The Confederation of Korea by: Amy Russ

INTA 8803: Inter-Korean Relations Dr. Choo Monday, Wednesday, Friday: 2:05-2:55

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The Cold War still plays an integral part in international politics. Furthermore, it is personified in the actions of North and South Korea. These two nations have been divided since the end of World War II. There has been calls for reunification, but is reunification possible? Furthermore, if it is possible, can the German reunification model be used as an example? This is an important question to answer, simply because of the fact that both nations have slowly cultivated different civil ideologies, beliefs, and government institutions that will be difficult to change and which were not factors during German reunification If Korean reunification is possible, it will have to follow a different blueprint than German reunification because of two reasons. First, South Korea s reunification policies, such as nordpolitik , which are based on West Germany s attempts to create a relationship with the United Soviet States of Russia and its satellite states, have not worked on bringing about positive changes between the two nations. Second, the generational gap that is characterized both by a more willingness to appease North Korean demands and an unwillingness to trust either Japan or China. Therefore, a new blueprint for Korean reunification must be created. This blueprint for Korean reunification can be analyzed in four broad steps. First, there must be four party talks between the two Koreas, the United States, and China. Second, South Korea must be willing to allow some of the elites from the North Korea government to enter and fully participate within the new government. Lastly, the new government must fully promise neutrality within the East Asian region for a number of years.

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Is Reunification Possible? Analysis of the German Model Many Korean scholars, politicians, and researchers view the German reunification model as an illustration of the possibility of Korean reunification. During the early 1990s, South Korean politicians scholars, journalists and business leaders wasted no time in traveling to unified Germany to observe its experience and universities and research institutes in Seoul have invited many Germans to South Korea to lecture and conduct seminars on the applicability of the German reunification model on the Korean peninsula.1 Many South Koreans believed that it was possible to use the similar, if not identical, policies as West Germany. As such, it is necessary to analyze the policies and tools used by West Germany in its pursuit of German reunification, and then to attempt to determine if these policies can be fully applied to the Korean case. One of the overarching strategies that West Germany utilized was ostpoitik . To this end, South Korea created a northern policy, often called nordpolitik which is modeled after West Germany's ostpolitik. 2 The German reunification model began first with an opening of trade and dialogue negotiations in 1988. These negotiations lead to an increase in political discussions, family reunifications, and other conciliatory measures that eased the tensions between the two nations. Unlike the West German ostpolitik , South Korea s nordpolitik was unsuccessful in bringing about a lessening of tensions between the two nations. The South Korea

1 Rhee, Kang Suk. Korea s Unification: The Applicability of the German Experience . Asian Survey, Vol. 33 No. 4 (Apr. 1993). 360 2 Rhee, Kang Suk. 360

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proposals did not bring any positive results such as improved travel, trade, or political cooperation and North Korea seemed even more closed off from South Korea and the rest of the globe.3 Another strategy was to initiate dialogue between itself, East Germany, Russia, Great Britain, France, and the United States. These two-plus-four talks assisted in easing the tensions regarding the future of German political and economic power. The possibility of using similar talks for Korean reunification may not be possible because of the common conception of the role that the United States played in dividing the nation. Indeed as was reported by multiple surveys: Koreans traditionally had unfavorable opinions about the four major powers (the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan, and China) surrounding the Korean peninsula; and these feelings were further aggravated by the division of Korea in 1945. In fact, when asked whether the major powers were primarily to blame for the partition of Korea, about 70 percent of South Koreans responded positively in the late 1960s and early 1970s (NUB 1976). A more recent survey (Ministry of Information, August 1990) showed almost the same percentage. This negative attitude toward the major powers was also reflected in the responses to a survey question about the most important factor hindering unification. Many South Koreans chose the four major powers as one of the key factors hindering unification (NUB 1976, 1980, 1988; Lee 1989: 106). More specifically, when asked in November 1990 whether the United States and Japan would not want Korean unification, surprisingly about 59.4 percent of those interviewed responded that they would not (Korea Institute of Social Development 1991).4 This negative view of the Western powers hinders the possibility of using party talks to bring about Korean reunification. This is problematic because two of the major international powers within the region, the United States and Japan, must be

Rhee, Kang Suk. 360 Chung, Jin Min and John D. Nagle. Generational Dynamics and the Politics of German and Korean Unification . The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 45 No. 4 (Dec., 1992). 856
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included in any discussions regarding Korean reunification. Indeed, the continuous distrust of the United States and Japan continues to hinder the peace process. As Rhee Kang Suk comments, many Korean politicians fear that, if the four powers interfere in Korean affairs then they may decide things over our heads, according to their own interests. 5 Historically, this has been the case. The Korean peninsula has been dominated by different powers, including Japan, and after World War II, Russia and the United States. This fear of having these three powers involved in possible reunification stems from this historical precedent. Another implication of this is that, based on the Potsdam Agreement, only the United States and Russia should have any involvement in the Korean reunification process. In other words, pursuant to the Potsdam agreement, Allied leaders decided that Soviet troops would accept the Japanese surrender to the north and American troops to the south of the 38th parallel. Hence, the United States and perhaps Russia, but not Japan and China, can claim legitimate rights to interfere in Korean affairs.
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Finally, there is the difference between East Germany and North Korea. The North Korean government has created and maintained a stigmatizing ideology that, at its base, prevents any attempts of outside interference in what is considered to be North Korean internal affairs. This ideology, called chuch e, advocates that Korean reunification should be an internal affair of the Korean people, in which no outside

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Rhee, Kang Suk. 364 Rhee, Kang Suk. 364

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force is permitted to interfere."7 This ideology has lead to the North Korean government rejecting any possibility of reunification talks that would involve other nations. This rejection is difficult to overcome, especially considering the fact that two major powers the United States and China are directly involved in the affairs of both states and, because of the political and economic ties between the United States and South Korea and China and North Korea, will have to be included in any and all negotiations. Positive Signs for Reunification Based on the above analysis, it is possible to make the conclusion that Korean reunification is not possible. After all, the only historical precedent, German reunification, cannot be applied to the situation. However, there are positive indicators that give hope for Korean reunification. One of the more positive signs for reunification is the sagging North Korea economy. The importance of economic growth and development cannot be ignored: North Korea is now "desperate to establish diplomatic relations with the United States and Japan. Despite antagonistic rhetoric Pyongyang is seeking ways to ensure the safety of its existence and revive the country's sagging economy. Recently, ideology has not seemed to matter so much to the North Koreans-for example, the simultaneous entry of North and South Korea to the United Nations-and chuch'e may not be a serious road block to Pyongyang's acceptance of two-plus-four talk.8 Another positive indicator for Korean reunification is the change in the generational view towards a more lenient view on what a possibly reunified

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Rhee, Kang Suk. 364 Rhee, Kang Suk. 365

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government will look like. It is assumed that a reunified Korea will be a democratic country. However, the exact leaning of this government (either liberal or conservative) is still very debatable. In particular, the exact leaning of this government will be determined by changes in how much the South Korean people are willing to surrender in terms of unification and the necessary deals that would be made to reassure the North Korean political elites there survival and chance to maintain power. There was a change in the generational view regarding the proper system of government and the willingness to meet and accept some of North Korea s demands. About half of South Koreans (49.9 percent) supported unification at some expense of the capitalist system and 40.3 percent wanted unification even if it meant sacrificing some individual freedoms and as many as 72.4 percent were ready to accept some costs for unification. 9 Indeed, the willingness to accept political costs for reunification does appear to make reunification a strong possibility. Even thought there is a willingness to lose some political and economic freedoms, its allies, such as the United States, will be very reluctant to allow a reunification model that allow the removal of democratic principles to occur on the Korean peninsula.

Korean Blueprint The Confederation of Korea As such, a possible form for Korean reunification may be best found in American history. Historically, a confederation has been used only once in American

Chung, Jin Min and John D. Nagle. 866

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history (during the Civil War); however, the Korea reunification case brings this model into a new light. In particular, a confederate system will allow for reunification while still pursuing three main objectives. First, for Korean reunification to truly be possible, the South Korean government will have to overcome the North s perspective regarding its political policies. In particular, North Korean elites are very interested in maintaining power; indeed, the interactions between the two nations have been governed on the assumption that inter-Korean relations are less important for Pyongyang as an end in themselves than as a means to for economic revitalization, which is in turn an important part of Kim Jong Il s own legitimization.
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The North Korean elites want to maintain legitimacy for one

main reason: survival. The North Korean government, as an authoritarian regime, understands that, historically, the removal of these kinds of regimes is often brutal and violent for the elite class. More recently, the forceful and violent removal of the authoritarian leader Muammar Gaddafi illustrates this point. As such, maintaining legitimacy (and thus power) is a necessity for survival against possible backlash over economic, political, and personal grievances that the lower class may feel. Because of the both the willingness to accept some political concessions and the fact that the North Korean political elites continuously seek power, one of the few ways to truly bring about the possibility of North Korean reunification will be to offer the creation of a full-fledged horizontal two-tiered government system, or a

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Armstrong, Charles K. Inter-Korean Relations: A North Korean Perspective . Inter-Korean Relations: Problems and Prospects. ed. Samuel S. Kim. 49

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confederation. In this system, certain North Korean politicians would be guaranteed political office in a distinct government that would work in tandem with the original South Korean government. Indeed, one of Pyongyang s principles is this exact idea: Therefore, at times dealing directly with ROK leadership has been considered a feasible tactic for unification. It is possible to negotiate with the ROK and even establish a Confederation bringing the two systems together under a single state, provided outside powers (meaning primarily the United States) do not interfere and the systems are left as they are for the time being.11 Understandably, the creation of a temporary confederation may also be in the best interest of Seoul. In particular, a confederation would allow the South to pursue a gradual reunification that may allow them to overcome the severe economic issues that will come from unifying with the extremely economically poor North Korea. Indeed, the South Korean government has learned that a fast reunification can ultimately lead to a stronger economic burden that will be hard to overcome. The historical problems that can come from reunification can be seen during the years after West and East Germany reunited. During the Germany reunification process, many of the state owned firms were forced to either shut down or had to undergo massive management and structural change and in either case, the result will be massive layoffs of workers.
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Remarkably, this economic problem occurred during

a reunification with a Germany that at least had a somewhat functioning economic system. On the other hand, the North Korea economy is a floundering system, and immediate reunification could lead to more harm to both systems. Because of the

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Armstrong, Charles K. 51 Cha, Victor D. Korean Reunification. Asian Perspective Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter 1997). 75

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need to assuage the North Korean political elite s fear of retribution and loss of power; the North s acceptance of a confederation; and the economic consequences that could arise from immediate reunification, a confederation or two-tiered government structure is best for the Korean reunification. Party Talks United States Interests One of the most important parties that must be included in any talks regarding reunification is the United States. However, this is difficult to achieve because of North Korea s stance regarding what it considers outside interference and the recent shift in Washington s stance on North Korea. For the United States, in the longer term the United States seeks a Korea that is unified, stable, and democratic; maintains a free market economy; effectively integrates the North and South; forsakes WMD; and is permanently aligned to Washington.
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It will be difficult to

pursue the last interest, simply because of the China s ties with the region. For the United States, maintaining the status quo is not option, simply because of the destabilizing effect that North Korea has on the entire region. Korean reunification could occur in different ways; however, the argument that a war with North Korea is the best option for the United States is not particularly true. A war initiated by North Korea with little or no notice is the worst case scenario. Although the U.S./ ROK alliance would prevail, the scale of casualties and the associated humanitarian

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Coghlan, David. Prospects from a Korean Reunification Strategic Studies Institute. 10

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crisis would be disastrous for all involved.

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As such, a war over the Korean

peninsula is not the best option for the United States, at least in the short term. However, that does not mean it is not possible to maintain a permanent alliance with a unified Korea. In particular, the concept of a confederacy will allow the United States to maintain close ties with the newly formed Korean government. Because the new confederate government will be made up of both members of the South Korean and North Korean government, the United States will be able to exert pressure on both groups in regards to political interests while using its already strong political ties with South Korea to increase its standings within the region. China Interests In many instances, China s interests in the region can be seen as being heavily focused on maintaining the status quo because any other reunification scenario will be seen as a loss for China in the long term: Reunification by war would be a worst-case outcome for China. The result of such a conflict would most likely be a unified peninsula aligned to the United States, with the possibility of increased Japanese influence in the region. At the same time, Beijing would have to deal with an expected influx of North Korean refugees and the immediate redirection of South Korean investment from China into the reconstruction of the North. It comes as no surprise, then, that China remains committed to indefinite status quo on the peninsula, that reunification is in the (remote) future.15 In and of itself, China has been pursuing the goal of maintaining the status quo in two different ways. First, it has maintained its support through economic aid and

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Coghlan, David. Prospects from a Korean Reunification Strategic Studies Institute. 10 Coghlan, David. Prospects from a Korean Reunification Strategic Studies Institute. 8

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political backing of North Korea. This can be seen in the fact that more than half of North Korea s trade is with China. China also continues to support North Korea in arenas such as the United Nations, were it uses its status as member of the Security Council to prevent strong international action against North Korea acts of aggression. For instance, the prevention of full condemnation of the North Korea s sinking of the Cheonan was orchestrated by China s use of its veto power in the United Nations Security Council. However, in the longer term, China may not have a choice regarding Korean reunification. In particular, with a strong United States backing, it is possible (but difficult) that Korean reunification could still occur. By not being a part of this process, China will loose any influence it may have gained. Furthermore, there is possibility that North Korea may become too much for China to handle. This scenario may be closer to reality than many politicians assume. Most recently, famous Chinese professor, Mr. Zhu Feng, argued that the problems on the Korean peninsula were not just a result of the Cold War. He argued, It was also a result, of the unchanged nature of the North Korean regime and its behavior and that North Korea, risks biting the Chinese hand that feeds it .
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As such, the scenario of China

changing its risk benefit analysis and pushing for a reunified Korea, which would indicate more predictability, economic stability, and allow China to further its influence.

16 Friends Like These: Why China May Worry about North Korea just as Much as America Does The Economist. Jun. 30, 2011. http://www.economist.com/node/18897395

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Under the confederate system, China would better able to pursue its interest of maintaining influence over the region and a buffer state while still allowing for ease in tensions and a prevention of a unified Korea that is pro-United States. A confederacy would mean that North Korea would be able to maintain its legitimacy as a state and its ideology. However, it would gain a stronger economy through more open trade practices and better political standing within the region. Furthermore, because a confederacy does not mean a removal of a nation s own internal government, Beijing would still be able to maintain its influence over North Korea. In addition, by assisting in the creation of this confederacy, China would be able to pursue its unstated goal: to separate South Korea from the U.S.-Japan bloc and draw Seoul closer to China .17 Neutrality Promise As argued above, a confederacy is the best way to pursue Korean reunification. However, to further ensure that both the United States and China s political interest are met, it will be necessary to create a neutral clause, within the framework of the creation of the new confederate Korea. In this framework, the United States would give up its military bases in South Korea to gain a Korea that is less destabilizing within the region. This neutrality would not be permanent and it would encompass certain areas of international economic and political consequence. The first would be that the newly reunified Korea would not be allowed to pursue nuclear weapons

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Coghlan, David. Prospects from a Korean Reunification Strategic Studies Institute. 9

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and would be subjected to inspections by the IAEA. This nuclear weapon free nation is a strategic benefit to the United States, which is still pursuing a policy of nuclear proliferation prevention. Furthermore, China is gains one of its most important goals within the region: the removal of American troops from the Korean peninsula. This has been a major political goal for China, and the removal of troops from the peninsula will be seen as an important political victory. Furthermore, under the neutrality promise, China will gain an ally that, without the ability to pursue military growth, will be interested in expanding its economic growth. This economic growth will offset the negative consequences regarding the creation of the confederation. As such, China stands to gain much from a neutral, confederate Korea. Conclusion: Political Hurdles and Negative Consequences of Reunification A possible political hurdle can be found within both North and South Korea. A reunified Korea would mean that a strong Korean military presence would no longer be necessary. This could lead to some covert and, in the case of North Korea, overt resistance to reunification: In Korea, some resistance from the military in both Koreas is more likely because unification will lessen the need for a strong army and reduce the political influence of the military. A gradual relaxation of tension on the Korean peninsula over time could, however, reduce the probability of military intervention in a future unification process.18 Another possible complication is the role of Japan within the reunification. In particular, the Japanese government has a mixture of similar interests with the
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United States and its own personal state interest. A unified Korea, even a confederacy would be a strong economic competitor. Furthermore, the reunification process would draw United States funds away from Japanese military and economic. Lastly, any attempt at Japan to have part in the Korean reunification process will be hindered because of the range of historical disputes between the two nations, which limits its policy options.19

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Coghlan, David. Prospects from a Korean Reunification Strategic Studies Institute. 9

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Works Cited Armstrong, Charles K. Inter-Korean Relations: A North Korean Perspective . InterKorean Relations: Problems and Prospects. ed. Samuel S. Kim. PalgraveMacMillian: New York. 39-56. Print Cha, Victor D. Korean Reunification: The Zero-Sum Past and the Precarious Future. Asian Perspective Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter 1997). 63-92. Print

Chung, Jin Min and John D. Nagle. Generational Dynamics and the Politics of German and Korean Unification . The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 45 No. 4 (Dec., 1992). 851-867. Print Coghlan, David. Prospects from a Korean Reunification Strategic Studies Institute. April 2008. 1-23. Print

Friends Like These: Why China May Worry about North Korea just as Much as America Does The Economist. Jun. 30, 2011. http://www.economist.com/node/18897395

Rhee, Kang Suk. Korea s Unification: The Applicability of the German Experience . Asian Survey, Vol. 33 No. 4 (Apr. 1993). 360-375. Print