Aquinas on Liberty The moral relativism and nihilistic scepticism that seem to characterize our contemporary culture are

attached to an appreciation of liberty to which is attributed a supreme value. Even as the Enlightenment elevation of reason against faith understood as superstition is fading away into the distance and even while mythical memories of the ancien regime evaporate and the Churchs defence of human rights in the face of totalitarian dictatorships is recognized, the standard of liberty is still being raised against the Church. Some even claim that even though the brown and red dictatorships have gone, the purple one is still there and so the sphere of human liberty needs to be extended against the encroaching power of the Churchs hold on human minds and hearts. In this there is a Freudian desire to decapitate the Father, liberating the individual from the shackles of religious morality. The creeping revolution of social mores and ethical thinking, engineered in a soft way, with no crowd-filled piazzas and drastic measures is supposedly a process of empowerment, in which individuals are told that they are now to have a rightful say in their matters and they are invited to make their own decisions in their own best interests, according to their wishes and feelings, but at the same time they are denied their culturally transmitted ethical heritage, they are told to be mistrustful towards their own reason and so ultimately they are deprived of any tools to be able to assess what in truth really are their best interests and how to differentiate between their subjective and fleeting wishes and feelings and authentic convictions that need to be formed and strengthened because sometimes the truth of the matter turns out to be in direct conflict with fleeting emotional wishes and feelings. An empowerment that burns incense in front of ephemeral feelings and simultaneously invokes an epistemological nihilism shunning from any convictions in the name of tolerance, fearing to propose anything that could be held as true is not an empowerment. It is a sham of liberty. Formation to true liberty is not simple. Just as the acquisition of extensive knowledge and even more of wisdom requires a lengthy process of education, so the formation of the volitional life is also a lengthy and demanding process that needs experience and external guidance. There is, particularly in Britain an esteemed culture of sports that understands that the body needs to be trained so that it would be agile and fit. There is, particularly here in Oxford, an esteemed intellectual culture that understands that the mind needs to be trained in its acquisition of erudition and discovery of truth. But where are there schools that look into the functioning of the spiritual faculty of volition, in conjunction with but not in subjection to the sensitive appetitive powers that are the

emotions, and enabling its training and development? Is there not also an inherited wisdom that can be transmitted about the volitional life? It is not only because I am a Dominican, and not only because I am here to give the Aquinas Lecture, that I turn to a mediaeval Dominican friar with my question. I am convinced that Aquinas has succeeded in capturing the wisdom of the great minds that had preceded him and in presenting a coherent exposition of the nature of the will and its functioning in the human person. He was not responding to the questions of modernity or post-modernity, and so his mode of presentation of the issue differs from our modern reflection but in it can be found an illuminating response to our modern questions about human liberty. Aquinas was above all a theologian. He was not engaged in ideological battles and so he should not be used for such. His prime attention was focused on God and when he wrote about man, both man as he came out of the hands of the Creator, and man as he is transformed by grace, as also the unique God-man that is Christ, Aquinas was always focused on God, as He Himself has revealed Himself to humanity. Aquinas extensive use of Aristotles philosophy should not fool us into thinking that his theology was a marginal aspect of his metaphysical and ethical considerations. Aquinas was primarily a theologian, engaged most of his time in offering Biblical commentaries, and when he wrote other works it was always in view of a theological finality. The presentation of the essence of liberty was necessary for him to explain who is God, and how His image is reflected in the moral action of the graced individual. The inquiries of Aquinas, (including those that were concerned with the Trinity) were not undertaken so as to satisfy a proud curiosity, nor were they undertaken so as to convince non-believers about the mysteries of faith, nor even were they undertaken primarily so as to disprove errors, even though that may be a perfectly justified intellectual project. They were undertaken as a spiritual exercise so as to manifest the truth, thereby enabling the structuring of the existing virtue of faith that has been given to us graciously by God, supplying nourishment, strengthening and a defence of faith as it adheres to the salutary mystery. Thought structures worked out within faith, even while they are subject to a purely rational assessment of their inner coherence offer a solatium, a joy and a peace of mind, an interior conviction that what we know in faith is not absurd, because it corresponds with the true conclusions of the reasoning mind, and is something solid on which we can build our lives.1
1

ScG, I, c. 9: Sunt tamen ad huiusmodi veritatem manifestandam rationes aliquae verisimiles inducendae, ad fidelium quidem exercitium et solatium, non autem ad adversarios convincendos: quia

The theme of liberty has a central place among revealed truths, but it provokes questions springing from a surprised mind. How can we make sense of St. Pauls claim that it is God, for his own loving purpose, who puts both the will and action into you (Ph 2, 13) and that everyone moved by the Spirit of God is a son of God (Rm 8, 14)? How can we be free when even our own willing and action are moved by God? And if it is possible for us to undergo a divine transformation that somehow implicates what seems to be our most inner self, our own will, how can we then open up to this divine influence, in particular when we painfully perceive the limitations of our own self-command recognizing ourselves in St. Pauls cry: I cannot understand my own behaviour. I fail to carry out the things I want to do, and I find myself doing the very things I hate (Rm 7, 15)? If Gods influence can heal a wounded will, eliciting liberty in it, how is this possible and why does it not always happen? These questions that refer to the mystery of God working within the human soul are fundamentally theological, but they presuppose a philosophical understanding of the nature of the will and of its dependence upon divine causality and they offer a stimulus and corrective guidance to philosophical enquiry. A clear grasping of the nature of the will and of its possible graced transformation may allow for such an understanding of liberty that hopefully corresponds with human experience and is useful in the mapping out of a perspective of human growth. In itself, theological knowledge will not ensure the good working of the will and the liberation of liberty through grace. It may however offer an inner joy as the ramifications of the workings of grace are perceived; it may assist in the correction of erroneous conceptions and also distortions of liberty; and it may offer a perspective towards which we are on the way in our struggles and cooperation with grace. The history of moral theology has pointed to a XIV century English Franciscan, William of Ockham as the author of a far-reaching change in the understanding of the nature of the will and as a consequence of the entire organization of ethical inquiry. In fact the mediaeval nick-name given to him venerabilis inceptor manifests an early conviction that he had introduced something radically new. In his attribution of an unlimited potency to the divine will and in consequence to the human will, he defined liberty as an essential quality of the will. That liberty was understood as being absolutely supreme exerting a resistance towards everything that is not the will, be it reality in its truth,
ipsa rationum insufficientia eos magis in suo errore confirmaret, dum aestimarent nos propter tam debiles rationes veritati fidei consentire. Cf. Gilles Emery, Trinity, Church, and the Human Person, Thomistic Essays, (Naples, FL.: Sapientia Press, 2007), p. 28.

or in the case of the human will, the moral law, an acquired habit, an infused virtue or the will of another person. Far from elevating the will, such an attribution to the human will of an inherent liberty indifferent to reality placed it in constant opposition against the more powerful will of God. The juxtaposition of these two wills, divine and human, led to the reduction of ethics or moral theology to the study of their mutual interplay or conflict. Since the domination of nominalism in ethical thought the common parlance of most European languages couples the will always with an adjective. The human person is said to have a reason and a free will. We not say that reason by nature is reasonable because we understand that the reason requires training before reasonableness and even more wisdom will inhabit it. Why do we immediately attribute freedom to the will, as if it were its natural endowment, disregarding the obvious fact that often human willing is not free since it is sometimes shackled by a chaotic lack of purpose, by bad habits and addictions? The skipping back over centuries to a time preceding this linguistic misrepresentation may enable us to rediscover the will in its pristine nature and the conditions of growth of interior liberty. Nominalism, attributing supreme free choice uniquely to the will has seeped so deeply into Western thinking that some philosophers perceiving the incoherence of this idea have began to question the very existence of the will doubting as to whether Aristotle himself recognized the existence of such a spiritual appetitive faculty. Daniel Westberg appreciating the insight of his Oxford professors has clarified the issue.2 The will does exist as an immaterial being and its essential characteristics and functioning can be recognized and precisely delineated. Since it has a nature it is determined to the willing of its appropriate object even though that object may be infinite in its extension. This fact adds to the perplexity of understanding the will. The spiritual faculties of cognition and volition are similar in that they are distinct from the senses and the emotions that include a bodily component.3 In cognition the known object is somehow absorbed by the knowing mind. In an immaterial way, the known object is assimilated by
Right Practical Reason. Aristotle, Action and Prudence in Aquinas, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) p. 37-38. 3 De Ver., q. 22, art. 10, ad 2: Potentia dupliciter potest considerari: vel in ordine ad obiectum, vel in ordine ad essentiam animae, in qua radicatur. Si ergo voluntas consideretur in ordine ad obiectum, sic ad aliud genus animae pertinet quam intellectus; et sic voluntas contra rationem et intellectum distinguitur... Si vero voluntas consideretur secundum id in quo radicatur, sic, cum voluntas non habeat organum corporale, sicut nec intellectus, voluntas et intellectus ad eamdem partem animae reducentur. Et sic quandoque intellectus vel ratio sumitur prout includit in se utrumque; et sic dicitur quod voluntas est in ratione. Et secundum hoc rationale includens intellectum et voluntatem dividitur contra irascibile et concupiscibile.
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the intellect as it reaches out towards it. In willing, the reverse happens, because, as the will reaches out to its object, that object remains outside the will. Who knows what is money has within his intellect, the concept of money. Who wills money, wills it as it exists outside the will and not just the concept of money.4 Anthony Kenny notes that in the beauty contest between the intellect and the will, both the author of the Imitation of Christ and Karl Marx attributed a primacy to the will, whereas Aristotle attributed a primacy to the intellect.5 Aquinas had no doubt that the will as it loves God has a primacy over the intellect,6 but viewed in abstraction from their objects the intellect has primacy because it absorbs the truth about its object, whereas the will can only reach out to an external object.7 The capacity of the intellect to assimilate a known truth is not only the source of its dignity, but also occasionally of its pride. The intellect may be so fascinated by its consumption of conquered truth that it then rejects the humble reception in faith of truths that exceed its natural capacity. When the intellect knows a truth that is inferior to it, the knowing attributes a dignity to the known object, whereas when the intellect knows an object that is superior to it, that known object is then reduced to the cognitive limits of the intellect.8 Electrical energy existed unproductively for millions of years. When it was discovered by the human mind it acquired a specific dignity and value. When however God is known uniquely as a philosophical reality, He is reduced by the intellect to the level of a solution to a riddle. (Only when God is known through the grace of faith the intellect is liberated from its pride and its cognition is extended beyond its natural limits.) Whereas when the will
De Ver., q. 22, art. 10: Dicitur autem aliquid esse obiectum animae, secundum quod habet aliquam habitudinem ad animam. Ubi ergo invenimus diversas rationes habitudinis ad animam, ibi invenimus per se differentiam in obiecto animae, demonstrantem diversum genus potentiarum animae. Res autem ad animam invenitur duplicem habitudinem habere: unam secundum quod ipsa res est in anima per modum animae, et non per modum sui; aliam secundum quod anima comparatur ad rem in suo esse existentem. Et sic obiectum animae est aliquid dupliciter. Uno modo in quantum natum est esse in anima non secundum esse proprium, sed secundum modum animae, id est spiritualiter; et haec est ratio cognoscibilis in quantum est cognoscibile. Alio modo est aliquid obiectum animae secundum quod ad ipsum anima inclinatur et ordinatur secundum modum ipsius rei in seipsa existentis; et haec est ratio appetibilis in quantum est appetibile. 5 Aquinas on Mind, (London and New York: Routledge, 1994) p. 71. 6 De Ver., q. 22, art. 11, ad sc. 1: Caritas est habitus perficiens voluntatem in ordine ad Deum; et in tali ordine voluntas est nobilior intellectu. Sc 5: Quanto aliquid est Deo propinquius, tanto est nobilius. Sed voluntas magis appropinquat Deo quam intellectus: quia sicut dicit Hugo de S. Victore, ibi dilectio intrat, ubi cognitio foris est: plus enim Deum diligimus quam ipsum possumus cognoscere. 7 De Ver., q. 22, art. 11: Perfectius autem est, simpliciter et absolute loquendo, habere in se nobilitatem alterius rei, quam ad rem nobilem comparari extra se existentem. Unde voluntas et intellectus, si absolute consideretur, non comparando ad hanc vel illam rem, hunc ordinem inveniuntur habere, quod intellectus eminentior est simpliciter voluntate. 8 De Ver., q. 22, art. 11: Rerum autem quae sunt anima superiores, formas percipit intellectus inferiori modo quam sint in ipsis rebus: recipitur enim aliquid in intellectu per modum sui... Et eadem ratione earum quae sunt anima inferiores, sicut res corporales, formae sunt nobiliores in anima quam in ipsis rebus.
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moves to its specific object, the will itself is transformed. It is the object that grants to the will an appropriate dignity. When we love truth and values, the will is ennobled. It is therefore better to love God than to know Him, because divine goodness exists in more eminent way in God Himself than in our minds when it is known, and so when that goodness is loved it ennobles the will.9 Is the will therefore degenerated when it wills lower material objects? This would neatly fit our scheme, but this is only the case when the will is drawn irrationally by the bodily passions to their objects. When the reason perceives the rationality of desiring a sensitive material object, be it a good meal or pleasant music, the will is not degenerated by willing it, because it wills it together with the rational perception of it that ennobles the will.10 Reflecting upon emotional desires and spiritual volition, we tend to interpret their difference psychologically concluding that the type of cognition, sensitive or intellectual, generates a different appetitive movement. Curiously enough Aquinas does not offer such an explanation. He perceives a hierarchy amongst the various types of appetitive movements beginning with the amor naturalis which we would now call the law of gravity and ending in the love of God Himself, who moves other beings and is not moved by them.11 Why this reference to God, where it seems that psychology could suffice? For Aquinas, the differentiation of the types of appetitive movement is not decisively conditioned by the type of preceding cognition, but by the internal springs of the movement itself. Physical bodies are moved executively. Animals are moved by their own passions, whereas the human will may express itself or it may not express itself. In this it is similar to God. In its movement the human will profits from the reasons knowing of an end
9

De Ver., q. 22, art. 11: Sic igitur triplici potest sumi comparatio intellectus ad voluntatem. Uno modo absolute et in universali, non respectu huius vel illius rei; et sic intellectus est eminentior voluntate; sicut habere id quod est dignitatis in re aliqua est perfectius quam comparari ad nobilitatem eius. Alio modo per respectum ad res naturales sensibiles: et sic iterum intellectus est simpliciter nobilior voluntate, utpote intelligere lapidem quam velle lapidem; eo quod forma lapidis nobiliori modo est in intellectu secundum quod ab intellectu intelligitur, quam sit in re ipsa secundum quod a voluntate desideratur. Tertio modo in respectu ad res divinas, quae sunt animae superiores; et sic velle est eminentius quam intelligere, sicut velle Deum et amare quam cognoscere; quia scilicet divina bonitas perfectius est in ipso Deo prout a voluntate desideratur, quam sit participata in nobis prout ab intellectu concipitur. 10 Ia, q. 82, art. 3: Quando igitur res in qua est bonum, est nobilior ipsa anima, in qua est ratio intellecta; per comparationem ad talem rem, voluntas est altior intellectu. Quando vero res in qua est bonum, est infra animam; tunc etiam per comparationem ad talem rem, intellectus est altior voluntatis. Unde melior est amor Dei quam cognitio: e contrario autem melior est cognitio rerum corporalium quam amor. 11 De Ver., q. 22, art. 4: Quanto enim aliqua natura est Deo propinquior, tanto expressior in ea divinae dignitatis similitudo invenitur. Hoc autem ad divinam dignitatem pertinet ut omnia moveat et inclinet et dirigat, ipse a nullo alio motus vel inclinatus vel directus. Unde, quanto aliqua natura est Deo vicinior, tanto minus ab alio inclinatur et magis nata est seipsam inclinare.

and of the means leading to it. The will needs therefore the support of the reason for its functioning.12 It is not a purely independent faculty. But the specificity of the will lies in its interiority, in its capacity to move and not to move, and it is this capacity that necessitates an intellectual cognition.13 The will is not therefore bound by the dictates of reason. It has its own movement flowing from within itself. Is this interior wellspring of the will the source of its liberty? And in what way is that interior movement conditioned by the nature of the will? The suggestion that the will has a nature, which in some way determines it, baffles the modern mind. Is not the contingency of willing the essence of liberty? Aquinas raises some intriguing questions. Does the will will anything of necessity? Does it necessarily will whatever it wills? And does one merit when one wills necessarily?14 The necessity of the will is not that of external coercion but of the interior inclination of the will.15 For each being, it is necessary to be according to the nature of that being, and in this there is no coercion. The volcano erupts, the monkey jumps and the acid reacts with a metal, all in accord with their specific natures. The idea that the will could separate itself from its nature is intrinsically contradictory and so has to be rejected, even though there are people who are inclined to assert such an absurdity. In all beings there is a metaphysical inclination towards their inherent finality. (The scientist empirical approach abstains from asking the question about the finality of beings even though common sense perceives its pertinence.) In the will therefore, Aquinas concludes, there are two levels of its drive towards objects. On the deepest level, by virtue of its nature, the will is inclined, or even determined to its appropriate object. On a secondary, we could say more superficial level, there is in the will an inclination towards an object that is not determined by the wills nature, but is qualified by the will itself in conjunction with the reason.16 The deepest determined
De Ver., q. 22, art. 4: Quod autem aliquid determinet sibi inclinationem in finem, non potest contingere nisi cognoscat finem, et habitudinem finis in ea quae sunt ad finem: quod est tantum rationis. Et ideo talis appetitus non determinatus ex aliquo alio de necessitate, sequitur apprehensionem rationis; unde appetitus rationalis, qui voluntas dicitur, est alia potentia ad appetitu sensibili. 13 De Ver., q. 22, art. 4, ad 1: Voluntas ab appetitu sensibili non distinguitur directe per hoc quod est sequi apprehensionem hanc vel illam; sed ex hoc quod est determinare sibi inclinationem, vel habere inclinationem determinatam ab alio: quae duo exigunt potentiam non unius modi. Sed talis diversitas requirit diversitatem apprehensionum.. Unde quasi ex consequenti accipitur distinctio appetitivarum virium penes distinctionem apprehensivarum, et non principaliter. 14 De Ver., q. 22, art 5-7. 15 De Ver., q. 22, art. 5: Duplex est necessitas: necessitas scilicet coactionis, et haec in volentem nullo modo cadere potest; et necessitas naturalis inclinationis, sicut dicimus Deum de necessitate vivere: et tali necessitate voluntas aliquid de necessitate vult. 16 De Ver., q. 22, art. 5: Hoc autem est cuiuslibet naturae creatae, ut a Deo sit ordinata in bonum, naturaliter appetens illud. Unde et voluntati ipsi inest naturalis quidam appetitus sibi convenientis boni. Et praeter hoc habet appetere aliquid secundum propriam determinationem, non ex necessitate; quod ei comptetit in quantum voluntas est.
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inclination of the will has however an impact on the undetermined willing of the will.17 With a strained, as usual, etymology Aquinas asserts that appetere comes from aliquid petere, that is, the asking for or reaching out towards something that the Creator of nature has set as the end of the interior finality of a being.18 All beings, whether alive or lifeless are endowed with a fundamental and spontaneous orientation towards the supreme good that is not only the continuation of their being,19 its inner peace and beauty, but also ultimately the Creator of all being.20 The will therefore is endowed with a primeval inclination to the universal good, and without it, it would not be able to will anything.21 This fundamental inclination may at times be submerged by other movements of the will and by the sensitivity, but it can never be destroyed. In this assertion, Aquinas presents a vision of the will that is much more optimistic than the modern one, which under the influence of Kant sees in the will primarily a form of energy exerting pressure on itself, on the emotions and on other people so that obligations would be fulfilled. The will having essentially a natural inclination to the supreme good expresses the love of good and it suffers the impression of the good that attracts it, and therefore any forms of pressure on other faculties or objects or personal imperatives are consequent to this fundamental drive towards the supreme good that animates the will from within.22 Contained in this fundamental and determined inclination of the will there is the focus on the universal good that is God, on the ultimate end and supreme happiness, and on all

De Ver., q. 22, art. 5: Sicut autem est ordo naturae ad voluntatem, ita se habet ordo eorum quae naturaliter vult voluntas, ad ea respectu quorum a seipsa determinatur, non ex natura. Et ideo, sicut natura est voluntatis fundamentum, ita appetibile quod naturaliter appetitur, est aliorum appetibilium principium et fundamentum. 18 De Ver., q. 22, art. 1: Unde, cum omnia naturalia naturali quadam inclinatione sint inclinata in fines suos a primo motore, qui est Deus, oportet quod illud in quod unumquodque naturaliter inclinatur, sit id quod est volitum et intentum a Deo. Deus autem, cum non habeat alium suae voluntatis finem nisi seipsum, et ipse sit ipsa essentia bonitatis: oportet quod omnia alia sint inclinata naturaliter in bonum. Appetere autem nihil aliud est quam aliquid petere quasi tendere in aliquid ad ipsum ordinatum. 19 De Ver., q. 22, art. 1, ad 4: Cum dicitur Omnia bonum appetunt, non oportet bonum determinari ad hoc vel illud: sed in communitate accipi, quia unumquodque appetit bonum naturaliter sibi conveniens. Si tamen ad aliquod unum bonum determinetur, hoc unum erit esse. Nec hoc prohibetur per hoc quod omnia esse habent: appetunt enim eius continuationem; et quod habet esse in actu uno modo, habet esse in potentia alio modo. Ad 12: Ex hoc enim ipso quod aliquid appetit bonum, appetit simul pulchrum et pacem. 20 De Ver., q. 22, art. 2, ad 2: In quantum aliqua desiderant esse, desiderant Dei similitudinem et Deum implicite. 21 Ia-IIae, q. 9, art. 6, ad 3: Deus movet voluntatem hominis, sicut universalis motor ad universalis obiectum voluntatis, quod est bonum. Et sine hac universali motione homo non potest aliquid velle. 22 Servais Thodore Pinckaers OP, Les sources de la morale chrtienne, (Paris, Fribourg: Cerf, ditions Universitaires, 1994), p. 390.

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appropriate objects of particular faculties.23 This is of course a statement of metaphysics about the will and not an anthropomorphic attribution of qualities to the will. On the secondary level of willing of the will, in which there is no necessity, there is room for a personal determination of the objects of will.24 In comparison with the inherent finality of the will, this secondary level of willing is indeterminate. The quality of this second-level willing however is assessed through its reference to the primary drive to the ultimate end that is God.25 Since as spiritual beings we can engage in a knowing and loving of God, we can include into every second-level willing a conscious reference to the ultimate end,26 or we can ignore it, engaging in a short-sighted or even purposeless willing. The un-coerced but necessary willing of the ultimate end27 is the source of the wills dignity.28 Just as the orientation towards truth is not a limitation of the intellect in its cognition of concrete objects, so the inclination of the will to the ultimate end is not an enslaving limitation of the will as it wills concrete things. When the spiritual faculties consciously strive for truth and goodness they find themselves in that which is most appropriate for them. We are really free when we truly are what we are. Paradoxically therefore the will is most free, when it is spontaneously determined without any preceding deliberation to the ultimate end, given to it by the Creator.29 It is in this context, and only in this, that Aquinas uses the
De Ver., q. 22, art. 2: Et ideo, sicut Deus, propter hoc quod est primum efficiens, agit in omni agente, ita propter hoc quod est ultimus finis, appetitur in omni fine. Sed hoc est appetere ipsum Deum implicite. 24 De Ver., q. 22, art. 5: Et ideo, quod voluntas de necessitate vult quasi naturali inclinatione in ipsum determinata, est finis ultimus, ut beatitudo, et ea quae in ipso includuntur, ut est cognitio veritatis et alia huiusmodi; ad alia vero non de necessitate determinatur naturali inclinatione, sed propria dispositione absque necessitate. 25 De Ver., q. 22, art. 2: Unde sola rationalis natura potest secundarios fines in ipsum Deum per quamdam viam resolutionis inducere, ut sic ipsum Deum explicite appetat. Et sicut in demonstrativis scientiis non recte sumitur conclusio nisi per resolutionem in prima principia, ita appetitus creaturae rationalis non est rectus nisi per appetitum explicitum ipsius Dei, actu vel habitu. 26 De Ver., q. 22, art. 2, ad 5: Sola creatura rationalis est capax Dei, quia ipsa sola potest ipsum cognoscere et amare explicite; sed aliae creaturae participant divinam similitudinem, et sic ipsum Deum appetunt. 27 Ia, q. 82, art. 1, ad 3: Sumus domini nostrorum actuum secundum quod possumus hoc vel illud eligere. Electio autem non est de fine, sed de his quae sunt ad finem... Unde appetitus ultimi finis non est de his quorum domini sumus. 28 De Ver., q. 22, art. 5, ad sc. 2: Non pertinet ad impotentiam voluntatis, si naturali inclinatione de necessitate in aliquid feratur, sed ad eius virtutem. 29 De Potentia, q. 10, art. 2, ad 5: ...naturalis necessitas secundum quam voluntas aliquid ex necessitate velle dicitur, ut felicitatem, libertati voluntatis non repugnat, ut Augustinus docet... Libertas enim voluntatis, violentiae vel coactionis opponitur. Non est autem violentia vel coactio in hoc quod aliquid secundum ordinem suae naturae movetur, sed magis in hoc quod naturalis motus impeditur... unde voluntas libere appetit felicitatem, licet necessario appetit illam. Sic autem et Deus sua voluntate libere amat se ipsum, licet de necessitate amet se ipsum... Libere ergo Spiritus sanctus procedit a Patre, non tamen possibiliter, sed ex necessitate.
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modern expression free will.30 In being determined by its nature to the ultimate end, the will is supremely free. The angels, who live outside time and have no possibility of changing their orientation are permanently hooked onto the determined end that is God, and in this their will, being in accord with its nature is a supremely free will. The fundamental orientation to the ultimate end, understood not temporarily but as the object that is willed for itself, grants to all volition a basic foundation. All other choices are in the shadow of this primeval orientation of the will. The secondary level of willing of the will that is undetermined, in which the will functions in unison with the reason concerns three directions: the object of the act, the act itself, and the relationship of the act to the ultimate end.31 The transfer of the general orientation of the will to concrete objects is an open question, and here there is a possibility of free choice, made however always by the will and reason together. Certainly concern for food and drink is included in the undetermined deepest inclination of the will as it is focused on the ultimate end. The question however of whether tea or coffee is chosen is left to the liberty of specification focused on the object.32 Then the actual choice that says Tea, now! is an expression of the undetermined liberty of exercise.33 And finally the tying of the actual choice with the ultimate end is also undetermined. It is possible to consciously tie given acts with a focus on God or this may be done purely mechanically or even not at all. And it is also possible to go for something that only apparently can be referred to the ultimate end, whereas in fact it is in blatant contradiction with the ultimate end. The reason plays an important role in these movements of the will and furthermore the concomitant force of passion may strengthen or
30

De Ver., q. 24, art. 1, ad 20: Iudicium autem in agendis sumitur ex fine, sicut de conclusionibus ex principiis. Unde, sicut de primis principiis non iudicamus ea examinantes, sed naturaliter ei assentimus, et secundum ea omnia alia examinamus; ita et in appetibilibus, de fine ultimo non iudicamus iudicio discussionis vel examinationis, sed naturaliter approbamus, propter quod de eo non est electio, sed voluntas. Habemus ergo respectu eius liberam voluntatem, cum necessitas naturalis inclinationis libertati non repugnet...; non autem liberum iudicium, proprie loquendo, cum non cadat sub electione. 31 De Ver., q. 22, art. 6: Invenitur autem indeterminatio voluntatis respectu trium: scilicet respectu obiecti, respectu actus, et respectu ordinis ad finem. 32 De Ver., q. 22, art 6: Respectu obiecti quidem est indeterminata voluntas quantum ad ea quae sunt ad finem, non quantum ad ipsum finum ultimum..; quod ideo contingit, quia ad finem ultimum multis viis pervenire potest, et diversis diversae viae competunt perveniendi in ipsum. Et ideo non potuit esse appetitus voluntatis determinatus in ea quae sunt ad finem, sicut est in rebus naturalibus, quae ad certum finem et determinatum non habent nisi certam et determinatam viam. 33 De Ver., q. 22, art. 6: Secundo est voluntas indeterminata respectu actus; quia circa obiectum determinatum potest uti actu suo cum voluerit, vel non uti; potest enim exire in actum volendi respectu cuiuslibet, et non exire. Quod in rebus naturalibus non contingit... Et inde est quod voluntas potest velle et non velle.

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inhibit the free choice.34 Since there are various ways how acts can be elicited it does not follow that the determination of the will to the ultimate end of necessity influences the second-level movements of the will.35 We can therefore attribute a certain structural liberty to the will in its secondlevel functioning in these three directions, but it is better to describe this as an indetermination of the will,36 reserving the term liberty to the free choice, the Latin liberum arbitrium, in which the reason and the will work together.37 Aquinas concedes that the term free will may correctly be applied to the undetermined second-level movements of the will, but it would be incorrectly applied in the case of the choice of evil.38 On this undetermined level the will may move towards that which lacks a reference to the ultimate end, but is this a sign of its liberty and dignity? The liberty that interests Aquinas is the liberty in the Holy Spirit, which generates human maturity and a permanent adherence to goodness. The acts in which under the movement of grace the reason and the will acting together choose the true good that is in accord with the basic orientation of the will to the ultimate end are meritorious,39 contributing thereby to a growth in the rooting in grace. We merit when we choose that to which

De Ver., q. 22, art. 6: Et haec indeterminatio ex duobus contingit: scilicet ex indeterminatione circa obiectum in his quae sunt ad finem, et iterum ex indeterminatione apprehensionis, quae potest esse recta et non recta... Ita ex quo inest appetitus rectus ultimi finis, non posset sequi quod aliquis aliquid inordinate appeteret, nisi ratio acciperet aliquid inordinate in finem quod non est ordinabile in finem; sicut qui appetit beatitudinem appetitu recto, nunquam deduceretur in appetendam fornicationem, nisi in quantum apprehendit eam ut quoddam hominis bonum, in quantum est quoddam delectabile bonum, et sicut ordinabile in beatitudinem, velut quamdam imaginem eius. Ex qua sequitur indeterminatio voluntatis, qua bonum potest vel malum appetere. 35 De Ver., q. 22, art. 6, ad 4: In scientis demonstrativis conclusiones hoc modo se habent ad principia, quod remota conclusione removetur principium; et sic propter hanc determinationem conclusionum respectu principiorum, ex ipsis principiis intellectus cogitur ad consentiendum conclusionibus. Sed ea quae sunt ad finem, non habent hanc determinationem respectu finis, ut remoto aliquo eorum, removeatur finis; cum per diversas vias possit perveniri ad finem ultimum vel secundum veritatem vel secundum apparentiam. Et ideo ex necessitate quae inest appetitui voluntario respectu finis, non inducitur necessitas ei respectu eorum quae sunt ad finem. 36 De Ver., q. 22, art. 6: Cum autem voluntas dicatur libera, in quantum necessitatem non habet, libertas voluntatis in tribus considerabitur: scilicet quantum ad actum, in quantum potest velle vel non velle; et quantum ad obiectum, in quantum potest velle hoc vel illud, et eius oppositum; et quantum ad ordinem finis, in quantum potest velle bonum vel malum. 37 Aquinas discusses the structural second-level indetermination of the will in De Ver., q. 22, art. 5-7 and free choice, the liberty in action in q. 24. 38 De Ver., q. 22, art. 6: Et pro tanto dicitur, quod velle malum nec est libertas, nec pars libertatis, quamvis sit quoddam libertatis signum. 39 De Ver., q. 22, art. 7: Quando ergo ex propria ratione, adiutus divina gratia, apprehendit aliquod speciale bonum, ut suam beatitudinem, in quo vere sua beatitudo consistit, tunc meretur, non ex hoc quod appetit beatitudinem quam naturaliter appetit, sed ex hoc quod appetit hoc speciale quod non naturaliter appetit, ut visionem Dei, in quo tamen secundum rei veritatem sua beatitudo consistit. Si vero aliquis per rationem erroneam deducatur ut appetat aliquid speciale ut suam beatitudinem, puta corporales delectationes, in quibus tamen secundum rei veritatem sua beatitudo non consistit; sic appetendo beatitudinem demeretur, non quia appetit beatitudinem, sed quia indebite appetit hoc ut beatitudinem, in quo beatitudo non est.

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we have the deepest inclination.40 The choice of evil therefore in which there is a turning away from the ultimate end is a defect of liberty.41 From where then, does the inclination to evil come from? Why is that sometimes evil choices are made? Can the possibility of choosing evil be seen as a sign of the wills greatness? In response to this query Aquinas always gives the same terse and intriguing answer. In the will there is a certain flexibility also towards evil but this comes not from God, the Creator of the will, but from the fact that the will is created out of nothing.42 What can this mean? Not only the will, but also everything else is created out of nothing. Is the nothingness out of which the will is created, some shoddy quality clay, out of which the defective will was made? Of course this cannot be the case, because creation ex nihilo does not mean the creation out of something that would be called nothingness. The world is not created out of some preexisting reality. There is in fact some similitude between the describing of evil as something positively existing and the attempt of attributing to nothingness the status of a substance. For Aquinas, it is precisely the absence of a substrate in created reality that justifies metaphysically its imperfection.43 God allows for imperfections, so that various grades of goodness would manifest themselves. It is against the background of limitations that various types of goodness can shine.44 Some people attach more love to their choices and others less. The total ignoring of the

De Ver., q. 22, art. 7, sc 2: Ergo aliquis meretur volendo id quod naturaliter vult. Ia, q. 62, art. 8, ad 3: Quod liberum arbitrium... eligat aliquid divertendo ab ordine finis, quod est peccare, hoc pertinet ad defectum libertatis. Unde maior libertas arbitrii est in angelis, qui peccare non possunt, quam in nobis, qui peccare possumus. 42 De Ver., q. 22, art. 6, ad 3: Et tamen, quod voluntas sit flexibilis ad malum, non habet secundum quod est a Deo, sed secundum quod est de nihilo. In II Sent., d. 34, q. 1, art. 3, ad 4: In voluntate creata invenitur duplex defectus. Unus qui est potentialis causa mali, scilicet esse ex nihilo; ex hoc enim quod ex nihilo est potest deficere peccando, secundum vertibilitatem electionis. Non tamen iste defectus est actualis causa mali: quia sequeretur quod voluntas semper deficeret... Alius autem est defectus actualis, secundum quod actu deficit: et quidquid procedit ab ipso, prout sub isto defectu stat, totum est malum. Illius autem defectus qui est in actu voluntatis, non oportet quod sit causa aliquis alius defectus in voluntate praeexistens actu...; sed ipsamet voluntas secundum se considerata illius defectus causa est. Ille enim defectus in voluntate est, secundum quod voluntas ad aliquid aliquo indebito modo convertitur. Ejus autem quod est converti ad bonum creatum indebito modo, voluntas dominium habet, quia ad utrumque libera est. 43 Micha Paluch OP, "Pojcie nicoci w koncepcji stworzenia z niczego witego Tomasza z Akwinu", Teofil 1(1996) s. 32. 44 De Potentia, q. 3, art. 6, ad 4: Deus est adeo bonus quod nunquam aliquod malum esse permitteret, nisi esset adeo potens quod de quolibet malo posset elicere bonum. Unde nec propter impotentiam nec propter ignorantiam Dei est quod mala in mundo proveniunt; sed est ex ordine sapientiae suae et magnitudine bonitatis, ex qua provenit quod multiplicantur diversi gradus bonitatis in rebus; quorum multi deficerent, si nullum malum esse permitteret; non enim esset bonum patientiae, nisi accidente malo persecutionis; nec esset bonum conservationis vitae in leone, nisi esset malum corruptionis in animalibus ex quibus vivit.
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orientation to supreme goodness however and the resisting of the impulse of grace through the opting for evil always comes as a surprise to God.45 In its functioning, the will is subject also to other influences that should not be interpreted automatically as being enemies of the wills indetermination, because the will needs their support in its functioning. These are first of all the reason, emotional and bodily influences, acquired habits of virtues or vices, the influence of other people and finally the supernatural influence of grace. These factors, coming to the will from without, may assist it within the practical choices in its rediscovery of its own inherent inclination to the supreme good, and so they may contribute to the growth in liberty or they may impede in the discovery of the supreme good. It is therefore useful to know these external influences, assess their contribution and even at time invite them. God as the Creator of the human will can work within it in such a way that the willing is simultaneously divine and ours.46 The prime cause acts within the secondary cause without taking away anything of the dignity of the secondary cause. The divine and human wills are not set in permanent opposition. A human act flowing from grace will therefore be totally divine and totally human at the same time.47 Only God can act within the human will in this way. The failure to perceive this philosophical statement about causality has generated multiple perturbations in European religious history.48 The divine influence in the second-level movement of the will may be punctual or it may be permanent through the infused habits.49 The will is then, as if, magnetized towards the pole of goodness, even though it still at times quivers.50 If
Jean-Miguel Garrigues OP, Dieu sans ide du mal. La libert de lhomme au cur de Dieu (Descle, 1990). 46 De Ver., q. 22, art. 8: Deus potest immutare voluntatem de necessitate, non tamen potest eam cogere. Quantumcumque enim voluntas immutetur in aliquid, non dicitur cogi in illud. 47 De Ver., q. 22, art. 8: Cum igitur Deus voluntatem immutat, facit, ut praecedenti inclinationi succedat alia inclinatio, et ita quod prima aufertur, et secunda manet. Unde illud ad quod inducit voluntatem, non est contrarium inclinationi iam existenti, sed inclinationi quae prius inerat: unde non est violentia nec coactio. 48 Charles Morerod OP, Ecumenism and Philosophy. Philosophical Questions for A Renewal of Dialogue, (Ann Arbor: Sapientia Press, 2006). 49 De Ver., q. 22, art. 8: Immutat autem voluntatem dupliciter. Uno modo movendo tantum; quando scilicet voluntatem movet ad aliquid volendum, sine hoc quod aliquam formam imprimit voluntati; sicut sine appositione alicuius habitus, quandoque facit ut homo velit hoc quod prius non volebat. Alio vero modo imprimendo aliquam formam in ipsam voluntatem. Sicuti enim ex ipsa natura, quam Deus voluntati dedit, inclinatur voluntas in aliquid volendum... ita ex aliquo superaddito, sicut est gratia vel virtus, inclinatur ulterius ad volendum aliquid aliud, ad quod prius non erit determinata naturali inclinatione. 50 De Ver., q. 22, art. 8: Sed haec quidem inclinatio superaddita, quandoque est perfecta, quandoque est imperfecta. Quando quidem est perfecta, facit necessariam inclinationem in id ad quod determinat; ...sicut contigit in beatis, in quibus caritas perfecta inclinat sufficienter in bonum, non solum quantum ad finem ultimum, sed quantum ad ea quae sunt ad finem. Aliquando vero forma superaddita non est
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grace is rejected, the wills created status may urge it then at times to move towards the non-being of evil.51 Other beings may influence or even try to cajole the human will from without, but their sway is not decisive.52 Nothing apart from God can move the will from within.53 Aquinas rejected Avicennas theory that the human will may be moved by some angelic or celestial soul,54 but he did accept that bodies may be influenced by external physical factors generating thereby certain psychic humors, which the will of the prudent individual will know how to resist, while the crowds will be moved by them.55 Among the factors bearing upon the will a prime place needs to be attributed to objects perceived by the reason. The attractiveness of the object depends upon its real or apparent connection with the ultimate end. The emotions react immediately to sensitive cognition, whereas in the free choice of objects, the reason and the will work together. Some form of reasonableness has to motivate the choice, which may be suggested but not decisively by the persuasion of others.56 Since the emotions can color
usquequaque perfecta, sicut est in viatoribus; et tunc ex forma superaddita voluntas inclinatur quidem, sed non ex necessitate. 51 De Ver., q. 22, art. 8: Quod Deus operatur in cordibus hominum ad inclinandas eorum voluntates in malum, non est intelligendum quasi Deus malitiam impartiatur; sed quia, sicut apponit gratiam, unde inclinatur hominum voluntas ad bonum, ita subtrahit quibusdam: qua subtracta, inclinatur voluntas eorum ad malum. 52 De Ver., q. 22, art. 9: Voluntas potest intelligi immutari ab aliquo dupliciter: Uno modo sicut ab obiecto suo, sicut voluntas immutatur ab appetibili: et sic non quaerimus hic de immutante voluntatem. ...Aliquod bonum de necessitate movet voluntatem per modum obiecti, quamvis voluntas non cogatur. Alio vero modo potest intelligi voluntas immutari ab aliquo per modum causae efficientis: et sic dicimus, quod non solum nulla creatura potest cogere voluntatem agendo in ipsam, quia hoc nec Deus poterat; sed nec etiam potest directe agere in voluntatem ut eam immutet necessario, vel qualitercumque inclinet, quod Deus potest; sed indirecte potest aliqualiter inclinare voluntatem aliqua creatura, non tamen necessario immutare. 53 De Ver., q. 22, art. 9: Ex parte quidem voluntatis mutare actum voluntatis non potest nisi quod operatur intra voluntatem; et hoc est ipsa voluntas, et id quod est causa esse voluntatis; quod, secundum fidem, solus Deus est. Unde solus Deus potest inclinationem voluntatis quam ei dedit transferre de uno in aliud, secundum quod vult. 54 De Ver., q. 22, art. 9: Sed secundum illos qui ponunt animam creatam ab intelligentiis (quod tamen fidei contrarium est), ipse angelus vel intelligentia habet effectum intrinsecum voluntati... Avicenna ponit quod sicut corpora nostra immutantur a corporibus caelestibus, ita voluntates nostrae immutantur a voluntate animarum caelestium; quod tamen est omnino falsum. 55 De Ver., q. 22, art. 9, ad 2: Corpora caelestia non possunt de necessitate immutare voluntatem nec unius hominis nec multitudinis, sed possunt immutare ipsa corpora. Ex ipso autem corpore aliquo modo voluntas inclinatur, licet non necessario, quia resistere potest... Corpora caelestia immutant multitudinem, in quantum multitudo sequitur inclinationes corporales; non autem immutant hunc vel illum, qui per prudentiam resistunt inclinationi praedictae. 56 De Ver., q. 22, art. 9: Aliud vero est obiectum voluntatis, quod quidem natum est inclinare voluntatem, in quantum est in eo aliqua similitudo vel ordo respectu ultimi finis naturaliter desiderati; non tamen ex hoc obiecto voluntas de necessitate immutatur... quia non in eo singulariter invenitur ordo ad ultimum finem naturaliter desideratum. Et mediante hoc obiecto potest aliqua creatura inclinare aliquatenus voluntatem, non tamen necessario immutare; sicut patet cum aliquis persuadet alicui

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the perception other people may play on them thereby impeding or enhancing the adherence to the rationally perceived true good.57 The emotions are not to be interpreted only as a foreign body in free choice. They add a humane dimension to choices, drawing out to their proper objects. Aquinas is optimistic about the emotional sphere, seeing that is has an in-built need to cooperate with the reason.58 The free choice of the reason and will combined may approve the dynamic force of the affectivity and it may resist it, although grace is needed for a permanent adherence to values in the face of contrary passions.59 This means that we have full moral responsibility for acts, because the succumbing to the passions is voluntary.60 The passions involve the memory and imagination; they are also marked by habituation, and so the rational perception of the good may at times be dimmed and the free choice may even be paralyzed by addiction. Whoever does not act according to convictions, in time adapts the convictions to acts. Contemporary psychology has a more extensive knowledge of internal inhibitions than Aquinas had, but we should not arrive at conclusions denying the free choice the capacity to resist the passions,61 because in doing so we deny the humanity of persons reducing them to a bundle of determinist forces. Each sinner bears a personal responsibility for his or her sins and each saint is sanctified by grace which requires personal cooperation.62 In
aliquid faciendum proponendo ei eius utilitatem et honestatem; tamen in potestate voluntatis est ut illud acceptet vel non acceptet, eo quod non est naturaliter determinata ad id. 57 Ia-IIae, q. 9, art. 2: Manifestum est autem quod secundum passionem appetitus sensitivi, immutatur homo ad aliquam dispositionem. Unde secundum quod homo est in passione aliqua, videtur sibi aliquid conveniens, quod non videtur extra passionem existenti... Et per hunc modum, ex parte obiecti, appetitus sensitivus movet voluntatem. Ad 2: Ex hoc ipso quod appetitus sensitivus est virtus particularis, habet magnam virtutem ad hoc quod per ipsum sic disponatur homo, ut ei aliquid videatur sic vel aliter, circa singularia. Ad 3: Unde et irascibilis et concupiscibilis possunt in contrarium movere ad voluntatem. Et sic nihil prohibet voluntatem aliquando ab eis moveri. 58 Ia-IIae, q. 74, art. 3, ad 1: Appetitus sensitivus natus est obedire rationi. 59 Ia-IIae, q. 109, art. 2, ad 1: Unde mens hominis etiam sani non ita habet dominium sui actus quin indigeat moveri a Deo. Et multo magis liberum arbitrium hominis infirmi post peccatum, quod impeditur a bono per corruptionem naturae. 60 De Ver., q. 22, art. 9, ad 3: Incontinens non dicitur vinci a passionibus quasi ipsae passiones cogant vel immutunt necessario voluntatem; alioquin incontinens non esset puniendus... Incontinens autem non dicitur involuntarius operari... sed dicitur incontinens vinci a passionibus, in quantum eorum impulsui voluntarie cedit. 61 De Ver., q. 22, art. 9, ad 6: Illud quod est inferius voluntate, ut corpus vel appetitus sensibilis, non immutat voluntatem quasi directe in voluntatem agendo, sed solum ex parte obiecti... quia ex hoc quod appetitus ille [sensitivus] utitur organo, impeditur et interdum totaliter ligatur ipsa particularis apprehensio, vel id quod ratio superior dictat in universali, ut non applicetur actu in hoc particulare. Et sic voluntas in appetendo movetur in illud bonum quod sibi nuntiat apprehensio particularis, praetermisso illo bono quod nuntiat ratio universalis. Et per hunc modum huiusmodi passiones voluntatem inclinant; non tamen de necessitate immutant, quia in potestate voluntatis est huiusmodi comprimere, ut usus rationis non impediatur. 62 De Ver., q. 22, art. 9, sc 2: Meritum et demeritum in voluntate quodammodo consistit. Si ergo aliqua creatura posset immutare voluntatem, posset aliquis iustificari vel peccator effici per aliquam creaturam: quod falsum est; quia nullus fit peccator nisi per seipsum, nec aliquis fit iustus nisi Deo operante, et ipso cooperante.

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trying to understand Aquinas we must remember however that his perspective was metaphysical and not psychiatric. He tried to grasp the fundamental truths about the spiritual faculties and their functioning in a healthy, virtuous or sinful person. This vision offers a structural framework, within which further observations and conclusions may be made pertaining to psychiatry,63 medicine, pedagogy or cultural anthropology. The empirical observations of these sciences concern not the immutable metaphysics of the spiritual faculties, but the mutable characteristics of the body, the emotions or the moral and cultural habits. Since in the adherence to the verum bonum the reason and the will function together, a question may be posed as to their mutual cooperation. Aquinas was understood by the Franciscans in the XIII century as holding that the light of reason is decisive in free choice with the will being passive in respect to its light. This intellectualist interpretation of morality is contrary to human experience and so it was rejected. In the modern centuries and in neo-scholasticism it was held that the reason and the will function together but sequentially. The reason, it was held, perceives the truth about an object, and then the will follows almost automatically. This interpretation of the psychology of the moral act placed the prime focus on the conscience, which as an act of the practical reason sees the truth and then it located the merit or fault for the act upon the obedient or disobedient will alone. In fact Aquinas sees that the reason and the will act in unison, each faculty influencing the other, and not sequentially. This may be seen to be a fine speculative point of ridiculous significance. Differences however in the interpretation of the mechanics of free choice generate differing theories of morality. If, as in the sequential interpretation, the prime responsibility is attributed to the will alone, its obedience to the act of reason becomes the general virtue. And if the will is found to be disobedient it is then concluded that it has to be forced to obey. In this, most often an unnoticed slip of focus appears and the spiritual faculty of the will that spontaneously moves to the true good is substituted then by the assertive emotions of ambition, anger and courage, and these emotions are then forced in a neurotic way. The sequential understanding of the functioning of the reason and the will leads therefore to a rigorist vision of morals with the primacy of self-forced imperatives responding to externally perceived moral obligations in the place of the education of the free choice in virtues, to the disappearance of creativity in the genesis of the moral act and to the distortion of the cardinal virtue of persistent resourcefulness traditionally called prudentia reduced to an external caution that is then marginalized. Daniel Westberg correctly
For a Thomistic intepretation of neurosis, cf.: A.A. Terruwe, C.W. Baars, Psychic Wholeness and Healing, (New York: Alba House, 1981).
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noted: Moral theology went wrong with a voluntarist theory of law, but even more fundamentally with a voluntarist psychology.64 The liberum arbitrium or free choice that for Aquinas, following St. John Damascene is the key factor manifesting the divine image in the graced individual is not a will that would by nature be free in its indifference to values, other faculties and external human and divine influences. The free choice refers to the joint action of the reason and the will, mutually and creatively influencing one and another, as they assimilate the perceived true good, the psychic dynamism of the emotions, the educative influence of others and the inner dynamic of grace. It is this inner capacity for the creative and responsible choice of objects perceiving the splendor of truth about them that is the hallmark of personal liberty. The fundamental question is how this inner liberty can be developed. When the free choice is viewed from the angle of the reason, the formulation of the end by the reason is perceived.65 The end of action is not an ontic good, an act in its mere physicality but a moral good as it is seen and co-formulated by the reason. When the free choice is viewed from the angle of the will, the will is seen to be the efficient factor that moves towards the object itself and not just to the concept of the object. But in reality the reason and the will function together. In the three second-level movements of the will, the liberty of specification, the liberty of exercise and the tying of the act with the ultimate end, the undetermined movements of will need the support of reason. That light of reason however is not decisive. The will is not forced to obedience towards the light of reason, but it is not indifferent to it. The two spiritual faculties influence one another and if any further query is raised about the deepest source of the final movement of free choice, it has to refer to the inner impulses of God, the Creator of these two spiritual faculties.66

Op. cit., p. 35. De Ver., q. 22, art. 12: Et ideo finis praeexistit in movente proprie secundum intellectum, cuius est recipere aliquid per modum intentionis, et non secundum naturae. Unde intellectus movet voluntatem per modum quo finis movere dicitur, in quantum scilicet praeconcipit rationem finis, et eam voluntati proponit. 66 Ia, q. 82, art. 4, ad 3: Omnem enim voluntatis motum necesse est quod praecedat apprehensio: sed non omnem apprehensionem praecedit motum voluntatis; sed principium consiliandi et intelligendi est aliquod intellectivum principium altius intellectu nostro, quod est Deus. Ia-IIae, q. 9, art. 4: Manifestum est autem quod voluntas incipit velle aliquid, cum hoc prius non vellet. Necesse est ergo quod ab aliquo moveatur ad volendum. Et quidem... ipsa movet seipsam, inquantum per hoc quod vult finem, reducit seipsam ad volendum ea quae sunt ad finem. Hoc autem non potest facere nisi consilio mediante... Unde necesse est ponere quod in primum motum voluntatis voluntas prodeat ex instinctu alicuius exterioris moventis.
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In response therefore to miscomprehensions about Aquinass interpretation of the psychology of the moral act, it has to be stressed that there is a passivity of the will primarily in respect to the ultimate end, which draws the will of necessity, but in the free choice, the liberum arbitrium, which is the source of liberty of the person the reason and the will are actively creative in their choice of the true good. But since in the will there is a moment of its being attracted to the good, in the will there is an affective moment. This intuition has been somewhat dimmed in the modern cultural awareness, which following the distortions of nominalism and the philosophy of Kant sees in the will primarily a power of execution. The will serves not only for the execution of obligations but also for love. With justice, by way of analogy it is possible to apply to the will such terms as love, desire, joy, sadness, and aversion, even though they strictly refer to the emotions. In an integrated personality there is a certain diffusion between the spheres of the emotions and the will. The will profits from the dynamism of the emotions and is colored by them. In the mutual cooperation of the reason and the will, the reason may reflect upon its own act and it may reflect upon the will assimilating it itself the reasons for the willing. Similarly the will may direct its movement not only towards objects that are outside the will, but also towards itself, and to the knowing intellect.67 Since the will may will all possible objects and faculties,68 it may also will its own willing. It is possible to will ones own willing as also it is possible to neglect the willing of ones own willing! The education of volition involves therefore the formation of the free choice, in which the reason and the will combine passing from the intention of an act, to the decision about it, which may if necessary be preceded by a moment of deliberation, and finally to the execution of the act. At each stage, that of the intention, decision, deliberation and execution, there may appear resistances coming from various internal and external factors. Each individual needs to recognize where the resistances appear so as to deal with them. It is the function of the cardinal virtue, called prudentia to put all the psychic forces together and ensure that the final execution of acts is really done, and creatively so. At each stage there is room for the searching of the truth of the matter
De Ver., q. 22, art. 12: Potentiis autem animae superioribus, ex hoc quod immateriales sunt, competit quod reflectantur super seipsas; unde tam voluntas quam intellectus reflectuntur super se, et unum super alterum, et super essentiam animae, et super omnes eius vires. Intellectus enim intelligit se, et voluntatem, et essentiam animae, et omnes animae vires; et similiter voluntas vult se velle, et intellectum intelligere, et vult essentiam animae, et sic de aliis. 68 De Ver., q. 22, art. 12: Sicut intellectus cum intelligit voluntatem velle, accipit in seipso rationem volendi; unde et ipsa voluntas, cum fertur super potentias animae, fertur in eas ut in res quasdam quibus convenit motus et operatio, et inclinat unamquamque in propriam operationem. Et sic non solum res exteriores movet voluntas per modum causae agentis, sed etiam ipsas animae vires.
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in its splendor, for the recognition of values, for inventiveness in the multiple ways of responding. Furthermore, in the life of faith, it is possible to invite a divine support at each stage. The spiritual encounter with Abba, the eternal Father, awakens to the Fathers love and joy as He perceives from heaven the creativeness of our love. Within that paternal regard, there is room for the growth of personal liberty.