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Whyanewoperationalconceptis neededforthePersianGulf Challenginglegacyassumptionsfor projectingU.S.militarypower Pacingthreat:anantiaccess/area denial(A2/AD)strategywithPersian characteristics OutsideIn objectives&linesof operation Recommendedsupportinginitiatives
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Thethreathaschanged:proliferationofprecisionguidedweapons,maritime threats,terroristproxygroups,neartermpotentialofanucleararmedIran TheArabawakeningpresentsbothstrategicopportunitiesandchallenges Operationalplanningassumptionsdevelopedalmostthirtyyearsagoforthe PersianGulfmaynolongerbevalid Aturningpoint:WiththeendofoperationsinIraq,DoDhasanopportunityto rethinkplans,forwardposture,andcapabilitiesneededtomaintainstable militarybalanceintheGulfoverthenext20years

U.S. policy will emphasize Gulf securityto prevent Irans development of a nuclear weapon capability and counter its destabilizing policies
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Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership, January 2012

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Todayscontingencyforceisnotwellsuitedto manyoftheproblemsitislikelytoface
CapabilitiesforLimitedContingenciesinthePersianGulf,1979

Recommendations:
Establishaforwardposturethatregularlydeploys forcesintothePersianGulfandincludesayear roundcarriertaskgroup/amphibiousready grouppresence Prepositionequipmentandconsumablesinthe PersianGulftosupportrapidforcedeployments Rapidlydeploylargeforcesofbombersand fighterstotheregionintheeventofanIranian invasionorSovietadventurism Upgradeplansandcapabilitiestosupport operationsagainstguerillaforces Hardenanddefendcriticaloilfacilitiesand infrastructureagainstairandterrorattacks
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TheU.S.militaryhastraditionallyassumed: Closeinbaseswouldbeavailableforearly arrivingfighters,groundforces,C2elements Navalunitscouldoperatewithinrangeof theirtargetareas U.S.wouldhaveanearmonopolyonPGMs Norealthreatstorefuelingandlogisticsops C4ISRnetworkswouldremainsecure MajorU.S.GulfOperations
EarnestWill,19871988 DesertShield/Storm,19901991 SouthernWatch,19912003 DesertStrike,1996 NorthernWatch,19972003 DesertFox,1998 IraqiFreedom,20032010

AlthoughtheseassumptionsservedtheU.S.militarywellforthepastthirtyyears,it shouldnotbeassumedthattheywillbesuitableforopsagainstcapableA2/ADcomplexes Asin1979,weareinatimeoftransitionanotherPersianGulfreviewmaybeneeded

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TodaysU.S.airoperationsusuallyexpect: (1) Securepermanentordeployedbasesinor closetotheater; (2) Effectivelowobservable(orstealthy) capabilitiestopenetrateairdefense systems; (3) Longforcebuildupsintheatertosupport maximumsustainedoperations; (4) Securelinesofcommunicationforfueland otherlogistics; (5) Effectivebeyondvisualrangeairtoair missiles;and (6) Adequatetankersupport.

USNAVCENT 5th Fleet 105nm Bahrain CAOC AlUdeid

149nm

BallisticMissileFlightTimes<5minutes

RecentandongoinganalysesquestionwhethertheUSAFcandependonany ofthesekeyenablersofairpowerinthefutureprimarilyduetogrowingchallenges associatedwithantiaccessandareadenialstrategies

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TheU.S.willnotinitiatearmedhostilities Priorintelligenceandwarningwillbelimited NeitherU.S.norIranianterritorywillbesanctuaries Alloperatingdomainswillbecontested Closeinoperatinglocationsandforceswillbeatriskatthebeginningofa conflictwithIran Cannotassumeadditionalcloseinbasingwillbeimmediatelyavailable IranwillthreatentouseWMD TheU.S.militarywillneedtofighttomaintainitsfreedomofaction
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Aredesignedtocreatetimeneededforanenemytoachieveits
campaignobjectives,e.g., PreventtheU.Sfromdeployingandemployingitsforceseffectively CoerceU.S.partnersandalliestodenysupporttotheU.S.military and/ordrivethemoutofthewar InflictsuchdamagetoU.S.forcesandbasesthattheU.S.wouldchooseto discontinuethefight MaketheprospectofeventualU.S.victoryappeartooprolongedorcostly

IranisdevelopinganA2/ADstrategywithPersiancharacteristics
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Natural channelizing effect of the Strait of Hormuz and Persian Gulf Short-/medium-range missiles from Iran can reach critical areas across the region

Global dependence on Gulf energy exports, most of which still transit the Strait 80-90% of populations for many Persian Gulf states located in coastal urban areas 9

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Shahab3

C802

Fateh110

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ClicktoeditMastertitlestyle Iadvise,recommendand
warnthemoverthe returnofthiscarrierto thePersianGulfbecause wearenotinthehabitof warningmorethan once

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Defendingforwardbasesand partnerinfrastructureagainst guidedrocket,artillery,mortarand missileattacks Counteringwidespreadandhighly mobileirregularproxyforcesarmed withguidedweapons Defendingsurfacevesselsagainst missile,submarine,andswarming boatattacks Penetratingcontestedairspaceto conductoffensiveoperations Securingsafepassagethroughthe StraitofHormuzandPersianGulf Settingconditionsforother campaignoperations(e.g.,counter WMD,unconventionalwarfare missions)

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Prevent the U.S from deploying and employing its forces effectively Coerce U.S. partners to deny support to the U.S. military Inflict such damage that the U.S. would choose to discontinue the fight Make the prospect of an eventual U.S. victory appear too prolonged or costly Freedom of action in all domains air, land, sea, space & cyberspace Create advantages over a capable opponent Gain the initiative Deny a quick victory Set the conditions for effective follow-on operations

Important OutsideInproposesanenablingconcept,notatheaterwarplan Caveats: AirSeaBattlelikeconceptsarenot allaboutWESTPAC

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OutsideInencompassesallelementsofthejointforce

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ISR and C2 networks are the "Achilles heel" of A2/AD strategies

U.S. ability to sustain operations over extended distances is a key advantage At the outset of hostilities, U.S. could use this advantage to:
Degrade/deny enemys ability to effectively target its missiles Regain U.S. naval maneuver and ability to deploy air forces close to an enemy, thereby increasing sortie generation Deny enemys ability to form an accurate picture of the battlespace or assess effects of its strikes Force the enemy to waste its missile assets against targets of little value
FootagereportedlyfilmedbyanIranianUAV

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Conductlongrangeoperationsfromoutsidethereach ofIransantiaccessthreatstogaintheadvantage: DISPERSEANDDEPLOYTOSECURESTAGINGBASES
avoidatrapbydeployingandoperatingfrombaseslocatedoutsidethereachofIransmissilethreats

BLINDTHEENEMY,SHRINKTHEA2/ADTHREATRING
fightfromrangetodominatethebattlespace killthearcher,notthearrows

CREATEENABLINGPOCKETSOFAIR&MARITIMESUPERIORITY
includesair,EW&underseawarfare,specialops,andjointtheaterentryopstocreatelodgmentsnearStrait

Other Possible Theater Campaign Lines of Operation: Counterweaponsofmassdestruction Imposecosts CounterproxygroupsarmedwithGRAMM UWtobringaboutregimechangefromwithin

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Deploy to operate from bases located outside the reach of Irans missile threats Disperse steady-state theater presence forces Deploy initial response forces to locations outside of Irans threat ring Undersea warfare for strike & maritime dominance ops Fight from a posture of advantage to complicate Irans planning and reduce its A2/AD threat

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Fight from range to dominate the battlespace Prevent the enemy from developing an accurate picture of the battlespace Attack from multiple axes to complicate and overwhelm Irans defenses Force Iran to its culminating point, regain the initiative for the U.S. Enable forces to deploy closer to the area of operations, increasing aircraft sortie rates / tempo of operations
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Includes air, electronic warfare and undersea warfare, special operations

and potentially joint theater entry ops to create lodgments to help secure the Strait

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Counterweaponsofmassdestruction, includingnuclearweapons Counterproxygroupsarmedwithguided rockets,artillery,mortars,andmissiles ImposecostsonIran,degradeitsabilityto conductoffensiveanddefensivemilitary operations Unconventionalwarfareoperationsthatcould leadtoaregimechangefromwithin
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Amorebalancedmixofshortrangeandlongrangecapabilitiesfor surveillance& strike Land andseabasedmannedandunmannedpenetrating,persistentISRto supportoperationsinhighthreatareas RobustsurfacewarfaredefensesagainstASCMs,swarmingattackcraft,UAVs Underseawarfarepayload,UUVswithlongendurance Landbasedmissiledefenseswithlowtheaterfootprints Landbasedcounterfires Offensive&defensivecyber,electronicwarfare,directedenergycapabilities NewcapabilitiestosupportSOFopsinnonpermissiveareas Forcestobuildingpartnercapacity
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2010level:1272Launchers
1200

1124

1000

Total Number of Launchers

4SSGNs
800

720

VPMSSN PayloadModules

600

564
400

468
SSN VerticalLaunchTubes SSN TorpedoTubes SSN LargeBowTubes

200

FiscalYear

10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45

Fiscal Year

PlannedSSGNretirementsandSSNfleetreductionwillsignificantlyreducetheunderseastandoffstrikemagazine VirginiaPayloadModules(VPMs)onfutureVirginiaclassSSNswouldmorethantripleSSNTLAMpayloads(from12to40TLAMs) 20modifiedSSNswouldsignificantlyreducetheunderseastrikeshortfall

forlesscostthanbuyingnewreplacementSSGNs

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Work with regional partners to diversify posture, harden shelters and support facilities Improve ability to rapidly disperse forces across the Arabian Peninsula Hundreds of candidates for bases located outside the Persian Gulf, including facilities across Europes southern tier Does a networked force with reach-back need to maintain major C2 facilities on the western coastline of the Gulf?
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Potential Airbases

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Operational concepts such as AirSea Battle and Outside-In are not all about preserving the defense budget and buying major new weapon systems New, innovative concepts are needed that will help:
Provide the vital links between the Defense Strategy and future defense spending; Increase synergy across operating domains and the Services; Identify priority capabilities; and Identify areas for reduced investment as DoD rebalances to support its new strategy
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