G.R. No. 94902-0 April 21, 1999 BENJAMIN V. KHO and ELIZABETH ALINDOGAN, petitioners, vs. HON.

ROBERTO L. MAKALINTAL and NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, respondents. On May 15, 1990, NBI Agent Max B. Salvador applied for the issuance of search warrants by the respondent Judge against Benjamin V. Kho, now petitioner, in his residence at No. 45 Bb. Ramona Tirona St., BF Homes, Phase I, Paranaque. On the same day, Eduardo T. Arugay, another NBI agent, applied with the same court for the issuance of search warrants against the said petitioner in his house at No. 326 McDivitt St., Bgy. Moonwalk, Paranaque. The search warrants were applied for after teams of NBI agents had conducted a personal surveillance and investigation in the two houses referred to on the basis of confidential, information they received that the said places were being used as storage centers for unlicensed firearms and "chop-chop" vehicles. Respondent NBI sought for the issuance of search warrants in anticipation of criminal cases to be instituted against petitioner Kho. On the same day, the respondent Judge conducted the necessary examination of the applicants and their witnesses, after which he issued Search Warrants. Armed with Search Warrants, NBI agents searched house 1 and recovered various high-powered firearms and hundreds of rounds of ammunition. Another search was conducted at the house 2 which yielded several high-powered firearms with explosives and more than a thousand rounds of ammunition. Also confiscated were various radio and telecommunication equipment, two motor vehicles and one motorcycle. Upon verification with the Firearms and Explosives Unit in Camp Crame, the NBI agents found out that no license has ever been issued for the confiscated firearms. Likewise, the radio transceivers recovered and motor vehicles seized turned out to be unlicensed and unregistered. Petitioners presented a Motion to quash the said Search Warrants ISSUE: WON the search warrants were issued in violation of the procedural requirements set forth by the Constitution HELD: Petitioners question the issuance of subject search warrants, theorizing upon the absence of any probable cause therefor. They contend that the surveillance and investigation conducted by NBI agents within the premises involved, prior to the application for the search warrants under controversy, were not sufficient to vest in the applicants personal knowledge of facts and circumstances showing or indicating the commission of a crime by them (petitioners). Petitioners' contention is untenable. Records show that the NBI agents who conducted the surveillance and investigation testified unequivocally that they saw guns being carried to and unloaded at the two houses searched, and motor vehicles and spare parts were stored therein. In fact, applicant Max B. Salvador declared that he personally attended the surveillance together with his witnesses (TSN, May 15, 1990, pp. 2-3), and the said witness personally saw the weapons being unloaded from motor vehicles and carried to the premises referred to. NBI Agent Ali Vargas testified that he actually saw the firearms being unloaded from a Toyota Lite-Ace van and brought to the aformentioned house in BF Homes, Paranaque because he was there inside the compound posing as an appliance agent (TSN, May 15, 1990, pp. 4-5). It is therefore decisively clear that the application for the questioned search warrants was based on the personal knowledge of the applicants and their witnesses. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; SEARCH WARRANTS; ISSUANCE THEREOF; WHEN PROPER; CASE AT BAR. -- It is therefore decisively clear that the application for the questioned search warrants was based on the personal knowledge of the applicants and their witnesses. In the case of Central Bank vs. Morfe (20 SCRA 507), this Court ruled that the question of whether or not a probable cause exists is one which must be determined in light of the conditions obtaining in given situations. In Luna vs. Plaza (26 SCRA 310), it held that the existence of a probable cause depends to a large extent upon the finding or opinion of the judge who conducted the required examination of the applicants and the witnesses. After a careful study, the Court discerns no basis for disturbing the findings and conclusions arrived at by the respondent Judge after examining the applicants and witnesses. Respondent judge had the singular opportunity to assess their testimonies and to find out their personal knowledge of facts and circumstances enough to create a probable cause. The Judge was the one who personally examined the applicants and witnesses and who asked searching questions vis-a-vis the applications for search warrants. He was thus able to observe and determine whether subject applicants and their witnesses gave accurate accounts of the surveillance and investigation they conducted at the premises to be searched. In the absence of any showing that respondent judge was recreant of his duties in connection with the personal examination he so conducted on the affiants before him, there is no basis for doubting the reliability and correctness of his findings and impressions. Nothing improper is perceived in the manner the respondent Judge conducted the examination of subject applicants for search warrants and their witnesses. He personally examined them under oath, and asked them searching questions on the facts and circumstances

personally known to them, in compliance with prescribed procedure and legal requirements. It can be gleaned that the sworn statements and affidavits submitted by the witnesses were duly attached to the pertinent records of the proceedings. It was within the discretion of the examining Judge to determine what questions to ask the witnesses so long as the questions asked are germane to the pivot of inquiry the existence or absence of a probable cause. G.R. No. L-45358. January 29, 1937 NARCISO ALVAREZ, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF TAYABAS and THE ANTIUSURY BOARD, respondents Alvarez v. CFI of Tayabas definition of a search warrant an order in writing, issued in the name of the People of the Philippine Islands, signed by a judge or justice of peace and directed to a peace officer commanding him to search for personal property and bring it before court, OATH - any form of attestation that a party signifies that he is bound by conscience to perform an act faithfully or truthfully In ALVAREZ VS. CFI, 64 PHIL. 33, it was held that the following test must be complied with in an application for search warrant or in a supporting deposition based on personal knowledge or notThe true test of sufficiency of a deposition or affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it was drawn in a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and the affiant be held liable for damage caused. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant of a search warrant and/or his witnesses, not of the facts merely reported by a person whom one considers to be reliable. Tested by the above standards, the allegation of the witness, Lt. Angeles, do not come up to the level of facts based on his personal knowledge so much so that he cannot be held liable for perjury for such allegations in causing the issuance of the questioned search warrant. FACTS: On June 3 1936, Judge Eduardo Gutierrez David of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas issued a search warrant on the basis of affidavit of Agent Mariano Almeda in whose oath he declared that he had no personal knowledge but through information from a reliable source. In other words, the applicant's knowledge of facts is based on a mere hearsay. In the affidavit presented to the judge, the description is as follows:"That there are being kept is said premises books documents, receipts, lists chits, and other papers used by him in connection with his activities as money lender, charging a usurious rate of interests, in violation of the law."At 7 pm on June 4, by virtue of the warrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury Board entered the store and residence of Narciso Alvarez seized some articles such as internal revenue license, ledger, journals. cash bonds, check stubs, memorandums, blackboards, contracts, inventories, bill of lading, credit receipts, correspondence, receipt books, promissory notes and checks. On July 8, Alvarez filed a petition alleging that the search was illegal based on the lack of personal knowledge, that it was made at night and for non compliance in the particularity description rule in issuing warrant. On September 10, the Court of First Instance ruled against the Alvarez and upheld the validity of the search warrant. HELD: (1) No. The search warrant is ILLEGAL because the affidavit is based on mere hearsay. RATIO: The general rule is that when the affidavit of the applicant or complainant contains sufficient facts within his personal and direct knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge is satisfied that there exists probable cause. But when the applicant's knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses having personal knowledge of facts is necessary. The Court held that the warrant is illegal because it is based on the affidavit of an agent who had no personal knowledge of the facts. The true test of sufficiency of a deposition or affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in such a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and affiant is held liable for damages caused. (2) Yes, the search can be made at night. RATIO: Section 101 of General Orders number 58 authorizes a search made at night when it is positively asserted that the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched. However, since the search warrant is declared illegal (RULING 1), such search could not be legally made at night. (3) Yes, it satisfied the requirement of particularity of description. RATIO: Article III of the Constitution and section 97 of General Orders Number 58 requires that the affidavit must contain a particular description of the placed to be searched and the person or thing to be seized. But, where, by the nature of the goods to be seized, their description must be rather general, it is not required that technical description is given, as this would mean that no warrant could issue. Based on the description of the affidavit, and taking into consideration the nature of the articles as described it is clear that no other more adequate and detailed description could have been given, particularly because it is difficult to give a particular description of the contents thereof. The description so made substantially complies with the legal provisions because the officer of the law who executed the warrant was thereby placed in a position enabling him to identify the articles in question, which he did. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. BENHUR MAMARIL, appellant.

Intelligence Section PNCO of the Lingayen Police Station applied before the RTC of Lingayen, Pangasinan, for a search warrant authorizing the search for marijuana, at the family residence of appellant Benhur Mamaril. SW was issued. Police officers went to the residence of appellant and implemented the search. Upon seeing the policemen, appellant turned back and tried to run towards the back door. SPO3 Rico told appellant to stop, which appellant did. SPO3 Rico informed appellant that they had a search warrant to search the house premises. They showed appellant and his mother the search warrant. The search was witnessed by two members of the barangay council in said area. Found in the search where marijuana leaves. SPO4 Faustino Ferrer, Jr. prepared a certification that the house was properly searched, which was signed by appellant and the barangay officials who witnessed the search. After the search, the police officers brought appellant and the confiscated articles to the Lingayen Police Station and turned them over to the desk officer. After weighing the specimens and testing the same, Police Superintendent Cid issued a report finding the specimens to be "POSITIVE to the test for the presence of marijuana", urine sample of appellant was positive for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride known as "shabu.". Trial court found appellant guilty. Appellant prays for his acquittal on the ground that SW was illegally issued considering that there was no evidence showing that the required searching questions and answers were made anent the application for said search warrant. HELD: In determining the existence of probable cause, it is required that: (1) the judge must examine the complainant and his witnesses personally; (2) the examination must be under oath; and (3) the examination must be reduced in writing in the form of searching questions and answers. Atty. Enrico O. Castillo who was requested to testify on the available records kept in their office regarding presented before the court only the application for search warrant and the supporting affidavits of PO3 Santiago and Fernandez. Castillo could not produce the sworn statements of the complainant and his witnesses showing that the judge examined them in the form of searching questions and answers in writing as required by law. Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and to attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false. We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge to conform with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to the record, rendering the search warrant invalid. Although it is possible that Judge Ramos examined the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers, the fact remains that there is no evidence that the examination was put into writing as required by law. G.R. Nos. 94054-57 February 19, 1991 VICENTE LIM, SR. and MAYOR SUSANA LIM, petitioners, vs. HON. NEMESIO S. FELIX and HON. ANTONIO ALFANE, respondents. Lim Sr. v. Felix certification by the fiscal of the existence of probable cause does not bind the judge. Preliminary inquiry determines probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant (prosecutor); preliminary examination (judge) investigation for the determination of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest; preliminary investigation proper ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or be released. FACTS: On March 17, 1989, at about 7:30 o'clock in the morning, at the vicinity of the airport road of the Masbate Domestic Airport, located at the municipality of Masbate province of Masbate, Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr. and his security escorts, namely Provincial Guards Antonio Cortes, Gaspar Amaro, and Artemio Fuentes were attacked and killed by a lone assassin. Dante Siblante another security escort of Congressman Espinosa, Sr. survived the assassination plot, although, he himself suffered a gunshot wound. An investigation of the incident then followed. Thereafter, and for the purpose of preliminary investigation, the designated investigator filed an amended complaint with the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate accusing Vicente Lim, Sr. et al of the crime of multiple murder and frustrated murder in connection with the airport incident. After conducting the preliminary investigation, the court issued an order concluding that a probable cause has been established for the issuance of a warrant of arrest of named accused.. On October 30, 1989, Fiscal Alfane filed with the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, four (4) separate informations of murder against the twelve (12) accused with a recommendation of no bail.

On November 21, 1989, petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with us a verified petition for change of venue w/c was authorized, from the RTC of Masbate to the RTCt of Makati to avoid miscarriage of justice. The cases were raffled to Branch 56 presided by respondent Judge Nemesio S. Felix. Petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with the respondent court several motions and manifestations, among others was an order be issued requiring the transmittal of the initial records of the preliminary inquiry or investigation conducted by the Municipal Judge Barsaga of Masbate for the best enlightenment of this Honorable Court in its personal determination of the existence of a probable cause or prima facie evidence as well as its determination of the existence of guilt, pursuant to the mandatory mandate of the constitution that no warrant shall issue unless the issuing magistrate shall have himself been personally convinced of such probable cause. Respondent court issued an order denying for lack of merit the motions and manifestations and issued warrants of arrest against the accused including the petitioners herein. ISSUE: Whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on the prosecutions certification and recommendation that a probable cause exists. HELD: Yes. But by itself, it does not bind judges to come out with the warrant of arrest. Issuance of warrants calls for the exercise of judicial discretion on the part of the issuing judge. If the judge is satisfied from the preliminary examination conducted by him or by the investigating officer than an offense complained of has been committed and that there is a reasonable grounds to believe that the accused has committed it, he must issue a warrant or order for an arrest. A judge is not required to personally examine the complainants and witnesses, what the constitution mandates in satisfying the existence of probable cause, the judge shall either; 1. Personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause, and in basis thereof, issue arrest warrant and

2.

If there is no sufficient establishment of probable cause, he may disregard the prosecutors certification and require the submission of the supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. Moreover, the constitution pursuant to Sec 2 Art III also mandates that x x x probable cause should be personally determined by the judgex x x. This means that 1. The determination of probable cause is a function of the judge. 2. Preliminary inquiry made by a prosecutor does not bind the judge. 3. Judges and prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry, which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper, which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or release. In the case at bar, the only basis of the respondent judge in issuing warrants of arrest is only the certification of the prosecutor, without personally examining the information (which still in Masbate, and wherein the respondent denied the motion for transmittal of such records of the cases in the ground that certification id enough ground for the determination of probable cause and issuance of warrant). Thus, there is no personal examination conducted by the judge to establish the existence of probable cause, thereby, the respondent committed abuse of discretion. The questioned Order of respondent Judge Nemesio S. Felix of Branch 56, Regional Trial Court of Makati dated July 5, 1990 is declared NULL and VOID and SET ASIDE. Note: Preliminary investigation for the determination of sufficient ground for filing of information and investigation for the determination of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, Distinguished. The former is executive in nature and part of a PROSECUTORS JOB. While the latter aka preliminary examination is judicial in nature and is lodged to the JUDGE. A.M. No. RTJ-01-1642 March 6, 2002 P/SUPT. SEVERINO CRUZ and FRANCISCO MONEDERO, complainants, vs. JUDGE PEDRO M. AREOLA and BRANCH CLERK OF COURT JANICE YULO-ANTERO, respondents. On November 26, 1998, the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an Information for Estafa against Marilyn Carreon, an employee of the LTO, based on the complaint filed by herein complainants. The Office of the City Prosecutor found no cogent reason to reverse, modify, or alter the resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman and recommended that the case be set for trial.

On January 19, 1999, accused Marilyn Carreon filed with the trial court an Urgent Motion for Reinvestigation. In his Order dated January 25, 1999, the respondent Judge considered the said motion a mere scrap of paper for non-compliance with Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. On the same date, a Warrant of Arrest was issued by the respondent Judge and released by respondent Branch Clerk of Court. On February 10, 1999, respondent Judge issued another Order deferring the implementation of the Warrant of Arrest against the accused pending the resolution of her Motion for Reinvestigation. On June 16, 1999, respondent Judge granted Carreons Motion for Reconsideration and directed the Branch Trial Prosecutor to conduct a reinvestigation of the case. Complainants filed the instant complaint charging both respondent Judge and his Branch Clerk of Court with ignorance of the law. Complainants take issue of the fact that although respondent Judge already issued a warrant of arrest, he still deferred its implementation to give way to a reinvestigation of the case on motion of the accused. They believe that there is no longer any reason why the respondent Judge should withhold the issuance of a warrant of arrest c o n s i d e r i n g t h a t t h e Office of the City Prosecutor already made a finding t h a t t h e r e e x i s t s probable cause to indict the accused. In their Joint Comment, respondent Judge manifests that the issuance of a warrant of arrest is not a ministerial function of a judge as he is mandated to determine the existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant. Respondent Branch Clerk of Court, on the other hand, claims that it is a ministerial duty on her part to release duly signed orders, resolutions and decisions of the presiding judge of her branch. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Judge erred in deferring the implementations of thewarrant of arrest. HELD: NO The 1987 Constitution provides that no warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the ju d g e a f t e r e x a m i n a t i o n u n d e r o a t h o r affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Preliminary investigation should be distinguished as to whether it is an investigation for the determination of a sufficient ground for the filing of the information or it is an investigation for the determination of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The first kind of preliminary investigation is executive in nature. It is part of the prosecutions job. The second kind of preliminary investigation is judicial in nature and is lodged with the judge. In making the required personal determination, a judge is not precluded from relying on the evidence earlier gathered by responsible officers. The extent of reliance depends on the circumstances of each case and is subject to the judges sound discretion. It is not obligatory, but merely discretionary, upon the investigating judge to issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused, even after having personally examined the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers. For the determination of whether a probable cause exists and whether it is necessary to arrest the accused in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, is left to his sound judgment or discretion. It appears from the records that the challenged Orders issued by the respondent Judge were not at all baseless. The respondent Judge merely exercised his sound discretion in not immediately issuing the warrant of arrest and in susp e n d i n g f u r t h e r p r o c e e d i n g s p e n d i n g reinvestigation of the case. On her part, respondent Branch Clerk of Court cannot be faulted for performing a ministerial function that is, releasing Orders duly signed by the respondent Judge. TERESITA TANGHAL OKABE, petitioner, vs. HON. PEDRO DE LEON GUTIERREZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC, Pasay City, Branch 119; PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES; and CECILIA MARUYAMA, respondents. In Okabe v. Gutierrez, the Court stressed that the judge should consider not only the report of the investigating prosecutor but also the affidavit and the documentary evidence of the parties, the counter-affidavit of the accused and his witnesses, as well as the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the preliminary investigation, if any, submitted to the court by the investigating prosecutor upon the filing of the Information. If the report, taken together with the supporting evidence, is sufficient to sustain a finding of probable cause, it is not compulsory that a personal examination of the complainant and his witnesses be conducted. FACTS: Cecilia Maruyama filed a complaint charging Lorna Tanghal and petitioner Teresita Tanghal Okabe, a.k.a. Shiela Okabe, with estafa. Maruyama alleged, that on December 11, 1998, she entrusted Y11,410,000 with the peso equivalent of P3,993,500 to the petitioner, who was engaged in the business of "door-to-door delivery" from Japan to the Philippines. It was alleged that the petitioner failed to deliver the money as agreed upon, and, at first, denied receiving the said amount but later returned only US$1,000 through Lorna Tanghal.

During the preliminary investigation, the complainant submitted the affidavit of her witnesses and other documentary evidence. After the requisite preliminary investigation, 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Joselito J. Vibandor came out with a resolution, finding probable cause for estafa against the petitioner w/c was subsequently approved by the city prosecutor. The trial court then issued a warrant of arrest with a recommended bond of P40,000. Petitioner posted a personal bail bond in the said amount. The petitioner left the Philippines for Japan on June 17, 2000 without the trial courts permission, and returned to the Philippines on June 28, 2000. She left the Philippines anew on July 1, 2000, and returned on July 12, 2000. On July 14, 2000, the private prosecutor filed an urgent ex parte motion for the issuance of the hold departure order. Trial court approved the same. Meanwhile, the petitioner filed a verified motion for judicial determination of probable cause and to defer proceedings/arraignment, alleging that the only documents appended to the Information submitted by the investigating prosecutor were respondent Maruyamas affidavit-complaint for estafa and the resolution of the investigating prosecutor; the affidavits of the witnesses of the complainant, the respondents counter-affidavit and the other evidence adduced by the parties were not attached thereto. On July 19, 2000, the petitioner also filed a Very Urgent Motion To Lift/Recall Hold Departure Order dated July 17, 2000 and/or allow her to regularly travel to Japan for the reason that she have 3 minor children residing there relying on her for support. Petitioner also questioned the irregularity of the determination of probable cause during the preliminary investigation however the respondent judge ruled that the posting of bail and the filing motions for relief estopped the petitioner from questioning the same. Upon arraignment, petitioner refused to enter a plea and w/ leave of court left the court room. Petitioner filed w/ CA a petition for Certiorari. CA set aside the hold departure order however all the other motions were denied, hence this case. ISSUE: Whether the respondent judge committed a reversible error in determining existence of probable cause despite lack of affidavits of the witnesses of respondent Maruyama and the latters documentary evidence, as well as the counter-affidavit of the petitioner. HELD: Yes, the rulings of this Court are now embedded in Section 8(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides that: SEC. 8. Records. (a) Records supporting the information or complaint. An information or complaint filed in court shall be supported by the affidavits and counter-affidavits of the parties and their witnesses, together with the other supporting evidence and the resolution on the case. The respondent judge is hereby DIRECTED to determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the petitioner based on the complete records, as required under Section 8(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. If the judge is able to determine the existence or nonexistence of probable cause on the basis of the records submitted by the investigating prosecutor, there would no longer be a need to order the elevation of the rest of the records of the case. However, if the judge finds the records and/or evidence submitted by the investigating prosecutor to be insufficient, he may order the dismissal of the case, or direct the investigating prosecutor either to submit more evidence or to submit the entire records of the preliminary investigation, to enable him to discharge his duty. The judge may even call the complainant and his witness to themselves answer the courts probing questions to determine the existence of probable cause. In sum, then, we find and so declare that the respondent judge committed a grave abuse of his discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in finding probable cause for the petitioners arrest in the absence of copies of the affidavits of the witnesses of the private complainant and her reply affidavit, the counter-affidavit of the petitioner, and the evidence adduced during the preliminary investigation before the investigating prosecutor. [GR L-32409, 27 February 1971] Bache & Co. (Phil.) Inc. vs. Ruiz On 24 February 1970, Misael P. Vera, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, wrote a letter addressed to Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search warrant against Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc. and Frederick E. Seggerman for violation of Section 46(a) of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) and authorizing Revenue Examiner Rodolfo de Leon to make and file the application for search warrant which was attached to the letter. In the afternoon of the following day, De Leon and his witness, Arturo Logronio, went to the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal. They brought with them the following papers: Veras letterrequest; an application for search warrant already filled up but still unsigned by De Leon; an affidavit of Logronio subscribed before De Leon; a deposition in printed form of Logronio already accomplished and signed by him but not yet subscribed; and a search warrant already accomplished but still unsigned by Judge. At that time the Judge was hearing a certain case; so, by means of a note, he instructed his Deputy Clerk of Court to take the depositions of De Leon and Logronio. After the session had

adjourned, the Judge was informed that the depositions had already been taken. The stenographer, upon request of the Judge, read to him her stenographic notes; and thereafter, the Judge asked Logronio to take the oath and warned him that if his deposition was found to be false and without legal basis, he could be charged for perjury. The Judge signed de Leons application for search warrant and Logronios deposition. 3 days later (a Saturday), the BIR agents served the search warrant to the corporation and Seggerman at the offices of the corporation on Ayala Avenue, Makati, Rizal. The corporations lawyers protested the search on the ground that no formal complaint or transcript of testimony was attached to the warrant. The agents nevertheless proceeded with their search which yielded 6 boxes of documents. On 3 March 1970, the corporation and Seggerman filed a petition with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal praying that the search warrant be quashed, dissolved or recalled, that preliminary prohibitory and mandatory writs of injunction be issued, that the search warrant be declared null and void, and that Vera, Logronio, de Leon, et. al., be ordered to pay the corporation and Seggerman, jointly and severally, damages and attorneys fees. After hearing and on 29 July 1970, the court issued an order dismissing the petition for dissolution of the search warrant. In the meantime, or on 16 April 1970, the Bureau of Internal Revenue made tax assessments on the corporation in the total sum of P2,594,729.97, partly, if not entirely, based on the documents thus seized. The corporation and Seggerman filed an action for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus. ISSUE: Whether or not there had been a valid search warrant. HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Bache on three grounds. 1. J Ruiz failed to personally examine the complainant and his witness. In the case at bar, no personal examination at all was conducted by respondent Judge of the complainant (respondent De Leon) and his witness (respondent Logronio). While it is true that the complainants application for search warrant and the witness printed-form deposition were subscribed and sworn to before respondent Judge, the latter did not ask either of the two any question the answer to which could possibly be the basis for determining whether or not there was probable cause against herein petitioners. Indeed, the participants seem to have attached so little significance to the matter that notes of the proceedings before respondent Judge were not even taken. 2. The search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense. The search warrant in question was issued for at least four distinct offenses under the Tax Code. As ruled in Stonehill Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court that a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense. Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense. 3. The search warrant does not particularly describe the things to be seized. The documents, papers and effects sought to be seized are described in the Search Warrant Unregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers, journals, columnars, receipts and disbursements books, customers ledgers); receipts for payments received; certificates of stocks and securities; contracts, promissory notes and deeds of sale; telex and coded messages; business communications, accounting and business records; checks and check stubs; records ofbank deposits and withdrawals; and records of foreign remittances, covering the years 1966 to 1970. The description does not meet the requirement in Art III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution, and of Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, that the warrant should particularly describe the things to be seized. A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow or when the description expresses a conclusion of fact not of law by which the warrant officer may be guided in making the search and seizure or when the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued.