DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL BAR COUNCIL G.R. No.

191002 | March 17, 2010 FACTS This case is based on multiple cases field with dealt with the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory requirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010 or seven days after the presidential election. On December 22, 2009, Congressman Matias V. Defensor, an ex officio member of the JBC, addressed a letter to the JBC, requesting that the process for nominations to the office of the Chief Justice be commenced immediately. In its January 18, 2010 meeting en banc, the JBC passed a resolution which stated that they have unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice to be vacated on May 17, 2010 upon the retirement of the incumbent Chief Justice. As a result, the JBC opened the position of Chief Justice for application or recommendation, and published for that purpose its announcement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Philippine Star. In its meeting of February 8, 2010, the JBC resolved to proceed to the next step of announcing the names of the following candidates to invite to the public to file their sworn complaint, written report, or opposition, if any, not later than February 22, 2010. Although it has already begun the process for the filling of the position of Chief Justice Puno in accordance with its rules, the JBC is not yet decided on when to submit to the President its list of nominees for the position due to the controversy in this case being unresolved. The compiled cases which led to this case and the petitions of intervenors called for either the prohibition of the JBC to pass the shortlist, mandamus for the JBC to pass the shortlist, or that the act of appointing the next Chief Justice by GMA is a midnight appointment. A precedent frequently cited by the parties is the In Re Appointments Dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the RTC of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively, shortly referred to here as the Valenzuela case, by which the Court held that Section 15, Article VII prohibited the exercise by the President of the power to appoint to judicial positions during the period therein fixed. ISSUES a. b. c. W/N the petitioners have legal standing? W/N there is justiciable controversy that is ripe for judicial determination? W/N the incumbent President appoint the next Chief Justice? RULING

d.

W/N mandamus and prohibition will lie to compel the submission of the shortlist of nominees by the JBC?

Petitioners have legal standing because such requirement for this case was waived by the Court. Legal standing is a peculiar concept in constitutional law because in some cases, suits are not brought by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other government act but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest. But even if, strictly speaking, the petitioners are not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised. There is a justiciable issue We hold that the petitions set forth an actual case or controversy that is ripe for judicial determination. The reality is that the JBC already commenced the proceedings for the selection of the nominees to be included in a short list to be submitted to the President for consideration of which of them will succeed Chief Justice Puno as the next Chief Justice. Although the position is not yet vacant, the fact that the JBC began the process of nomination pursuant to its rules and practices, although it has yet to decide whether to submit the list of nominees to the incumbent outgoing President or to the next President, makes the situation ripe for judicial determination, because the next steps are the public interview of the candidates, the preparation of the short list of candidates, and the interview of constitutional experts, as may be needed. The resolution of the controversy will surely settle with finality the nagging questions that are preventing the JBC from moving on with the process that it already began, or that are reasons persuading the JBC to desist from the rest of the process. PROHIBITION UNDER SECTION 15, ARTICLE VII DOES NOT APPLY TO APPOINTMENTS TO FILL A VACANCY IN THE SUPREME COURT OR TO OTHER APPOINTMENST TO THE JUDICIARY. Two constitutional provisions seemingly in conflict: The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when

continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof. Justification of the Supreme Court: First. The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the framers devoted time to meticulously drafting, styling, and arranging the Constitution. Such meticulousness indicates that the organization and arrangement of the provisions of the Constitution were not arbitrarily or whimsically done by the framers, but purposely made to reflect their intention and manifest their vision of what the Constitution should contain. The Constitution consists of 18 Articles, three of which embody the allocation of the awesome powers of government among the three great departments, the Legislative (Article VI), the Executive (Article VII), and the Judicial Departments (Article VIII). The arrangement was a true recognition of the principle of separation of powers that underlies the political structure As can be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and, among others, it lists the powers vested by the Constitution in the President. The presidential power of appointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Article. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. Although Valenzuela came to hold that the prohibition covered even judicial appointments, it cannot be disputed that the Valenzuela dictum did not firmly rest on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. Moreover, the usage in Section 4(1), Article VIII of the word shall an imperative, operating to impose a duty that may be enforced should not be disregarded. Thereby, Sections 4(1) imposes on the President the imperative duty to make an appointment of a Member of the Supreme Court within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy. The failure by the President to do so will be a clear disobedience to the Constitution.

The 90-day limitation fixed in Section 4(1), Article VIII for the President to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court was undoubtedly a special provision to establish a definite mandate for the President as the appointing power, and cannot be defeated by mere judicial interpretation in Valenzuela to the effect that Section 15, Article VII prevailed because it was couched in stronger negative language. Second. Section 15, Article VII does not apply as well to all other appointments in the Judiciary. There is no question that one of the reasons underlying the adoption of Section 15 as part of Article VII was to eliminate midnight appointments from being made by an outgoing Chief Executive. Given the background and rationale for the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII, we have no doubt that the Constitutional Commission confined the prohibition to appointments made in the Executive Department. The framers did not need to extend the prohibition to appointments in the Judiciary, because their establishment of the JBC and their subjecting the nomination and screening of candidates for judicial positions to the unhurried and deliberate prior process of the JBC ensured that there would no longer be midnight appointments to the Judiciary. Indeed, the creation of the JBC was precisely intended to de-politicize the Judiciary by doing away with the intervention of the Commission on Appointments. Third. As earlier stated, the non-applicability of Section 15, Article VII to appointments in the Judiciary was confirmed by then Senior Associate Justice Regalado to the JBC itself when it met on March 9, 1998 to discuss the question raised by some sectors about the constitutionality of xxx appointments to the Court of Appeals in light of the forthcoming presidential elections. He assured that on the basis of the (Constitutional) Commission s records, the election ban had no application to appointments to the Court of Appeals. This confirmation was accepted by the JBC, which then submitted to the President for consideration the nominations for the eight vacancies in the Court of Appeals. Fourth. Of the 23 sections in Article VII, three (i.e., Section 14, Section15, and Section 16) concern the appointing powers of the President. Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.

Fifth. To hold like the Court did in Valenzuela that Section 15 extends to appointments to the Judiciary further undermines the intent of the Constitution of ensuring the independence of the Judicial Department from the Executive and Legislative Departments. Such a holding will tie the Judiciary and the Supreme Court to the fortunes or misfortunes of political leaders vying for the Presidency in a presidential election. Consequently, the wisdom of having the new President, instead of the current incumbent President, appoint the next Chief Justice is itself suspect, and cannot ensure judicial independence, because the appointee can also become beholden to the appointing authority. In contrast, the appointment by the incumbent President does not run the same risk of compromising judicial independence, precisely because her term will end by June 30, 2010. Sixth. The argument has been raised to the effect that there will be no need for the incumbent President to appoint during the prohibition period the successor of Chief Justice Puno within the context of Section 4 (1), Article VIII, because anyway there will still be about 45 days of the 90 days mandated in Section 4(1), Article VIII remaining. The argument is flawed, because it is focused only on the coming vacancy occurring from Chief Justice Puno s retirement by May 17, 2010. It ignores the need to apply Section 4(1) to every situation of a vacancy in the Supreme Court. Section 4 (3), Article VII requires the regular elections to be held on the second Monday of May, letting the elections fall on May 8, at the earliest, or May 14, at the latest. If the regular presidential elections are held on May 8, the period of the prohibition is 115 days. If such elections are held on May 14, the period of the prohibition is 109 days. Either period of the prohibition is longer than the full mandatory 90-day period to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court. The result is that there are at least 19 occasions (i.e., the difference between the shortest possible period of the ban of 109 days and the 90-day mandatory period for appointments) in which the outgoing President would be in no position to comply with the constitutional duty to fill up a vacancy in the Supreme Court. It is safe to assume that the framers of the Constitution could not have intended such an absurdity. Seventh. As a matter of fact, in an extreme case, we can even raise a doubt on whether a JBC list is necessary at all for the President any President to appoint a Chief Justice if the appointee is to come from the ranks of the sitting justices of the Supreme Court. Sec. 9, Article VIII says: xxx. The Members of the Supreme Court xxx shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for any vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation. xxx

The provision clearly refers to an appointee coming into the Supreme Court from the outside, that is, a non-member of the Court aspiring to become one. It speaks of candidates for the Supreme Court, not of those who are already members or sitting justices of the Court, all of whom have previously been vetted by the JBC. WRIT OF MANDAMUS DOES NOT LIE AGAINST THE JBC Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act that the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It is proper when the act against which it is directed is one addressed to the discretion of the tribunal or officer. Mandamus is not available to direct the exercise of a judgment or discretion in a particular way. For mandamus to lie, the following requisites must be complied with: (a) the plaintiff has a clear legal right to the act demanded; (b) it must be the duty of the defendant to perform the act, because it is mandated by law; (c) the defendant unlawfully neglects the performance of the duty enjoined by law; (d) the act to be performed is ministerial, not discretionary; and (e) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

DUMLAO vs. COMELEC 95 SCRA 392, Jan. 22, 1980 FACTS: A petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injuction and/or Restraining Order was filed to enjoin respondent form implementing certain provisions of BP 51, 52 and 53 for being unconstitutional. Petitioner Dumlao questions Sec. 4 of BP 51 as discriminatory and contrary to equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. Meanwhile, Petitioners Igot and Salapantan, Jr questions the accreditation of some political parties by respondent as contrary to the constitution that provides that a bona fide candidate shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination. ISSUE: Whether or not the filed petition is an actual case or controversy subject to judicial review. Whether or not petitioners have legal standing on the case at bar. HELD:

The Supreme Court held that the petitioners fell short of the necessity that the case be an actual controversy. Dumlao has not been adversely affected by the application of BP 52 nor is any party seeking for his disqualification. The question he poses is in the abstract and a hypothetical issue. Whether or not petitioners are the proper party to submit the petition, the Supreme Court held in the case of Igot and Salapatan, neither of them has been called to have been adversely affected by the operation of the statutory provisions they assail as unconstitutional. What they have is only generated grievance as contrasted to a direct injury creating a substantial interest in the case. Without a litigate interest, they cannot claim any locus standi. However, due to the impelling public interest involved and the proximity of the elections, the strict procedure for judicial relaxed. The Supreme Court held that Sec. 4 of BP 51 was not discriminatory and contrary to equal protection and due process guarantees of

the Constitution. The equal protection clause of the constitution does not forbid all legal classification. It only proscribes arbitrary and unreasonable classification. Furthermore, it should be emphasized the purpose of such classification was to allow emergence of younger blood in local governments. Regarding the accreditation of Comelec in pursuance to BP 52, it was held that charges for committing any act of disloyalty to the state should not be a basis to disqualify a candidate. An accusation is not synonymous with guilt. Therefore, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the first paragraph of Sec. 4 of BP 52 while the second paragraph of Sec. 4 of BP 52 as null and void for being violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to the accused

Dumlao vs COMELEC by Howard on September 23, 2011 Leave A Comment Judicial Review Requisites

that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case. In this case, only the 3rd requisite was met. The SC ruled however that the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for public office and that the filing of complaints against them and after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office as null and void.

Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has retired from his office and he has been receiving retirement benefits therefrom. He filed for reelection to the same office for the 1980 local elections. On the other hand, BP 52 was passed providing disqualification for the likes of Dumlao. Dumlao assailed the BP averring that it is class legislation hence uncons titutional. His petitioned was joined by Atty. Igot and Salapantan Jt. These two however have different issues. The suits of Igot and Salapantan are more of a taxpayer s suit assailing the other provisions of BP 52 regarding the term of office of the elected officials, the length of the campaign and the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for public office

Mirasol vs. Court of Appeals and that the filing of complaints against them and after preliminary [GR 128448, 1 February 2001] investigation would already disqualify them from office. ISSUE: Whether or not the there is cause of action. HELD: The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for this case would never have been merged. Dumlao s cause is different from Igot s. They have separate issues. Further, this case does not meet all the requisites so that it d be eligible for judicial review. There are standards that have to be followed in the exercise of the function of judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea Second Division, Quisumbing (J): 4 concur Facts: Spouses Alejandro and Lilia Mirasol are sugarland owners and planters. In 1973-1974, they produced 70,501.08 piculs of sugar, 25,662.36 of which were assigned for export. The following crop year, their acreage planted to the same crop was lower, yielding 65,100 piculs of sugar, with 23,696.40 piculs marked for export. The Philippine National Bank (PNB) financed the Mirasols' sugar production venture for crop years, 1973-1974 and 1974-1975 under a crop loan financing scheme. Under said scheme, the Mirasols signed Credit Agreements, a Chattel Mortgage on Standing Crops, and a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of PNB. The

Chattel Mortgage empowered PNB as the Mirasols' attorney-in-fact to negotiate and to sell the latter's sugar in both domestic and export markets and to apply the proceeds to the payment of their obligations to it. Exercising his law-making powers under Martial Law, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Presidential Decree 579 in November, 1974. The decree authorized the Philippine Exchange Co., Inc. (PHILEX) to purchase sugar allocated for export to the United States and to other foreign markets. The price and quantity was determined by the Sugar Quota Administration, PNB, the Department of Trade and Industry, and finally, by the Office of the President. The decree further authorized PNB to finance PHILEX's purchases. Finally, the decree directed that whatever profit PHILEX might realize from sales of sugar abroad was to be remitted to a special fund of the national government, after commissions, overhead expenses and liabilities had been deducted. The government offices and entities tasked by existing laws and administrative regulations to oversee the sugar export pegged the purchase price of export sugar in crop years 1973-1974 and 1974-1975 at P180.00 per picul. PNB continued to finance the sugar production of the Mirasols for crop years 1975-1976 and 1976-1977. These crop loans and similar obligations were secured by real estate mortgages over several properties of the Mirasols and chattel mortgages over standing crops. Believing that the proceeds of their sugar sales to PNB, if properly accounted for, were more than enough to pay their obligations, the Mirasols asked PNB for an accounting of the proceeds of the sale of their export sugar. PNB ignored the request. Meanwhile, the Mirasols continued to avail of other loans from PNB and to make unfunded withdrawals from their current accounts with said bank. PNB then asked Mirasols to settle their due and demandable accounts. As a result of these demands for payment, the Mirasols on 4 August 1977, conveyed to PNB real properties valued at P1,410,466.00 by way of dacion en pago, leaving an unpaid

overdrawn account of P1,513,347.78. On 10 August 1982, the balance of outstanding sugar crop and other loans owed by the Mirasols to PNB stood at P15,964,252.93. Despite demands, the Mirasols failed to settle said due and demandable accounts. PNB then proceeded to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgaged properties. After applying the proceeds of the auction sale of the mortgaged realties, PNB still had a deficiency claim of P12,551,252.93. The Mirasols continued to ask PNB to account for the proceeds of the sale of their export sugar for crop years 1973-1974 and 1974-1975, insisting that said proceeds, if properly liquidated, could offset their outstanding obligations with the bank. PNB remained adamant in its stance that under PD 579, there was nothing to account since under said law, all earnings from the export sales of sugar pertained to the National Government and were subject to the disposition of the President of the Philippines for public purposes. On 9 August 1979, the Mirasols filed a suit for accounting, specific performance, and damages against PNB with the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City (Civil Case 14725). On 16 June 1987, the complaint was amended to implead PHILEX as party-defendant. After trial on the merits, the trial court decided in favor of the Mirasols (1) declaring PD 579 and all circulars, as well as policies, orders and other issuances issued in furtherance thereof, unconstitutional and therefore, NULL and VOID being in gross violation of the Bill of Rights; (2) Ordering PNB and PHILEX to pay, jointly and severally, the Mirasols the whole amount corresponding to the residue of the unliquidated actual cost price of 25,662 piculs in export sugar for crop year 1973-1974 at an average price of P300.00 per picul, deducting therefrom however, the amount of P180.00 already paid in advance plus the allowable deductions in service fees and other charges; (3) and also, for PNB and PHILEX to pay, jointly and severally, the Mirasols the whole amount corresponding to the unpaid actual price of 14,596 piculs of export sugar for crop

year 1974-1975 at an average rate of P214.14 per picul minus however, the sum of P180.00 per picul already paid by PNB and PHILEX in advance and the allowable deduction in service fees and other charges; and (4) directing PNB and PHILEX to pay, jointly and severally, the Mirasols the sum of P50,000.00 in moral damages and the amount of P50,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus the costs of the litigation. The same was, however, modified by a Resolution of the trial court dated 14 May 1992, which adding the following paragraph: "This decision should however, be interpreted without prejudice to whatever benefits that may have accrued in favor of the plaintiffs with the passage and approval of Republic Act 7202 otherwise known as the 'Sugar Restitution Law,' authorizing the restitution of losses suffered by the plaintiffs from Crop year 1974-1975 to Crop year 1984-1985 occasioned by the actuations of government-owned and controlled agencies." The Mirasols then filed an appeal with the appellate court (CA-GR CV 38607), faulting the trial court for not nullifying the dacion en pago and the mortgage contracts, as well as the foreclosure of their mortgaged properties, and the trial court's failure to award them the full money claims and damages sought from both PNB and PHILEX. On 22 July 1996, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court (1) declaring the dacion en pago and the foreclosure of the mortgaged properties valid; (2) ordering the PNB to render an accounting of the sugar account of the Mirasol[s] specifically stating the indebtedness of the latter to the former and the proceeds of Mirasols' 1973-1974 and 1974-1975 sugar production sold pursuant to and in accordance with PD 579 and the issuances therefrom; (3) ordering the PNB to recompute in accordance with RA 7202 Mirasols' indebtedness to it crediting to the latter payments already made as well as the auction price of their foreclosed real estate and stipulated value of their properties ceded to PNB in the dacion en pago; and (4) whatever the result of the recomputation of Mirasols' account, the outstanding balance or the excess payment

shall be governed by the pertinent provisions of RA 7202. On 28 August 1996, the Mirasols moved for reconsideration, which the appellate court denied on 23 January 1997. The Mirasols filed the petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the Trial Court has jurisdiction to declare a statute unconstitutional without notice to the Solicitor General where the parties have agreed to submit such issue for the resolution of the Trial Court. Held: It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have the authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute, presidential decree, or executive order. The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all Regional Trial Courts. Furthermore, BP 129 grants Regional Trial Courts the authority to rule on the conformity of laws or treaties with the Constitution. However, Rule 64, Section 3 (Notice to Solicitor General) of the Rules of Court provides that "in any action which involves the validity of a statute, or executive order or regulation, the Solicitor General shall be notified by the party attacking the statute, executive order, or regulation, and shall be entitled to be heard upon such question." The purpose of the mandatory notice in Rule 64, Section 3 is to enable the Solicitor General to decide whether or not his intervention in the action assailing the validity of a law or treaty is necessary. To deny the Solicitor General such notice would be tantamount to depriving him of his day in court. The mandatory notice requirement is not limited to actions involving declaratory relief and similar remedies. The rule itself provides that such notice is required in "any action" and not just actions involving declaratory relief. Where there is no ambiguity in the words used in the rule, there is

no room for construction. In all actions assailing the validity of a statute, treaty, presidential decree, order, or proclamation, notice to the Solicitor General is mandatory. Herein, the Solicitor General was never notified about Civil Case 14725. Nor did the trial court ever require him to appear in person or by a representative or to file any pleading or memorandum on the constitutionality of the assailed decree. Hence, the Court of Appeals did not err in holding that lack of the required notice made it improper for the trial court to pass upon the constitutional validity of the questioned presidential decrees.

KILOSBAYAN, INC., et. al. vs. GUINGONA, et. al. G. R. No. 113375, May 5, 1994 FACTS: This is a special civil action for prohibition and injunction, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction which seeks to prohibit and restrain the implementation of the Contract of Lease executed by the PCSO and the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation in connection with the on-line lottery system, also know as lotto. Petitioners strongly opposed the setting up of the on-line lottery system on the basis of serious moral and ethical considerations. It submitted that said contract of lease violated Section 1 of R. A. No. 1169, as amended by B. P. Blg. 42. Respondents contended, among others, that, the contract does not violate the Foreign Investment Act of 1991; that the issues of wisdom, morality and propriety of acts of the executive department are beyond the ambit of judicial reviews; and that the petitioners have no standing to maintain the instant suit. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not petitioners have the legal standing to file the instant petition. 2. Whether or not the contract of lease is legal and valid. RULING: As to the preliminary issue, the Court resolved to set aside the procedural technicality in view of the importance of the issues raised. The Court adopted the liberal policy on locus standi to allow the ordinary taxpayers, members of Congress, and even association of planters, and non-profit civic organizations to initiate and prosecute actions to question the validity or constitutionality of laws, acts, decisions, or rulings of various government agencies or instrumentalities. As to the substantive issue, the Court agrees with the petitioners whether the contract in question is one of lease or whether the PGMC is merely an independent contractor should not be decided on the basis of the title or designation of the contract but by the intent of the parties, which may be gathered from the provisions

of the contract itself. Animus homini est anima scripti. The intention of the party is the soul of the instrument. Therefore the instant petition is granted and the challenged Contract of Lease is hereby declared contrary to law and invalid.

KILOSANBAYAN VS. GUINGONA resolved in a legal forum Facts: Petitioners filed a case for the prohibition / injunctionwith a prayer for a TRO & preliminary injunction against theimplementation of the Contract of Lease between PCSO &PGMC in connection to an online lotto system. Petitioners aresuing in their capacity as members of Congress and astaxpayers. On DECEMBER 17, 1993 the Contract of Lease wasexecuted and approved by the president on DECEMBER 20,1993. Petitioner claims that the respondents & the OFFICE OFTHE PRESIDENT gravely abused their discretion tantamount toa lack of authority by entering into the contract, because: 1.Section 1 of RA 1169 (PCSO Charter) prohibits thePCSO from conducting lotteries in cooperation with anyentity 2. RA 3846 & jurisprudence require Congresionalfranchise before a telecom system (public utility) can beestablished 3.Article 12 of Section 11 of the Constitution prohibitscompanies with less than 60% Filipino Ownership fromoperating a public system 4.PGMG is not authorized by its charter or by RA 7042(ForeignInvestment Act) to install an online Lottosystem a.The contract shows that PGMC is the actualoperatior while it is a 75% foreignownedcompany. RA 7042 puts all forms of gamblingon the negative list Respondents answered the allegations by contending: 1.PGMC is only an independent contractor. There is no shared franchise 2.PCSO will not a operate a public system as a telecomsystem is an indispensable requirement of an onlinelottery system. Petitioner interpretation of Section 1 ofRA 1169 too narrow. 3.There are no violations of laws 4.The issue of morality is a political one and should not be Held: 1.Yes, petitioners have standing.Standing is only aprocedural technicality that can be set aside dependingon the importance of an issue. As taxpayers andcitizens to be affected by the reach of the lotto system,petitioners have standing. 2.No, the contract is illegal. The Court rules in the negative arguing that whatever is not unequivocally granted is withheld. PCSO cannot share the franchisein any way. The contracts nature can be understood toform the intent of the parties as evident in the provisionsof the contract. Article 1371 of the CC provides that theintent of contracting parties are determined in partthrough their acts. The necessary for radio stations Issues: 1.Whether or not petitioners have standing 2.Whether or not the contract is legal under Section 1 of RA 1169 franchisees are not 5.Petitioners are without legal standing, as illustrated in Valmonte vs. PCSO a.The PCSO is a corporate entity and can enterinto all kinds of contracts to achieve objectives.Arguing that PCSO will operate a public utility,it is still exempted under Section of Act 3846,where legislative

only contribution PCSO will begiving is the authority to operate. All risks are to betaken by the lessor; operation will be taken by thePCSO only after 8 years. Further proof are: a.Payment of investment acts in the even of contract suspension / breach b.Rent not fixed at 4.9% and can be reduced given that all risks are borne by the lessor c.Prohibition against PGMC involvement incompetitor games; strange if gaming is PGMC;business d.Public stock requirement of 25% in 2 years,which is unreasonable for a lease contract. Itindicates that PGMC is the operator and thecondition an attempt to increase public benefitthrough public involvement. e.Escrow deposit may be used as performance bond. f.PGMC operation evident in personnelmanagement, procedural and coordinatingrules set by the lessor. g.PCSO authority to terminate contact upon PGMC insolvency The contract indicates that PCSO is the actual lessor ofthe authority to operate given the indivisible communitybetween them. Wherefore, Petition granted. Contract invalid and TRO made permanent

SC: GSIS Not Exempt from Legal Fees By Arcie M. Sercado

The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) is not exempt from payment of legal fees imposed under the Rules of Court. Thus the Supreme Court held when it denied the petition of the GSIS seeking exemption from the payment of legal fees imposed on government-owned or controlled corporations under Rule 141, sec. 22 of the Rules of Court. The GSIS anchored its petition on sec. 39 of its charter, RA 8271, the GSIS Act of 1997, which states that the GSIS is exempt from all taxes, assessments, fees, charges, or duties of all kinds. The Court En Banc, through a 19-page resolution penned by Justice Renato C. Corona,however, held that the Constitution and jurisprudence do not sanction the view of the GSIS. The Court held that since the payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by it concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed, or modified by Congress. It also stressed that the doctrine of separation of powers makes such rule-making power within its sole province. Thus, the claim of a legislative grant of exemption from the payment of legal fees through RA 8271 necessarily fails, the Court ruled. The Court added that Congress could not have carved out an exemption for the GSIS without transgressing the Courts fiscal autonomy. Considering that legal fees fuel the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and the Special Allowance for the Judiciary Fund (SAJF) which guarantee the independence of the Judiciary, legal fees do not only constitute a vital source of the Courts financial resources but also comprise an essential element of the Courts fiscal independence, the Court explained. (AM No. 08-2-01-0, Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS from Payment of Legal Fees, February 11, 2010)

Angara vs. Electoral Commission Facts: (1)That in the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and DionisioMayor, were candidates voted for the position of member of the NationalAssembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas; (2) That on October 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers,proclaimed the petitioner as member-elect of the National Assembly for thesaid district, for having received the most number of votes; (3) That on November 15, 1935, the petitioner took his oath of office; (4) That on December 3, 1935, the National Assembly in session assembled, passed the following resolution: "[No. 8] "RESOLUTION CONFIRMANDO LAS ACTAS DE AQUELLOS DIPUTADOS CONTRAQUIENES NO SE HA PRESENTADO PROTESTA. "Se resuelve: Que las actas de eleccion de los Diputados contra quienes nose hubiere presentado debidamente una protesta antes de la adopcion de lapresente resolucion sean, como por la presente, son aprobadas y confirmadas. "Adoptada, 3 de diciembre, 1935." (5) That on December 8, 1935, the herein respondent PedroYnsua, filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest"against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, beingthe only protest filed after

the passage of Resolution No. 8aforequoted, and praying, among elected other-things, member of that the said respondentbe Assembly declared for the National

firstdistrict of Tayabas, or that the election of said position be nullified; (6) That on December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution, paragraph 6 of which provides: "6. La Comision no considerara ninguna protesta que no se haya presentado en o antes de este dia." (7) That on December 20, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, oneof the respondents in the aforesaid protest, filed before the ElectoralCommission a "Motion to Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a) that ResolutionNo. 8 of the National Assembly was adopted in the legitimate exercise of itsconstitutional prerogative to prescribe the period during which protestsagainst the election of its members should be presented; (b) that theaforesaid resolution has for its object, and is the accepted formula for, thelimitation of said period; and (c) that the protest in question was filed out ofthe prescribed period; (8) That on December 27, 1935, the herein respondent, Pedro Ynsua, filedan "Answer to the Motion of Dismissal" alleging that there is no legal orconstitutional provision barring the presentation of a protest against theelection of a member of the National Assembly, after confirmation; (9) That on December 31, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, filed

a "Reply" to the aforesaid "Answer to the Motion of Dismissal" ANOTHER DIGEST!

(b) The system of checks and balances and the overlapping of functions and duties often makes difficult the delimitation of the powers granted. (c) That in cases of conflict between the several departments and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries. (d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority. (e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers and functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of the other two departments of the government. (f) That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly. (g) That under the organic law prevailing before the (1935) Constitution went into effect, each house of the legislature was respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective members. (h) That the (1935) Constitution has transferred all the powers previously exercised by the legislature with respect to contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of its members, to the Electoral Commission.

In the elections of Sept 17, 1935, Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua et al. were candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas. On Oct 7, 1935, Angara was proclaimed as member-elect of the NA for the said district. On November 15, 1935, he took his oath of office. On Dec 3, 1935, the NA in session assembled, passed Resolution No. 8 confirming the election of the members of the National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been filed. On Dec 8, 1935, Ynsua, filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against the election of Angara. On Dec 9, 1935, the EC adopted a resolution, par. 6 of which fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the NA, notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the NA. Angara filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that by virtue of the NA proclamation, Ynsua can no longer protest. Ynsua argued back by claiming that EC proclamation governs and that the EC can taele cognizance of the election protest and that the EC can not be subject to a writ of prohibition from the SC. ISSUES: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over such matter. Whether or not EC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the election protest. HELD: (a). The government established by the Constitution follows the theory of separation of powers of the legislative, the executive and the judicial.

(i) That such transfer of power from the legislature to the Electoral Commission was full, clear and complete, and carried with it ex necesitate rei the implied power inter alia to prescribe the rules and regulations as to the time and manner of filing protests. (j) That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral Commission was to have an independent constitutional organ pass upon all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, devoid of partisan influence or consideration, which object would be frustrated if the National Assembly were to retain the power to prescribe rules and regulations regarding the manner of conducting said contests. (k) That section 4 of article VI of the (1935) Constitution repealed not only section 18 of the Jones Law making each house of the Philippine Legislature respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its elective members, but also section 478 of Act No. 3387 empowering each house to prescribe by resolution the time and manner of filing contests against the election of its members, the time and manner of notifying the adverse party, and bond or bonds, to be required, if any, and to fix the costs and expenses of contest. (l) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member, irrespective of whether his election is contested or not, is not essential before such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National Assembly. (m) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member against whom no protest had been filed prior to said confirmation, does not and cannot deprive the Electoral Commission of its incidental power to prescribe the time within which protest against the election of any member of the National Assembly should be filed.

Article VI, Section 25 Case Digest - Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission, G.R. 192935 and 193036, December 7, 2010

Biragao v. Philippine Truth G.R. 192935 and December 7, FACTS

Commission 193036 2010

violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions. The respondents, on the other hand, contested that E.O. No. 1 did not arrogate the powers of the Congress to create a public office because the President's executive power and power of control necessarily includes the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure laws are faithfully executed. More so, it does not violate the principle of separation of powers as alleged by the petitioners. They strongly argue that the said Executive Order, is valid and constitutional. ISSUE Does E.O. No. 1 transgress on the power of Congress to appropriate funds for the operation of a public office? HELD

The petitioners raised in Court that E.O. No. 1, which created the Truth Commission, should be declared unconstitutional and to enjoin PTC from performing its functions. The petitioners alleged that E.O. No. 1 violates theseparation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation. They also asserted the fact that the role of the president, as stated in the 1987 Philippine Constitution, to achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office, which was inexistent before, the "Truth Commission". According to them, the said Executive Order

No. E.O. No 1 does not transgress on the power of the Congress to appropriate funds for the operation of a public office. In the said E.O., there will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations existing funds already appropriated. Thus, there is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. According to the Solicitor General, "whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be the very source of the funds for the commission," and thus, will be subject to auditing rules and regulations. However, the Court stressed that, "The end does not justify the means." No matter how noble and worthy of admiration the purpose of an act, but if the means to be employed in accomplishing its goals is simply irreconcilable with the constitutional parameters, then it cannot still be allowed. The Court cannot just run a blind eye and simply let it pass. It will continue to uphold the Constitution and its enshrined principles. The Philippine Supreme Court, according to Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987

Constitution, is vested with Judicial Power that "includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave of abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." Hence, the petitions were granted.

Biraogo vs Philippine Truth Commission of 2010

Chester Cabalza recommends his visitors to please read the original & full text of the case cited. Xie xie! G.R. No. 192935 December 7, 2010 LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner, vs. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010, Respondent. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x G.R. No. 193036 REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP. SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, and REP. ORLANDO B. FUA, SR., Petitioners, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. and DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Respondents. When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. --Justice Jose P. Laurel Facts:

The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events prior to the historic May 2010 elections, when then Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III declared his staunch condemnation of graft and corruption with his slogan, "Kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap." The Filipino people, convinced of his sincerity and of his ability to carry out this noble objective, catapulted the good senator to the presidency. The first case is G.R. No. 192935, a special civil action for prohibition instituted by petitioner Louis Biraogo (Biraogo) in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer. Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for being violative of the legislative power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution as it usurps the constitutional authority of the legislature to create a public office and to appropriate funds therefor. The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as incumbent members of the House of Representatives. Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30, 2010, signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission). Issues: 1. Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to file their respective petitions and question Executive Order No. 1; 2. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;

3. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ; 4. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection clause; and 5. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to injunctive relief. Held: Legal Standing of the Petitioners The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogos assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Where the issues are of transcendental and paramount importance not only to the public but also to the Bench and the Bar, they should be resolved for the guidance of all.Undoubtedly, the Filipino people are more than interested to know the status of the Presidents first effort to bring about a promised change to the country. The Court takes cognizance of the petition not due to overwhelming political undertones that clothe the issue in the eyes of the public, but because the Court stands firm in its oath to perform its constitutional duty to settle legal controversies with overreaching significance to society. Power of the President to Create the Truth Commission The Chief Executives power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having been constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298

as mandate, the legality of the investigation is sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC had the same composition, or that the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry. Power of the Truth Commission to Investigate The distinction between the power to investigate and the power to adjudicate was delineated by the Court in Cario v. Commission on Human Rights.59 Thus: The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn described as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; x x an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters." In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. x x. Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment." Finally, nowhere in Executive Order No. 1 can it be inferred that the findings of the PTC are to be accorded conclusiveness. Much like its predecessors, the Davide Commission, the Feliciano Commission and the Zenarosa Commission, its findings would, at best, be recommendatory in nature. And being so, the Ombudsman and the DOJ have a wider degree of latitude to decide whether or not to reject the recommendation. These offices, therefore, are not

deprived of their mandated duties but will instead be aided by the reports of the PTC for possible indictments for violations of graft laws. Violation of the Equal Protection Clause The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1 because it is violative of this constitutional safeguard. They contend that it does not apply equally to all members of the same class such that the intent of singling out the "previous administration" as its sole object makes the PTC an "adventure in partisan hostility." Thus, in order to be accorded with validity, the commission must also cover reports of graft and corruption in virtually all administrations previous to that of former President Arroyo. The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the government including the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken. Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth "concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration"only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it has been made in at least three portions of the questioned executive order. Decision The issue that seems to take center stage at present is - whether or not the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its constitutionally mandated power of Judicial Review with respect to recent initiatives

of the legislature and the executive department, is exercising undue interference. Is the Highest Tribunal, which is expected to be the protector of the Constitution, itself guilty of violating fundamental tenets like the doctrine of separation of powers? Time and again, this issue has been addressed by the Court, but it seems that the present political situation calls for it to once again explain the legal basis of its action lest it continually be accused of being a hindrance to the nations thrust to progress. WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. As also prayed for, the respondents are hereby ordered to cease and desist from carrying out the provisions of Executive Order No. 1. SO ORDERED.