.
(righteous dharma and regulations), reflecting an apparent confusion
of viniisa and vinaya. On this example see KARASHIMA 1992: 203. Another
possible instance of this graphic confusion between yalsa occurs in
(FINOT, ed., 35.19): apiiyabhumil[! gatim
daridratiil[! nfcakulopapattim ("[they will be subject to] an evil state, a
destiny among inopportune rebirths, poverty, and rebirth in a lowly family");
renders this (3:413c.21): /F ("not
seeing the stage of enlightenment, they follow corrupt practices and are born in a
poor and lowly family"). Although there are several problems with this line, it
would appear that has misconstrued apiiya- as apas(y)a- ("not
seeing").
17. KARASHIMA 1992: 30.
18. On the unusual expression zhusuo fffifiJT (= many), see KARASHIMA 1996: 206.
19. KARASHIMA (1992: 30) suggests that this rendering by is due to an
instance of metathesis, in which he, or less likely, his manuscript, read sarva-
kiila(l[!) as sarva-loka(l[!) with a concomrnitent confusion between ii and o.
BOUCHER 15
Most relevant for our purposes, however, is the translation of putra
("sons") as jingji ("sutras"). Since no phonological development
cquld. account for such a confusion, it seems more likely that Dharma-
mistook a pu J' in script as su 1.20 Although these two
signs are on the whole clearly distinguished in our extant documents and
inscriptions, there are a number of texts, especially those from Niya,21 in
which the pa comes close to being closed at the top, thus approx-
imating some versions of sa.
22
These examples are by no means unambiguous, but they do demon-
strate that had great difficulties in reading some of his
Indic manuscripts. His difficulties could have been exacerbated no doubt
by manuscript corruptions and translation assistants of varying linguistic
skill. We should, under the circumstances, be surprised that he got so
much right. But it is what he got wrong that tells us the most about his
Indic source texts, now heavily Sanskritized and obscured from our
view. And what we learn from passages like those cited above is that a
number of the translation infelicities within translation of
the SaddharmapU1:u;!arfkasutra can best be explained as misreadings of a
manuscript. That the colophon to this translation describes the
Indic text as hujing (Hu sutra) confrrms the connection between the
term hu in a limited, technical sense and the script. As possible
supporting evidence, BROUGH has argued that transla-
tion of the Lalitavistara (T 186) stems from a GandharI Prakrit original
as evidenced by the reconstructed pronunciations of a few of the head-
words to its arapacana formulary, a formulary now known to be the
20. Moreover, in a we would expect long vowels to have been
unmarked; thus putrii and satra may well have been distinguished only on the
basis of the initial consonant.
21. Cf., e.g., BOYER et al. 1927, document no. 696, line 3.
22. There is an identical confusion between putra and satra in chap. 2 of the Lotus,
noted by KARASHIMA (1992: 51). KN 46.3: bhavanti 'me eeha sadii visuddhii
vyaktii suer sarata buddhaputriilJ. (''These sons of the Buddha here are always
pure, wise, virtuous, and compassionate."); Dh 70bA-5: t
("Desiring to experience enlightenment, you should always be
under control and pure; for you to take pleasure in the sacred scriptures is truly
the essential purpose"). My translation of s rendering hereis neces-
sarily tentative given the problems in his apprehension of the Indic source text.
For a discussion of other instances of a form of the verb ...Jbha (MIA bho(n)di)
being confused with bodhi, "enlightenment," see BOUCHER 1998: 478-79.
nABS 23.1 16
syllabic order of GandharI Prakrit in script.2
3
And the
colophon to this translation also describes the Indic text as huben (iii::2[s:).
Given that there appears to be evidence of misapprehensions of.
orthography underlying some of our early Chinese Buddhist
translations, and these same texts are specifically described by the
anonymous colophon writers as a hujing or huben - in marked contrast
to other texts in corpus - it would seem likely then that
the term hu carried the more technical sense of rather than
"barbarian" in many of our early Chinese Buddhist records.
24
By no
means are these records entirely consistent in this matter; there are sqme
strikingly ambiguous examples.
25
23. BROUGH 1977; for a discussion of the arapacana formulary and its connection
to script and Gllndhlln Prakrit, see SALOMON 1990. One of the best
examples offered by BROUGH to support his thesis is the use of the Chinese
character xin m ("faith") in translation to represent the Indic
presumably the first syllable of GllndharI Skt.
sraddhii), typifying the usual Giindhan development of sr >
24. There is an additional piece of evidence confirming the association of hu with
cited in RAo 1993 and kindly brought to my attention by Stefano
ZACCHETTI. In a work discussing the history of the Siddham script, the ninth-
century Japanese Tendai monk Annen cites an otherwise unknown
passage by the famous Southern dynasties poet Xie Lingyun liMlIW (385-433)
as follows:
The Hu and Briihmf scripts are used by religious and lay alike; originally
they were created by the Buddha. Therefore the scripture says: 'Various
siistras, mantras, languages, and scripts are all taught by the Buddha, not
by heretics. The heretics adopt them in order to be versed in writing.'
The Hu characters are what we call (qulou 1:!1t) writing. As
. for the script, the transcendent (named) copied the
Briihmf writing in order to establish the essentials" (T 2702, 84: 369a.
18-22).
Xie Lingyun may have been well placed to make such observations since not
only did he associate widely in the Buddhist circles of his day, but he participated
on translation committees with foreign monks as well, most famously con-
tributing to the revision of the so-called "Southern recension" of the Mahiiyiina-
mahiiparinirviil}-a-siitra (T 375), which may be the scripture referred to above.
For more details on his Buddhist activities, see MATHER 1958 and ZURCHER
1959: 412, note 125.
25. We have, for example, a curious set of records concerning the two earliest
translations of the Paiicavil'J1satisiihasrikii-prajiiiipiiramitii-siitra. The colophon
to Fangguang jing :1J:Y6# (CSZJJ, 55: 47c.1O-28) describes the
arrival of the Indic text in China:
BOUCHER 17
The switch from hu to fan in the Sui/Tang period as discussed by
YANG then may not be so much a reflection of "the key role played by
Central Asia and its languages in the early stage of the eastward spread
of Buddhism,'which was overshadowed by India and Sanskrit during the
later periods."26 Rather, if my findings above prove to be correct, it may
Formerly Zhu Shixing of Yingchuan during the Great Wei dynasty [220-
265] left the household in the fifth year of the Ganlu reign period [=
260] to study the Way and become a srama!la. He set out west of the
border and arrived in the country of Khotan. There he copied and
acquired the first chapter in brahm! script; the huben has ninety chapters
and more than 600,000 words. In the third year of the Taikang reign
period [= 282] he sent his disciple Fu Rutan - which in Chinese
characters is Farao - to convey this satra, a huben, to Luoyang. It
remained there for three years after which it went to Xuchang for two
years. Afterwards it reached the Shuinan Temple in Cangyuan in the
vicinity of Chenliu [in modem Henan]. On the fifteenth day of the fifth
month of the fIrSt year of the Yuankang reign period [=June 28, 291], a
group of scholars assembled to discuss [the text] and make exact copies
in Chinese. At that time the one who held the huben was the Khotanese
srama!la (Wuchaluo the upiisaka Zhu Shulan orally
transferred (kou chuan Df$) it [i.e. transformed recitation of
theIndic text into an oral draft translation in Chinese] and Zhu Taixuan
and Zhou Xuanming together took it down in writing. [It was written in]
standard script (zhengshu it has ninety chapters, altogether
consisting of 207,621 words.
Dao'an, in his "Preface to the Concise Commentary to the Synoptic Edition of the
Fangguang and Guangzan" (CSZJJ, 55: 47c.29-48a.23) described the manu-
script held by as hu, as he did the Indic text underlying s
translation, the Guangzanjing (cf. CSZJJ, 55: 48a.9-10 and 62b.29-c.1). Since
Dao'an and other Chinese exegetes generally did not see the Indic originals of the
Chinese translations at their disposal, it is not swprising that we will occasionally
find confused or even contradictory details passed on concerning their script or
language.
26. YANG 1998: 163. YANG repeats here an argument that has been often propa-
gated, especially by East Asian scholars, but never substantiated, namely, that
Buddhist texts arriving in China in the first few centuries of the common era were
sometimes, perhaps usually, composed in Central Asian languages. Jl Xianlin,
for example, has suggested that certain early transcriptions reflect pronunciations
derived from Bactrian (Middle Iranian) and Tokharian languages (Jl 1947 and
1990). Again, the problem is not with the evidence but with the interpretation
thereof. It is indeed possible that early transcriptions of Indian proper names and
Buddhist technical terms may reflect pronunciations that have clear similarities
with Central Asian languages. But this is by no means an indication of texts
written in those languages. Given the fundamentally oral/aural nature of the
translation process in China, it is not at all ulllikely that a foreign missionary's
'nABS 23.1 18
more simply be that the discontinuation of hu = and the more
systematic use of fan = briihmf reflects the fact that the script
became largely obsolete by the fifth century, being superseded by
briihmf in north India and Central Asia.27 Thus, by the Tang period
(7th-10th cents.) it is likely that when Chinese Buddhists saw Indian
manuscripts or dealt with foreign missionaries who worked with them,
these texts were almost exclusively written in a version of briihmf script.
The replacement of hu withfan in the Tang then may well only suggest
that medieval scholastics in China saw the term hu as imprecise vis-a-vis
their knowledge ofIndian texts and not necessarily racially charged.
28
,
The observation that colophon writers and Buddhist exegetes differen-
tiated Indian manuscripts by script should not lead us to the conclusion
that early Chinese Buddhists had clear and accurate understandings of
the languages of these source texts. Hu and fan do not refer to Prakrit
and Sanskrit respectively, but only - and not necessarily always - to
recitation of an Indian manuscript would have been strongly influenced by his
native language. Since most of the early translators in China were not from India
proper but were generally Yuezhi, Iranian, and Tokharian, it should not surprise
us to find remnants of their pronunciation habits in our earliest Chinese
translations.
27. There are some possible exceptions to this general rule. Still unpublished
bilingual manuscripts, presumably from the northern Tarim Basin, have been
reported to be written in both script (in Giindhatr Prakrit) and briihmf
script (in Tokharian B); see BERNHARD 1970: 56. We, of course, will have to
await their publication to detennine their significance, It is also possible that some
of the iigama texts translated in China in the early fifth century were rendered
from Indic originals whose language has much in common with, and is perhaps
identical to, Gandhatr Prakrit. If this is the case, as has been often supposed, then
such texts may also have been written in script. Such a supposition,
however, has not to date been adequately' supported; see the discussion in
BOUCHER 1998: 473-75. A firmer opinion will have to await further research.
28. IfY ANG's analysis of the cultural implications of hu andfan were correct, that hu
(=barbarian) came to be replaced by fan (=Indic) as Buddhism became more
widely acceptable in Tang times, then we might expect that critics of Buddhism
during the Tang - of which there were many - would adopt such pejorative
language in lashing out against Buddhism. No critic during the late Tang was
fiercer than Han Yu And yet, when labelling Buddhism as but a "barbarian
cult" -$), or disparging the Buddha as "a barbarian unfamiliar with the
Chinese language" he does not invoke hu M and
the presumed cultural connotations attached to it. This certainly does not prove
that hu was not negatively charged in the Chinese literati world of the medieval
period. But it does seem that the resonance of this term with "barbarian" was
insufficient to inspire Buddhism's critics to invoke it for their purposes.
BOUCHER 19
and briihmf.29 It is clear that even very learned Chinese
Buddhist scholastics did not understand the relationship between these
scripts and the languages they transcribed. Let me illustrate this with one
notable example. Sengyou, from whose early sixth-century bibliography
I have taken some of the data presented above, discusses in detail what
he perceived to be the similarities and differences between the Indic and
Chinese languages. I will translate the relevant parts of his essay here:
Sengyou's "Hu han yijing yin yi tongyiji" (A Record of Similarities and Differences in
Pronunciation and Meaning When Translating Scriptures from Western Languages to
Chinese)30
Numinal concepts are without sound; we rely upon words and expressions in
order to transcribe meaning. Words and expressions are without vestiges; we
depend upon graphs and characters in order to depict pronunciation. Therefore,
characters are "rabbit snares" for words; words are "fish traps" for concepts.
3
!
When pronunciation and meaning coincide, there cannot be any bias or loss. This
is why writing should be used to comprehensively order the world. Although the
vestiges are tied to brush and ink (i.e., the literary arts), concepts are suited to the
numinous.
In ancient times there were three progenitors of writing. The eldest was called
Fan (= brahmr); his script went toward the right. Next was Qulou (=
his script went toward the left. The youngest was Cang Jie; his script went
29. Thus I would want to qualify somewhat LEVI's remark made in reference to
Sengyou's usage in his CSZJJ: " ... on est tente d'admettre que Ie terme hou em
denote ici soit un original pracrit, soit une ecriture du type en contraste
avec Ie sanscrit (fan) ou la brahmI (fan) . ... Les variations de Seng-yeou tiennent
sans aucun doute a la diversite des sources ou il puise; simple compilateur, il
copie fidelement des extraits sans penser ales mettre en harmonie" (LEVI 1904:
560). LEVI's arguments concerning hu = are based on his broader
attempt to associate the name kharo!!hr) with the region of the
western Tarim Basin (in the vicinity of but not restricted to Kashgar). This
particular suggestion has not been generally accepted; cf. SALOMON 1998: 50-51.
30. CSZJJ 55: 4b-5a. This essay was previously translated in LINK 1961: 284-91.
Although I have benefited greatly from some of his suggestions, there are several
points of disagreement.
31. The locus classicus for this allusion, as Arthur WRIGHT has pointed out
(WRIGHT 1954: 401, n. 1), is the Zhuangzi, chap. 26 (SBBY ed., j. 9, 6a). The
passage, in Victor MAIR'S felicitous translation, goes as follows: "A fish-trap is
for catching fish; once you've caught the fish, you can forget about the trap. A
rabbit-snare is for catching rabbits; once you've caught the rabbit, you can forget
about the snare. Words are for catching ideas; once you've caught the idea, you
can forget about the words. Where can I find a person who knows how to forget
about words so I can have a few words with him?" (MAIR 1994a: 276-77).
'nABS 23.1 20
downward.
32
Briihmf and lived in India; Cang Jie, scribe to the
Yellow Emperor, lived in China. Briihmf and took their exemplars
from the Suddhiiviisa heaven; Cang Jie relied upon impressions from, bird tracks.
The strokes of the scripts are certainly different, but in the end they convey
concepts equally.
When we reverently inquire into what was taught by the formerly enlightened
one (i.e., the Buddha), we find that there are 64 scripts.
33
The scribal techniques
"deer wheel" and "rolling eye"34 are distinguished among them. The forms of the
characters such as niiga, yalqa, and the eight classes (of supernatural beings)
differ in style.
35
Only briihmf and .are the superior scripts for our
times. Therefore the various kingdoms in India call them the divine scripts.
Despite the fact that, for copying siitras from the West, the common ancestor [of
the various scripts] is briihmf, still the thirty-six countries [of the Western
regions] frequently have variations in writing styles.
36
Is this not like the
changing styles of the small seal script [of the Qin dynasty] and the great seal
script [of the Zhou bronzes] in China? When we examine the changes in the
ancient script of Cang Jie handed down over successive historical periods, we
find that the ancient style changed into the great seal script, the great seal script
changed into the small seal script, and the small seal script was modified to
become the clerical script [of the Han]. These transformations are many indeed ....
32. Cang Jie was the minister of the legendary Yellow Emperor of hoary antiquity.
He is traditionally accredited with inventing Chinese writing, modelling his sCript
on the footprints of birds and animals. See BOLlZ 1994: 130 ff.
33. As LINK points out, this is a clear reference to the 64 scripts that the Buddha had
mastered as a youth according to the biographical account in chapter 10 of the
Lalitavistara. For a list of these scripts in Sanskrit, see LEFMANN 1902: 125-126
or the more recent and comprehensive edition by HOKAZONO 1994: 526-28; the
equivalent Chinese translation of can be found in T 186, 3:498b.
There are considerable divergences between the Sanskrit and Chinese lists. See
LEVI 1904: 573-79 for a comparative tabulation.
34. These are two of the 64 scripts listed in translation of the
Lalitavistara. "Deer wheel" (lulun clearly refers to mrgacakra, the thirty-
second script listed in list (thirty-fIfth in HOKAZONO's Sanskrit
edition). "Rolling eye" (zhuanyan .1lN) is the forty-ninth script listed by
but its Sanskrit equivalent is difficult to determine. It is possible
that may have been attempting to translate nilqepiivartiilipi1Jl here,
though a clear explanation for the faulty equivalence is not immediately apparent.
35. The eight classes of supernatural beings are a standard motif in Buddhist texts;
each one is associated with the name of a script in chapter 10 of the Lalitavistara.
36. On briihmfas the "common ancestor" of all Indian scripts, see SALOMON 1998:
10-14. Though Sengyou's view may have been widely held among missionaries
in China, it is likely, as SALOMON points out, that in fact preceded
briihmf on the Indian subcontinent. Hence, "it can generally be assumed that the
primary direction of influence was from to BrahmI" (SALOMON 1998:
54).
BOUCHER 21
When we come to Western
37
pronunciation, [these languages] form words,
single and double, without regularity. Sometimes one syllable (zi =f:; is
used to represent many concepts; sometimes several words generate but one
meaning. Examining the Mahliylina-mahliparinirvtll;zasiitra, we find that it has
enumerated -in order the fifty completely explaining their various
meanings.3
8
The fourteen (vocalic) phonemes it calls the root of the
We observe that in their uttering of phrases and discriminating of phonemes, the
permutations [of pronunciation] aid one another [in distinguishing meaning].
Some are "tongue-root" sounds (i.e., velars) or "end of the lip" sounds (i.e.,
labials); some make distinctions with long or short [vowels]. Moreover, a
Western (huzi is a single phoneme but does not constitute a word.
Additional words are necessary to complete the phrase; only then is a meaning
realized.
40
When translators convey meaning, how could there not be difficul-
ties!
Furthermore, compositions in Indic (fan ')t) script have half-characters (i.e.,
and full-characters (i.e., words).41 The reason some are called half-
37. I render hu M here as Western, following Edward SCHAFER (1963: 4-5), since
Sengyou appears to use it without the technical nuance that I believe it carried in
many of the colophons he records. In more generic application, hu could refer to
Indians or Central Asians (esp. Iranians), and by Tang times, also to Arabs and
others from the Mediterranean world.
38. The practice of assigning a semantic signification to each of the in the
Sanskrit syllabary is known from several Buddhist texts. For the version
preserved in the Mahtiylina-mahtiparinirvli[Ulsiitra, see T 375, 12:653c-655b
and T 376, 12:887c-888c.
39. Sengyou would appear once again to take this line directly from the Mahiiylina-
mahtiparinirvlil}asiitra: T 376, 12:887c.25; cf. also T 375, 12:653c.24. The
expression shisi yin +12]=' refers, as LINK remarks, to the string of vocalic
sounds beginning the Sanskrit alphabet. Arthur WRIGHT has noted (1957: 279)
that Kumarajiva's leamed assistant, Sengrui, is reported in his biography to have
composed an exposition on these phonemes called the Shisi yin xun xu
(Gaoseng zhuan, T 2059, 50:367b.15-16). It is likely that Sengrui
also drew upon this section of the Mahaylina-mahliparinirvlil}asiitra.
40. Sengyou is here attempting to understand and explain - not without some
difficulty and confusion - that a single graph in Indic scripts does not constitute a
morpheme as individual graphs do in Chinese (though not necessarily words in
the modem linguistic sense).
41. Sengyou almost certainly borrows this terminology from the Mahiiylina-mahti-
parinirvlil}asiitra: "The bodhisattva Kasyapa addressed the Buddha: 'World
Honored One. Why does the Tathagata teach the fundamentals concerning
script?' The Buddha said: 'Noble son, I first teach (banzi #"F),
considering them to be the foundation. [They allow one] to grasp the various
treatises, spells, chapters, and esoteric truths. When ordinary people (Prthagjana)
study the basics about script, they can afterwards discern [the difference between]
JIABS 23.1 22
characters is that their meaning is not yet complete (i.e., they are only letters).
Therefore, the form of the character is halved (banpian *1Jiji), as if the character
"moon" (yue J=I) in Chinese script were missing its side. The reassm some are
called full-characters is that with them concepts are fully expressed. Therefore,
the form of the character is complete, as when the character "sun" (ri B) in
Chinese script fills out its shape. Therefore, half-characters poorly express
meaning; one can liken them to the defilements (klesas). Full-characters are good
at expressing meaning; one can liken them to constancy.42 Furthermore, to take a
half-character as the principal constituent is like the character "to say" (yan ) in
Chinese script; to take a full-character as the principal constituent is like the
character "all" (zhu in Chinese script. To pair yan with zhe
(nomiilalizing particle) constitutes forthwith the character zhu The character
zhu unites both [elements, yan and zhe] and is thus an example of a full-character.
The character yan standing by itself would be in the category of half-[character].
Although half-characters are simple, they are the foundation of
[morphemic] characters (i.e., words). We depend upon half-characters to form
full-characters. It is like an ordinary man (fanfu P!thagjana) at fIrst being
stuck in ignorance, afterwards attaining constancy. Therefore, we rely on charac-
ters to create meaning; one can liken this to nirviiI)a.
Sengyou's analysis here of Indian languages is telling. Even while
recognizing stylistic variations within and between Indian scripts, his
attempt to find adequate analogies in the history of Chinese writing is
strained and misleading at best. Sengyou's greatest difficulty would
seem to lie in grasping the very nature of an alpha-syllabic script: the
capacity of Indian languages to use non-morphemic characters, i.e.,
written letters that are not in themselves words.
43
truth and falsehood (shifafeifa )'" (T 375, 12:653c.18-22); cf. T 376,
12:887c.19-24.
42. Again, iSengyou is drawing from the Mahayana-mahaparinirvarasiitra here:
"Moreover, the meanings of the half-characters [enumerated earlier in the text] are
the source of the teachings on the klefas. Therefore they are called half-
characters. The full-characters then are the basis for the teachings on all good
things. It is like people engaged in bad actions being called 'half people' while
those who cultivate good actions are called 'complete people.' Thus, all sUtra
texts and treatises depend on half-characters as their basis" (T 375, 12:655a.20-
24).
43. If a "word," following BLOOMFIELD, is the smallest meaningful unit of language
that can stand alone, then the vast majority of sinographs are words. But it does
not follow - and this is important - that all words in classical Chinese are single
sinographs. There are numerous compound expressions that we would classify
as single words even though native grammarians would view the compound in
terms of its discrete members. On the monosyllabic myth with regard to the
Chinese language, see KENNEDY 1951 and DE FRANCIS 1984: 177-88.
BOUCHER 23
Sengyou is not troubled by the foreignness of Indian scripts and
languages, their so-called "barbarian" traits. But they are conceptually
alien to him .. It is not at all certain, for example, that he had a clear
understanding .of the difference between the (syllable) and the
word (composed of multiple syllables), despite his awkward attempt.
The long tradition of a single, morphosyUabic script uniting the diverse
regions and languages of China would have in all likelihood impeded
any sense of the independence of script and language.
44
I hope to have shown here that any simple equation of hu and
''barbarian'' is inadequate on multiple grounds. First, hu appears to have
been used with the technical sense of script in records on
Indian sources texts underlying early Chinese translations. Secondly, hu,
when referring to scripts, languages, and texts, is not used in any overtly
derogatory manner - neither by the critics of Buddhism nor by Buddhist
exegetes themselves. On the contrary, what we fmd with regard to one
of the inost prominent of early medieval Buddhist intellectuals is a
serious attempt to fathom the nature of Hu languages, albeit with only
partial success.
If to be barbarian is to stutter4
5
and therefore to be unintelligible, to
have no real language, then it is clear that at least some Chinese took
44. Chad HANSEN has astutely pointed out that a conception of the diversity of
languages within China was absent largely as a result of the universality of the
written medium: "Given the difference between written and spoken language, an
ancient Chinese linguist would have equally good reason to individuate words by
their written form. He would then say different Chinese languages simply
pronounced the words differently. Prior to encountering Sanskrit or Japanese, he
would have little reason for a theory of translation or interlinguistic meaning. The
character itself would serve the relevant interlinguistic role" (HANSEN 1989: 79).
But even after centuries of exposure to Sanskrit and Indian literature, very learned
Chinese scholars perpetuated fundamental confusions about the nature of Indic
languages and their alpha-syllabic scripts. Victor MAIR has recently demonstrated
that the Song scholar Zheng Qiao (1104-1162), despite great acumen in
philology, failed to come to grips with a phonetic-based spelling, in part because
of his confused equation of script and language. See MAIR 1994b, esp. 340.
45. The very word "barbarian" is an onomatopoeic word imitating any kind of
unintelligible speech. As such, it is connected with a wide range of Indo-
European cognates, including Greek barbaros ("non-Greek"), Sanskrit barbara
("stammering"), and English babble; cf PORKORNY 1959: 91-92. In fact, for the
ancient Greeks, ethnic self-identification was defined in almost entirely linguistic
terms from the fifth century B.C.E.; the lumping of all non-Greek speaking
peoples together was instrumental in developing a pan-Hellenic self-conScious-
ness that served to unite otherwise separate Greek polities against a common
nABS 23.1 24
Buddhism and its languages as not only meaningful, but elevated,
civilized, and even divinely inspired. We would do these ancient
linguists a severe disservice to normalize the bitter rhetoric of the
Confucian and Daoist opponents of Buddhism - those most frequently
responsible for charges of barbarism. Chinese attitudes toward foreigners
were never simple in any period; political and, more often, economic,
interests frequently dictated the fluctuations between attraction, toler-
ance, and persecution of foreigners and foreign faiths. But by the Tang
period, Buddhism had made deep and indelible impressions not only on
the Chinese religious milieu, but on native understandings of their own
literary and linguistic heritage.
46
And it was these first, tentative engage-
ments with lndic scripts, languages, and texts that made much of this
impact possible.
enemy, the Persians. See the discussion in HALL 1989, esp. 3-13 and 56-62.
Something not entirely different occurred in medieval China as well. By the Tang
period, literati often referred to the various - and potentially threatening - peoples
of the north collectively as Xiongnu (not hu), even though many of these people
were not ethnically related to these infamous nomads of Han times. Hu, by
contrast, was typically associated with western peoples involved in the lucrative
silk route trade, most notably the Sogdians.
46. One of the most profound impacts of Indian linguistics on Chinese literature was
the development of the intricate tonal patterns reflected in Recent Style poetry
(jinti shi mtt&), as thoroughly studied by Victor MAIR and Tsu-lin MEl
(1991). MAIR and MEl have convincingly argued that exposure to systems of
Sanskrit metrics, particularly by the poets of the Southern dynasties in the late
fifth and early sixth centuries, gave a meter-like structure to Chinese tonal
patterns, giving birth to one of the most influential and widely used prosodies in
the history of Chinese poetry.
BOUCHER 25
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voIs.
ANNHEIRMAN
What Happened to the Nun MaitreyI?
One of the precepts for Buddhist monks! stipulates that a monk commits
a offense
2
if he accuses another monk of an unfounded
plirlijika offense.3 The introductory story preceding the precept
4
relates
why this precept has' been laid down: two monks are angry with the
venerable monk Darva Mallaputra (Pali: Dabba Mallaputta) and they
want to see him removed. They convince the nun Maitreyi (Pali:
Mettiya) to help them, whereupon she accuses Darva of having an
impure conduct and of having raped her (= a violation of the first
plirlijika precept). The Buddha, however, does not believe her and, after
having heard Darva's defense, he starts an investigation against the two
monks. Thereupon, the two admit to have incited Maitreyi to accuse
Darva. The Buddha then lays down a precept whereby he stipulates that
a monk who accuses another monk of an unfounded plirlijika, commits a
The question what happened to the nun Maitreyi remains
however. She too accused a monk of an unfounded plirlijika.
The introductory story preceding the above precept in the Pali Vinaya
says that the Buddha wanted Mettiya to be expelled: "tena hi bhikkhave
MettiyaT(t bhikkhuniT(t nlisetha" (Vin, Vol.III, pp.162,38-163,1). This
statement created many discussions as to how to interpret it. U. HOSKEN
(1997: 96-98)5 points to the fact that the procedure of expulsion cannot
have been based on any fixed rule of the Vinaya since, until the precept
had been laid down, no regulation prohibiting monks or nuns from
accusing another of having committed a plirlijika offense existed. The
1. sarrz.8 for monks: Pall Vinaya, H. OLDENBERG, Yin, Vol.III, p.163,21-26;
Mahf, p. 16a29-b3; Mahli, p. 280c3-6; Dharma, p. 588b22-26; Sarva, p.23a21-
25; Mala, p. 697c2-5.
2. Pili sarrzghiidisesa, and variants: an offense leading to a
temporary exclusion from the Buddhist order.
3. piiriijika, and variants: an offense leading to a definitive exclusion from the
Buddhist order.
4. The introductory story is analogous in all the Vinayas, except for the Mahii.
5. U. HUSKEN (1997), "The Application of the Vinaya Term niisanii", JIABS 20.2:
93-111.
Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies
Volume 23. Number 1.2000
nABS 23.1 30
first wrong-doer is not punished, but only induces the Buddha to fomlU-
late a new precept. Moreover,the expulsion of Mettiya is, in any case,
not (legally) justified since a false accusation constitutes a sa1Jlghiidisesa
offense and not a piiriijika (leading to an expulsion). Therefore, U.
HDsKEN concludes that her expulsion "must be regarded as an excep-
tion, made possible through the personal intervention of the Buddha."
The term 'niisetha' is thus not used as a technical term. U. HDsKEN
(1997: 102-105) further refers to the Samantapiisiidikii, a commentary
on the Pali Vinaya,6 Sp 582,30-584,9. The passage concerned reports a
controversy between the Abhayagirivasins and the Mahaviharavasir:ts on
the actual reason of Mettiya's expulsion. Was it because of her (false)
statement (Abhayagiri) or because of another reason (Mahavihara).
According to the author of the Samantapiisiidikii, experts considered the
latter view to be the right one. In that case, the question remains, how-
ever, what kind of offense Mettiya was actually accused of. According
to the Samantapiisiidikii, it cannot have been a sa1Jlghiidisesa offense
since the precept on the false accusation is valid only for nuns with
respect to other nuns
7
and for monks with respect to other monks, but
not for nuns with respect to monks. Nor did she violate one of the
piiriijika precepts. In this way, she only can have committed an offense
that is not sanctioned with an expUlsion. Yet, she has been expelled. To
this, the Samantapiisiidikii says that she has been expelled because of her
bad character, of which she herself was aware. The latter explanation is
considered by U. HDSKEN "to be a provisional solution."
Also O. VON HINDBER (1997: 87-91)8 gives an account of the contro-
versy between the Abhayagirivasins and the Mahaviharavasins.He too
indicates that "at least at the time of the Samantapiisiidikii, there was no
6. Although attributed to Buddhaghosa, the commentary is probably written by a
different author in the fourth or the fifth century AD (0. VON HlNOBER 1996), A
Handbook of PiiIi Literature, Berlin, New York, Walter de Gruyter (Indian
Philology and South Asian Studies 2), pp. 103-109).
7. sal'J'l. for nuns: Pali tradition, M. WIJAYARATNA, Moniales, p.174, sal'J'l.8;
Mahf, p. 79a21-25, sal'J'l. 2; Mahii, p. 517c4-8, sal'J'l. 2; Dharma, p.718b12-15,
sal'J'l.2; Sarvastivadins, T.1437, p.480a29-b3, sal'J'l.2; Mala, p.933c20-23,
sal'J'l.2.
The Pili Vinaya and the Sarva do not mention those precepts that nuns have in
common with the ones for monks. These precepts are, however, enumerated in
the respective (Moniales and T.1437).
8. O. VON HINDBER (1997), "Buddhist Law According to the Theravada Vinaya
(II): Some Additions and Corrections," nABS 20.2: 87-92.
HEIRMAN 31
tangible legal argument in the Vinaya by which Mettiya could have been
expelled(!)." He further points to Sp 583,17 and Sp 584,3-5 that state
that a monk who accuses a nun, and a nun who accuses a monk commit
a dukkata (Ski . .
The aim of this paper is to investigate (1) whether the other Vinaya tra-
ditions
10
equally lead to a similar discussion and (2) whether, throughout
the Vinayas, a monk who has offended (a monk or) a nun, and a nun
who has offended (a nun or) a monk are judged analogously to the
above outlined case?
1. What happened to Maitreyf in the Vinaya traditions that have
survived in their Chinese translation?
All the Vinayas have a precept saying that a monk who accuses another
monk of an unfounded plirlijika offense, commits a
offense.1* In all the Vinayas, except for the Mahli, the precept is intro-
duced by the story of the two monks who, with the help of the nun
MaitreyI, falsely accuse Darva Mallaputra of having had sexual inter-
course with her. The Mahli does not mention a nun helping the angry
monks.
In the Mahf, MaitreyI hesitates to help the monks, since she is afraid
that she will be expelled after having confessed.!l It is not explicitly
mentioned what she would confess (the sexual intercourse or the false
accusation), but it seems to be the act of sexual intercourse since the two
monks answer her that they will testify that Darva did wrong and not
she, so that there is no reason to expel her. Nevertheless, MaitreyI still
hesitates. She stays afraid that Darva's expUlsion will imply also her
expulsion. Yet, she accuses him in order to help the two angry monks.
Although the Buddha knows that she is telling a lie, he questions Darva
about it. When Darva denies, the Buddha believes him. Whereas no
9. i.e. 'wrong doing,' a light offense.
10. Five Vinayas have survived in a Chinese translation: the MahfSiisakaVinaya
(T.1421, Mahf), the Mahiisli1J!ghikaVinaya (T.1425, Mahii), the Dharma-
guptakaVinaya (T.1428, Dharma), the SarvlistivlidaVinaya (T.1435, Sarva) and
the MiUasarvlistivlidaVinaya (T.I442 up to and inCluding T.1451, Mala [because
of its size, the Malasarvlistivlida Vinaya is not edited in one work, but consists of
a number of different works]). Of the latter Vinaya, there is also a Tibetan
translation.
11. Mahf, p.15c8:
nABS 23.1 32
punishment is thus imposed on him, the nun MaitreyI is definitively
expelled from the order with ajfiapticaturtha karman
12
(Mahf, p.1Sc2S-
26). She is expelled for having said that Darva had intercourse with her
(Mahf, pp.ISc26-16a3). When the two monks keep on saying that Darva
had intercourse with MaitreyI, Darva is again questioned, and again he
denies. Thereupon, the Buddha stipulates that a monk who accuses
another monk of an unfounded piiriijika, commits a The
commentary following upon the precept adds that a monk who accuses a
nun, a probationer or a (male or female) novice commits a that
a nun who accuses a monk commits a piicittika,13 and that a nun .who
accuses a probationer or a (male or female) novice commits a
(Mahf, p.16b14-17).
The above account leads to a discussion similar to the one mentioned
in the Samantapiisiidikii: there is no legal argument to expel only
MaitreyI when she confesses that she has had sexual intercourse with
Darva. If it is true, she and Darva should both be expelled (on account
of the first piiriijika). As the Buddha does not believe her, he, conse-
quently, does not expel Darva. However, MaitreyI is expelled. This
cannot be on account of her false accusation since, before the precept has
been laid down, she cannot be punished. The first wrong-doer is never
sanctioned. Moreover, once the precept has been laid down, if a nun
falsely accuses a monk, her act constitutes a piicittika offense, which is
never sanctioned with an expulsion.
The Dharma only mentions that Darva denies having committed a
piiriijika offense. It does not say what happened to the nun MaitreyI. No
sanction is mentioned. Consequently, it is very doubtful that a discussion
arose on the interpretation of a sanction imposed on her.
Finally, in the Sarva, the Buddha states that MaitreyI has to be
expelled by means of a formal procedure because she herself says that
she has committed a (piiriijika) offense:
(p.22c9). In the Mala, we find a similar statement:
Ft:. (p.696c26). In these two Vinayas, MaitreyI is
thus expelled after having confessed a piiriijika offense, even if the
12. Ajiiapticaturtha karman is a formal act consisting of one motion (jiiapti), three
propositions (karmaviicanii) that concern the acceptance of the motion by the
assembly of monks or nuns, and a conclusion.
13. piicittika, PliIi piicittiya, and variants: an offense that must be expiated.
HEIRMAN 33
believed to be untrue. In this way, there seems to be no legal argument
for the expulsion.
In addition, all the Vinaya traditions equally contain a precept saying
that a nun who. accuses another nun of an unfoundedparajika offense,
commits a offense.
7
* The question what happens to a nun
who accuses a monk of an unfounded parajika offense, or to a monk
who accuses a nun remains. In the Samantapasadika, it is said that a nun
who accuses a monk, and a monk who accuses a nun commit a dukka!a
(Skt. (Sp 583,17 and Sp 584,3-5). The Mahf, p.16b14-17,
states that a monk who accuses a nun commits a but that a nun
who accuses a monk commits a pacittika. The Maha, p.281a2-3, says
that a monk who accuses a nun of a parajika or of a
commits a pacittika. There is no information on a nun who accuses a
monk. The Dharma, p.589a26-28 - i.e. in the commentary following
upon the precept on the false accusation of a monk by another monk -
says that a monk who accuses a nun of an unfounded parajika (also)
commits a It adds that (also) a nun [in a similar situa-
tion] commits a (p.589b6). In my
view, the latter statement is to be interpreted as 'a nun who accuses a
nun [or a monk] of an unfoundedparajika, commits a
This interpretation is confirmed by a precept for nuns: Dharma,
p.718b12-15, 2: if a nun accuses someone of an
unfounded parajika offense, she commits a The Sarva
and the Mala do not give any information on a monk who accuses a
nun, or on a nun who accuses a monk.
We thus see that, although there seems to be no legal argument to expel
MaitreyI, most Vinayas state that she is to be expelled. The Dharma does
not impose a punishment upon her.
The above mentioned facts also show that
only two Vinayas indicate which offense a nun commits when she
accuses a monk: according to the Mahf, it is a pacittika; according
to the Dharma, it is a (just as when she accuses a
14. Dharma, p. 589a26-28:
15. See also A. HEIRMAN (1998), Disciplinaire voorschriften voor boeddhistische
nonnen, van de dharmaguptaka's (T.Vo1.22, Nr.1428,
pp. 714-778) (Ph.D. Universiteit Gent), Dee12, VoLl, pp. 53-55, note 288.
JIABS 23.1 34
monk). The Samantaptistidikti supports the opinion that a nun
commits a dukka!a.
the Pilii tradition, the MahIsasakas and the MahasaJ1lghikas judge a
monk who accuses a monk and a monk who accuses a nun in a
different way. This is not. the case for the Dharmaguptakas for
whom gender has no influence: regardless whether a monk accuses
a monk or a nun, he commits a
2. Is a monk who has offended a nun, and is a nun who has offended a
monk judged analogously to the above outlined case throughout the
Vinayas? .
In order to answer this question, I will consider the other Vinaya
precepts that (1) regard misbehavior towards a monk or a nun, with the
exclusion of the precepts that involve a sexual relation between the two
parties,16 and on which (2) relevant information is found concerning the
jUdgment of a monk for having offended a monk, and of a nun for
having offended a nun versus the judgment of a monk for having
16. A first investigation of the Dharma reveals that the category of precepts that
involve sexual or physical contact is to be considered as a separate category with
a proper logic: a monk sexually or physically involved with a woman is
committing a more serious offense than a monk involved with a man; and a nun
sexually or physically involved with a man is committing a more serious offense
than a nun involved with a woman. There is one exception: a monk who has
sexual intercourse with a man or with a woman commits a parajika in both cases
p.571a21-24; p.571c11-12, 21-22). See
vibhariga, salJ'l. 2: a monk commits a salJ'l. if he has physical contact with a
woman (p. 580b28-29); he commits a if he has physical contact with a
man (p. 581a14); salJ'l. 3: a monk commits a salJ'l. if he talks about indecent items
[the genital zone] to a woman (p. 581 c1-2); he commits a if he talks to a
man (p. 581c25-26); sal'!!. 4: a monk commits a sal'!!. if he incites a woman to
offer her body to him (p. 582b8-11); he commits a if he incites a man
(p. 582c1-2); sal'!!. 5: a monk commits a sal'!!. if he acts as a go-between between
a man and a woman, or vice versa (p. 583a16-18); if he acts as a go-between
between men, he commits a (p. 584al-2); par. 1: a
nun commits a par. if she has sexual intercourse with a man (p.714a14-15);
there is no penetration possible between women who have a sexual relation, but
the Dharma says that nuns who slap on one another's vagina commit a pac.
(p. 738cll-12); par. 5: a nun commits a par. if she has physical contact with a
man (p.715b6-1O); she commits a if she has contact with a woman
(p. 715c23-24); sal'!!. 8: a nun commits a sal'!!. if she accepts things from a man
who is filled with desire (p.721c22-24); she commits a if she accepts
things from a woman who is filled with desire (p. 722a6-7).
HEIRMAN 35
offended a nun, and of a nun for having offended a monle In this way,
we can examine four precepts:
1. a monk a if he uses a minor event1
7
to
accuse a monk of an unfounded piiriijika; a nun commits a
if she uses a minor event to accuse a of an
unfounded piiriijika
The precept and the commentary following upon this precept are similar
to the above mentioned case on the accusation of an unfounded parajika:
- Pili tradition:
- MahIsasakas:
- Mahas3.qighikas:
- Dharmaguptakas:
- Sarvastivadins:
- a monk: who accuses a monk: commits a sa1'!l. (Vin, Vol.ID,
pp.167,38-168,7); the Pili tradition does not give any further
commentary; it is not unlikely, however, that the commentary
on the preceding precept on the accusation of an unfounded
par. also applies here.
- bhikkhunfpatimokkha: a nun who accuses a nun commits a
SaJTI. (Moniales, p. 174).
- a monk who accuses a monk: commits a sa1'!l. (Mahf,
p.16clO-14); the commentary refers to the commentary follow
ing upon the preceding sa1'!l. (Mahf, p.16c20) - thus: a monk:
who accuses a nun commits a a nun who accuses a
nun commits a sa1'!l.; a nun who accuses a monk:, commits a
pac ..
- a nun who accuses a nun commits a sa1'!l.
(Mahf, p.79a29- b5)
- a monk: who accuses a monk commits a sa1'!l. (Maha,
p.281b21-24); the commentary refers to the commentary
following upon the preceding sa1'!l. (Mahii, p.281c8-9) - thus:
a monk: who accuses a nun commits a pac ..
- a nun who accuses a nun commits a saTfl.
(Mahii, p.517c8-12).
- a monk: who accuses a monk commits a sa1'!l. (Dharma,
p.589c12-16); the commentary adds that a monk: who accuses a
nun (also) commits a sa1'!l. (Dharma, p.590a27-29); it further
says that (also) a nun [in a similar situation] commits a sa1'!l.
(p.590b8). IB The latter commentary is possibly to be interpreted
as: a nun who accuses a nun [or a monk] commits a saTfl..
- the however, only mentions that a nun
who accuses another nun, commits a sa1'!l. (Dharma,
p.718b19-24).
- a monk who accuses a monk: commits a sa1'!l. (Sarva,
p.23clO-14).
17. A minor event that has no relation with a parajika offense is deliberately
misinterpreted in order to falsely accuse an innocent monk:.
18. Dharma, p. 590b8:
. JIABS 23.1 36
- a nun who accuses a nun commits a
sarrz. (T.1437, p.480b4-8).
- MiHasarvastivadins: - a monk who accuses a monk commits a sarrz. (Mala,
p.699c24-28).
- a nun who accuses a nun commits a sarrz.
(Mala,
Similar conclusions can be drawn as with the preceding precept on the
accusation of an unfounded pilriljika offense:
only two Vinayas indicate which offense a nun commits when she
accuses a monle according to the Mahf, it is a pilc.; according to
the Dharma, it - possibly - is a sarrz. (just as when she accuses a
monk).
the MahIsasakas and the Mahiisarp.ghikas (and possibly the PaIi
tradition) judge a monk who accuses a monk and a monk who
accuses a nun in a different way. This is not the case for the
Dharmaguptakas for whom gender has no influence: regardless
whether a monk falsely accuses a monk or a nun, he commits a
sarrz
2. a monk commits a piicittika offense if he slanders someone/a
monk; a nun commits a piicittika offense if she slanders someone/a
nun
The different schools further display the following infonnation:
- PaIi tradition:
- MahIsasakas:
- a monk who slanders someone commits apac. (Vin, Vo1.N,
p.6,5); the commentary adds that a monk who slanders a non-
ordained person commits a dukka!a (Skt. (Vin,
Vol.N, pp.l0,29-11,2). KankhavitaralJf,19 (D. Maskell (ed.),
London, PaIi Text Society) p. 83, says that here also a nun has
to be seen as a non-ordained person. This implies that a monk
who slanders a nun commits a dukka!a.
- plitimokkha for nuns: a nun who slanders commits a pac.
(Moniales, p.185: omasavade, pacittiyarrz).
- a monk who slanders a monk commits a pac. (Mahf,
p.38a11); the commentary adds that a monk who slanders a
nun commits a and that a nun who slanders a nun or a
monk commits a pac. (Mahf, p.38a15-17).
- a nun who slanders a nun commits a pac.
(Mahf, p.85bll-12).
19. An anonymous commentary on the PaIi Patimokkha, ascribed to Buddhaghosa
(fourth-fifth century) (see O. VON HlNOBER (1996), op. cit., pp. 109-111).
HEIRMAN 37
- Mahasarp.ghikas: - a monk who slanders someone commits a pilc. (M ahil,
p.325b28-29); the commentary adds that a monk who slanders
a nun commits a sthaliltyaya
20
(Maha, p.326b4-5).
- a nun who slanders commits a pac.
(Mahii, p.527bI8: only the key-word 'to slander').
- Dharmaguptakas: - a monk who slanders someone commits a pac. (Dharma,
p.635b10 and following); the commentary adds. that (also) a
nun [in a similar situation] commits a pac. (Dharma,
p.636a5).21
- the above corresponds to the that says that
a nun who slanders (someonel commits a pilc. (Dharma,
p.734c12).22
-,Sarvastivadins: - a monk who slanders someone commits a pilc. (Sarva,
p.64b21-22); the commentary adds that a monk who slanders
someone who is not a monk (and thus, theoretically, also a
nun) commits a (Sarva, p.65c28-29).
- for nuns: a nun who slanders a nun commits a
pilc. (T.1437, p.482c16).
- MUlasarvastivadins: - a monk who slanders someone commits a pilc. (p.765b27
and following); the commentary does not give any further
information.
- a nun who slanders someone commits a
pac. (p.970alO and following); the commentary adds many
details on a nun who slanders a nun, but not on a nun who
slanders a monk.
The above reveals that
three Vinayas indicate which offense a nun commits when she
slanders a monle according to the Mahf, to the Dharma and to the
Mala, it is apiic .. Yet, the commentary in of
the Mala only gives details on a nun who slanders a nun.
the Pi:ili tradition, the Mahisasakas, the Mahasarp.ghikas and the
Sarvastivadins judge a monk who slanders a monk and a monk who
slanders a nun in a different way. This is not the case for the
Dharmaguptakas and for the MUlasarvastivadins for whom gender
seems to have no influence: regardless whether a monk slanders a
monk or a nun, he commits a pac ..
20. lit. 'a grave offense,' an offense considered to be slightly lighter than a pilriljika
or a
21. Dharma, p. 636a5:
22. Dharma, p. 734c12:
nABS 23.1 38
3. a monk commits a piicittika offense if he tells about someone's/ a
monk's grave offense [piiriijika/salflghiivaselja] to a non-ordained
person; a nun commits a piicittika offense if she tens about some-
one's/a nun's grave offense
The different schools further display the following infonnation:
- Pali tradition: - a mOIh'<: who tells about a monk's grave offense commIts a
pac. (Vin, Vol.lV, p.31,12-14);
- bhikkhunfpiltimokkha: a nun who tells about a nun's grave
offense commits a pac. (Moniales, p.186).
-MahISiisakas: - a monk who tells about a monk's grave offense commits a
pac. (Mahf, p.41a17-18); the commentary adds that a monk
who tells about a nun's grave offense commits a and
that a nun who tells about a nun's or a monk's grave offense
commits apac. (Mahf, p.41a21-22).
- a nun who tells about a nun's grave
offense commits apac. (Mahf, p.85b19-21).
- Mahasfurlghikas: - a monk who tells about a monk's grave offense commits a
pac. (Mahil, p.338a8-10); the commentary adds that a monk
who tells about a nun's grave offense commits a sthalatyaya
(Mahil, p.338a25-26).
- a nun who tells about a grave offense
commits a pac. (Mahil, p.527b20: only the key-words 'to tell
about a grave offense').
- Dharmaguptakas: - a monk who tells about someone's grave offense commits a
pac. (Dharma, p.639b26-28); since the commentary that
follows upon the precept states that in case a monk tells about a
grave offense of a person who is not a monk or a nun, he does
not commit apac., but a (Dharma, p.639c6-7), we can
deduce that the term 'someone' mentioned in the precept has to
be interpreted as 'a monk or a nun.' The commentary further
adds that (also) a nun [in a similar situation] commits a pac.
(Dharma, p.639c9-10).23
- the above corresponds to the that says that
a nun who tells about someone's grave offense, commits a
pac. (Dharma, p.734c19-20).
- Sarvastivadins: - a monk who tells about someone's grave offense commits a
pac. (Sarva, p.72c10-H); the commentary only gives details on
a monk who tells about a monk's grave offense.
- a nun who tells about a nun's grave
offense commits apac. (T.l437, p.482c22-23).
- Miilasarvastivadins: - a monk who tells about a monk's grave offense commits a
pac. (Mula, p.773b28-29);
23. Dharma, p. 639c9-1O:
HEIRMAN 39
- a nun who tells about a nun's grave
offense commits a pac. (MUla, p.972b20-21).
The above reveals that
.. only two Vinayas indicate which offense a nun commits when she
tells about a monk's grave offense: according to 'the Mahf and to
the Dharma, it is a pac .. Consequently, there is no difference be-
tween a nun who tells about a monk's grave offense and a nun who
tells about a nun's grave offense.
the Mahisasakas and the Mahasrup.ghikas judge a monk who tells
about a monk's grave offense and a monk who tells about a nun's
grave offense in a different way. This is not the case for the
Dharmaguptakas for whom gender has no influence: regardless
whether a monk tells about the grave offense of a monk or of a
nun, he commits a pac ..
4. a monk commits a piicittika offense if he accnses someone/a monk
of an unfounded offense; a nun commits a piicittika
offense if she accuses someone/a nun of an unfounded
offense
This precept is very similar to the one on the accusation of an unfounded
parajika offense. The different schools further display the following
information:
- Pali tradition:
- MahIsasakas:
- Mahasii.rp.ghikas:
- a monk who accuses a monk commits a pac. (Vin, Vol.IV,
p.148,5-6); the Pali tradition does not give any further com-
mentary; it is not unlikely, however, that the commentary on the
precept on the accusation of an unfounded par. offense also
applies here.
- bhikkhunfpatimokkha: a nun who accuses a nun commits a
pac. (Moniales, p.190)
- a monk who accuses a monk commits a pac. (Mahf,
p.67b12-13); the commentary adds that a monk who accuses a
nun commits a and that a nun who accuses a monk or a
nun commits a pac. (Mahf, p.67bI3-15).
- a nun who accuses a nun commits a pac.
(Mahf, p.86b14-15).
- a monk who accuses a monk commits a pac. (Maha,
p.395a8-9); the commentary adds that a monk who accuses a
nun commits a sthiilatyaya (Mahii, p.395a25-26).
- a nun who accuses commits a pac.
(Mahii, p.527c12: only the key-words 'to falsely accuse of a
sa'!l.').
nABS 23.1 40
- Dharrnaguptakas: - a monk who accuses (someone} commits a pac. (Dharma,
p.689a21-12)24; the commentary does not say whether
'someone' is a monk or a nun; given the above mentioned
commentary on the precept on the accusation oran unfounded
par., however, it is likely that we have to interpret 'someone'
as 'a monk or a nun' . The commentary further says that (also) a
nun [in a similar situation] commits a pac. (Dharma,
p.689b12-13).25
- the above corresponds to the that says that
a nun who accuses (someone) commits a pilc. (Dharma,
p.736b19-20).
- Sarvastivadins: - a monk who accuses a monk commits a pilc. (S,arva,
p.1l5b7-8).
- a nun who accuses a nun commits a
pac. (T.1437, p.484all-12).
- MUlasarvastivadins: - a monk who accuses a monk commits a pac. (Mala, p.852a9-
10).
- a nun who accuses a nun commits a pilc.
(Mala, p.991b13-14).
The above reveals that
only two Vinayas indicate which offense a nun commits when she
accuses a mollie according to the Mahf and to the Dharma, it is a
pilc .. Thus, in these two traditions, a nun commits a pilc. regardless
whether she accuses a nun or a mollie
the Mahlsasakas and the Mahasal1lghikas (and possibly the Pali
tradition) judge a monk who accuses a monk and a monk who
accuses a nun in a different way. This is not the case for the
Dharmaguptakas for whom gender has no influence: regardless
whether a monk falsely accuses a monk or a nun, he commits a.
pilc ..
We can conclude that
only two Vinayas indicate which offense a nun commits when she
offends a monk. The Mahf says that a nun commits a pilcittika if
she uses a minor event to accuse a monk of an unfounded pilriljika
(whereas she commits a if she accuses a nun). This is
analogous to the first precept on a false accusation. Also with
regard to the other precepts, a nun commits a pilcittika if she
offends a monk. In these cases, however, there is no difference with
24. Dharma, p. 689a21-22:
25. Dharma, p. 689b12-13:
HEIRMAN 41
a nun who offends a nun. The Dharma makes no difference
between a nun who offends a monk and a nun who offends a nun.
the MahIsasakas and the Mahasfu:p.ghikas (and possibly the PaIi
traditionUudge a monk who offends a monk and a monk who
offends a nun in a different way. This is not the case for the
Dharmaguptakas for whom gender has no influence:. regardless
whether a monk offends a monk or a nun, he commits the same
offense.
Consequently, throughout the Vinayas, a monk who has offended a nun,
and a nun who has offended a monk are judged analogously to the above
outlined case on the accusation of an unfounded piiriijika offense.
List of abbreviations
Dharma
Mahti
Mahz
Moniales
Mala
pac.
par.
sa'!!.
Sarva
Sp
T.
T.1437
Yin
T.1428, Jl!!:5J-1$, trans. BuddhayaSas and Zhu Fonian
(Dharmaguptaka Vinaya).
T.1425, trans. Buddhabhadra and $mi Faxian (Mahti-
sii'!!ghikaVinaya).
T.1421, trans. BuddhajIva, Huiyan and
Zhu Daosheng (MahfsiisakaVinaya).
Wijayaratna, M. (1991), Les moniales bouddhistes, naissance et
diveloppement du monachisme jeminin, Paris.
T.1442, trans. Yijing (bhiJquvibhaflga
of the Miilasarviistiviidins); T.1443:
trans. Yijing of the Miilasarviistiviidins).
pacittika (pili: piicittiya) or variants
piirajika or variants
(Piili: sa'!!ghlidisesa) or variants
T.1435, trans. KumiirajIva, Dharma-
ruci and Vimaliik!!a (SarviistivadaVinaya)
Buddhaghosa, Samantapiisiidikii, J. Takakusu, M. Nagai and (Vols.5
and 7) K. Mizuno (editors) [1924-1947], London, Pili Text Society, 7
Vols.
TaishOShinshaDaizokyo 1. Takakusu and K. Wata-
nabe (editors), Tokyo: 1924-1934.
compilation Faying
of the Sarviistiviidins).
Oldenberg, H. (1964
2
-
3
[1879-1883]), The Vinaya Pitaka'!l, London,
Text Society, 5 Vols.
CHARLES B. JONES
Mentally Constructing What Already Exists:
The Pure Land Thought of Chan Master Jixing Chewu
(1741-1810)
I. INTRODUCTION
One aspect of Chinese Pure Land history that has begun receiving atten-
tion during the past twenty years is the existence of a widely-recognized
series of "patriarchs" (zu til.), whose number stands at thirteen (although
one list I have seen contains fourteen names).! These are figures whom
Pure Land devotees acknowledge as shapers, defenders, and revivers of
the tradition. Twelfth in this series is the mid-Qing dynasty figure of
Jixing Chewu a Chan monk in the Linji line who, in mid-life,
abandoned the practice of Chan and devoted himself exclusively to the
Pure Land path. After this change of direction, he put his energy into
building up his home temple, the Zifu Temple on Hongluo
Mountain #.lIt; UJ in Hebei, into a center for Pure Land practice, and his
talks and essays focused on issues related to Pure Land practice, philoso-
phy, and apologetics. His essays, as well as notes recorded by disciples
during his dharma-talks, were later compiled into a relatively small
work called "The Recorded Sayings of Chan Master Chewu" (Chewu
chanshi yulu The writings contained in this brief
1. See for example Yu 1981: 36-52 for a survey of patriarchs and an account of the
formation of the list. The only source of which I am aware for fourteen patriarchs
is found in DAOYUAN 1978, p. 330-331, which lists Cizhou as the four-
teenth after Yinguang. However, from DAOYUAN's remarks this appears to be a
part of a personal crusade to add Cizhou to the list, a move that has so far failed
to attract wide support.
2. Chewu chanshi yulu, z:z 109: 750-790. Another edition is found in OUYI 1980, .
2: 589-664. The thirteenth patriarch, the late-Qing I early Republican era figure
Yinguang, also privately printed an edition that re-arranged the different parts of
this work and gave them new section titles without altering the actual content,
under the title Mengdong chanshi yi ji (An anthology of Chan
Master Mengdong's [i.e., Chewu's] literary remains). All references to the Dai
Nihon Zoku Zokyo will be given as "ZZ," and the volume and page numbers that
follow will be taken from the Taiwan reprint edition.
Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies
Volume 23. Number 1.2000
nABS 23.1 44
anthology shoW avery gifted literary mind at work: full of parallel
phrases, literary allusions, and clear, concise writing, it is a joy to read.
The contents reveal his wide learning in several branches of Buddhist
thought: perfection of wisdom, Tiantai 5I(i:r, Huayan, and Chan. His
overriding concern is to generate a desire on the part of his reader to
follow in the Pure Land path, and to settle any intellectual doubts that
the reader might have by demonstrating that Pure Land practice and
soteriology are fully compatible with the highest and most speculative
Buddhist philosophy. In addition, it contains stele inscriptions, fore-
words and prefaces to other works, and his famous "One Hundred
Giithiis on the Teachings" (Jiaoyi baijie), a set of one hundred four-line
verses all beginning with the line "The single word Amitabha ... " (yi ju
Mituo) and going on to praise the wonderful effects and doctrinal signif-
icance of this name.
In this article, we will begin our examination of this figure with a
resume of his life, and then look more closely at his methods of Purf( .
Land practice, and his incorporation of mind-only thought into Pure
Land theory as the basis for practice.
ll. THE liFE OF CHEWU
There is only one source for Chewu's biography, and that is the "Brief
Sketch of the Life of Chan Master Chewu" (Chewu chanshi xing lile
written by the monk Mulian and appended to the end of
''The Recorded Sayings of Chan Master Chewu" (Chewu chanshi yulu
This brief outline of the master's life is remarkably
un-hagiographical. Mulian claims that he heard everything from eyewit-
nesses and Chewu's close associates, and that he intentionally presents
his material in a straightforward, unembroidered manner. The result is a
true biography that is very modern in its style and content.
Chewu's ordination name was Jixing; "Chewu," along with "Natang
were his style-names (zi *), and he was also occasionally called
(hao Mengdong He came from Fengrun County in
what is now Hebei Province, the son of a family surnamed Ma. He was a
gifted student and an avid reader in his youth, taking in the classics,
3. z:z 109: 788-790. Other sources recount Chewu's life, but they are all summaries
or abbreviations of this work. See, for example, the entry "Jixing" in the
Foguang Da Cidian 1988, 5947c-5948a; and PENG 1987: 360-363. As a way of
demonstrating the variability in the Pure Land patriarchal tradition, this last source
lists him as the eleventh, not the twelfth, patriarch.
JONES 45
histories, and anything else he came across. As Mulian says, "There is
nothing that he did not survey." The course of his life was changed at
the age of twenty-two by a serious illness, which had the effect on him,
as it has had on many other famous Buddhist figures, of awakening him
to the evanescence of life. As soon as he recovered, he left home and
went to the Sansheng Hermitage (sansheng an in Fangshan
County also in Hebei, and took refuge under the monk Rongchi
who tonsured him. The following year, he received the full
precepts from the Vinaya Master Hengshi 'I!iJfitgjjj of the Xiuyun
Temple twenty-five kilometers west of Beijing.
4
For the first
few years after ordination, he immersed himself in doctrinal and textual
studies, attending lectures on a variety of scriptures including the Satra
of Peifect Enlightenment, the Lotus Satra, the Diamond Satra, and the
Sararrzgamasamiidhisatra. He travelled to one monastery after another,
and eventually mastered the teachings of all the schools. In the course of
his studies, he concentrated especially on the Faxiang teachings of con-
sciousness-only, teachings that he would adapt later in life to explain the
Pure Land.
He also began Chan practice sometime during this period, and had his
breakthrough in the year 1768, while practicing under the master Cuiru
nPD at the Guangtong Temple As Mulian writes, "Master,
student, and the Way all came together, and he received the mind-seal
[from Cuiru] in the 36th generation of Linji." Thus, at the age of
twenty-seven, Chewu was already an accomplished scholar and a certi-
fied Chan master. Five years later, Cuiru moved away to the Wanshou
Temple and Chewu remained at the Guangtong Temple to con-
tinue "leading the assembly in the practice of Chan." He remained there
as an eminent Chan teacher for the next fourteen years, and his fame
spread far and wide. Mulian credits Chewu with contributing to a revival
of Chan teaching and practice.
Despite the success of his career as a Chan teacher, Chewu felt there
was still something missing. He himself later wrote:
From the guisi B year ofthe Qianlong reign period (1773) I was the abbot of
the Guangtong Temple in Jingdu I led the people in Chan practice, talking
here and there, and my words were recorded. In the dingxi Tgs year (1777)5 my
4. Also known as the Tanzhe Temple There is an entry on this temple in
the Foguang da cidian, 6106b-6I07a.
5. The text in the Zoku Zokyo gives this date as the dingmao T-!lP year (1807),
which is clearly incorrect. The verson of the text found in the Jingtu shiyao, first
JIABS 23.1 46
store of karI)1a was deep and heavy, and so the conditions for all [kinds of] ill-
nesses increased.
6
He began to look at the example of the Song dynasty Chan'master and
scholar-monk Yongming Yanshou (904-975), a genuinely
enlightened master living in times that Chewu considered far more con-
ducive to the dharma who had turned to the Pure Land. Reflecting on
Yanshou's example ofreciting Amitabha's name 100,000 times daily in
hopes of gaining rebirth, Chewu thought, "how much more in this age
of decline would it be especially right and proper to follow and accept
[this path], coming to rest one's mind in the Pure Land?? He began to
turn away from Chan practice and toward recitation, and Mulian reports
that he eventually set aside only a short period of each day for receiving
guests, and devoted the rest of his time to worship and recitation of
Amitabha's name.
In the 57th year of the Qianlong emperor (i.e., 1792), Chewu accepted
an invitation from the Juesheng Temple near Beijing to come
and serve as its abbot, a post he held for the next eight years.8 During
this time, he restored the original buildings and added several others "so
that all the old and sick could have a place to go for help, and beginners
would have a convenient [place] in which to recite and practice." Both
resident clergy and the local people admired him for his devotion and
strict observance of the precepts, and many came to hear him preach or
to receive advice and encouragement in their practice.
In 1800, he moved once again to the Zifu Temple on Hongluo
Mountain near Beijing, where he remained for the last ten years
of his life. During this time, he carried on as before: teaching disciples,
restoring the temple, meeting with lay devotees, and lecturing. In the
third month of 1810, he began to have premonitions that his life was
nearing its end, and he made arrangements for his own cremation and
published in 1678 and reprinted in expanded form in 1930 by Ven. Yinguang to
include the Chewu chanshi yulu has the dingxi Tiffi year (1777), which seems
much more likely. See OUYI Zhixu 1980,2: 593.
6. ZZ 109: 750blO-11.
7. ZZ 109: 789al-2.
8. There is an entry on this temple in the Foguang da cidian 1988, 6796b-c. It was
constructed in 1733, and its most notable feature, according to the dictionary, is
its large, eight-sided bronze bell, which is 9.6 meters in height and inscribed with
several siitras, mantras, and illustrations.
JONES 47
chose a senior disciple to succeed him as abbot. At one point, he assem-
bled the resident clergy and admonished them with these words:
The Pure Land dharma-gate covers all [beings] of the three roots [i.e., inferior,
middling, superior]; there is no level of capability that it does not take in. For
many years now I have labored along with the assembly to build up this
daochang m ~ . It was originally for the sake of drawing [people] from all
directions to practice pure karma together. It would behoove everyone always to
observe the rules and procedures I have set up; you are not permitted to alter
course. This is so that perhaps the old monks and the assembly will not be
burdened with any hardships.9
About two weeks before his death, he detected the flrst slight symptoms
of the illness that would take him. He called together his disciples and
set them to the task of helping him remain focused on the Pure Land by
reciting the Buddha's name by his bedside, and he began to see signs
that he would be reborn there: innumerable pennants and banners fllled
the sky in the west. When his disciples expressed sadness that he was
leaving them, he told them: "I have arrived in the realm of the sages -
you should be happy for your master. Why do you remain in suffering?"
On the seventeenth day of the twelfth month, he reported having seen
a vision of MafijusrI, A valokitesvara, and Mahasthamaprapta in the west,
and told his followers that he fully expected to see the Buddha Amitabha
himself that day. His disciples chanted the name more intensely, and
Chewu said that with every nian, he could see more of the Buddha's
body. He died that day, sitting upright with his hands in the Amitabha-
mudra. The assembly could smell an unusual fragrance fllling the room.
After the first seven days of the funeral period, the master's face looked
like he was still alive; it was filled with compassion and peace. Hair that
was white at the end of his life turned black, and was extraordinarily
lustrous. After the second seven days, he was placed in the vault, and
after the third seven days he was cremated. Over one hundred relics
(sarfra) were collected, and his followers, respecting his wishes, placed
his remains in the common pagoda rather than construct a special struc-
ture just for him.
Chewu died at the age of seventy, having been a monk for 49 years.
Mulian, who wrote the master's biography a decade or so later, says
nothing of his recognition as a "patriarch" of the Pure Land School, but
Yinguang's (f[17\:;, 1861-1940) 1933 expanded edition of Peng Jiqing's
( ~ ~ ~ f F t 1740-1796), 1783 Jingtu sheng xian lu (Record of the sages
9. ZZ 109:789aI5-18.
JIABS 23.1 48
and worthies of the Pure Land) labels him the eleventh patriarch,1O and
OGASA W ARA SenshU believes that the popularity of this anthology of
biographies and rebirth stories may have contributed to his ,acceptance
throughout China as suchl!
III. CHEWU'S METHODS OF PURE LAND PRACTICE
At different times in Pure Land history, masters have recommended
various forms of practice to their followers. In China, Lushan Huiyuan
(344-416) and Tiantai founder Zhiyi (538-597)
taught forms of meditative contemplation suitable for rigorously <;lisci-
plined practitioners. Guifeng Zongmi (780-841) described
four different methods of nianfo and even today one can find a
work that describes forty-eight different methods of nianfo, each of
which serves a different purpose or is suited to a different circum-
stance.
12
How did Chewu envision the methods of Pure Land practice
and what results did he expect from them?
A. The prerequisites. In concert with other Pure Land writers, Chewu
recommended that practitioners develop certain beliefs and attitudes
prior to the actual practice of nianfo. The first was bodhicitta (putixin
cg:tit{,,), the altruistic intention to dedicate the merit of all one's
practices to the benefit of other living beings.13 After that, one needed
faith and vows. Faith came first, and was indeed the basis for the
generation of vows: "One need only have deep faith in the Buddha's
words, and in dependence upon them generate a vow to hold on to his
name (chi ming :Mt1S)."14
As to vows, Chewu explains these both in terms of the practitioner's
own aspiration to achieve rebirth in SukhavatI, and Amitabha's vows to
10. PENG 1987: 360.
11. OGASAWARA 1951: 10. As OGASAWARA notes, the list of patriarchs of the Pure
Land school has undergone many changes as different authorities proposed their
own versions. Modern usage makes Chewu the 12th, not the 11th patriarch, as
one can see in the monastic breviary most in use in Taiwan, the Fomen bibei
kesong ben, which includes a liturgy for honoring the patriarchs on page 118-
119, and in the list given by Ven. DAOYUAN in his study of Pure Land's
"globalization" (shijie hua tltW-1!::;) in DAOYUAN 1978: 330-331.
12. ZHENG 1991.
13. ZZ 109: 754alO.
14. ZZ 109: 758b2; see also 109: 769b8-1O.
JONES 49
bring rebirth about. In a long hortatory essay designed to engender faith
and vows on the part of his audience, Chewu relates the following story:
For example, take Ying Ke He was a man who had not given up alcohol
and meat. Later, he began reading biographies of those who have gone to rebirth.
With each story he read, he gradually gained more willingness until at last he
gave up the food [and] recited the Buddha's name. After seven days, he felt the
Buddha appearing to him, comforting him and saying, "You have ten years
remaining to your life. Recite the Buddha's name well, and after ten years I will
receive you." Ke replied, "In this Saha world, it is easy to lose true recitation. I
wish that I could attain rebirth even sooner, and serve all of the worthies." The
Buddha said, "Since you have made this wish, I will come for you in three days."
Three days later, he attained rebirth. 15
At the end of this essay, after presenting several such inspirational
stories of vows made and aspirations granted, Chewu drives home his
point:
Ah! There is nothing that the Buddha will not achieve for the sake of sentient
beings. He is truly a kind and compassionate mother and father. If one wishes
rapid rebirth [in the Pure Land, as in the story of Ying Ke then he leads
them to rapid rebirth. [ ... ] Thus, he shows kindness to all; how is it that he should
withhold his compassion from me alone? He brings to pass the vows of all
beings; how is it that he should frustrate my vows alone? [ ... ] Therefore, these
three seeds: faith, vow, and practice, are exhausted by the single word vow.
16
Besides faith and vows (and practice, mentioned in the above quotation
and to which we will come shortly), a list of four requisite states of
mind appears in another essay. Here Chewu says:
In nianfo, one needs to produce four kinds of mind. What are these four? First,
from beginningless time up to the present one has created karma; one must
generate a mind of shame. Second, having had an opportunity to hear this dharma
gate, one must generate a mind of joy. Third, one's karmic obstructions are
beginningless, and this dharma-gate is difficult to encounter, and so one ought to
generate a mind of great sorrow. Fourth, as the Buddha is thus compassionate,
one ought to generate a mind of gratitude. If [even] one of these four minds are
present, then one's pure karma
17
will be fruitful.
18
15. ZZ 109: 757aI6-b3.
16. ZZ 109: 757b9-16.
17. jing ye 11-*, a term frequently used in Pure Land writings to refer specifically to
Pure Land practices. The locus classicus of this term is the Guan wuliangshou fo
jing (or Meditation Sutra), where the Buddha Siikyamuni uses
this term to refer to the practices and attitudes that will lead to rebirth in
Sukhavat!. See, for example, T.365, 12:341cS.
IS. ZZ 109: 772b5-S.
nABS 23.1 50
This list of four prerequisite states of mind does not appear in any of the
three Pure Land scriptures, although it may come from another source
within the Chinese Pure Land tradition.
One item that Chewu explicitly leaves out of the list of prerequisites
for practice is confession of faults. Chewu states that the lack of any
need for confession in fact constitutes one of Pure Land's advantages
over the other dharma-gates. He says:
Moreover, the other gates of cultivation require one to confess one's present
karma; if any manifest karma is not confessed, then it constitutes an obstacle on
the Way, leaving one without a path for advancement. But the one who practices
pure karma goes to rebirth carrying their karma with them; there is no need to
confess one's karma. This is because when the mind reaches the point of reciting
the Buddha's name just once, one is able to extinguish the faults [accumulated
over] 8,000,000,000 kalpas.
19
And so, with these preliminaries in place, one is ready to begin practice.
What does one then do?
B. Oral/mental invocation and the goal of attaining rebirth. The term
nianfo is ambiguous: the first character, nian, can mean either to
contemplate or think about, or it can mean to recite aloud. Thus, in
reading Pure Land texts, one must always attend to the context within
which an individual author discusses nianfo in order to clarify whether
he or she means oral invocation and recitation or mental contemplation
and visualization. In the case of Chewu, we find evidence that he taught
nianfo at various times in both senses, and so extra care is needed to
determine which meaning he gives in any given passage. In this section,
we will look at the places where Chewu uses terms such as chi ming
is ("hold the name"), nian yil duo sheng ("recite one/many
sound[sD, or cheng ming {.is ("invoke the name"), and see how he en-
visioned this aspect of practice and what results he expected it to bring.
Aside from the term nianfo itself, the term that Chewu most
commonly uses for Pure Land practice is chi ming "to hold the
name." In the Pure Land scriptures, this term (or its expanded form
zhichi minghao does not necessarily mean oral recitation of
the name, although such practice is not excluded either. For example,
Luis G6MEZ's translation of the relevant passage from the shorter
Sukhiivatfvyilhasiltra reads as follows:
19. ZZ 109:758b8-11.
JONES 51
Sariputra, if good men or good women hear this explanation of the qualities of
the Buddha Arnita, and embrace his name (zhichi minghao and keep
it in mind single-mindedly and without distraction, be it for one day, or for two,
for three, for four, for five, for six, or for seven days, then, when their lives come
to an end, the Buddha Amita, together with his holy entourage, will appear before
them. At the time of their death, their minds free of any distorted views, they will
be able to be reborn forthwith in Arnita Buddha's Land of Supreme Bliss.20
Similarly, the final instructions of Sakyamuni Buddha at the end of the
Meditation Sutra are: "Hold well to these words. 'Holding these words'
means to hold the name of the Buddha Amitayus."21 In both cases, the
emphasis is on the name itself rather than on any meditative visualiza-
tion of the Buddha, his retinue, or his land. One hears the name, and one
keeps it finnly in mind. Whether one does so through spoken recitation
or mental concentration appears to be left to the practitioner's discretion.
Chewu uses the tenn chi ming :R't-iS in exactly this sense. At times he
clearly uses the tenn in the sense of oral invocation, as when he says,
"when one holds to the name with a mind of faith and aspiration, each
recitation will be a seed for a nine [-petalled] lotus. Reciting one time is
the proper causal basis for rebirth."22 Here, "reciting one time" is my
rendering of chi yi sheng :R't-, where sheng ("sound") is a numerary
adjunct used for counting a number of audible repetitions. Nevertheless,
in other places where the tenn occurs, he seems to mean something more
like keeping the name in one's mind and letting it dominate one's
thoughts at all times. For example, in the middle of a discussion of the
basic identity of the Buddha that is recited or contemplated (nian) with
the practitioner, he says, "the causal mind of the self that is itself the
Buddha, with profound faith and total resolve, holds the name exclu-
sively and sincerely."23 In the context of this discussion within which
this statement appears, it is clear that Chewu is recommending that the
practitioner keep the name in mind at all times, understanding that the
20. GOMEZ 1996: 148. His translation of the same passage from the Sanskrit text
appears on page 19. Interestingly, it omits the words "this explanation of the
qualities of" and stipulates only that people should hear the name itself and bring
it to mind. Thus, the Sanskrit focuses more concretely than the Chinese on the
sense of hearing the name and remembering it.
21. T.465, 12:346bI5-16.
22. ZZ 109: 7 54b 10-11.
23. ZZ 109:772a13-14.
JIABS 23.1 52
presence of the .name both realizes and brings about the identity of his or
her mind with the Buddha.
In the final analysis, we must say that Chewu was indifferent on the
issue of oral versus mental invocation of the name, and he used the term
chi ming ~ ; g freely in both senses, sometimes emphasizing one or the
other explicitly as in the examples given above, and other times leaving
the issue ambiguous. We find in his writings no attempt to categorize or
systematize oral and mental methods of chi ming ~ ; g as we see in, for
instance, Zhuhong ***'s "audible," "silent," and "half-audible and
half-silent" typology with its recommendations as to when or for whom
one or the other was most appropriate.
24
What mattered to Chewu was
that, whatever means one used, the name, and not a visualized image,
predominated in one's mind every waking moment.
The reason for this emphasis lay in Chewu's explanation of the rela-
tionship between Amitabha's name and his reality. Chewu equated the
name "Amitabha" and the title "Buddha" with the existence of all the
virtues that enable a being to merit the name "Amitabha Buddha": ''The
Buddha that appears in an instant of thought establishes his name with
all of his virtue; outside of this virtue, there is no name. By means of the
name one calls virtue in; outside of that name, there is no virtue."25 In
this and similar passages, Chewu appears to assume that Amitabha could
not even establish his own name as a Buddha if he did not exercise the
merits and virtues by which he earned that title; the name depends on the
reality that gives it validity. Therefore, the simple name "Amitabha"
held in the mind or on the lips stands as a placeholder for the full visual-
ized image of the Buddha and opens the mind to the Buddha's full
reality. This may perhaps serve to account for Chewu's apparent lack of
interest in training students to perform the visualization techniques
found in the Meditation Sutra and his emphasis on the practice of chi
ming t ~ ; g .
Finally, it is quite clear from almost every passage in the Recorded
Sayings that Chewu takes for granted that the goal of practice is the
attainment of rebirth in the Pure Land of Sukhavat!. The stories he
recounts to illustrate the power of even the most frivolously-made vows
all show how beings attain the rebirth that they desire, and he devotes
much space to instilling a longing for the Pure Land in his readers.
24. YO 1981: 59.
25. ZZ 109: 762b5. See also 109: 767b7.
JONES 53
However, the question for the next section is: Is rebirth in the Pure Land
at the end of the present life the only goal he imagined for his students
and followers? Or did chi ming lfiS bring other benefits in this life?
C. Mental contemplation and the goal of enlightenment. The first essay
in Chewu's Recorded Sayings begins this way:
The essence of all the gates of teaching is to illuminate the mind; the essence of all
the gates of practice is to purify the mind. Now for illuminating the mind, there is
nothing to compare with nianfo Recollect the Buddha (yi fo
contemplate the Buddha (nianjo), and you will surely see the Buddha manifesting
before you. This is not a provisional skillful means! One attains to the opening of
the mind oneself. Is this kind of Buddha-contemplation (nianfo) not the essence
of illuminating the mind? Again, for purifying the mind, there is also nothing to
compare with nianfo. When one thought conforms [to the Buddha], that one
thought is Buddha; when thought after thought conforms [to the Buddha], then
thought after thought is Buddha. When a clear jewel drops into turbid water, the
turbid water cannot but become clear; when the Buddha's name enters into a
chaotic mind, that mind cannot help but [be] Buddha. Is this kind of Buddha-
contemplation not the essence of purifying the mind?26
Thus, at the very outset we get clues as to the results that Chewu
expected to obtain from the practice of nianfo: the illumination of the
mind, the purification of the mind, and a vision of the Buddha
Amitabha, all accomplishments that are to come about not after death,
but in this very life. Throughout his writings, he discussed (a) the way
in which nianfo had its effects instantaneously, (b) the way in which it
caused practitioners to manifest their innate Buddha-mind, and (c) the
need to persevere in the practice every moment over a lifetime in order
to maintain the identity of the self and the Buddha and assure the attain-
ment of rebirth. We will examine these three aspects of his teaching in
tum.
(a) Chewu saw the mind as an ongoing process of thinkings that could
radically alter their course from one moment to the next. He reminds his
reader in several places that thought creates karma, and karma has only
ten directions into which it can lead one: the traditional ten realms of
Buddhas, bodhisattvas, pratyekabuddhas, sravakas, gods, asuras, humans,
animals, hungry ghosts, and hell-denizens. He says:
With the manifestation of a single moment of the mind, all of reality can become
delusion and all delusion can become reality. On my last day there is no change
[in my fundamental nature], and on my last day I will follow my conditioning.
26. ZZ 109:752b5-10.
JIABS 23.1 54
Now if it is not the conditioning of the Buddha-realm and the thought of the
Buddha-reaim, then I will have thoughts of one of the other nine realms. If it is
not one of the three vehicles [of sravaka, pratyekabuddha, or bodhisattva], then I
will have thoughts of the six worldly paths. If I do not have thoughts of [the
realms ot] gods and humans, then I will have thoughts of the three evil paths. If I
do not have thoughts of [the realms ot] animals and hungry ghosts, then I will
have thoughts of the hells. As an ordinary being, I cannot but have thoughts; only
a Buddha has accomplished [the feat ot] having the substance of the mind empty
of all thoughts. [ ... ] If a thought arises, then it must fall into one of the ten realms;
there is no thought that subsists outside of the ten realms. Every thought that
arises is a condition for receiving [future] rebirths. There is no-one who knows
this principle and yet fails to nianfo.27
Thus, for Chewu, every instant was a pivotal moment in which one's
fate could be decided and one's trajectory altered. The law of cause-and-
effect meant that the contents of one's mind set one on a certain path.
Since everyone had thoughts at every moment (fully-enlightened
Buddhas excepted), then their path was set or re-set at every moment.
Since there were only ten possible directions to go, then one's path must
of necessity be chosen from among those ten. The most desirable path,
as he thought should be obvious to all, was that of the Buddhas, and to
put oneself on that path, one had to nianfo. That meant, as outlined
above, to practice chi ming t'if1'S, to hold the name which, as the vessel
of all the Buddha's virtues, was the Buddha itself.
(b) Based on this principle, Chewu could assert that allowing the
Buddha's name to dominate one's mind for a moment made it identical
with the Buddha in that moment. He stated the matter in this way:
What is "being a Buddha"? "Being a Buddha" is just reciting the Buddha's name
and contemplating the Buddha's proper and dependent [recompense]. Thus, it is
easy. A sutra says, "When your mind thinks of the Buddha, then it is the thirty-
two marks and the 80 minor characteristics." How could this not mean that
thinking of the Buddha entails being the Buddha? And becoming the Buddha
means that one is the Buddha.
28
In a later essay, Chewu elaborates on this idea further. When one's mind
is filled with Amitabha Buddha (even if only through holding the name
27. ZZ 109: 752b14-753a2.
28. ZZ 109:754b18-755a3. The term "proper recompense" (zheng baa l E ~ ) and
"dependent recompense" (yi baa ~ ~ ) refer respectively to the fruition of a
Buddha's pure karma in terms of his own natural attributes (stature, adornments,
intelligence, wisdom, strength, and so on) and in terms of his environment (land,
dwelling, retinue, and so on).
JONES 55
in mind without any other mental imagery), then it becomes identical to
the Buddha in that instant:
Now if at this present moment, my mind is focused on Amitabha, the Western
Region, and.on seeking rebirth in the Pure Land of utmost bliss, then at this very
moment the proper and dependent [recompense] of the western region are within
my mind, and my mind is within the proper and dependent [recompense] of the
western region. They are like two mirrors exchanging light and mutually illumi-
nating each other. This is the mark of horizontally pervading the ten directions. If
it firmly exhausts the three margins of time, then the very moment of contemplat-
ing the Buddha is the very moment of seeing the Buddha and becoming the
Buddha. The very' moment of seeking rebirth is the very moment of attaining
rebirth and the very moment of liberating all beings. The three margins of time are
all a single, identical' time; there is no before and after. [ ... ] Awakening to this
principle is most difficult; having faith in it is most easy.29
The fact that nianfo ; f r , ~ revealed Buddha-nature so directly in this way
made its practice superior to any method that Chan had to offer.
The two phrases in the Meditation Sutra, 'this mind becomes the Buddha,' 'this
mind is the Buddha,' are simpler and more direct than the Chan statements 'direct
pointing to the person's mind,' and 'see [one's own] nature and become a
Buddha.' Why is this? Because 'seeing the nature' is difficult and 'being a
Buddha' is easy.30
As this passage and the quotation that opened this section show, even
though Chewu turned his back on Chan, illumination of the mind and
the uncovering of its inherent Buddhahood remained important goals for
him. What had changed was the method he recommended for attaining
these goals.
(c) The fact that the course of the mind could be turned in a single
instant presented practitioners with a wonderful opportunity. A single
moment spent filling the mind with Amitabha's name made the mind
Amitabha for that moment. However, there was also a danger: in the
very next moment the mind was liable to turn back to its old patterns of
thought, and Chewu asserted that the benefits of nianfo could all be lost
as quickJy as they were gained:
However, if in this very moment one occasionally loses the illumination, or
suddenly produces regressive regrets, and is out of accord with the Buddha, then
karma can [once again] entangle the mind, and the present sensory-realm will
29. ZZ 109: 756a3-9.
30. ZZ 109: 754bI6-18.
JIABS 23.1 56
revert to its previous recompense. As a result, one will again be just another
suffering seritient being in the iand of endurance. 31
Such an idea contrasts sharply with the ebullient optimism of a Shinran
or an Ippen that rebirth is assured after the first utterance of the nem-
butsu.
In practical terms, this meant that the Pure Land practitioner was
under the necessity of maintaining this practice of chi ming f f ~ from
one moment to the next, deepening it and strengthening it through
constant application all their lives. Not only that, but Chewu thought
that this life was too precious even to waste it on other Buddhist
practices; they were not as reliable as nianfo, and thus time and energy
spent in their pursuit was time taken away from the critical practice of
chi ming f f ~ : .
This day has passed; our lives are now that much shorter. The light that passes in
a span of time is also the light that passes through a span of our lives. Can you
not cherish it? Knowing how precious is the spirit (jingshen ffit$), then one
must not dissipate it uselessly; hold on to the Buddha's name each and every
moment! The days and nights [must] not pass away empty; practice pure karma
each and every instant! If one sets aside the Buddha's name and cultivates the
holy practices of the three vehicles, this too is squandering one's spirit. Even this
is like a common mouse trying to use a lOOO-pound crossbow; how much more
the activities of those in the six paths of birth-and-death! If one puts aside pure
karma in favor of the small results of the provisional vehicles, this is also an
empty passage of days and nights. Even this would be like using a precious jewel
to buy one garment or one meal; how much more choosing [to aim for] the small
results with outflows of [rebirth in the realms of] deities or humans 13
2
This constant practice had two purposes. One was to maintain the iden-
tity of one's own mind and the Buddha's mind as much as possible,
which le4 to the very this-worldly or pre-mortem results of illumination
and purification. In this it provided the same results that Chan practice
promises, but much more easily and reliably.
The other purpose was to establish the mind in this identification with
the Buddha Amitabha so that, at the moment of death, one would be
much more likely to have one's mind properly focused at this most criti-
cal juncture. This raises a point in which I believe one may see a major
difference of opinion between Chinese and Japanese Pure Land thought.
Chinese masters tended to be much less sanguine than their Japanese
31. ZZ lO9:756b9-12.
32. ZZ lO9:758al-8. "Pure karma" (jingye { 1 J ~ ) is a term specifically used to refer
to Pure Land practice.
JONES 57
counterparts about the certainty of rebirth, and one can even find stories
within the tradition about devoted practitioners who, despite years of
nianfo practice, are distracted from it on their deathbeds and lose their
place in the P u r ~ Land.
33
While Chewu may not express the idea quite this starkly, he is very
frank about the possibility that one may turn away from the practice in a
moment and never recover it again:
However, if at the very moment the mind can tum its karma [ ... ], the great mind
suddenly regresses and the true practices are compromised, then karma will be
able to [once again] entangle the mind.
34
It is imperative, according to Chewu, that the last thought in this life-
time be fixed on Amitabha; only then is rebirth assured. And, he says,
the arising of this thought at the proper time does not happen by chance.
One must prepare for it through prior training.
35
Thus, constant practice
not only provides the pre-mortem benefits of purifying the mind and
manifesting its original Buddha-nature; lifelong effort also sets up a
pattern of thought that makes the arising of concentration on Amitabha
and his Pure Land at the crucial moment of death more and more likely
the longer it is prolonged.
At this point we have a fairly complete picture of the kinds of
practices Chewu advocated and the goals that he expected the the practi-
tioner to realize through them. It remains now to examine the way in
which he thought that the practice of chi ming :t'if;g made these goals
possible. The key, as we shall see, lay in a melding of Pure Land and
mind-only thought.
33. The modem Taiwan Pure Land Master Zhiyu once told this story during a
dharma-talk: There was once an elderly layman who had two wives. He was very
pious, and practiced nianfo ardently for many years. He developed a serious
illness, and knew that his death was near, so he concentrated his mind and
practiced intensely on his bed, and reported to those around him that he could see
Amitabha and his retinue coming to receive him. Right at this critical moment,ohis
second wife came into the room crying and agitated, and asked him how she and
her son were to get along once he was dead. The layman assured her that he
would provide for them in his will, but the distraction proved disastrous for him.
He lost the vision of Amitabha and could not get it back. Instead of the Buddha
and his attendants, he now saw a wall of black and the pathway to hell opening
before him. This story is found in Zhiyu 1992: 58.
34. ZZ 109:756b2-4.
35. See ZZ 109: 762a1-3.
JIABS 23.1 58
IV. THE BUDDHA AND THE DEVOTEE IN THE MIRROR OF THE
MIND
Like many commentators in the Chinese Pure Land tradirion, Chewu
concerned himself at times to explain how nianfo worked to bring about
the results it did, and these explanations brought him into the realms of
the theological and the metaphysical. However, a comparison of
Chewu's writings on this aspect of Pure Land theory with other writers'
demonstrates a narrower range of concerns than one finds in most other
texts. A reading of MOCHIZUKI Shinka History of Chinese
Pure Land Thought (ChUgoku }odokyori-shi shows
that Pure Land thinkers in China historically took on a wide range of
problems in explaining the workings of Pure Land practice: the nature
of the Pure Land itself; how the Pure Land fit into the overall picture of
the cosmos and the various other realms that constituted it; how defiled
beings could be reborn in the Pure Land without defiling it in tum; the
relationship of AmiUibha to Sakyamuni; how the AmWibha seen in
visions and dreams relates to the Amitabha who lives in his distant Pure
Land; how to define both the practices and goals of Pure Land in the
vocabulary of principle (Ii :ElE) and phenomena (shi and so on.
36
In
contrast, Chewu's comparatively small literary output deals with only
one or two problems of this sort in any depth: the relationship of Pure
Land thought to the two truths of Madhyamika, and its compatibility
with the principle of mind-only. Of the two, the latter draws the lion's
share of his thought and is elaborated in more detail and subtlety.
However, his exposition of the theme of mind-only contains an
interesting twist that makes a closer examination worthwhile.
Near the end of Chewu's Recorded Sayings, one finds a creed of sorts
that he composed which lists ten essential articles of faith for practition-
ers. Of these ten, the sixth says, "Believe that there really is a Pure
Land," and is followed by an editorial gloss that reads, "Its existence is
no different from the present Saba world." The tenth article reads,
"Believe that the only source of all dharmas is the mind."3? These two
statements in juxtaposition define the problem that appears to have pre-
occupied Chewu greatly: to confirm the existence of Amitabha and his
Pure Land in a literal, realistic way while simultaneously upholding the
36. MOCHIZUKI 1932, passim.
37. ZZ 109: 788a.
JONES 59
fundamental tenet of Chinese Buddhist thought which held that all
reality is nothing more than a manifestation of mind.
Chewu was certainly not the first Chinese Buddhist to apply mind-only
thought to Pure Land practice. This had been done throughout history
by Pure Land's supporters and detractors both. One of the main issues
dividing the two camps was not whether the Pure Land and the Buddha
who created and sustained it were mind-only - all agreed that they were.
The difference lay in their willingness or unwillingness to accept that
they also existed literally, apart from the Saha world, off to the west, as
a destination for those of low capacities who had failed to realize the
truths of mind-only and universal emptiness. This latter position,
sometimes called "Western Direction Pure Land" (xifang jingtu iZSh
{), was rejected by detractors in favor of a strict mind-only
construction called "Mind-Only Pure Land" (weixin jingtu IltJG,{).38
The supporters claimed that both "Western Direction Pure Land" and
"Mind-Only Pure Land" were equally true, and this is the position that
Chewu, in the simultaneous affirmations of the sixth and tenth articles,
defended.
The detractors of Pure Land practice liked to point out that a literal
belief in Amitabha as a Buddha external to one's own consciousness to
whom one could cry for help, and the belief in the real existence of
Sukhavatl as a land localizable to the west were violations of a basic
Buddhist understanding of the world. Their favorite proof texts were the
dictum in the "Chapter on Buddha-Lands" in the Vimalakfrti Satra that
stated: "If the bodhisattva wishes to acquire a pure land, he must purify
his mind. When the mind is pure, the Buddha-land will be pure,"39 and
the statement in the Meditation Satra: "This mind creates the Buddha;
this mind is the Buddha."4o For example, the Ming dynasty Buddhist
reformer Hanshan Deqing (1546-1623) disparaged the practice of cheng
ming fji; or chi ming if it consisted solely of oral invocation
without any effort made to purify the mind. In his view, the practice of
nianjo absolutely had to be accompanied by a strict observance of the
precepts and the firm intention to cut off the roots of desire, after which
one could engage in either recitation or visualization exercises.
38.. On the opposition between xifang jingtu iffi:JJi1jl- and weixin jingtu Il\EIL\i1jl-,
see Sill Jianzheng 1989: 48.
39. WATSON, trans. 1997, p. 29.
40. Guan wuliangshou fo jing T.365, vol. 12:343a21.
JIABS 23.1 60
However, during the course of this practice, one must understand that
while one will be reborn in the Pure Land, this birth will really be "no-
birth" and the going "non-going." This, he claimed, was the,splendor of
the teaching of "Mind-Only Pure Land."4! Hanshan was uncompro-
mising in his belief that nianfo only worked when used as an active form
of self-cultivation and mental illumination; it did not work automatically
for the ignorant and the defiled.
Chewu fully agreed that the Buddha Amitabha and the land SukhavatI
were manifestations of the mind. The opening statement of his longest
and most sustained exposition of his thought begins with the state!Dent,
"It is essential to know that the phrase 'a-mi-tuo-fo' has its
main import in the doctrine of mind-only." From this starting-point he
goes on to demonstrate the truth of the doctrine of mind-only from the
three viewpoints of direct experience, the use of similes and metaphors,
and the testimony of enlightened beings and Buddhas.
42
After these
demonstrations, he argues that a further examination of the meaning of
the word "mind" in "mind-only" reveals the multivalence of this word.
Following an analysis from Guifeng Zongmi (780-841)
Chan yuan zhu quan ji dou xu (T.2015, vol. 48,
p. 397-415), Chewu states that "mind" can mean the insentient, material
mind-organ, the mind composed of the eight consciousnesses of the
Faxiang or Weishi school, the unenlightened iilayavijiiiina, and the
enlightened iilayavijiiiina which is the "true mind." This last aspect is the
"mind" one affirms in the doctrine of "mind-only," and this mind exists
inherently (ben you and beginninglessly (wu shi in all
beings, whether worldlings or Buddhas. To affirm that all of reality,
whether the Saba world or SukhavatI, is mind-only is to affirm its non-
duality with this mind.
Up to this point in his argument, Chewu has said nothing with which a
critic such as Hanshan Deqing could find fault. However,
Chewu then begins to shift the terms of the debate in such a way as to
simultaneously affirm the reality of other things, including the Buddha,
as external to the mind and existent in a provisional, phenomenal way.
He asserts that, just as one can take the word "mind" and make it part of
the compound "mind-only," one may take any phenomenon and make it
part of a parallel compound, "X-only." The equal pervasion of the
41. Hanshan Deqing 1: 437, 439.
42. ZZ 109: 763a1O ff.
JONES 61
enlightened mind that all sentient beings possess with all other phe-
nomena makes this novel construction of "X-only" thought possible.
If the mind pervades everywhere horizontiilly and exhausts everything vertically,
then the meaning of mind-only is complete, and the meaning of all the other "X-
only" doctrines (wei yi l l / E ~ ) is also complete: form-only, sound-only, smell-
only, flavor-only, touch-only, dharma-only, right on up to subtle-obscuration
only and particle-only. Only when these "X-only" doctrines attain' completion
does one complete the true meaning of mind-only. If the meanings of all these
other "X-only" doctrines are not attained, then one is left with only the empty
name of "mind-only" rather than the true meaning of "mind-only." It is only
because the meanings of all these other "X-only" are attained that one can say that
dharmas lack fixed characteristics, and the import is that they encounter condi-
tions, as one could also say of subtle-obscuration-only and particle-only. 43
Thus, because this fundamental mind unobstructedly pervades all phe-
nomena, one can say that they also unobstructedly pervade the mind and
each other, and everything can become the "only" reality there is.
Chewu uses "mind-only" as a way of affirming the Huayan doctrine of
the mutual interpenetration of principle and all phenomena and of all
phenomena with each other.
44
Within this understanding, Chewu then begins to discuss the status of
AmiUibha. One of the variables that one may insert into the algebraic
expression "X-only" is "Buddha": thus, "Buddha-only" is just as much
the case from the ultimate point of view as "mind-only." As he develops
his argument further, Chewu then goes on to stress the transcendence of
all oppositions in the enlightened mind, and the mutual interpenetration
of all distinct phenomena that takes place even while the transcendence
of oppositions undercuts their distinctiveness one from another. Thus,
the mind of the practitioner who recites the name "Amitabha," as we
have seen, actually incorporates the complete reality of Amitabha
(through the transcending of oppositions between practitioner and
Buddha) while remaining distinct from him (through the Huayan doc-
trine of perfect interpenetration which requires that distinctions be
maintained in order to have things that can interpenetrate). Because this
complete coincidence of transcendence and immanence is impossible for
the rational mind to hold, it is inconceivable, and can only be under-
stood by "surpassing feelings and leaving aside views."
43. ZZ 109: 764a16-b3.
44. That Chewu draws his inspiration from Huayan thought on this point is clear
from his use of the metaphor of the jewels in Imrra's net at 764blO-11.
JIABS 23.1 62
Chewu sums up his argument as follows:
First, we took "mind-only" as the meaning. Second, we took "Buddha-only" as
the meaning. Third, we took "transcendence of oppositions and perfect interpene-
tration" as the meaning. Finally, we took "surpassing feelings and leaving aside
views" as the meaning. Only when one takes all four of these meanings as the
primary import does one get a proper understanding of the single phrase,
"Amitabha." How, then, could it be simple to talk about the proper understand-
ing!45
How, indeed!
What has Chewu done with this argument? First, he has co-opted the
detractors' position of "mind-only," agreeing with them that this
doctrine is fundamental to orthodox belief and making it a member of
his own list of ten essential beliefs. But then, by making use of the
Huayan doctrine of mutual, unobstructed interpenetration, he advancet>
his position in two ways that begin to undercut the position of the strict
"Mind-Only Pure Land" partisans.
First, he de-centers the practitioner's mind. Those critics who
depended upon the above-quoted statements from the Vimalakfrti Satra
and the Meditation Satra tended to emphasize the centrality of the indi-
vidual's mind while ignoring the status of other beings and phenomena.
When they repeatedly argued that the purity or impurity of the practi-
tioner's mind constituted the decisive factor in the attainment of rebirth
(as Hanshan Deqing argued) or in the adornment of one's own pure land
through self-purification (as the Sixth Chan Patriach Huineng
stated),46 they left any notion of Amitabha as a being who existed in his
own right out of the account altogether. The practitioner's own mind
then becomes the central creative and organizing principle for all of
reality. Chewu's exposition of "Buddha-only" and all the other "X-only"
philosophies that flow logically from the pervasion of mind into all
reality takes the practitioner's own mind out of the center and places it
as one phenomenon among all others, not creating them, not dominating
them, not organizing them in any way, but interacting with them equally
and reciprocally.
Second, he the real distinction between the practitioner and
the Buddha in such a way that Amitabha can be seen as a genuinely
different being from the practitioner without violating the principle of
45. ZZ 109:765al-3.
46. YAMPOLSKY 1967:156-159.
JONES 63
non-duality. Amitabha, as much as any other being or phenomenon,
exists external to and in distinction from the practitioner. The critics, in
over-emphasizing the mind's role in "creating" Amitabha and "being"
Amitabha, had neglected Amitabha as an autonomous being who is free
to act according to his own purity and enlightenment, independently of
the practitioner's level of attainment. Chewu, on the other hand,
affirmed both positions at the same time, and so re-positioned Amitabha
as a phenomenon in the world as well as an instantiation of the principle
that pervaded the world. This allowed the practitioner and the Buddha to
co-exist in a relationship of mutuality and equality as fellow phenomena,
where neither could subsume or dominate the other. By emancipating
Amitabha from the domination of the practitioner's mind, Chewu set the
stage for the explanation of the efficacy of nianfo ~ ~ according to the
concept of ganying ffi?;JJ! found in other parts of his Recorded Sayings.
Chewu, like many other Pure Land thinkers, attributed the efficacy of
nianfo to ganying, a kind of sympathetic vibration or resonance that
took place when one set one's mind upon Amitabha. The non-dual
relationship of perfect interpenetration at the level of phenomenon -
phenomenon explained in terms of "mind-only" as given above - gave
Chewu the freedom to explain how this ganying worked. By affirming
the principle of "mind-only," Chewu agreed that Amitabha was an
image (a phamomenon in the Greek sense) in the practitioner's mind,
even if only the name appeared there with no accompanying visualiza-
tion. However, by maintaining Amitabha's autonomy from the practi-
tioner's mind, Chewu was able to affirm that the practitioner was
equally an image in Amitabha's mind. The result of nianfo, therefore,
was to bring two authentically-separate-yet-interpenetrating minds into a
similarity and simultaneity of content in such a way that they could
begin to "vibrate" together, setting in motion the mechanism of ganying
ffi?;JJ! that would lead to illumination and rebirth. Unenlightened beings
cannot conceive of this mutual interpenetration of two minds, and so in
discussing it one necessarily has to look at the matter from the point of
view of either the practitioner's mind or Amitabha's mind, as Chewu
does in a passage that is a rhetorical tour de force:
Now the reason that Amitabha can be Amitabha is that he deeply realized his self-
nature as mind-only. However, this Amitabha and his Pure Land - are they not
[also the practitioner's own] self-natured Amitabha and a Mind-Only Pure Land?
This mind-nature is exactly the same in both sentient beings and Buddhas; it does
not belong more to Buddhas and less to beings. If this mind is Amitabha's, then
sentient beings are sentient beings within the mind of Amitabha. If this mind is
nABS 23.1 64
sentient beings', then Amitabha is Amitabha within the minds of sentient beings.
If sentient beings within the mind of Amitabha recollect (nian) the Amitabha
within the mind of sentient beings, then how could the Amitabha within the mind
of sentient beings fail to respond to the sentient beings within the mind of
Amitabha?47
In other words, Amitabha and the practitioner are related to each other
within a completely symmetrical two-way contemplation. Amitabha is a
phcenomenon of the practitioner's mind, but at the same time, the
practitioner is aphcenomenon of Amitabha's mind. Amitabha, being an
omniscient Buddha, is always aware of sentient beings, but these beings,
in their delusion and distraction, are seldom aware of Amitabha.
However, when someone begins the practice of nianfo, then both
become aware of each other and each becomes a phcenomenon within the
other's mind, and this sets up the Non-duality is the key: the
distinction between beings and Buddhas as phenomenon (shi $) makes
this relationship possible, while their fundamental identity in terms of
principle (li 3][) makes this resonance possible. Thus, Chewu summa-
rizes: "This means that the one is the many, always identical and always
distinct [ ... ] this is the essential summary of nianfo."48
v. CONCLUSIONS
What is Chewu's place in the Pure Land tradition, how original are his
formulations, and how do we profit from this reading of his works?
At the outset of an evaluation of his significance, it seems that
Chewu's claim on our attention and study should be assured because of
his place within the lineage of Chinese Pure Land patriarchs. For those
who study the Chinese Pure Land tradition, this in itself makes some
level of awareness of his life and thought self-evidently worthwhile.
But to dig deeper, we may ask: how significant a figure is he within
the wide and varied scope of Chinese Pure Land thought? That he was
acclaimed a patriarch within a relatively short time of his death would
indicate that he enjoyed a high reputation among devotees of nianfo, and
so we can assume a certain amount of charisma on his part, although it
does not seem to have issued in the organization of his followers into
any great nianfo societies among clerics and laity. Also, within the
history of Pure Land ideas and doctrinal developments, his legacy may
47. ZZ 109: 761a2-8.
48. ZZ 109: 761a15-17.
JONES 65
seem rather meager. After all, he left only one slim text in two juan to
posterity which deals, as I observed earlier, with only a narrow range of
concerns when compared with the wide-ranging reflections of earlier
figures such as Yunqi Zhuhong or Ouyi Zhixu
This paucity of literary and philosophical output may well justify
scholars in leaving him to one side while they explore the writings of
other, more prolific figures. However, it seems to me that he had at least
one very original idea that merits allocating some time and energy to the
study of his work. That idea is the re-working of "mind-only" thought
along Huayan lines as given in section IV above. But how original was
this idea? An examination of the Pure Land tradition that preceded
Chewu shows that many thinkers before him had written about the non-
duality of the Buddha and the practitioner; and of the simultaneous
affIrmation of conventional and ultimate truth with regard to the Buddha
and his land. It may be worth taking a moment to examine briefly some
of these antecedents.
The application of mind-only thought to AmWibha and his realm of
Sukhavatl is among the oldest trends in the Chinese Pure Land tradition.
The Pratyutpannasamiidhisutra (Ch. Banzhou sanmei jing rut:-ffi .:::::.$}'
T.418), one of the first scriptures to be translated into Chinese in the
second century C.E., puts forth this idea. In Paul HARRISON's trans-
lation, the relevant passage says: "Whatever I think, that I see. The mind
creates the Buddha. The mind itself sees him. The mind is the
Buddha."49 Here, however, the concern is specifically with the vision of
Amitabha achieved by an experienced practitioner in nianfo as a visual-
ization exercise, and therefore deals with Amitabha as an image, not as
an autonomous being. One can easily see this as part of a larger concern
within meditative circles about the status of visualized objects generally,
as seen in the Sa'!ldhinirmocanasutra.
Lushan Huiyuan (344-416), upon reading this and related
passages in the Pratyutpannasamiidhisutra, sensed that it was speaking
only of Amitabha as an internally-generated image, and was led to ask
the Central Asian monk and translator KumarajIva to clarify for him
how such an internal image could act like an independent being:
answering questions, touching the practitioner on the head, and so forth.
KumarajIva's response hints at the notion of a reciprocity between
Buddha and practitioner. One can see the Buddha in the pratyutpanna-
49. TA18, vol. 13:905c-906a. The translation is found in HARRISON 1998, p. 21.
JIABS 23.1 66
samiidhi, he says, because while the practitioner's mind is turned toward
the Buddha, the Buddha emits light that illumines the ten directions.
Thus, seeing the Buddha is similar to a tuning a radio to the frequency
of a particular radio station; when tuned correctly, it catches the signal.
Just so, when the practitioner's mind is "tuned" to the frequency of a
Buddha's light, one achieves a vision of that Buddha, and the image that
appears is simultaneously an appearance in the mind and a true represen-
tation of an actual, externally-existent Buddha.
50
While this exchange
succeeded in relating an internal vision of Amitabha to an externaUy-
existent Amitabha, it did not place the practitioner and the Buddha.in the
relationship of parity in the way that Chewu's construction does.
Since Chewu's biography mentions the major impact that Yongming
Yanshou had on his thought, one might reasonably expect to
find precedents for the former's Pure Land theology in the latter's
writings. One of Yanshou's shorter works, the catechetical tract Wan-
shan tong guiji (Anthology on the myriad virtues
ing to the same [source], T.2017), does have a short series of questions
and answers that deal explicitly with the meaning of the term weixin
jingtu or "Mind-Only Pure Land." However, the questions
raised regarding this Mind-Only Pure Land and the answers given evince
very different concerns from those of Chewu. Yanshou's fictitious
questioner wants to know how the visualization of an external Buddha,
violating as it does the principle of mind-only, can possibly avoid
entrapping the practitioner in delusion and discrimination. Yanshou
replies that this is an upiiya, a skillful teaching device by which aU the
Buddhas and bodhisattvas lead the unenlightened in the right direction,
even though what they teach might not be literally or ultimately true.
Beginners on the-bodhisattva path, who have not yet realized that all of
reality is mind-only, simply cannot grasp the ultimate nature of their
own minds and the Buddha that they contemplate. For them,
contemplating the Buddha and seeking rebirth in an objectified
Sukhavati is all right as a provisional measure. With time, they will
eventually come to the realization that the Buddha and his land were
creations of their minds all along, and they will revise their perception
50. T.1856, vol. 45:134b5-22; 134c7-12. The reader is also referred to KIMURA
Eiichi's critical edition of this text found in KIMURA 1960-62, 1:34-36, with a
modern Japanese rendering at 1: 165-169.
JONES 67
of reality accordingly.51 Chewu's concern to validate the practice of chi
ming as a means of purifying the mind or to defend the idea of an
Amitabha that actually does exist ina manner autonomous from the
practitioner's mind appear quite antithetical to Yanshou's claim that
such a Buddha appears only as an upaya.
Yunqi Zhuhong most extended doctrinal treatment of Pure
Land thought, the long preface to his commentary on the shorter Sukhii-
vatfvyiihasiitra (Fo shuo amituo jing shu chao ZZ
33: 326-491) has surprisingly little to say on the subject of weixin jingtu
IltJL.\i' . For the most part, Zhuhong contents himself to affirm the
nature of Amitabha and Sukhavatl as mind-only and repeat Yongming
Yanshou's exposition of the ultimate truth of mind-only coupled with
the need for a provisional discrimination of practitioner from Buddha as
an upiiya. Only once does Zhuhong actually use the technical vocabulary .
of the Consciousness-Only school (at ZZ 33:356a17-b9), where he
brings in the eight consciousnesses and the iilayavijfiiina, only to reduce
them to the "one mind" (yi xin -JL.,) of the phrase "the single, un-
perturbed mind" (yi xin bu luan In so doing, he demon-
strates that his primary doctrinal background is not actually in
Consciousness-only thought, but in Tiantai J(i=; thought and its concern
to show how all phenomena are ultimately grounded in the "one mind"
or "absolute mind." It is this mind to which Zhuhong refers when he
calls everything "mind-only."
So far, we have not encountered the relationship that Chewu described
between practitioners and Amitabha, based on an epistemology that held
between two autonomous beings, each holding the other in his gaze. One
can find some idea of a mutuality of this sort in the writings of the
eighth century Pure Land thinker Feixi Feixi also used Huayan
thought to advocate the efficacy of Pure Land practice by showing the
non-duality and mutual illumination of the practitioner's and the
Buddha's mind. This idea, found in Feixi's Nianfo sanmei baowang lun
(T. 1967,47: l41c-142b, section 15, and following
sections passim), seems similar to Chewu's reasoning on the mutuality
of mind-only. However, Feixi's primary concern here appears to be
affirming that the practitioner is an instantiation of the Buddha, relating
the two in terms of phenomenon (shi and principle (Ii In other
words, it is an ontological argument relating the inherent but inchoate
51. T.2017,966b26ff.
nABS 23.1 68
Buddhahood of the practitioner to the realized Buddhahood of Arnitabha
as if it were a question of relating the many to the one. While Chewu, as
seen in one quotation given above (at the end of section III), does in one
instance use the language of "the many and the one" to describe the
relationship, the majority of his essays present an epistemological
analysis of the image of the Buddha that appears in the practitioner's
mind at the same time that an image of the practitioner appears in the
Buddha's mind.
This is far from an exhaustive survey of all Chinese Pure Land litera-
ture, and one could go on indefinitely multiplying individual exa:rnples
of past Pure Land masters. Based on a reading of MOCHIZUKI's History,
however, it appears that one would only continue seeing the analyses and
concerns given in the previous paragraphs appearing again and again. It
is safe to conclude that, in this .one instance within his limited literary
remains, Jixing Chewu did indeed hit upon an original way of
explaining the relationship between Arnitabha Buddha and the beings,
both unenlightened and enlightened, who contemplate either his image
or his name. His analysis went beyond the chorus of predecessors in the
tradition whose primary concern was to emphasize the non-duality of
this relationship while disparaging the of duality as a delu-
sion that the Buddha exploits as a skillful expedient. Chewu, going
against the stream, argues that the distinction between the Buddha and
the devotee is a real one, and it will not be overcome or superceded even
with the attainment of enlightenment. Buddhas and other beings are
independent entities, interrelated as phamomena in each other's minds,
as much separate as identical. Their separateness makes a relationship
possible, while their identity makes possible the resonance of ganying
through which the Buddha saves beings and takes them at death to
a really-existent Pure Land in the west.
Because of the originality of this insight, as well as his patriarchal
status within the tradition, Chewu deserves more scholarly attention than
the half-paragraph accorded him in MOCHIZUKI's History,52 and the
author hopes that this small study has made a start in his rediscovery.
52. MOClllZUKI 1932: 534-535.
JONES 69
Works cited:
Chappell, David W. 1986: "From Dispute to Dual Cultivation: Pure Land Responses to
Ch'an Critics," In Peter N. Gregory, ed. Traditions of Meditation in
C/1inese Buddhism. Kuroda Institute Studies in East Asian Buddhism
4. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press. p. 163-198.
Chewu flJ:\:"\!f 1990: Mengdong chanshi yi ji (An anthology of Chan
Master Mengdong's [Le., Chewu's] literary remains). ed. Yinguang
1930. Rpt: Hong Kong: H.K. Buddhist Book Distributor.
Chewu chanshi yulu in Dai Nihon zoku zokyo. Kyoto: Zoky6 Shoin,
1905-1912. Rpt: Taibei: Xinwenfeng 1993. vol. 109:750-790.
Daoyuan 1978. "Jingtu zong yu fojiao zhi shijiehua
(Pure Land and the globalization of Buddhism), in Jingtu sixiang [un ji
(Anthology of essays on Pure Land thought) Zhang
Mantao ed. Xiandai fojiao xueshu congkan
:f;I'qjlHU 66. Taibei: Dacheng Wenhua Chubanshe
pp. 329-336.
Nianfo sanmei baowang lun .tiffif (A Discourse on nianfo
samadhi, the king of jewels).T.1967, 47: 134-144.
Foguang da cidian 1988: ed. Shi Xingyun Gaoxiong: Foguang
Chubanshe 8. vols.
Fomen bibei kesong ben 1954: Rev. ed. Taibei: Fojiao Chubanshe

G6mez, Luis O. 1996: The Land of Bliss: the Paradise of the Buddha of Measureless
Light. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.
Guan wuliangshou fo jing T.365.
Hanshan Deqing Hanshan laoren meng youji (Elder
Hanshan's dream-travel anthology). 4 vols. Yangzhou :J?!Hi'/: Jiangbei
Kejing Chu 1879; rpt. Taibei: Xinwenfeng 1992.
Harrison, Paul, trans. 1998: The Pratyutpanna-samiidhi-sutra. BDK English
25.11. Berkeley: Numata Center.
Kimura Eiichi 1960-1962: Eon kenkyu (Huiyuan studies). 2 vols.
Tokyo: Sobunsha ilUxt.
Lushan Huiyuan Dacheng da yi zhang T.1856, vol. 45: 122-
143.
Mochizuki Shink6 -7 1932: Chiigoku jodokyori-shi r:p (History
of Chinese Pure Land Thought). Kyoto: H6z6kan itiU8'.
Ogasawara Senshii 1951: "Chiigoku kindai j6d6ky6 no ichi kosatsu"
(An inquiry into the modem Chinese Pure
Land school), in Ryukoku shidan (March 1951): 7-14.
Ouyi Zhixu 1980: Jingtu shi yao (Ten Essential [Texts] of Pure
Land). Rev. and expo Shi Yinguang 1930. Rpt: Gaoxiong:
Foguang Chubanshe
JIABS 23.1 70
Peng Jiqing 1987: Jingtu sheng xian lu (A Record of the sages
and worthies of the Pure Land). Ed. and expanded Yinguang 7\:;
1933. Rpt: Taibei: Xinwenfeng
Shi Jianzheng 1989: Yinguang dashi de sheng ping yu sixiang fP7\:;::ki1iS"J
(The life and thought of the great master Yinguang).
Dongchu zhihui hai 15. Taibei: Dongchu Chubanshe
*WtBlt&t.
Shih Heng-ching 1991: "The Syncretism of Chinese Ch' an and Pure Land Buddhism,"
in David Kalupahana, ed. Buddhist Thought and Ritual. New York:
Paragon House, pp. 69-84.
1992: The Syncretism of Ch'an and Pure Land Buddhism. ,Asian
Thought and Culture 9. Peter Lang.
Watson, Burton, trans. 1997: The Vimalakfrti Sutra. New York: Columbia University
Press.
Yampolsky, Philip B., trans. 1967: The Platform Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch. New
York: Columbia University Press.
Yinguang fP7\'; 1991: Yinguang dashi quanji (The complete works of
the great master Yinguang). Ed. Shi Guangding 7 vols.
Taibei: Fojiao Chubanshe
Yongming Yanshou 7kFmEf!J: Wanshan tong guiji (Anthology on the
myriad virtues returning to the same [source]). T.2017, vol. 47:957-
993.
Yii Chiin-fang 1981: The Renewal of Buddhism in China: Chu-hung and the Late
Ming Synthesis. New York: Columbia University Press.
Yunqi Zhuhong Fo shuo amituo jing shu chao
(Exegetical commentary on the shorter Sukhtivatzvyuhasutra). ZZ
33:326-491.
Zheng Weian 1991: "Nianfo si shi ba fa" (Forty-eight methods
of nianfo), In Yuan Liaofan fL and Mao Lingyun et al.
Qing zuo yao jue yu nianfo fa yao Xindian
tFffJi5: Chang Chun Shu :RtfW, pp. 54-7l.
Zhiyu 1992: Shifu de hua (The master's talks). Sanxia =.il!?t: Xilian
Jingyuan Yinhang
JAN NATTIER
The Realm of Alqobhya: A Missing Piece in the History
of Pure Land Buddhism*
The foun of Buddhism known as "Pure Land" (Ch. ching-t'u, Jpn. jiJdo
~ ) has long held an uneasy status among English-speaking scholars of
Buddhism. Exposed early in their training to the first substantial body of
Buddhist texts to be made available in English - the canonical texts of
the Theravada school, translated from Piili into English beginning in the
late 19th century - British and American scholars have often found it
difficult to find any connection between the seemingly austere and
contemplative teachings of the so-called historical Buddha and the lush
celestial imagery and faith-oriented language of scriptures like the
longer and shorter Sukhiivatfvyuha.
1
Writing in the late 1920s, British
historian Sir Charles ELIOT went so far as to ask whether the Pure Land
Buddhism of Japan should be referred to as "Buddhism" at all:
It has grown out of Buddhism, no doubt: all the stages except the very earliest are
perfectly clear, but has not the process of development resulted in such a
complete transformation that one can no longer apply the same name to the
teaching of Gotama and the teaching of Shinran?2
* This paper was originally presented at a conference held at the Chung-Hwa
Institute in Taipei, Taiwan in July 1997. I am grateful to the conference orga-
nizers, especially the Ven. Sheng-yen, for the rich intellectual experience afforded
by that gathering, as well as for their permission to publish this paper here. I
would also like to thank Paul Harrison and Daniel Boucher for their helpful
comments on an earlier draft. Any errors that remain are my own.
1. The difference is more apparent than real. Scholars of the Piili texts are at long
last beginning to break free of the European rationalism that informed (or better,
constrained) the interpretation of these texts during the late 19th and early 20th
century, and are now realizing that the Piili texts contain abundant references to
the use of paranormal powers by enlightened beings, the existence (and impor-
tance) of heavenly realms, the activities of ghosts and spirits of a variety of
species, and so on.
2. At his death in 1931 ELIOT left a nearly completed manuscript which was
published posthumously (together with a chapter on Nichiren contributed by G.
B. SANSOM) as Japanese Buddhism (London: Edward Arnold & Co. 1935). The
comments cited above appear on pp. 389-390 of the reprint edition (London:
Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies
Volume 23. Number 1.2000
JIABS 23.1 72
ELIOT was hardly the last to express incredulity that two such seemingly
divergent forms of Buddhism could be related. Indeed I would venture
the guess that most scholars who have had the experience of teaching an
"Introduction to Buddhism" course in an American or European
university have heard these saine sentiments expressed by our own
undergraduate students.
Though the thrust of ELIOT's remarks was to call into question the
legitimacy of "Pure Land" Buddhism (or at least of the Japanese inter-
pretation of that form of Buddhism set forth by Shiman), in so doing he
also pointed - if perhaps inadvertently - to a way of overcoming this
sense of unease. What has made Pure Land Buddhism so difficult for
Westerners to appreciate, I believe, is that the "problem" has been posed
in precisely the terms expressed by Eliot: that of the apparent disconti-
nuity between the teachings of Gotama found in the early Pali sources,
on the one hand, and the teachings associated with scriptures devoted to
Amitabha
3
on the other. But the latter are not, historically speaking,
directly related to the former. On the contrary, prior to the emergence of
the belief in Amitabha several intermediate developments had taken
place, and without a clear understanding of these prior stages the culti-
vation of devotion to Amitabha does indeed appear anomalous. As I
hope to demonstrate, however, there is a significant body of evidence
that has been largely overlooked in the study of Pure Land Buddhism:
evidence concerning the Buddha (Ch. /f1iJ; Tib. Mi-
'khrugs-pa) who presides over an "eastern paradise" known as Abhirati
(Ch. M'*; Tib. Milon-par dga'-ba) that resembles in many
respects the paradise-like world of Amitabha. Despite the abundant simi-
larities (as well as illuminating divergences) between these two figures,
it remains a fact that in both Asian and Western scholarly circles
Amitabha has been studied in isolation, while has hardly been
Routledge & Kegan Paul 1959), The idea of opening this discussion with
ELIOT's comments on Pure Land Buddhism was inspired by the use of the same
quotation in FUJITA Kotatsu, "Pure Land Buddhism in India," translated by
Taitetsu Unno, in James Foard, Michael Solomon, and Richard K. Payne, eds.,
The Pure Land Tradition: History and Development (Berkeley, CA: Berkeley
Buddhist Studies Series 1996), pp. 1-42 (p. 3).
3. As a matter of convenience I will use the name Amitabha ("Unlimited Light")
throughout this paper to refer to the Buddha known both by this name (Ch.
1!liiIi7\:;) and by the name Amitayus ("Unlimited Life," Ch. 1!liiIlS) in Sanskrit
sources. The Chinese abbreviation A-mi-t'o JlilIsmwt can, of course, refer to
either.
NATTIER 73
studied at all.
4
This paper is intended as a small contribution toward
remedying this situation. By examining in detail the information about
and his world contained in Indian sources (above all in the
a siltra devoted entirely to the career and the "pure
land" of this figure) I hope to show that this material provides valuable
clues concerning the "very earliest stage" in the development of Pure
Land ideas to which Eliot referred. Far from being simply a "different
lineage" of Indian thought concerning other Buddha-worlds than the one
based on Amitabha, as FUJITA Kotatsu has suggested,5 it may well have
been an earlier one, which rather than running parallel to beliefs about
Amitabha was actually assumed and elaborated upon by Amitabha's
devotees.
"Pure Land" Thought in Early Mahiiyana Literature
The term "Pure Land" (Ch. ching-t'u / Jpn. jodo 1J ) is not, of course,
an Indian term. It has no known Sanskrit antecedent, and it is now
widely agreed that this expression was first coined in China.
6
4. The only studies of that have appeared in Western languages to date
are Jean DANTINNE: La Splendeur de l'Inebranlable, Tome 1, Chapitres I-III:
Les Auditeurs (Sriivaka) (Louvain-la-Neuve, Institut Orientaliste 1983; no
subsequent volumes have been issued) and an unpublished doctoral dissertation
by Kw AN Tai-wo, "A Study of the Teaching Regarding the Pure Land of
Buddha in Early Mahayana" (UCLA: Dept. of East Asian Languages
and Cultures 1985). A partial translation of Bodhiruci's version of the Alqobhya-
vyaha (T No. 310[6]) is included in Garma C. C. Chang, ed., A Treasury of
Mahayiina Satras (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press
1983), pp. 315-338. See also the brief but useful entry "Ashuku" in Paul
DEMIEVILLE et aI., eds., HobOgirin, vol. II (Tokyo: Maison Franco-Japonaise
1930), pp. 39a-40b. Far more surprising than the relative paucity of studies of
in the West is the notable lack of attention to in Japan,
where Pure Land Buddhism is a topic of significant academic concern. The
statement of FUJITA K6tatsu (op. cit., p. 9) that "Pure Land ideas are non-existent
in such Mahayana siitras as the Prajftiipiiramitii and
vyaha" - both of which provide detailed information on and his world
- is indicative of the deep chasm that has separated the study of Amitabha
Buddha from the study of his fellow celestial Buddhas in Japanese scholarly
circles.
5. FUJITA, op. cit., p. 9.
6. FUJITA, op. cit., p. 20, and more recently in "The Origin of the Pure Land" by the
same author, in Eastern Buddhist, vol. 29, no. 1 (1996): 33. The peculiar fact that
the word vyaha is sometimes translated as ching { "pure" by early Chinese
translators, most notably Chili Ch'ien and raises the
JIABS 23.1 74
Expressions such as "Pure Land teachings" (Ch. ching-t'u chiao
or "Pure Land thought" (Jpn. jodo however, have
come to be widely used, and in Taiwan and Japan they are generally
understood as referring solely to ideas and practices associated with the
Buddha Amitabha.
7
I would like to propose here, however, that we extend the category of
"Pure Land Buddhism" to include scriptures devoted to and
other celestial Buddhas as well, at least forpurposes of the discussion at
hand. In so doing I am deliberately diverging from established tradition
in order to engage in a particular type of comparative study. Specifi-
cally, I would like to define "Pure Land Buddhism" as the set of all
ideas and practices related to Buddhas who are presently living in world-
systems other than our own, a category which would include not only
Amitabha but also and the countless Buddha figures described
in Mahayana texts as presiding over world-systems in all of the ten
directions.
8
Defined in this way, Pure Land Buddhism consists of all Buddhist
teachings that look forward to the possibility of rebirth in another
possibility that the term ching-t'u i1J resulted from a confusion between a
Prakrit form of vyaha (*viyuha) and visuddha "pure," a confusion that could
occur most easily in the script, where the characters for yu P and su J1
are virtually identical (see the chart given in Plate XIV at the end of Part II of
A. M. BOYER et aI., Inscriptions [Oxford: Clarendon Press 1927]).
See for example the translation of the Vimalakfrtinirdda by Chih Ch'ien (T No.
474), where the character ching is used in translating the proper names Prabha-
vyilha (T 14.519b6 and 14.524a21), Mahavyilha (14.519b7), Padmavyilha
(14.519bI6), and Ratnavyilha (14.529a7), and the title of the translation of the
by (T No. 31S), where the
characters yen-ching -i'i1J are apparently used to translate gUIJa-vyaha. If this line
of reasoning is correct, the expression ching-t'u might well have originated as a
rendering of ("field-array"), itself a very common expression in
Mahayana siltras.
7. This is not a recent development. According to PumA (''The Origin of the Pure
Land," p. 36) this usage had already become current in T'ang-period China.
S. I will exclude from this category only those Buddha-figures who have appeared,
or will appear, in our own world-system, viz., Siikyamuni, Maitreya, and their
numerous predecessors (including Krakucchanda, Kanakamuni, Kasyapa, and so
on). Maitreya might in fact be described as a borderline figure: though he will
appear in our own world-system, which is generally described as characterized
by undesirable qualities (in contrast to other more glorious Buddha-worlds), he
will do so in a distant future age when our world has reached the peak of its
potential.
NATTIER 75
world-system (lokadhiitu) or Buddha-field where a
Buddha is presently teaching the Dharma. Such worlds are commonly
described as far more glorious than our own, but this is not their
defining feature; indeed many of these glories are shared with the deva-
realms (e.g., the Trayastrirpsa and Paranirmitavasavartin heavens) and
even with parts of our own world (e.g., the northern continent of
Uttarakuru, or the continent of Jambudvlpa itself during Maitreya's
future time).9 The essential feature of a Pure Land is thus not its physi-
cal attributes, lovely as they may be, but the opportunity to live in the
presence of a Buddha.
By defining "Pure Land Buddhism" in this more inclusive sense, we
will be able to ask a number of important questions of this material as a
whole. What brings such delightful world-systems into being, and what
must one do to be born there? How are the (previous) practices of the
presiding Buddha in such a land, on the one hand, and the (current)
practices of the community of his devotees, on the other, related to
traditional Mainstream
10
and Mahayana ideas of the paths leading to
Arhatship and to Buddhahood? To what extent are such Pure Lands
analogous to the heavens in which many early Buddhists hoped to be
reborn, and in what respects do they differ (in both form and function)
from such worlds? In short: in what ways are ideas about Pure Lands
and the possibility of rebirth there continuous with earlier Mainstream
and Mahayana notions, and in what ways do they represent genuine
innovations?
By viewing a wide range of such materials in conjunction we will not
only be able to gain a clearer sense of the process of development of
. Pure Land thought and practice in India, but also to get a better sense of
9. There was clearly a widely accepted body of ideas in India about what an ideal
world should be, for the same attributes - soft earth, golden color, pleasant
breezes, fragrant scents, easily accessible food and clothing, abundant pools,
flowers and fruit, a large popUlation, and so on - recur in a wide range of litera-
ture. The appearance of these "utopian tropes" is thus not sufficient in itself to
support the argument that one such text is directly related to another. On the most
unexpected of such tropes - the notion that an ideal world is entirely flat - see
below, note 23.
10. I am using the term "Mainstream" in the sense suggested by Paul HARRISON (in
The Samtidhi oj Direct Encounter with the Buddhas of the Present [Tokyo: The
International Institute for Buddhist Studies 1990], p. xviii, n. 8) to refer to those
Indian Buddhists who continued to pursue the traditional path to Arhatship rather
than adopting the newer option of the bodhisattva vocation.
JIABS 23.1 76
what is unique to traditions conceming Amitabha and what features the
Amitabha scriptures share with the larger Pure Land tradition. The result
of such a study should thus be of use not only to those interested in
Indian Mahayana Buddhism in general, but also to those concerned
specifically with the development of faith in Amitabha.
In a paper of this length it will not, of course, be possible to deal with
the full range of Indian Pure Land literature. I I Instead, I will concen-
trate on what are arguably two of the earliest extant Pure Land texts: the
on the one hand, and the larger Sukhiivatfvyiiha
l3
on
11. By "Indian Pure Land literature" I mean not only those few texts that have
survived in Indic-Ianguage versions (such as the shorter and longer Sukhavatf-
vyilha siitras) but also scriptures that were surely composed in India but have
been preserved only in Chinese and/or Tibetan translations.
12. The two extant Chinese translations are Taishii no. 313, (translated
by no later than 186 CE) and T no. 310(6), /fllJtlD*i" (translated
by Bodhiruci in 706-713 CE). The sole Tibetan translation, 'Phags-pa de-biin
gsegs-pa Mi-'khrugs-pa'i bkod-pa ies bya-ba theg-pa chen-po'i mdo (Stog
Palace no. 11[6], Peking/Otani no. 760[6], Derge/Tiihoku no. 50, etc.) by Jina-
mitra, Surendrabodhi, and Ye-ses-sde, is undated, but was probably produced in
the late 8th or early 9th century. No Sanskrit or Prakrit version of this sutra has
survived; a transliterated title is given in the
Tibetan version, but this is in all probability (like many other such titles) only a
reconstruction.
13. Following the chronology set forth by PUmA Kiitatsu in his Genshi
jodo shiso no kenkyil (Tokyo: lwanami Shoten 1970),
most scholars now hold that the earliest extant Chinese translation of the larger
Sukhavatfvyilha is T No. 362, attributed to Chih Ch'ien and assigned to the
period 223-253 C.E., followed by T No. 361 (attributed to but
considered by PUmA to be the work of Po-yen, c. 258 CE), No. 360 (attributed
to Saiighavarman, but attributed by PUmA to Buddhabhadra and Pao-yiin, c. 421
C.E.), The attribution of T Nos. 310[5] (translated by Bodhiruci in 706-713) and
363 (translated by Fa-hsien in 991 c.B.) is not controversial.
More recently, however, in a paper presented at the lABS meeting in
Lausanne in August 1999 Paul HARRISON offered detailed evidence pointing to
the likelihood that T No. 362 may be the work (or a revision of the work) of
and that T No. 361 should be assigned to Chih Ch'ien (i.e., that the
attributions were switched by early cataloguers). It is hoped that this important
study will soon be available in print.
The relative ages of the shorter and longer Sukhiivatfvyilha siitras (as they are
known to Western scholars) is still a matter of debate. I am somewhat inclined to
consider the longer version to be the earlier one, though arguments can be made
in either direction. In any event it should be emphasized that we are not dealing
here with the condensation or expansion of a single text, but with two quite
different siltras on the same topic. Whatever the date of the composition of the
NATTIER 77
the other. Since the is far less familiar to most scholars
of Buddhism I will first describe in some detail what is said in this sutra
about s world and the possibility of rebirth there. Having
done so, I will then turn to a comparison of this text with the
Sukhttvatfvyuha, showing that a thorough study of can indeed
illuminate our understanding of Amitabha and his world.
The Emergence of Pure Land Thought in India
Any study of early Mahayana Buddhism is subject to one overarching
constraint: the absence of any written sources that could document
directly the nascent phase of these new ideas and practices. To put it
another way, the initial stages of the development of ideas about the
practice of the bodhisattva path took place off-camera, and only after the
basic ideas associated with this practice had undergone considerable
development were the earliest texts that we now refer to as Mahayana
sutras composed. Rather than showing us the incipient phase of
Mahayana thinking, these scriptures already represent a somewhat later
phase of development, in which the viability of the bodhisattva path (at
least for some members of the Buddhist community) is already taken for
granted. 14
Much the same problem attends the study of the subset of early
Mahayana thought with which we are concerned here: the emergence of
ideas about other Buddhas and other worlds. What I will attempt to do
in this section, therefore, is not to establish precisely when and in what
form Pure Land ideas first appeared in India (for our sources do not
allow us the luxury of such specificity), but simply to review briefly
what the earliest Mahayana sutras translated into Chinese can tell us
about ideas and practices associated with these Buddha-figures. Such
texts (for which a precise or at least an approximate tranSlation date is
generally known) cannot of course provide us with an absolute chronol-
ogy of developments in India, but they at least offer us a terminus ante
quem, a date by which the ideas and practices they contain must have
been known at their Indian source.
shorter Sukhiivatrvyuha in India, no Chinese translation is attested prior to that of
KumarajIva, completed in 402 CE (T No. 366). The only other Chinese version is
that of Hsiian-tsang (T No. 367), translated in 650 CEo
14. I have discussed this issue in greater detail in a forthcoming study of the
U graparipTcchii-sutra, provisionally titled A Few Good Men: The Bodhisattva
Path According to the Inquiry ofUgra.
JIABS 23.1 78
Pure Land assumptions already play a central role in a number of
Buddhist scriptures translated into Chinese prior to 200 CEo There are
numerous references to the "Buddhas of the ten directions," i.e., to
Buddhas who are presently living and teaching the Dharma in other
worlds, itself an innovative concept vis-a-vis earlier Buddhist ideas of a
single universe with long intervals between the appearance of Buddha
figures. But among these many Buddhas two in particular -
and Amitabha - receive by far the most attention. Among the small
number of Buddhist scriptures whose appearance in Chinese prior to 200
CE can be confirmed,15 is the subject of one entire (and quite
lengthy) siltra, the (Taish6 No. 313, trans-
lated in 186 CE or before) and receives substantial attention in another,
the (T No. 224, trans-
lated in 179 CE). Neither of these siltras ever mentions Amitabha, but he
is referred to several times in the Pratyutpannabuddhasarrtmukhiiva-
sthitasamiidhisutra -= (T No. 418, translated in 179 CE) as one
of the numerous Buddhas of the ten directions who may be visualized in
meditation. Both Buddhas, therefore, must have been well known in
India prior to the translation of these texts, all of which are the work of
the pioneering Ytieh-chih translator,
By the middle of the third century still other scriptures dealing with
these figures had been translated into Chinese, of which we may mention
in particular two attributed to Chih Ch'ien the larger Sukhavatf-
vyaha (T No. 362, assigned to
the period 223-253 CE), which of course is devoted entirely to
Amitabha,16 and the Vimalakfrtinirdeia (T No. 474, translated
in 223-228 CE), in which the name of Amitabha is mentioned once in
15. For an authoritative discussion of which translated siltras can legitimately be
assigned to this early date see Erik ZORCHER, "A New Look at the Earliest
Chinese Buddhist Texts," in Koichi Shinohara and Gregory Schopen, eds., From
Benares to Beijing: Essays on Buddhism and Chinese Religion (Oakville,
Ontario: Mosaic Press 1991), pp. 277-304. On the translations see
also Paul HARRISON, "The Earliest Chinese translations of Mahayana Buddhist
Siltras: Some Notes on the Works of Buddhist Studies Review, vol.
10, no. 2 (1993), pp. 135-177.
16. If the revised attributions proposed by HARRISON are accepted - as I am strongly
inclined to do - T No. 361, and not T No. 362, would now be considered the
work of Chih Ch'ien. In either event the translation of a version of the
Sukhiivatfvyuha by Chih Ch'ien during the early to mid-third century CE is
assured.
NATTIER 79
passing (in a list of various Buddhas), while and his world are
discussed in considerable detail.
While still other Buddhas and their worlds would eventually appear in
translated scriptures - most notably perhaps the (not yet actualized)
world of Mafijurl in the :><:"*Bffi
(T No. 318), first translated into Chinese by Dharma-
in 290 CE, and the world of described in
chapter 12 of the Kuan-ting ching rl]][#& translated by Po Srlmitra in
the first half of the fourth century - the evidence provided by the
earliest Chinese translations points clearly in the direction of viewing
and Amitabha as the first and most important Buddhas of
their type.
The fact that appears to be better represented than Amitabha
in scriptures translated prior to the beginning of the third century cannot
of course be treated as decisive evidence for the situation in India.l7
There is no reason to think that the scriptures that happened to have
arrived in China by that date were at all representative of the body of
Buddhist literature then circulating in India, nor for that matter that
translators such as actually succeeded in rendering into
Chinese all the Indian texts that were available to them. All we can say
for sure, based on the Chinese evidence, is that these early translations
demonstrate with certainty that the cult of (to a significant
degree) and the cult of Amitabha (perhaps to a lesser degree) were
already well established in India by this time. In scriptures translated
from the late third century onward, however, the relationship between
and Amitabha is reversed, for no new scripture devoted
wholly to is ever translated (though the is
retranslated once), while works extolling Amitabha (including several
of the larger Sukhiivatfvyilha, two translations of the
17. Indeed there is considerable reason to suppose the opposite. To take just one
example: the scriptures translated into Chinese during the 2nd-4th centuries C.E.
are overwhelmingly Mahayanist in content, while as late as the mid-7th century
C.E. (when HSiian-tsang recorded his famous statistics on the number of
members of various Buddhist schools) Mahayanists still represented less than
half of the Buddhist population in India (for a convenient tabulation of Hsiian-
tsang's figures see Etienne LAMOTIE, Histoire du bouddhisme indien [Louvain:
Institut Orientaliste 1958], pp. 597-600). It seems quite possible that partisans of
the Mahayana path appeared in China as missionaries and translators in dispro-
portionate numbers precisely because they were a minority - and in some cases a
despised one - in their own homeland.
JIABS 23.1 80
shorter Sukhilv.atfvyuha, and .one version of the apocryphal Kuan Wu-
liang-shou ching appear with considerable frequency.
There is some evidence to suggest that this increasing attention to
Amitabha is an accurate reflection of the situation in India, for it is
during this same period of time. that we see a proliferation of references
to Amitabha in Indian Mahayana texts.
18
A particularly intriguing tidbit
of evidence is found in the Vimalakfrtinirdea, where a change in the
sequence of names in a list of Buddhas suggests that the cult of
was gradually being eclipsed by that of Amitabha.
19
We will return to. the difficult question of the chronological relation-
ship between these two Pure Land figures below. First, however, we
must examine the contents of the Ak.Jobhyavyuha in detail.
The Nature of Ak.Jobhya's World
Though the existence of eastern paradise is taken for granted
in several early Mahayana siitras, it is in the Ak.Jobhyavyuha that this
world is discussed in the greatest detail. I will rely primarily on this
scripture, therefore, in the discussion given below.
2o
It should also be
pointed out that the considerably shorter discussions of and
his realm contained in texts like the A.J!asilhasrikil and the Vimalakfrti
conform to the description given in the Ak.Jobhyavyuha in most of the
relevant details.
21
Thus there is every reason to believe that a coherent
18. For a discussion of a number of such references and their implications for. the
history of Pure Land Buddhism see Gregory SCHOPEN, "SukhavatI as a
Generalized Religious Goal in Sanskrit Mahayana Siitra Literature," Indo-Iranian
loufnalvol. 19 (1977): 177-210.
19. appears first after Sakyamuni in the list of Buddhas given in Chih
Ch'ien's translation of the Vimalakfrtinirdefa (T No. 474, 14.529a7-8), while by
the time of Kumarajiva's translation in the early 5th century Amitabha (who
appears in sixth place after Sakyamuni in Chih Ch'ien's version) has now been
moved into first place (T No. 475, l4.548b14-16). Amitabha remains in first
place in Hsiian-tsang's mid-7th century translation (T No. 476, 14.574b8-11),
and the same order is found in the Tibetan version (Peking/Otani No. 843, vol.
34, 90.2.8).
20. All citations from the unless otherwise indicated, will be taken
from the earliest available version of the text, translated by in the late
2nd century CE (see above, n. 12).
21. The sole exception is that the Vimalakfrti refers to the presence of mountains in
Abhirati.
NATTIER 81
body of thought concerning the celestial realm of the Buddha
was already circulating in India, at least in certain Mahayana circles.
The first point to note is that realm is not, in the technical
sense, a heaven: on the contrary, it comprises an entire world-system
(lokadhatu) endowed with heavens of its own. Indeed the sutra makes
much of the fact that in world the human realm and the
Trayastrirp.sa Heaven are connected by a staircase, and that the gods
frequently descend to the human realm, drawn by the presence of
there.2
2
Abhirati is thus a multi-layered universe much like
our own Saha world, but with two important exceptions: it lacks the
lower three realms, or durgatis (hell-beings, animals, and ghosts), and it
lacks Mt. Sumeru and the other mountain ranges that are so central to
Indian (including Buddhist) cosmology.23 In other respects, however,
land is clearly modeled on that of Sakyamuni, so much so
that the human realm within it is even referred to repeatedly as "that
Jambudvlpa." It is thus not a heaven in the traditional Buddhist sense -
that is, a realm located in the upper reaches of the Desire Realm or in
the realms of Form or Formlessness - but an entire (if slightly trun-
cated) world-system, shorn only of what the authors
apparently considered to be our own world's most unattractive features.
In a number of respects world appears simply as a much
improved version of our own. Here we find no reference to the
"apparitional birth" (hua-sheng by which living beings are born
into the various heaven-realms (or, for that matter, into Sukhavat!);
22. T 11.757a-b.
23. The absence of mountains is a regular feature of ideal lands in Indian Buddhist
literature, including Amitabha's world, the future worlds of the various 'sravakas
predicted to Buddhahood in the Lotus Sutra, and even our own Jambudvlpa
during the time of the future Buddha Maitreya. Given the centrality of mountains
(and indeed, their positive valence) in Indian cosmographic thought, it seems
surprising that they should be entirely absent from these utopian realms. One
possible explanation is that the "flat-earth" scenario did not emerge out of Indian
utopian speculation, but was borrowed from another source. In fact this motif
appears with some regularity in Iranian apocalyptic literature, where - in contrast
to the Indian texts, where the motif of flatness is isolated and plays no productive
role - it is explicitly associated with a leveling of social status, and thus with the
promise (or threat, depending on the text in question) of an egalitarian society.
For a discussion of this motif and the Iranian sources in which it occurs see
Bruce LINCOLN, "'The Earth Becomes Flat' - A Study of Apocalyptic Imagery,"
Comparative Studies in Society and History vol. 25 (1983): 136-153.
JIABS 23.1 82
rather, men and women are born in the normal manner, but without any
impurity or suffering on the mother's part. The version preserved in
Tibetan translation supplies additional details not found'in the Chinese,
hastening to add that in world birth does not result from
ordinary sexual intercourse. On the contrary, whenever a man looks at a
woman with desire (for in this world desire has not been completely
eliminated) his lust is immediately cooled, and he enters into a state of
samiidhi; as for the woman, she immediately conceives a child.
24
All this
takes place, in other words, without any physical contact between the
"parents" whatsoever.
Just as the manner of conception and birth is simply a more rarefied
version of processes that take place here in this J ambudvlpa, so are the
other physical aspects of s realm best described as upgraded
versions of our own. His land is free of sickness, people are never ugly;
and (on a doctrinal note) there are no "heretical religions" there. Jewelry
and clothing grow on trees, and once picked these garments always
remain fresh and clean, imbued with the scent of heavenly flowers (thus
averting the drudgery of laundry). Nor does food need to be planted,
harvested, or cooked: like the gods of the Trayastri:rp.sa Heaven, as soon
as the inhabitants of Abhirati think of food and drink, they immediately
attain whatever they desire. In world people do not have to
exert any effort to earn a living, and buying and selling are unknown.
Thus those fortunate enough to be born in Abhirati are free to relax and
enjoy a paradise-like climate free from the extremes of heat or cold,
where a gentle, scented breeze blows in accord with people's wishes.
25
I will not enumerate here all of the myriad features of Abhirati,
virtually all of which (an abundance of jewels, lotuses, ponds, celestial
music, and so on) will be familiar to those who have studied other Pure
Land texts. Before moving on to describe other aspects of life in this
land, however, we should pause to take note of the use to which these
enticing features are put within the text. Contrary to what we might
expect, the siitra does not use these attractive qualities - not, at least, in
this portion of the text
26
- to encourage rank-and-file Buddhists to look
24. Tib. 74.7-75.3. Unless otherwise indicated, all references to the Tibetan text are to
the version contained in vol. 36 of the Stog Palace edition.
25. 11.755c-756b.
26. Cf. however what I have described below as a "coda" to the siitra, in which
devotees are urged to seek rebirth there by remembering and reciting the siitra
itself.
NATTIER 83
forward to rebirth in Abhirati. Instead the delightful features of that land
are marshaled to elicit a very different response: bodhisattvas are urged
to study and emulate conduct so that they will eventually
obtain such a world for themselves.27
The Practice of Buddhism in World
Not all of the is devoted to enumerating the physical
attributes of the Abhirati realm. Considerable attention is also given to
how those fortunate enough to be reborn there will carry out Buddhist
practices once they arrive. In particular, the text describes at length how
much easier it is to attain Arhatship in world than in our
own. Innumerable listeners attain Arhatship each time
preaches the Dharma, and those who require four such lectures to
progress step by step from stream-enterer to Arhatship are considered
the "slow learners" of the group. No one, apparently, will require rebirth
elsewhere before attaining final liberation; thus birth in s land
is tantamount to the last birth of the non-returner.
The description of life in Abhirati closely resembles that of an ideal-
ized monastic community. disciples do not need to beg for
food, nor do they have to cut and sew their own monastic robes; robes
and bowls simply appear before them as needed, and at mealtime their
bowls automatically fill up with food. Nor is there any need for the
monks and nuns to wash their dishes, for at the end of the meal their
bowls simply disappear.
28
Since no one in Abhirati would even think of
doing an evil deed, does not confer the prohibitive precepts
on his congregation, but preaches only about the positive aspects of the
Dharma,29 and the entire congregation listens attentively as he does.
3D
When one of disciples at last enters into extinction the
ground quakes in recognition, and many of them exhibit various marvels
(such as spontaneous disappearance, self-cremation in the sky, or the
emanation of a rainbow body) as they pass into final
Not all the inhabitants of realm, however, are engaged in
pursuing the path to Arhatship. Comparably gargantuan numbers of
27. This theme is repeated throughout the siitra, but see especially 11.7 56b22-24.
28. 11.757b16-22.
29. 11.757b22-28,757c4-1O.
30. 11.757c21.
31. 11.757c26-758a6.
JIABS 23.1 84
bodhisattvas are also present, and just as was the case with
srilvaka-assembly, the bodhisattvas reborn in his land have a much easier
time pursuing their chosen path than do their counterparts in our world.
Whenever preaches, for example, those bodhisattvas will be
able to remember and recite all that they hear.
32
Though Mara is present
in world - or rather, though Abhirati has its own Mara
figure - he will not attempt to obstruct the bodhisattvas' progress, and
without such interference they will all be able to attain the state of non-
retrogression from Buddhahood.
33
Despite all the wonders of s realm, the bodhisattvas. there
will not be content simply to enjoy life in Abhirati itself, for the sutra
emphasizes the fact that they will be able to travel freely to other
Buddha-worlds. Upon their arrival they will make offerings to the
Tathagata who resides there, listen to his Dharma-teachings, and clarify
their understanding by asking relevant questions before returning to
realm.
34
Elaborating upon the straightforward description of
this process found in version, the editor of a later recen-
sion displays a rather cosmopolitan sense of the difficulties that some-
times attend travelers to other cultures:
'" if those bodhisattvas wish to go to another Buddha-land, they will no sooner
think of that land than they will arrive there, wearing the native costume, speaking
the local language with no accent, and acting in harmony with the customs of that
land.
35
It is noteworthy, incidentally, that only bodhisattvas (and not srilvakas)
are described as engaging in this inter-galactic travel, an issue to which
we will return below.
The benefits experienced by bodhisattvas in that land continue to
accrue even after death, for the sutra tells us that they will be able to see
all of the nine hundred ninety-six who are yet to come in this
Good Aeon (bhadrakalpa),36 and will be reborn in one Buddha-field
after another until enlightenment is attained)7 In this connection the
32. 11.758bl-2, 758c1-2, etc.
33. 11.758c24ff., 759b16ff., etc.
34. 11.758b9-13.
35. This passage is found only in Bodhiruci's version; see 11.107a27-28. The
English translation is taken from CHANG, Treasury, p. 327 (cited above, n.4).
36. 11.758b13-15.
37. 11.760a16-18, 760b7-8, etc.
NATTIER 85
theme of being able to remember the Buddha's teachings is sounded
once again, for it is said that even across the cycle of death-and-rebirth,
these bodhisattvas will never forget thesutras they have heard.
38
The Conclusion of Career
Glorious as it is, lifespan as a Buddha will not last forever,
and the devotes considerable attention to the circum-
stances that will attend his demise. On the last day of his life
will send out magically produced versions of himself which will appear
throughout all the worlds, preaching the Dharma and causing sentient
beings to attain Arhatship.39 He will also issue a prophecy (vyiikaral}a)
to his successor, the bodhisattva Gandhahastin, predicting his future
attainment of Buddhahood.
40
Upon his entry into extinction various
auspicious portents will occur (the shaking of the earth, the sound of a
great roar, etc.).41 Finally will bring forth fire from his own
body,42 thus performing the same kind of self-cremation previously
displayed by many of the Arhats in his realm. After his death
Dharma will endure for several hundred thousand kalpas,43
after which it will gradually fade away as the inhabitants of his world
lose interest in the Buddhist teachings.
44
The Making of a Buddha-Field: Path to Buddhahood
Like the longer Sukhiivatfvyaha, the begins with an
encounter between a Buddha and a monk. Inspired by the preaching of a
Buddha known as "Great Eyes" (Ch. ta-mu *- , kuang-mu ; Tib.
Spyan chen-po),45 the initially nameless monk who is to become
38. 11.758c5-7.
39. 11.760b26-28.
40. 11.760b28-c2.
41. 11.760c5-8.
42. 11.761a13.
43. 11.761b14-15.
44. 11.761b20-24. Even in its later recensions the does not refer to
any of the various periodization systems that some Indian writers used to divide
the duration of the Buddhist religion into periods of saddharma and saddharma-
pratiriipaka.
45. The underlying Sanskrit name is uncertain, but Visalanetra - a word which
occurs as an epithet of the Buddha in the larger Sukhavatfvyiiha, 9(6), and also
at Mvy. 678 as the name of a bodhisattva - would be one possible candidate.
JIABS 23.1 86
states his intention to undertake the trammg of the
bodhisattva.
46
Rather than simply validating his disciple's ambition,
however, the Buddha offers a realistic caution. Just as a contemporary
professor of Buddhist Studies might try to discourage an eager student
from setting out on the long and difficult path that would culminate in
the student's becoming a professor herself, so Great Eyes attempts to
dissuade his eager disciple. The training of the bodhisattva is very diffi-
cult, he points out, implying that the monk should consider the matter
carefully before embarking on such a daunting course. Specifically, the
Buddha states that the bodhisattva path is extraordinarily demanding
because a bodhisattva must bear no malice toward any living being.47
The monk is not easily dissuaded, however, and he immediately
pronounces a series of resolutions, beginning with the promise not to
bring forth anger, malice or ire toward any living being from then on
until his attainment of Buddhahood. Impressed by this long list of vows,
another unnamed monk in the audience suggests that it would be good if
this bodhisattva-monk were to be called ("the unperturbed").
Others present in the assembly also take up this usage, and
becomes the monk's name for the remainder of his lifetimes.
then goes on to make an extensive series of vows detailing
the specifics of his intended practices. And the majority of these reflect
the acts of strenuous self-denial that the writers of a number of early
Mahayana slUras (e.g., the UgraparipTcchii, the Kiisyapaparivarta, and
the Ratnariisi) saw as essential prerequisites for attaining Buddhahood:
not simply observing all ten of the "good deeds" (kusala-karmapatha),
though these are enumerated in full, but leaving home in every lifetime
to become a monk, practicing the twelve (sometimes thirteen) ascetic
practices known as dhiitagulJas,48 maintaining utter detachment from
one's audience while preaching the Dharma, and so on.
The validity of vows - that is, the fact that he will actu-
ally succeed in carrying them out - is subsequently confirmed by an
46. 11.752al-2.
47. 11.752a3-5.
48. Only four of the most important of these - wearing a patchwork robe, limiting
oneself to the three robes of the sramaJJa, dwelling at the foot of a tree, and
constantly standing, sitting, or walking (i.e., never lying down) - are singled out
for attention in version (11.752bll-12 and 23-25); in Bodhiruci's
translation and in the Tibetan, however, the list of dhiitagUlJas is spelled out in
full.
NATTIER 87
"Act of Truth" voiced by another monk in the audience.
49
If it is true
that will succeed in fulfilling his vows, the monk proposes,
"may he press the earth with the finger of his right hand and cause a
great quake."50 The earth indeed shakes six ways in confirmation, and
Great Eyes then confers on the formal prediction (vyakara!la)
of his future Buddhahood, a prophecy which - as Sakyamuni remarks
parenthetically to Ananda - is just like the one Sakyamuni himself
received from the Buddha Dlpmpkara.
51
The Bodhisattva Path According to the
But that is not the end of the story. The sUtra goes on to describe how
successfully carried out his vows, never shrinking from giving
away parts of his body52 and going from Buddha-field to Buddha-field
in one life after another, always making offerings to the Buddhas ther-e
and practicing brahmacarya in their presence. 53 The story of
makes explicit, in other words, the kinds of activities that early
49. The "act of truth" (for which several different Indian terms - including Pali
saccakiriya and Skt. satyavacana, satyavadya, satyavakya, etc. - are used) is
often conflated with the bodhisattva's vows (pratijfia, pralJ.idhiina) in Japanese
and Western scholarship, but it is in fact a speech-act of a very different type. The
act of truth is not a promise or pledge to do something; on the contrary, it is based
on a simple declaration of a fact (though this may be a fact that is to occur inthe
future). What makes this an "act" rather than a mere pronouncement is the request
made by the speaker for a confirmation of his or her statement by the forces of
nature: "If what I have said is true, may this river run backwards," for example,
or "If will succeed in carrying out his vows, may the earth quake in
response." Such an act of truth may occur, as here, when a vow or series of vows
has just been made, but it may also occur independently, as when the prostitute
BindumatI causes the Ganges to flow backwards in confirmation of her statement
that she has treated all of her customers equally regardless of their social status
(Milindapafiha 4.1.42), or when King Sivi's eye is restored by his statement that
"whatsoever sort or kind of beggar comes to me is dear to my heart" (Jiitaka no.
499). What is common to all accounts of the performance of an act of truth is that
a proposition is first set forth and then confirmed (or disconfirmed, as the case
may be) by a miraculous response from the environment. For a thorough discus-
sion of the act of truth as presented in both Buddhist and Hindu sources see W.
Norman BROWN, "Duty as Truth in Ancient India," Proceedings o/the American
Philosophical Society, vol. 116, no. 3 (1972), pp. 252-268.
50. 11.753a18-19. This is of course the bhami-sparia-mudra.
51. 11.753blO-15.
52. 1 L754b26-27.
53. 1 L754c2-5.
JIABS 23.1 88
Mahiiyana Buddhists believed were required in order to amass the vast
amounts of merit needed to procure all the qualities of a Buddha.
54
U sing a script supplied at least in part by the jiitaka tales, these pioneer-
ing bodhisattvas had to look forward to thousands of lifetimes of self-
sacrifice before Buddhahood coilld be attained. And this self-sacrifice
did not consist simply of renouncing one's belongings or being kind and
compassionate to others; on the contrary, it required dramatic acts of
"giving up the body" (iitmabhiiva-parityiiga), narrated in such tales as
the Khiintiviidi-jiitaka (no. 313), where the bodhisattva as a renunciant
sage Pali isi) is cut to pieces at the order of an evil king, or the
Vyiighrf-jiitaka (found in, among other sources, chapter 19 of the
Sanskrit Suvan:taprabhiisasiitra) in which the bodhisattva as a young
prince sacrifices his body to feed a hungry tigress and her cubs. It is no
wonder, then, that the bodhisattva is referred to in a number of early
Mahiiyana sutras as a "doer of what is hard"
But there were other means through which merit could be attained as
well. From the very beginning of Buddhist history, the act of giving
(diina) to members of the Buddhist monastic community was seen as the
merit-making activity par excellence. Though the notion of the recipient
as a "field of merit" was subject to a variety of interpre-
54. Opinions on the length of time required to complete all the prerequisites for
Buddhahood varied according to school, but one common figure was three
asalJ1khyeya kalpas and one hundred mahiikalpas. See for example the Ta chih-tu
lun (T No. 1509), 25.86c-87c and the French translation in Etienne
LAMOTTE, Le traite de la grande vertu de sagesse, vol. 1 (Louvain-Ia-Neuve:
Institut Orientaliste 1981), pp. 246-255. According to the Ta chih-tu lun each of
the thirty-two marks of a Buddha is "adorned with one hundred merits." Each
one of these merits, in turn, is the equivalent of the amount of merit necessary to
become a cakravartin (according to some sources cited by the Traite), Indra
(according to others), or Mara, the chief of the Paranirmitavasavartin gods
(according to yet another opinion). Some authorities gave even more immense
equivalents, e.g. "the collective merit of all beings at the end of the kalpa," which
is the amount of merit that results in the re-formation of a trisiihasramahii-
siihasra world-system after a period of dissolution (25.87b; Traite 1,250-251).
55. The prominence given to the Lotus Satra (with its promises that even a child who
offers to the Buddha a stilpa made of sand will eventually become a Buddha him-
self) in both Western and East Asian interpretations of Mahayana Buddhism is
probably one of the factors (together with a certain squeamishness about bloody
acts of self-sacrifice) that have made it difficult for modern readers to appreciate
the extent to which the bodhisattva career was viewed by most Indian Buddhists
as an excruciatingly difficult path.
NATTIER 89
tations, in at least some circles it was maintained that it was not merely
the gift itself, or even the intention with which it was given, but the
virtuousness of the recipient that determined the amount of merit the
donor received. What better object of giving could there be, therefore,
than a fully enlightened Buddha?
Thus for a bodhisattva-in-training the possibility of meeting with an
endless series of Buddhas - in the course of "traveling from Buddha-
field to Buddha-field," as so many early Mahayana sutras put it - is not
merely optional but required, for there is simply no other way to attain
the vast quantities of merit required in order to become a Buddha one-
self. "Serving billions of Buddhas" thus becomes a kind of internship, as
it were, during which the bodhisattva can learn how to be a Buddha by
serving one, while simultaneously amassing vast stores of merit by
making offerings to the Best of Men.
But there is yet another prerequisite to becoming a Buddha according
to these early texts. Not only the equipment of merit (puflya-Sarrtbhtira)
but also the equipment of knowledge (jfiana-sarrtbhtira) is required.
Specifically, the bodhisattva must attain the same degree of knowledge
that the Buddha had (now frequently referred to as sarvajfia or
"omniscience"), a knowledge that seems to be associated, for many early
Mahayana thinkers, with the teachings contained in Buddhist Dharma-
texts. Hence the emphasis on traveling to other Buddha-fields - even
while inhabiting a place as glorious as s realm - to hear addi-
tional discourses on the Dharma, as well as the importance placed on
being able to actually remember those discourses, not only during one's
present lifetime but even after death.
Finally, it should be noted that while myriads of beings succeed in
attaining Arhatship in land, not a single bodhisattva (other
than, of course, himself) is described as attaining Buddhahood
there. Indeed such cannot be the case, for (as the Tibetan version makes
explicit) "since only one bodhisattva, not two, can attain anuttara-
samyaksambodhi" in a given time and place, those who want to attain
Buddhahood "should do as did."56 Those who wish to become
Buddhas, in other words, cannot simply do so in s encourag-
ing presence, but must themselves retrace the steps of his path.
57
56. Tib. 195.2-6.
57. 11.753a21-25; cf. the Tibetan version at 31
JIABS 23.1 90
This brings us to yet another factor that must surely have contributed
to the formulation of ideas concerning other Buddha-worlds, a problem
that we rnight describe (in contemporary parlance) as "bodhisattva job-
market crowding." As more and more people within the Buddhist com-
munity opted for Buddhahoodrather than Arhatship, the problem of
where one might find "employment" as a Buddha emerged in sharp
relief. Given the axiomatic assumption that there could be only one
Buddha in a given world at a time (for the very definition of a Buddha
is one who discovers the path to enlightenment by himself and then
teaches it to others in a world where no "Buddhism" exists), one,could
not of course become a Buddha while still a member of an existing
Buddhist community; the attainment of the final goal would have to wait
until a later life when one is reborn into a world with no knowledge of
the Buddha's teachings. Those desiring to become Buddhas in our own
world-system might, of course, simply get in line behind the bodhisattva
Maitreya (recognized by virtually all Buddhists as the next Buddha-to;-
be), but this would mean a wait of several billion years, as Maitreya's
own descent from the T u ~ i t a heaven was not expected to occur for some
five and a half billion years.58 Alternatively - and much more appeal-
ingly - one might seek rebirth in another realm whose qualities are the
result of one's own bodhisattva activities, and where Buddhahood could
far more quickly be attained.
All of the above suggests a radically new way of understanding the
emergence of so-called "Pure Land" ideas in Indian Buddhism. No
longer do these paradise-like realnis appear as a concession to the needs
of an under-achieving laity, much less as evidence for the incorporation
of foreign (e.g., Iranian) or non-Buddhist (e.g., Hindu) ideas. On the
contrary, the existence of other Buddha-fields now appears as a logical
necessity, elicited by the mainstream understanding of the requirements
of the bodhisattva path itself. Whatever the other factors in Indian
culture at the time that might have contributed to this expanded vision of
the cosmos,59 the idea of the bodhisattva path as a viable option for a
58. On some of the ways in which Buddhists have responded to this anticipated
delay see Jan NATTIER, "The Meanings of the Maitreya Myth: A Typological
Analysis," in Alan Sponberg and Helen Hardacre, eds., Maitreya, the Future
Buddha (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1988), pp. 23-47.
59. A wide-ranging comparative study of the emergence of ideas of other world-
systems in India would be a valuable contribution not just to Buddhist Studies,
but to the study of Indian religious history as a whole.
NATTIER 91
small but significant minority within the Buddhist community virtually
required that such a worldview be produced.
* * *
If the existence of other worlds where bodhisattvas might be reborn in
the presence of Buddhas in the near future and ultimately become
Buddhas themselves was viewed as a necessity by those those who had
taken bodhisattva vows, such worlds surely offered an attractive possi-
bility for rank-and-file Buddhist devotees as well. Before turning to a
comparison of the and the Sukhavatfvyaha, therefore, we
must first pause to consider what the literature can tell us
about the emergence of a generalized hope for rebirth in a "Pure Land."
It is clear from the outset that, while rebirth in Abhirati is portrayed as
an option for many Buddhists, it is far from easy or automatic. "Those
born into Buddha-world," the gods remark after hearing
his vows, "will not [be people who] have inferior merits."60 Somewhat
later in the sutra the difficulty of entry into Abhirati is made even
clearer when an unnamed monk in the audience naively expresses his
desire to be reborn in world and is rebuked by Sakyamuni:
"A deluded man like you cannot be born in that Buddha-field!"
Sakyamuni replies. "One who has a lustful mind cannot be born there.
Beings are born there by virtue of meritorious conduct, righteous con-
duct, pure conduct [brahmacarya, i.e., celibacy] and correct conduct."61
Based on these statements it would seem that birth into Abhirati operates
in much the same way as birth into the various heavens known in earlier
Buddhist literature: it is a reward for one's own merit, and considerable
quantities are required.
This stance is maintained throughout most of the with
repeated mentions of the importance of dedicating one's merit to rebirth
in Abhirati (for which, of course, one must have accumulated the
requisite merit). Toward the end of the sutra, however, it suddenly
appears that birth in Abhirati might be much easier than the text had
previously suggested. Now we are told that rebirth in
presence can rather easily be ensured - not by visualizing him or
remembering his name (as those familiar with the Sukhavatiliterature
60. 11.753b3 (reading with note 6 to the Taisho edition; cf. Bodhiruci's version,
11.103b4).
61. 11.756a18-22. Bodhlruci and the Tibetan have essentially the same reading.
nABS 23.1 92
might suppose); but rather by the acceptance, memorization, and diffu-
sion of the text of the its elf. 62 What we have here, in
other words, is a series of classic "book-cult" exhortations -of the type
that appear at the conclusion of so many Mahayana siitras.
63
* * *
Having examined the contents of the in some detail, we
may now conclude with some comparative observations on the content
of the larger Sukhiivatfvyaha.
64
These two texts - both of which describe
the career of a bodhisattva-monk from his initial vow in the presence of
a Buddha to his present-day life in a glorious Buddha-field - are
strikingly similar in structure and content, and thus they provide an ideal
laboratory for comparative analysis. If we use the as a
mirror for comparison with the larger Sukhiivatfvyaha, what can we see
in each of these siitras that might have been invisible before?65
Both siitras begin with the narration by Sakyamuni of a long-ago
encounter between a Buddha and a monk, but even at the outset they
begin to diverge in interesting ways. In the the Buddha
Great Eyes, as we have seen, tries at first to dissuade the future
62. 11.762c-764a. It is interesting to note that the two methods of attaining rebirth in
Abhirati described in the - directing one's accumulated merit
toward that end and revering the text of the sutra itself - are the same methods
recommended in a set of verses on how to be reborn in Abhirati included in the
Mahayana Mahiiparinirval)a-siitra (T No. 375, 12.734a-b); cf. the English
translation in John STRONG, The Experience of Buddhism: Sources and
Interpretations (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth 1995), pp. 193-195.
63. A casual perusal of the concluding sections of the Mahayana sutras preserved in
the Taisho edition of the canon will turn up dozens, if not hundreds, of such
passages.
64. The larger Sukhiivatfvyiiha has been chosen for this purpose mainly because its
more extensive content allows for a much more detailed comparison. It is also
possible (and in my view rather likely) that it is older than the shorter text. The
authors of the shorter Sukhavatfvyiiha, incidentally, were clearly aware of the
existence of who is correctly placed (along with several other
Buddhas) in the East ( 11). In the by contrast, there is no
mention of Amitabha
65. All references to the larger Sukhavatfvyiiha in this section, unless otherwise
noted, will be taken from the Sanskrit edition edited by F. MAX MULLER. A
thorough comparative study of the treatment of each of the issues discussed here
in all extant versions of the sutra - Chinese and Tibetan as well as Sanskrit - is
highly desirable, but unfortunately this lies outside the scope of the present paper.
NATTIER 93
from embarking on the bodhisattva path; in the Sukhavatl-
vyuha, by contrast, Lokesvararaja makes no attempt to discourage
Dharmakara. On the contrary, he simply replies that the monk should
obtain for hims,elf the vast array (vyuha) of qualities that contitute a
Buddha-field, and then proceeds to tutor him for a full million years on
what constitutes this "array."
Already we can discern the outlines of two major differences in per-
spective between these texts. First, it is clear that for the writers of the
the bodhisattva path is not intended for everyone, and
should only be undertaken after serious reflection on what it entails. For
the authors of the Sukhavatfvyuha, by contrast, the bodhisattva path is
simply taken for granted, and the appropriateness of Dharmakara's
"choice" is never called into question. Second, while the future
s initial resolution is simply to train himself in the bodhisattva
path, Dharmakara's initial resolutions are already focused on the final
goal of Buddhahood. And that goal is understood in a very specific way:
it involves, above all, the design and construction of one's own Buddha-
land.
These foreshadowings are confirmed by what is found later in the
texts. In the as we have seen, Abhirati is praised as a
place where Arhatship can easily be attained, thus making it clear that
Arhatship is still viewed as a viable (and indeed valuable) path. In the
Sukhavatfvyuha, by contrast, there is no discussion whatsoever concern-
ing the ease of attaining Arhatship in Amitabha's land. On the contrary,
though Arhats are mentioned briefly,66 the sutra seems to suggest that
the only "live option" for members of its Buddhist audience is the
attainment of anuttarasamyaksambodhi. But this notion is bifurcated in a
peculiar way: a distinction is made between rank-and-file bodhisattvas,
described as ekajatipratibaddha "bound to (only) one more birth," and
bodhisattvas who have taken on vows to rescue other beings.
67
The
classical notion of the bodhisattva as one who has vowed to attain
66. Arhats receive considerably more notice in the the two earliest versions of the
Sukhiivatfvyiiha (T Nos. 361 and 362) than in the extant Sanskrit text or, for that
matter, in the Chinese version attributed to Sailghavarman. A thorough compari-
son of these two early renditions of the Sukhiivatfvyiiha with Lokalqema's trans-
lation of the could provide valuable additional information on the
stages by which the Arhats gradually became marginalized to the point of near-
invisibility in later recensions of the Sukhiivatfvyiiha.
67. The most vivid instance of this bifurcation is in 33.
JIABS 23.1 94
Buddhahood for the sake of others thus appears here only in vestigial
form, suggesting that the idea of the bodhisattva path as a challenging
alternative suited for only the few has now been left far behind. What
we see in the in other words, is the standard scenario of
the "three vehicles," according to which some Buddhists - but not all -
can and should undertake the difficult practices leading to Buddhahood
so that they may in tum assist others in attaining Arhatship, just as
Sakyamuni did.
68
In the Sukhavatfvyuha, by contrast, this notion has
receded into the background, and the bodhisattva path (now understood
in far less rigorous terms) has now been generalized as approprjate to
all.
In fact these two developments would be expected to occur in con-
junction, for it is quite improbable that the bodhisattva path - conceived
of in the intensely demanding terms in which it was initially formulated
- could be viewed as appropriate for, much less attractive to, the entire
Buddhist community. On the contrary, the bodhisattva path in its
incipient stages is best viewed not as a new "school" of Buddhism at all
but simply as a higher and more demanding vocation suitable for a few
within the larger Buddhist sangha, analogous to the monastic vocation
6S. It is important to point out that the notion of "one vehicle" (ekayiina) was never
universally accepted by Indian Mahayana Buddhists. The
piiramitii-sutra and its descendants, for example, take for granted the validity of
all three vehicles even as they direct their message (mainly) toward those on the
bodhisattva path, and the widely used five-gotra theory is explicitly based on the
understanding that the bodhisattva path is not an appropriate choice for all
Buddhists. Even Santideva - the Sth-century Madhyamika scholar-monk who so
eloquently describes the requirements of the bodhisattva path in his
Bodhicaryiivatiira and - makes it clear at the beginning of the
latter that his instructions are intended not for all Buddhists, but specifically for
those who belong to the Buddha-gotra (BENDALL ed., p. 2, line 9). Much confu-
sion has been created by the widespread practice of interpreting all negative
comments found in Mahayana sources about "falling to the level of the sriivakas
and pratyekabuddhas" (to use the wording found in the as if they
were criticisms directed toward a competing Buddhist school. On the contrary -
to use an academic analogy once again - they are better understood as the exhor-
tations of a professor to a PhD. student not to take a terminal M.A. degree and
be done with it, but to strive to complete the much more demanding doctoral
degree, at which point the student (having become a professor) can then teach
others, leading them to the attainment of the (admittedly lower) B.A. and M.A.
degrees.
NATTIER 95
within the Roman Catholic church.
69
In those circles where the bodhi-
sattva path came to be viewed as appropriate for all members of the
Buddhist community, however, the requirements for being a bodhisattva
had of necessity to be reduced. To put it simply: the bodhisattva path as
originally conceived was suitable (and indeed intended) only for a small
elite within the larger Buddhist community. Once it had been general-
ized to apply to the entire population of Buddhist practitioners - old and
young, male and female, householder and renunciant - the difficult
requirements of the bodhisattva path had either to be deferred. to a future
lifetime for most meinbers of the Buddhist community or to be radically
reduced in the present.
To explore the significance of the second difference in perspective
foreshadowed above - the centrality of the traditional bodhisattva path
in the versus the centrality of the construction of a
Buddha-field in the Sukhiivatfvyilha - we must turn to what is widely
considered to be the heart of the SukhavatI literature: the vows made by
the monk Dharmakara. These vows are almost too well known to require
discussion, but we may summarize them briefly by saying that in a series
of resolutions - twenty-four in the earliest extant versions (T Nos. 361
and 362), forty-eight in the version most widely used in East Asia (T
No. 360) - the future Amitabha details the specific qualities of his future
Buddha-field. Each vow concludes with what might be described as a
"sanction" clause, in which Dharmakara states "[If I do not succeed in
bringing this about], may I not attain Buddhahood."7o
vows are also followed by a sanction clause, but the
formulation of the penalty is entirely different. In wording widely
echoed in other Mahayana sutras,71 the future underscores the
69. In the Buddhist case, of course, the bodhisattva option is initially presented as a
more rigorous path within the monastic community, thus making it (at least at the
outset) an even more demanding religious option. I am drawing here on several
sources, including my own study and translation of the Ugraparip!cchti, the
content of several other early Mahayana siitras, and the work of a number of
other scholars including Paul HARRISON, Paul WILLIAMS, and SHIZUTANI
Masao IEnt.
70. Skt. mti ttivad aham anuttarti1]'t samyaksa1]'tbodhim abhisa1]'tbudhyeya1]'t; Ch.
HI!::ff'F-&1l in T No. 362, /fI[lZ:iE. in T No. 360.
71. See for example the (T Nos. 318,
310[15],319; Tibetan Peking/Otani No. 760[15]); the Vimaladattiiparip!cchti (T
Nos. 338, 3110[33], 339; Pek. No. 760[33]); and the Sumatidiirikii-parip!cchti
(T Nos. 334, 335; 336, 310[30]; Pek. No. 760[30]).
JIABS 23.1 96
seriousness of his vows by stating "[If I should fail to fulfill these vows)
I would be breaking faith with all the Buddhas, the Blessed Ones, who
are even now teaching the Dharma in incalculable, innumerable, incon-
ceivable, immeasurable world-systems - those Buddhas, the Blessed
Ones."72 The notion of breaking a promise made to the Buddhas may
not seem, to the contemporary reader, nearly as serious as the prospect
of renouncing the possibility of Buddhahood; but as the discussion in
Santideva's makes clear, in the Indian religious context,
where the relationship with one's guru was of paramount importance,
the notion of breaking a pledge made to one's spiritual teacher was a
dreadful prospect indeed.
73
More important than the difference in the wording of the sanction
clause, however, is the difference in the content of the vows themselves.
In Dharmakara's case, as we have seen, the majority of his vows are
72. The version I have cited is from Lokaksema's translation, where the sanction
clause, repeated after each of the eight of vows, reads
(11.752a-c).
Bodhiruci's version is generally shorter, reading in most cases simply "that
would be to deceive all the Buddhas" (e.g., 11.102b4-5). In
a few cases, however, his version reads "that would be to turn my back on all the
Buddhas" (e.g. 11.l02b26-27). The same expression occurs
in a longer version of the same clause at 102b2-3 ("that would be to turn my back
on the Buddhas, the Tathagatas, who are presently teaching the Dharma in
immeasurable, innumerable, unlimited world-systems"). The Tibetans seem to
have interpreted the underlying optative verb not as a conditional statement ("I
would be ... ") but as an imperative ("may 1 ... "), for the Tibetan version reads
bdag-gis ... sans-rgyas bcom-ldan-'das de-dag bslus-par gyur-cig, "May I
deceive (sic) the Buddhas, the Blessed Ones" (15.6-16.1 and passim).
; Happily a Sanskrit version of this statement has been preserved in Santideva's
which makes it clear that the underlying verb form was indeed
an optative. Singling out s vow to become a monk in every future life-
time, Santideva quotes him as saying visa1J1.va.dita me buddha bhagavanto
bhaveyur yadi sarvasya.m ja.tau na pravrajeyam "the Buddhas, the Blessed Ones
would be broken faith with by me if in all my lives 1 do not go forth [as a monk]"
(BENDALL ed., 14.15). (I do not know the source of the phrasing ta.vad aha1J1.
buddha1J1.s tathagata.n vanceyam ye
etarhi dharma1J1. deayanti given without attribution in DANTINNE
[La splendeur, p. 81]; presumably it is a reconstruction based on the Tibetan cited
in his previous note.) Since a bodhisattva necessarily makes his vows in the
presence of the Buddhas of the ten directions (who are, after all, all-seeing and
all-knowing), the degree of his offence if he should he break one of his vows
would be immense.
73. (BENDALL ed.), pp. 12-13.
NATTIER 97
devoted to a description of the precise qualities of the Buddha-field he
intends to create. s vows, however, are entirely different in
focus. Rather than describing the particular features of his future
Buddha-world, he sets forth in detail the bodhisattva-practices that he
promises to carry out. These practices are in no way innovative, but
simply draw on standard Mahayana assumptions about the necessity of
spending countless eons in the cycle of rebirth, engaging (via self-sacri-
fice as well as dana and other practices) in the acquisition of the
tremendous quantity of merit required for Buddhahood.7
4
To be sure, the devotes considerable attention to the
delightful features of the Abhirati realm, but is never
described as vowing to bring these particular qualities about.7
5
On the
74. In the earliest version of the there are eight sets of such vows
(11.752a-c), containing an average of five vows each. Following the pronounce-
ment of these eight sets of vows the sutra states that Great Eyes and various gods
and humans "stood as guarantors" for the vows, and the Buddha declares that if
bodhisattva-monks put on that kind of armor (Le., take vows of this kind) they
will all attain anuttarasamyaksal]'lbodhi.
75. Certain passages within the sutra might be viewed at first glance as exceptions,
but they can, I believe, be easily explained. In the section of the sutra that follows
the eight sets of vows in version (and are set off from these main
vows by the statement that Great Eyes and various gods, asuras and humans
witnessed vows, thus arousing the suspicion that these additional
resolutions are an interpolation) the future makes some additional
promises, including the promise not to find fault with the members of the four-
fold sangha and not to emit semen even in a dream (752c18-753a15). Each of
these additional two resolutions has a correlate in the nature of his future world:
in the first case, that the members of his future sangha will in fact be faultless;
and in the second, that the members of his community will be free from certain
types of contamination - specifically, that renunciant bodhisattvas will not suffer
from the emission of semen even during dreams, and that the women (literally
"mothers") of Abhirati will not suffer from any impurity. My point is that even
though these two resolutions appear to be phrased in such a way as to constitute
an exception to the rule, they probably originated simply as by-products of
actions himself promised to do.
In Bodhiruci's version and in the Tibetan, only one of vows
appears to violate this rule: the vow in which he promises that women will have
no impurity (now understood, in these two versions, as being free of faults). It is
interesting to note that in both versions (or rather, in the branch of the Indian
textual tradition that underlies them) this vow seems to have been altered in
transmission by an editor familiar with the sanction clause of the Sukhavatfvyuha:
in both cases, the future states that if women in his land are not free of
JIABS 23.1 98
contrary, the lovely features of his Buddha-field are portrayed as a side
effect of the excellence of what he did in fact vow: to undergo intensive
and sometimes grueling bodhisattva practices. Just as rebirth in more
comfortable circumstances in this world is regularly described in
Buddhist literature as the result of good actions which often have no
direct connection to the reward received, so the specific features of
world are described as the by-product of the "excellence of
his vows"
This same expression occurs, as is well known, in the Sukhilvatfvyiiha,
both before and after the list of Dharmalcara's VOWS.?7 But there it is
used in a quite different sense. Now it is understood not as referring to
the "excellence" or "distinguished quality" of the bodhisattva's vows in
general, but to the specific (and individual) promises contained in those
vows. In the Sukhiivatfvyiiha, in other words, the expression pralJidhilna-
(here used in the plural) is understood as referring to the
distinctive - i.e., unique and individual - vows made by Dharmakara
that determined what his Buddha-field would be like.
It is easy to see how someone familiar with the kind of language used
in the could have interpreted the expression in this sense.
It occurs only in the. section of the siitra in which future
Buddha-field is being described, and the context in which it is used
could well have led a listener to assume that it referred to some unstated
list of vows concerning the features of that field. What we may have in
the Sukhilvatfvyiiha, in other words, is a reinterpretation of the expres-
sion as used in the in a way that
brought the notion of making vows concerning the nature of one's
future Buddha-field onto center stage, while the more generic vows con-
cerning the requirements of bodhisattva practice receded into the back-
ground.
* * *
faults, he will renounce his own attainment of Buddhahood (11.103a15ff., Tib
29.3-7). No such statement appears in s version.
76. The wording in version is
(11.756b20-21, reading the final character with the Taish5 editors' note 10, a
reading that is confirmed by the Tibetan, where khyad-par is also surely a
translation of Skt. "excellence, distinctive [quality]").
77. See 7 (MAX MULLER ed., p. 11, line 7) and 9 (p. 21, line 19 - p. 22, line 1).
The Chinese reads
NATTIER 99
By reading the and the Sukhlivatfvyiiha in conjunction
we have been able to identify a number of elements shared by these two
texts, as well as a number of important differences. To return now to the
question posed. at the outset: in what ways are the ideas about Pure
Lands contained in these siltras continuous with earlier Mainstream and
Mahayana notions, and in what ways do they represent genuine innova-
tions?
Both siltras - to begin with elements they share in common - present a
vision of a world in which a Buddhist practitioner may aspire to be born
which is in many respects like the early Buddhist vision of heaven.
Indeed both texts, in searching for analogies to the glories of Abhirati or
Sukhavatl, refer explicitly to heavens known already in earlier Buddhist
cosmology.7
8
More specifically, the fact that Abhirati provides an opti-
mal setting for the rapid attainment of Arhatship makes it analogous to
the "Pure Abodes" (suddhliviisa) of the Theravada (and indeed the
general Mainstream) tradition, the upper heavens of the Form Realm in
which the non-returner (aniigamin) is reborn, attaining Arhatship there
and never returning to our world. Here the Sukhiivatfvyiiha diverges,
however, for it contains - at least in the Sanskrit and "Sanghavarman"
recensions - no discussion of the ease of attaining Arhatship there.7
9
On
the contrary, Sukhavatl appears to provide a way-station only for bodhi-
sattvas, who (apparently with little preparation here on earth) will
become irreversible from the enlightenment of a Buddha.
If we look at what is necessary to attain rebirth in these worlds, once
again the appears to be closer to earlier tradition. What
is necessary to attain rebirth in Abhirati (according to all sections of the
text except the closing "book-cult" passage) is very much in line with
the entrance requirements for traditional heavens: it is the result of one's
own good actions, and a considerable quantity of such merit is required.
In the Sukhlivatfvyiiha, by contrast, access to Amitabha's world is con-
siderably easier: all that is necessary is remembering Amitabha ten
times, and avoiding particularly heinous actions (viz., the five iinantarya
sins and slandering the Dharma). What is especially noteworthy in the
Sukhiivatfvyiiha is what replaces individual merit as the means of
78. The refers several times to the Trayastriqlsa heaven, while the
Sukhavatfvyaha takes its analogy from the highest heaven in the Desire Realm,
the ParanirmitavaSavartin heaven.
79. As mentioned above, however (note 66), Arhats are considerably more
prominent in the two earliest Chinese versions.
JIABS 23.1 100
entrance, for rebirth in Sukhavatl is portrayed as the result of a relation-
ship between the believer and Amitabha. We have here the seeds - if not
yet the full fruition - of what would come to be known as- reliance on
"other-power" in the Pure Land Buddhism of East Asia.
Thus in several respects appears to lie slightly
closer than does the Sukhiivatfvyaha to the pre-existing worldview of
Mainstream Buddhism. But how do these two siUras align themselves
with what we have referred to above as the "trunk-line" Mahayana
tradition? That is, in what ways does the Pure Land Buddhism of these
two texts appear to be continuous with early Mahayana beliefs and
practices, and in what ways do these siUras diverge from those conven-
tions in unique and innovative ways?
Once again it is the that appears to be the more conser-
vative of the two. Here we still find the standard early Mahayana
assumption that Buddhahood is only for certain members of the com-
munity, while other Buddhists should be content to attain Arhatship.
Indeed it is the role of a Buddha to help them do so quickly, a part that
plays with great effectiveness. Moreover, the path to Buddha-
hood is still conceived of as tremendously difficult, requiring eons of
self-sacrifice to attain. Though offers an "accelerated course"
(as it were) to those fortunate enough to be born in his realm, it is also
reiterated throughout the siitra that those who wish to become Buddhas
must imitate the rigorous and extensive bodhisattva training undergone
by himself. Thus while the path to Buddhahood may be
shortened by hearing the Dharma and making offerings both in the
presence of and in other Buddha-worlds, the basic require-
ments of the path have not been changed. Nor has the final destiny of
the bodlllsattva been revised in any way: the ultimate goal is to become a
Buddha oneself in a world that has no Buddhism, and there to preside
over one's own immeasurable assembly of sriivakas.
When we tum to the Sukhiivatfvyaha, by contrast, we see that many of
these ideas have changed. Buddhahood now appears to be viewed as
appropriate for everyone - or at any rate, there is no discussion of the
attainment of Arhatship by the denizens of SukhaVatl,80 and the term
anuttarasamyaksal!lbodhi is now generalized to the extent that it seems
80. Once again these comments are based solely on the text of the siitra contained in
the extant Sanskrit version and in T No. 360.
NATTIER 101
to refer to the spiritual destination of all beings.
81
Even in the case of
AmWibha himself the path appears far less difficult: in the sole passage
in which Dharmakara's bodhisattva-conduct is actually described, only
such practices as self-restraint, kindness to others, and the practice of the
piiramitiis, are named.
82
There is no reference to bloody acts of self-
sacrifice like those described in the jiitaka stories, nor to the solitary and
rigorous self-cultivation in the forest that characterized the pursuit of
enlightenment in Siikyamuni's [mal life.
Above all, though, there is a shift in focus in the Sukhiivatfvyaha
toward viewing the creation of a Pure Land as the primary aim of the
bodhisattva path. Virtually all of Dharmiikara's bodhisattva vows are
centered on this project, while in the the qualities of
Abhirati are portrayed not as the objective but as the by-product of
s vows. Indeed we have even seen evidence that the authors of
the Sukhiivatfvyaha may have formulated their own understanding of the
content of Dharmakara's resolutions with the wording of the
in mind.
Whatever the direct relationship between the and the
Sukhiivatfvyaha, however (and we should recall thai we do not have the
"original" version of either text), one thing is clear. The
- though it is explicitly a "Pure Land" sutra - remains quite close in its
content and expectations to the world-view of earlier Mainstream and
Mahayana Buddhism. The Sukhiivatfvyaha, by contrast, has introduced a
number of important innovations, including the generalization of the
bodhisattva path to all practitioners, the ease of the attainment of
Buddhahood, and the importance of relying on Amitabha with faith. All
of these suggest that the Sukhiivatfvyaha - at least in the form of the text
most widely used in East Asia today - is the product of a community
that was operating on the principle of "one vehicle" for all, in which the
requirements for Buddhahood had accordingly been radically revised.
It seems clear, therefore, that the' ideas contained in the
Sukhiivatfvyaha represent a further development of those found in the
and not vice versa. The type of Pure Land Buddhism
presented in the thus constitutes a transitional stage
8L This issue is explored in detail in an unpublished paper by Andrew JUNKER, "A
Look at Oddities and Influence in the Shorter and Longer Sukhiivatfvyaha Siitras"
(Indiana University 1997).
82. MAx MilLLERed., 1O.
JIABS 23.1 102
between the earliest understanding of the bodhisattva path and the
distinctive form of Pure Land Buddhism articulated in the larger
Sukhavatfvyiiha. As such it provides an important missing piece in the
historical puzzle, revealing that "very earliest stage" of Indian Pure Land
Buddhism to which Charles Eliot so long ago referred. Perhaps with the
addition of this new material we will more accurately be able to. trace
the steps by which Pure Land Buddhism gradually became an importa..'1t
element in Indian Buddhist thought and practice, and ultimately -
through its East Asian manifestations ...:. a major player on the world
religious scene today.
REIKO OHNUMA
The Story of Rl1pavatI: A Female Past Birth of the Buddha
This article is a first attempt at making sense of the jiltaka of Rupavat!, a
fascinating Indian Buddhist story that has heretofore received very little
attention.! I first came upon this story while doing research for a Ph.D.
dissertation dealing with jiitakas involving the theme of the bodhi-
sattva's bodily self-sacrifice. Stories involving the bodhisattva's sacrifice
of his own body on behalf of others (generally as a manifestation of
diina-piiramitii) constitute a major subgenre of Buddhist narrative litera-
ture, and my dis'sertation was a first attempt at making sense of this
theme and the prominent place it holds within the Indian Buddhist
tradition.
2
Toward that end, I compiled a corpus of relevant stories upon
which to base the dissertation and decided to include the story of Rupa-
vat!, since it deals very prominently with the theme of the bodhisattva's
bodily self-sacrifice. Throughout the course of my research, however, I
repeatedly found that Rupavatl's story differed in significant ways from
the other stories in my corpus, and that all of these differences seemed
inextricably linked with Rupavatl's gender. For Rupavatl represents one
1. The Divyavadiina version of the story is very briefly summarized in WINTERNITZ
1933: 289-290 and in BURLINGAME 1922: 313-314, but has never, as far as I
know, been translated into English in full; see also DAYAL 1932: 184, which
briefly summarizes both the Divyavadana and Avadanakalpalata versions. The
Avadanakalpalata version is translated into English in CHANDRA DAS 1893; this
translation is so rough, however, that it does not faithfully represent
version. The version found in Haribhaga's Jatakamali1 has been translated into
English by myself and is forthcoming in the Penguin Classics anthology of
Buddhist literature (to be edited by Donald S. Lopez, Jr.). Published discussions
of the story are scarce. Susanne MRazIK discusses the story in an unpublished
paper (MRaZIK 1997) and has an article on the story in the forthcoming volume
Bodily Citations: Religionists Engage Judith Butler, to be edited by Ellen Armour
and Susan St. Ville. I have discussed the story in my Ph.D. dissertation
(OHNUMA 1997: 226-257) and an unpublished paper (OHNUMA 1998a); the
present article is largely based upon these two discussions. For further references
to the story, see GREY 1990: 223, s.v. RiipavatI or RukmavatI.
2. For some discussions of this theme, see OHNUMA 1997, OHNUMA 1998b,
OHNUMA 2000, DAYAL 1932: 181-187, BURLINGAME 1922: 297-336,
GRANOFF 1990, and GRANOFF [forthcoming].
Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies
Volume 23 Number 1 .2000
JIABS 23.1 104
of the very few instances in the Indian Buddhist tradition in which a
previous birth of the Buddha Sakyamuni is depicted as being female.
3
Thus, despite the many ways in which Rupavatl's story fit into the
general patterns I found to be characteristic of the bodhisattva's bodily
self-sacrifice, nevertheless, her gender became a thorn in my side, con-
stantly "infecting" the story and setting it slightly askew when compared
to the other stories in my corpus, all of which involved male forms of
the bodhisattva. This led me increasingly to reflect on the significance of
gender as an analytical category in interpreting such stories, and
eventually caused me to devote the longest chapter of the dissertation to
the Buddhist construction of gender and its relationship to stories of
bodily sacrifice.
4
The present article has grown out of this attempt.
In this article, I will first undertake a detailed analysis of the jataka of
RupavatI, relying primarily on the Divyavadana version of the story and
paying special attention to the category of gender and the way in which
Rupavatl's gender is manifested throughout the story and makes it differ
in significant respects from those stories involving male bodhisattvas. I
will then tum my attention to another version of RupavatI's story (from
Haribhaga's Jatakamiila) and examine the fascinating way in which
Haribhaga uses the gendered imagery of breasts and breastfeeding to
materialize and signify the Buddhist values conveyed by RupavatI's tale.
The Story of Rupavatf
The story of RupavatI exists in at least three different Sanskrit versions
that I am aware of. The earliest version appears as Chapter 32 of the
Divyavadana; this is a long, prose version and refers to its title character
as RupavatI. The version next in date appears in Haribhaga's Jataka-
mala; this is an ornate, mixed verse-and-prose version and refers to its
title character as RupyavatI. Finally, the version last in date appears as
Chapter 51 of Avadanakalpalata; this is a shorter, verse
version and refers to its title character as RukrnavatI.
5
All three versions
3. In the massive Pali Jiitaka collection, for example, none of the Buddha's 550
previous births are female.
4. See OHNUMA 1997: Ch. 5.
5. The Divyavadana version (Riipiivatf Avadana) is edited in COWELL and NEIL
1886: 469-481. The Jiitakamiilii version of Haribhana (Rupyiivatf Jiitaka) is
edited in HAHN 1992: 51-57. The Avadanakalpalata version (Rukmavatf
Avadana) is edited in VAIDYA 1959a: 2,316-319. For translations into English,
see note 1.
OHNUMA 105
explicitly identify the woman RilpavatI as a previous birth of the Buddha
Sakyamuni, and develop the basic plotline in similar ways. In this
analysis, however, I will be relying primarily on the Divyavadana
version, where the story is referred to as the Rupavatf A vadana.
The Rupavatf A vadana actually consists of four separate episodes
involving four different manifestations of the "same" individual. The
initial frame-story opens with the Buddha preaching a short sermon on
the virtue of generosity (dana) to his assembled monks. To illustrate the
virtue of generosity, the Buddha then launches into a "story of the past"
that actually involves four separate episodes. In the first episode, a
woman named RilpavatI cuts off her own breasts in order to feed a
starving woman who is about to devour her own, newly born child.
Drawing on the power of her gift, she later performs an Act of Truth by
which she abandons her female sex permanently and transforms herself
into a man, who is then christened with the name Prince Rilpavata. In
the second and briefest episode, Prince Rilpavata (formerly Rilpavati) is
appointed as the new king of UtpalavatI when the former king dies and
leaves no heirs. He rules righteously for sixty years and then dies. In the
third episode, the same individual is reborn as a merchant's son named
Candraprabha, who goes to a charnel ground in order to feed hungry
beings with his body. At the charnel ground, he has his eye plucked out
repeatedly by an inquisitive bird, and is ultimately killed when his body
is torn to pieces by a flock of hungry birds. In the fourth episode, the
same individual is reborn as a brahmin's son named Brahmaprabha, who
gives his body as food to a starving tigress about to devour her own
cubs. Finally, at the end of the story, the Buddha reveals that all four
characters were previous births of himself.
6
The Rupavatf Avadana thus involves three separate episodes of bodily
self-sacrifice and is full of rich associations and invocations of other
such tales. The name of the merchant's son Candraprabha, for example,
6. In the Divyiivadiina version (COWELL and NEIL 1886: 469-481), the episodes
may be divided up as follows: Riipavati (470.29-474.6), Riipavata (474.7-13),
Candraprabha (474.13-476.20), and Brahmaprabha (476.21-479.16). In the
Avadiinakalpalatii version (V AIDYA 1959a: 2, 316-319), where the stories are the
same but the names of the characters differ, the episodes may be divided up as
follows: RukmavatI (vv. 6-16), Rukmavan (vv. 17-19), Sattvavara (vv. 20-27),
and Satyavrata (vv. 28-49). Finally, the version found in Haribharta's Jiitakamiilii
(HAHN 1992: 51-57) includes only the fIrst two episodes: RiipyavatI (51-56) and
Riipyavata (56-57).
nABS 23.1 106
recalls the prominent Buddhist story of King Candraprabha, who gives
away his head to a greedy brahmin} But whereas King Candraprabha
gives away his head, this Candraprabha gives gifts more reminiscent of
the famous deeds of King Sibi, having his eye plucked out and using his
body to feed hungry birds.
8
Likewise, the episode involving the brah-
min's son Brahmaprabha, of course, constitutes another version of the
famous story of the Tigress.
9
It is not altogether surprising that the
Tigress story has attached itself to the story of Rupavati, since the two
stories are obviously parallel - one invoiving a woman who sacrifices
herself to save another woman and her child and the other involving a
man who sacrifices himself to save a starving tigress and her cubs.
Finally, it is also interesting to observe that the four episodes of the
Rupiivatf Avadiina involve a woman, a a vaiya, and a brah-
min, as if wishing to cover a full range of social positions. This rich
complexity makes the Rupiivatf A vadiina especially interesting, although
here I will be focusing primarily on the episode directly involving
Riipavati, which is the longest of the four episodes and the one that lends
its name to the whole story.
7. This story appears,for example, as Chapter 22 of the Divyiivadiina (ed. COWELL
and NEn. 1886: 314-328) and as Chapter 23 of the Tibetan mdo mdzangs blun
(Sutra o/the Wise and the Foolish) (English translation of the Mongolian version
in FRYE 1981: 105-114). For further citations, see GREY 1990: 180, s.v.
Candraprabha. .
8. Two famous episodes of bodily self-sacrifice are associated with the name of
King 8ibi. In one prominent story, King 8ibi gouges out his own eyes and gives
the!ll to a blind, old beggar; this story is found, for example, in the Pili Jiitaka
(No. 499; ed. FAUSBOLL 1875-1897: 4,401-412; trans. COWELL 1895-1913: 4,
250-256), in the Cariyiipi!aka (No.8; ed. JAYAWICKRAMA 1974: 2, 5-7; trans.
HORNER 1975: 2,7-8), in Arya Sura's Jiitakamiilii (No.2; ed. VAIDYA 1959b:
7-15; trans. KHOROCHE 1989: 10-17), and in the Avadiinasataka (No. 34; ed.
SPEYER 1902-1909: 1, 182-186; trans. FEER 1891: 138-142). In another famous
episode, King Sibi sacrifices his flesh to ransom a captured pigeon from a hungry
falcon; this story is found, for example, in Sutriilal']'lkiira (No. 64;
Chinese version translated into French in HUBER 1908: 330-341). For further
citations, see GREY 1990: 137, s.v. Sivi, and 227, s.v. Sarvrup.dada.
9. This story appears, for example, in Arya Sura's Jiitakamiilii (No.1; ed. V AIDYA
1959b: 1-6; trans. KHOROCHE 1989: 5-9) and in the Mahayana Suvartza-
bhiisottama Sutra (Ch. 18; ed. NOBEL 1937: 201-240; trans. EMMERICK 1970:
85-97). For further citations, see GREY 1990: 248, s.v. VyaghrI or Mahasattva;
see also FEER 1899.
OHNUMA 107
The story of Rllpavati opens in the Northern Country, in the capital
city of Utpalavatf. Though usually prosperous and flourishing, at the
time of the story, Utpalavatl is afflicted by "a famine, a dearth, a
scarcity of food," so bad that it is "difficult to survive in the cramps and
convulsions [of hunger]."1o In this setting, the charming woman
Rllpavatl (whose name denotes physical beauty) goes for a leisurely walk
and encounters a woman in another house who has just given birth to a
beautiful baby boy. But due to the famine and the difficulty of giving
birth, the woman is now "emaciated and seized by hunger, with savage
thoughts in her mind ... intending to devour the flesh of her own son."11
Alarmed, Rllpavati first tries to persuade the woman to eat something
else: "But, Sister, is there anything [else] in the house - food or drink or
something to eat or something to taste or something to sip? That which
we call a son is difficult to obtain in this world."12 When the woman
replies that she has nothing else to eat - adding that "life, [too], is diffi-
cult to hang onto in this world"13 - Rllpavatl tries a different tack,
telling the woman to wait while she goes back to her own house to fetch
food. The starving woman, however, is too far gone: " ... My belly has
wasted away, the earth seems to split open [before me], my heart IS on
fire, and the world seems dark to me. No sooner will you go out from
this doorway than my vital breaths will rise [out of me]."14 Rllpavatl is
now faced with a genuine moral dilemma: "If I take her son and go, this
woman, emaciated and seized by hunger, will die. But if I leave .her son
[here] and go, surely she will eat him. So how can I save both of their
lives?,,15
10. . .. abhild durjfval!l durlabhapiTy;lal!l na sukaram apatiine pra-
graha[le yiipayitum I (COWELL and NEIL 1886: 471.3-4).
11. ... ... icchati ca sviini putramiil!lsiini I
(COWELL and NEIL 1886: 471.11-12).
12. tena bhagini niveSane kil!lcid sal!lvidyate 'nnaT{! vii pii[lal!l vii bhojanal!l vii
sviidanfyal!l vii lehyal!l vii / durlabhaJ:t putrasabdo lokasya I (COWELL and NEIL
1886: 471.15-17).
13 .... durlabhal!ljfvital!llokasya I (COWELL and NEIL 1886: 471.19).
14 .... me lupyati prthivf me sphu!ati hrdayal!l me dhilmiiyati diso me na
pratibhiinti / na tiivat tval!l dviirasiiliiyii nirgatii yiivan me viiyava
/ (COWELL and NEIL 1886: 471.22-24).
15. yadi diirakal!l grhftvii strf kiilal!l I atha
diirakam apahiiya yiisyiimi niyatal!l diirakal!l I yathii kathaT{!
punar mama kurvantyii dvayor jfvitaliibhaJ:t syiit I (COWELL and NEIL 1886:
471.25-472.1).
HABS 23.1 108
It is this situation, of course, that sets the stage for RilpavatI's bodily
gift, and here we might pause to note the gradual manner in which the
situation builds. In stark contrast to many other tales of bodily self-
sacrifice, RilpavatI does not set out with any intention to give away her
body and completely lacks the martial swaggering and bravado that the
male bodhisattva so often exhibits. Unlike a royal hero such as King
Sibi, RilpavatI is not engaging on a heroic mission of generosity,
deterniined to give away her body because she has run out of other gifts
to give, or determined to fulfill the perfection of generosity. She is more
like the hare (in all versions of the hare story),!6 who is s.imply
confronted with a pathetic situation that arouses her compassion and
eventually results in a bodily gift. Unlike even the hare, however,
RilpavatI first attempts to enact a number of other possible solutions to
the problem, asking the woman if there might be food in the house and
offering to fetch food for her if she will only wait for RilpavatI's return.
It is only the starving woman's persistent refusals that place RilpavatI in
the thorny dilemma that eventually spurs her gift. The gift of RilpavatI' s
body is thus depicted as something of a last resort.
When RilpavatI does hit upon the idea of giving away her body, her
reasoning is interesting and unique among the stories of bodily sacrifice
I have encountered:!?
It occurred to her: "Even when one's intentions are blameless, many miseries are
experienced in sal'{lsiira over and over again - in the hells, among the animals, in
the world of Yama, and in the world of men. The cutting off of the hands, of the
feet, of the ears, of the nose, of both the ears and the nose, of the major and minor
limbs, and many other similar types of misery are experienced. What good am I
to gain from that, when I might [instead] generate power, strength, and energy
within myself, satisfy this woman with my own flesh and blood, and [thus] set
free her son?"
16. The familiar story of the hare is found, for example, in the Pali Jiitaka (No. 316;
ed. FAUSBOLL 1875-1897: 3, 51-56; trans. COWELL 1895-1913: 3, 34-37), in the
Cariyiipi!aka (No. 1.10; ed. JAYAWICKRAMA 1974: 2, 12-13; trans. HORNER
1975: 2, 14-16), and in Arya Sura's Jiitakamiilii (No.6; ed. V AIDYA 1959b: 30-
35; trans. KHOROCHE 1989: 32-38). For further citations, see GREY 1990: 129,
s.v. Sasa, and 228, s.v. Sasaka.
17. tasyii etad abhavat / anapariidhyasayavati sal'{lsiire bahiini dul;.khiiny anu- .
bhiitiiny asakrn asakrt asakrd yamaloke 'sakrd
hastacchediil;. piidacchediil;. kan:zacchediil;. niisiicchediis karl)aniisiicchedii
a/igapratya/igacchediis tathiinyiini vividhiini bahiini dul;.khiiny anubhiitiini / ko
mahii teniirtho 'nupriipto yadiiham iitmanal;. sthiimal'{l ca balal'{l ca vfryal'{l ca
sal'{ljanayitvii imiil'{l striyal'{l svena rudhirelJa miil'{lsena sal'{ltarpya imal'{l
diirakal'{l parimocayeyam / (COWELL and NEIL 1886: 472.1-8).
OHNUMA 109
Thus, Rupavati is led to the decision to sacrifice her body by considering
the "many miseries ... experienced in sal'{tsara over and over again,"
specifically the miseries of the body. But the strangeness and uniqueness
of Rupavatl's line of reasoning can be illuminated by briefly comparing
it to similar passages found in other stories of bodily self-sacrifice. In
many such stories, it is quite common for the bodhisattva's decision to
give away his body to grow out of a consideration of the body's inherent
worthlessness, impurity, and inevitable suffering. A bodhisattva named
Sattvavara, for example, thinks to himself: "The body is worthless and
repulsive, attended by misfortune and wasting away in an instant. [Only]
when it gives the slightest benefit to others does it attain [any] worth in
sal'{tsara."18 Similarly, another bodhisattva, upon deciding to give up his
body, thinks to himself: "Now at last, this vessel of countless diseases,
this refuge of every kind of trouble resulting from its perpetual suffer-
ing, this multitude of evils called the body will [finally] be put to use in
acting for the benefit of others."19 And a third bodhisattva muses to
himself: "This body is devoid of individual existence. It is insubstantial
and breaks apart. It is miserable, ungrateful, and always impure. He who
would not rejoice upon its being useful to another is a foo1."20 Thus,
many bodhisattvas reason their way to the act of bodily self-sacrifice by
considering the body's inherent worthlessness.
What is striking in Rupavatl's line of thought, however, is that rather
than invoking the inherent worthlessness of the body, its impermanence,
or its propensity to decay, here Rupavati invokes the suffering inflicted
upon the body by others. Instead of imagining a body that naturally
succumbs to the forces of old age, death, and disease, here RupavatI
conjures up the picture of a body that has been hacked up, mutilated,
18. slipliyo 'yaT[l I paropakliraldena yliti saT[lsli-
ratlim // (Avadiinakalpalatli No. 51, v. 25; V AIDYA 1959a:317). This appears in
the version of Riipavatr s story found in s Avadlinakalpalatli, but not
in connection with RiipavatI. The quote is spoken by the merchant youth
Sattvavara as a hungry bird is plucking out his eyes.
19. cirasya tlivad bahurogabhlijanaT[l sadlituratvlid I sarfra-
saT[ljfio 'yam parlirthakrtye viniyogam /1 (Jatakamlilli
No. 30, v. 17; V AIDYA 1959b: 211). This verse is spoken by an elephant imme-
diately prior to sacrificing his body as food for hungry travelers.
20. nirlitmake bhedini slirahfne krtaghne satatasucau ca / dehe
parasmliyupayujyamline na prftimlin yo na // (Jlitakamlilli No.1,
v. 22; VAIDYA 1959b: 4). This verse is spoken by a brahmin immediately prior to
sacrificing his body as food to a hungry tigress.
nABS 23.1 110
and denuded of its various extremities - particularly the hands, feet,
ears, and nose. The mention of these specific body-parts is, perhaps,
significant. In her discussion of the mutilated female bodies so often
encountered in Indian Buddhist narrative literature, Liz WILSON notes:
21
The display of disfigured female forms [often] exhibits the symbolic logic of
corporal punishment Michel Foucault describes in Discipline and Punish ... [in
which] the nature of the crime is iconically inscribed on the body of the crimi-
nal .... The use of earrings and nose-rings and the application of henna and
cosmetic pastes to the hands, feet, and breasts were conventions used by Indian
women of the period to adorn and eroticize the body. Thus amputation of the
ears, nose,. hands, feet, and breasts of adulterous women (as specified in Indian
law books) mortifies the erotic body, punishing and displaying the nature of the
crime at the same time.
The mutilation of hands, feet, ears, and nose as a punishment meant
specifically for women who had committed sexual transgressions is thus
attested in Indian law books and occasionally depicted in Buddhist litera-
ture. Perhaps the most famous and oft-cited example is the episode of
the Aokavadana in which a prostitute named Vasavadatta has her hands,
feet, ears, and nose cut off after having one lover killed in favor of
another.
22
The mutilation of those bodily extremities most commonly
adorned and decorated by beautiful women thus serves as a marker for a
woman's sexual crimes.
23
Thus, Rupavatl's attribution of the "miseries" of the body to harmful
infliction by others, and her specific mention of the mutilation of hands,
feet, ears, and nose, perhaps serve to suggest that Rupavatl gives away
her body out of fear of the future sufferings inevitably (perhaps
21. WILSON 1995: 79.
22. The episode is translated in STRONG 1983: 179-184. For some insightful discus-
sions of this episode, see STRONG 1992: 76-85, WILSON 1995: 79-81, and
WILSON 1996: 95-105.
23. The same does not tend to be true in the case of men who have committed sexual
transgressions. As WILSON observes, Indian legal discourse tends to focus on
the genitalia "as the natural site of punitive marking" for sexual crimes committed
by men. The punishments for female sexual transgression, however, are less
predictable: ''The bodies of the female transgressors are punished in a variety of
places ... there is virtually no end to the number of female body parts that may,
according to Indic legal discourse, legitimately be inscribed with punitive marks.
Since women have no external organs of reproduction indicative of sexual
arousal comparable to male genitals, it follows that virtually the entire female
body is apt to be regarded erotically and subject to punitive measures ... " (WILSON
1995: 79-80).
. OHNUMA.. 111
unfairly) undergone by women's bodies, "even when on e's . t .
" m entlOns .
are blameless. Although I would not want to over-emphasize the extent
. to which gender plays a role in Rupavati's reasoning, I would, at least
maintain that for anyone who has read a large number of these stories'
RupavatI's thoughts and her tone of hurtful resignation do stand out
unusual and somewhat puzzling.
Following her decision to give away her body, Rupavati then asks the
starving woman for a weapon and proceeds to cut off her breasts and
feed the starving woman her own flesh and blood. Once the woman has
eaten enough to calm her murderous impulses, Rupavati tells her:24
Sister, be informed that I have purchased your son with my own flesh and blood.
I am leaving him with you in trust. By no means may you eat your son while I go
back to my house to bring you some food.
Once again, this seemingly innocuous detail of the story is a startling
occurrence when read against the context of other tales of bodily self-
sacrifice involving the feeding of hungry beings. First of all, RupavatI's
flesh and blood are not intended to satisfy the woman completely, or
even to constitute a real meal; instead, they constitute a very temporary
measure, meant to tide the woman over until Rupavati can fetch some
more appropriate food. This, in itself, is unusual, since most tales of
bodily self-sacrifice involving the feeding of hungry beings highlight the
idea that the donor's flesh and blood are the only proper or available
food for the recipient and are intended to satiate the recipient com-
pletely. In fact, I have never encountered another story of bodily sacri-
fice in which the bodhisattva first offers up his flesh and then goes off to
get regular food.
Even more unusual, however, is the fact that RupavatI's gift of her
breasts is not a true "gift" at all. Through a clever stratagem, Rupavati
uses her flesh to "purchase" the woman's son; in exchange for her flesh
and blood, she gains exclusive control over the boy, such that his mother
only holds him "in trust" and cannot rightfully eat him. The idea of
"exchange" implicated in this particular bodily gift is completely foreign
- and, I would contend, would be completely repugnant - to a male
bodhisattva engaging in a similar deed. Male bodhisattvas - especially
24. yat khalu bagini janfya ayal!l darako maya svakena mal!lsarudhirel)a krftaJ:t sa
'hal!l tava anuprayacchlimi ma bhayo darakal!l yavad
ahal!l niveanal!l gatva tavarthliya bhojanam I (COWELL and NEIL
1886: 472.14-17).
JIABS 23.1 112
the heroic kings and princes we so often encounter in stories of bodily
self-sacrifice - consistently espouse and embody a of
unrequited and one-sided liberality that eschews and is repulsed by any
hint of reciprocal exchange.
25
In order for the sacrifice of one's body to
constitute a true manifestation of the virtue of generosity (dana), it must
be performed altruistically, with no expectation or hope of reward. In
this sense, Riipavatl's "purchase" of the baby by means of her flesh is
the very opposite of the freely-given gift and distinguishes her strategy
significantly from the sentiments expressed by male heroes.
Thus far, I have noted several details of Riipavatl's story that distin-
guish her gift from that of the standard male bodhisattva hero: the
happenstance manner in which the gift comes about, the attempt to enact
other solutions to the problem before resorting to the bodily gift, .
Riipavatl's reasoning and tone of resignation in deciding to give the gift,
and the implication that the gift is really a transaction or exchange. It is
also interesting to note the elements that are absent: The gift is not
preceded by any vow on the part of Riipavatl, nor is it followed by any
divine praise, earth-shaking, or shower of heavenly flowers - both
common elements in stories of bodily sacrifice involving males.
26
I
would suggest, then, that the development of Riipavatl's story up to this
point reflects a certain pragmatism, prosaic quality, and lack of willful
intention not found in the stories of male bodhisattvas. These differences
are admittedly subtle, however, and for the most part, Riipavatl's story
does conform closely to the standard narrative set-up of the bodhi-
sattva's bodily sacrifice: a virtuous person, an encounter with someone
less fortunate who either demands or could make use of a gift of the
body, donor's decision to make the gift, and the gift itself. It is in
the remainder of Riipavatl's story that we see a more explicit discourse
on gender emerging. Before continuing with the story, however, let me
25. On this k,l'atriya-ethic, see TRAUTMANN 1981: 282-285 and HARA 1974. It is
true that the bodhisattva who gives away his body often implicitly desires some-
thing in return (such as Buddhahood, a particular kind of body, or a better
rebirth). These "ulterior motives" usually remain implicit, however, or they are
voiced only in very specific contexts (such as an Act of Truth); in general terms,
they remain cloaked by an overlying rhetoric of complete selflessness, generosity,
and no expectation of reward. See OHNUMA 1997, esp. 77-84, Ch. 3, and 171-
188.
26. On the thoroughly conventional nature of these elements, see OHNUMA 1997: 77-
84 and 99-104.
OHNUMA 113
pause to consider one of the subtexts of the story implicit in its choice of
characters.
ADiscourse on Motherhood
It is interesting to note that the object of RiipavatI's compassion is an-
other woman and the woman's newly born child. This situation might
suggest that RiipavatI's gift derives as much from her female identifica-
tion with another woman and her motherly instincts toward the woman's
child as from the abstract virtue of generosity. Indeed, I would maintain
that the decision to depict a mother and her baby son as the objects of
. RiipavatI's compassion is not arbitrary, but has been made in a very
deliberate manner.
This initial situation, in fact, seems to set up a kind of subtext con-
cerned with motherhood, and contrasting Riipavati and the starving
woman as suitable and non-suitable mothers to the baby boy. For
example, while the usual gift for starving beings is generalized "flesh
and blood," here Riipavati resolves to save the starving woman and her
son specifically by feeding the woman her breasts. This appears to me to
be an obvious evocation of the idea of breastfeeding, although exactly
who is being breastfed is open to several different interpretations. On the
one hand, by feeding the other woman her breasts, perhaps Riipavatl is
literally "breastfeeding" her. On the other hand, I think it is also possible
to suggest that the starving woman is merely a conduit through which
the flesh of RiipavatI's breasts will eventually end up in the baby boy, as
if Riipavati herself were breastfeeding him and thus constituted his "true
mother." The latter interpretation - that Riipavatl constitutes the boy's
"true mother" - is supported by several other details: Riipavatl and the
baby physically look alike, for both are described in exactly the same
terms as "pleasing, attractive, and beautiful, endowed with an excellent,
bright complexion"27 - a description that sharply contrasts with the
appearance of the starving woman herself. Furthermore, at the very end
of the story, Riipavatl is identified as a past life of the Buddha, whereas
the starving woman's son is identified as a past life of the Buddha's son
Rahula (the starving woman herself being identified as the past life of an
anonymous young woman named Candraprabha). ltitakas and avadanas,
27. RiipavatI is abhirupii darsanfyii priisiidikii samanvii-
gatii; the baby boy is abhirupal'{! darsanfyal'{! priisiidikal'{!
tayii samanviigatam (COWELL and NEIL 1886: 471.5-6 and 471.10-11).
JIABS 23.1 114
of course, frequently depict genetic or social relationships in "stories of
the past" as direct precursors to genetic or social relationships in "stories
of the present" - which would further suggest that Rl1pavatl, in some
sense, constitutes the boy's "true mother." Within this story's implicit
discourse on motherhood, then; the "good mother" (represented by
Rl1pavatI) is one who gives her body to the child, whereas the "bad
mother" (represented by the starving woman) is one whose love for her
own body supersedes her love for her child,
Let me pause to observe that the same discourse on motherhood and
contrast of "good" and "bad" mothers also occurs, in a slightly different
form, in the SuvarlJabhasottama Satra's version of the Tigress story.28
As I have already noted, the tigress story is largely parallel to the story
of Rl1pavatI, except that it involves a male hero in contrast to a female
hero. Because the hero of the story is male, of course, it is unlikely that
he should explicitly represent a "good mother" in contrast to the "bad
mother" represented by the tigress. In this particular version of the
tigress story, however, I would argue that the role of the "good mother"
is here displaced from the male hero onto his own mother, who plays a
very prominent role in the tale.
The hero in this version is Prince Mahasattva, who goes out into the
forest with his two brothers, encounters a starving tigress, evades his
brothers, and then sacrifices his body to the tigress - falling down before
her, cutting his throat open with a bamboo stick, and allowing the tigress
to drink his blood and then devour him. Just as this momentous deed is
occurring, Prince Mahasattva's own mother, the queen, has an ominous
dream involving several symbolic elements, including the wrenching out
of her teeth and the cutting off of her breasts; upon waking, she further
complains to the king: "Not long ago, milk was released from both of
the nipples on my breasts. My body is afflicted as if it were being split
apart by needles, and my heart is bursting open."29 The pricking of the
queen's body by needles, the flow of milk from her breasts, and the
splitting open of her heart seem to constitute an exact reflection of
Prince Mahasattva's deed of cutting his throat with a bamboo stick,
flowing with blood, and then being devoured, suggesting an identity
28. Vyiighrfparivarta, Ch. 18 of Suvarl}abhiisottama Sutra (ed. in NOBEL 1937:
201-240; trans. in EMMERICK 1970: 85-97).
29. ubhiibhyillJl stanamukhiibhYiilJl k ~ f r a l J l me pramuktam acirel}a I sucfbhir
bhidyamilnam iva me 'ligalJl pft!yati sphu!ati mama hrdayalJl ca II (NOBEL
1937: 229.1-2).
OHNUMA 115
between Prince Mahasattva and his mother, as if the queen herself were
making a gift (of blood/breastmilk) to the tigress and her cubs. At the
same time, of course, the cutting off of the breasts is reminiscent of
RupavatI's gift, and the production of milk from the nipples evokes the
breastfeeding that is characteristic of the "good" mother as opposed to
the "bad." In this story, then, I would argue that the same discourse on
motherhood that I discerned in the Rilpilvatf A vadilna and that contrasts
the good mother's gift of her body to her child with the bad mother's
willingness to eat her own child in order to save herself is here repro-
duced in the figures of the queen and the tigress.
3D
What is the meaning of this implicit discourse on motherhood? First of
all, the "good mother," as depicted in these tales, conforms to the
general, pan-Indian idealization of motherhood and its exaltation of the
mother's self-sacrificing love, whereas the "bad mother" who ruthlessly
devours her own offspring is also a standard Indian trope (exemplified,
for example, by the Hindu goddess Kali or the Buddhist goddess Harm).
However, the imagery of good and bad mothers is also used here, I
would argue, to illustrate a specifically Buddhist (and non-gendered)
contrast between selflessness and attachment-to-self. Whereas RupavatI
as the "good mother" who willingly gives away her body is representa-
tive of the virtues of extreme selflessness, the starving woman as the
"bad mother" who loves herself more than her child is explicitly invoked
as a paradigmatic example or extreme case of the evils brought about by
attachment-to-self. In fact, the sight of the "bad mother" ready to eat her
own offspring inspires three different heroes and a narrator to generalize
on the evils of self-love:
30. Interestingly enough, at the end of the story, the queen is identified as a past life
of the Buddha's mother Maya, whereas the tigress is identified as a past life of
the Buddha's aunt and foster-mother (as well as founder of the nun's order)
MahaprajapatI. Would this suggest, perhaps, that a contrast is being drawn
between Maya as the Buddha's "good mother" and MahaprajapatI as the
Buddha's "bad mother"? This would seem to accord well with the pattern
discerned by several scholars in which Maya is idealized as the consummate
woman and mother, whereas MahaprajapatI is treated in an ambivalent - some-
times quite negative - manner. See, for example, the comments on Maya in PAUL
1985: 63-64, and the comments on MahaprajapatI in FALK 1980: 219-220.
JIABS 23.1 116
Alas! How pernicious is the evil of self-love (atmasneha), such that even a
mother seeks to eat her own children! Who would glorify this enemy - self-love
- by which one would engage even in such behavior as this pI
Alas! Out of regard for one's own welfare (svartha), one forgets even the love of
offspringP2
Alas! Because oflove for one's own body (svadehasneha), the mind engages in
evi1!33
Look, indeed, how she shows hatred even for her own child! For the self-love
(atmasneha) of beings does not recognize right and wrongP4
The mother who would devour her own child is thus emblematic- of the
selfishness and attachment-to-self that keep all benighted people within
the realm of saY(lSara. This accords with a general tendency in Buddhist
literature to treat the figure of the mother as a particularly potent
emblem or "extreme case" of various different abstract qualities: In
many Buddhist texts, a mother's love for her only child is taken as the
paradigmatic example of self-sacrificing love, and a mother's grief at
losing her child is taken as the paradigmatic example of the suffering
brought about by attachment;35 similarly, in this case, the mother ready
to eat her own offspring is taken as the paradigmatic example of the
evils brought about by selfishness.
It is interesting to note that in the Visuddhimagga, in the long discus-
sion devoted to meditation on the repulsiveness of food, Buddhaghosa
notes that food should be regarded as a necessary evil for the mainte-
nance of the body, but should be viewed with as much repUlsion and
31. aha atmasnehasya raudrata / yena matapi tanayan ahlirayitum
icchati 1/ atmasneham ayaY[! satru'!l ka vardhayitum arhati / yena kuryat pada-
nyasam api karmasu 1/ (spoken by the bodhisattva in the latakamala's
version of the tigress story; VyaghrfJataka, latakamala No.1, VAIDYA 1959b:
3, vv. 19-20).
32. aha vatasyaJ:z svarthena putrasneho 'pi vismrtaJ:z /I (spoken by the bodhisattva in
the tigress episode of the A vadanakalpalata version of RiipavatI's story;
Rukmavatf Avadana, Avadanakalpalata No. 51, VAIDYA 1959a: 318, v. 37b).
33. aha svadehasnehena matiJ:z pape pravarttate II (spoken by RiipavatI in the
Avadanakalpalata version; Rukmavatr Avadana, Avadanakalpalata No.51,
VAIDYA 1959a: 316, v. 8b).
34. sutam apy aurasaY[! nama iva pasyatam / atmasneha hi sattvanaY[!
dharmadharmau na pasyati II (spoken by the narrator in the version of
Riipavatf's story found in Haribhaga's latakamalli., HAHN 1992: 52, v. 11).
35. For example, in the numerous poems of the Therfgatha dealing with mothers
who join the Sarp.gha out of grief over the death of a child.
OHNUMA: 117
as that with ,:hich lost in a wilderness, would regard
eatmg the flesh of theIr only chIld In order to survive. 36 Thus, just as a
mother eager and willing to devour her own child is used as an image of
extreme attachment to body and self, so also, a parent repulsed and
horrified at the thought of eating her own child is used by Buddhaghosa
as an image of the detachment from body and self that should be culti-
vated by monks and nuns on the Buddhist path. In the figure of
RilpavatI, of course, we go one step further: The bodhisattva carries this
selflessness so far that he actually reverses the image - becoming the
food that feeds the child instead of eating the child himself.
Two Acts of Truth
After feeding the starving woman the flesh and blood from her breast's,
RilpavatI sets out for her own house in order to fetch more food. The
remainder of the story takes place at Rilpavatl's house and involves two
separate Acts of Truth and a sex-change. Let us look at the first Act of
Truth in full:
37
Then RiipavatI approached her own house with her blood gushing and flowing.
RiipavatI's husband saw RiipavatI with her blood gushing and flowing, and
having seen her corning from far away, he said to her: "RiipavatI, who inflicted
such an injury [on you]?"
She told him what had happened in detail. Having told him, she said: "Good
Husband, prepare some food for the woman."
"Good Wife," he answered, "you prepare her food. Meanwhile, I am going to
speak some words of truth: Good Wife, a marvelous deed such as this has never
been seen or heard of anywhere before. By these true words of truth, may both of
your breasts appear as they were before!"
As soon as such an expression of truth had been made, at that very moment
both of her breasts appeared as they had been before.
36. RHYSDAVIDS 1920-1921: 347.
37. atha Riipiivatf strf rudhireIJodgharatii pragharatii yena sval'{t niveSanal'{t tenopa-
sal'{tkriintii / sviimf Riipiivatfl'{t strfl'{t rudhireIJod-
gharatii pragharatii diirata eviigacchantfl'{t dN.tvii ca punii Riipiivatfl'{t etad
avocat / kenedam eval'{triipal'{t Riipiivati viprakiiral'{t krtam / saitiil'{t prakrtil'{t
vistareIJiirocayati sma / iirocayitvaitad avocat / prajiiapayiiryaputra stri-
yii bhaktam / sa iiha / prajiiapayiiryaduhitas tasyii bhaktam api tu satyavacanal'{t
tiivat / satyena satyavacaneniiyal'{t eval'{triipa
iiScaryiidbhuto dharmo na kadiicid dN!O vii sruto vii tena satyena satya-
vacanena ubhau tava stanau yathiipauriiIJau priidurbhavetiim I sahakrte-
niisminn eval'{triipe satyavacane tasyii asminn eva ubhau stanau yathii-
pauriiIJau priidurbhiitau / (COWELL and NEIL 1886: 472.17-29).
JIABS 23.1 118
This episode is unique in a number of ways. In a very large sub-set of
stories of bodily self-sacrifice, the restoration of the body-part given
away by means of an Act of Truth is a thoroughly conventional ele-
ment.
38
Having willingly sacrificed his body with no expectation of
return or reward, the bodhisattva ill these stories very frequently ends up
getting his body back by performing an Act of Truth (which usually
attests to the pure intentions and motivations underlying his initial gift).
However, it is also thoroughly conventional that the donor always
performs his own Act of Truth, based on his own meritorious deed. This
is the only story of bodily sacrifice I have come across, in fact, in which
the Act of Truth restoring the body-part is performed by someone other
than the donor himself. Here, the Act of Truth is appropriated away
from Rupavatl and performed instead by her husband. Moreover, the
forcefulness of this appropriation is indicated by the fact that RupavatI's
husband directly refuses RupavatI's request to prepare food for the
starving woman, ordering his wife to prepare the food instead, while he
performs the Act of Truth.
39
This appropriation of RupavatI's Act of
Truth by her husband, I would contend, must be seen as a reflection of a
social and cultural milieu in which husbands possess and legally speak
for their wives - where wives, in fact, are seen as direct extensions of
the male householder's self, such that RupavatI's husband is almost
restoring his own "body" by means of the Act of Truth. Moreover, this
appropriation strips Rupavati of the full subjectivity she deserves and
places her in a position of dependency on her husband.
40
38. On this convention, see OHNUMA 1997: 57-66.
39. In Haribhatta's version of the story, in contrast, RiipavatI's husband does prepare
the food, but he also performs the Act of Truth. In version, this
entire episode (the first Act of Truth) is eliminated.
40. It is interesting to note how frequently mutilated female bodies are restored by
men, rather than by the women themselves. Just as Riipavatl's breasts are
restored by her husband, so also in the Therfgatha, a nun named Subha who rips
her own eye out in order to stop the sexual advances of a threatening rogue later
has her eye restored passively when she gazes upon the excellent body of the
Buddha (Therfgatha No. 7l, vv. 366-399; ed. OLDENBERG and PISCHEL 1883:
158-162; trans. NORMAN 1971: 38-40; for discussions of this oft-cited story, see
OHNUMA 1997: 214-226, LANG 1986, TRAINOR 1993, and WILSON 1996: 165-
179). Similarly, in the Dhammapada!!hakatha's commentary on verse 53 of the
Dhammapada (English translation in WARREN 1896: 473-474), a woman named
Suppiya cuts the flesh from her thigh and uses it to make a meat broth for a sick
monk in need (as no other meat can be found). Afterwards, the Buddha himself
OHNUMA 119
The same social and cultural milieu that produced this episode did, of
course, also produce many Hindu and Buddhist stories in which women
themselves performed their own Acts of Truth. The peculiar nature of
women's Acts of Truth, however, was noticed already in 1940 by W.
Norman BROWN in his essay on the Act of Truth.
4
! Examining the
collection of Acts of Truth compiled in BURLINGAME's classic 1917
essay on the subject,42 BROWN first surmises that "the basis of the Truth
Act is the singleness with which the performer ... fulfills his personal
duty."43 He then observes that duty in ancient India - particularly in the
Hindu ideology of van;,asramadharma - was relative to one's stage of
life and position in society. Thus: "A corollary of this general proposi-
tion is that the range of occupations which may provide the basis for a
Truth Act is very wide for men, but narrow for women" - generally
being limited to wifehood and prostitution (particularly the former).44
The classic example of a woman's Act of Truth in Indian literature, he
contends, is that performed by the maiden Damayantl in the
Mahabharata when she must choose her beloved suitor Nala as her
husband in a ceremony of "self-choice" (svayaf!lvara), but is confused
because four gods have also disguised themselves in forms identical to
that of Nala:
45
As it is true that Nala is destined to be my husband, as it is true that from the first
moment when I heard his name I took him for my lord, as it is true that I have
instituted this ceremony to win him - by that Truth the gods must reveal him to
me.
Damayanti's Act of Truth, then, is based on her complete physical and
mental chastity prior to marriage, her complete devotion to Nala, and
her future role as an ideal wife. It accords with the traditional duties
incumbent upon Indian women and sets the standard, according to
BROWN, for other Acts of Truth performed by women in Hindu and
Buddhist literature.
In fact, when we examine the forty Acts of Truth compiled by
BURLINGAME, we see that BROWN's assertion is generally correct.
restores Suppiya's body. The passivity of these women stands in marked contrast
to the plethora of male bodhisattvas who restore their own mutilated bodies.
41. BROWN 1940.
42. BURLINGAME 1917.
43. BROWN 1940: 38.
44. BROWN 1940: 39.
45. Mahiibhiirata 3.52-79; quote trans. in BROWN 1940: 40.
JIABS 23.1 120
BURLINGAME's collection includes twenty-five Acts of Truth per-
formed by women. Of these, the largest single group consists of wives
attesting to their love or faithfulness toward their husbands, while
another large group deals in some other way with the women's relation-
ships to husbands, sons, brothers, or other men. Many more are simple
statements of virtue or simple statements of fact, whereas only three of
the twenty-five refer to specific active virtues performed by the women
themselves. Thus, while women are sometimes granted full subjectivity
in performing their own Acts of Truth, these Acts of Truth are generally
based upon women's traditional roles in relation to men:
Perhaps the incidence of Acts of Truth based on virtuous wifehood in
BURLINGAME's collection would have been even greater had he not
focused so heavily on Buddhist Acts of Truth. Though he subtitles his
article "A Hindu Spell and Its Employment as a Psychic Motif in Hindu
Fiction," his collection in fact contains thirty-five Buddhist examples
and only five from the Hindu tradition. In BROWN's opinion (stated in
his second article on the Act of Truth),46 the traditional Hindu Act of
Truth - which he traces as far back as the IJ.g Veda - is usually based on
the traditional societal duties of men and women in particular stations of
life; whereas Acts of Truth based on specific religious virtues - such as
Buddhist Acts of Truth based on the ten perfections, or Jain Acts of
Truth based on sexual continence - represent "specialized Buddhist and
Jain" usages that "should doubtless be viewed as late sectarian develop-
ments."47 Thus, BROWN seems to suggest that both Buddhism and
Jainism appropriated the traditional, particularistic Acts of Truth charac-
teristic of Hinduism and used them to promote universal ethical values
(such as generosity or monastic celibacy). From this perspective, we
might perhaps interpret the Act of Truth performed by RupavatI's
husband as transitional or ambivalent in nature: on the one hand, its
power is based not on RupavatI's traditional, gender-specific role of
devoted wife, but rather, on the Buddhist and non-gendered virtue of
generosity; on the other hand, this substitution of a universalistic ethical
virtue for a particularistic societal duty seems to require that RupavatI be
divested of her rightful role in performing her own Act of Truth, which
is instead performed by her husband.
46. BROWN 1968.
47. BROWN 1968: 176.
OHNUMA 121
The Act of Truth performed by Riipavatl's husband is followed, how-
ever, by a second Act of Truth that makes the story even more intrigu-
ing, and perhaps suggests that Rilpavatl's husband is accorded a less
exalted position than at first seemed apparent, or that his Act of Truth is
preliminary and trivial in nature - though this second Act of Truth is not
devoid of ambivalences of its own.
Following the restoration of Rilpavatl's breasts, the god Sakra
becomes aware of what is occurring down on earth and starts to worry
about where Rilpavatl's extreme virtue might lead her. In a scene that is
thoroughly typical of tales of bodily self-sacrifice,48 he muses to him-
self: 49
The woman RupavatI, who highly values extreme generosity, has made an
extraordinary gift. I fear that the woman RilpavatI might thus cause Sakra to fall
from his palace! Suppose I were to test her?
Taking on the guise of a brahmin, Sakra comes to Riipavatl's house and
begs for food. Their subsequent dialogue leads up to the second Act of
Truth and the climax of the story:50
48. On the conventional nature of Sakra's involvement in such tales, see OHNUMA
1997: 57-66 and 104-120.
49. atityiigo 'tityiigagauravatiiyii Rupiivatyii!; striyii!; k.rta!; I mii haiva sii Rupiivatf
strf ata!; Sakra1J1 bhavaniic cyiivayet yan nv aham enii1J1 mfmii1J1seyam I
(COWELL and NEIL 1886: 473.1-3).
50. satya1J1 te Rupiivati diirakasyiirthiiyobhau stanau parityaktau I siiha I iirya
briihma1:za satyam I sa tiim iiha I eva1J1 te Rupiivati ubhau stanau parityajiimfti
parityajantyii!; parityajya viibhuc cittasya vipratisiira!; / siiha I na me ubhau
stanau parityajantyii abhuc cittasya vipratisiira!; I Sakra iiha I atra ka!;
sraddhiisyati I Rupiivatf iiha I tena hi briihma1:za satyavacana1J1 I yena
satyena brahman satyavacanenobhau stanau parityajiimfti parityajantyii!; pari-
tyajya vii niibhuc cittasyiinyathiitva niibhuc cittasya vipratisiiro 'pi ca brahman
yena satyena mayii diirakasyiirthiiyobhau stanau parityaktau na riijyiirtha1J1 na
bho giirtha1J1 na svargiirtha1J1 na Sakriirtha1J1 na riijfiii1J1 cakravartinii1J1
niinyatriiham anuttarii1J1 samyaksa1J1bodhim abhisa1J1budhyii-
diintiin damayeyam amuktiin mocayeyam aniiSvastiin iisviisayeyam aparinir-
vrtiin parinirviipayeya1J1 tena satyena satyavacanena mama strfndriyam antar-
dhiiya priidurbhavet I tasyiis tasminn eva strfndriyam
antarhita1J1 priidurbhatam I atha khalu Sakro devendras
udagra iittamanii!; pramudita!; prftisaumanasyajiita!; I tata eva rddhyii
vaihiiyasam atyudgamyodiinam udiinayati Rupiivatyii!; strfndriyam antarhita1J1
priidurbhatam I Rupiivatyii!; striya!; Rupiivata!; kumiira iti
sa1J1jfiii utpiiditii I (COWELL and NEIL 1886: 473.14-474.6). My translation omits
the phrases "he said," "she answered," etc.
JIABS 23.1 122
"Is it true, RupavatI, that you sacrificed both of your breasts for the sake of a
young boy?"
"Yes, Noble Brahmin, it is true."
"RupavatI, did your mind feel any regret when you decided to sacrifice, when
you were sacrificing, or when you had sacrificed both of your breasts?"
"No, my mind did not feel any regret when I sacrificed both of my breasts.'"
"But who will believe such a thing?"
"In that case, Brahmin, I will speak some words of truth: Brahmin, when I
decided to sacrifice, when I was sacrificing, and when I had sacrificed both of my
breasts, my mind felt no contrariness and no regret. Rather, Brahmin, I sacrificed
my breasts for the sake of that young boy [alone] - not for the sake of kingship,
not for the sake of wealth, not to go to heaven, not to [become] Sakra, not to
[acquire] the territories of kings or Cakravartins, and not for any other reason
[except this]: When I have awakened to unsurpassed perfect enlightenment, may I
tame those who are untamed, liberate those who are unliberated, console those
who are inconsolable, and bring to complete Nirvana those who have not attained
complete Nirvana. By these true words of truth, may the bodily faculties of a
woman disappear from me, and may I appear with the bodily faculties of a
man!"
At that very moment, her female bodily faculties disappeared, and male bodily
faculties appeared [in their place].
And Sakra, Lord of the Gods, was satisfied, pleased, delighted in mind, happy,
and full of joy and gladness. At that very moment, he rose up into the air by
means of his magic power, and uttered a solemn utterance:
"Rupavatl's female bodily faculties have disappeared, and male bodily faculties
have appeared [in their place]!"
And he gave the woman RupavatI the name Prince Rupavata.
At this point, the story of the woman Rllpavati ends, and the Rilpiivatf
A vadiina proceeds with its three remaining episodes involving Prince
Rllpavata, Candraprabha, and Brahrnaprabha.
Reading the two Acts of Truth together, it seems apparent that
Rllpavati's Act of Truth constitutes the truly significant one, whereas her
husband's is only a preliminary step. It is Rllpavati's Act of Truth that
conforms so closely to the standard pattern characteristic of stories of
bodily self-sacrifice: an encounter with Sakra, an Act of Truth
performed by the donor herself and based on the purity of the donor's
intentions, a statement of the two standard motivations behind the gift
(to benefit the recipient and to attain highest enlightenment), a cliched
statement of the lack of ulterior motives (such as kingship, wealth, or
heaven), and praise by Sakra when the Act of Truth succeeds. All of
these elements are thoroughly conventional in natureS! and characteristic
51. On the conventional nature of these elements, see OHNUMA 1997: 104-115 (for
the encounter with Sakra, the Act of Truth, and Sakra's praise when the Act of
OHNUMA 123
of Buddhist stories of bodily sacrifice. A contrast seems to be drawn,
then, between the husband's trivial Act of Truth - which is brief and
simple in nature, contains no explicit religious vows or sentiments, and
is accompanied by no supernatural occurrences - and the exalted Act of
Truth performed by Riipavatl herself. Whereas her husband merely
wishes to restore his wife's beautiful body (particularly her breasts),
Riipavatl reveals herself to be a true bodhisattva, fulfilling the perfection
of generosity in order to attain unsurpassed, perfect enlightenment.
Nevertheless, there is, of course, something unique and significant
about Riipavatl's Act of Truth that makes it different from what we
normally find, and that is what kind of body Riipavatl herself wishes to
attain by means of the truth-act. Whereas male bodhisattvas generally
use the Act of Truth to restore the body they previously had, or to attain
a better body (such as a divine body, a supernatural body, an immortal
body, or the body of a Buddha),52 Riipavatl, on the other hand, is
Truth succeeds) and 77-84 (for the two standard motivations behind the gift and
the cliched statement of the lack of ulterior motives).
52. Sometimes the male bodhisattva wishes to trade in his physical body for a
"dharma-body" or some other abstract type of body. In one version of the tigress
story, for example, the bodhisattva states: "By abandoning my body, a boil,
impelled by hundreds of existences, full of excrement and urine, as insubstantial
as foam, full of hundreds of worms, driven forward by its acts, I will obtain a
dharma-body, free of grief, free of change, free of [all] attachments [to existence],
pure and stainless, full of hundreds of virtues, fully endowed with virtues such as
meditation and so forth" (tyaktvilhal'{l gaIJtjabhiital'{l bhavasatakalital'{l vitjmiitra-
bharital'{l phenakalpal'{l krmisatabharital'{l kilyal'{l krtanudam I
nirvikilral'{l nirupadhim amalal'{l dhyilnildibhir sal'{lpiirIJal'{l
dharmakilyal'{l gUIJasatabharital'{l prilpsyilmi virajam II [v. 7 of Vyilghrfpari-
varta, Ch. 18 of SuvarIJabhilsottama Siitra, NOBEL 1937: 211]). Similarly,
another bodhisattva remarks: "[By giving away my body,] I will obtain a dharma-
body that cannot be split apart, cut up, or carried away, that is imperishable,
unscarred, and unsurpassed" ( ... mayilpsyate / abhedyam acchedyam ahilryam
avyayal'{l niruttaral'{l dharmasarfral'{l avraIJam /1 [v. 47 of Silrthavilhajiltaka,
Avadilnasilrasamuccaya No.2, HANDURUKANDE 1984: 46]). And a third bodhi-
sattva says: "Those who abandon their bodies in order to save the lives of others
... have an enduring 'body of fame' brought about by the arising of abundant
merit..." (paraprilIJatrilIJe ... sthilyf bhavati prthu-
I [spoken by a male bodhisattva in v. 40a of Rukmavatf
Avadilna, Avadilnakalpalatil No. 51, VAIDYA 1959a: 318]). In other cases, the
male bodhisattva's restored body is a superior version of the physical body he
gave away. For example, in the MaIJiciitjilvadilna, the light emitted by King
Malficuga's crest-jewel doubles in size when it is later restored. Likewise, in
various versions of King Sibi's story, his restored eyes are supernatural and can
JIABS 23.1 124
concerned with the body's sex: she wishes to get rid of her female body
altogether and acquire a normal male body instead. Rather than a transi-
tion from "human" to "divine" or "human" to "Buddha," or even from
"injured" to "healed," Rupavatl's Act of Truth results in a sex-change
from "female" to "male." This would seem to suggest that "female" is to
the imperfect "human" as "male" is to the "supernatural/ divine/
Buddha." In order to understand further the significance of this transfor-
mation, however, let us look at previous scholarship on sexual
transformation in Indian literature, and especially, the sexual transfor-
mation of bodhisattvas.
The Theme of Sexual Transformation
The phenomenon of spontaneous sexual transformation in human beings
is clearly recognized in a wide variety of Hindu and Buddhist texts. In
Hindu literature, it most commonly comes about through various
magical means, such as bathing in an enchanted pool, being cursed or
blessed by a deity, exchanging sex with a y a k ~ a , or taking a magical pill.
As W. Norman BROWN has noted, in all such cases, "a change from
woman to man is always desirable while the reverse is always undesir-
able."53 The means of transformation themselves, however, are depicted
as morally neutral.
Such is not the case in Buddhist literature, where sexual transforma-
tion is often depicted as having some moral significance. For example,
the PiUi Vinaya records the cases of a monk who turned into a woman
and of a nun who turned into a man. Although the Vinaya itself gives no
indication of the reasons for such changes, its commentary observes that
they occ;ur on the basis of powerful good and bad moral deeds - an
opinion shared by several other Piili commentaries. More specifically,
transformation from male to female occurs as a result of a powerful evil
action (such as unfaithfulness to one's wife), whereas transformation
from female to male occurs as a result of the weakening of the inferior
karma that brought about rebirth as a woman, accompanied by a power-
ful good action and/or a strong aspiration to become male.
54
Obviously,
see through walls, rocks, and mountains, and for a hundred yojanas on every
side. Thus, whether or not the bodhisattva requests it, the restored body is
generally greater - in some way - than the body given away.
53. BROWN 1927: 6.
54. All of these points are usefully summarized in BAPAT 1957. The commentaries
discussed are the Samantapilsildikil (commentary on the Vinaya), Ayhasillinf
OHNUMA 125
then, these texts agree upon several basic points: It is better to be a man
than a woman; sex change from male to female is unfortunate, whereas
sex change from female to male is fortunate; and - most importantly,
when contrasted with the Hindu examples - the former is associated with
negative moral deeds and is a sign of karmic backsliding, whereas the
latter is associated with positive moral deeds and is a sign of karmic
progress. We might describe this complex of ideas as one Buddhist
model of sexual transformation.
These references to spontaneous (often unintentional) sexual transfor-
mation in non-Mahayana literature have not received much scholarly
attention, however. More prominently represented - particularly in
scholarship dealing with women and images of the feminine in the
Buddhist tradition - is a group of episodes culled from Mahayana siitras,
all reflecting a variation on the general theme of sexual transformation.
In the pattern generally found within these episodes, a woman (in some
cases just a girl) debates or discourses with various men (including
monks, male bodhisattvas, and the Buddha). The woman is depicted as .
being a very wise bodhisattva, and the statements made by her generally
focus on the standard Mahayana notions of emptiness, the illusory nature
of reality, and the unreality or essencelessness of all dharmas.
Sometimes the woman also vows to attain Buddhahood or to practice the
bodhisattva discipline. Despite her obvious insight and resolve, however,
the woman is then challenged in some way by one of the males, who
expresses doubt about the abilities of women to practice the bodhisattva-
discipline, be advanced bodhisattvas, or attain Buddhahood. In response
to this challenge, she transforms herself into a man (often a young male
novice or monk), either spontaneously or through an Act of Truth.
Several scholars have discussed the meaning and implications of such
episodes. Perhaps the simplest interpretation is that of Yuichi
KAJIYAMA. In an article entitled "Women in Buddhism,"55 he focuses
especially on the traditional dictum that a woman's body bars her from
becoming a Buddha (along with four other states of existence, usually
listed as Brahma, Sakra, Mara, and a Cakravartin). By analyzing the
textual occurrences of the dictum, along with other evidence,
KAJIYAMA concludes that the dictum arose only in the 1st c. B.C.E.,
(commentary on the Dhammasangal}i, first book of the Abhidhamma Pitaka),
and the Siiratthadfpanf (sub-commentary on the Samantapiisiidikii).
55. KArrYAMA 1982.
JIABS 23.1 126
and was largely due to the well-established idea that a m a h a p u r u ~ a is
characterized by thirty-two bodily marks, including the mark of kosopa-
gatavastiguhya, or having the penis encased in a sheath (which logically,
of course, excluded women). He then interprets the theme of sexual
transformation as a strategy used within certain Mahayana sCitras to
refute the dictum by showing that a woman could indeed become a
Buddha or advanced bodhisattva within the present life. However, these
sutras also made a concession to the prevailing view of the m a h a p u r u ~ a
by having the woman first transform herself into a man. Thus, in
KAJIYAMA's view, the change of sex is a practical yet necessary matter,
meant to give the female bodhisattva a male body so that she could
become a Buddha.
KAJIY AMA' s straightforward interpretation of the theme of sexual
transformation was perhaps a result of the fact that he focused primarily
on a famous episode from the Lotus Sutra, in which Siiriputra asserts
that a woman cannot become a Buddha, and a naga-princess responds by
transforming herself first into a male bodhisattva and then into a fully
enlightened (male) Buddha.
56
Both Diana PAUL and Nancy SCHUSTER,
in their discussions of the subject,57 distinguish this Lotus Sutra episode
from other Mahayana episodes of sexual transformation, and interpret it
in the same simple terms as KAJIY AMA: In the polemic of the Lotus
Sutra episode, Hi:nayanist disciples (such as Siiriputra) are depicted as
those who hold to the traditional dictum that a woman could not become
a Buddha, while the Mahayanists put forth a new view that champions
the abilities of women, refutes the traditional dictum, yet ultimately
retains the idea that a male body is a necessary prerequisite to
Buddhahood.
What distinguishes the Lotus Sutra episode from other such episodes,
in the view of PAUL and SCHUSTER, is the fact that it lacks anyempha-
sis on the notions of emptiness, the unreality of dharmas, and the ulti-
mate irrelevance of all distinctions - all of which are prominent philo-
sophical themes in other Mahayana sex-change episodes. In the
SumatidarikapariPTccha, for example, the girl Sumati precedes her
sexual transformation by telling her male challenger that her female
body "cannot be apprehended, for dharmas are neither male nor
56. The Sanskrit version of the passage is translated into English in PAUL 1985: 187-
190; the Chinese version in HURVITZ 1976: 198-201.
57. PAUL 1985: 166-216; SCHUSTER 1981.
OHNUMA 127
female."58 In the Vimaladattiibodhisattvapratibhiinaparivarta, the girl
Vimaladatta transforms herself into an eight-year-old boy, but also
asserts: "Neither with a female body nor with a male body is true
enlightenment attained ... for there is no achieving perfect enlightenment
in any way."59 And in a famous episode from the Vimalakfrtinirdeia
Satra, when Sariputra asks a goddess why she has not changed her
female body, the goddess replies that she has looked for the quality of
"femaleness" for the last twelve years, but has never been able to find it,
for that which is called a woman is like a magical creation.
60
Thus, in all
of these episodes, the woman's sexual transformation into a man is
accompanied by statements asserting the ultimate irrelevance of all
distinctions such as "male" and "female."
These latter episodes have been interpreted in largely similar terms by
PAUL, SCHUSTER, and Rita GROSS61 as using the narrative theme of
sexual transformation to make larger philosophical points from the
perspective of emptiness. In all of the episodes, the woman is obviously
already a highly advanced bodhisattva even before she changes her sex.
She has attained (as several of the episodes
mention), and she understands the nonarising and emptiness of all
dharmas; in fact, it is only because she understands the emptiness of
phenomena that she is able to gain control over them and thus playfully
change her sex in order to startle and enlighten a benighted male. Her
male challenger, on the other hand, is usually a sriivaka and is depicted
as someone who does not truly understand emptiness - someone who
clings to distinctions between categories such as "male" and "female,"
"magic" and "reality." Thus, in these episodes, the man's mistake is not
in adhering to the dictum that a woman could not become a Buddha, but
in adhering to any ultimate distinction between "man" and "woman,"
"Buddha" and "non-Buddha," at all. Likewise, the sexual transformation
of the woman is not primarily depicted as a necessary step or as some-
thing that makes the woman better. Instead, it is a magical display - a
58. SCHUSTER 1981: 31. The episode (part of the Mahiiratnaku!a Sutra) is translated
from Chinese into English in PAUL 1985: 201-211, and summarized in
SCHUSTER 1981: 29-31.
59. SCHUSTER 1981: 35. The episode (part of the Mahiiratnaku!a Sutra) is summa-
rized in SCHUSTER 1981: 31-37.
60. The Chinese version is translated into English in PAUL 1985: 224-232; the
Tibetan version in THURMAN 1976: 58-63.
61. GROSS 1993: 67-73.
JIABS 23.1 128
transformation-body or nirmiiJ}a-kaya - playfully engaged in for the
benefit of the benighted male. As GROSS puts it, "the sex change is a
mockery to slow-witted conservatives, who believe in some"essence of
gender that defines and limits women, not an improvement to the main
character ... [who is] already clearly superior to all the males present
except for the reigning Buddha."62
Despite these scholars' recognition of the rhetoric of emptiness under-
lying these episodes, however, they are ultimately unable to accept it
completely. Most of these episodes still involve a permanent transfor-
mation from female to male, and that leaves all three scholars uncom-
fortable. All of them naturally prefer the episode from the
Vimalaklrtinirde.sa, since the goddess, having made her point by taking
on the male form of Sarlputra, takes her own female form back again.
And all of them compare these episodes with other, more positive texts,
in which a woman is challenged but refuses to change her sex, or a
woman is simply depicted as an advanced bodhisattva or virtual female
Buddha without ever being challenged or having to justify her sex.
Thus, despite the texts' own invocation of the rhetoric of emptiness,
the transformation from female to male still seems to carry some signifi-
cance that must be accounted for. GROSS, PAUL, and SCHUSTER take
different views on this matter. SCHUSTER is the most generous in this
regard, maintaining that because women in ancient India were so closely
associated with a specific traditional role, the abandoning of a female
body was used to symbolize the abandonment of ordinary worldly goals
in favor of the Buddhist goal of perfect enlightenment. Thus, the female
body stood merely for "traditional roles," whereas the male body stood
for an enlightened Buddhist perspective that perceives the emptiness of
all such traditional roles and distinctions - including gender roles and
distinctions. "Despite the maleness of these new bodies," she maintains,
"it seems fair to assume from the context that the transformation signi-
fies the transcendence of ordinary worldly life and the sex distinctions
that are part of it."63 Elsewhere, SCHUSTER also observes that the male
body preferred in such episodes is generally that of a young boy, a
young novice, or a monk - male bodies that have abandoned (or not yet
engaged upon) traditional male roles. In SCHUSTER's formulation, then,
the significance of these bodies' "maleness" is considerably downplayed;
62. GROSS 1993: 7l.
63. SCHUSTER 1981: 55. See also BARNES 1987: 120-121.
OHNUMA 129
in fact, "maleness" almost appears as a symbol for the transcendence of
all gender categories .
. GROSS, on. the other hand, believes more pessimistically that these
episodes ultimately retain the male body as a necessary prerequisite to
Buddhahood - as if a narrative theme involving conventional notions of
gender were overlaid with a more radical critique from the perspective
of emptiness. Her strategy is to artificially separate the two themes and
also hierarchize them, for she argues that the necessity of acquiring a
male body is here trivial and secondary to the emptiness-critique, which
she sees as constituting the primary significance of these episodes. She
states, for example, that the sexual transformation into a man conforms
to "androcentric expectations," but that these expectations "are overcome
by sex-neutral ... modes of perceiving and understanding which
proclaim that, in truth, at a deep level of understanding, male and
female do not really exist."64 Thus, it is the irrelevance of all gender
distinctions that constitutes the primary message of these episodes "at a
deep level of understanding"; nevertheless, GROSS admits, "to some
extent the context remains androcentric."65 GROSS' discussion is full of
such hierarchizing statements which aim to minimize the significance of
the sexual transformation and subordinate it to the emptiness-critique.
In contrast to both SCHUSTER and GROSS, PAUL's interpretation
refuses to explain away or minimize the significance of the sexual trans-
formation. PAUL maintains that, within these episodes, sexual transfor-
mation from "female" to "male" is used to symbolize the transition from
"delusion" to "enlightenment" precisely because of the traditional conno-
tations of each gender which align the "female" with "delusion" and the
"male" with "enlightenment":66
Since the feminine represented the deceptive and destructive temptress or
"daughter of evil," the feminine body represented imperfection, weakness,
ugliness, and impurity. Transformation of sex represented a transition from the
imperfection and immorality of human beings (the female body) to the mental
perfection of Bodhisattvas and Buddhas (the male body). Maleness was an image
for the perfection of the mind. ...
Thus, in PAUL's formulation, the maleness of the bodies these women
acquire is not merely a symbol for the transcendence of all gender, nor
64. GROSS 1993: 73.
65. GROSS 1993: 73.
66. PAUL 1985: 175.
JIABS 23.1 130
is it an archaic, leftover motif from a more conservative time. Instead,
the sexual transformation into a man is significant: and is used deliber-
ately as a symbolic marker for spiritual perfection.
What are we to make of all of this in light of the story of RupavatI? It
is interesting to note that in spite of the fact that Rupavatl's story shares
many elements in cornmon with the Mahayana episodes discussed above,
none of these scholars mentions it, presumably because it comes from
the Divyiivadiina - a "Hmayana" text - and doesn't quite conform to the
general pattern of the other episodes. What is lacking, of course, is any
philosophical invocation of the Mahayana notions of emptiness, the
unreality of dharmas, or the ultimate irrelevance of all conventional
distinctions. Rupavatl's story might therefore be seen as an episode of
sexual transformation devoid of any secondary significance brought
about by association with the emptiness-critique. Rupavatl's change-of-
sex is not the playful, magical transformation of an advanced bodhi-
sattva; rather, like the non-Mahayana examples I alluded to earlier, it
results from a strong aspiration backed up by a powerful moral deed.
Rupavatl does make a distinction between "male" and "female," and she
wants to become a man.
67
Furthermore, when we read her Act of Truth
within the context of the entire story, it is clear that her sexual transfor-
mation is depicted literally as a necessary precursor to Buddhahood. Her
husband's Act of Truth first transforms her from a deformed female into
a normal female - a necessary precursor to Rupavatl's own Act of
Truth, which further transforms her from a normal female into a normal
male. This male body, in turn, seems to be a necessary prerequisite not
merely to her attainment of Buddhahood, but even to her kingship as
Rupavata and her subsequent bodily sacrifices as Candraprabha and
Brahmaprabha. In fact, the parallelism between Rupavatl's gift to the
starving woman and Brahmaprabha's gift to the starving tigress seems to
suggest that she must perform what is essentially the same deed over
67. RupavatI's desire for a male body is, in fact, presaged by the gift itself; out of all
the parts of her body, she chooses to give away her rounded, feminine breasts, as
if she were already shedding her female form. The same type of foreshadowing
of a sex-change occurs in the Lotus Satra episode, where the naga-princess gives
away the jewel on her head immediately prior to her change-of-sex. As PAUL has
noted (1985: 186), naga-princesses were believed to carry a priceless jewel on
their heads which male nagas did not possess. In this sense, the naga-princess'
gift of her jewel is symbolically parallel to RupavatI's gift of her breasts.
OHNUMA 131
again, this time with the body of a man. Change-of-sex here is, to some
extent, a natural and necessary karmic progression.
At the same time, however, RilpavatI's change-of-sex differs from the
non-Mahayana :wodel of sexual transformation discussed earlier because
of the way in which sexual transformation is explicitly linked with the
goal of unsurpassed, perfect enlightenment. What we might borrow
from the scholarship pertaining to the Mahayana episodes, then, is
PAUL's suggestion that transformation from female to male is not
merely a technical and practical matter, but is used symbolically as a
marker for spiritual perfection. In Rilpavau's Act of Truth, the aspira-
tion to attain unsurpassed, perfect enlightenment is accompanied by the
wish to become a man; the latter is symbolic of the former, just as much
as it constitutes its necessary physical precursor.
I would disagree, then, with SCHUSTER's contention that "maleness"
can be read as a symbol for the transcendence of gender categories, as
well as with GROSS' assertion that the sexual transformation is merely
secondary to the more significant emptiness-critique. Rather, like PAUL,
I see the two to be intimately connected: The female body here stands
for worldly human bondage and suffering, while the male body stands
for perfect enlightenment; a transformation from female to male is thus
a potent means of symbolizing the transition from bondage to freedom.
This accords well with the contention of many feminist theorists that
women tend to be associated with the bondage of the body and that
"women function as the body for men," thereby leaving men to inhabit a
pure, disembodied, and transcendent place of authority that pretends to
be gender-neutral (here, the ultimate spiritual authority of the enlight-
ened mind).68 Thus, as I suggested previously, RilpavatI's transition
from "female" to "male" is symbolically parallel to the male bodhisattva
hero's transition from the imperfect "human" to the "divine/ super-
naturallBuddha" - as well as its necessary physical prerequisite - because
of the traditional connotations of "female" and "male" displayed
consistently throughout Buddhist literature.
The Veracity of Women's Words
Finally, I would like to point out one more parallel between the story of
RilpavatI and the Mahayana episodes of sexual transformation, a parallel
that further supports the connotations of "male" and "female" I have
68. See, for example, GROSZ 1994a: 38 and GROSZ 1994b: 14.
JIABS 23.1 l32
discussed above. As we have noted,in all of the Mahayana episodes, the
change-of-sex comes about after the woman is challenged in some way
by a man. Usually, this challenge consists of the man's doubt in the
abilities of the woman. The man's doubt persists even after the woman
has gone to considerable lengths to prove herself. In the Lotus Satra
episode, for example, Sanputra challenges the naga-princess even after
she has made a formal vow to attain Buddhahood. In the Sumatidarika-
parip!cchil episode, Mafijuri Bodhisattva challenges Sumati even after
she has performed two Acts of Truth causing various supernatural
occurrences; Sumati, in fact, precedes her sexual transformation with the
statement that, while dharmas are neither male nor female, nevertheless
"I must remove your doubts."69 It is striking to note here that formal
ritual procedures (such as the vow and the Act of Truth) that would
normally serve as definite markers of spiritual progress and therefore
allay all doubts are, in the cases of these women, still not enough to
convince their male challengers - only the change-of-sex can do that.
Thus, a persistent element of doubt in the veracity of women's words
and deeds - doubt that can only be expiated by change-of-sex into a man
- is characteristic of all these episodes of sexual transformation.
The story of RllpavatI also conforms to this pattern. The god Sakra is
here akin to the male challenger in the Mahayana episodes, for even
after RllpavatI asserts that she felt no regret upon giving away her
breasts, Sakra expresses doubt in the veracity of her words: "But who
will believe such a thing?" It is this possibility of doubt that induces
Rllpavati's Act of Truth: "In that case, Brahmin," she says, "I will speak
some words of truth." Only after RllpavatI proves herself by changing
into a man is Sakra "satisfied, pleased, delighted in mind." His doubt
allayed, he rises up into the air and utters a solemn utterance in praise of
RllpavatI's transformation.
This interpretation of the encounter between RllpavatI and Sakra, in
fact, helps to explain one of the peculiarities of the story's narrative
structure. In many stories of bodily self-sacrifice, the supplicant who
asks for the bodhisattva's body is really the god Sakra in disguise, his
demand for the bodhisattva's body being nothing more than an elaborate
test of the bodhisattva's generosity. The "test by Sakra" motif is thus a
common and conventional element of many stories of bodily self-sacri-
fice. Ordinarily, however, the test by Sakra occasions the bodily gift,
69. SCHUSTER 1981: 30.
OHNUMA 133
and what is tested is the hero's generosity. Only in the case of Rupavati
does the test by Sakra/ollow the bodily gift, rather than occasioning it.
So what does Rupavati's "test" consist of? In fact, the test here is not a
demand for a gift at all, and not a test of generosity, but rather, a
challenge to Rupavati to prove the veracity of her words to those who
remain doubtful - a proof that can only be accomplished by transform-
ing herself into a man. This gives Rupavati's Act of Truth a somewhat
different flavor than those characteristic of male bodhisattva heroes. The
male hero's Act of Truth is concerned largely with himself, aggressively
drawing upon the power of his own moral deed in order to reap his due
rewards. Rupavatl's Act of Truth, on the other hand, is largely directed
toward others; its concern with allaying the doubts of others, in fact,
makes it somewhat akin to the oath of deliverance performed by an
innocent person accused of a crime. Although Rupavati does benefit
from the Act of Truth by acquiring a superior body, she also needs this
male body to excuse her from the possible sin of speaking falsely of her
accomplishments.
Even in the Mahayana episodes of sexual transformation, I would .
argue, despite the high stature of the woman, the stupidity of her male
challenger, and the depiction of the woman's sex-change as an act
undertaken out of compassion for the man, there still remains an
underlying theme involving doubt in the veracity of women's words and
the need to expel such doubt by acquiring the body of a man. Once
again, this underscores the way in which moral qualities are reflected in
the physical form one is endowed with. Just as many scholars have
pointed out the tendency in Buddhist literature to perceive women's
bodies as deceptive and duplicitous,70 so also are women's words
depicted as unreliable and fickle in nature. Proof of their veracity comes
about when it is reflected in the more "truthful" body of a man. What
the theme of sexual transformation perhaps suggests, then, is that falsity
70. Women's bodies - much more so than men's - are described as being foul and
disgusting on the inside while appearing beautiful and pure on the outside. A
woman's beauty is depicted as an external, artificial creation (like a painted
puppet or doll) that relies on clothing, perfume, and ornaments to cover up and
conceal the foul impurity - the "bag of excrement" - that lies underneath and that
constitutes woman's true nature. Thus, the woman's body is perceived as being
deceptive and duplicitous in nature. See, for example, LANG 1986: 71-73,
BLACKSTONE 1998: 69-75, and WILSON 1996: 93-95.
JIABS 23.1 134
and female gender are so closely implicated that one must shed the latter
in order to allay accusations of the former.
Breasts and Breastfeeding in Haribhatta's Version
The intimate connection between specific moral values and the kinds of
physical bodies that materialize and express them can be further high-
lighted by turning our attention to Haribhaga's fascinating version of
Rupavatl's story.?! Haribhaga consistently correlates specific moral
values with their physical embodiments, putting forth several striking
and contrasting images of female bodies, breasts, and breastfeeding,
using these stark images to impress upon the reader the moral messages
of Rupavatl's tale.
The story of Rupavatl begins with a famine afflicting the normally
prosperous city of Utpalavati. While the A vadanakalpalata version of
the story fails to mention the famine at all, and the Divyavadana version
mentions it only briefly, Haribhaga's version dweUs at great length on
the effects of the famine and the way in which it leads to the deteriora-
tion of the city, which is described in both physical and moral terms. In
physical terms, Haribhaga mentions dried up rain, withered fields,
empty store-rooms, emaciated cowherds, and "thin herds of cows, their
ranks thinned by death."72 This physical deterioration of the city is
paralleled by the declining moral quality of the city's inhabitants.
Overcome by starvation and crazed with hunger, they become depressed,
violent, and desperate for food. The correlation of the famine's physical
and moral symptoms is not merely symbolic, as Haribhaga tells us that
the famine itself has been brought about by the country's "diminishing
roots of merit,"?3 which manifest themselves physically in a diminishing
supply of food.
But particularly striking here is Haribhaga's description of the women
inhabiting the city and the effects the famine has upon them in both
physical and moral terms. Physically, the women's bodies - and specifi-
cally, their breasts - become loose and lax, losing their normally
rounded feminine form. In addition to his mention of "extremely thin"
women with "hollow eyes" and "loose bracelets," Haribha!!a also tells us
that "without any food, the heavy breasts of the young women, which
71. For edition and translation information, see notes 1 and 4.
72. (HAHN 1992: 51).
73. (HAHN 1992: 51).
OHNUMA 135
normally resembled shiny water pots with tiny, lovely nipples, now
sagged."74 The women's sagging breasts are also mimicked in the city's
female cows. Haribhaga observes that "when cows have no grass to eat,
they gradually 1;:>ecome weak, and their gait becomes sluggish. Their
udders become lax, and their milk disappears."75
It seems to me that this loosening and depletion of the female form -
and specifically, of the breasts - is used by Haribhaga as a symbolic
marker for the declining morality brought on by the famine. Depleted
and sagging breasts suggest a loss of breastmilk, and thus, of the mother-
love that breastmilk symbolizes, as well as the general altruism and com-
passion that both breastmilk and mother-love stand for within the gender
imagery of Riipavati's story. In fact, Haribhaga follows his description
of loose and saggy female bodies with several startling depictions of the
city's moral decline: As the famine drags on, women start giving stale
food to their children without even caring and watch their husbands
starve without feeling any regret, and a cowherd violently throws down
one of his cows and sinks his teeth into her hindquarters.
76
Thus, as the
moral virtue of the city declines, so also, the women's bodies lose their
feminine form and become more and more lax and saggy.
These themes are intensified when we get to Haribhaga's description
of the starving woman. In physical terms, her normally rounded body
has, again, become loose and lax. Haribhaga notes that "her cheeks,
eyes, belly, and other bodily cavities were sunken and depressed, and her
ribs were clearly visible."77 In consonance with this depleted female
body, the "bad mother" is also morally corrupted - again, in the specific
sense that she has lost all mother-love for her child, refuses to feed the
child, and instead wishes to devour the child for her own sake. Moral
corruption and the loss of mother-love are thus reflected in a hollow,
sunken, and depleted female form; and both are connected to the evils of
self-love, which again, the narrator pauses to condemn: "Look, indeed,
74. vinimagnamanojnacucukiiJ:t suciciimfkarakumbhasarrmibhiiJ:t I ka!hinatvam
anandhasiilJ1 jahuJ:t pramadiiniilJ1 guravaJ:t payodhariiJ:t I I (HAHN 1992: 51, v. 3).
75. paridurbalatiilJ1 kramiid gatiiniim atrr:tiiMratayii sanairgatfniim I adhikalJ1 sithi-
latvam uhaJ:tsu gaviilJ1 payo jagiima II (HAHN 1992: 52, v. 8).
76. See HAHN 1992: 52, vv. 6 and 9. The image of a cowherd actually trying to eat
one of his cows is particularly striking because of the sanctity of the cow in tradi-
tional India and its status as the preeminent symbol of mother-love (viitsalya).
77. abhivyaktaparsukiipaliktim (HAHN
1992: 52).
JIABS 23.1 136
how she shows hatred even for her own child! For the self-love
(iitmasneha) of beings does not recognize right and wrong!"78
Ri.1pavatl, on the other hand, stands in marked contrast to' the other
females in the story. Rupavatl has not declined in morality or in mother-
love; in fact, she spends five long verses gushing over the baby boy and
admiring his bouncing black ringlets, his glittering teeth, and the bud of
his quivering lower lip.1
9
Moreover, as we might by now expect,
Ri.1pavatl's positive maternal feelings are physically reflected in the
description of her breasts. For despite the famine and the lack of food,
Ri.1pavatl's breasts have not become loose or lax; in fact, they. are
compared to "two golden water pots," which is precisely the rounded
female shape that all of the other women are said to have 10st.80 Nor has
Ri.1pavatllost the ability to breastfeed - as the female cows have done -
for at the climactic moment of the story, of course, she slices off her
breasts and very literally "breastfeeds" the other woman.
8l
In short, throughout Haribhana's version of Ri.1pavatl's story, the
moral quality of the characters and of the city as a whole is clearly
inscribed upon the bodies of the women and female animals. A hollow,
sunken, and depleted female form, with breasts that have lost their
78. See note 34 above.
79. See HAHN 1992: 53, vv. 12-16.
80. stanayuga1J'l ... hemakaiasakrti (HAHN 1992: 54, v. 20). Compare verse 3 (note
74 above), in which the other women's breasts no longer resemble "shiny water
pots" (sucicamfkarakumbha).
81. It is also interesting to note that the opposition between RiipavatI as the "good
mother" and the starving woman as the "bad mother" once again finds an
analogue in the animal world. At one point, Riipavatl says to the starving woman
in exasperation: "Even when afflicted with hunger, a mother crow cares for and
nourishes her young, who follow her around with their faces lifted up and their
beaks wide open, longing for food and uttering a thin cry. So how much more
should a virtuous woman do so!"
I savam anugaminam adareIJa
kakf parigatapi satf kim u strf II [HAHN 1992: 53, v. 16]). While the
mother crow who feeds her young is here used as an image of the "good" and
nurturing mother, a more familiar female animal is invoked by RiipavatI as an
image of the "bad" and devouring mother: In the very next verse, Riipavatl
compares the starving woman to "a tigress who devours a baby deer" - thus
calling to mind the "bad mother" of the tigress story (mrgasavam iva vyaghrf
[HAHN 1992: 53, v. 17]). Women are here consistently likened to
female animals, and the opposition of "good" and "bad" mothers and the moral
values they embody is thus replicated in the animal world.
OHNUMA 137
ability to produce milk, are a marker for the loss of mother-love - and
beyond that, moral virtue, compassion, and altruism. On the other hand,
a fully rounded female form, with breasts that both look like water pots
and have the same feeding and nurturing qualities as a water pot, are a
marker for the continuing presence of selflessness, generosity, and com-
passion. Thus, the contrast between selflessness and attachment-to-self is
played out in Rl1pavatI's story not only through the abstract metaphor of
"good" and "bad" motherhood, but also upon the very concrete surface
of the women's (and female animals') bodies. Many theorists, of course,
have written about the body as an inscriptive surface upon which cul-
tural and religious values are inscribed and thus materialized. Many
feminist theorists, moreover, argue that this is especially true of female
bodies: Women, more so than men, are reduced to their bodies and to
their distinctively female-sexed corporeality; therefore, women's bodies
constitute an especially effective surface upon which to materialize the
Buddhist values being discussed within Rl1pavatI's story.
Let me conclude this brief discussion with one final, telling detail of
Haribhaga's version of the story. Once Rl1pavatI has been transformed
into a man and renamed Rl1pavata, he is then consecrated as the new
king of UtpalavatI and ushers in an age of both physical and moral
plenitude. In moral terms, the king is said to be virtuous and to rule the
country through good government, whereas in physical terms, the rain-
clouds give water seasonably and abundantly, natural disasters disappear,
the rice grows without being cultivated, and the trees are always laden
with flowers and fruit. But perhaps the most telling marker of the
golden age ushered in by King Rl1pavata once again has to do with the
city's female animals - for Haribhaga does not neglect to tell us that
"the cows gushed forth such abundant milk, they virtually milked them-
selves. "82
Riipiivatf, the Father?
Despite the straightforward interpretation of female imagery I have
given above, Haribhaga's version, and the story in general, ultimately
resists such a simple formulation. I claimed above that depleted and
sagging breasts suggest a loss of breastmilk and mother-love, and thus
stand as a marker for moral corruption; whereas full and nurturing
breasts suggest an abundance of breastmilk, and thus stand as a marker
82. svayaf!l duduhire 'tanudugdhadhiiriil:z (HAHN 1992: 56).
JIABS 23.1 l38
for the continuing presence of selflessness, generosity, and compassion.
This seems to be a simple opposition between "breastfeeding" and "non-
breastfeeding" women. The starving woman as the "bad mother" has
saggy breasts and refuses to breastfeed her child, whereas Rupavati as
the "good mother" has full breasts and willingly breastfeeds the child.
But exactly how does she "breastfeed" the child? She does not breast-
feed in the passive way that ordinary mothers do, by emitting milk from
her breasts; instead, she "breastfeeds" in a much more active and heroic
manner, by slicing off her breasts and feeding them to the other woman.
Within the Buddhist context, the contrast between these two modes of
breastfeeding could not be more obvious: Whereas ordinary breast-
feeding involves breastmilk leaking and oozing out of the breasts, and
thus calls to mind the way in which women's bodies are generally
depicted in Buddhist literature as a mottled array of open orifices
continuously oozing all manner of vile substances,83 Rupavatl's more
heroic "breastfeeding" is a dramatic instance of the bodhisattva's bodily
self-sacrifice out of compassion for others. Moreover, this "heroic"
mode of breastfeeding actually gets rid of Rupiivatf's breasts - that
which mark her as a woman in the first place - and eventually allows
her to transform herself into a man.
Ultimately, then, the story does not accept a simple opposition
between the breastfeeding "good" mother and the non-breastfeeding
"bad" mother. Ultimately, the story seems to suggest that even the best
mother's breastfeeding is nothing more than a pale reflection of the true
breastfeeding - which is the bodhisattva's heroic self-sacrifice.
Moreover, this true breastfeeding involves the removal of the female
breasts and ultimately transforms its agent into a man.
84
Might this
83. See, for example, LANG 1986, WILSON 1995 and 1996, and BLACKSTONE 1998.
84. The insufficiency of even the most nurturing female breasts to symbolize the
bodhisattva's compassion is strikingly revealed in a verse from Haribhaga's
version of the story. This is how the narrator describes RiipavatI's transformation
from female into male: "And when her two breasts, swollen like the frontal lobes
of an elephant in rut, saw just a few beard-hairs as dark as collyrium powder
appearing on that moon-like face, they immediately disappeared into a manly
chest, as if out of shame" (smasriidgamaTJ1 praviraliifijanaciirlJanflam iivir-
bhavantam avalokya tad iinenendau I payodharayugaTJ1 gajakumbha-
pfnam antardadhe prthuni lajjayeva II [HAHN 1992: 56, v. 36]). Thus,
RiipavatI's breasts, whose rounded shape and nurturing qualities have been
implicitly praised throughout the entire story, now disappear "as if out of shame"
when confronted with the superior qualities of a male body.
OHNUMA 139
perhaps suggest that the "good" mother who is opposed to the "bad"
mother is ... in fact ... a. father?
The suggestion that the true mother is, in fact, the father might be
supported by considering another striking characteristic of the way in
which Rupavatl "breastfeeds" the child. In actual fact, it is the starving
woman, and not the child, to whom Rupavatl feeds the flesh of her
breasts. Nevertheless, I speculated above that several details in the
Divyilvadilna version of the story seem to suggest that Rupavati consti-
tutes the boy's "true mother," and that the starving woman here merely
serves as a conduit by means of which the flesh from Rupavatl's breasts
will eventually end up in the baby boy. Thus, Rupavatl does not feed the
child directly, but only through the conduit of his mother. We might say
that Rupavatl is an "indirect" mother. And an "indirect" mother is ... a
father. 85
In fact, Haribharta's version of the story is, in general, extremely misogynistic.
The story opens with the following verse: "Even as a woman, the bodhisattva cut
the flesh from her own body and gave it away. How much more did he do so as a
man, for a man is superior in goodness and strength and better at achieving the
welfare of others!" (strftve 'pi bodhisattvas chittva ma1J1sa1J1 dadau nijad dehiit I
kim utadhikasattvabale pararthakusale II [HAHN 1992: 51, v. 1]).
After RiipavatI has sacrificed her breasts, the people of the city remark in amaze-
ment: "How your sharp intellect contrasts with your female sex! How this gift of
yours stands in contrast with your delicate form!" (strftva1J1 kveda1J1 buddhir
kva tfkg/a kvaya1J1 tyagal; saukumarya1J1 kva cedam I [HAHN 1992: 55, v. 28a]).
RiipavatI herself appears to share these sentiments, for when she transforms her-
self into a man, she states to Sakra: "0 Brahmin, by means of this truth of mine,
let my sex become male immediately, for manhood is an abode of virtue in this
world!" (etena dvija mama sunrtena sadyal; pU1J1bhiivo jagati gU/}iiSrayas
tathiistu II [HAHN 1992: 55, v.34b]). Finally, at the end of the story, once
RiipavatI has succeeded in transforming herself into a man, he preaches to others
about the benefits of generosity, using his own gift as an example: "Look at the
magnitude of the fruit resulting from generosity! By means of it, I have gotten rid
of my female state right here, in this world, and ... produced the state of a man!"
(danasya paSyata vipakamahattvam etad atraiva me yuvatitam apanfya yena I
udbhiivita1J1 ... ida1J1 naratvam II [HAHN 1992: 57, v. 43]).
85. In November 1998, when I first shared my thoughts on RiipavatI within a public
forum (see OHNUMA 1998a), someone in the audience made this observation
(that RiipavatI is an "indirect" mother and an "indirect" mother is really a father). I
regret that I did not know who the person was, nor did I later get his name. I
hereby thank him for this insightful observation and cite him anonymously. In
thinking about the "true" mother being the father, I have also benefited from
conversations on this topic with Susanne Mrozik.
jIABS 23.1 140
Remember, too, that Rupavatl is a previous life of the Buddha and is
thus closely identified with the Buddha. The Buddha, of course, is the
father of the Smp.gha, but there are also suggestions in Buddhist litera-
ture that this father is also the true mother. Perhaps the most striking
evidence in support of this claimtnay be found in a few verses of the
Gotamf Apadiina (part of the Pali Apadiina collection), which has
recently been translated by Jonathan WALTERS.86 In these verses, the
Buddha's foster-mother Mahapajapatl GotamI compares her physical
nourishment of the baby Buddha through breastmilk with his "spiritual
nourishment" of her by means of the dharma:
87
Well-gone-one, I am your mother;
you're my father, 0 wise one.
Lord, you give the truth's pure pleasure!
Gotama, I'm born from you!
It was I, 0 well-gone-one,
who reared you, flesh and bones (riipa-kiiya).
But by your nurturing was reared
my flawless dharma-body (dhamma-tanu).
I suckled you with mother's milk
which quenched thirst for a moment.
From you I drank the dharma-milk,
perpetually tranquil.
Thus, while she nurtured his physical body, he nurtured her "body of
dharma"; while she fed him physical milk that satiated his thirst for a
moment, he fed her the "milk of dharma" that satiated her thirst forever.
Clearly, the Buddha is here depicted as the true mother next to which all
ordinary human mothers pale in comparison. Likewise, the Buddha's
nurturing ()f beings through the "milk of dharma" is the true breast-
feeding next to which MahapajapatI's breastfeeding seems trivial. Thus,
the Buddha is the true mother - and yet, as Mahapajapatl observes,
"you're my father." The Buddha is the father, and the father constitutes
the "true. mother." And inasmuch as Rupavatl is identified with the
Buddha, perhaps we can say the SaIne of her.
The gender imagery of RupavatI's story is thus neither simple nor
straightforward. At times, it draws a simple opposition between the
"good" mother who feeds her child and the "bad" mother who devours
86. See WALTERS 1995. For an interesting discussion of this apadiina, see also
WALTERS 1994.
87. WALTERS 1995: 121.
OHNUMA 141
her child, signifying the former by means of rounded, milk-filled breasts
and signifying the latter by means of a hollow, depleted, and ambiguous
female form. At other times, however, it seems unsatisfied with this
trope, and forces RiipavatI to move beyond her female gender com-
pletely, suggesting in subtle ways that true motherhood is really father-
hood, the true woman is one who has transformed herself into a man,
and true breastfeeding consists' of Buddhist ethical practices such as the
bodhisattva's self-sacrifice or the Buddha's preaching of the dharma -
practices that are implicitly coded as male. Because the story engages in
both of these strategies simultaneously, it ultimately presents us with a
rich, complex, and ambiguous gender imagery that is capable of being
interpreted in multiple and contradictory ways. Throughout the story,
this gender imagery manifests itself in a diverse and sometimes bizarre
array of bodies - hollow and sunken women; cows whose udders have
gone lax; RiipavatI with perky, water-pot breasts; RiipavatI with bloody,
severed breasts; RiipavatI with new breasts restored by her husband; and
RiipavatI transformed into a man. The complexity of the story's
structure and the embarrassing wealth of its imagery make RiipavatI's
story a fitting miniature image of the complex construction of gender
characteristic of Indian Buddhism as a whole.
JIABS 23.1 142
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BHIKKHU pASADlKA
A Hermeneutical Problem in SN 42, 12 (SN IV, 333)
and AN X, 91 (AN V, 178)* .
Both the Sa'!lyutta and Aliguttara Nikiiya
l
contain a considerable
hermeneutical problem, and it is rather amazing that, to the best of my
knowledge, hitherto no scholar and no translator
2
has pointed it out.
The problem is found in a) the Riisiyasutta of the Giima7}isa'!lyutta and
b) in the section of the Dasaka-Nipiita, Upiisaka- Vagga, treating the
kiimabhogf and being largely identical to the major part of SN 42, 12. In
the endnotes to his German translation of the Riisiyasutfa, HECKER says
that this discourse is a 'precisionisation' of SN 56, 11, viz. the Buddha's
'first sermon' on the two extremes of self-indulgence and mortification
known from the Mahiivagga of the Vinayapi!aka.
3
* I am indebted to Rudolf Knauf of Volkshochschule Kassel who, together with
his students, detected the hermeneutical problem dealt with here.
1. Abbreviated to SN, AN; for all the Pali references, including those to the SN,
AN commentaries, see the PTS editions.
2. The following translations were consulted by me: a) W. GEIGER,
NYANAPONIKA, H. HECKER 1997: Die Reden des Buddha. Gruppierte
Sammlung IV, Herrnschrot: Beyerlein-Steinschulte, p.188; b) Jagadish
KASHYAP, DHARMARAKSHIT 1954: Saf!!yutta-Nikiiy, Diisarii bhiig, Sarnathl
Varanasi: Mahabodhi Sabha, p. 590; c) Anand KAUSAL YA YAN 1969: Ariguttar-
Nikiiy, Caturth bhiig, Calcutta: Mahabodhi Sabha, p.228; d) NYANATILOKA
1984: Die Lehrreden des Buddha aus der Angereihten Sammlung V, Freiburg i.
Br.: Aurum, p. 84; e) Fritz SCHAFER 1995: Der Buddha sprach nicht nur fur
Monche und Nonnen. Die ganze Lehre erstmals nur nach seinen Reden fur
Nichtasketen, Heidelberg-Leimen: W. Kristkeitz, p.206; f) F.L. WOODWARD
1927: The Book of the Kindred Sayings IV, London: PTS, p.237f; g) F.L.
WOODWARD 1936: The Book of the Gradual Sayings V, London: PTS, p. 121.
Thanks are due to Yen. Dr. Tampalawela Dharnmaratana who consulted for me
the Sinhalese translations in: h) Editorial Board and Tripitaka Translation
Committee 1981: Saf!!yuttanikiiya with the Sinhalese Translation N, Colombo:
Buddha J ayanti Series XVI, published under the patronage of the Govt.
of Sri Lanka, p. 598f.; i) Editorial Board ... 1977: Ariguttaranikiiya with the
Sinhalese Translation V, Colombo: Buddha Jayanti Tripitaka Series XXII,
p.320f.
3. Cf. GEIGER et al. 1997, part N, p.191.
Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies
. Volume 23. Number 1.2000
JIABS 23.1 148
The two versions in which the said problem occurs deal with ten types
of 'enjoyers of sense-pleasures':4
the 1st type: a) seeks wealth unlawfully and with violence
b) he does not enjoy.his wealth
c) he does not share his wealth with others and does no
meritorious deeds
the 2nd type: a, c) as with the 1st type
b) he enjoys his wealth
the 3rd type:
the 4th type:
the 5th type:
the 6th type:
the 7th type:
the 8th type:
."i
a) as with the 1st type
b) as with the 2nd type
c) he shares with others and does meritoriousdeeds
a) seeks wealth both lawfully and unlawfully,with
violence and without it
b) he does not enjoy his wealth
c) he does not share ...
a, c) as with the 4th type
b) he enjoys his wealth
a) as with the 4th type
b) as with the 5th type
c) he shares with others and does meritorious deeds
a) seeks wealth lawfully and without violence
b) he does not enjoy his wealth
c) he does not share ...
a, c) as with the 7th type
b) he enjoys his wealth
the 9th type: a) as with the 7th type
b) as with the 8th type
c) he shares with others and does meritorious deeds
The 9th type, nevertheless, makes use of his wealth 'with greed and
longing' and is thus 'blind to his own salvation', whilst
the 10th type (a, b, c as with the 9th) uses his wealth 'without greed
and longing' and therefore is 'alive to his own salvation'.
After the enumeration of these various types of kiimabhogfs the Buddha
is given as making his judgement about their conduct one by one, and
4. Cf. WOODWARD 1927, p. 234ff.; Woodward 1936, p.119ff.
BIDKKHU PASADIKA 149
the words employed by him for doing this are garayha, 'blameworthy',
and pasafTlsa, 'praiseworthy'. In his translation of AN X, 91, in a foot-
note WOODWARD refers to the Rasiyasutta and remarks on the
enumeration of the above ten types as being 'arranged in the same
tedious way, but doubtless held suitable for the comprehension of house-
fathers'. Taking a closer look in particular at the behaviour of the
second type of a kamabhogf being judged by the Buddha, from a
fundamentalist point of view one may have no qualms about the text as
it stands. However, paying attention to it in a common-sense manner,
one cannot, I think, help having serious misgivings. For the sake of
convenience, here W OODW ARD' s translation of the problematic passage
is quoted:
Now, headman, this one who, given to sensual pleasures, seeks wealth by unlaw-
ful means, with violence, is blameworthy in two respects, praiseworthy in one
respect. In what two respects is he blameworthy? Seeking wealth by unlawful
means and by violence, he is first to blame for that. Secondly, in so seeking
wealth he shares it not nor does meritorious deeds, that is the second respect.
And what is the one respect in which he is praiseworthy? In getting ease and
pleasure for himself. In this respect he is praiseworthy.5
Given the comparatively long enumeration of various types of
kamabhogfs, it is somewhat easy to overlook this passage according to
which a kamabhogf who selfishly enjoys bhoga, 'any object of enjoy-
5. Cf. WOODWARD 1927, p. 237f. Comments on SN 42,12 and on AN X, 91 made
in a) WOODWARD: Sarattha-Ppakasinf III, p.108f. and in b) H. Kopp:
Manoratha-puraJy.f V, p.62, yield nothing conducive to a solution of the
hermeneutical problem. As for the fundamentalist point of view, there might be
one possibility - which, however, I do not consider a very convincing one - to
explain away the problem: There is no dearth of instances in the Pili canon where
the Buddha makes use of irony. So also the 'praiseworthy' behaviour of the
second enjoyer of sense-pleasures in particular could be cited as an example of
the Buddha's irony.
Thanks are due to Professor R. Gombrich who kindly offered his comments
on the present paper. According to him, there is good reason to regard the
supposedly 'dubious' passage as an authentic piece of the Buddha's irony. The
very title of the SN discourse already indicates, as he points out, that irony is
likely to be found here: Rasiyo I Rasiyasutta, deriving from rasi, 'heap, mass',
and implying 'someone intent on amassing bhoga (lit.: 'relating to heaps')'. - If
one accepts this interpretation which, as Professor Gombrich says, follows the
general principle of text editing lectio difficilior prior, "it is the more difficult
reading which is likely to be correct," one might be prompted to look on the
Chinese translations of the text in question as attempts to iron out what was felt to
be an issue by means of new versions of the original text.
JIABS 23.1 150
ment', appropriated by unlawful means and with violence, is considered
by the Buddha ptisarrzsa, 'praiseworthy'. This kind of estimation
certainly does credit to a votary of Carvakadarsana. In his main work
JAY A TILLEKE states that the impact of Materialist thinking on the
thought of the PaIi canon is strong and that 'it therefore seems desirable
to study the epistemological doctrines of the Materialists in so far as they
seem to have a bearing on the thought of the Canon.' He also writes,
however, that the theories of karma, rebirth and moral responsibility,
accepted on the ground of the verifiability of their truth, became almost
universally accepted in the post-Buddhistic Indian tradition largely due
to the fact that the Jains and Buddhists accepted them while the
Materialists, repudiating and ridiculing them, 'came under fire' from
these schools with the result that the Carvakas 'gradually faded out of
the Indian philosophical scene' .
6
As for large parts of SN taken for Buddhavacana in a quite literal
sense, Mrs RHYS DAVIDS already asked emphatically: 'Where in these
pages is Gotama?'7 Well-known are also PANDE's attempts at stratifying
the canonical texts of the PaIi Tipi!aka. He also refers to the sutta nos.
10 and 12 of the GamalJisarrzyutta. In respect of the controversy figuring
in the former discourse, he observes that it 'could easily have arisen in
the minds of laymen during the epoch of the second council...' and
regarding the latter, viz. our Rtisiyasutta, he remarks that it is 'long and
straggling, and does not appear an organically unified composition. Its
different parts are but loosely connected.'8 Although one may readily
concede that the latter discourse is 'long and straggling' one could,
nonetheless, also well regard it as an organically unified composition,
the dubious. passage, of course, put aside. Moreover P ANDE presents his
stratification of SN and AN in tabular form, tentatively dividing the
discourses into those belonging to early and late strata and those of
uncertain provenance. The two discourses in SN and AN relevant to the
present discussion are both considered to be of uncertain provenance.
9
6. Cf. K.N. JAYATILLEKE 1963: Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, London:
Allen & Unwin 1963, pp. 69, 376.
7. Cf. C.A.F. RHYS DAVIDS 1922: Kindred Sayings n, London: PTS, p. xiii.
8. Cf. G.c. PANDE 1974: Studies in the Origins of Buddhism, Delhi: MotilaI
Banarsidas, p. 222.
9. Cf. ibid., pp. 229, 246f.
BHIKKHU PASADIKA 151
Fortunately there exists a large body of Sravakayana canonical texts,
albeit preserved as intact Agama collections only in Chinese, containing
many parallels to Pali suttas. Thus also the Riisiyasutta has a parallel to
be found in the Saf!lyuktiigama of the Chinese Tripitaka.1O The Dasaka-
Nipiita section on the kiimabhogf, too, has its corresponding Chinese
versions found in the Madhyamiigama
11
and in the separate Fuyin jing,
in the Discourse on Succumbing to kiima.
12
In the following, looking
into the SA and MA parallels of our Pali suttas might perhaps provide a
clue as to how the above-mentioned hermeneutical problem could be
disposed of.
Like SN 42, 12, the corresponding SA section could be regarded as a
commentary on the Buddha's 'first sermon'. For riisiya the Chinese has
wangding (.:Em) which might rather stand for riijya. The Buddha ex-
plains to Wangding the two extremes because of which one strays from
the Middle Way. He enumerates altogether three types of persons
engrossed in sense-pleasures and three types of those given to torturing
themselves. Since for the present discussion the latter three types are not
relevant, I shall only deal with the former, as with SN where exclusively
the various types of kiimabhogfs have been listed.
a) The first kiimabhogin [seeks wealth] unlawfully and with
violence, but he does not enjoy [his wealth]. Moreover, he neither cares
for his parents nor shares [his wealth] with his brothers, his wife and
children, housemaids, relatives, friends and acquaintances. Furthermore,
he does not support sramar;as and briihmar;as and thus does no merito-
rious deeds in order to be born in a heavenly world.
b) The second kiimabhogin seeks wealth both lawfully and unlawfully
and [partly] with violence and also enjoys it. He cares for his parents
and shares [his wealth] with his brothers ... , but he does not support
ascetics and brahmins so as to be born in a devaloka.
c) The third kiimabhogin seeks wealth lawfully and without violence;
he enjoys it and also shares it with his parents ... and by supporting reli-
gious persons he will eventually be born in a heaven.
10. Cf. TaishO No. 99, p. 228c15-229c2 (abbreviated to SA); substantially the same
version - differing though in style - is found at ibid., No. 100, p.421c24-
422c17.
11. Cf. Taisho No. 26, p. 615a5-616a4; abbreviated to MA.
12. Cf. Taisho No. 65 . Thematically this discourse, whose translation is
about a hundred years older than that of MA, is a close parallel to the Agama
version from which it differs in diction only.
JIABS 23.1 152
After this comparatively short enumeration of only three types of
kiimabhogins, according to sA, the Buddha does not judge their respec-
tive conduct by using the words 'blameworthy' and 'praiseworthy', but
he characterises the three types as being a) inferior ( !If. T, adhara),
b) middling (r:FJ\., madhya) and c) the superior person ('3iJA, pudgala-
Similarly three types of those who torture themselves are
described and subsequently characterised as being 'inferior, middling
and the superior person'. Then, in some detail, the causes - viz. greed,
hatred and delusion - are set forth due to which man fails to follow the
Middle Way and consequently is plunged into suffering and lamentation.
If, on the other hand, one overcomes lobha, and moha and lives a
life of non-violence, this will result in permanent happiness, and in this
very life one will realise Nirval).a before long. Finally the means to put
an end to the mental defilements is briefly mentioned, viz. the Eightfold
Path.
Without making a detailed comparative study of SN 42, 12 and its sA
counterpart, it is sufficiently clear that sA does not contain any passage
that corresponds to the description of the second type of a kiimabhogfin
SN posing, as shown, a hermeneutical difficulty. A comparison between
the two versions suggests that with this particular example - a generali-
sation, all the same, is absolutely unwarrantable - the original Agama
text might have represented an older version than that of the Pali canon.
The Pali text much more clearly betrays the hands of later redactors
13
than the Chinese Agama version: It lacks the traditional opening of a
sutta, whereas sA gives the Buddha's sojourn, viz. on the bank of Pond
Gaggara in Campa District. SN 42, 12 opens rather abruptly and ends
with considerably abridged stock phrases. sA has the full wording of a
traditionalsutra-ending including the statement that Wangding, on
having been enlightened by the Buddha, realises the Truth as a
srotiipanna. On the other hand, the Chinese text is much more straight-
forward than the Pali version without the latter's lengthy description of
the various types of kiimabhogfs and tapassfs, even though both versions
are parallels beyond any doubt. So the conclusion can be drawn that the
smack of Materialist thought in SN 42,12 is certainly due to later edito-
rial interpolation.
As mentioned, AN X, 91, dealing with ten types of kiimabhogfs
tallying with their description in SN, has its corresponding MA version
13. Cf. Mrs RHYs DAVIDS' further remarks at loco cit. - see above n. 7.
BHIKKHU PASADIKA 153
in Chinese. So, unlike the SA text treating only three types of
kiimabhogins, the MA version also deals with ten types, and the question
remains to be answered as to whether the MA text substantially tallies
with AN X, 91. or only numerically.
According to MA:
a) the first type of a kiimabhogin (1Tw.:A) seeks wealth unlawfully and
by means of what is not the Way (yan niisti miirgaft, ;f!lH"@:), but neither
enjoys it nor shares it with his parents, wife and children ... He does not
support religious persons so as to be born among the Dirghayuka gods
thanks to his meritorious deeds.
b) The second type enjoys and shares what he has obtained unlawfully,
but he does not support religious persons.
c) The third type enjoys and shares what he has obtained unlawfully
and also supports religious persons.
d) The fourth type seeks wealth both lawfully and unlawfully, neither
enjoys nor shares it and does not support sramalJas and briihmalJas.
e) The fifth type enjoys and shares what he has obtained both lawfully
and unlawfully, but he does not support.
f) The sixth type, in addition to what the fifth type does, supports reli-
gious persons.
g) The seventh type seeks wealth lawfully and by means of what is the
Way, but he neither enjoys nor shares and does no meritorious deeds in
order to be born in a heaven.
h) The eighth type enjoys and shares what he has obtained lawfully,
but he does not support.
i) The ninth type, in addition to what the eighth type does, supports
religious persons, but he is strongly attached to his wealth, is not aware
of the great misfortune inherent in that kind of attachment and thus is
'blind to his own salvation'.
j) The tenth type, in addition to all the karmic ally wholesome actions
done by the ninth type, is aware of the danger inherent in attachment to
possessions and thus is 'not blind to his own salvation'.
Thereafter, the Buddha characterises the first type as being vile (l1ir,
nihina), the sixth type as being surpassing (11i.1., adhika) and the tenth
type as being foremost (l1iMj, agra), the very first, the greatest, the best,
the uppermost and most excellent.
In many details the MA text agrees with AN X, 91, for instance with
regard to the opening of the sutra or the simile of the various qualities
of milk products employed to illustrate the characterisation of the
nABS 23.1 154
various types of kamabhogins. On the other hand, while the AN version
lacks the traditional sutta-ending, MA. gives both a resume of the whole
discourse in the form of verses and the stock phrases concluding it. What
is significantly different with the MA. text is that not all the ten types of
enjoyers of sense-pleasures are judged, but only three of them in terms
resembling those used in sA., viz. the first, the sixth and the tenth as
being, respectively, the worst, middling and the best type.
This brief survey of the MA. parallel to AN X, 91 confIrms the conclu-
sion drawn above that the trace of Materialist thought found in the given
places of SN and AN is a peculiarity of the Piili tradition and does not
occur as a hermeneutical problem in the Chinese A.gamas.
Addendum
See above n. 2, given with reference to the statement that to the best of my knowledge
no Pili scholar and no translator has pointed out that in the above-mentioned places we
have a hermeneutical problem. The same statement was made earlier in my review of
SCHAFER's book (see n.2, e) in which I briefly mentioned the said problem. After
reading this review which appeared in The Journal of Religious Studies XXIX.2
(Patiala 1988), p. 153-157, SCHAFER informed me that he, in fact, had been aware of
the problematic passage in the given places - and together with him also HECKER (see
n.2, a) - and that he had commented on them in the original press-copy of his
voluminous book. For practical purposes it has been necessary, however, to avoid an
inordinate size of the book so that a substantial part of it - including the author's
comments on the issue - had to be cut and left unpublished. SCHAFER is preparing a
revised edition of his work to be augmented by a footnote from which it can be inferred
that he does not see a hermeneutical problem in the places under discussion: in case of
wealth, procured unlawfully, with violence and neither shared with others nor used for
merit-making, it would still be better (and therefore in a way 'praiseworthy') to enjoy it
oneself and thus - to some extent having obtained satisfaction - hopefully become
more sociable than to let bhoga fall into disuse and rot away. I am much obliged to Dr
F. Schafer for having shared his understanding of the passages discussed above.
OSKAR VON HINUBER
Report on the XIIth Conference of the IABS
1. Report on the Conference
After an unavoidably long interval following the XIth conference held
in Mexico City (24th - 28th October 1994), the very well attended XIIth
conference was held at Lausanne between 23rd and 28th August 1999.
With 260 participants (members of the Organizing Committee and
auditors not included) it was the largest meeting of lABS members ever.
During the conference 57 persons emolled as new members of the lABS.
The conference began on the 23rd (Monday afternoon) with
registration and a get-together party. During the opening session T. J. F.
Tillemans as the local organizer, M. Pascal Bridel, Vice-rector of the
University of Lausanne, and Mme Jacqueline Maurer, Conseiliere
d'Etat, Minister of the Economy of the Canton of Vaud, welcomed the
participants to the congress. The president of the Association, C. Caillat,
delivered her address "Comparing Buddhism and Jainism". Finally,
J. Bronkhorst gave practical advice to the participants.
All contributions were either organized within a panel or a section.
The following scholars each initiated one of the 23 panels:
1. Ch. S. Prebish: Recent Works on Vinaya Studies
2. J. Newman / G. Orofino: Conservative and Evolutionary Elements
in Buddhist Tantra Literature
3. B. Dessein: Abhidharma
4. B. Oguibenine: Buddhist (Hybrid) Sanskrit
5. M. Baumannn: Buddhism in the West
6. R. Kritzer: Antarabhava
7. Ch. Muller: Electronic Texts, Internet and Computer Resources in
Buddhist Studies
8. S. Katsura: Buddhist Logic: The Function of Examples
9. L. Schmithausen: The Value of Nature in Buddhism
10. M. Hara: Buddhism and Brahmanism
11. J. Braarvig: New Discovery of Early Buddhist Manuscripts
12. A. Saito: Madhyamika and Yogacara
Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies
Volume 23 Number 1 .2000
JIABS 23.1 156
13. R. Sharf: What is a Sutra? Reflections on the Material Culture of
Buddhist Sutras in China and Japan
14. P. Harrison: Early Mahayana and Mahayanasutras (I)
15. R. Gombrich: Buddhism and Society in South and South-East Asia
16. S. Batchelor: Buddhist Psychology
17. M. Mohr: Japanese Buddhism since the Seventeenth Century: The
Quest for Sectarian Identity
18. 1. Silk: Early Mahayana and Mahayanasutras (II)
19. J. Ducor: Buddhism and Pure Land
20. A. W.Barber: Tathagatagarbha
21. S. McClintock / G. Dreyfus: Is there a Real Distinction between
Svatantrika and Prasailgika Madhyamika?
22. R. Salomon / C. Cox: New Discovery of Early Buddhist Manu-
scripts
23. S.P. Bumbacher: Buddhist-Daoist Interaction in Traditional China.
The 16 sections were chaired by:
1. S. Yamakami: Logic and Epistemology
2. Ch. Mliller: East Asian Buddhism (I)
3. R. Duquenne: East Asian Buddhism (II)
4. J. S. Strong: Early Buddhism
5. C. Gianotti: Mahayanasutras (I)
6. C. Dragonetti: Mahayanasutras (II)
7. E. Mikogami: Logic and Epistemology
8. F. K. Erhard: Buddhism in Tibet and Nepal (I)
9. B. Steinmann: Buddhism in Tibet and Nepal (II)
10. P. S c h ~ l k : Aspects of Buddhism in South Asia
11. Bhikkhu Pasadika: Pali and Theravada Tradition (I)
12. L.S. Cousins: PaIi and Theravada Tradition (II)
13. H. Ogawa: Philosophy (I)
14. G. Bugault: Philosophy (II)
15. F. Bizot: Vinaya
16. Chr. Clippers: Contemporary Buddhism
Furthermore, there was a round table discussion chaired by M. T.
Kapstein on The Cult of Vairocana.
Tuesday (24th) evening there was a reception by the Rectorate of the
University of Lausanne, and on Thursday (26th) evening the participants
met in the Hotel de la Paix for a cocktail dinner.
REPORT XIIth lABS CONFERENCE 157
The excursions on Thursday (26th) were well attended, with
participants going either to the castle of La Sarraz and the abbey of
Romainrn6tier, or to Gruyeres, with a visit to the chocolate factory.
The conference, which was universally acclaimed as a great success,
first of all due to the excellent local organization by T. J. F. Tillemans
and his staff, ended officially with the closing session including the
business meeting, and socially with a dinner and farewell party during a
magnificent evening cruise on Lake Geneva.
2. Report on the Meeting of the Board of Directors on Wednesday 25th
August.
The Board of Directors met on 25th August between 18.35 and 20.55
hours over dinner. The following points were discussed and decided
unanimously:
1. Prof. Dr. Cristina Scherrer-Schaub was appointed as interim
Treasurer until the next election of lABS officers.
2. A suggestion to exempt members of the Board of Directors from
paying membership fees was rejected.
3. An invitation by the Mom Rajavong Kalaya Tingsabadh, PhD, Dean
of the Faculty of Arts, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, to host the
XIIlth lABS conference in December 2002 was handed over to the
president by Peter Skilling, Regional Secretary for SE-Asia, and
accepted with thanks. A further provisional invitation for the XIVth
lABS conference to be held in London in 2005 was accepted from
Ulrich Pagel, SOAS, London.
4. It was decided by majority vote to make the JIABS available also on
the internet for a trial period provided that the lABS incurs no extra
costs and that the technical problems involved could be mastered. The
JIABS will of course continue to appear in hard copy as well.
5. Jacques May, professor emeritus of the Universite de Lausanne, was
elected as Honorary Fellow.
6. The proceedings for the business meeting were prepared.
3. Report on the Closing Session and Business Meeting.
The president opened the business meeting, which was attended by about
125 members of the lABS, on 29th August at 14.00 hours. She gave
warm thanks to all local organizers and, at the same time, thanked the
previous president, D. Seyfort Ruegg, and the previous secretary
general, A. Macdonald, for their work for the lABS.
JIABS 23.1 158
T. Tillemans offered his thanks to those assisting him in organizing
the conference, especially Johannes Bronkhorst, Toru Tomabechi and
Danielle Feller, and to all those who assisted him during the conference:
Nicolas Mirimanoff and other students. He pointed out that there will be
no comprehensive publication of the papers read. However, organizers
of panels are invited to take care of the publication of their respective
panels.
The president communicated the results of the business meeting (see
separate report) to the audience.
During the meeting the following information was passed to the
members of the lABS:
I. Christian Wittern and Tu Arning, acting on behalf of the Chung-Hwa
Institute of Buddhist Studies and the Chinese Buddhist Electronic Text
Association (CBET A) in Taipei, presented two CD-ROMs to the Section
de Langues et Civilations Orientales, Universite de Lausanne to express
their gratitude to the organizers of the conference. The first CD-ROM
containing a computerized version of volumes 5 to 10 of the Taishi5
Tripi!aka is the first publication of CBETA.
Moreover, the offer was put forward to all those present and to the
readers of this announcement that everybody can register for a free copy
of this CD-ROM, which will be mailed in due course. It can be used on
almost any computer provided it is equipped with the ability to display
Chinese characters. The address for postal orders is: Chung-Hwa
Institute of Buddhist Studies, 276, Kuang Ming Road, Peitou, Taipei,
Taiwan. E-mail ordersarealsoaccepted<cbeta@ccbs.ntu.edu.tw>.
CBETA plans to release a second CD-ROM, which will contain volumes
1-17 and 2 2 ~ 3 2 of the Taishi5 Tripi!aka within the next six months. The
second CD-ROM also contains an introduction to the Chung-Hwa
Institute of Buddhist Studies as well as an electronic version of the
Chung-Hwa Journal of Buddhist Studies (including back issues) and
other journal articles. It is regularly sent to institutions engaged in
Buddhist Studies on the basis of exchange of publications.
II. Jan Nattier announced a new journal, Buddhist Literature, designed
expressly to provide a forum for publication of primary texts in
translation. The SUbscription is US$ 25.- (US$ 30.- outside the US) for
individuals, reduced to US$ 15.- (US$ 20.-) for students, or US$ 35.-
(US$ 40.-) for institutions. Subscription orders should be sent to:
Buddhist Literature, c/o East Asian Center, Memorial Hall West 210,
REPORT XIIth lABS CONFERENCE 159
Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 470405, USA. The first issue is
due in fall 1999. For further inquiries contact: Jan Nattier, Editor,
Buddhist Literature, Department of Religious Studies, Indiana
University, Bloomington, IN 47405, USA <buddhlit@indiana.edu>.
III. Charles Muller draw attention to the e-mail list called Buddhist
Scholars Information Network (Budschol) that has been created for the
purpose of communication and exchange of information within the
Buddhist scholarly community. The list is exclusively for the purpose of
posting announcements regarding new publications, book reviews,
conference information, internet resources, etc. Therefore, despite a
fairly large membership (170, steadily climbing), the average number of
messages is fairly small. At present, designated members of Budschol
are monitoring and reporting on the Buddhism-related articles contained
in over 20 journals. We are also receiving regular publications from
several academic publishers. Membership in the network is strictly
limited to those possessing an advanced degree in Buddhist Studies, or
those enrolled in an advanced degree program. You may subscribe to the
list by sending an e-mail message to Dr. Charles Muller at <acmuller
@human.toyogakuen-u.ac.jp>. Please include your name, e-mail
address, and academic affiliation. If you are not personally known to
Muller, please include also a brief description of your academic
background.
IV. Max Deeg announced the formation of a network for scholars
working on Sino-Indian Buddhism. This prospective network, which
was discussed by a group of scholars during the conference, should
enable participants first of all to exchange bibliographical and research
information pertinent particularly to Sino-Buddhist terms. For, it was
felt that multilingual glossaries (e.g., Chinese-Sanskrit-English) for
certain works or translators, badly needed by all who are working in the
field of translating Chinese Buddhist texts, should be created in the
course of time as one result of the discussions. Access to the network
should be given primarily to scholars really doing research in Chinese
Buddhist texts, mainly in texts translated or claiming to be translations
(apocrypha). Inquiries about the network should be sent to Max Deeg
<Deeg-Max@t-online.de>, and about subscription to
subscribe@onelist.com>.
The president, thanking once again all praticipants for their
contributions, closed the meeting and the conference at 14.25 hours.
Accounts of the XIlth lABS Conference*
Credit
1) Total amount paid by the participants
(registration fees: 260 x 275):
2) Amount paid by the Faculty of Letters,
University of Lausanne:
3) Amount paid by the Fonds de Boer,
University of Lausanne:
Expenditures
1) University Restaurant (aperitif 24.8.99)
2) University Restaurant (teas-coffees)
3) University Restaurant (lunches)
4) Restaurant de Dorigny (lunch 28.8.99)
5) Hotel de la Paix (cocktail cum dinner 26.8.99)
6) Service Boissons (aperitif 23.8.99)
7) Cruise on Lake Geneva
8) Tourist Bureau (telephones, faxes, administrative fee)
9) Hostess on site
10) Transport passes for participants
11) Participants' folders
12) Postal charges
13) Badges
14) Pens
15) Printing costs of 1 st circular
16) Printing costs of 2nd circular
17) Printing costs of 3rd circular
18) Printing costs of abstracts and programmes
19) Small expenditures (miscellaneous)
20) Cost for hiring 4 portable phones
21) Salary of Administrative assistant (2 years)
Tom Tillemans
71'500.-
8'000.-
49'604.70
Total: 129'104.70
1'128.-
2'950.50
9'200.-
4'715.-
13'224.-
616.20
16'540.-
1'616.-
1'025.-
4'773.-
3'911.80
771.90
453.65
434.30
264.-
214.-
161.60
2'600.-
457.75
520.-
63'528.-
Total: 129'104.70
President of the Organizing Committee
Danielle Feller
Secretary of the Organizing Committee
* All the amounts are indicated in Swiss Francs.
Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies
Volume 23 Number 1 2000
JIABS 23.1 163
Guidelines for Contributors to JIABS
Two paper copies of articles for publication should be submitted to the
editors. Material in English, French and German will be considered for
publication, with the proviso that a summary in English should accom-
pany manuscripts written in French or German.
For Sanskrit and Pali, use the standard system of transcription as given
in, for example, A.L. Basham, The Wonder that was India, Appendix X.
Transcription of Chinese should preferably be according to pinyin, and
Tibetan should be in the system of the American Library Association -
Verein Deutscher Bibliothekare, using ft, ii, Z, S, rather than the ng, ny,
zh and sh of the Wylie system. Hyphenation may be used for Tibetan
proper names, if wished, but should not be used elsewhere. Japanese
should be transcribed according the system to be found in KenkyUsha's
New Japanese-English Dictionary.
In addition to the mandatory two paper copies, the JIABS requests
contributors also to send their articles on computer disks. Please clearly
label the disk with format, name(s) of relevant files, and the word-
processing program used to create the files. In addition, please translate
the article to ASCII code on the same disk if possible. For more infor-
mation on computer matters, contact the editors.
The International Assocation of Buddhist Studies
Colette Caillat
President
Gregory Schopen
Vice-president
Oskar v. Hintiber
General Secretary
Cristina Scherrer-Schaub
Treasurer
Regional Secretaries:
Janet Gyatso (Amherst, MA, USA)
S. Katsura (Hiroshima)
Peter Skilling (Bangkok)
D. Seyfort Ruegg (London)
Members of the Board:
R. Buswell (Los Angeles), H. Durt (Kyoto), R. Gupta (Shantiniketan),
K. Kimura (Saitama), D. S. Lopez, Jr., (Ann Arbor), A. Macdonald
(Paris), D. Seyfort Ruegg (London), E. Steinkellner (Vienna),
T. Tillemans (Lausanne), A. Yuyama (Tokyo)
The International Association of Buddhist Studies, founded in 1976, is devoted to
promoting and supporting scholarship in Buddhist Studies in all its aspects, past and
present, around the world. Membership is open to scholars of all academic disciplines.
Membership dues are $40 for full members, $20 for student members, $1000 for life
members. Subscriptions to the JIABS for libraries and other institutions are $70. Dues
and subscriptions may be paid in the following ways: .
1. by direct bank to bank transfers in US dollars or in the equivalent amount in
Swiss francs. The transfers should be to the IABS accounts at the Banque Cantonale
Vaudoise, PI. St-Fran<;ois, CH-IOOI Lausanne, Switzerland (SWIFT CODE:
BCVLCH2L, clearing no. 7677), account numbers, 983.51.04 for US dollars and
983.51.02 for Swiss francs.
2. by Visa or Mastercard.
3. by cheque payable to the "Association internationale d'etudes bouddhiques
(lABS)." There will be no supplementary charges for cheques drawn in Swiss
currency on Swiss banks. Otherwise, please add 10 dollars or 15 Swiss francs to cover
our processing charges.
4. by Eurocheque in Swiss francs.
Prospective members from developing countries may contact the Treasurer concerning
subsidized membership rates. Dues and SUbscriptions are payable per calendar year by
December 3 I of the previous year. Payments other than direct bank transfers should be
sent to Professor Cristina Scherrer-Schaub, Section de langues et civilisations
orientales, Universite de Lausanne, BFSH 2, CH-I015 Lausanne, Switzerland.
Abstracts of the articles published in this issue available at: http://www-orient.unil.ch