The Philippines and Human Rights Protection Mechanisms GRHR 502: Final Exam Melizel F.

Asuncion Introduction After the Philippines has finally struggled free from the shackles of the Marcos regime, the government, starting with the Aquino administration, had shown eagerness in embracing the international human rights treaty system by ratifying or acceding to four of the seven major treaties in succession. But the initial burst of enthusiasm waned and the government proved to be reticent and hesitant in implementing the human rights standards and obligations to which it bound itself and in triggering the international protective mechanisms available in the treaties that it entered into. In writing this paper, the premise that I am asked to consider is, to wit, There is a wide gap between legal obligations, and state practice and ratification of legal instruments. The procedure does not always indicate the willingness or capacity of governments to respect their obligations. There are many states that ratify all possible human rights instruments without having the slightest intention or capacity to implement them. In many countries, there is an enormous rift between the legal and institutional world, and practical day-to-day political and social reality. The number of ratifications of international treaties in the field of human rights is therefore not a good indication of the real progress in the protection of human dignity. In this paper, I will describe the available protective mechanisms in the treaties and their status vis--vis the Philippines. I will confine the discussion to the mechanisms in the seven major treaties, excluding the procedures emanating from Charter-based bodies and specialized agencies. To further delineate the scope of this paper, I will limit my discussion to the reporting obligations under the seven human rights treaties and to the treaties that institutionalize the complaints procedures thereby excluding the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their Families from the analysis of the treatybased protective mechanisms. Subsequently, I will examine two domestic institutions in the Philippines the Commission on Human Rights and the judiciary in order to see whether these domestic mechanisms are at par with the international human rights protective mechanisms thereby (potentially) making the international protective mechanisms redundant in terms of complying with the Philippines international standards and obligations. Then, I will outline my recommendations as regards maximizing the available domestic protective mechanisms in order to fully serve the interests of the Filipino citizens. I will explain how the civil society, particularly the non-governmental organizations (NGOs), can contribute to the enhancement of the

mechanisms domestically by informing and taking an active part in the preparation of reports submitted to various treaty-based bodies and by forwarding legal arguments based on human rights treaties whenever necessary and relevant so as to build up a body of jurisprudence, and the media by maintaining its vigilance, in publicizing the human rights developments at both the international and domestic levels, and by working towards being generators and sources of human rights information can take part in enhancing protective mechanisms. Status of Ratification Currently, the Philippines has ratified all seven major international instruments and for easy reference, the status of the seven treaties is pictorially shown below: Treaties International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) Optional Protocol (individual complaints mechanism) Second Optional Protocol (abolition of the death penalty) International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) Declaration under article 14 (individual complaints mechanism) Convention against Torture, and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) Declaration under article 22 (individual complaints mechanism) Declaration under article 20 (in-country inspections of places of detention) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) Optional Protocol (individual complaints mechanism) Convention on the Rights of the Child Optional Protocol (involvement of children in armed conflicts) Optional Protocol (sale of children, child prostitution and pornography) International Convention on the Protection of All Migrant Workers and members of their Families (CMW)
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Signature 19 December 1966 19 December 1966 20 September 2006 19 December 1966 7 March 1966 15 July 1980 26 January 1990 -

Ratification/ Accession 23 October 1986 22 August 1989 7 June 1974 15 September 1967 18 June 1986 (a) 5 August 1981 12 November 2003 21 August 1990 26 August 2003 28 May 2002 5 July 1995

Declaration under article 77 (individual complaints mechanism)

Even a cursory review of the information in the table above will show that even though the Philippines has excitedly and immediately embraced the international human rights treaty system, as proved by the fact that it has signed or ratified all of the seven major human rights treaties, the same level of excitement does not exist when it comes to implementing the mechanisms emanating from the various treaties. Except for the reporting obligations, wherein the governments performance is also dismal, to date it has only accepted the individual complaints procedure under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) or the First Optional Protocol and the individual complaints mechanism under CEDAW. Although the Philippine government has never opted out of or made reservations on protective mechanisms that are automatically subscribed to with the ratification of the treaties, it likewise failed to make explicit declarations about optional mechanisms in the treaties and as a consequence, these optional mechanisms have languished in neglect. In the following section, I will evaluate the compliance of the Philippines in terms of its reporting obligations and I will discuss the various mechanisms as provided for in the human rights treaties and the status of the Philippines vis--vis these protective mechanisms. As such, I will limit my discussion to the treaties that include protective mechanisms other than reporting. International Mechanisms A. Reporting Obligations All seven human rights treaties require state parties to submit periodic reports for the consideration of the Committee, on the legislative, judicial, administrative or other measures that they have adopted to give effect to the provisions of the Convention and on the progress made in this respect. This provision appears, almost identically, in all of the treaties and it is the source of the reporting obligation of state parties. The reporting process is said to be the core part of the human rights treaty review system (Mertus 2005, 86). In order to evaluate the compliance of the Philippines in terms of its reporting obligations, its track record is summarized below1: Treaty Bodies Periodic Report Due Date Date Submitted Delay in submission (in years)

In preparing this matrix, I updated the tables prepared by Heyns & Viljoen 2002, 459-462 and the Treaty Ratification and Reporting History of the Philippines. The Philippines and HR Protective Mechanisms M. Asuncion 3

CERD CESCR CCPR CAT CEDAW CRC CMW

11th-14th (CERD/C/299/Add.12; HRI/Corr.1/Add.37) 15th report 2nd (Arts. 6-9) (E/1984/7/Add.4) 2nd report 3rd report 2nd (CCPR/C/PHL/2002/2) 3rd report Initial report (CAT/C/5/Add.6; CAT/C/5/Add.18) 2nd report 5th and 6th report (CEDAW/C/PHI/5-6) 7th and 8th combined report 2nd (CRC/C/65/Add.31) 3rd and 4th consolidated report Initial report

4 Jan 1990 4 Jan 1998 1 Sept 1983 30 June 1995 30 June 2000 22 Jan 1993 1 Nov 2006 25 June 1988 25 June 1992 3 Sept 1998 Sept 2010 19 Sept 1997 19 Sept 2007 July 2004

21 Feb 1997 17 Oct 1983 18 Sept 2002 26 July 1988 2 Aug 2004 5 Nov 2004 9 12 1 15 3

It may be said that the Philippines compliance with its reporting obligations is not too bad given that it manages to submit the periodic reports, although frankly the punctuality in submitting them leaves a lot to be desired. The shaded cells in the table above indicate the reports, except for the CEDAW and CRC reports that surprisingly are up to date, that are already way overdue. Beyond other indicators, the lateness in submitting the reports is a clear referent of the countrys poor performance. The CAT and CESCR reports, in particular, are already 15 and 12 years overdue, respectively. The delay in submitting the CAT report may be explained by the fact that there is an overlap with the CCPR state report, particularly the states manifestations on Article 7 of the ICCPR. Although the areas are the same, the CAT report requires a more detailed information about the measures that the state parties have undertaken to prevent and punish torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment therefore, the overlap does not excuse the Philippines from not submitting the report to the Committee against Torture. With regard to the report owing to the CERD, the delay may be explained by the inability of the government to reconcile the fact that discrimination on the basis of race, color, descent or national or ethnic origin can and does occur in the Philippines. In the last Committee meeting that the Philippines has attended, the government representative claimed that racial discrimination, as defined under the Convention, is alien to the culture of the Filipino people (CERD Concluding Observations 1997, par. 11). The poor reporting record is magnified if one considers the existence of an inter-Agency Coordinating Committee on Human Rights, created in 1997 through Administrative Order 370, which has the following functions: (1) to respond to urgent requests for information from UN
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human rights bodies, domestic and international non-government organizations and private individuals concerning the human rights violations allegedly perpetrated upon individuals or groups in the country and (2) the preparation of the Philippine periodic reports which are submitted to UN human rights bodies in accordance with international human rights covenants and, after consultations with non-government organizations, sectoral groups and other private sector institutions, to submit these reports in time for the treaty-required due dates (as cited in Heyns & Viljoen 2002, 450). The fact that the government devotes resources to an institution for it to take charge of the reporting obligations says a lot about its commitment to comply with its obligations, which simultaneously, in my view, makes it harder to explain the failure to submit the reports promptly. The common observation in all the Philippine reports that I have reviewed is the failure of the government to explain the status of the Covenants in the domestic legal regime and their practical relevance within the judicial system (HRC Concluding Observations 2003; CESCR Concluding Observations 1995). The importance of clarifying the status of the Conventions in the domestic legal system cannot be overstated because it is through the domestic application and enforcement that international human rights standards are given relevance. B. Complaints Procedures under the Treaties The complaints procedures are institutionalized in four out of seven major human rights treaties and they will be discussed serially. Since the ICESCR and the CRC do not contemplate of any complaints procedure and since the individual complaints procedure under the CMW has not entered into force, they will not be included in the analysis done in this section. Under Article 41 of the ICCPR, state parties may, at any time, declare that it recognizes the competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications against another state party, on the ground that the latter is not fulfilling its obligations under the Covenant. The Philippines has made the necessary declaration and it entered into force on 23 October 1986 but to date, it has not availed of this mechanism. The first optional protocol to the ICCPR institutionalizes the individual complaints procedure. Under Article 1, a state, by becoming a party to the optional protocol, recognizes the competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications from individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation by that state party of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant. Accordingly, the Committee seeks to place individuals who complain and states that are alleged to have violated their rights on an equal footing throughout its proceedings and to provide each with an opportunity to comment on the others arguments (Mertus 2005, 100-01). The Philippines has
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ratified the first optional protocol on 22 August 1989 and various individuals have availed of this mechanism. A cursory survey of the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee from the 81st session showed that, on the average, the Committee decides one communication filed against the Philippines per year. Such information however does not disclose how many individual communications are filed against the Philippines in a year. Majority of the communications decided by the Human Rights Committee dealt with the imposition of the death penalty (see, e.g., Rolando v. the Philippines and Rayos v. the Philippines). It cannot be overemphasized that there are rights emanating from the Covenant other than the right against arbitrary deprivation of life and liberty. Given the fact that the individual complaints procedure is a well-established mechanism and given the richness of the jurisprudence it has issued, any communication filed with it against the Philippines will be more a testimony on the human rights record of the country rather than a challenge to the Committees effectiveness as a venue for grievance and redress. Under the ICERD, aside from the reporting requirement under Article 9, it institutionalizes the states complaints procedure under Article 11, which is automatically subscribed to by states parties to the Convention, and the optional individual complaints procedure under Article 14. The Philippines, to date, has not made the necessary declaration under this article so the Committee may not entertain communications filed against the former (Article 14). As a result of this non-acceptance, the Philippines is not bound by the additional obligation to establish or indicate a body within its national legal order which shall be competent to receive and consider petitions from individuals or groups of individuals within its jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation of any of the rights under the Convention (Article 15). It is only if the petitioners fail to obtain satisfaction from the national body that the petitioners may bring the matter to the Committees attention (Mertus 2005, 103). This non-acceptance closes off a potential venue within which individuals or groups may assert their rights against racial discrimination. In the case of the Philippines where various indigenous groups and Muslim Filipinos have been subjected to discrimination, legal and otherwise, the lack of any international venue within which to assert their rights is a big blow to the continuing advocacy for the recognition of their rights. I mentioned earlier the Philippine governments insistence that racial discrimination, as defined under the Convention, as being alien to the culture of the Filipinos and as a serious consequence, there does not seem to be any reason to give sufficient attention to differently-situated groups and to want the effective implementation domestically of the rights accorded under the Convention. A further point to make is about the Committees lack of emphasis as regards the importance of the protective mechanism in the face of the continuing failure of the Philippines to
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accept the competence of the Committee to accept individual communications. The token mention in paragraph 20 of the CERD Concluding Observations, wherein the Committee states that, it is noted that the State Party has not made the necessary declaration provided in article 14 of the Convention, and some members of the Committee requested that the possibility of making the declaration be considered just dont cut it anymore. Considering that the Philippines had been a state party to the ICERD since 1969, the continuing failure to make the necessary declaration for 38 years becomes inexcusable and the Committee has to look for measures to pressure the Philippine government to accept the procedure beyond encouraging the state party to consider making the declaration. Since there is no legislation specifically dealing with racial discrimination and the available mechanism at the international level has not been accepted, there is significant lacuna, if not outright failure, in the implementation of the provisions of the Convention. The Philippines ratified the CEDAW and the optional protocol on 5 August 1981 and 12 November 2004, respectively. There is however no information in the documents reviewed on the progress made in implementing and availing of the mechanisms under CEDAW and the optional protocol. The optional protocol to CEDAW establishes the individual complaints procedure, which allows the Committee to receive communications from or on behalf of individuals or groups of individuals, under the jurisdiction of a state party, who claim to be victim/s of a violation of any of the rights accorded under the Convention (Articles 1 and 2). There is also an inquiry procedure, that state parties to the protocol may opt out of, that enables the Committee to initiate inquiries into situations of grave or systemic violations of womens rights in countries that have become parties to the Optional Protocol (Mertus 2005, 105). This mechanism, however, is applicable only to states that are parties to both CEDAW and the optional protocol (Mertus 2005, 105). For the purpose of being comprehensive, I should note the seldom-mentioned arbitration procedure provided for in Article 29 of CEDAW, which states that, any dispute between two or more States Parties concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention which is not settled by negotiation shall, at the request of one of them, be submitted to arbitration. It is further stated that if within six months from the date of the request for arbitration the parties are unable to agree on the organization of the arbitration, any one of those parties may refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice by request in conformity with the Statute of the Court. Although this provision is at best vague and at worst futile considering the track record of states in complaining against its kind, it is still worth mentioning because for one, it exists and secondly, it remains an open avenue for the assertion of rights because it contemplates disputes with regard to the interpretation and application of the Conventions
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provisions. The last treaty-based procedures that I will discuss are those established under the CAT. There are numerous procedures available under the CAT and the optional protocol, namely, (1) the investigative procedure, under Article 20 of the Convention which state parties may opt out of, that the Committee initiates motu proprio upon receipt of reliable information that contains well-founded indication that torture is being systematically practiced in the territory of the state party, (2) the optional inter-state complaints procedure under Article 21 which allows the Committee to receive and consider communications alleging that another state party is not fulfilling its obligations under the Convention, (3) the optional individual complaints procedure under Article 22 that the Committee may receive from or on behalf of individuals who claim to be victims of a violation by a state party of the provisions of the Convention, and (4) the incountry inspections of places of detention under the optional protocol to the CAT. Although the Philippines has not opted out of the investigative procedure, it has not achieved a lot in terms of actually implementing the provisions of the Convention as proven by its reluctance to accept the protective procedures. It had neither made any declarations accepting the optional complaints procedures nor had it ratified the optional protocol. As things stand, we only have standards without any means of redress in case of violation of any of the rights. Among all the treaties, compliance with the CAT has been the poorest. With its continuing refusal to accept the optional protective mechanisms and the dismal reporting record, obviously, the CAT is not a priority with both the Executive and the Legislative, which is unfortunate given that abuses and violations of the accused or detained persons rights are most vulnerable in the hands of the police and the military and failure to address such by actively engaging the provisions of the Convention encourage a culture of impunity. To conclude, ratification of any treaty without concurrently accepting the protective mechanism is nothing but a half-hearted attempt to jump the human rights bandwagon. The significance of articulating and setting the human rights standards had already passed and had been duly celebrated but the hard work of implementing such standards is still continuing. In this, the Philippines fails resoundingly as proved by its intransigence in accepting and making declarations under the optional protective procedures. The duties of the state are to respect, fulfill, promote and protect human rights and in the last one, the Philippines is shown to not have done enough. One commentator notes that the Philippines human rights record, in terms of promotion and protection on human rights is spectacular on paper but is a classic case of failure at implementation (Asian Center for Human Rights 2003, 1). After reviewing the status of ratification of protective mechanisms, though, I have to disagree and say that the human rights
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record of the Philippines is not spectacular, not even on paper. The last point here is about the role of the Committees in pushing and selling the optional protective procedures. Although it is not part of their tasks, the treaty-based bodies should be more pro-active in encouraging states to make their declarations and accept the protective mechanisms in each of the treaties. As Mertus (2005, 114) notes, a central dilemma concerns the trade-offs inherent in pushing for universal acceptance and ratification of human rights treaties versus effective implementation. While it is a positive sign that more countries are ratifying human rights treaties, the legitimacy of human rights law is called into question when compliance remains patchy. Further, according to Anne Gallagher (2000, 201), the worth of the United Nations human rights treaty system can best be measured by reference to its ability to encourage and cultivate national implementation of, and compliance with, international human rights standards. It appears that the treaty system still has a lot of work to do as regards the Philippines. When the failure to make the necessary declarations, and therefore lacking the essential tool for implementing the standards, has been continuing for more than 30 years, like in the case of ICERD, maybe the time has come for the Committee to step in and more forcefully argue for the acceptance of the protective procedures lest the human rights which the protective mechanisms seek to implement be eroded and ultimately be rendered inutile. Domestic mechanisms A common assertion is that compliance with international human rights obligations i.e., respect for human rights at home is more responsive to domestic forces, to the domestic constitutional culture, than to any international culture pressing for compliance with international human rights norms (Steiner & Alston 2002, 594). In this section, I will discuss two domestic protective human rights mechanisms, namely, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) as an implementing institution and the courts as potential implementers (and interpreters) of international human rights standards. Concurrently, I will outline my recommendations as to how the potential of these two mechanisms can be maximized in order to protect the human rights of the Filipinos, along with the possible role of the NGOs and the media in realizing the full protection of rights. A. The Commission on Human Rights National human rights institutions (NHRIs) are defined as independent entities which have been established by a government under constitution or by a law entrusted with specific responsibilities in terms of the promotion and protection of human rights (Gallagher 2000, 202).
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NHRIs as seen as essential to the implementation and realization of human rights standards entered into by states at the international level because the former are seen (1) to have the capacity to narrow the gap between the international system and governments on the one hand, and the civil society on the other, (2) the national character of such institution enables them to demystify universal principles and translate them into practical measures at the level where it most matters and (3) they can facilitate the implementation of international human rights standards in a way which accommodates national peculiarities and which respects cultural, religious and ethnic diversity, and in a more informed and sensitive manner than any international body (Gallagher 2000, 203). Potentially, then, the NHRIs can be the foremost implementers of human rights standards at the domestic level but of course, only if the work is done properly. The Philippine Commission on Human Rights is a body created through the 1987 Philippine Constitution and has the following protective powers and functions: (1) investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights, (2) provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection, (3) exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons or detention facilities and (4) monitor the Philippine governments compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights. Its function is primarily investigatory and where violation of any of the rights mentioned above occurs, a complaint may be filed by an aggrieved party or by a third party, any government institution or at the Commissions own initiative. As Mariko Akuzawa (2005) details in her study, the CHR is also notable for its efforts to reach grassroots communities by establishing community human rights centers called Barangay Human Rights Actions Centers (BHRACs). At each center, a Barangay Human Rights Action Officer is mandated to receive complaints and conduct human rights education. On its face, it appears that the CHR has all the necessary ingredients to become a successful human rights institution and in my view, it only needs to keep to its sworn mandate in order to make everything work. Implementation is said to be poor for various reasons, but these are external to the design of the institution, like financial constraints and dubious commissioners. These factors, although contributory to the poor performance, should not indict the institution as a failure because there are sufficient guidelines and mechanisms to make the system work. Although the active involvement of the CHR with the preparation of state reports is desired, this gap is something that can be remedied in the future. There has been considerable debate as to whether the CHR should have prosecutorial functions but unless the government intends to
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expand the personnel base of the commission, adding this function will stretch the resources of the commission too thinly and it may jeopardize the status of the other functions that the commission is already undertaking. Considerable resources of the commission are devoted to human rights education and this, in my view, more than compensate for the perceived gap because of the commissions lack of prosecutorial powers. Although the engagement of the Philippines with the international human rights system is already lengthy and mature, there is still a gap in internalizing the human rights standards among the citizens. There is still no sense of ownership of human rights in the sense that we still see them as something foreign and distant. As such, we still refer to and rely on the rights that have been recognized and accorded domestically, like the bill of rights (versus the civil and political rights) and the social justice provisions (versus economic, social and cultural rights), among others. Continuing human rights education at the national level and at the smallest and farthest barangay (village) will hopefully contribute to building a sense of ownership of rights and it may pave the way towards a more vigorous and dynamic human rights culture in the country. Judicial intervention The premise for looking at the role of the judiciary as potential implementers of international human rights standards is grounded on the argument that the application of international law by municipal courts and other domestic legal operators is the keystone of international law itself (as cited in Scheinin 2000, 231). As Scheinin (2000, 231) asserts, the domestic role and effect of international human rights norms cannot be assessed in the abstract on the basis of a study of the written constitution of a country. What counts in the final analysis is whether the courts apply human rights norms in their substantive decisions. In the Philippines, entry into treaties and international agreements are essentially acts of the Executive but formally, their entries into force commence after the ratification by at least twothirds of all the members of the Senate (see Article VII, section 21, 1987 Constitution). After such ratification, the treaty or international agreement becomes valid and with force and effect of law. Bernas (1996, 55-56) observes that the problem, however, which the provision poses is the problem of determining what these generally accepted principles of international law are which the Philippines accepts. Ultimately, in the absence of the guiding direction of treaties or statutes, the process of selecting these accepted principles [would] have to be done by the courts. As it stands, a treaty is inferior to the Constitution and even though it has been ratified, it cannot be implemented if it is contrary to the former. The legality or constitutionality of a ratified treaty is
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subject to judicial review, pursuant to Article VIII, section 4, paragraph 2 and Article VIII, section 5, paragraph 2(A) of the Constitution, which empowers the Supreme Court en banc to hear all cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law. If a treaty is found to be contrary to the spirit and the letter of the Constitution, even though it is ratified, then it shall be declared illegal and null and void. Currently, there is no active engagement between the domestic legal system and the international human rights treaty system. Cases wherein the petitioners or defendants alluded to human rights norms are few and far between. In one study, it is found that domestically there is infrequent use of the treaties as an interpretative tool (Heyns & Viljoen 2001, 502), and if I may add, as source of rights. Given the uncertain status of human rights norms and principles domestically, the national legal order should then be confronted with challenges and questions that will force it to make an explicit pronouncement with regard to the status of these norms, for instance, as to whether international human rights norms in their current, general state are already self-executory or whether they need to be interpreted through legislation. At this point, any pronouncement, even an adverse one, will be better than letting the gray area or in legal speak, penumbra persist. Given the common law aspect of the Philippine legal system, the human rights norms and standards can enter the system and be internalized as precedents, but the system should be engaged first. As Heyns and Viljoen (2001, 487) observes, the international system has had its greatest impact where treaty norms have been made part of domestic law more or less spontaneously (for example as part of constitutional or legislative reform), and not as a result of norm enforcement (through reporting, individual complaints, or confidential inquiry procedures). Obtaining judicial precedents pertaining to human rights norms is just one way of making them part of the domestic legal system. Subsequent cases will then be decided on the basis of such precedents and the existing gap between international human rights law and the rights recognized and accorded domestically will slowly disappear because these two sets of human rights laws will not anymore be seen as belonging to different traditions but as coalescing into a single human rights regime. This internalization, through the judiciary, is where the NGOs can play a big part. B. Role of civil society On the question of how the civil society negotiate its involvement in enhancing the effectiveness of international protection mechanisms, it will be a disservice, particularly to NGOs and the media, to make hasty judgments, based only on secondary sources, as regards its participation (or non-participation). To make a fair evaluation, it is necessary to study one
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institution one NGO or one media outlet as regards its deployment of human rights norms and mechanisms, which is simply beyond the scope of this paper. As such, I will have to limit my discussion to giving general recommendations as to how the civil society can contribute to enhancing the protective mechanisms. The Philippines is currently enjoying a vibrant human rights movement and it is home to many non-governmental organizations that take it upon themselves to ensure that that the environment remains conducive to the full enjoyment of rights. The NGOs are instrumental in forwarding and proposing legislative amendments with the purview of enhancing the respect, promotion and protection of human rights. The impression that the current situation gives is that the NGOs use whatever laws are relevant to serve the purposes of rights-protection and promotion, more than rights-protection, and they are not creating a clear division between domestic or international human rights laws. In my view, a primary contribution of the NGOs in enhancing the effectiveness of protective mechanisms domestically is their part in developing the jurisprudence on human rights norms, whether they be international or domestic, by filing cases in court and forcing the courts to make rulings and judgments on the status of the norms. NGOs should actively lobby the judiciary by forwarding legal arguments based on human rights treaties, whenever necessary and relevant. As the body of jurisprudence develops, the gap between the international human rights treaty system and the domestic human rights system will slowly diminish, paving the way toward building a single human rights regime locally. Secondly, NGOs can contribute to the enhancement of international protective mechanisms by taking part in the consultations conducted prior to the preparation of state reports in order to inform the process. In the absence of such consultations, the NGOs should take it upon themselves to prepare and submit shadow reports to various treaty-based committees. Mertus (2005, 84) explains the necessity of submitting shadow reports, in that, the general purpose of preparing a shadow report is to provide the Committee with an independent tool to assess and describe a governments accountability in fulfilling its obligations to promote and protect human rights, to monitor actions to honor commitments made in treaties or at world and regional conferences, and to put political pressure on States Parties through publicity and education. Thirdly, NGOs themselves should engage the treaty-based procedures by submitting information to the committees whenever the latter are empowered to accept and consider information other than that provided by state parties. There are inquiry procedures under CEDAW and CAT and NGOs can maximize such venues by submitting detailed information as regards the Philippines compliance with international human rights standards and obligations. Heyns and Viljoen (2001, 535) also suggest that NGOs should help set precedents by submitting individual complaints with
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a good chance of success, to help jump-start the process. Various complaints procedures allow the submission of communications on behalf of individuals or groups of individuals and NGOs are well advised to take advantage of this opportunity. With regard to the media, it not has figured prominently in terms of contributing to the effectiveness of international or protective mechanisms. In one study, it was concluded that in the Philippines, the media is generally not interested in the UN treaties, and that the human rights education efforts of the government and the NGOs have a limited effect (Heyns & Viljoen 2002, 455). The media, on its own, do not generate any information relating to human rights; they report on and relay the information that comes from human rights organizations and government institutions. My impression is that although, the media seem well versed on human rights, they rarely refer to international treaties, much less international protective mechanisms. A check on an online newspaper revealed an item about how the Philippines has been lagging behind in meeting its reporting obligations but this information was fed to it by the Commission on Human Rights. Journalists do not really devote time and effort into conducting investigative reporting on international human rights matters. The media however can take part in enhancing the protective mechanisms media by maintaining its vigilance, in publicizing the human rights developments at both the international and domestic levels, and by working towards being generators and sources of human rights information can take part in enhancing protective mechanisms and not just as carriers of information generated by human rights organizations and government institutions (International Council on Human Rights Policy 2002, 18). Conclusion In conclusion, it is observed that, international protection mechanisms do not work in a vacuum and instead, they rely on domestic forces like governments and other institutions to feed it information. Without any input from the local institutions, the treaty-based bodies will not have enough information to consider and evaluate. However, the international human rights system is still seen as distant and distinct from the domestic realm of rights and this perceived separation is what resounds at the level of individuals and communities. The latter identify more closely with what is local than with what is seen as foreign, and yes, as something Western. Heyns and Viljoen (2001, 488) argues that, international enforcement mechanisms must be supplemented by creative efforts to ensure that treaty norms are internalized in the domestic legal and cultural system, and that they are enforced on that level. The challenge is to harness the treaty system to domestic forces domestic constituencies that will ensure its realization. The treaty-based mechanisms and the domestic constituency, which includes NGOs, the judiciary and the media,
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should have a symbiotic relationship in order to have impact at the local level. Indeed, this is something worth considering. As I see it, though, it is more the burden of the international system to adjust and work for relevance in peoples day to day realities rather than the other way around. It is for the international system to show that it has something of value to add to what the citizens are already enjoying under the domestic realm of rights. The design of the international treaty system itself does not make it accessible and attractive to individuals and communities because it is exclusive and elitist, in the sense that its audience is composed of governments and state parties. To look for its relevance in peoples lives is too huge a task for the system primarily because it is not intended for the participation of the common person. To be sure, the citizens are the indirect beneficiaries of the protective mechanisms but, really, their primary function is to check on the state parties compliance with their human rights obligations. This is not to say that the international protective mechanisms should be abandoned because they have their own function and relevance. What this all mean is that it is pointless to look for its practical and grounded relevance because it is too much to expect of a system that is not designed for such noble aspirations. Reference Akuzawa, M 2005, Issues and Problems in Disseminating Universal Human Rights in Local Communities: Through the Efforts of the National Human Rights Institutions in the Philippines and in Malaysia. Paper prepared for the Fourth Asian Public Intellectuals Workshop, Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia. Alston, P 2000, Beyond Them and Us: Putting Treaty Body Reform into Perspective, in P Alston & J Crawford (eds), The Future of Human Rights Treaty Monitoring, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 501-525. Alston, P (ed) 1992, The United Nations and Human Rights: A Critical Appraisal, Clarendon Press, Oxford. Asian Center for Human Rights 2003, Human Rights Record of the Philippines: Spectacular on Paper, Asian Center for Human Rights, New Delhi. Asia Pacific Human Rights Network 2002, An Assessment of the Philippine Commission on Human Rights, in National Human Rights Institutions in the Asia Pacific Region, Asia Pacific Human Rights Network and South Asia Human Rights Documentation Center, New Delhi, pp. 109-118. Bernas, J 1997, The 1987 Philippine Constitution: A Reviewer-Primer (3rd edn), Rex Bookstore, Manila. Burdekin, B & Gallagher, A 2001, The United Nations and National Human Rights Institutions, in G Alfredsson et al (eds), International Human Rights Monitoring Mechanisms, Martinus
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Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, pp. 815-825. Elridge, P 2002, The Politics of Human Rights in Southeast Asia, Routledge, London. Gallagher, A 2000, Making Human Rights Treaty Obligations a Reality: Working with New Actors and Partners, in P Alston & J Crawford (eds), The Future of Human Rights Treaty Monitoring, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 201-227. Heyns, C & Viljoen, F 2002, The Impact of the United Nations Human Rights Treaties on the Domestic Level, Kluwer Law International, The Hague. Heyns, C & Viljoen, F 2001, The Impact of the United Nations Human Rights Treaties on the Domestic Level, Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 23, pp. 483-535. International Council on Human Rights Policy 2004, Performance and Legitimacy: National Human Rights Institutions. Accessed on 4 December 2006, from http://www.ichrp.org/paper_files/102_p_01.pdf. International Council on Human Rights Policy 2002, Journalism, Media and the Challenge of Human Rights Reporting, International council on Human Rights Policy, Switzerland. Mertus, J 2005, The United Nations and Human Rights: A guide for a new era, Routledge, London. Mingst, K 2003, Essentials of International Relations (2nd edn), W.W. Norton and Company, New York. Mohamad, M 2002, Towards a Human Rights Regime in Southeast Asia: Charting the Course of State Commitment, Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 230-251. Scheinin, M 2000, Domestic Implementation of International Human Rights Treaties: Nordic and Baltic Experiences, in P Alston & J Crawford (eds), The Future of Human Rights Treaty Monitoring, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 229-243. Scheinin, M 1999, International Mechanisms and Procedures for Implementation, in R Hanski & M Suksi (eds), An Introduction to the International Protection of Human Rights: A Textbook (2nd rev edn), Institute for Human Rights, Finland, pp. 429-452. State Party Report of the Philippines 2002, submitted to the Human Rights Committee, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/PHL/2002/2 (18 September 2002), [cited as ICCPR Report]. State Party Report of the Philippines 2004, submitted to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/PHI/5-6 (2 August 2004), [cited as CEDAW Report]. State Party Report of the Philippines 2004, submitted to the Committee on the Rights of the Child, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/65/Add.31 (5 November 2004), [cited as CRC Report]. Steiner, H & Alston, P 2000. International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals Text and Materials, 2nd edn, Oxford University Press, New York.

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Treaty Ratification and Reporting History of the Philippines 2005. Accessed on 24 October 2006, from http://untreaty.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/part1/ chapterIV/chapterIV.asp U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations to the Report submitted by the Philippines under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1995/7 (7 June 1995), [cited as CESCR Concluding Observations]. U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding Comments to the Report submitted by the Philippines under Article 18 of the Convention, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/PHI/CO/6 (25 August 2006), [cited as CEDAW Concluding Comments]. U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding Observations/Comments to the Report submitted by the Philippines under Article 9 of the Convention, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/304/Add.34 (15 October 1997), [cited as CERD Concluding Observations]. U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations to the Report submitted by the Philippines under Article 44 of the Convention, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.259 (21 September 2005), [cited as CRC Concluding Observations]. U.N. Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations to the Report submitted by the Philippines under Article 40 of the Convention, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/29/PHL (1 December 2003), [cited as HRC Concluding Observations].

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