Applying Oberschalls Cognitive Frame Theory to China Pei Xiong Liu December 2011, Nationalism GOVT 278 In this

paper, I will be applying Oberschalls cognitive frame theory to explain displays of nationalism by Chinese citizens. I argue that like Yugoslavs, the Chinese have a peace frame and a conflict frame when thinking about their relationship with Japan and the United States. The peace frame is anchored in Chinese peoples desire for their countrys peaceful rise that is supported by mutual trade and cultural exchange. The conflict frame is rooted in past memoriesfor Japan, the memory of the first and second Sino-Japanese Wars and of the Nanking Massacre; for the United States, Chinas Century of humiliation and past exploitation at the hands of imperialist Western powers. On May 1999, hundreds of protesters flooded the streets in cities throughout China to protest the NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade which caused 23 Chinese casualties including three deaths. The United States apologized for the bombingwhich was carried out by U.S. planescalling it a tragic mistake. However, most Chinese were not satisfied with the U.S. response, insisting that the bombing was intentional and aimed at humiliating China.1 A crisis was triggered last September when a Chinese fishing boat collided with a Japanese patrol boat off the Diaoyu or Senkaku islands which both the Chinese and the Japanese governments claim sovereignty over. Japanese officials held the captain of the fishing boat for over two weeks as Chinese officials demanded his release. The incident disrupted official as well as non-official activities between the two countries and threatened regional stability. Massive

Gries, Peter Hays. Chinese Nationalist Reactions to the Belgrade Embassy Bombing. The China Journal 46 (2001): 25-43. Print.

anti-Japanese protests sprung up all over China that continued for weeks, even after the captain was released. In both of these cases, arguably minor incidents led to a strong display of nationalism in China. The Diaoyu islands are a collection of barren rocks that only have symbolic value. The Belgrade embassy bombing was a more serious incident, but there was little reason to expect the episode was more than just an accident. The protests and official reactionsthe Diaoyu Island dispute started a brief trade war with Japanrisked damaging Chinas relationship with its two largest trade partners. In a country obsessed with economic growth, it is puzzling why the Chinese would risk damaging trade relations in the name of nationalism. I argue that conflicts with Japan and the U.S. trigger a crisis frame where powerful nationalism that is usually repressed rises to the surface. This emotionally-charged nationalism is channeled and partially instigated by elites in the government. Under the crisis frame, Chinese people show a disregard for the potential negative consequences of their actionsa trait that makes the crisis frame dangerous to world stability. In his theory, Oberschall uses the Prijedor conflict to argue that Yugoslavs possess two cognitive frames: a peace frame during normal times and a crisis frame that is based on World War II memories. Before the Serbs staged a coup in 1992 to take control of the city of Prijedor and unleashed ethnic conflict, Serbs, Muslims, and Croats all lived peacefully side by side. However, repressed nationalism, or what Oberschall calls a latent nationalism at the grassroots, existed among the population just beneath the surface. Elites were easily able to exploit that hidden nationalism in order to trigger the crisis frame and turn ordinary Serbs against their Croat

neighbors and vice-versa.2 This sudden switching to a crisis frame can be observed among the Chinese as well. During normal times, the relationship between China and Japan is quite good. Both countries are heavily dependent on each other for trade; in 2004, Japan surpassed the United Sates to become Chinas biggest trade partner and last year, trade between the two countries surpassed $300 billion dollars, a new record.3 Aside from the strong economic ties, Japanese culture is present in everyday life in China. Japanese food, fashion, and pop culture have infiltrated the mainland, especially after Chinas opening up in 1980. Last year, 1.4 million Chinese tourists visited Japan, more than ever before.4 Japanese stores and restaurants exist side by side with Chinese businesses. The cultural exchange has been bilateral; China regularly sends students to study in Japan and has established Confucian institutes there. Like the Serbs and Croats in Yugoslavia before 1992, China and Japan are generally peaceful neighbors. However, as demonstrated by the Diaoyu islands dispute, Sino-Japanese relations can deteriorate rapidly over a minor incident. During one anti-Japanese demonstration in 2010 in Xian, I witnessed an unruly mob tossing bottles at the storefront of supermarket that carried Japanese products while nervous Chinese employees inside held a Chinese flag up to the window to try and placate the crowd. A Xian native described to me how he had witnessed several of these protests since the Diaoyu island incident and that these protesters will be shopping at this same store the next day. The reason why the Chinese can so easily and abruptly switch into the crisis frame is due to the fact that just below the surface of the Chinese consciousness are memories of Chinas
2

Oberschall, Anthony. The manipulation of ethnicity: from ethnic cooperation to violence and war in Yugoslavia. Ethnic and Racial Studies 23.6 (2000): n. pag. Print. 3 Japan-China Trade in 2010 Exceeds US$300 Billion to Set New Record - Press Release - JETRO. Japan External Trade Organization. 23 Feb. 2011. Web. 13 Dec. 2011. 4 AFP. Japans tourism drive threatened by China crisis. The Independent. 25 Sept. 2010. Web. 29 Nov. 2011.

victimization under Japanese imperialism, the most potent of which is the memory of the Nanking Massacre during World War II. Known as the Rape of Nanking, the massacre occurred recently enough that some of those who lived through it are still alive. There are photos and films documenting the slaughter, rape, and mutilations in graphic detail, and a museum and memorial in Nanjing commemorates the event. These memories are so deeply etched in Chinese peoples minds that they serve as a focal point for any conflicts with Japan. City of Life and Death5, a Chinese film about the Battle of Nanjing and the subsequent massacre, was released in 2009. The film was a box office success, thanks in no small part to the salient topic. However, after the film was released in the mainland, the director Lu Chuan received heavy criticism, even death threats against both him and his family, for his sympathetic portrayal of Kadokawa, a Japanese soldier. The criticism came in spite of the fact that the film as a whole graphically depicted the brutality of the imperial armys actions. The film contained scenes of women being raped, rows of severed heads, groups of unarmed Chinese POWs being mowed down by machine gun fire or being buried alive, even children being murdered. The criticism directed at the director reveals Chinese peoples inability to tolerate the telling of the Nanking massacre from any angle other than the evil Japanese victimized the innocent Chinese, a view that has become deeply and perhaps irreversibly ingrained into Chinas historical narrative. In the Prijedor case, Serb and Croat elites used propaganda to stir up nationalism. The ten percent of Serbs who were armed and controlled mass communication were able to get 60 percent of the population to go along with ethnic cleansing.6 In China, I would argue that nationalism more often rises from a grassroots level than in Yugoslavia. Still, the Chinese

5 6

Lu, Chuan. City of Life and Death. Media Asia Distribution, 2009. Film. Oberschall, 986

government plays a large role in channeling and amplifying popular nationalism for political purposes. One way the government promotes nationalism is by simply allowing nationalist protests to take place. China has the most powerful censorship machine in the world and is quick and heavy-handed in squashing demonstrations that it sees as threatening to social harmony. Evidence of this can be found during the Jasmine revolution, where pro-democracy protests inspired by the 2011 Tunisian Revolution sprang up in urban areas. Chinese officials cracked down on protesters, even arresting and beating Chinese and foreign journalists. Internet censors kicked into full gear, blacking all variations of the phrase taking a stroll, which was code among activists for a protest gathering. Human rights lawyers and activists were threatened and jailed. Given the ability of the government to silence political dissenters, when the government allows demonstrations like the 2010 anti-Japanese protests to proceed, it amounts to tacit approval. Like most elites that employ popular nationalism, the CCP does so to keep their grasp on power. The government promotes anti-Japanese and anti-Western demonstrations in order to divert public attention from the countrys own social problems like wealth inequality and lack of democratic freedom. Another example of top-down influence on Chinese nationalism occurred after the 1999 embassy bombing. Soon after the bombing, Clinton issued a public apology, but official Chinese media outlets were prevented by the government to broadcast the apology for four days. This led numerous Western outlets to denounce the Chinese government for manipulating its people into thinking that the bombing was intentional.7 However, it would be unfair to attribute the Chinese publics outrage solely to governmental actions. Peter Gries argues that while it is true that the government was manipulative, many Chinese who read the apology
7

Gries, 30

in Western media outlets also genuinely believed that the bombings were hostile in nature which suggests that nationalism was more than just elite orchestrated. Gries analyzed letters sent to Chinese newspapers about the bombing and concludes that outrage over the bombing mostly arose from the grassroots level. A common refrain found in the letters analyzed by Gries and in Chinese newspapers is that the United States is once again trying to humiliate China. They paint China as a victim and recall Chinas Century of humiliation, which refers to the period beginning in the 19th century when China was de facto colonized by Western powers. An article in the Peoples Daily reads: The wheel of history will not go backward. This is 1999, not 1899. This is not ... the age when people can barge about the world in gunboats ... It is not the age when the Western powers plundered the Imperial Palace at will, destroyed the Old Summer Palace, and seized Hong Kong and Macao ... China is a China that has stood up; it is a China that defeated the Japanese fascists; it is a China that had a trial of strength and won victory over the United States on the Korean battleground. The Chinese people are not to be bullied, and China's sovereignty and dignity are not to be violated ... US-led NATO had better remember this.8 9

Letter writers claimed that the embassy bombing was only the latest in a series of U.S. actions to humiliate Chinaone writer cited the U.S.s blocking of Chinas bid to host the 2000 Olympics (in 1993, the U.S. Congress passed a resolution against Chinas bid). While I agree with Gries that a good deal of anti-American nationalism displayed in the aftermath of the embassy bombing arose from the grassroots level, I do not think he gives enough credit to the elites within the Chinese government who cultivated a historical narrative and created a framework in which Chinese nationalism could thrive. The modern rise of anti-Western nationalism in China began in 1989 after the Tiananmen Square protests and peaked a decade later with the 1999 embassy bombing. After the Tiananmen
8

Han Zhongkun, "Zhongguo, bushi yibajiujiu" (This is Not 1899 China), Renmin ribao (People's Daily), 12 May 1999. 9 Gries, 32

protests, the CCP became hyper-aware of the danger of social unrest to the party. In a time of disillusionment with Marxism and communism, rising social problems, and market-oriented decentralization, the government used patriotism to hold the country together. Following the violent crackdown on the 1989 demonstration, China was getting a lot of heat from the United States and other countries about its poor human rights record. To counter Western criticism, the government launched a campaign condemning Western influence in Chinese affairs and promoting Chinese heritage and traditional values. under the slogan of "Renewing China," Beijing pursued a campaign of patriotic education focusing on China's humiliating past to arouse awareness of suffering, a concept with origins in Buddhism. The purpose of the campaign was to build a politically, economically, and culturally unified China free from Western influences regarded as threatening to the foundation of the Chinese Communist nation-state.10

Like in the Japan case, Chinas crisis frame for the U.S., thanks in part to efforts by the elites, is based on memories of Chinas victimization. On the 150th anniversary of the Opium War on May 3, 1990, General Secretary of the CCP Jiang Zemin gave a speech at the Peoples Great Hall where he told 3,000 students that the Opium War marked the start of Chinas humiliation.11 Although Chinas Century of humiliation was evoked many times in embassy bombing letters and during other U.S.-China conflicts, the United States did not actually have a large part in the Opium War, which was waged by the British Empire. No Americans were involved in the sacking of the old Summer Palace mentioned in the China Daily article above; only French and British soldiers played a role there.12 This indiscriminate lumping of the United States with Western powers suggests that there is some degree of imagined historical narrative that contributes to Chinas crisis frame.
Xu, 155 Xu, 156 12 Gelber, H. Opium, soldiers and evangelicals: Englands 1840-42 war with China, and its aftermath. Hampshire: palgrave MacMillan, 2004. Print.
11 10

The ease of which the Chinese can slip into the crisis frame is worrisome. Though it is only a state of mind, cognitive frames can have real consequence as seen in the ethnic conflict in Yugoslavia. In the crisis frame, the Chinese view their relationship with Japan and the United States as a zero-sum game. Instead of seeing Japan and the U.S. as partners, they are seen as an obstacle; China can only rise at the expense of other countries. As China becomes more powerful, it will exert more regional influence, generating backlash from Japan and other neighboring countries, which will in turn cause the Chinese to slip into the crisis frame more often. We can already see this happening with Chinas increasing assertiveness in claiming territory in the South China Sea. Anti-western nationalism is also sure to rise as long as the United States continues to try and contain Chinas power. On November 2011, President Barack Obama announced plans to station 2,500 marines in Australia to buttress alliances in Asia, prompting a sharp rebuke from Chinese officials and criticism from netizens on internet forums. The U.S.s alliance with Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, India, and other countries and territories surrounding China continues to be a source of tension. There is also the remote risk of nationalism leading to armed conflict between superpowers. What we see now in Sino-Japanese relations is that the negative consequences of relatively minor altercations between China and Japan are amplified by nationalism (on both sides). It is not entirely implausible to imagine an incident more severe than a boat crash leading to armed conflict or a sustained trade war between China and the U.S. or Japan, which would be catastrophic for the world economy. It is important for China to remain in the peace frame where citizens view Chinas relationship with other countries as one of positive interdependence; one of

mutually beneficial trade and cross-culturalization. There is little doubt that Chinas power will continue to grow. What remains to be seen is whether it will grow peacefully.

Bibliography AFP. Japans tourism drive threatened by China crisis. The Independent. 25 Sept. 2010. Web. 29 Nov. 2011. Downs, Erica Stvecker, and Phillip C. Saunders. Legitimacy and the Limits of Nationalism. International Security 23.3 (1998): 114-146. Print. Gelber, H. Opium, soldiers and evangelicals: Englands 1840-42 war with China, and its aftermath. Hampshire: palgrave MacMillan, 2004. Print. Gries, Peter Hays. Chinese Nationalist Reactions to the Belgrade Embassy Bombing. The China Journal 46 (2001): 25-43. Print. Japan-China Trade in 2010 Exceeds US$300 Billion to Set New Record - Press Release JETRO. Japan External Trade Organization. 23 Feb. 2011. Web. 13 Dec. 2011. Lee, Joyman. Senkaku/Diaoyu: Islands of Conflict. History Today 61.5 (2011): n. pag. Web. 12 Dec. 2011. Lu, Chuan. City of Life and Death. Media Asia Distribution, 2009. Film. Oberschall, Anthony. The manipulation of ethnicity: from ethnic cooperation to violence and war in Yugoslavia. Ethnic and Racial Studies 23.6 (2000): n. pag. Print. Xu, Guangqiu. Anti-Western Nationalism in China, 1989-99. World Affairs 163.4 (2001): n. pag. Print.