SYMPOSIUM

Democratic Professionalism: Sharing Authority in Civic Life Constituting Green Democracy: A Political Project
Douglas W. Dzur Albert Torgerson
Early flirtations with authoritarian and anarchist proposals have largely given way to a democratic turn in green political theory. With this turn, issues of constitutionalism have become salient, and we face the issue of the proper scope of state power in the face of green concerns. Understood as being concerned with the limitations that should be placed upon state power, constitutionalism was something that both authoritarianism and anarchism either avoided or rejected. The current concern with democracy, however, obviously cannot avoid confronting the issue of the role of state power in a democratic green state.1 Whether one concludes that the role of the state should be a large one or a small one, however, focusing on the problem of state power frames the question in liberal terms that have been familiar since Locke. Here the state is regarded as both a necessary protector of individual rights and a threat to them.2 What is ideally sought, moreover, is a finished constitutional design, or at least the basic outline of one. Is this framing of the question sufficient? No approach to the constitution of a green democracy can be adequate if it focuses simply on the problem of state power. Such an approach lacks a sufficient assessment of the prevailing alignments of power in the present historical context. The conventional assumption is that this context, at least in the industrially advanced countries, is fundamentally a democratic one. This assumption often prevails even when liberal democracy is deemed not to be entirely adequate as a democratic form, but to require enhanced deliberation. Yet, if the typically established form of liberal democracy is significantly undemocraticif, indeed, it contains pronounced oligarchic and authoritarian elements that severely inhibit democratizationthen efforts to determine the proper constitutional design of a green democracy are inadequate on their own. What they lack, most significantly, is a recognition of the historical scope of the problem and the political project that would be needed in actually constituting a green democracy. form that could respond effectively to the threats that the prevailing order had created and was continuing rapidly to generate. From the authoritarian perspective, the whole point of such a transformation would be to place reliance upon the coercive powers of the state in a way that entailed the diminution, if not total elimination, of established constitutional limitations. This approach placed an emphasis on the necessity of a hierarchical institutional order.3 In contrast, the anarchist response to ecological crisis maintained that hierarchy was the problem, not the solution. From this perspective, the crisis demanded an institutional transformation toward a pattern of decentralized, egalitarian and self-managing local communities attuned to ecological constraints and complexities. The overarching goal was one of harmony, both between humankind and the rest of nature and among human beings themselves. There could be no question of a need for limitations upon state power because the state, along with all forms of hierarchy, would be abolished. There was also no doubt that such a transformation was a revolutionary project based in a diversity of emerging social movements, of which the ecological movement would be of primary importance.4 The authoritarian response, often hearkening back to Hobbes, was guided by the idea that the environmental crisis demanded an extraordinary concentration of power capable of suppressing human wants that, if left unchecked, would overwhelm the carrying capacity of the earth. The anarchist response was based upon an entirely different diagnosis. The real source of the crisis was not unchecked human wants, but hierarchical social structures, patterns of domination distorting the human potential to create cooperative communities in ecological harmony with nature. Instead of a concentration of power, the utopian vision of ecological communities involved the belief, as Michael Kenny has put it, that power relationships can be transcended once humans and nature are operating harmoniously.5 The authoritarian and anarchist responses thus mirrored one another with opposing images that both, in effect, anticipated an abolition of politics. It is striking that the aura of impracticality that surrounds the anarchist scenario is matched by an apparently hard-headed realism on the part of authoritarianism. Yet, what accounts for this appearance of realism? The authoritarian response gathers credibility from the contention that liberal democracies have become too democratic for their own good. What is needed, from this perspective, is a concentration of power able both to overcome

Beyond Constitutionalism? Authoritarianism and Anarchism

What both authoritarian and anarchist schools of thought shared, despite their stark opposition to one another, was a perception of ecological crisis and the conviction that this crisis called for a rapid and dramatic transformation of the established order. What was urgently needed was an institutional
18 The Good Society, Volume 17, No. 2, 2008

Copyright 2009 The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA

GREEN CONSTITUTIONALISM
resistance from an undisciplined populace and to impose a to the image of the possessive individual, whichas a figure coherent strategy for the common good. populating economic and game-theoretic modelsis commonly Authoritarianism, however, does not simply stand opposed pictured as equivalent to the human being as such. to liberal democracy, but reinforces authoritarian elements that With citizenship thus ultimately conceived on an economic have emerged historically as part of liberal democracy itself. model, politics tends to be understood in a functional sense as These elements become manifest prinpart of the operation of a given sociocipally in the administrative sphere.6 economic system. The liberal concern Calls for an authoritarian response to to establish constitutional limits on With the democratic turn in green ecological crisis thus do not primarily state power seeks primarily to create political theory, the potential confront some unruly populace, but protective barriers around the possessignificance of public activism gains necessarily challenge what remains sive individual. Authoritarianism takes attention in regard to deliberative a largely oligarchic and authoritarthis model of the actor as given and institutions and the public sphere. ian institutional order. It is an order seeks to establish more direct conYet the accent here on deliberation that has played a central role both in trol over this individual. Anarchism, suggests yet another image of the advancing the industrial project and in in turn, simply rejects this model as actor, that of the politically active generating environmental problems. an impoverished understanding of the citizen. This image signals a return Authoritarianism thus finds itself in potential of the human being as a to politics, to a context in which the contradictory position of challengcooperative community member, a power is neither so concentrated ing one hierarchical order in the name potential that is to be realized through nor so diminished in its significance of another, thereby requiring demorevolutionary transformation. that an abolition of politics would be cratic support from the same populace With the democratic turn in imaginable. that it seeks to control. green political theory, the potential The authoritarian position, in other significance of public activism gains words, implicitly relies upon the same base of support that anarattention in regard to deliberative institutions and the public chism seeks to mobilize for revolutionary ends. At the same time, sphere. Yet the accent here on deliberation suggests yet another authoritarianism assumes that the administrative sphere is in image of the actor, that of the politically active citizen. This effect an instrument that can be turned to a qualitatively different image signals a return to politics, to a context in which power is endthat of serving not industrialism, but the environmentalist neither so concentrated nor so diminished in its significance that challenge to it. Anarchism at least threw this institutional form into an abolition of politics would be imaginable. question and helped to place on the agenda of inquiry and practice the potential significance of decentralized, grassroots initiatives. The Green State: A Problem of Constitutional The anticipated abolition of politics, in both authoritarian Design? and anarchist instances, has been based upon presuppositions about what is natural for human beingsor, more precisely, With its focus on the problem erecting barriers to restrict the on opposing models of the actor. Especially in its invocation of scope of state power, modern constitutionalism revolves about Hobbes, the authoritarian response to ecological crisis would a notion of political order marked by division, even fragmentaeradicate politics by concentrating power in a way that limits tion. This notion appears to contrast sharply with ancient and the destructiveness of the naturally self-seeking possessive medieval conceptions of a constitutional unity in which different individual, an image of the human being that has become famillevels join together to form a coherent whole. In his early coniar in the figure of the rational economic actor.7 The anarchist tribution to green political theory, John Rodman indicated how response, in contrast, rejects this image as a distortion of the these conceptions, particularly in Plato and Aquinas, operate on human potential, advancing instead the diametrically opposed a logic of analogy so that the distinct levels of psyche, polis, and image of the cooperative community member. cosmos all mirror and reinforce one another in the context of a The citizens of liberal democracy are conventionally whole ruled by a common principle.8 Yet Rodman holds that the modern era only appears to dispense with the logic of analogy. understood as individuals acting instrumentally to realize their Even though modern standards of rationality rule out analogy preferred outcomes in a competitive context governed by conas a legitimate form of argumentative proof, he maintains, the stitutionally grounded legal rights and obligations that make up legitimacy of the modern order at a cultural level has historically the rules of the game. Collective actionwhether, for example, been supported by the implicit analogy of mechanism operating by interest groups, state agencies, political parties, business corat the levels of the individual, the collectivity, and nature so that porations or social movementsis ultimately deemed reducible
Volume 17, Number 2, 2008 19

SYMPOSIUM
each level mirrors and reinforces the others. Indeed, the liberal conception of the possessive individual who requires protection both from others and the state fits into the coherent operation of a larger whole, the self-regulating market mechanism and, even, the more general pattern of a socio-economic system. It was thus that Max Weber pointed to the centrality for modern culture of the conviction that all things might be mastered through calculation.9 From the liberal perspective, indeed, the case for the protection of the apparently free possessive individual is sustained not only by the intrinsic rights of the individual, but also by the larger vision of a collective historical project: the domination of nature.10 Green political theory has arisen with environmentalism, which itself emerged in the late 1960s and has periodically waxed and waned since then as a public concern. Yet what is environmentalism?11 Efforts to define environmentalism in positive terms as a set of determinate attributes invariably confront the perplexing problem of either including too much or excluding too much. The constant risk is for the resulting concept to become part of doctrinaire squabbles about what is and what is not truly green. Such an approach to the question also risks a preoccupation with relatively narrow issues that tend to screen out attention to the larger historical context. Another approach is to begin by asking not what environmentalism is, but what it is notmore precisely, to consider what it opposes. In a word, environmentalism has arisen historically as a challenge to industrialism and, in particular, to its premises. Industrialism is premised on a pair of beliefs that, arising in the early modern era, were able to go largely unquestioned for centuries, until environmentalism posed a sharp challenge to both: (1) the view that human beings had the collective capacity to dominate nature; and (2) the conviction that human beings had the moral right, even responsibility, to do so. Indeed, Francis Bacons New Atlantis of 1627 anticipated the advent of a modern research institute capable of technological innovations for the enlarging of the bounds of Human Empire, to the effecting of all things possible.12 Even though Bacons own thought perhaps retained some pre-modern sense of limits, this sense would increasingly be attenuated as industrialism gained sway at the level of cultural presuppositions. Even as late as 1967, a serious observer could still make this explicit claim: It appears that a total control of nature is possible in the not very distant future.13 The consequence of industrialist presuppositions in the context of specific project proposals has been captured by Giandomenico Majone in this depiction of a characteristic bias: The initial assumption is that the innovation will achieve what the innovator claims for it and that it will have no negative consequences that could reduce the attractiveness of its practical implementation.14 Reaffirming the prudence of a sense of limits, environmentalism constitutes a challenge to this type of
20 The Good Society

bias both in specific cases and more generally in the industrialist vision of the domination of nature. Green constitutional proposals often seek to extend the scope of state protection beyond the liberal conception of the possessive individual, to assign rights, or at least moral consideration, to the socially oppressed and disadvantaged, to future human generations, and to non-human beings. This same concern guides Robyn Eckersleys suggestion in The Green State that the precautionary principle be constitutionally entrenched. Significantly, however, her proposal also strikes at the industrialist presupposition that human beings have, or are developing, the technological capacity to dominate nature. At the level of particular projects, to recall Majones point, this presupposition typically translates into a distinct tendency to favor proposed developments while denying or downplaying potential problems. Especially in the context of scientific uncertainty, as Sylvia Tesh has shown in the specific case of toxic waste concerns, the burden of proof is placed on demonstrating danger rather than on demonstrating safety.15 The reversal of this burden of proof is key to the idea of the precautionary principle. By advocating the constitutional entrenchment of this principle in a green state, Eckersley not only makes a legal proposal, but also challenges the cultural orientation that sustains industrialism. In proposing the precautionary principle as a constitutional provision for a green state, Eckersley emphasizes that she is advocating not the outcome of a decision-making process, but simply a change in the process itself in order to mandate more systematic consideration of potential environmental impacts: Mandating such consideration is not the same as mandating particular outcomes. To constitutionally entrench the precautionary principle would not put it beyond the reach of democratic debate, since the appropriateness of its application to particular circumstances would always need to be debated on a case by case basis. The main point for Eckersley, however, is that participants in the dialogue would not be free to ignore it.16 In the design for a green state proposed by Eckersley, then, such constitutional entrenchment would have two main features: (1) it would tend to shift the burden of proof in decision-making processes; and (2) it would be part of giving decision-making processes a more deliberative orientation. Indeed, a democratic green state would, more generally in her view, need to take a form in accord with the orientation of deliberative democracy. Is constitutional entrenchment necessary? In his book The Liberal Tradition in America, Louis Hartz suggested that the entrenchment of liberal rights in the United States constitution was largely redundant because the tenets of liberalism were already culturally presupposed in America, the land of Locke.17 Eckersleys current proposal to entrench the precautionary principle builds upon developments, influenced by environmentalism,

GREEN CONSTITUTIONALISM
that include both earlier efforts to establish processes of environmental impact assessment and the more recent acceptance of the precautionary principle in certain jurisdictions. Compared with the prevalence of liberalism that Hartz saw in late 18th century America, however, contemporary environmentalism does not hold sway culturally in the context of advanced industrial societies: here the presuppositions of industrialism continue to prevail in both discourse and decision. It may well be, indeed, that the constitutional entrenchment that Eckersley seeks could be achieved only when it had become largely redundant, only when the capacity of industrialism to prevail in discourse and decision had been sharply attenuatedif not entirely displacedby the challenges of environmentalism. Yet, even if one might question the need for her constitutional design in the context of a fully green state, her suggestion has the significance of now focusing attention on the need to contest industrialist presuppositions in the context of a political project to constitute a green democracy. This political project could not have the aim simply of influencing changes at a functional level in the operations of an established socio-economic system. The project, rather, has to be one of constitutive politics in the sense that the goal is that of making change more broadly in prevailing structures of power and in cultural presuppositions. The need for change at this constitutive level becomes all the more evident, indeed, if a green democracy is also to be a deliberative democracy. environment while underestimating problems of complexity and unpredictability. In this context, deliberative institutions serve to expand limited and fallible perspectives, particularly offering an ingenious mechanism for contesting the perspectives of experts whose professional opinions are liable to be shaped by the presuppositions of industrialism.18 For Smith, deliberative institutions both promote reflective public opinion and serve as mechanisms for its transmission to decision making centers within the liberal democratic state.19 Although he suggests the possibility of connecting deliberative institutions with a more radical project of ecological democratisation,20 Smith does not fully address the problems of power and co-optation that confront a project of constituting green democracy in a world dominated by institutions that have developed with and for the promotion of industrialism. Even though he is not oblivious to the problems of power and co-optation that have been stressed from critical perspectivessuch as that of John Dryzek21Smith is clear in stating that he tends to be optimistic about the green potential of the liberal democratic state.22 Here he makes explicit an orientation, common in the deliberative literature, that tends to be fairly sanguine concerning prevailing structures of power and to accept at face value the typical view that they are, in fact, democratic. The oligarchic and authoritarian features of liberal democracy thus tend to be neglected. If these features are clearly acknowledged, then the project of constituting a green democracy cannot be fulfilled by the mere expansion of deliberative institutions within the established context of liberal democracy. Instead, deliberative institutions become significant as part of a larger project of democratization. What if the citizens of a green democracy turn out not to support green initiatives? The simplistic framing of this common question views green democracy as a change merely in the content of liberal democracy, rather than a change in its context and form. The project of constituting a green democracy requires a cultural challenge to the tenets of industrialism that would involve a reversal in the orientation of public discourse. More generally, indeed, this reversal would entail constitutional changes, to recall Rodman, at the levels of psyche, polis, and cosmosor, in other words, in ways of understanding both the individual and the collectivity, as well as the broader context of nature. The democratic turn in green political theory has implicitly followed Rodman by calling for an ecological orientation. Calls for ecologically virtuous citizenship do, indeed, alter the understanding of the individual in relation to the collectivity. The possessive individual here tends to be displaced by the cooperative community member. Moreover, the appeal to ecology draws attention, as Rodman maintains, to the significance of such principles as diversity, complexity, integrity, harmony, stability, scarcity as criteria to guide practical decision-making.23
Volume 17, Number 2, 2008 21

The Green Democratic Project: Deliberative Democracy and Beyond

The democratic turn in green political theory has not only moved away from authoritarianism and anarchism, but has also tended to criticize liberal democracy as a form that is lacking in its capacity to respond to environmental challenges. In his book Deliberative Democracy and the Environment, Graham Smith has indeed shown how the democratic turn has tended to endorse the goal of deliberative democracy. Emphasizing the importance of effective decision-making, however, Smith himself stresses that deliberative democracy does not offer a fully adequate model. What he endorses is not a total rejection of liberal democracy, but the promotion within it of deliberative institutions. Responding to industrialism, environmentalism challenges its promotion of the domination of nature. Smith finds no guarantee that deliberative institutions in this context would necessarily result in a rejection of industrialist tenets, but simply the potential that a serious consideration of plural perspectives would be opened up. Liberal democracy, by itself, lacks the capacity to challenge the cultural orientation of industrialism with the consequence that what tends to prevail is a reductionism that overestimates the human ability to control the natural

SYMPOSIUM
emergence of a green public sphere, in particular, has chalUltimately, though, Rodman is at a loss to provide a determinate lenged this context while advancing an environmentalist idiom set of guidelines and a way to judge their application in particuthat serves to throw into question, or even reverse, the presuplar circumstances. Indeed, although he suggests the prospect of positions of industrialism.30 In doing so, the green public sphere replacing the mechanistic analogies of modernity with ecologialso challenges the administrative sphere, which has emerged hiscal ones, he clearly recognizes that this cannot mean a reduction24 torically as the chief vehicle both for the project of industrialism ist appeal to the shifting sands of the science of ecology. and for the rise of mass communication. The nascent green public The consequence for green political theory is that the consphere is thus an institution, emerging from green politics, which stitution of a green democracy cannot simply replicate with is key to the political project of constituting a green democracy. a different content the mechanistic ordering of psyche, polis, The administrative sphere is no monolith, but that complex and cosmos that modernity offered as an implicit guarantee to ofpartly conflicting and partly cooperativeformal organizathe tenets of industrialism. The same problem arises with the tions that is central to the functioning of advanced industrial proposal, advanced by Alan Carter, for a radical green politisociety. In other words, the administrative sphere is by no means cal theory that would replace an environmentally hazardous to be equated with the administrative state alone, but is constidynamic with one that is environmentally benign. There is tuted by the full ensemble of modern formal organizations no doubt much to recommend decentralization, participatory emphatically including the great corporations, their profound democracy, self-sufficiency, egalitarianism, alternative technolimpact upon the shape and direction of public policy, their ogy, pacifism, and internationalism,25 but such criteria suggest an agenda rather than an outcome. The politically significant internal structures and dynamics, and their pervasive influence point is that concrete decisionsand, indeed, the very question in propagating the consumerism of mass society. of what constitutes a green initiativecannot be reduced to Liberal democracy calls itself democratic by adhering to a matters of knowledge and calculation, but emphatically remain self-serving conception of democracy as being strictly a form matters of opinion. of government. Here democracy is Opinion, in this sense, is by no achieved through the constitutional means mere opinion. Indeed, the entrenchment of civil rights and demoThe project, rather, has to be one of public shaping and sharing of opincratic procedures, such as equality constitutive politics in the sense that ions through debate among multiple before the law, freedom of expresthe goal is that of making change sion, universal suffrage, and competiperspectives is, for Hannah Arendt, more broadly in prevailing structures tive elections. What liberal democracy the very essence of politics.26 She of power and in cultural presuphere advances a highly originaland has largely had to ignore, or discount positions. The need for change at contestedview of politics as a kind as irrelevant, is democracy conceived this constitutive level becomes all as a form not only of government, but of performance in the public realm. On the more evident, indeed, if a green also of society.31 The stark inequaliher terms, indeed, such a performative democracy is also to be a deliberapolitics would rule out understandings ties of wealth in capitalist societies are tive democracy. of politics in either a functional or clearly at odds with such a conception constitutive sense. Yet a key question of democracy and thus throw into would be the extent to which debate, as a means of developquestion the democratic character of liberal democracy. Yet it ing and refining opinion, might be significant in functional or is in the dynamics of the administrative sphere that oligarchic constitutive domains.27 Deliberative institutions, indeed, have at and authoritarian features of advanced industrial society become 28 times been promoted, as with Smiths call for citizen forums, especially manifest. with functional or constitutive ends in view. Yet the potential Max Weber, who acutely perceived the advent of the adminfor such public debate in the shaping and sharing of opinions istrative sphere, regarded the modern bureaucratic form of appears to be sharply attenuated in the present historical context organization as an instrument, an administrative machine. He 29 Exaggerated claims to of propagandistic mass communication. did not, however, say that this instrument was suitable to just any the authority of knowledge and the scope of calculability carry purpose; he saw it, rather, as particularly suited to the advance with them, moreover, an authoritarian propensity that, itself part of rationalization and the promotion of the iron cage of the of the project of industrialism, serves to close off debate and to industrial cosmos. He especially did not contemplate what instirule out of public discourse a sense of limits. tutional form would be appropriate in dealing with the deleteriConcerns to promote the significance of the public sphere ous and dangerous consequences of industrialism. Green politics along with deliberative institutions generally can be counted now faces this problem.32 Yet the power and importance of the as a challenge to the prevailing communicative context. The administrative sphere are too pervasive for it to somehow simply
22 The Good Society

GREEN CONSTITUTIONALISM
be overthrown, as the overthrow of the state was once contemplated in certain revolutionary scenarios. Consequently, the problem posed to green politics by the administrative sphere is one of adaptation, which might take the form of a slow boring of hard boards,33 but which would, in any case, require continuous struggles across a range of sites. Such struggles would not only be part of a project to constitute a green democracy, but would be part of any struggle for the democratization of advanced industrial society.34 The constitutional features of liberal democracy that allow for political action in civil society provide necessary groundwork for a green politics aiming to constitute a green democracy. In such a project, however, the green citizen, conceived as a cooperative community member, can neither be fully accepted nor rejected. Such a green citizen is no doubt important, but emphasizing the personal responsibility of the individual risks a moralism that is part of the problem because it deflects attention from systematic patterns of incentives, structured principally through the administrative sphere, that serve to shape and direct the behavior of the possessive individual. Green politics thus cannot rely entirely upon the cooperative green citizen. Nor can it avoid accepting the importance of the possessive individual as a persistent fixture of the contemporary cultural and historical context. The project of green democracy thus also faces the problem of devising environmentally appropriate incentives for the possessive individual.35 Lockes famous provision for a vast, perhaps unlimited, accumulation of wealth by the individual is one liberal right that has often been criticized in the name of economic and social justice. For a project of constituting a green democracy, however, the principal problem posed by this liberal right would reside not so much in the accumulation of wealth per se as in its impact upon social, economic, and political power. Constituting a green democracy would mean building upon the rights of citizens in a liberal democracy to engage in politics and, in doing so, to level the playing field of political action. Directly curbing the access of the great corporations to the corridors of state power could hardly be achieved as a first step, but this access could be brought more clearly into the open through deliberative institutions where it could be challenged and counteracted, at least partly, by groups in civil society. More generally, green politics would need to challenge the dominance of the administrative sphere in shaping the form and content of public discourse. The emergence of a green public sphere as an institution that tends to reverse the discursive orientation of industrialism certainly does not resolve the problem, but does at least indicate its scope. A political project for a green democracy would mean expanding the spaces of political action, particularly in the form of public debates among plural perspectives. This is the work not only of goal oriented social movements, but also of public spheres in which the quality of debate is itself prized.36 In this context, neither the cooperative community member nor the possessive individual is adequate. What needs to be encouraged is the role of the citizen, conceived as a political actor, who indeed acts with functional and constitutive ends in view, but who also engages in political performance, at least in part, for the value that resides in such action. Industrialism did not contemplate such value, but the environmentalist challenge opens up its potential in the form of green politics, especially with the debates that take place in the green public sphere. Douglas Torgerson is a Professor of Politics, Cultural Studies, and Environmental and Resource Studies at Trent University in Canada. He is the author of The Promise of Green Politics: Environmentalism and the Public Sphere and co-editor with Robert Paehlke of Managing Leviathan: Environmental Politics and the Administrative State.

Endnotes
1. Robyn Eckersley, The Green State: Rethinking Democracy and Sovereignty, (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2004). 2. Protection of individual rights remains a principle of liberalism, whether or not they are grounded in Lockean natural right. Cf. Mark Pennington, Classical Liberalism and Ecological Rationality, Environmental Politics 17:3 (2008), pp. 43148. 3. The works of William Ophuls, Garrett Harden, and Robert Helibroner are associated with the authoritarian perspective. See K.J. Walker, The Environmental Crisis: A Critique of NeoHobbesian Responses, Polity 21:1 (1988), pp. 6781. 4. The classic statement is Murray Bookchin, Ecology and Revolutionary Thought (1965), in his Post-Scarcity Anarchism, (San Francisco: Ramparts Press, 1971). 5. Michael Kenny, Paradoxes of Community, in Brian Doherty and Marius de Geus, eds., Democracy and Green Political Thought, (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 23. 6. See Douglas Torgerson, Limits to the Administrative Mind, in Robert Paehlke and Douglas Torgerson, eds., Managing Leviathan: Environmental Politics and the Administrative State, (Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press, 1990). 7. See C.B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964). 8. John Rodman, Paradigm Change in Political Science: An Ecological Perspective, American Behavioral Scientist, 24 (1980), pp. 4978. 9. Max Weber, Science as a Vocation, in H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds. and trans., From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 139. 10. See William Leiss, The Domination of Nature, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1974). 11. See Douglas Torgerson, Environmentalism, in Shepard Krech III, John McNeill, and Carolyn Merchant, eds., Encyclopedia of World Environmental History, Vol. I, (New York: Routledge, 2003). 12. Francis Bacon, New Atlantis in R.F. Foster, ed., Essays, Advancement of Learning, New Atlantis, and Other Pieces, (New York: Odyssey Press, 1937), p. 480.
Volume 17, Number 2, 2008 23

SYMPOSIUM
13. Earl F. Murphy, Governing Nature, (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1967), p. 11. 14. Giandomenico Majone, Evidence, Argument and Persuasion in the Policy Process, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), p. 5. 15. Sylvia Tesh, Environmentalism, Pre-environmentalism, and Public Policy, Policy Sciences 26 (1993), pp. 120. 16. Eckersley, pp. 13536. 17. Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America, (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1955). 18. Graham Smith, Deliberative Democracy and the Environment, London and (New York: Routledge, 2003), pp. 6263. 19. Ibid., p. 76. 20. Ibid., p. 81. 21. See John S. Dryzek, Strategies of Ecological Democratization, in William M. Lafferty and James Meadowcroft, eds., Democracy and the Environment, (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 1996); John S. Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); John S. Dryzek, David Downes, Christian Hunold, and David Schlosberg, Green States and Social Movements, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). Cf. Douglas Torgerson, The Ambivalence of Discourse, in Robert Paehlke and Douglas Torgerson, eds, Managing Leviathan: Environmental Politics and the Administrative State, (Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press, rev. 2nd ed., 2005). 22. Smith, p. 126. 23. John Rodman, Four Forms of Ecological Consciousness Revisited, in Donald Scherer and Thomas Attig, eds., Ethics and the Environment, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1983), p. 90. 24. Rodman, Paradigm Change in Political Science, p. 66. 25. Alan Carter, Towards a Green Political Theory, in Andrew Dobson and Paul Lucardie, eds., The Politics of Nature: Explorations in Green Political Theory, (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 53. 26. Hannah Arendt, Truth and Politics, in her Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought, (New York: The Viking Press, 1961), p. 241. 27. The functional, constitutive, and performative dimensions of politics are distinguished in Douglas Torgerson, The Promise of Green Politics: Environmentalism and the Public Sphere, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999); Douglas Torgerson, Farewell to the Green Movement? Political Action and the Green Public Sphere, Environmental Politics 9:4 (2000): 119. Also see Douglas Torgerson, Policy Discourse as Dialogue: Emergent Publics and the Reflexive Turn, Critical Policy Analysis, 1:1 (2007), pp. 117. 28. Smith, p. 27. 29. See Jrgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, (Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press, 1989). 30. See Torgerson, The Promise of Green Politics; Torgerson, Farewell to the Green Movement?; Douglas Torgerson, Expanding the Green Public Sphere: Postcolonial Connections, Environmental Politics 15:5 (2006), pp. 71330. 31. See C.B. Macpherson, The Real World of Democracy, (Toronto: CBC Publications, 1965); Robert R. Alford and Roger Friedland, Powers of Theory: Capitalism, the State and Democracy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). 32. See Douglas Torgerson, Obsolescent Leviathan: Problems of Order in Administrative Thought, in Paehlke and Torgerson, eds., Managing Leviathan, 2nd ed., 2005. Cf. Herbert Marcuse, Industrialization and Capitalism in the Work of Max Weber, in his Negations: Essays in Critical Theory, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), p. 216: Bureaucratic control is inseparable from increasing industrialization 33. Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in Gerth and Mills, eds. and trans., From Max Weber, p. 128. 34. Here it becomes important to speak not only of the public sphere or the green public sphere, but also of an indeterminate multiplicity of such spheres and their relationships. 35. See Douglas Torgerson, Rethinking Politics for a Green Economy: A Political Approach to Radical Reform, Social Policy and Administration, 35:5 (2001): 47289. 36. See Torgerson, Farewell to the Green Movement?

24

The Good Society