12 Jan 2012, NewAgeIslam.

Com William Milam: Pakistans Real Dangers are Internal William Bryant Milam, a former US ambassador to Pakistan in an interview with Ma lik Siraj Akbar January 6, 2012 The year 2010 witnessed a dramatic deterioration in trust and diplomatic relatio ns between the United States and Pakistan. The two strategic partners in the war on terror traded allegations on the Raymond Davis affair, the raid on Osama bin Ladens compound, drone strikes, Admiral Mike Mullens assertion about ISIs alleged contacts with the elements of Taliban who attacked the US embassy in Kabul, and the attack by NATO forces on Salala check post, which killed 24 Pakistani soldie rs. So, what is the future of the US-Pakistan relationship? Dawn.com spoke exclusive ly to William Bryant Milam, a former US ambassador to Pakistan (1998-2001) and B angladesh (1990-1993). Milam is a currently a Senior Policy Scholar at the Woodr ow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington DC, where he completed a comprehensive study on modern Pakistan and Bangladesh. Q: Some experts in Pakistan say the US does not seem to have a clear Pakistan po licy. Others say Washington is confused over whatever Pakistan policy it has at th e moment. Do you agree? A: The United States does have a Pakistan policy. In fact, it has had several Pa kistan policies at different times. It has not been confused about Pakistan but it has had different situations to deal with Pakistan at different times. What w e see today is the outcome of a long history of errors and misassumptions on bot h sides. In fact, it is a time when both countries will hopefully start reviewin g the way they have been behaving and dealing with each other. At the moment, it is a pretty bad relationship. Q: How would you evaluate Pak-US relationship in 2010? Were you expecting the de velopments that strained the relationship? A: No. I think no one was expecting these events. I have contributed a chapter i n the newly released book The Future of Pakistan. I had written the first draft of my paper two years ago and subsequently revised it twice but even then things c hanged to such an extent in 2010 that when the book was published in 2011, much of the subject matter seemed out of date. In early 2010, the US thought Pakistan could be an ally they could work with as a strategic partner, by helping develop it as a state instead of exclusively exp ecting it to cooperate in the war on terror. When the US passed the Kerry-Lugar Bill, it thought of Pakistan as a strategic partner. With the Raymond Davis affa ir, it became clear there was no free exchange of information between the two co untries. The raid that killed Osama bin Laden highlighted the faulty exchange of information between both sides. It also became clearer that the two countries d id not trust each other. Since then, the relationship has been limping along on distrust. Q: How can a strategic relationship succeed when, with respect to drone strikes, Pakistanis feel that the US does not respect Pakistans sovereignty? A: I presume Pakistan has been complicit in drone strikes. In fact, I think the government and military looked at the drone attacks on al-Qaeda and the Pakistan i Taliban in Pakistans interest for a long time. There has always been misunderst anding on the part among the public. As far as the Osama raid is concerned, distrust between the United States and Pa kistan had already reached such a point that the United States did not feel that it could inform Pakistan about an important target like bin Laden. They could n ot gamble on such a rich target being warned before conducting the raid and obvi ously did not inform the Pakistanis. Q: So what was the reaction of retired diplomats and scholars when bin Laden was found and killed in Pakistan? A: Well, everybody knew that he was hiding in Pakistan. His presence in Pakistan

did not surprise us but the fact that he had taken shelter in Abbottabad was su rprising. We all envisioned him hiding somewhere in a cave but he was found in a mansion in Abbottabad. I think the Pakistani government was not officially comp licit in this but it leads to questions about their capabilities. Q: How do the Americans look at the upsurge in anti-Americanism in Pakistan, the ir ally? A: Pakistan has recently experienced the enormous growth of anti-Americanism in public opinion. It was always present but it was submerged much of the time. The real problem is that the Pakistani military officers and political leaders are all driven by this anti-American public opinion, which is fanned by the media. O ne example of how anti-Americanism can appeal to public opinion is the emergence of Imran Khan as a politician of consequence. The basis of his philosophy is an ti-Americanism. Anti-Americanism among politicians is understandable as they hav e to move with public opinion but the rise of similar feelings in the military h as surprised a lot of Americans. Q: Do you see an end of US engagement with Pakistan after 2014, when it withdraw s troops from Afghanistan? A: I think our engagement with Pakistan will continue beyond 2014, but its import ant to address the issue Pakistans impending failure as a state. One of the thing s currently bringing Pakistan down is its economy. The countrys economic situatio n is influencing the behaviour of its people. Q: Will the (US) presidential elections influence Americas policy on Pakistan? A: I dont think so. Pakistan is going to remain geo-strategically important to th e US even after the Afghanistan withdrawal. Pakistan remains vitally important t o Americas interests in the South Asian region in terms of ensuring peace and cur bing terrorism, be it from Pakistani soil or elsewhere, so that it does not spre ad across the region and the world. The Bush administration dealt with Pakistan differently from the way the Obama a dministration did. It is clear that every administration will have its own way o f working with Pakistan, but their interests will remain the same. If President Obama gets re-elected, you will see almost the same policy towards Pakistan. Non etheless, the emphasis on Afghanistan, due to the withdrawal, may change. If the Republican presidential candidate gets elected, I do not foresee any policy cha nge. Q: It is ironic that the US castigates Pakistan for having contacts with differe nt factions of Taliban but it also continues to have secret communication with s ome sections of the Taliban movement, such as the Haqqani Network. The US no lon ger discourages or rules out negotiating with Taliban. A: For a long time, I didnt know that the United States had contacts with the Haq qani Network. There are different types of Taliban within the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistani Taliban. The Afghan Taliban are further divided between the Haqqa ni Network and the Quetta Shura while the Pakistani Taliban are also divided bet ween the Taliban in tribal region and the Punjabi Taliban. You cant lump them all together. When President Obama was elected, we thought of trying to find a peaceful and po litical solution to the Afghan problem. This would allow us to draw down the num ber of US troops present in Afghanistan. From the initial days of President Obam a, we were looking for ways to push for a political settlement. I think we shoul d have made it a South Asian regional settlement from the very beginning. This c ould be something akin to the international agreement on the neutralization of S witzerland, in which all the neighbours would guarantee the neutralization of Af ghanistan. Thus, none of these regional states would have a reason to push their own interests inside Afghanistan through their ethnic followers. We started with the idea that we needed to reconcile with the reconcilable Talib an. At that point, it did not include the Haqqani Network. It only included some members of the Quetta Shura. You remember that we began to know about this when the ISI picked up Abdul Ghani Baradar, one of the reconcilable Taliban, who was supposedly talking to the Afghans and others. As our relations worsened because of the Raymond Davis affair and the bin Laden raid, we thought it was necessary to get the Haqqani Network involved in negotia

tions. I dont know how much we are talking to the Haqqani Network now. Whatever c ontacts remain there, they are mainly through the ISI. My guess is that our cont acts with the Haqqanis are a very recent phenomenon. Q: Is Afghanistan becoming a proxy battleground between Pakistan and India? A: I sincerely hope not. In my article in the recently published book, The Futur e of Pakistan, I say we should try to build the kind of peace and political proc ess in Afghanistan which will bring Indians and Pakistanis together so that they work with each other. Otherwise, the alternative may turn out to be that Afghan istan becomes a proxy battleground between the two. It is clear that one of the things that has been bothering Pakistan for a long time is the Indian presence i n Afghanistan. I dont think that is going to change much. Q: It is paradoxical that many American diplomats and scholars complain about Pa kistans India-centric approach although they know it emanates from the unresolved conflicts between India and Pakistan. Can the United States help in settling th e problems between the two countries so that Pakistan gives up its burden of his tory? A: The US cant do anything in a tangible way as far as the dispute over Kashmir i s concerned. We tried that years ago and failed miserably. We can help in formul ating a peace process in Afghanistan that brings the two countries closer to eac h other to work together for a peaceful, stable and neutral Afghanistan which wi ll benefit the interests of both countries. Another idea, which seems more likel y, is to improve relations between the two countries by promoting bilateral trad e. We should stress our interests in both countries working to resolve their differ ences. Countries can have normal relations despite having differences. That is a ctually harder without a normal relationship. Pakistan and India need to normali ze their relationship to resolve their differences, which can only happen over t ime. If they do not normalize relations by encouraging trade and allowing people -to-people contacts, they will never resolve their problems. I dont believe there is anything the US can do in a specific way to help Pakistan accomplish its goa ls in Kashmir. Pakistanis have also started to understand this reality. Q: How significant was the recent Bonn Conference without Pakistan attending it? A: The Conference was a serious attempt to get things started on a regional basi s. It was a serious problem that the Pakistanis boycotted the conference because of the killing of the Pakistani soldiers, which I think was basically an accide nt. Q: Is the recent opening of a Taliban office in Qatar another attempt to distanc e Pakistan from the future solution of Afghanistan? A: I dont think it has anything to do with moving Pakistan out of the picture. Pa kistan has legitimate interests in a viable, peaceful solution in Afghanistan. T he Taliban had been looking for an office and it does not push them further apar t from Pakistan than they are today. We have to know which Taliban we are talkin g about. If it is the TTP, they are already hostile against the state of Pakista n and they are determined to bring it down. If it is the Quetta Shura or the Haq qani Network, they are already friends with Pakistan. Q: What are the immediate challenges Pakistan faces in near future? A: Pakistans real and immediate dangers are internal, and, at the moment, primari ly economic. The economy is about to collapse, which is a problem that cannot be solved overnight or without sacrifices on the part of the political leadership. The political leadership should develop policies that encourage growth and stop inflation. A second immediate danger is an armed insurgency from the Pakistani Taliban. Thirdly, related to the economic coming economic tsunami, the 18th Amen dment has not been implemented well, which is likely to trigger inter-provincial disharmony, increasing risks that endanger the very survival of the federation. If you look closely at these problems, the external threats, such as the Indian involvement in Afghanistan, pale by comparison. Pakistans internal problems are e ating away at the vitals of the state. Pakistan may muddle through in the next f ive to ten years, but the present direction is sliding toward failure. There are some strong and positive institutions, such as the military and the judiciary, which will not let Pakistan fail. However, I hope the military does not take the

economic situation as a pretext to grab political power. Q: Today the future of democracy in Pakistan is once again in danger because of visible rift between the civilian government and the strong military in the wake of the Memogate which somewhat indirectly involves the United States. What are your thoughts on Memogate? A: I am totally befuddled. When I saw the text of the memo, I wondered how anybo dy could think it was genuine. It seemed a ridiculously phony document. I am con fused why intelligent people are trusting the memo is real, and why intelligent people who are accused of having written it would have done so. The memo has cle arly worsened relations between Pakistans senior military and civilian leadership . We dont know what is going to happen as a result of that. There are now rumours of ousting Prime Minister Gilani and replacing him with so mebody else. This all looks weird to us outsiders. Pakistan is falling apart eco nomically and here the leaders are caught debating a very questionable memo and making it into a cause celebre, when there are riots over electricity and gas sh ortages, raging inflation, and rapidly increasing poverty. The memo struck me from the beginning that somebody was being set up. I find it a weird preoccupation at a time when the country is sinking fast economically. I hope the investigation conducted will be fair, objective, transparent and quick so the leaders can get back to Pakistans real existential problems. Malik Siraj Akbar is a freelance journalist based in Washington DC. Source: The Dawn.com URL: http://www.newageislam.com/NewAgeIslamInterview_1.aspx?ArticleID=6358