Plato's Criticism of the "Democratic Man" in the "Republic" Author(s): Gerasimos Santas Source: The Journal of Ethics, Vol.

5, No. 1, Ancient Greek Ethics (2001), pp. 57-71 Published by: Springer Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25115678 . Accessed: 11/06/2011 19:27
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GERASIMOS SANTAS

PLATO'S CRITICISM OF THE "DEMOCRATICMAN" IN THE REPUBLIC

(Received 29 December 1999; accepted 18 September 2000)

ABSTRACT. person:

The

article his

discusses of

(1) unlike

account

two puzzles the democratic

about

Plato's

account

of

the democratic of a democratic is criticism of a

incorrect. is markedly person straw man. The article argues that a democratic assumption constitution. Such

(2) His criticism that the first puzzle is a person person

city, his characterization so characterized of a person is resolved whose if we

see it as a result

of Plato's

of desires equality to desire satisfaction endemic up two problems The criticism of conflicts of desires. and the problem of dealing with these problems, is irrational. his desires, KEY desire WORDS: satisfaction, bad desires, by applying

a person has a desire satisfaction as a basis for action. The article

to a democratic soul is isomorphic and adopts liberty and theory of good criticism that Plato's then argues brings of bad desires the problem theories of good, is that the democratic principles of liberty way person's to and equality

the social

conflict good, Plato,

of

desires,

democracy,

democratic

man,

desires,

equality,

Republic

Plato's

about what he calls "the democratic man" in the Republic are puzzling. One puzzle is that his definition or account of the (Book VIE) incorrect and has been rejected democratic person seems to be obviously of the democratic the subsequent tradition, even though his definition by remarks tradition.1 The by the subsequent city is roughly correct and accepted second puzzle is that Plato's criticism of the democratic person seems more and sarcasm than criticism; and if and when we begin to make sense irony since it is that it seems worthless of it, we are still faced with the prospect

of what a democratic based on a misconception person is. that the definition I try to address the first puzzle by showing of the is a consequence of one of the most central assump democratic person the Platonically the isomorphism between tions of Plato in the Republic: a criticism
1

Athenian

in essentials with Aristotle's It agrees the other hand, Constitution. On

account his

and wrong headed. For a characteristic unique to Plato's Introduction Press, 1981), p. 301: "But the kind of (Oxford: Clarendon Republic with democracy." The standard definition has no obvious of a connection person he depicts democrat would be, liberty of democracy, that s/he is a person who roughly, or to a constitution and equality, subscribes which satisfies to the political principles these principles.

in the Politics and the of democracy seems of a democratic person Julia Annas, An see, for example, reaction, definition

t4
^T

The Journal of Ethics 5: 57-71,2001.

? 2001 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

58 GERASIMOS SANTAS just city and the four unjust cities, on the one hand, and the Platonically on the other. First, I set out the just person and the four unjust persons, between a just city and a just person, since it is more explicit isomorphism Then I set out more and can guide the rest of the discussion. informally the isomorphism the (Platonically between unjust) democratic city and the democratic person. As in the case of Platonic psychic justice, whose defin ition also appears incorrect,2 here too we can see that Plato's apparently of a democratic definition of his correct person is a consequence of a democratic definition and the assumption of the isomorphism city incorrect between the two. The isomorphism of a democratic man, conception can be contrasted democratic city, is the source of our puzzle. And Plato's as one whose to a soul is isomorphic to the subsequent tradition's conception

to a democratic of a democratic constitution person, as one who subscribes or its leading principles of liberty and equality.3 In the second half of the paper I try to explain what is Plato's criticism of his democratic and person. I argue that it is not of a total misconception; some problems that it suggests for a conception of the human good which of desires. Plato is the moderns favor, the human good as the satisfaction a possible version of this theory: the good as the democratic criticizing of one's desires. Though this may not be the most rational to satisfy our desires, all theories of the it springs from problems that way as desire satisfaction have to face: the problem of bad desires and the good problem of conflicts among desires. And it is not clear that other versions, more modern, solve these problems. satisfaction

l. The

Isomorphism the between

between democratic

Just clty Person

City

and and the

Just

Person, democratic

and

about I set out here, rather dogmatically and ignoring many problems between the of the isomorphism it, what I take to be Plato's assumption Platonically just city and the Platonically just person. I embed it in the 2 Since George Grote in the 19th century and David Sachs in 20th century, it has been
definition argued that Plato's to the just person's conduct so there is no suffient reason standards conceives of social justice; of a just person toward others, to believe seems incorrect because itmakes of social no reference or to any laws that a Platonically or principles and justice; also be just by the Glaucon of which

see T. Irwin, Plato's of the problem, Ethics justice. Press, 1995), p. 256ff. (Oxford: Clarendon 3 as one who to the subsequent tradition's definition of a just person, Parallel roughly, or laws of a just society. to the principles subscribes of social For

or by the rules the latest version

just person will in terms of non-maleficence

MAN" INTHE REPUBLIC PLATO'SCRITICISM THE "DEMOCRATIC OF context

59

of a Platon of the argument by which Plato derives the definition of a just city constructed definition from his elaborately ically just person and the independent arguments for the division of the soul. Here I am using between a the subsequent this isomorphism isomorphism only to elucidate city and a democratic definition of a democratic to construct man, which in turn helps us understand person. the definition

democratic Plato's he used definition

Plato does not construct

a definition

of a just city of isomorphism principle at all with respect to justice; parts which correspond city and corresponding

of a just person by the procedure of a just city.4 Instead, he uses (1) the the (social justice) he had already constructed; (2) that a just city and a just man do not differ and (3) the division of the soul into psychic sense to his three natural divisions of the

in some

for the three psychic parts. The division of the soul is required and guided by (1) and (2), but it is arrived at by an of (1) and (2). argument independent I construct the argument in four stages as follows functions 1. A is just when it performs its own city each of the three natural social kinds function of people in

(i.e., its optimal) (Republic, I call this the formal principle of social justice. 433,435b).5 and provisioning the 2. The main social functions are ruling, defending,

city (Republic, 369bff, 374ff, 428dff).

in the city: persons of inborn of persons of inborn high spirit, and those of inborn persons high intelligence, abiUties for arts, crafts and trades (Republic, 415, 435). 4. The optimal social function of people of high intelligence is ruUng the those of high spirit defending it; and those of abilities in arts and city; 3. There the city (Republic, 434). crafts provisioning a city is just when those of high intelligence are assigned 5. Therefore, to rule, those of high spirit to defend, and those of artizan abilities to provision definition the city (from 1-4, of justice, combining and Republic, 433). formal and material I call this the full elements. are three natural kinds

to be based on the abstract and virtue, and to theory of function a city that performs to the city, (2) imagine these steps: (1) assign functions as well as possible functions and (3) discover the conditions (a "completely good city"), as the other virtues enable the city to do so, on the assumptions which that justice (as well of the city) will be among these. 5 I take the idea of optimal at Republic, function from Plato's definition of function 352e and 353a: "that is the work of a thing which it only or better than [ergon, function] I take that procedure consist of three else can perform" anything (Shorey, the second function." "optimal translation). I call the first "exclusive function" and

60 GERASIMOS SANTAS 6. If things, whether [name], they will same 7. We (Republic, [sometimes called [by] the same large or small, are [correctly] be alike in the respect in which they are called the 435a). correctly] call cities and persons [by the same name] at all with respect

just (Republic, 435a). a just person 8. Therefore, 9. Therefore,

and a just city will

not differ

to the kind justice (from 6 and 7; Republic, 435ab).

a person is just if each of the natural kinds in his/her psyche its own i.e. its optimal] function (from 1 and 8, performs psychic 435ac, 441e). Republic, to defend oneself, 10. The functions of the soul are to rule oneself, and to for one's bodily needs (from 1, 2, 8; Republic, 441e, 442). provide 11. The human 12. Reason psyche has three parts, reason, spirit, and appetite. to the class of people is the psychic part which corresponds to the class of high spirited individuals, and intelligence, spirit part to those with artisan abilities (Republic, 440, 441).6 the optimal function of reason is to rule the person, of spirit

of high the appetitive 13. Therefore, to defend,

and of appetite to provide for bodily needs (from 4, 8, 10, 11; Republic, 44le). a soul is just when reason is assigned to rule the person, 14. Therefore, to defend it, and appetite to provide for one's bodily needs (from spirit 9 and 13; Republic, 441e-442a).7

of

is from Plato's In this argument the pattern of inference conception a just city to his conception of a just soul, via the assumption of and may be compat This may be only the order of discovery isomorphism.
6 How to characterize

to the appetitive it correspond the artisan class so as to make part or conversely, I bypass here. On the basis of Platonic is one of the problems is the class of persons best suited social justice, we have to say that the artisan class (i.e., we can think of the city's material needs. whose function is) to provide Perhaps optimal as signaling the bodily needs which and motivating (though not very accurately) appetites of the soul, to the city's material between isomorphism us completely what the relation correspond 7 The passage actions needs. as expounded here, does not tell just city and just person, a just city and a just person. If we consider the is between in his soul will pronounce those tells us that a person who has justice where Plato and preserve that just state of soul, and unjust those tend to produce just which on conduct. social (namely of actions with satisfied and We can then of say that at least internal consistency which demands that the kinds of behavior own social does not function) optimal cannot have the two "justices" Plato this consistency thought in making has suceeded clear.

which destroy it (Republic, 443e), we can see that both definitions (of just cities and just
persons) Plato's social conflict put theory justice with requirements of justice, requires the kinds requirements would be individual,

performing individual respect no one,

one's

conflicting requirement

justice to conduct.

requires; But why

so far as I know,

PLATO'SCRITICISM THE "DEMOCRATIC OF MAN" INTHE REPUBLIC ible with Plato's

61

remark that city justice is an image of psychic justice.8 But in any case, in Republic, Book VIII, where Platonically unjust cities and souls are described, the order in which Plato proceeds is again the same: from a timocratic city to a timocratic person, from an oligarchic city to an oligarchic person, from a democratic person, and a city to a democratic to a tyrannical person. In all these cases the isomorphism is tyrannical city taken for granted; in all of them the descriptions of the four unjust cities seem uncontroversial; some if not all the descriptions of the corresponding and what seems responsible for these

types of persons is at least dubious; doubts is the isomorphism. Plato cratic does

not set out the inference

of the democratic city to his description explicitly as he does in the case of the inference

from his description of the demo as succinctly and person from city justice to psychic

justice. He proceeds more informally as follows. He defines the democratic city by the principles of equality and freedom of all the citizens; and he mentions some institutions and procedures by which the equality of citizens was achieved. Democracy comes into being, he tells us, when everyone in the city is granted an "equal share in both and offices and for the most part these offices are assigned citizenship is strictly satisfied by lot" (Republic, 557a). The equality of the citizens in the Assembly: citizen is a member and has exactly one vote; every while in the Council and the Jury Courts equality is achieved by rotation of freedom Plato includes by lot. In the principle freedom of speech, the freedom to do as one pleases in his life, including the freedom to choose any career one pleases and to move from any voca tion into politics. Plato ends his description of democracy with a heavy dose of ironic criticism: "it is a delightful form of government, anarchic in office and selection

8 this

443c. Republic, issue is can be

Nick seen

Smith in Brian

brought

this passage dismissal

on a well-ordered human soul" [Theories of Justice is much more I, p. 5]. But the story in the Republic on this very point. There may be several some logical, some involved, complex priorities causal. Plato has other relations the relation of isomorphism and the order of going, besides between For some of the causal discovery, just and unjust cities and just and unjust persons. connections, Nussbaum Politics of Narcissism," in T. Irwin and M. see, e.g., Jonathan Lear, "Plato's Academic and Publishing, (eds.), Virtue, Love, and Forms (Edmonton: Printing out some of these relations, has brought which he calls "externalizing" and 1994), who come into light mostly in Book VII. in Plato's Irwin also, They "internatlizing." Ethics, In on

"One theory [of justice] remarking, to which a just society is one modeled (U.C. Press, Berkeley, 1988) Volume

Barry's is his own

to my attention. How important of Plato's of justice, after theory a hierarchical notion [Plato's], according

has a subtle discussion of relations between cities and persons in Book VIII. pp. 256ff., this paper, I am abstracting from these other relations. somewhat I am mainly relying the isomorphism or exposition. and follow Plato's order of discovery

62 and motley,

GERASIMOS SANTAS to equals and unequals alike"

a kind of equality assigning (Republic, 558c, Shorey). It is fairly easy to see that the democratic are in conflict with his

and freedom

principles full definition

arguably with his formal principle of city justice Plato characterizes the democratic which person by two conditions, seem to be applications of the principles of political and freedom equaUty to the human psyche, and so parallel to the two conditions by which Plato the democratic correctly characterized see one condition We by contrast persons. accumulate The city.9 to the other

of political equality and of city justice, as well.

three types of unjust to for example, has a dominant desire person, oligarchic or and he makes all his other desires subordinate wealth,

to it; he also thinks that wealth is the good and makes all other or subservient to it. And similarly with the timocratic goods subordinate as Plato and the tyrannical persons. All these persons may be mistaken, holds, in thinking that wealth or honor or power is the good and in making reason nothing but an instrument for gaining these ends; but all the same, these priorities do bring some order and instrumental into their rationality subservient the democratic end or stable contrast, person has no dominant to bring order into his desires and make choices desire by which nor does he think that any one (or subset) of the things he accordingly; reason can desires is the good. Consequently, lacking the kind of priorities Uves. By dominant the other unjust persons just person, and the kind of priorities to the political principle of equality the democratic have,10 person adopts his desires, regards them all as equal and equally worthy of satisfaction. The second condition is that the democratic person does not observe the between and "unnecessary" and pleas distinction "necessary" appetites are those which ures, which Plato draws as follows: necessary appetites we cannot get rid of by training and education, those which are necessary for survival, and those whose one's own good; for satisfaction promotes one whose the desire for bread is satisfaction is necessary for example, satis the desire for lean and fat-free food is one whose survival, while
not only characterizes some but he also gives a timocratic into an olicharcic, Plato acters, characters. case these In each case of contractarian historical 9 or defines accounts and the four char unjust cities and corresponding a just city can turn into a timocratic one, and he does the same for the corresponding did in the discusses

set in Plato's

of how so on;

he speaks of the "origin and nature" of each, as Glaucon in Book II. In Plato's Politics J. Lear of Narcissism, justice

accounts. I abstract discussion of the and psychological here from Plato's in so far as these of the democratic and person from the oligarchic ones, except origin city accounts of the nature of the democratic his conception city and help us to understand man. 10 man in Republic, to the oligarchic 559d-560e. See, e.g., the contrast

MAN" INTHEREPUBLIC OF PLATO'SCRITICISM THE "DEMOCRATIC faction promotes

63

the goods of health and strength (Republic, 558d-9e). for survival, Unnecessary appetites are those that exceed what is necessary and those that those that can be gotten rid of by training or education, to the body and the soul (Republic, 559bc).11 The democratic between good and bad desires and to restrain person refuses to distinguish of them on such grounds. He is thereby deprived of another way of any bringing order into his life, the way Plato's just person brings order into his life, namely, by ordering his desires on the basis of criteria external to desires themselves, their being desired.
... he establishes lives

are harmful

such as the goodness of their objects All this Plato sums up:

independently

of

and maintains

turning over the guard house as if it had been drawn by lot for but fostering them all equally from good desires and others esteem the one and control ...

none disdaining or accept that some pleasures arise to practice from those that are base, and that we ought and ... and avers that and subdue the other they are all alike and to and does not admit in this fashion indulging the appetite of the

on a footing all his pleasures of equality of his soul to each as it happens along and then in turn to another, that office,

forsooth, until

and

so

it is sated,

... and lives out his life be equally esteemed ... 561 be, Shorey translation). (Republic, day

Though our texts here are not as clear as in the case of justice, we can think to the political equality of the psychic equality of desires as corresponding of citizens, and the psychic refusal to restrain any of them as corresponding to the political refusal to restrain the freedom of citizens (except by the similar Plato freedom of other citizens).12 Thus we can set out the democratic infers his characterization of the democratic argument, by which isomorphism of the democratic person from his charac as follows: city,

terization

1. (a) If things are called [correctly] by the same name, they will be alike in the respect in which they are called the same, (b)We call cities and cities and persons do persons "democratic." Therefore, (c) democratic not differ at all with respect to being democratic.
It is not clear to me whether Plato has two or three classes of necessary in appetites; or habituation cannot be rid of by education are the same as whether those which particular those that are necessary for survival to Plato's discussion in A Companion [See N. White's the case, I take the distinction to import (Hackett, 1979)]. Whatever Republic Indianapolis, criteria from outside desire for distinguishing 12 is a question here about what There of part, or the "desires" appetitive we are to understand division Plato's the theory of the human good Plato can be seen in, for example, in, say, J. Elster's complications between corresponds and reason good and bad desires. to citizens: just the desires as well? This may of the 11

spirit of the psyche, and also how as the satisfaction of desires. Many Irwin's Sour Plato's Ethics,

depend to understand desires of

on how in in

pp. 256ff.;

the complications and the corresponding University Press,

Grapes

(Cambridge:

Cambridge

1987).

64 GERASIMOS SANTAS 2. A democratic (a) all citizens city is a city in which and (b) all citizens have equal (maximum shares, to do and live as they please. have equal political freedoms possible)

3. The

of equal political shares is implemented principle through (a) all citizens being members of the Assembly with one vote each; (b) rotation in office and (c) selection by lot in the Council and the Jury Courts. The principle of equal maximum freedoms is implemented through
pleases.

the fewest

possible

political

contraints

on freedom

to do as one

4. What

in whom (a) all desires have an equal shares in ruUng, and (b) all desires have equal maximum freedom to be satisfied (from lc and 2ab). 6. Therefore, the democratic (a) each desire person is a person in whom one vote (equal claim to satisfaction), has (b) desires take turns (rota and (c) desires are selected for satisfaction tion) for satisfaction, by lot (from lc, and 3abc).

to citizens in a democratic corresponds desires in a democratic or] person.13 a democratic 5. Therefore, is a person person

city are [parts of the soul

In the passage we last quoted we can see that Plato comes very close to applying the democratic in office and devices of rotation egalitarian to bring election by lot, to the psyche of the democratic person, presumably some order into it and make choices possible.14 Here we can perhaps see that Plato's definition of a democratic person is not totally mistaken. We may still have a hard time seeing why a democratic of poUtical and person has to apply the principles equality to his psyche; why a democratic freedom of citizens is not simply person a person who subscribes to the principles of political equaUty and freedom of the Crito seems to be, surely of citizens, as, let us say, the Socrates no democrat But we can at least see why Plato's demo of the psyche. Such a person would cratic person might prefer to live in a democracy.
or parts of the soul, as Plato has in mind, it is not entirely clear which desires Again, no matter what to citizens. their origin, rather than parts of desires, Probably corresponding of the appetitive the soul; in any case, the latter might be incoherent, since all appetites part as having a claim to satisfaction of the soul would then have to be grouped together equal to those admit view of Plato's seems it is not clear spirit or reason. Of course, of the soul and what it implies division to be that Plato's democratic person speaks whatever premise a person happens to want. that about the democratic desires. person would most plausible sense in some common The 13

of desires

way, as simply 14 I inserted

3 and conclusion 6 into the argument, how the full just to indicate or rotation in the application of the poUtical devices go, taking argument might seriously in The latter device would be necessary office and selection by lot to the human psyche. cases where severa appetites at once. demanded satisfaction

MAN" INTHE REPUBLIC OF PLATO'SCRITICISM THE "DEMOCRATIC

65

in to any of the others Plato discusses constitution prefer a democratic to do as he it gives him greater political freedom because the Republic, on constraints he has fewer external in a democracy (political) pleases: to satisfy his desires, and he has at least as much political his attempts to do so as anyone else. and tyrannies, Plato's oligarchies, freedom freedom In Plato's democratic ideal city, and in timocracies, person would have no such

which he could (or equality); unless he were a philosopher-king, a general in charge, a wealthy person, or a tyrant. or happened to be not be, seems to prize the very values he applies to his In addition, a democracy own soul, freedom in an oligarchy, for example, and equality; whereas he would wealth. If we would as Plato does, the isomorphism, a democratic be reciprocal relations between assume a democratic person if he is as Plato defines would have we can see that there city and a democratic to be pretty exactly what Plato him, then we can see why he would be in disagreement with the dominant value of that society,

person: says he is. And

constitution. prefer a democratic This resolves the first puzzle, not in the sense that itmakes Plato's defin it understandable ition of a democratic person correct, but in that itmakes to us, by revealing its basis. We are more familiar with a similar puzzle to definition of a just person, from the Grote-Sachs objection now a century and a half old; I think it presents a similar that definition, puzzle and itmay have a similar resolution. about Plato's

2. Plato's

Criticisms

of

the

Democratic

Man

Plato's assume

cricitisms

of the democratic

the two conditions and freedom constraints.

of desires

person, though not entirely explicit, which Plato defined him: psychic equality by of desires from psychic reason's or (presumalby

spirit's) is that since the democratic The first objection person has no dominant choices desire but treats them all alike, he has no rational way for making when his desires conflict with each other and cannot all be satisfied at once, of conflicts of desires abound: Examples perhaps not even successively. say, one wants to smoke, and she wants to be healthy, one wants to take a how is vacation and finish her book, and so on. In case of such conflicts, that our desires sometimes takes it as a. she to choose? The objection fact when applied to that the theory of democracy, do conflict, and suggests no way of guiding choices cases. So at best, the in such has the psyche, are frequent, as they appear to and if such conflicts theory is incomplete,

66 GERASIMOS SANTAS be, the theory may be devastatingly of desires problem."15 incomplete. Iwill call this the "conflict

The second objection is that some desires are for things known to be if we happen to have no desire for food we may bad for us: for example, hasten our death; if we have desires for fat foods, their satisfaction may be bad for our health. The desires for smoking, for fat foods, for avoiding to be bad for us. And if this is school, are all desires for things known so, it is a mistake problem."16 Plato himself, of his democratic between to treat all desires as far as I can as equal. I call this the "bad desires

person and unnecessary necessary on a theory of good external to desire, amounts To to abandoning the freedom and abandoning their equality. the conflict of desires problem

to the bad

no reply on behalf tell, suggests desires the distinction objection: as it seems to be based appetites, would of desires Plato a solution, but it provide from internal constrains

(in suggest a solution the passage and with heavy that it is very much quoted), irony implies The solution mistaken. is for the person, when faced with conflict of devices for solving desires, to adopt for his psyche the democratic political to the conflicts conflicts in his own psyche he among persons (citizens): does applies desires of rotation in office and selection his by lot. When he tries to satisfy them in turn. And further, if there is a conflict, conflict about which desire to satisfy first, he uses selection by lot. The second, and so on. lucky desire is satisfied first, and the unlucky Plato seems to think that this is a reductio ad absurdum of the demo cratic person's that it is theory of value. He is probably right in supposing absurd to treat all desires as equal, as these two poUtical devices do when they are applied to the psyche. After all, it is clear enough that desires differ with respect to their objects, such a survival, food, health, extrinsically wealth, honor, and so on. An they differ inherently pleasure, knowledge, with respect to their intensities, and cycles of recurrence. The durations, desire for food occurs with periodic it can be very intense, and regularity, its generic object (food) is necessary for health and survival. None of this is true of the desires to go to the theater, attend the assembly, or travel abroad. As a general strategy, to rotate the satisfaction of these four desires over a
15

the devices

Plato

presents

us with

vivid

descriptions

of such conflicts

in his democratic

person,

in

e.g., Republic, 16 Insofar commonly Leontius, is bad

pp. 560ff. as Plato admits to do incontinence on the basis may or weakness of his division as he is in the Republic, the psyche and the story of even he knows or believes which of will of

supposed he admits

that a person

desire

something

for him.

PLATO'SCRITICISM THE "DEMOCRATIC MAN" INTHE REPUBLIC OF

67

four day period is simply irrational, if not outright mad. And to select by lot which of these desires to satisfy first, second, and so on, is even worse. But now we are faced with the second part of our second puzzle: we sense of Plato's criticism of his democratic may have made person; but if to the political principles of the person is one who subscribes one who applies these and freedom of citizens, and not necessarily equality to his very psyche, what is Plato criticizing? The obvious answer principles him. the democratic man as he conceives is, of course, that he is criticizing But what My about him suggestion theory of the human good. One piece of evidence is that Plato with some is he criticizing? is that he is criticizing a version of a desire satisfaction a democratic

seems

to correlate

and theory of the good of the individual, In an oligarchy, for example, such a theory to the corresponding person. a high property wealth is the dominant value, institutionalized by putting is also the dominant value of the oligarchic for office; wealth qualification it is the good, correlated with his dominant desire to accumulate person, wealth.

every constitution seems to attribute

Similarly, honor is the dominant value of timocracy and dominant of the timocratic man; power for tyrannies and the tyrant. The same value is true, I think, for Plato's theory of the ideal city and the ideal person: his political of justice and the other social virtues is correlated with theory based on, I would and formal good and his theories of functional say reason's unique ability to discover them. If we now ask, what theory of the a human good does Plato correlate with the political theory of democracy, very plausible in the relevant democratic A second cratic person answer passages is that it is the good as desire satisfaction: because the satisfaction of desire is precisely what Plato's prizes and goes after.17

person

appetites, of character.18
17

is that Plato takes away from his demo piece of evidence the distinction he draws between necessary and unnecessary seems to allow that distinction to all his other types though he If we interpret this distinction as importing criteria for the

Itmight

be rather

hedonism,

that the theory than a desire

of the good satisfaction

that Plato theory.

attributes

It is not

or the Republic, the two, either in the Gorgias guishes have a much better target in desire satisfaction theories 18 draw it differently. For example, Though they might Plato explicitly allows the distinction, draws it by reference or possibly even only his dominant desire for wealth. This actually essential draws

to his democratic is person clear that Plato distin entirely but I think the objections he makes ones. rather than hedonistic to whom the oligarchic man, to his dominant value, wealth, is different from the way Plato

is the way the Platonically draws it. The it, which presumably just person to draw this distinction, is that Plato's democratic refuses either as person point other unjust persons Plato's do or as his just person and so he is deprived of these does; order and rationality of bringing into his choices. ways

68

GERASIMOS SANTAS

of a desire from outside desires, then what we seem to have left goodness seems to be a person who seems to think that his good is the satisfaction of his desires and tries to make his choices accordingly. A third piece of evidence is that the chief objections Plato has to the way of life of his democratic of desires and of bad desires, theory of the good as desire of conflict person, what I called the problems are indeed among the chief problems that any faces. satisfaction we can look on Plato's of the good criticisms of the of theories as the satisfaction the lot to

If the suggestion is correct, democratic person as criticisms

of desire, and even ask how sound they are. a desire to begin with, Now satisfaction theory need not devices of rotation in office and selection democratic poUtical the psychic devices political solve to the psyche, irrationalities. need normal

adopt

by desires to satisfy. These problem of which of conflicting seem rational appUed to the polls and irrational applied to such but a desire satisfaction theory has no commitment who holds a desire sense. And satisfaction if he in Plato's

A person not be a democrat sense

theory of good in the is a democrat

to the principles of freedom and equaUty (one who subscribes to adopt rotation in office and selection by he does not have of citizens), lot in order to make choices in his life. So Plato's criticisms of psychic of all versions of a rotation and psychic selection are not sound criticisms satisfaction sense. theory of the good, or of a person who is a democrat in the normal

desire

the problem of bad desires which Plato brings up against the Moreover, desire satisfaction theory, is indeed severe if the theory is that a person's she the desires in the satisfaction of her actual desires, good consists to have at any given time and over a lifetime. But this is a naive happens version of the desire who satisfaction favor desire The moderns theory of human good. satisfaction theories, from John Rawls

to John Broome, to Richard to Jon Elster all admit that actual Brand theories of good are false: because, desire satisfaction they admit, it is a widespread sometimes desire and well known fact that human beings which are known to be bad for them (and, we can add, if we admit things weakness The desire to be bad for them). of will, known by the subjects themselves to smoke is a well known example. a different to these problems, of bad solution The moderns propose solution: the solu desires and conflicts of desires, from Plato's democratic tion is to define desires, but of actual good not in terms of the satisfaction the desires a person would have under certain of hypothetical the satisfaction desires. the human of in terms

conditions,

MAN" INTHEREPUBLIC PLATO'SCRITICISM THE "DEMOCRATIC OF

69

of desire, but Thus Rawls tells us not that the good is the satisfaction in turn, he explic that it is the satisfaction of rational desire. Rationality, ates by a series of conditions: and deliberative the counting principles rationality.19 Here are Broome's faction conditions: in the satis A person's good consists she would have if she were well (preferences) seems to be an idealiza definition, which to the view that the good is the objections as overcoming

of all the desires

informed and rational.20 This to overcome tion, is supposed of desires. the satisfaction Broome bad desires treats this theory and the conflicts

the bad desires objection answers the well-informed objection. Presumably, being and being rational answers the conflict of desires objection;

since rationality requires at least consistency. objection, This is not the place to examine whether these theories do successfully a huge task which, in any case, requires a lot more resolve these problems, than I know. But it is not clear to me that they do, and in any case there is whether they do. certainly disagreement It is not clear, for example, how information about facts would enable us to decide, within the desire satisfaction theory, that some of the things we desire are bad for us. Suppose we desire to smoke and we learn that smoking will cause an early death. How can this affect our choices on the modern it will affect our choice only if we want to theory? Presumably avoid an early death. But now we have reduced the problem of bad desires to a problem of conflicts of desires: we want to smoke and we want to avoid

an early death, but how do we decide which desire to satisfy?21 Elster, for that is one, has argued that rationality, what he calls "thin rationality" to say, consistency and information does not exclude known immoral for things bad for us: one can have consistent immoral desires and make no factual errors; and consistent desires for things bad as all for us. Elster mentions, and genocide suicide, homicide, voluntary and information.22 consistent with rationality as consistency being desires Again, Rationality
19

or desires

how

is rationality

requires

to resolve conflict supposed for example, of preferences, consistency

Press, 1971), and deliberative

of desires? transitivity
7, Sections are not

63

A Theory Harvard University of Justice (Cambridge: 64. Rawls admits that the counting principles in all cases. sufficient for making rational choices and 21 will even we

Chapter

rationality

20 John Broome, Weighing Goods (Cambridge: Blackwell,

Nor the receiving of the information if we could decide which is bad know the better and we can by for us itself lead

1971), p. 133.
to the extinction of one of will of the occurs;

desires,

even when

still desire

to satisfy, if weakness the worse. We may have 15ff.

all the pertinent

negative 22 See Elster's

information

still desire discussion

brilliant

the object. in Sour Grapes,

pp.

70 GERASIMOS SANTAS so that we have no conflicting or inconsistent preferences. to answer the conflict of desires objection. this is supposed Presumably, occur in our actual desires or preferences, But if conflicts how are we of preferences; to eliminate the conflict and become consistent? By eliminating supposed If we admit consistency which desires, which preferences? into the desire it is not clear how to reach consistency, satisfaction how to decide theory, desires to eliminate which of the actual conflicting (or satisfy).23 one might Now the idealized that Plato would agree with suppose theory: in his terms, he might agree that is good if it is guided by reason. But though true, he has a different this is misleading, because notion of the powers and functions of reason from the moderns (as well as a different theory of the - the now out of favor). Plato believes that functional-formal good theory human reason is capable of knowing what is good in itself; it is capable of knowing the forms and the form of the functional good and ultimately version of the desire satisfaction the satisfaction of desire includes good. So rationality It is not simply instrumental the capacity rationality to know or simply ultimate formal human rationality, good. or a

of the two.24 conjunction That is why, for Plato, not only the democratic person, but also the timo the oligarchic, and the tyrannical, are all (both unjust and) unhappy: cratic, of putting reason to a purely instrumental they all share the characteristic use: to discover means ideally just person is ultimately good, as well as correct means the role of ruling the soul. deserve
23 ences There

to victory, assigns reason

to honor, wealth or power. Only Plato's to its correct functions: to discover what to it; and for that reason to

They is also a good; consistency might in value from outside and desire satisfaction but in so far as they do that they bring desire, A Theory 7 of Rawls' is then no longer the only source of value (thus the title of Chapter as Rationality," for the theory, the good "Goodness rather than his earlier phrase of Justice: as "the satisfaction Or they might of rational be taken to show that consistency desire"). is a necessary leave us with which 24 means the problem to maximizing the satisfaction But such of desires. of how to bring about consistency: by eliminating of some differences between the ancients and still arguments which desires, on

are some modern that inconsistency, arguments for example, is bad for one. It is not always clear what to desire be taken to show that in addition satisfaction,

lack these

of

transitivity arguments

of prefer show.

preferences? For a fine discussion

the moderns

see M. Frede, in G. Striker and "The Affections of the Soul," the scope of human reason, Nature M. Schofield The Norms Press, (New York: Cambridge 1986). (eds.), University of are just in scope, or even in that the relevant differences It is not entirely clear, though, scope at all. Itmay well be that the relevant differences are differences about the nature of a theory of goodness the with such that human endowed reason, goodness. on David to it, can apprehend whereas Hume's attributes powers Hume theory goodness; nominalists and logical of good this may not be so. Metaphysical differences, say, between come in here too. The matter is certainly more realists, may complex. Plato may have

OF MAN" INTHE REPUBLIC PLATO'SCRITICISM THE "DEMOCRATIC But the moderns seem to use a much

71

thinner notion of rationality, a rationality which excludes the capa rationality, or intrinsic goods or ultimate to know in themselves city things good between Plato goods.25 So there remains a very substantial disagreement on rationality; on their idealized and the moderns and consequently versions of desire satisfaction. On Plato's view, desire - desire which is not - has itself the result of reasoning nothing to say about what is good, either or instrumentally; these are reason's functions. This is certainly ultimately formal and instrumental true of appetite; while the so-called desires of reason are reason's tenden toward the good, or desires based entirely on reason and reasoning, sense. not desires in the modern cies outside on desires, view, reason only operates given from a formal cognitive reason, tomake them rational: that is, consistent, and value-neutral function; and, with the help of the senses, well informed an empirical about their objects (and their causes and effects), cognitive On the modern and value-neutral function. That is all. But of a democratic person,

the problems Plato raised for the problems of bad desires and of conflicts of desires, keep intruding into the modern versions of desire satis faction theories of the human good, which use this limited notion of reason. Whatever the present state of affairs with respect to these problems, Plato have been the first to recognize and articulate them, admittedly in a may his version roundabout Department way.26 of Philosophy

University of California Irvine, CA 92717-4555

USA

25 Elster,

See Rawls, Sour

Grapes,

A Theory of Justice, on notions of

Section "thin"

60

(the opening rationality.

section

of Chapter

7),

and thin

practical

are required and by the idea that if we explicate goodness we cannot turn around and explicate in terms of goodness. That rationality, rationality be a vicious would circle. 26 Earlier drafts of this paper were read at an American Association Philosophical in 1997, and at the conference on Plato in Berkeley at the University of Symposium notions Arizona my in 1998. commentators, I am grateful Jean Roberts for comments and Dale Cook. by several participants, and especially by

Roughly in terms

speaking, of desire