Centennial GK Koo 1 There wont be a withdrawal Obamas in it to win it Tellis, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International

l Peace specializing in international security,

defense, & Asian security issues., former Senior Adviser to the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, & former Senior Adviser to the U.S. Abassador in New Delhi,9 (Ashley, Reconciling With The Taliban?: Toward an Alternative Grand Strategy in Afghanist,http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/reconciling_with_taliban.pdf)
none of the four critiques, accordingly, provides a good alternative to the aims pursued by U .S . policy in afghanistan since 2001 . it is to President obamas credit that, despite strong pressure emerging from various constituencies in washington (most of which reside within his own party), he has rejected all of the options that compete with building an effective state . his formal statement of March 27, 2009, and the administrations white Paper issued that same day, corroborates this fact, albeit with varying degrees of clarity . Clearly, the president has renounced the overly narrow focus on counterterrorism that some of

his own advisers were advocating . although he has asserted that the United States will have a clear and focused goal, namely, to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future, this objective will not be pursued either in isolation or in any circumscribed fashion . no other conclusion can be derived from President obamas clear rejection of any return to Taliban
rule . Moreover, his administrations policy statement clearly declares that among washingtons realistic and achievable objectives would be promoting a more capable, accountable, and effective government in afghanistan that serves the afghan people and can eventually function, especially regarding internal security, with limited international support . and, finally, developing increasingly self-reliant afghan security forces that can lead the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism fight with reduced U .S . assistance is also upheld as one of the key objectives that contribute to the fundamental goal of defeating terrorism comprehensively in afghanistan and Pakistan . whether explicitly stated or not, these propositions suggest that the United States will not abdicate state building in afghanistan; will not recognize the Taliban as an acceptable islamist group in contrast to, for example, al-Qaeda, which all acknowledge must be extirpated; and will not exit afghanistan either as an end in itself or to better focus on Pakistan, as some analysts in the United States have suggested . The administrations reiteration of the need for a a more capable, accountable, and effective government in afghanistan that serves the afghan people also implicitly conveys a rejection of all acephalous strategies of governance, a refusal to integrate an unrepentant Taliban into any afghan organs of rule, and a decisive repudiation of authoritarianism as a solution to the political problems in Kabul

The plan zaps global leadership Well look undependable Twining, Senior Fellow for Asia at the German Marshall Fund, 9-30-9 (Dan, The stakes in Afghanistan go well
beyond Afghanistan,http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/09/30/the_stakes_of_afghanistan_go_well_beyond_afghanistan)
The problem with the current debate over Afghanistan is that it is too focused on Afghanistan. There is no question that the intrinsic importance of winning wars our country chooses to fight -- to secure objectives that remain as compelling today as they were on September 12, 2001 -- is itself reason for President Obama to put in place a strategy for victory in Afghanistan. But the larger frame has been lost in the din of debate over General McChrystal's leaked assessment, President Obama's intention to ramp up or draw down in Afghanistan, and the legitimacy of the Afghan election. In fact, it is vital for the United States and its allies to recommit to building an Afghan state that can accountably govern its people and defeat the Taliban insurgency -- for reasons that have to do not only with Afghanistan's specific pathologies but with the implications of failure for the wider region and America's place in the international system. The surreal belief in some quarters that abandoning Afghanistan -- described as a "graveyard of empires" with its complicated tribes, forbidding terrain, and peripheral strategic importance -- would not have direct and bloody consequences for the United States, never mind the Afghan people, can be answered with three numbers: 9-11. It is troubling that our political and foreign policy elites even need to engage this debate (including its more sophisticated but equally illusory variants like moving to an "over-the-horizon" strike-and-retreat strategy). At the same time, the experts (correctly) advocating a counterinsurgency strategy make the same mistake of framing their arguments purely with reference to Afghanistan's internal dynamics. As important as they are, they constitute only part of a wider strategic landscape that would be upended by a U.S. decision to reduce its political and military commitment to Afghanistan. A recent trip to Islamabad and Lahore revealed to me that most Pakistani elites -- including the small minority that could credibly be described as sympathetic to Western goals in Afghanistan -- already believe that the game is up: the will of the transatlantic allies is broken, Obama doesn't have the courage or vision to see America's mission in Afghanistan through to victory, and the U.S. is well along the road to walking away from Afghanistan as it did after 1989. This widespread Pakistani belief has encouraged behavior deeply inimical to Washington's regional aims, with the effect that the American debate over whether Afghanistan is worth it is inspiring Pakistani actions that will make success all the harder to achieve. After all, why shouldn't the Pakistani security services continue to invest in their friendly relations with the Taliban if Mullah Omar and company soon will take power in Afghanistan's Pashtun heartland? Why should the Pakistani military take on the militant groups that regularly launch crossborder attacks into Afghanistan when the NATO targets of those attacks will soon slink away in defeat? Why should the Pakistani government get serious about wrapping up the Quetta Shura when the Afghan Taliban appears to be ascendant in the face of Western weakness? Why should Pakistan's intelligence service break its ties to Lashkar-e-Taiba, one of the world's most potent terrorist groups, when it forms such a useful instrument with which to bleed U.S. ally India? And why should Pakistani civilian and military leaders overtly cooperate with the United States when it appears such a weak and unreliable ally of the Afghan people -- incapable, despite its singular wealth and resources, of defeating a 25,000-man insurgency in one of the poorest countries on Earth? As Chris Brose and I recently argued, it is vital for the West to prevail in Afghanistan because of its effect in shaping Pakistan's

strategic future. Proponents of drawing down in Afghanistan on the grounds that Pakistan is the more important strategic prize have it only half right: if Pakistan is the strategic prize, it should be unthinkable not

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to press for victory in Afghanistan given the spillover effects of a Western defeat there. All of Pakistan's
pathologies -- from terrorist sanctuary in ungoverned spaces, to radicalized public opinion that creates an enabling environment for violent extremism, to lack of economic opportunity that incentivizes militancy, to the (in)security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, to the military's oversized role in political life in ways that stunt the development of civilian institutions -- all of this will intensify should Afghanistan succumb to the Taliban as the West withdraws. These dynamics, in turn, will destabilize India in ways that could torpedo the country's rise to world power -- and the strategic dividends America would reap from India's success. New Delhi is now a truer proponent of Washington's original objectives in Afghanistan -- the Taliban's decisive defeat by military force rather than reconciliation and the construction of a capable Afghan democracy -- than some American leaders are now. Afghanistan is in India's backyard -- they shared a border until 1947 -- and the collapse of its government would destabilize Pakistan in ways that would quickly cost Indian dearly. Indian strategists fear that the spillover from a Taliban victory in Afghanistan would induce Pakistan's "Lebanonization," with the Pakistani Taliban becoming a kind of South Asian Hezbollah that would launch waves of crippling attacks against India. India cannot rise to be an Asian balancer, global security provider, and engine of the world economy if it is mired in interminable proxy conflict with terrorists emanating from a weak or collapsing state armed with nuclear weapons on its border. The strategic implications of a Western defeat in Afghanistan for American relations with other major powers are similarly troubling. The biggest game-

changer in the nuclear standoff with Iran is not new sanctions or military action but a popular uprising by the Iranian people that changes the character of the radical regime in Tehran -- a prospect one would expect to be
meaningfully diminished by the usurpation through violence of the Afghan government, against the will of a majority of Afghans, by the religious extremists of the Taliban. And despite welcome new unity in the West on a tougher approach to Iran's

development of nuclear weapons following revelations of a new nuclear complex in Qum, how can Washington, London, Paris, and Berlin stare down the leaders of Iran -- a potentially hegemonic Middle Eastern state with an advanced conventional and near-nuclear arsenal and a vast national resource base -- if they can't even hold their own against the cave-dwelling, Kalashnikov-wielding despots of the Taliban? Russia appears to be quietly reveling in the prospect
that NATO, which appeared so threatening to Russian eyes during its multiple rounds of enlargement during the 1990s, could be defeated in its first real out-of-area operation. A NATO defeat in Afghanistan would call into question the future

of the alliance and the credibility of American leadership with it, possibly creating a new and lasting transatlantic breach and intensifying concerns about the alliance's ability to protect weak European states against a resurgent Russia. China has no interest in Afghanistan's collapse into a sanctuary for Islamist extremists, including Uighers who militate against China's rule in Xinjiang. But a Western defeat in Afghanistan, which if historical precedent holds would be followed by a bout of U.S. isolationism, would only create more space for China to pursue its (for now) peaceful rise. And that is the point: the debate over whether to prevail in Afghanistan is about so much more. An American
recommitment to a sustained counterinsurgency strategy that turned around the conflict would demonstrate that the United States and its democratic allies remain the principal providers of public goods -- in this case, the security and stability of a strategically vital region that threatens the global export of violent extremism -- in the international system. A new and sustained victory strategy for

Afghanistan would show that Washington is singularly positioned to convene effective coalitions and deliver solutions to intractable international problems in ways that shore up the stability of an international economic and political order that has provided greater degrees of human freedom and prosperity than any other. By contrast, a U.S. decision to wash its hands of Afghanistan would send a different message to friends and competitors alike. It would hasten the emergence of a different kind of international order, one in which history no longer appeared to be on the side of the United States and its friends. Islamic extremism, rather than
continuing to lose ground to the universal promise of democratic modernity, would gain new legs -- after all, Afghan Islamists would have defeated their second superpower in a generation. Rival states that contest Western leadership of the international order and reject the principles of open society would increase their influence at America's expense. Just as most Afghans are not prepared to live under a new Taliban regime, so most Americans are surely not prepared to live in a world in which the United States voluntarily cedes its influence, power, and moral example to others who share neither our interests nor our values.

It causes multiple scenarios for global nuclear war They decimate our global credibility -Causes Indo-Pak conflict, massive proliferation and arms racing, and undermines our allied security guaruntees. Carafano, Senior Research Fellow for National Security at the Heritage Foundation & Director of the Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, 1-2- 10 (James, Obama must win fast in Afghanistan or risk new wars across
the globe,http://gazettextra.com/news/2010/jan/02/con-obama-must-win-fast-afghanistan-or-risk-new-wa/)
Not much chance Obama will go that route. If the violence skyrockets next year and it looks as though the presidents ambitious objectives cant be met, Afghanistan could look a lot more like Vietnam in 1973. U.S. forces withdrew. Our abandoned ally was soon overrun. South Vietnam became a gulag; Cambodia sprouted the killing fields; life in Laos was just plain lousy. By 1979, the Sino-Vietnamese war erupted. We can expect similar results if Obamas Afghan strategy fails and he opts to cut and run. Most forget that throwing South Vietnam to the wolves made the world a far more dangerous place. The Soviets saw it as an unmistakable sign that America was in decline. They abetted military incursions in Africa, the Middle East, southern Asia and Latin America. They went on a conventional- and nuclear-arms spending

spree. They stockpiled enough smallpox and anthrax to kill the world several times over. State-sponsorship

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of terrorism came into fashion. Osama bin Laden called America a paper tiger. If we live down to that moniker in Afghanistan, odds are the world will get a lot less safe. Al-Qaida would be back in the game. Regional terrorists would go after both Pakistan and Indiapotentially triggering a nuclear war between the two countries. Sensing a Washington in retreat, Iran and North Korea could shift their nuclear programs into overdrive, hoping to save their failing economies by selling their nuclear weapons and technologies to all comers. Their nervous
neighbors would want nuclear arms of their own. The resulting nuclear arms race could be far more dangerous than the Cold Wars twobloc standoff. With multiple, independent, nuclear powers cautiously eyeing one another, the world would look a lot more like Europe in 1914, when precarious shifting alliances snowballed into a very big, tragic war. The list goes on. There is no question that countries such as Russia, China and Venezuela would rethink their strategic calculus as well. That could produce all kinds of serious regional challenges for the United States. Our allies might rethink things as well. Australia has already hiked its defense spending because it cant be sure the United States will remain a responsible security partner. NATO might well fall apart. Europe could be left with only a puny EU military force incapable of defending the interests of its nations. None of this is to suggest that staying in Afghanistan is an easy option. Wars never are. They require good men and women to put their lives on the line every day for our security. We should put them at risk only for an issue of vital national interest. Afghanistan is one such issue. And that not costis the real bottom line. The war wont bankrupt America. Multitrillion dollar proposals like cap and trade environmental schemes or government-managed health systems might well kill our economy. But the $30 billion required for the Afghanistan surge represents about 0.20 percent of our GDP. In terms of D.C. budget debates, thats a rounding error. But in terms

of national security, the cost of failure in Afghanistan would be incalculably high.

The plan creates global uncertainty Undermines our alliances and emboldens our enemies It makes us look soft and undepdendable Causes multiple scenarios for global conflict Brookes, Senior Fellow in national Security Affairs at the Heritage Foundation, 11-9-9 (Peter, Why We Can't
Walk Away,http://www.heritage.org/Research/Commentary/2009/11/Why-We-Cant-Walk-Away) And, of course, failure in Afghanistan will affect America's stature in the world. As the Afghan situation unfolds in the months to come, both friends and foes will be watching closely for even subtle signs of American intentions, especially its commitment to continuing the fight. Not surprisingly, a lot of strategic hedging is going on among
stakeholders in Afghanistan as America works out its strategy. Even a seeming lack of resolve will have consequences, as Afghanistan Commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal said recently in a speech in London: "Uncertainty disheartens our allies, emboldens our foe." But it goes beyond that. Perceptions of who is winning and who is losing and who is staying and who is going affect the civilian population in Afghanistan -- one that is famous for bending with the prevailing political winds. Having the population on the right side is critical to any counterinsurgency campaign. It is also not outlandish to assume that defeat in

Afghanistan to the Taliban would leave the United States looking soft and undependable with both allies and enemies, having a negative effect on American interests across the globe. For example, failure in Afghanistan will ripple into NATO,
where America's leadership will be undermined, perhaps, convincing the Europeans of the soundness of their parallel effort to establish a European Union defense policy and force. Asian allies would certainly wonder about their American partner, too. Moreover, coming up short in Afghanistan certainly would not encourage the likes of the recalcitrant regimes in Iran or

North Korea to come around to our way of thinking on negotiations over their nuclear and ballistic missile programs. And as the Pakistani foreign minister, Makhdoom Shah Mahmood Qureshi, plainly told the Wall Street Journal recently about a U.S. withdrawal before the Taliban is defeated: "This will be disastrous ... you will lose credibility ... who is going to trust you again?"

And, The plan triggers global terrorism, an India Pakistan nuclear conflict, expanded Chinese belligerence in places like the South China Sea, and Russian adventurism Carafano, Senior Research Fellow for National Security at the Heritage Foundation & Director of the Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, 8-2- 10 (James, How will leaving Afghanistan help?, The Washington
Examiner) It's 2021 -- 10 years on, the Kabul Declaration of 2011 isn't looking so good. Despite warnings from many quarters that "conditions on
the ground" made it doubtful the U.S.-backed government could maintain national sovereignty and domestic security, then-President Obama elected to withdraw U.S. forces from the war-torn nation. With vague assurances from Pakistan that Islamabad would press the Taliban to reconcile with the government in Kabul, Obama declared it was time for the United States to go and for the Afghans to determine their own destiny. But the decision to pull out before the war was won precipitated a dramatic chain of events that continues to unfold a decade later. Today, Afghanistan remains locked in a seemingly permanent state of civil war. As the southern-based Taliban battle the rump, Western-backed government in the north, the people of Afghanistan remain caught in the crossfire. Al Qaeda returned with the Taliban. Within 18 months of the U.S. withdrawal, they had re-

established the terrorist training camps that launched the 9/11 attacks and began a new wave of bloody attacks on the West that continues to this day. Their success has re-energized Islamist radicalism movements worldwide.

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Meanwhile, the resumption of U.S. airstrikes on the camps has seemed to have little effect other than fueling complaints about civilian casualties from various international human rights groups. The increasing violence quickly spread beyond Afghanistan. As soon as

the Taliban were re-established in the south, the Kashmir insurgency flared to new heights, bringing Pakistan and India into direct military conflict and a hair-trigger nuclear standoff. The bad news did not stop there. By 2010,
organized terrorist networks in Indonesia and other South Asia countries had largely been dismantled. Now, supported by a terror base in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the networks were back and deadlier than ever. At the same time, the American withdrawal and the

region's growing instability convinced Beijing that it needed to solidify its influence throughout the area. China declared itself the protector of the South China Sea and "demilitarized" the region by prohibiting the transit of "outside" naval forces -- including the U.S. Navy. Russia also took the U.S. withdrawal as a signal to solidify a security belt around its borders. Its annexation of part of the state of Georgia sent tremors through all Europe.
Russian expansionism and China's triumphalism inevitably led to renewed confrontations between these two powers. Meanwhile, India, living in an increasingly troubled neighborhood, abandoned its relationship with the U.S. and decided to follow China's lead. The future is a foreign country. No one can say for sure how history will unfold if the U.S. abandons its mission in Afghanistan. Events might turn out better ... or far worse. But the future sketched above is certainly possible and, many would say, probable. In all events, it's a future the United States must work hard to avoid. Yes, there are ways to protect U.S. interests other than fighting and winning in Afghanistan, but these alternatives are fraught with even more difficulties and uncertainties and carry a price tag -- in U.S. lives and treasure -- that could run far higher. In contrast, winning in Afghanistan will do wonders not just there, but in Pakistan and beyond. It will create the pressure necessary for Pakistan to: deal with the organized terrorists groups within its borders; help demobilize the Taliban; and recognize the importance of normalizing relations with India. It will crush international support for Islamist terrorism. And it will serve notice that the U.S. can and will defend its vital national interests. Winning does not offer a future without danger, but it

offers the promise of a better world for America and its friends and allies.

Their argument ignores the fact that Obamas campaign was largely based on increases resources for the war in Afghanistan and that there was universal support amongst his military advisors for the surge Going back on his campaign promise and overriding his advisors independently cripples our leadership. Kagan, Ph.D. in Soviet & East European Studies from Yale, Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise
Institute, Director of the Critical Threats Project, former Professor of Military History at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, 10-12 -9 ( Frederick, Don't Go Wobbly on Afghanistan: President Obama was right in March, The Weekly
Standard )
The Obama administration is not making this decision in a vacuum. Obama

ran on a platform that made giving Afghanistan the resources it needed an overriding American priority. President Obama has repeated that commitment many times. He appointed a new commander to execute the policy he enunciated in his March 27 speech, in which he
noted: "To focus on the greatest threat to our people, America must no longer deny resources to Afghanistan because of the war in Iraq."

If he now rejects the request of his new commander for forces, his decision will be seen as the abandonment of the president's own commitment to the conflict. In that case, no amount of rhetorical flourish is likely to persuade Afghans, Pakistanis, or anyone else otherwise. A president who overrules the apparently unanimous recommendation of his senior generals and admirals that he make good the resource shortfalls he himself called unacceptable can hardly convince others he is determined to succeed in Afghanistan. And if the United
States is not determined to succeed, then, in the language of the region, it is getting ready to cut and run, whatever the president and his advisers may think or say. That is a policy that will indeed have regional effects--extremely dangerous ones.

Their argument is premised on the argument that we have overused our hard power The plan emboldens all of our adversaries and undermines the confidence of our allies by creating the perception that we wont act to defend our national interests. Holmes, Ph.D., Vice President for Foreign & Defense Policy Studies at the Heritage Foundation & Director of the Kathryn & Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, 9-1- 10 (Kim, Defining the Obama Doctrine,
Its Pitfalls, and How to Avoid Them, Backgrounder, Number 2457, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/08/defining-the-obama-doctrine-its-pitfalls-and-how-toavoid-them) Obamas schizophrenic attitude toward soft and hard power is less a conscious application of good cop, bad cop than an expression of uncertainty about the direction his policy should take. Since taking office, his
Administration has backed off from some of Obamas promises, such as closing the detention center at Guantanamo Bay and trying captured terrorists in civilian courts. It also has stepped up drone attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the President did eventually approve the surge in Afghanistan. But those welcome policy changes more likely resulted from Obamas military and intelligence leaders preventing him from adopting ineffective or even nave policies than from a conscious shift in principle. At times, the President seems politically pained by his changes in his policies on Afghanistan and detainees. They were clearly unwelcome to his supporters in

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the left wing of his party, and splitting the difference among his advisers over an Afghan war strategyagreeing to an unwise timetable, for exampleis a manifestation of the ambivalence that pervades his thinking. This embrace of soft power, caused in part by a desire to break with perceived excessive applications of hard power by Bush, is thus grounded not merely in tactics, but in a basic attitude about the nature of Americas role in the world and how that role should be played. The belief that the U.S. overutilized hard

power in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan has shaken Obamas confidence in the application of hard power at all. Thus, the expressions of soft power he choosesdiplomatic engagement, working with the U.N., dispensing foreign aid, and soft-pedaling differences with enemies are grounded in the assumption that the limits of American military power are in fact also the limits of Americas ability to influence events on its own. In light of recent history, this viewpoint may be understandable, but it is also unfortunately selective in its choice of examples. For example, Libya gave up its nuclear weapons program not because of our engagement or soft-power outreach, but because it was afraid it was next on President Bushs target list after Iraq. The same is true for Irans early cooperation after 9/11 when it was helping us to confront alQaeda. After the Iranians realized they were not next, they stopped cooperating. Even Libyas Qadhafi has become
less cooperative in recent years. Additionally, while it is true that the Iraq War created a public relations backlash in Europe and parts of the Middle East, it is not true the war has been (so far at least) a failure in terms of power relations. Saddam Husseins removal from power eliminated any possibility of a major threat from Iraq for the foreseeable future. And while Afghanistan is still an open question, only the anti-war left argues that the Taliban can be persuaded to lay down their arms with promises of aid and diplomatic approval.

Soft power works only as an adjunct to hard power. Any time an American leader believes it is a substitute for or somehow superior to hard power, he is bound to fail. Presidents like Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, and even Obama may resort to military force when they feel they have no choice, but they do so often reluctantly.[41] In the case of Wilson and Obama
particularly (Jimmy Carter was also well within this tradition), this reluctance is an expression not merely of caution, but of an ideological predisposition about the proper role of America in the world. A More Humble America. This leads to the question of what Barack Obama means when he describes a more humble America. The Obama Doctrine seeks to raise Americas standing around the world and gain influence by acting less as a leader and more as an equal of many. Besides his now-famous remark about America not being any more exceptional than Britain or Greece,[42] Obama undertook a campaign around the world to apologize for what he believed had been Americas arrogance. His apology tour began with a video speech to the Muslim world, saying that we are not your enemy. We sometimes make mistakes. We have not been perfect, and theres no reason we cant go back to the respect and partnership that America had with the Muslim world as recently as 20 or 30 years ago.[43] Then in Europe, at his first NATO summit in early 2009, he lamented Americas arrogance, its failure to appreciate Europes leading role in the world, and those times where America has shown arrogance and been dismissive, even derisive.[44] Obama has been criticized for his policy of extending an open hand to enemies while rebuffing friends and close allies. Consider why: He is the first President since 1991 not to welcome the Dalai Lama to the White House (reportedly because he did not want to offend China) when that dignitary made his first visit to Washington after Obama took office.[45] He prominently posed in a now-famous handshake with Venezuelan dictator Hugo Chvez. He did not meet with Prime Minister Gordon Brown when Brown first came to Washington; in fact, the White House refused five requests from the U.K. before the President granted a meeting and after turning down Browns request for help in the Falklands dispute[46] (and reversing years of U.S. policy by supporting Argentina in that dispute). He canceled his trip to Asia twice for domestic political reasons. To reset relations with Russia, he essentially allowed Russia a veto over our missile defense plans with the Czech Republic and Poland, making no effort to criticize Moscows growing assault on its citizens political and civil rights. He further fed our allies concerns about his aims toward Russia when he failed to meet with the President of Georgia in Washington for his nuclear proliferation summit, and he did not even invite the President of Azerbaijana country important to his plans for Afghanistan and Iranto that summit despite inviting all of its neighbors but Iran.[47] To the people of The Americas, he wrote: too often, the United States has not pursued and sustained engagement with our neighbors. He said the U.S. had been too easily distracted by its other priorities in the world, but that his Administration would renew and sustain a broader partnershipon behalf of our common prosperity and our common security.[48] And he chose to back Hugo Chvezs ally in Honduras, who was seeking to extend his own presidency unconstitutionally, even as Chvez was mocking Obama for weakness and asking Russia for new weapons. Actions speak loudly, but perhaps the words of the new National Security Strategy speak loudest about how the Obama Administration sees its diplomatic role in the world: Finally, we will pursue engagement among peoplesnot just governmentsaround the world. The United

States Government will make a sustained effort to engage civil society and citizens and facilitate increased connections among the American people and peoples around the world.[49] The problem with this approach is that the U.S. government has
a responsibility to the people of America to act in its own and its allies best interests. Apologizing

for things that happened in the past may gain popularity abroad, but so far, it has done little to change minds about our policies. If anything, it has portrayed a weaker United States not only to our allies, but to adversaries striving to gain any advantage over us. The repercussions could be graveand here, history also provides an example. Not long after President Jimmy Carter apologized for Americas supposedly excessive fear of Communism, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and the hard-liners revolted in Iran, taking Americans hostage. Similarly, just two months after John F. Kennedy indicated to Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev that he was willing to compromise on nuclear testing, Khrushchev erected the Berlin Wall and restarted nuclear weapons testing.
Kennedy believed that reaching out to the Soviet leader would make him more conciliatory; Khrushchev read that as weakness. It is worth noting in this respect that the main reason why the Obama Administration has recently adopted a tougher line on Iran is that the previously conciliatory approach utterly failed. Many people predicted this would happen. President George W. Bush had in fact reached out to Iran numerous times, only to be rebuffed each time. So it is not as if there was not enough historical evidence to predict what would happen to Obama if policymakers in the Administration had been willing to acknowledge it. The reason that earlier policy had

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failed is that it misunderstood the problem. Iran does not want nuclear weapons because the U.S. is arrogant, but rather because it wants to dominate the region and prevent any military intervention that could dislodge its leadership. So a humbler America is completely irrelevant to the problem: In fact, it is a nave application of what hitherto had been a cynical political strategy to win the election against an unpopular President, George W. Bush. It would have been much better if the political cynicism practiced in politics at home had been applied internationally to Iran. A More Restrained America. As mentioned in the discussion of soft power, Obama clearly is uncomfortable with Americas role as the worlds dominant military superpower. In his Nobel Prize acceptance speech, he chastised America for its military actions in the past: Americain fact, no nationcan insist that others follow the rules of the road if

we refuse to follow them ourselves. For when we dont, our actions appear arbitrary and undercut the legitimacy of future interventions, no matter how justified. And this becomes particularly important when the purpose of military action extends beyond self-defense or the defense of one nation against an aggressor.[50] Adopting the worldview of
Americas critics abroad is telling. It may be what an ivory tower professor might assert, but it is not what Americans expect their President to say. Most American Presidents have believed it is always best to have more military power than they would actually use. This is fundamentally what deterrence is about. For a President to distrust that power, as Americas critics abroad appear to do, because it is different or exceptional suggests a willingness to tolerate a diminution of that power in order to strike some conciliatory posture abroad. Deterrence is no longer letting others know that you will strike at them hard if they attack you, but rather trying to disarm them by convincing them that you mean them no harm. This attitude is probably not shared by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, but it does not really matter. Both he and the President are allowing U.S. military power to wane. Gates may be doing so because he believes the future will not necessarily contain warfare among large land armies (believing we will need to fight insurgencies instead), but the President appears to believe that there is positive value in pulling back on hard military power. He cut funding for the production of F-22 fighter jets and the continued development and testing of key missile defense programs. His defense procurement budget is anemic, and so far, he refuses to modernize our nuclear deterrent. Secretary Gates proposed stretching out the procurement of the new class of aircraft carrier and terminating the development of the next-generation Navy cruiser with missile defense capabilities.[51] As our colleague Baker Spring explains, a force structure as small as they are projecting cannot sustain existing U.S. security commitments.[52] The repercussions of such misguided policy may not be known for years. Military power is not

only about fighting and winning wars, but also about others perception of whether you have the means and the will to defeat their aggression. In this case, the perception of American weakness, both in terms of diplomacy and in terms of likely cutbacks in military programs, is starting to bear some disturbing fruit. China has only become more bellicose in the wake of these developments, snubbing Secretary Gatess request to visit Beijing for talks on military affairs. Sensing that Russias influence, rather than Americas, is growing, Ukraines parliament adopted a law effectively preventing it from joining NATOunthinkable a few years ago. North Korea attacked a South Korean naval vessel with impunity and threatened nuclear war over the military exercises we planned with our ally. Despite Obamas late conversion to toughness, Iran appears to have taken Obamas mark and decided to go for broke on nuclear weapons. The correlation of forces, as the Soviets used to say, does not seem to favor America at this point, and it appears that the world is drawing this conclusion about Obamas America: Far from the kinder, gentler nation that will elicit goodwill and cooperation, they see a weak and untrustworthy America that forces friends to pull back and enemies to forge ahead. A recent poll of the
Arab world found that confidence in Obamas foreign policies in the Middle East fell from 51 percent to 16 percent in just one year. It also found that a slight majority of the Arab public sees a nuclear-armed Iran as a better option for the Middle East. According to an expert at George Washington University, Arabs have concluded that [Obama] cant deliver on his promises at best, or that hes just like Bush at worst.[53] A Better Foreign Policy Vision The pillars of the Obama Doctrine will have both intended and

unintended consequences: They will make America less exceptional and put us on the road to decline, and they will make us less secure as other countries feel emboldened to threaten us and hold our policies hostage.
The alternative is not to become the worlds bully, but rather to reassert American leadership in defense of liberty around the world. This will require policies that: Strengthen our security alliances, create new ones, and establish new coalitions and entities based on shared values. President Obama has talked about the significance of international partnerships, but partnerships will fall short of our expectations if the countries with which we align share neither our values nor our goals. The U.N. is a prime example. As one of 192 member states, our efforts there frequently are sidelined or voted down. For many other states, the U.N. is their only claim to relevance in the global arena and their only chance at influencing the decisions or restraining the actions of the United States. In addition, many of the institutions created in the aftermath of World War II are outdated, unable to respond to todays challenges. The U.S. is not required to run all of its initiatives to spur peace, security, and development through the U.N. or these other bodies. Instead, to spur economic development, respect for human rights, and security, the U.S. should take the lead in creating new institutions and arrangements that enhance strong bilateral cooperation among like-minded nations. Examples could include a Global Economic Freedom Forum that focuses on expanding free markets, a Liberty Forum for Human Rights that promotes individual freedoms and human rights, or a Global Freedom Coalition to promote security.[54] Invest in peace through strength. Our ability to defend our nation and our

allies, and to advance our interests, depends on our ability to maintain the strength, flexibility, and quality of our forces. Declining defense investments that take us to the margins of military superiority while countries like China and Russia invest heavily to modernize and grow their forces is risky business. A robust U.S. military is both the surest way to deter aggression and the backbone of effective diplomacy. However, U.S. defense spending is projected to fall, relative to the economy, from todays 4.9 percent to 3.6 percent by 2015.[55] According to White
House spending projections, Obama plans to increase spending for the General Services Administration by 22 percent, the Treasury Department by 35 percent, and foreign aid by 18 percent over the next two years, but he will cut the defense budget by 5.5 percent. In 2010, defense was targeted for about half of the $17 billion identified for spending cuts with some 50 defense programs either cut back or eliminated, compromising our air, naval, and ballistic missile defense superiority.[56] Yet one of the most serious threats to

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fielding a robust military force tomorrow is Obamas out-of-control domestic discretionary spending on top of the rapid growth of mandatory funding to run the nations entitlement programs.[57] Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recently told a group at the Brookings Institution that the number one threat that keeps him up at night is the national debt, because it is on a trajectory to exceed Americas gross domestic product in 15 years.[58] In fact, according to the Office of Management and Budget, gross federal debt will exceed GDP in 2012.[59] Place liberty first. Rather then apologizing for supposed American wrongdoings of the past, the President and his Administration should focus on defending and advancing liberty wherever it may be cultivated. As it was after World War II, promoting liberty should once again be the central organizing political principle of our alliances and the international institutions and treaties we join.[60] Promoting liberty is more than spreading democracy; it involves creating strong institutions that enable and protect self-governance, the rule of law, civil and political rights, property rights, and economic opportunities. The people of the United States continue to demonstrate the fruits of such liberty, and we should never apologize for their generosity and endeavors that have saved millions of lives and rescued millions of people from the throes of tyranny. Win in Afghanistan. The United States will sacrifice its credibility, undermine the confidence of the NATO alliance,

and place vital U.S. national interests at risk if it accepts defeat in Afghanistan. The world will become a much more dangerous place. On the other hand, winning in Afghanistan will guard against the possibility of another 9/11 type of terrorist attack on the U.S. and create the necessary pressure on nuclear-armed Pakistan to deal with organized terrorist groups within its borders, partner to demobilize the Taliban, and recognize the importance of normalizing relations with India. Winning will be a crushing blow to those who provide support for Islamist terrorism and a stern warning to all our enemies that the U.S. can and will defend its vital national interests. But winning will require renouncing a predetermined timeline and fully resourcing the U.S. military
counterinsurgency strategy. Take a tougher stand on North Korea. The U.S. must stand shoulder to shoulder in defense of its ally, South Korea. It must insist that all nations fully implement U.N. sanctions on North Korea to prevent Pyongyang from procuring and exporting missile- and WMD-related components and freeze the financial assets of any complicit North Korean or foreign person, company, bank, or government. The sanctions should be maintained until Pyongyang abandons the behavior that triggered punitive action. The U.S. must press the U.N. Security Council to close the loopholes in Resolution 1874, such as adding measures to enable the military means to enforce the sanctions. It should target the other end of proliferation by imposing unilateral sanctions on a more extensive list of foreign entities engaged in the pipeline and call upon other nations to fulfill their obligations to enforce laws and U.N. resolutions. It should lead the global effort to enforce international law against illegal North Korean activities, including the counterfeiting of currency and pharmaceuticals, the production and distribution of narcotics, and mo ney laundering. Prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. An Iranian people free from the domination of a repressive, extremist government is the best way to turn back the ambitions of a regime intent on threatening the free world with nuclear weapons. The U.S. must insist that other concerned countries enforce the strongest possible targeted sanctions on the regime in Tehran and on its internal security organs; ban all foreign investment, loans and credits, subsidized trade, and refined petroleum exports to Iran; and deny visas to its officials. It should launch a targeted public diplomacy campaign to expose the regimes human rights abuses and help facilitate communications among the dissidents. It should find ways to aid the opposition. It should strive to reduce Iranian meddling in Iraq by maintaining the strongest troop presence there; a stable and democratic Iraq will offer Shiites an alternative model that helps to delegitimize Irans Islamist system. The U.S. should rapidly develop and deploy a new generation of nuclear weapons to convince Tehran that any attempt to use nuclear weapons will likely fail to achieve whatever political and military objectives it has in mind. And it should expand U.S. military capabilities to defend U.S. interests and allies, including deploying a robust and comprehensive missile defense system. Undertake responsible arms control with a strategy to protect and defend the nation.Such a strategy would allow the U.S. and Russia to reduce their operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads below the levels in the Moscow Treaty without constraining missile defenses. It would permit nuclear weapons to be configured and deployed to enhance those defenses without the threat of retaliation on population centers. It would seek mutual cooperation from Moscow in fielding effective missile defenses against strategic attacks. It would seek, as an offshoot of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, to negotiate bilateral treaties with Russia and others to counter nuclear-armed terrorism. Finally, it would seek to invite other countries to join with the U.S. and Russia in a global stability treaty that emphasizes strategic defenses, not offensive nuclear arms. Establish the worlds freest economy. Economic strength is the cornerstone of national power. We must adopt an economic freedom agenda[61] for the United States that, if fully implemented, would help the U.S. to rejoin the ranks of the economically free on the Heritage Foundation/Wall Street Journal Index of Economic Freedom by improving its score from 78.0 to 89.8. Even better, for the first time ever, this would give the U.S. the top ranking among all the economies of the worlda worthy goal for the land of the free that is fully attainable by a committed and determined citizenry.

America Must Lead A doctrine that posits that America must blend in better with the rest of the world will usher in Americas decline. American exceptionalism is not dead. Even more, it is not the root of all the worlds evils. It is the blessing of the liberty for which so many Americans fought, and each generation has a moral obligation to do what they can to spread that liberty and thereby ensure peace. It is simply not possible to
remain free and prosperous at home if freedom and prosperity do not exist abroad. We cannot isolate ourselves from the world any more than we can become like all the rest without drastic repercussions for our nation and the world. The Obama Doctrine, by seeking to remake America to please others, will fail because, in the end, no one will like the instability, vulnerability, and economic stagnation that follow from a weaker America. America has seen dangerous times beforeduring the Revolution, the Civil War, and two world wars. Each time, America emerged stronger than before because most Americans decided they did not want to be defeated. They refused to give up. Americas decline is not inevitable. It is a choice; it will happen when most Americans decide that what is unique about this countrythe Constitution and our legacy of libertyis no longer worth fighting for. The Tea Party movement indicates that many Americans still hold our founding principles dear, but they must remain vigilant and ready to defend our liberties from every internal and external threat. America remains the indispensable nation, with many lives depending on its economic and political power. It is the guardian of freedoms and security at home and abroad precisely because it isexceptional. What Ronald Reagan believed remains true: America must secure the peace with strength strength of character, strength of will, moral strength from our values and our

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aspirations, economic strength born of opportunity, and military strength hewn from the ingenuity and ideals of a free people. President Obama believes that his outward orientation will improve Americas standing in the world and thus its security, but Americas policies and interests can never mirror those of other countries. No other country has the caliber of military and economic resources to compare to ours, and no other country accepts the kind of responsibility we have for assuring the security of free people around the world. Our interests will always be at odds with those of other nations, no matter how much we try to conform to them. The tenets of the Obama Doctrine described in this paper do not suit either this geopolitical reality or someone who believes in Americas obligation and ability to lead. Rather, they suit someone who believes he is managing Americas decline in a post-American world. They do not reflect history or the threats we face. They will serve to undermine Americas strengths and make it more difficult for friends and allies to figure out where we stand or how we might act in critical times. Ultimately, the Obama Doctrine will force friendly nations to look elsewhere, not to Washington, for arrangements that bring them greater security. And that will make this a far more dangerous world indeed.

The plan causes domestic isolationism Even if they preserve military strength we wont be willing to send our troops anywhere Twining, Senior Fellow for Asia at the German Marshall Fund, 9-30-9 (Dan, The stakes in Afghanistan go well
beyond Afghanistan,http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/09/30/the_stakes_of_afghanistan_go_well_beyond_afghanistan )
Russia appears to be quietly reveling in the prospect that NATO, which appeared so threatening to Russian eyes during its multiple rounds of enlargement during the 1990s, could be defeated in its first real out-of-area operation. A NATO defeat in Afghanistan

would call into question the future of the alliance and the credibility of American leadership with it, possibly creating a new and lasting transatlantic breach and intensifying concerns about the alliance's ability to protect weak European states against a resurgent Russia. China has no interest in Afghanistan's collapse into a sanctuary for Islamist extremists, including Uighers who militate against China's rule in Xinjiang. But a Western defeat in Afghanistan, which if historical precedent holds would be followed by a bout of U.S. isolationism, would only create more space for China to pursue its (for now) peaceful rise.