Professional Documents
Culture Documents
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are based; (8) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (9) when the finding of facts of the Court of Appeals is premised on the absence of evidence and is contradicted by evidence on record. Reasoning - The subject action for damages, being civil in nature, is separate and distinct from the criminal aspect, necessitating only a preponderance of evidence. - A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code, with a substantively all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime. A distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extracontractual. The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasidelictos or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code. Therefore, the acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case. - But this rule is not without exception. Thus, Section 2 (c) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court provides: Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration from a final judgment that the fact from which the civil action might arise did not exist. - In a previous case, CA-G.R. No. 07684-CR, People v. Rosario, the CA after a painstaking analysis of. (a) the testimonial evidence; (b) the relative positions of the two vehicles as depicted in the sketches; (c) the distance of each of the two vehicles from the cemented edge of the road; (d) the point of impact; (e) the visible tire marks, and (f) the extent of the damage caused upon each of the two vehicles, ruled that it was the driver of the jeep and not the accused driver of the car who was negligent and accordingly acquitted the latter. - Negligence, being the source and foundation of actions of quasi-delict, is the basis for the recovery of damages. In the case at bar, the CA found that collision was not due to the negligence of Rosario but rather it was Castillo's own act of driving the jeep to the shoulder of the road where the car was, which was actually the proximate cause of the collision. With this finding, the CA exonerated Rosario from civil liability on the ground that the alleged negligence did not exist. - During the trial of the case before the CFI, respondents were not present because they were
for it to overtake the truck. The signal was disregarded, as the car proceeded on its direction. - To evade the collision, he swerved his jeep to the right towards the shoulder and applied on the brakes, leaving his feet on it, even, immediately after the impact. The car rested on the shoulder of the right lane. The jeep's rear left wheel was on the road, leaving short tire marks behind it; while the car left long tire marks, specially its left rear wheel. Respodents Version Juanito Rosario who was driving the car, with his wife and daughter, were along MacArthur Highway going southwards. They saw ahead of them a big heavily loaded cargo truck. The truck was moving very slowly because of its heavy load so that Rosario decided to overtake it. But before doing so, he first saw to it that the road was clear and as additional precautionary measure, he blew his horn several times at the time he was overtaking the truck. - As the car was about to overtake the slow moving cargo truck, the car's front left tire suddenly burst due to pressure causing the car to swerve to the left and naturally making steering and control difficult. - Because of the tendency of the car to veer towards the left due to the blown out tire, the driver steered the car towards the direction where he could find a safe place to park and fix the tire. He finally brought the car to a halt at the left shoulder of the road. - Just as he was about to get off to fix the flat tire, the car was suddenly bumped by the jeep which came from the opposite direction ISSUE WON petitioners were deprived of due process because their civil action was decided on the basis of private respondent Juanita Rosario's acquittal in the criminal case for reckless imprudence HELD NO Ratio Findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and on the Supreme Court, unless (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises and conjectures; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admission of both appellant and appellee; (6) the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (7) said findings of facts are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they
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- The teachings of the cases of Soliven1, Inting2, Lim3, Allado, and Webb reject the proposition that the investigating prosecutors certification in an information or his resolution which is made the basis for the filing of the information, or both, would suffice in the judicial determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. - In the present case, nothing accompanied the information upon its filing with the trial court. Clearly, when respondent Judge Asuncion issued the assailed order directing, among other things, the issuance of warrants of arrest, he had only the information, amended information, and Joint Resolution as bases thereof. He did not have the records or evidence supporting the prosecutors finding of probable cause. And strangely enough, he made no specific finding of probable cause; he merely directed the issuance of warrants of arrest. It may, however, be argued that the directive presupposes a finding of probable cause. But then compliance with a constitutional requirement for the protection of individual liberty cannot be left to presupposition, conjecture, or even convincing logic.
order (1) denying the petitioners Motion to Suspend Proceedings and to Hold In Abeyance Issuance of Warrants of Arrest and the public prosecutors Motion to Defer Arraignment and (2) directing the issuance of the warrants of arrest after and setting the arraignment on 28 June 1993. - The petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with application for a temporary restraining order. They contended therein that respondent Judge Asuncion had acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the aforementioned order. - The Court of Appeals then issued a resolution denying the application for a writ of preliminary injunction. ISSUE WON public respondent Judge Asuncion committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the issuance of warrants of arrest without examining the records of the preliminary investigation. HELD YES. - Section 2, Article III of the present Constitution provides that no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. - The determination of probable cause is a function of the Judge. It is not for the Provincial Fiscal or Prosecutor nor the Election Supervisor to ascertain. Only the Judge and the Judge alone makes this determination. - The preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor does not bind the Judge. It merely assists him to make the determination of probable cause. The Judge does not have to follow what the Prosecutor presents to him. By itself, the Prosecutors certification of probable cause is ineffectual. It is the report, the affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes (if any), and all other supporting documents behind the Prosecutors certification which are material in assisting the Judge to make his determination.
JARANTILLA v CA 171 SCRA 429 JIMENEZ v AVERIA 22 SCRA 380 PEOPLE v VELOSO 112 SCRA 173 ALLADO v DIOKNO 232 SCRA 192 ROBERTS v CA 254 SCRA 307 DAVIDE, JR; March 5, 1996
FACTS - Several thousand holders of 349 Pepsi crowns in connection with the Number Fever Promotion filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City complaints against the petitioner officials of PEPSI. - The petitioners filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor a motion for the reconsideration of the Joint Resolution and with the DOJ a Petition for Review. The petitioners also Motions to Suspend Proceedings and to hold in Abeyance Issuance of Warrants of Arrest on the ground that they had filed the aforesaid Petition for Review. - Respondent Judge Asuncion issued the challenged
REPUBLIC v CA 301 SCRA 475 CASTILLO v VILLALUZ 171 SCRA 39 NARVASA; March 8, 1989
NATURE Petition for certiorari and prohibition FACTS - In July 1971, a complaint and a Joint Affidavit were filed directly by Renato Montes and Jose de Silva
1
The Judge does not have to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. The Prosecutor can perform the same functions as a commissioner for the taking of the evidence. However, there should be a report and necessary documents supporting the Fiscals bare certification. All of these should be before the Judge. 2 The supporting documents may consist of, viz., the affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes (if any), and all other supporting documents behind the Prosecutors certification which are material in assisting the Judge to make his determination of probable cause
The issuance of the warrants of arrest by a judge solely on the basis of the prosecutors certification in the information that there existed probable cause, without having before him any other basis for his personal determination of the existence of a probable cause, is null and void.
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the case to Provincial Fiscal Salvani with his finding that "there is prima facie evidence of robbery as charge in the complaint". The fiscal returned the records on the ground that Judge Samulde failed to include the warrant of arrest against the accused as provided in Sec 5, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Judge Samulde sent back the records to Fiscal Salvani. He pointed out that under Sec 6, Rule 112, he may issue a warrant of arrest if he is satisfied "that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, " implying that, although he found that a probable cause existed, he did not believe that the accused should be immediately placed under custody. Hence, he refused to issue a warrant of arrest. - A special civil action of mandamus was filed in the RTC by Provincial Fiscal Salvani against Judge Samulde to compel the latter to issue a warrant of arrest. The RTC dismissed the petition but nevertheless ordered Judge Samulde to issue a warrant of arrest, and to transmit the warrant to the Provincial Fiscal for appropriate action. He further advised the Municipal Judge "that henceforth he adheres to the same rule in similar cases where he conducts a preliminary investigation with a finding of a prima facie or probable cause." Unconvinced, Judge Samulde appealed to this Court. ISSUE WON a judge may be compelled to issue a warrant of arrest upon a finding of probable cause HELD NO Ratio 3 conditions must concur for the issuance of the warrant of arrest. The investigating judge must: (a) have examined in writing and under oath the complainant and his witnesses by searching questions and answers; (b) be satisfied that a probable cause exists; and (c) that there is a need to place the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. Reasoning The mandatory provision that the investigating judge "must issue a warrant of arrest" if he finds probable cause that the respondent committed the crime charged, found in all previous rules of criminal procedure, from General Orders No. 58 down to Rule 112 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court, is absent in Section 1 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. It is not obligatory, but merely
It follows that the conclusions derived by a judge from his own investigation cannot be superior to and conclusively binding on the fiscal or public prosecutor, in whom that function is principally and more logically lodged. 2. YES The power to conduct PI is lodged in the fiscal. It is grave abuse of discretion on a judge to seek to foreclose the fiscal's prerogative to conduct his own preliminary investigation to determine for himself the existence or non-existence of probable cause, and to require him to show cause for not filing the information within 24 hours, on the sole basis of the Judge's conclusions. The fiscal has the duty to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause, and could not shirk or be made to evade it by an unreasoning and indiscriminate reliance on the judge's investigation. Dispositive: Petition GRANTED. Challenged Orders annulled and set aside.
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Ratio Posting of a bail bond constitutes waiver of any irregularity attending the arrest of a person and estops him from discussing the validity of his arrest. Reasoning - In the case of Luna vs. Plaza, the Court held that where petitioner has filed an application for bail and waived the preliminary investigation proper, he waived his objection to whatever defect, if any, in the preliminary examination conducted, prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest. - This doctrine has been upheld in a number of cases including People vs. Olandar, Zacarias vs. Cruz, Bermejo vs. Barrios, People vs. La Caste, Manzano vs Villa and People vs. Obngayan which stated that where the accused has filed bail and waived the preliminary investigation proper, he has waived whatever defect, if any, in the preliminary examination conducted prior to the issuance of the warrant of arrest. - The city fiscal had been quite active in the investigation and in the prosecution of the accused. It was he who manifested his readiness to appear in the trial. Obiter - With regard to the issue of whether or not the only person vested with authority to conduct a preliminary investigation is the city fiscal, the Charter of the City of Dagupan provides that the City Court of Dagupan City may also conduct preliminary investigation for for any offense, without regard to the limits of punishment and may release or commit any person charged with such offense to secure his appearance before the proper court. Dispositive WHEREFORE, these petitions for certiorari are dismissed. The restraining order issued by this Court is lifted and set aside. Costs against petitioner.
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133 SCRA 800 PEOPLE v BURGOS 144 SCRA 1 GUTIERREZ; Sept.4, 1986
NATURE Appeal from RTC decision convicting Ruben Burgos of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms in Furtherance of Subversion FACTS - Prosecution version: Upon obtaining information from one Cesar Masamlok, who personally and voluntarily surrendered to the Davao del Sur police HQ stating that accused Ruben Burgos forcibly recruited him to join the NPA with the use of a firearm against his life, a team was dispatched the following day to arrest Burgos. Through the help of Pedro Burgos, the brother of accused, the team was able to locate Ruben Burgos, who was plowing his field at the time. - When asked about the firearm, the accused denied possession of it, but after questioning the accuseds wife, the police were able to locate and retrieve the said firearm, a .38 caliber S & W, buried in the ground below their house. The police, after accused pointed them to the location, were also able to retrieve alleged subversive documents (a notebook and a pamphlet) hidden underground a few meters away from the house. - To prove accuseds subversive activities, Masamlok testified that accused came to his house and told him to join the NPA or his family will be killed along with him. The threat to his life and family forced Masamlok to join the NPA. He later attended an NPA seminar where Burgos, the first speaker, said very distinctly that he is an NPA together with his companions, to assure the unity of the civilian. That he encouraged the group to overthrow the government. To prove illegal possession, a person in charge of firearms and explosives of the PC HQ in Davao testified that accused was not among the list of firearm holders - On the other hand, accused-appellants claims that he was taken to the PC barracks and when he denied ownership of the gun, he was beaten, tortured, mauled and subjected to physical agony. He was forced to admit possession or ownership of the gun. 2 witnesses as well as Rubens wife Urbana, were presented by the defense in support of the accuseds
the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized." - Both provisions require that there be not only probable cause before the issuance of a search warrant but that the search warrant must be based upon an application supported by oath of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce. In its broadest sense, an oath includes any form of attestation by which a party signifies that he is bound in conscience to perform an act faithfully and truthfully. -Reason 2: At the hearing of the case, it was shown that the documents and papers had really been seized to enable the Anti-Usury Board to conduct an investigation and later use all or some of them as evidence against the petitioners in the criminal cases that may be brought against them. The seizure of books and documents by means of a search warrant, for the purpose of using them as evidence in a criminal case against the person in whose possession they were found, is unconstitutional because it makes the warrant unreasonable, and it is equivalent to a violation of the constitutional provision prohibiting the compulsion of an accused to testify against himself Therefore, it appearing that the documents and papers were seized for the purpose of fishing for evidence to be used against the petitioners in the criminal proceedings for violation of the Anti-Usury Law which might be instituted against them, this court holds that the search warrants issued are illegal and that the documents and papers should be returned to them. - Definition and rationale of search warrant: A search warrant is an order in writing, issued in the name of the People of the Philippine Islands, signed by a judge or a justice of the peace, and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property and bring it before the court. Of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential to his peace and happiness than the right of personal security, and that involves the exemption of his private affairs, books, and papers from the inspection and scrutiny of others. While the power to search and seize is necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government.
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seizure which transpired afterwards could not likewise be deemed legal as being mere incidents to a valid arrest. Neither can it be presumed that there was a waiver, or that consent was given by the accused to be searched simply because he failed to object. To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right exists; secondly, that the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such a right; and lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. The fact that the accused failed to object to the entry into his house does not amount to a permission to make a search therein. 2. NO. Since the extra-judicial confession, the firearm, and the alleged subversive documents are inadmissible in evidence, the only remaining proof to sustain the charge is the testimony of Masamlok, which is inadequate to convict Burgos beyond reasonable doubt. Reasoning Although it is true that the trial court found Masamloks testimony credible and convincing, the SC is not necessarily bound by the credibility which the trial court attaches to a particular witness. As stated in People v Cabrera (100 SCRA 424): When it comes to question of credibility the findings of the trial court are entitled to great respect upon appeal for the obvious reason that it was able to observe the demeanor, actuations and deportment of the witnesses during the trial. But We have also said that this rule is not absolute for otherwise there would be no reversals of convictions upon appeal. We must reject the findings of the trial court where the record discloses circumstances of weight and substance which were not properly appreciated by the trial court. In the instant case, Masamloks testimony was totally uncorroborated. Considering that Masamlok surrendered to the military, certainly his fate depended on how eagerly he cooperated with the authorities. Otherwise, he would also be charged with subversion. Masamlok may be considered as an interested witness. His testimony cannot be said to be free from the opportunity and temptation to be exaggerated and even fabricated for it was intended to secure his freedom. Moreover, despite the fact that there were other persons present during the alleged NPA seminar who could have corroborated Masamlok's testimony that the accused used the gun in furtherance of subversive activities or actually engaged in subversive acts, the prosecution never presented any other witness.
the time of arrest, Burgos was not in actual possession of any firearm or subversive document. Neither was he committing any act which could be described as subversive. He was, in fact, plowing his field at the time. - The SolGen believes that the arrest may still be considered lawful under Sec.6(b) using the test of reasonableness. The SolGen submits that the info given by Masamlok was sufficient to induce a reasonable ground that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. In arrests without a warrant under Sec.6(b), however, it is not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in fact or actually have been committed first. That a crime has actually been committed is an essential precondition. It is not enough to suspect that a crime may have been committed. The fact of the commission of the offense must be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator. In this case, the accused was arrested on the sole basis of Masamlok's verbal report. Masamlok led the authorities to suspect that the accused had committed a crime. They were still fishing for evidence of a crime not yet ascertained. The subsequent recovery of the subject firearm on the basis of information from the lips of a frightened wife cannot make the arrest lawful. If an arrest without warrant is unlawful at the moment it is made, generally nothing that happened or is discovered afterwards can make it lawful. The fruit of a poisoned tree is necessarily also tainted. More important, We find no compelling reason for the haste with which the arresting officers sought to arrest the accused. We fail to see why they failed to first go through the process of obtaining a warrant of arrest, if indeed they had reasonable ground to believe that the accused had truly committed a crime. There is no showing that there was a real apprehension that the accused was on the verge of flight or escape. Likewise, there is no showing that the whereabouts of the accused were unknown. - The basis for the action taken by the arresting officer was the verbal report made by Masamlok who was not required to subscribe his allegations under oath. There was no compulsion for him to state truthfully his charges under pain of criminal prosecution. Consequently, the need to go through the process of securing a search warrant and a warrant of arrest becomes even more clear. The arrest of the accused while he was plowing his field is illegal. The arrest being unlawful, the search and
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exaggeration that the basest criminal, ranged against the rest of the people who would condemn him outright, is still, under the Bill of Rights, a majority of one. - The respondents cannot even plead the urgency of the raid because it was in fact not urgent. They knew where the petitioners were. They had every opportunity to get a search warrant before making the raid. If they were worried that the weapons inside the compound would be spirited away, they could have surrounded the premises in the meantime, as a preventive measure. - Conceding that the search was truly warrantless, might not the search and seizure be nonetheless considered valid because it was incidental to a legal arrest? Surely not. If all the law enforcement authorities have to do is force their way into any house and then pick up anything they see there on the ground that the occupants are resisting arrest, then we might as well delete the Bill of Rights as a fussy redundancy. - If the arrest was made under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court in connection with a crime about to be committed, being committed, or just committed, what was that crime? There is no allegation in the record of such a justification. Parenthetically, it may be observed that under the Revised Rule 113, Section 5(b), the officer making the arrest must have personal knowledge of the ground therefor. - It follows that as the search of the petitioners' premises was violative of the Constitution, all the firearms and ammunition taken from the raided compound are inadmissible in evidence in any of the proceedings against the petitioners. These articles are "fruits of the poisonous tree. Dispositive WHEREFORE, the search of the petitioners' premises on November 25, 1984, is hereby declared ILLEGAL and all the articles seized as a result thereof are inadmissible in evidence against the petitioners in any proceedings. However, the said articles shall remain in custodia legis pending the outcome of the criminal cases that have been or may later be filed against the petitioners.
FACTS - On November 25, 1984, a contingent of more than two hundred Philippine marines and elements of the home defense forces raided the compound occupied by the petitioners at Gov. Alvarez street, Zamboanga City, in search of loose firearms, ammunition and other explosives. - The military operation was commonly known and dreaded as a "zona," which was like the feared practice of the kempeitai during the Japanese Occupation of rounding up the people in a locality, arresting the persons fingered by a hooded informer, and executing them outright (although the last part is not included in the modern refinement). - The initial reaction of the people inside the compound was to resist the invasion with a burst of gunfire. The soldiers returned fire and a bloody shoot-out ensued, resulting in a number of casualties. - 16 male occupants were arrested, later to be fingerprinted, paraffin-tested and photographed over their objection. The military also inventoried and confiscated nine M16 rifles, one M14 rifle, nine rifle grenades, and several rounds of ammunition found in the premises. - On December 21, 1984, the petitioners came to this Court. Their purpose was to recover the articles seized from them, to prevent these from being used as evidence against them, and to challenge their finger-printing, photographing and paraffin-testing as violative of their right against self-incrimination. - The petitioners demand the return of the arms and ammunition on the ground that they were taken without a search warrant as required by the Bill of Rights. This is confirmed by the said report and in fact admitted by the respondents, "but with avoidance. ISSUE WON the search of petitioners premises was illegal.
HELD YES. Ratio Even if were assumed for the sake of argument that they were guilty, they would not have been any less entitled to the protection of the Constitution, which covers both the innocent and the guilty. Reasoning Article IV, Section 3, of the 1973 Constitution: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. Article IV, Section 4(2): Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. -The respondents, while admitting the absence of the required such warrant, sought to justify their act on the ground that they were acting under superior orders. There was also the suggestion that the measure was necessary because of the aggravation of the peace and order problem generated by the assassination of Mayor Cesar Climaco. - Superior orders" cannot, of course, countermand the Constitution. The fact that the petitioners were suspected of the Climaco killing did not excuse the constitutional short-cuts the respondents took. - Zamboanga City at the time in question certainly did not excuse the non-observance of the constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures. There was no state of hostilities in the area to justify, assuming it could, the repressions committed therein against the petitioners. - The record does not disclose that the petitioners were wanted criminals or fugitives from justice. At the time of the "zona," they were merely suspected of the mayor's slaying and had not in fact even been investigated for it. As mere suspects, they were presumed innocent and not guilty as summarily pronounced by the military. - lacking the shield of innocence, the guilty need the armor of the Constitution, to protect them, not from a deserved sentence, but from arbitrary punishment. Every person is entitled to due process. It is no
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thwart plots to destabilize the government in the interest of public security. In this connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the increased killings in cities of police and military men by NPA "sparrow units," not to mention the abundance of unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not all of which are reported in media, most likely brought about by deteriorating economic conditions ? which all sum up to what one can rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal times.) - In this case, the warrantless search and seizure is more reasonable considering that unlike in the former, it was effected on the basis of a probable cause. The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same. It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the bag in the possession of the petitioner only after they shall have obtained a search warrant for the purpose. Such an exercise may prove to be useless, futile and much too late. - In People vs. CFI of Rizal, the Court held as follows: . . . In the ordinary cases where warrant is indispensably necessary, the mechanics prescribed by the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court must be followed and satisfied. But We need not argue that there are exceptions. Thus in the extraordinary events where warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, or when the latter cannot be performed except without warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure becomes purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched and the character of the articles procured. Clearly, the search in the case at bar can be sustained under the exceptions heretofore discussed, and hence, the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures has not been violated. Dispositive The petition is denied
the possession of the petitioner are inadmissible in evidence against him. ISSUE WON the warrantless petitioner is valid search imposed on the
HELD NO Ratio - The argument of the Solicitor General that when the two policemen approached the petitioner, he was actually committing or had just committed the offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in the presence of the police officers and consequently the search and seizure of the contraband was incidental to the lawful arrest in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure is untenable. At the time the peace officers in this case identified themselves and apprehended the petitioner as he attempted to flee they did not know that he had committed, or was actually committing the offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions. They just suspected that he was hiding something in the buri bag. They did now know what its contents were. The said circumstances did not justify an arrest without a warrant. However, there are many instances where a warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest, foremost of which is the "stop and search" without a search warrant at military or police checkpoints, the constitutionality or validity of which has been upheld by this Court in Valmonte vs. de Villa (to quote: Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case. Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle or flashes a light therein, these do not constitute unreasonable search. True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to
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jurisdiction through decisional dicta. For that matter, we are unaware of any instance wherein a search warrant was struck down on objections based on territorial jurisdiction. - We do not believe that the enforcement of a search warrant issued by a court outside the territorial jurisdiction wherein the place to be searched is located would create a constitutional question. Nor are we swayed by the professed apprehension that the law enforcement authorities may resort to what could be a permutation of forum shopping, by filing an application for the warrant with a "friendly" court. It need merely be recalled that a search warrant is only a process, not an action. Furthermore, the constitutional mandate is translated into specifically enumerated safeguards in Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure for the issuance of a search warrant, and all these have to be observed regardless of whatever court in whichever region is importuned for or actually issues a search warrant. Said requirements, together with the ten-day lifetime of the warrant would discourage resort to a court in another judicial region, not only because of the distance but also the contingencies of travel and the danger involved, unless there are really compelling reasons for the authorities to do so. Besides, it does seem odd that such constitutional protests have not been made against warrants of arrest which are enforceable indefinitely and anywhere although they involve, not only property and privacy, but persons and liberty. - On the other hand, it is a matter of judicial knowledge that the authorities have to contend now and then with local and national criminal syndicates of considerable power and influence, political or financial in nature, and so pervasive as to render foolhardy any attempt to obtain a search warrant in the very locale under their sphere of control. Nor should we overlook the fact that to do so will necessitate the transportation of applicant's witnesses to and their examination in said places, with the attendant risk, danger and expense. Also, a further well-founded precaution, obviously born of experience and verifiable data, is articulated by the court a quo, as quoted by respondent court: "This court is of the further belief that the possible leakage of information which is of utmost importance in the issuance of a search warrant is secured (against) where the issuing magistrate within the region does not hold court sessions in the city or municipality, within the region, where the place to be searched is located."
court but anywhere in the judicial region of the issuing court (National Capital Judicial Region). - Respondent Court of Appeals rendered judgment, in effect affirming that of the trial court, by denying due course to the petition for certiorari and lifting the temporary restraining order it had issued on November 29, 1990 in connection therewith. This judgment of respondent court is now impugned in and sought to be reversed through the present recourse before us. ISSUE WON a court may take cognizance of an application for a search warrant in connection with an offense committed outside its territorial jurisdiction and to issue a warrant to conduct a search on a place likewise outside its territorial jurisdiction. HELD YES - No law or rule imposes such a limitation on search warrants, in the same manner that no such restriction is provided for warrants of arrest. The arguments of petitioners are not inferable by necessary implication from the statutory provisions which are presumed to be complete and expressive of the intendment of the framers. A contrary interpretation on whatever pretext should not be countenanced. - A bit of legal history on his contestation will be helpful. The jurisdictional rule heretofore was that writs and process of the so-called inferior courts could be enforced outside the province only with the approval of the former court of first instance. Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act, the enforcement of such writs and processes no longer needs the approval of the regional trial court. On the other hand, while, formerly, writs and processes of the then courts of first instance were enforceable throughout the Philippines, under the Interim or Transitional Rules and Guidelines, certain specified writs issued by a regional trial court are now enforceable only within its judicial region. - PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS The Court cannot be blind to the fact that it is extremely difficult, as it undeniably is, to detect or elicit information regarding the existence and location of illegally possessed or prohibited articles. The Court is accordingly convinced that it should not make the requisites for the apprehension of the culprits and the confiscation of such illicit items, once detected, more onerous if not impossible by imposing further niceties of procedure or substantive rules of
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The territorial jurisdiction of the courts is determined by law, and a reading of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 discloses that the territorial jurisdiction of regional trial courts, metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts and municipal circuit trial courts are confined to specific territories. In the second place, the majority view may legitimize abuses that would result in the violation the civil rights of an accused or the infliction upon him of undue and unwarranted burdens and inconvenience as when, for instance, an accused who is a resident of Basco, Batanes, has to file a motion to quash a search warrant issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila in connection with an offense he allegedly committed in Itbayat, Batanes. - Nor can Stonehill vs. Diokno (20 SCRA 383) be an authoritative confirmation of the unlimited or unrestricted power of any court to issue search warrants in connection with crimes committed outside its territorial jurisdiction. While it may be true that the forty-two search warrants involved therein were issued by several Judges ---- specifically Judges (a) Amado Roan of the City Court of Manila, (b) Roman Cansino of the City Court of Manila, (c) Hermogenes Caluag of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City Branch), (d) Eulogio Mencias of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig Branch), and (e) Damian Jimenez of the City Court of Quezon City (Footnote 2, page 387) ---- there is no definite showing that the forty-two search warrants were for the searches and seizures of properties outside the territorial jurisdiction of their respective courts. The warrants were issued against the petitioners and corporations of which they were officers and some of the corporations enumerated in Footnote 7 have addressed in Manila and Makati. (pp. 388-89). Rizal (which includes Makati) and Quezon City both belonged to the Seventh Judicial District. That nobody challenged on jurisdictional ground the issuance of these search warrants is no argument in favor of the unlimited power of a court to issue search warrants. - I have serious misgivings on the majority decision on the matter where another court may, because of extreme and compelling circumstances, issue a search warrant in connection with a criminal case pending in an appropriate court. To illustrate this exception, the Municipal Trial Court of Argao, Cebu, may validly issue a warrant for the search of a house in Davao City and the seizure of any property therein that may have been used in committing an offense in Manila already the subject of an information filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. I submit
shall likewise be subject to any proper remedy in the appropriate higher court. 4. Where the court which issued the search warrant denies the motion to quash the same and is not otherwise prevented from further proceeding thereon, all personal property seized under the warrant shall forthwith be transmitted by it to the court wherein the criminal case is pending, with the necessary safeguards and documentation therefor. 5. These guidelines shall likewise be observed where the same criminal offense is charged in different informations or complaints and filed in two or more courts with concurrent original jurisdiction over the criminal action. When the issue of which court will try the case shall have been resolved, such court shall be considered as vested with primary jurisdiction to act on applications for search warrants incident to the criminal case. Dispositive WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed judgment of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23533 is hereby AFFIRMED.
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executive function, the correctness of the exercise of which is matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon. - If the information is valid on its face and there is no showing of manifest error, grave abuse of discretion or prejudice on the part of the public prosecutor, courts should not dismiss it for 'want of evidence,' because evidentiary matters should be presented and heard during the trial. The functions and duties of both the trial court and the public prosecutor in "the proper scheme of things" in our criminal justice system should be clearly understood. Reasoning: Executive Determination of Probable Cause - The Separate (Concurring) Opinion of former Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa in Roberts v. Court of Appeals : xxxthe Court is being asked to examine and assess such evidence as has thus far been submitted by the parties and, on the basis thereof, make a conclusion as to whether or not it suffices "to engender a well founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial." - It is a function that this Court should not be called upon to perform. It is a function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor., one that, as far as crimes cognizable by a Regional Trial Court are concerned, and notwithstanding that it involves an adjudicative process of a sort, exclusively pertains, by law, to said executive officer, the public prosecutor. It is moreover a function that in the established scheme of things, is supposed to be performed at the very genesis of, indeed, prefatorily to, the formal commencement of a criminal action. The proceedings before a public prosecutor, it may well be stressed, are essentially preliminary, prefatory and cannot lead to a final, definite and authoritative adjudgment of the guilt or innocence of the persons charged with a felony or crime. Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon. It is not for instance permitted for an accused, upon the filing of the information against him by the public prosecutor, to preempt trial by filing a motion with the Trial Court praying for the quash or dismissal of the indictment on the ground that the evidence upon which the same is based is inadequate. Nor is it permitted, on the antipodal theory that the evidence is in truth inadequate, for the complaining party to present a petition before
- Elsa B. Gumban (eyewitness) identified Jonathan Cerbo as the assailant. - The 3rd Municipal Circuit Trial Court of NabunturanMawab, Davao, after a preliminary investigation, found "sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief" that the crime of murder has been committed by private respondent Jonathan Cerbo and resolved to forward the entire records of the case to the provincial prosecutor at Tagum, Davao. - After an information for murder was filed against Jonathan Cerbo, petitioner Alynn Plezette Dy, daughter of the victim Rosalinda Dy, executed an affidavit-complaint charging private respondent Billy Cerbo of conspiracy in the killing , supported by a supplemental affidavit of Elsa B. Gumban, alleging that the shooting was done in the office and in the presence of Billy Cerbo who after the shooting did nothing (did not apply first aid nor bring the victim to the hospital) After a reinvestigation the prosecution filed an amended information including Billy Cerbo in the murder case. A warrant for his arrest was later issued. - Private respondent Billy Cerbo then filed a motion to quash warrant of arrest arguing that the same was issued without probable cause. Respondent Judge issued the first assailed order dismissing the case against Billy Cerbo for lack of probable cause and recalling the warrant for his arrest and ordered the withdrawal of the amended information and the filing of a new one charging Jonathan Cerbo only. - Private Prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the respondent judge. - The Court of Appeals held that Judge Eugenio Valles did not commit grave abuse of discretion in recalling the warrant of arrest issued against Private Respondent Billy Cerbo and subsequently dismissing the Information for murder filed against the private respondent, because the evidence presented thus far did not substantiate such charge. ISSUE WON the Trial Court had the authority to reverse the public prosecutor's finding of probable cause to prosecute accused and thus dismiss the case filed by the latter on the basis of a motion to quash warrant of arrest HELD NO Ratio The determination of probable cause during a preliminary investigation is a function that belongs to the public prosecutor. It is an
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QUISUMBING; March 31, 2000
NATURE Appeal from judgment of RTC. FACTS - Acting on a report by an informant, police officers conducted a buy-bust operation (of marijuana) in Caloocan. They arrested the person who sold them the marijuana (Spencer), but the same was able to escape. Then: the buy-bust team pursued Spencer, who ran inside a bungalow-type house. Having trapped Spencer inside the house, the police officers frisked him and recovered the marked money. The officers also found Elamparo repacking 5 bricks of marijuana inside the houses sala Elamparo was then arrested and were taken to a precinct and delivered to an inquest fiscal for further investigation. The buy-bust operation and arrest happened on the same day (12 Feb 1995), while the information for illegal possession of drugs was filed on 15 Feb 1995. - Arraignment: plea of not guilty. - Trial: prosecution presented the ff witnesses: police officer who was also poseur-buyer, another officer who took part in buy-bust, and NBI chemist who examined and confirmed the confiscated drugs to be marijuana. Defense presented as witnesses boarders of Elamparos house, saying that Elamparo was at their house when somebody knocked at their door. His father opened the same and was informed that somebody was looking for him. He went out and saw Spencer with handcuffs and being held by an arresting officer. When Elamparo persistently questioned Spencer as to why he was arrested, the arresting officers got mad at him prompting them to likewise bring him to the police station where he was detained. The officers demanded P15,000.00 for his release which he did not give. On the other hand, Spencer gave the sum and was released. - RTC: Guilty, under RA 6425. penalty of reclusion perpetua and fine of P9million. Elamparo appealed. ISSUE: 1. WON RTC was correct in the assessment of credibility of witnesses 2. WON the arrest of Elamparo was valid 3. WON the penalty imposed was correct HELD: 1. YES
- As held in Inting, the determination of probable cause by the prosecutor is for a purpose different from that which is to be made by the judge. Whether there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and should be held for trial is what the prosecutor passes upon. The judge, on the other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused, i.e., whether there is a necessity for placing him under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. - Verily, a judge cannot be compelled to issue a warrant of arrest if he or she deems that there is no probable cause for doing so. Corollary to this principle, the judge should not override the public prosecutor's determination of probable cause to hold an accused for trial on the ground that the evidence presented to substantiate the issuance of an arrest warrant was insufficient, as in the present case. Inapplicabilty of Allado and Salonga - Allado and Salonga constitute exceptions to the general rule and may be invoked only if similar circumstances are clearly shown to exist. However, the present case is not on all fours with Allado and Salonga. First, Elsa Gumban, the principal eyewitness to the killing of Rosalinda Dy, was not a participation or conspirator in the commission of the said crime. In Allado and Salonga, however, the main witnesses were the confessed perpetrators of the crimes, whose testimonies the court deemed 'tainted'. Second, in the case at bar, the private respondent was accorded due process, and no precipitate haste or bias during the investigation of the case can be imputed to the public prosecutor. On the other hand, the Court noted in Allado the "undue haste in the filing of the Information and in the inordinate interest of the government" in pursuing the case; and in Salonga, " . . . the failure of the prosecution to show that the petitioner was probably guilty of conspiring to commit the crime, the initial disregard of petitioner's constitutioner rights and the massive and damaging publicity against him." The rulings in the two aforementioned cases cannot apply to it.
PEOPLE v USANA 323 SCRA 754 PEOPLE v DORIA 301 SCRA 668 PEOPLE v ELAMPARO 329 SCRA 404
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- contends that if found guilty, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority should be appreciated in his favor. - In drug cases, the quantity of prohibited drugs involved is determinative of the imposable penalty. Section 20 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659, provides that when the quantity of indian hemp or marijuana is 750 grams or more, as in this case, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death and fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00). - Appellant having been born on January 9, 1978, was only 17 years, 1 month, and 3 days old, at the time of the commission of the crime on February 12, 1995. - being a minor over 15 and under 18 at the time of the commission, he is entitled to a reduced penalty due to the privileged mitigating circumstance - Thus, penalty should be reduced to reclusion temporal. No fine is imposable in this case, for it is imposed as a conjunctive penalty only if the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. Dispositive Petition AFFIRMED with modification.
were not only authorized but also duty-bound to arrest him even without a warrant. Re: warrantless seizures: -However, not being absolute, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures is subject to exceptions. Thus, for example, Sec.12, Rule 126, Rules on CrimPro, provides that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant. -5 generally accepted exceptions to the right against warrantless searches and seizures have also been judicially formulated, viz: (1) search incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) search of moving vehicles, (3) seizure in plain view, (4) customs searches, and (5) waiver by the accused themselves of their right against unreasonable search and seizure. - this case falls squarely under the plain view doctrine People v Doria: Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure even without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence. The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent. - members of the buy-bust team were justified in running after Spencer (when he escaped) and entering the house without a search warrant for they were hot in the heels of a fleeing criminal. Once inside the house, the police officers cornered Spencer and recovered the buy-bust money from him. They also caught Elamparo in flagrante delicto repacking the marijuana bricks which were in full view 3. YES Ratio: Minority serves as a privileged mitigating circumstance to a crime, thus entitling the accused to a reduction of penalty one degree lower than that imposable (by virtue of art.13 (2) RPC) Reasoning:
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hear a petition for bail to determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong before deciding to grant or deny bail to the accused. While the accused can apply for bail and have the court hear his application summarily and promptly, such right may be waived expressly or impliedly. In this case, the trial court proceeded to try the case without resolving the petition for bail that appellants filed. However, the latter did not call the attention of the trial court to their unresolved application for bail. It was only in the appeal that they raised this issue. Thus, for failure to bring to the attention of the trial Court at the earliest opportune time, appellants are deemed to have waived their right to bail. - defense of relative: FAILED TO PROSPER because 1) unlawful aggression, the essential element to defense of relative is absent because if it were true that Sergon was being attacked, he would have suffered injuries. 2) if indeed he acted in defense of his younger brother Sergon who was then under attack, he would not harbor any fear in presenting himself to the proper authorities. - even though prosecution failed to show evident premeditation, trial court correctly considered treachery as qualifying the killing of the victim to murder. Dispositive we AFFIRM the judgment of the trial court convicting accused-appellants Sergon Manes and Ramil Manes of murder and sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties of the law and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Nicanor Tamorite in the amount of P50,000.00, plus P21,250.00, as actual damages.
two accused chased him did not render assistance to him. After Alan heard the two shots, he and Jose ran home. Alan told his father and uncle that Sergon stabbed Nicanor and that Ramil shot him. Alan, his father, uncle, Jose and the mother of Nicanor then went to where the body of Nicanor was in the downhill portion of the premises of the house of Ading. Nicanor was lying on his back, with 2 wounds on the breast, 1 gunshot wound and 1 stab wound. According to the accused(Ramil) > June 23, 1991 in the afternoon, he was at home cooking. At around 5:00 to 5:30, he heard shouts coming from the direction of the barangay basketball court, which was about ten (10) meters away from his house. He went to the window to check what it was. He saw his younger brother Sergon lying on the concrete pavement and several persons were ganging up on him, three of whom he identified as Nicanor, Alan and Jose. They kept on boxing and kicking his brother prompting him to come to the latter's aid. On his way out, he saw a gun on top of the table and brought it with him to the basketball court. > While on his way to the basketball court, Ramil fired a warning shot to prevent Nicanor from stabbing his brother Sergon. Nicanor persisted in the pursuit of Sergon, with a knife in his hand. Sergon was about three meters ahead of Nicanor who was about ten meters ahead of the pursuing Ramil. Ramil fired another shot that hit Nicanor who,, fell to the ground. Meanwhile, Sergon managed to flee. Ramil also fled to the direction of the sugarcane field as soon as he fired the second shot because he saw the group of Alan approaching,, armed with guns .12 Ramil and his brother Sergon went into hiding and only surfaced a year later when they were arrested in Romblon. - prosecutions set of facts was favored by the court ISSUE WON petitioner has a right to bail HELD NO Ratio When an accused is charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment or death, and evidence of guilt is strong, bail must be denied, as it is neither a matter of right nor of discretion Reasoning - In offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or death, the accused has no right to bail when evidence of guilt is strong. The court must
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Dispositive Grant of bail is declared void. The court should issue a warrant of arrest of Odiamar if his bail bond has been approved.
- In the case at bar, bail is discretionary and not a matter of right considering that the punishment for the offense is reclusion perpetua. the grant of the bail is dependent on the evidence of the guilt which should which should be strong to justify denial. this determination is a matter of judicial discretion. - By judicial discretion, the law mandates the determination of whether proof is evident or the presumption of guilt is strong. Proof evident or evident proof is this connection, has been held to mean clear, strong evidence which leads a well guarded dispassionate judgment to the conclusion that an offense has been committed as charged, that the accused is the guilty agent, and that he will probably be punished capitally if the law is administered. Presumption great exists when the circumstances testified to are such that the inference of guilt naturally to be drawn therefrom is strong, clear, and convincing to an unbiased judgment and excludes all reasonable probability of any other conclusion. In other words, the test is not whether the evidence establishes guilt beyond reasonable doubt but rather whether it shows evident guilt or a great presumption of guilt. - In the case of an application for bail, the duties of the judge are as follows: 1. Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation; 2. Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its discretion 3. Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution 4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bail bond. Otherwise the petition should be denied. - Based on the duties, the courts order granting or denying bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution. A summary is defined as a comprehensive and usually brief abstract or digest of a test or statement. HENCE, THE SUMMARY SHOULD NECESSARILY BE A COMPLETE COMPILATION OR RESTATEMENT OF ALL THE PIECES OF EVIDENCE PRESENTED DURING THE HEARING PROPER. The Lower court cannot exercise judicial discretion as to what pieces of evidence should be included in the summary. Otherwise, the same will be considered defective in form and substance which cannot be sustained or be given a semblance of validity.
LAVIDES v CA (PISON and PEOPLE) 324 SCRA 321 MENDOZA; February 1, 2000
FACTS - Lavides was arrested for child abuse under R.A. 7610. His arrest was made without a warrant as a result of an entrapment conducted by the police. - Parents of complainant Lorelie San Miguel reported to the police that their daughter, then 16 years old, had been contacted by petitioner for an assignation that night at petitioners room at the Metropolitan Hotel. This was not the first time the police received reports of petitioners activities. An entrapment operation was therefore set in motion. The police saw him with Lorelie, who was wearing only a shirt and an underwear, whereupon they arrested him. Based on the sworn statement of complainant and the affidavits of the arresting officers, which were submitted at the inquest, an information for violation of Art. III, 5(b) of R.A. 7610 was filed. - Petitioner filed an "Omnibus Motion (1) For Judicial Determination of Probable Cause; (2) For the Immediate Release of the Accused Unlawfully Detained on an Unlawful Warrantless Arrest; and (3) In the Event of Adverse Resolution of the Above Incident, Herein Accused be Allowed to Bail as a Matter of Right under the Law on Which He is Charged." - Nine more informations for child abuse were filed against petitioner by the same complainant, Lorelie San Miguel, and by three other minor children, Mary Ann Tardesilla, Jennifer Catarman, and Annalyn Talingting. In all the cases, it was alleged that, on various dates mentioned in the informations, petitioner had sexual intercourse with complainants
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- On the other hand, to condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to place him in a position where he has to choose between (1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay his release on bail because until his motion to quash can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail. These scenarios certainly undermine the accuseds constitutional right not to be put on trial except upon valid complaint or information sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right to bail. [Under Art. III, 5 of R.A. 7610, the offenses with which petitioner is charged are punishable by reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua.] - It is the condition in the May 16, 1997 order of the trial court that "approval of the bail bonds shall be made only after arraignment," which CA should instead have declared void. The condition imposed in the trial courts order of May 16, 1997 that the accused cannot waive his appearance at the trial but that he must be present at the hearings of the case is valid and is in accordance with Rule 114. For another condition of bail under Rule 114, 2(c) is that "The failure of the accused to appear at the trial without justification despite due notice to him or his bondsman shall be deemed an express waiver of his right to be present on the date specified in the notice. In such case, trial shall proceed in absentia." - Art. III, 14(2) of the Constitution authorizing trials in absentia allows the accused to be absent at the trial but not at certain stages of the proceedings, to wit: (a) at arraignment and plea, whether of innocence or of guilt,9 [Rule 116, 1(b)] (b) during trial whenever necessary for identification purposes, and (c) at the promulgation of sentence, unless it is for a light offense, in which case the accused may appear by counsel or representative.11 [Rule 120, 6.] At such stages of the proceedings, his presence is required and cannot be waived. - Although this condition is invalid, it does not follow that the arraignment of petitioner on May 23, 1997 was also invalid. Contrary to petitioners contention, the arraignment did not emanate from the invalid condition that "approval of the bail bonds shall be made only after the arraignment." Even without such a condition, the arraignment of petitioner could not be omitted. In sum, although the condition for the grant of bail to petitioner is invalid, his arraignment and the subsequent proceedings against him are valid.
issued and the cases shall proceed to trial in absentia;] - CA invalidated the first two conditions imposed in the May 16, 1997 order for the grant of bail to petitioner but ruled that the issue concerning the validity of the condition making arraignment a prerequisite for the approval of petitioners bail bonds to be moot and academic. It noted "that petitioner has posted the cash bonds; that when arraigned, represented by lawyers, he pleaded not guilty to each offense; and that he has already been released from detention." CA thought that the aforesaid conditions in the May 16, 1997 order were contrary to Art. III, 14(2) of the Constitution which provides that "[a]fter arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable." - With respect to the denial of petitioners motion to quash the informations against him, CA held that petitioner could not question the same in a petition for certiorari before it, but what he must do was to go to trial and to reiterate the grounds of his motion to quash on appeal should the decision be adverse to him. ISSUE WON CA erred in not determining the validity of the conditions imposed in the trial courts order of May 16, 1997 for the grant of bail.. HELD YES - CA should have determined the validity of the conditions imposed in the trial courts order of May 16, 1997 for the grant of bail because petitioners contention is that his arraignment was held in pursuance of these conditions for bail. - Bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the accused may be precluded from filing a motion to quash. For if the information is quashed and the case is dismissed, there would then be no need for the arraignment of the accused. In the second place, the trial court could ensure the presence of petitioner at the arraignment precisely by granting bail and ordering his presence at any stage of the proceedings, such as arraignment. Under Rule 114, 2(b) of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, one of the conditions of bail is that "the accused shall appear before the proper court whenever so required by the court or these Rules," while under Rule 116, 1(b) the presence of the accused at the arraignment is required.
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entered a plea of guilty. The appellant without denying the fact in itself, contends that the record does not show when, where or how he was arraigned. ISSUE WON the statement in the judgment that the accused has been arraigned and pleaded guilty is sufficient HELD YES - The statement is in compliance with the provisions of section 16&25 of Gen. Order No. 58, inasmuch as it may be presumed from said statement that the law has been obeyed by causing the accused to appear before the court, and it is shown thereby that he has really been arraigned, his plea entered personally being that of guilty. All this is not a mere conclusion as appellant contends, because the court is of the opinion that generally a conclusion is the averment or denial of a fact deduced from some evidence, or the averment or denial of a point of view of law derived from a law or a principle of law. In this case, however, the courts averment that the accused was arraigned and that he pleaded guilty, is not a deduction or consequence of an evidence, legal provision or principle of law, but a positive statement of facts. - It does not make a difference if the court, after hearing the accused plead guilty upon arraignment, stated such facts in the judgment rendered immediately, in open court and in the presence of the accused, or caused said arraignment and plea to be stated in the minutes. What is important is that the accused be arraigned and that he enters his plea. It is immaterial how or in what manner such facts are stated. For legal purposes, it makes no difference whether they appear in the minutes or in the judgment itself.
in court until after the fiscal had presented all of the witnesses for the prosecution; all of the other defendants were present, were duly arraigned, pleaded not guilty, and were represented by a lawyer; that after the prosecution had closed its case against all of the said defendants except Rufino Lavarias, the court discovered that Rufino Lavarias was outside the court room. Upon discovering this fact the court ordered the said defendant Rufino Lavarias to appear in the court room, and then and there recalled one of the witnesses for the prosecution, Regino Maminta, and proceeded to examine him with reference to the part Rufino Lavarias took in the said robbery charged in the complaint, without arraigning the said Rufino Lavarias, reading to him the complaint, or informing him that he had the right to be represented by an attorney during the trial, in accordance with the provisions of sections 16, 17, and 18 of General Orders, No. 58. ISSUE WON the court did not comply with the provisions of sections 16, 17, and 18 of General Order No. 58 HELD YES. Rufino Lavarias was not arraigned. Dispositive The judgment of the court with reference to Rufino Lavarias is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the CFI Pangasinan for the purpose of a new trial. The court is affirmed as to the sentence of Fabiano Diadib and Inocencio Valerio on the ground of sufficiency of evidence.
PEOPLE v MARK JIMENEZ G.R. No. 148571 PEOPLE v FITZGERALD G.R. No. 149723 US v PALISOC 4 Phil 207 JOHNSON; February 13, 1905
FACTS The defendants were charged with the crime of robbery for entering the house of one Regino Maminta, all being armed with talibones took and carried carried away the sum of 20 pesos, Mexican, and various pieces of jewelry, all of the value of 120 pesos, Mexican. The said defendants were tried and each of the defendants, Paulino Palisoc, Fabiano Diadib, Inocencio Valerio, and Domingo Torres, was sentenced to be imprisoned for the period of five years of presidio correccional; and Rufino Lavarias, because the court found that he was the leader of the said band of robbers, was sentenced to a period of six years of presidio correccional. From this sentence Fabiano Diadib, Inocencio Valerio, and Rufino Lavarias appealed to this court. The record shows that at the beginning of the trial Rufino Lavarias was not present and did not appear
PEOPLE v AMBROSIO 56 Phil 801 PEOPLE v CARIAGA 64 Phil 1057 CONCEPCION; June 29, 1937
NATURE Appeal from the judgment of the CFI of Manila FACTS - Appellant Deogracias Cariaga was convicted of the crime of theft and sentenced to 1 month and 1 day of arresto mayor and to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P1.50. - Cariaga alleges that the court erred in having found him guilty of the crime based of the fact that the appealed judgment states: Upon arraignment, he
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to suffer the death penalty in each case, and to indemnify the heirs of the victims. ISSUES 1. WON a plea of guilt is always binding upon the accused for all the contents of the information 2. WON the killing was qualified by treachery 3. WON there were aggravating circumstances present HELD 1. NO. Ratio It may be true that a judicial confession of guilt admits all the material facts alleged in the information, including the aggravating circumstances listed therein, as stated by the trial judge, yet where there has been a hearing and such circumstances are disproven by the evidence, they should be disallowed in the judgment. Reasoning The norm that should be followed where a plea of guilty is entered by the defendant, especially in cases where the capital penalty may be imposed, is that the court should be sure that defendant fully understands the nature of the charges preferred against him and the character of the punishment provided by law before it is imposed. For this reason, the Court requires that in every case under a plea of guilty, where the penalty may be death, the trial court should call witnesses for the purpose of establishing the guilt and degree of culpability of the defendant and not only to satisfy the trial judge but to aid the Supreme Court in determining whether accuse understood and comprehended the meaning, full significance and consequences of his plea. In the instant case, the trial judge required the taking of testimony as to the circumstances under which the crime was committed before passing judgment so that the resulting verdict cannot in any way be branded as deficient. 2. NO. Reasoning The circumstances qualifying or aggravating the act of killing a human being must be proved in an evident and incontestable manner, mere presumptions or deductions from hypothetical facts not being sufficient to consider them justified. - According to the RPC, "there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make."
comprehended the meaning, full significance and consequences of his plea. Dispositive. WHEREFORE, the judgment under automatic review is hereby SET ASIDE and the case REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings. SO ORDERED.
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MENDOZA; February 2, 2000
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degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence on his behalf. -Under this Rule, three things are enjoined upon the trial court when a plea of guilty to a capital offense is entered: (1) the court must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea and the accused's full comprehension of the consequences thereof; (2) the court must require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and, (3) the court must ask the accused if he desires to present evidence on his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires. -As explained in People v. Alicando, a searching inquiry must focus on: (1) the voluntariness of the plea, and (2) the full comprehension of the consequences of the plea. -In the case at bar, the record does not show what exactly transpired at the re-arraignment of accusedappellant, for what reason he changed his plea from "not guilty" to "guilty," and whether he fully understood the consequences of his guilty plea. -In its decision, the trial court described the manner in which the accused pleaded guilty, thus: Upon arraignment, accused, assisted by Atty. Manolo A. Brotonel of the Public Attorney's Office, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. However, when these cases were called for pre-trial and trial, counsel for the accused manifested that the accused, realizing the futility of entering into trial and considering that he actually committed the acts complained of, intimated his intention to enter a plea of guilty to the above-mentioned charges. The accused was then asked by this Court if he was aware of the consequences of a plea of guilty to a capital offense: that for the rape he committed on May 17, 1992 against his daughter, Oleby Nadera, who was 9 years old at the time, he would be sentenced to reclusion perpetua and for the three other counts of rape committed on April 17 and 24, 1995 [both against Oleby Nadera] and on March 3, 1996 [against Maricris Nadera, 11 years old at the time], he would be sentenced to death by lethal injection. After having been informed of this, he insisted that he is willing to enter a plea of guilty to the crimes charged and is ready to face the consequences thereof. -The warnings given by the trial court in this case fall short of the requirement that it must make a searching inquiry to determine whether accused-appellant understood fully the import of his guilty plea. As has been said, a mere
NATURE Automatic review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Oriental Mindoro FACTS -On April 28, 1996, Oleby and Maricris, assisted by a neighbor, Lita Macalalad, told their mother that they had been raped by their father, herein accusedappellant. Thereupon, they went to the police authorities of Naujan and filed a complaint against accused-appellant -After preliminary examination, on June 6, 1996, four informations charging accused-appellant with rape on various dates were filed in the Regional TrialCourt, Calapan, Oriental Mindoro. -The record shows that at his arraignment on July 23, 1996, accused-appellant, assisted by Atty. Manolo A. Brotonel of the Public Attorney's Office, pleaded not guilty to the charges filed against him. -However, on August 5, 1997, after the prosecution had presented Dr. Cynthia S. Fesalbon, accusedappellant pleaded guilty to the crime charged in all the informations. -On August 12, 1997, the prosecution formally offered its documentary evidence and rested its case thereafter. -Accused-appellant did not present any evidence in his defense. -On August 27, 1997, the trial court rendered judgment finding accused-appellant guilty of four counts of rape against his daughters. -Nadera appealed ISSUES 1. WON the trial court erred when it accepted his plea of guilty to a capital offense without making a searching inquiry to determine whether he understood the consequences of his plea 2. WON the conviction must be set aside HELD 1. YES - Rule 116 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides: Sec. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the Court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise
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date, without reasonable ground therefor and for the purpose of delivering said Marcial Apolonio y Santos to the proper authorities, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously arrest said Marcial Apolonio y Santos; that after the said Marcial Apolonio y Santos had been arrested in the manner aforestated, and while the latter was supposedly being investigated by the said accused, the said accused did then and there place on commingle a marked P1.00 bill together with the money taken from said Marcial Apolonio y Santos, supposedly given to the latter by one Emerita Calupas de Aresa, so that he (Marcial Apolonio y Santos), then an employee of the Local Civil Registrar's Office of Manila, would appear to have agreed to perform an act not constituting a crime, in connection with the performance of his (Marcial Apolonio y Santos) duties, which was to expedite the issuance of a birth certificate, thereby directly incriminating or imputing to said Marcial Apolonio y Santos the commission of the crime of bribery." -defendants filed a motion to quash saying that (1) the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense (because the two crimes cannot be complexed); and (2) the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged -CFI granted motion to dismiss agreeing with defendants -MFR was denied -appeal by fiscal before SC ISSUE WON the CFI erred in granting motion to quash HELD YES - It is very apparent that by the use of the phrase "thru unlawful arrest" in the information an idea is conveyed that the unlawful arrest was resorted to as a necessary means to plant evidence in the person of the offended party, thereby incriminating him. From a reading of the info the SC finds a close connection between the act of the accused in first unlawfully arresting the offended party and then investigating him; and it was during that investigation that they plated incriminatory evidence against him. SC agrees with the Solicitor General in his contention that the accused first had to resort to unlawful arrest in order to be able to plant the P1.00 bill among the money taken from the offended party. Also the court a quo has jurisdiction to try the accused of the offense charged in the information. The crime of unlawful arrest is punishable with arresto mayor or
their mother, Daisy, and the physician who conducted the medical examination of the two girls, Dr. Cynthia Fesalbon. Certain circumstances present in this case, however, persuade us that a remand of this case is necessary. -First, a perusal of the decision of the court reveals that the trial judge failed to state the factual and legal reasons on which he based accused-appellant's conviction. Except for the narration of the prosecution's evidence and a bare recital of R.A. No. 7659, amending Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, there is nothing else to indicate the reason for the decision. There is no evaluation of the evidence and no reason given why the court found the testimonies of the witnesses credible. -Second, the cavalier attitude of accused-appellant's counsel, Atty. Manolo A. Brotonel of the Public Attorney's Office, cannot go unnoticed. It is discernible in (a) his refusal to cross examine Oleby Nadera; (b) the manner in which he conducted Maricris Nadera's cross examination; and, (c) his failure not only to present evidence for the accused but also to inform the accused of his right to do so, if he desires. Dispositive The appealed decision is set aside.
PEOPLE v NAVARRO 75 Phil 516 PEOPLE v ALAGAO 16 SCRA 879 ZALDIVAR; April 30, 1966
NATURE This is an appeal by the City Fiscal of Manila from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila sustaining the motion to quash the information FACTS -City Fiscal of Manila filed an information against the defendants-appellees charging them of the complex crime of incriminatory machinations thru unlawful arrest, as follows: "That on or about the 28th day of February, 1961, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then members of the Manila Police Department, conspiring and confederating together and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously incriminate or impute to one Marcial Apolonio y Santos the commission of the crime by bribery thru unlawful arrest, in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, on the aforesaid
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is no allegation in said information that the firearms and ammunition enumerated therein were carried outside the accused's residence or used in the commission of some other crime. - In support thereof, the respondent judge cited the decision in People vs. Lopez, 79 Phil 658. -The prosecution filed a MR of said Resolution, but the motion was denied -Hence, the present recourse by the prosecution. Petitioners Claims -nothing is contained in said EOs which legalizes the possession of firearms and ammunition without a permit; -that said EOs merely authorized holders or possessors of unlicensed firearms and ammunition to surrender the same within a specified filing period without incurring criminal liability; -that illegal possession of firearms and ammunition is still penalized under PD No. 1866 which was not repealed by said EO NO. 107 and 222. ISSUES 1. WON J. Asuncion erred in holding that the possession of loose firearms and explosives is not illegal per se during the period covered by EO Nos. 107 and 222 2. WON it was not necessary for the prosecution to allege in the information that the firearms and ammunition, subject matter of this case, were brought out of the residence of the accused or were used by him in the commission or another offense, since these circumstances are not essential ingredients of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition 3. WON under the allegation in the information, prosecution may prove that the accused earned the firearms and ammunition outside of his residence HELD 1. EO NO. 107, as amended by EO No. 222, is similar to RA Nos. 4 and 482. SC did NOT give it a different meaning because there is no basis for such a difference. 2. NO. IT IS NECESSARY TO ALLEGE IT IN THE INFO. 3. NO. The information, in this particular charge against Abadilla, is fatally defective. It would be fatally defective against any other accused charged with the same offense. J. Asunction, in dismissing the information, committed no reversible error or grave abuse of discretion. Ratio (citing People vs. Austria) the presentation of evidence "cannot have the effect of validating a void information, or proving an offense which does not
LOPEZ v CITY JUDGE [supra, page 41] GAMBOA v CRUZ 162 SCRA 642 PADILLA; June 27, 1988
NATURE Peition for certiorari and prohibition to review the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Br. 29 FACTS Petitioner alleges that he was arrested for vagrancy without a warrant of arrest. Thereafter, he was brought to Precinct 2, Manila where he was booked for vagrancy and then detained therein together with several others. The next day, five detainees, including petitioner, complainant Bernal pointed to petitioner and said, that one is a companion. After the identification, the other detainees were brought back to their cell but petitioner was ordered to stay on. While the complainant was being interrogated by the police investigator, petitioner was told to sit down in front of her. Subsquently, an information for robbery was filed against petitioner. He was arraigned and thereafter hearings were held. The prosecution formally offered its evidence and then rested its case. Petitioner, by counsel, instead of presenting his defense, manifested in open court that he was filing a Motion to Acquit or Demurrer to Evidence. Petitioner filed said motion on the ground that the conduct of the line-up without notice to, and in the absence of, his counsel violated his constitutional rights to counsel and to due process. The respondent court issued an order denying the Motion to Acquit. Hence, the instant petition. ISSUE WON the respondent judge acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed order HELD NO
If a defendant does not move to quash the complaint or information before pleading, defendant is deemed to have waived all objections which are grounds for a motion to quash, except where the complaint or information does not charge an offense, or the court is without jurisdiction of the same. Here, petitioner filed a Motion to Acquit only after the the prosecution presented its evidence and rested its case. Since the exceptions above-stated, are not applicable, petitioner is deemed to have waived objections which are grounds for a motion to quash. Besides, the grounds relied upon by petitioner in his Motion to Acquit are not among the grounds provided in Sec. 2, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court for quashing a complaint or information. Consequently, the lower court did not err in denying petitioner's Motion to Acquit. Dispositive Petition dismissed.
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review, and that respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion. - Because Layosa defied suspension, lower court adjudged him in contempt of court and penalized him by imprisonment for 3 mos and fine of P500. Layosa appealed to CA. - Respondent Judge explained that, to avoid delay, he acted on motion for suspension because case was filed after raffling between 2 branches of court had been terminated. He was scheduled to hold sessions and the other Judge was to begin one-month vacation. Judge pointed out that his action was sanctioned by Administrative Order No. 6 of SC which empowers Executive Judge to act on interlocutory matters prior to raffling. Case was eventually raffled to sala of respondent Judge. Layosa posted bail bond. He was arraigned and replaced as collector of customs. Office of State Prosecutors sustained filing of information against Layosa. - Layosa did not submit memorandum. Respondent fiscal alleged that petitioner had abandoned contention as to lack of jurisdiction. Fiscal stressed that case had been scheduled for trial at instance of petitioner and that latter manifested his willingness to proceed. ISSUE WON trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in ordering suspension HELD NO - Lower court acquired jurisdiction upon filing of information. Petitioner was notified of presuspension hearing. His counsel participated. Requirements of due process were observed. Public interest demands a speedy determination of that question. - It is true that petitioner was not yet arrested or taken into custody when pre-suspension hearing was held. However, voluntary appearance through counsel was submission to lower court's jurisdiction. (Note that in civil cases, defendant's voluntary appearance is equivalent to service of summons.) - "Where a court has jurisdiction of the offense or subject matter, the objection that it has no jurisdiction of the person of the accused may be waived. One who desires to object to the jurisdiction of the court over his person must appear in court for that purpose only, and if he raises other questions, he waives the objection." Layosa waived the objection based on lack of jurisdiction over his person
purpose of surrender. Appellant's conviction cannot stand, since it is rested solely on unlicensed possession on or about November 6, 1950. 2. People vs. Lopez~ the Court already ruled that, under RA No. 4, the use or the carrying of firearms and/or ammunition was an ingredient, if not the sole ingredient, of the offense; i.e. the very acts which were punished, subject to certain conditions, and hence, should be alleged and proved. -People vs. Austria~ the Court also ruled that in order that an information charging illegal possession of firearm and ammunition, under RA No. 482, may be deemed suffident, it must allege that the accused was using the unlicensed firearm or carrying it in his person at the time he was apprehended by the authorities with said firearm. Dispositive Petition is DENIED.
LOPEZ v CITY JUDGE [supra, page 41] LAYOSA v RODRIGUEZ 86 SCRA 300 AQUINO; November 10, 1978
NATURE Certiorari from order of CA FACTS - This is about suspension of Layosa, collector of customs, who was charged by city fiscal in CFI w/ having violated AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Law (Republic Act No. 3019). Information was based on complaint filed by assistant director of District AntiSmuggling Action Center. It was one of 5 cases filed against Layosa, aside from malversation case. - Gravamen is that he demanded and received from M/V Lady Angelita I 2 to 3 cases of beer & soft drinks as consideration for giving preferential berthing facilities. - Fiscal, pursuant to sec 13 of RA No. 3019, filed motion for Layosa's suspension. Respondent Judge granted motion. He found that a valid information had been filed against Layosa. - Layosa filed instant petition for certiorari. He prayed that suspension be set aside. He contended that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person because no warrant of arrest had as yet been issued when hearing on his suspension was held and the case was not raffled to respondent Judge, that the Chief State Prosecutor in a telegram to the fiscal directed that the record of the case be elevated for
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- At any rate, I concur in the affirmance of the order of dismissal in line with the many protections that the Constitution and the laws give to the accused in criminal prosecutions.
PEOPLE v CITY COURT OF MANILA 121 SCRA 637 RELOVA; April 27, 1983
NATURE Petition to review the order of the City Court of Manila, Branch XI FACTS - October 17, 1971: The incident occurred. - October 18, 1971: An information for serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence was filed against Francisco Gapay y Mallares, driver of the truck. On the same day, the victim Diolito de la Cruz died. - October 20, 1972: Gapay was arraigned on the charge of serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence. He pleaded guilty, was sentenced to 1 month and 1 day of arresto mayor, and commenced serving sentence. - October 24, 1972: An information for homicide thru reckless imprudence was filed against Gapay - November 17, 1972: the City Court of Manila, upon motion of private respondent, issued an order dismissing the homicide thru reckless imprudence case on the ground of double jeopardy. ISSUES WON a person who has been prosecuted for serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence and convicted thereof may be prosecuted subsequently for homicide thru reckless imprudence if the offended party dies as a result of the same injuries he had suffered HELD NO Ratio One who has been charged with an offense cannot be charged again with the same or identical offense though the latter be lesser or greater than the former. However, where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the defendant is responsible, which changes the character of the offense and, together with the facts existing at the time, constitutes a new and distinct offense, the accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense. Reasoning
- Respondent court held that above rule does not apply in this case. It based its decision on the ruling in People v Buan, which held that Article 365 of the Penal Code punishes the negligent state of mind and not the resulting injury. The trial court concluded that once prosecuted for and convicted of negligence, the accused cannot again be prosecuted for the same negligence although for a different resulting injury. - In his memorandum, the Solicitor General made mention of the fact that on October 21, 1972, the City Fiscal filed an Urgent Motion asking that the "hearing and arraignment of this case be held in abeyance for there is information that the victim, Diolito dela Cruz died, and the information would have to be amended." - Be that as it may, the fact remains that the victim Diolito dela Cruz died on October 18 "one (1) day after the accident and the arrest of the respondent Gapay" and that on October 20, 1972, the accused was arraigned, pleaded guilty and sentenced accordingly. Thus, jeopardy had attached and no new fact supervened after the arraignment and conviction of the accused. Dispositive Order of dismissal of lower court affirmed.
GALMAN v SANDIGANBAYAN 144 SCRA 43 PEOPLE v RELOVA 148 SCRA 292 PEOPLE v GROSPE [supra, page 43] CANIZA v PEOPLE 159 SCRA 16 QUE v COSICO 177 SCRA 410 GUTIERREZ, JR.; September 8, 1989
FACTS - Petitioners in G.R. No. 81861 and private respondent in G.R. No. 83114 all stand as the accused in Criminal Case No. C-2152 for estafa thru falsification of commercial documents which case was dismissed but subsequently reinstated. - During the trial for the estafa case, Atty. Rodriguez Dadivas, counsel for the accused Devera and Machado, orally moved for the inhibition of the presiding Judge Suplico on the ground that he had some doubts as to the impartiality of the judge against whom he and some nineteen (19) other practicing lawyers had filed serious administrative charges with the President of the Philippines, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the Minister of Justice. Following Atty. Dadivas, Atty. Roberto Barrios, former private prosecutor, also moved for the inhibition of the judge for the same reason alleged by Atty. Dadivas. The presiding judge, however, ruled Attys. Dadivas and Barrios out of order and asked the City Fiscal to present the evidence for the prosecution. Thereupon, the City Fiscal manifested that he was authorizing the private prosecutor to actively handle the prosecution of the case. Atty. Roberto Barrios, however, insisted that the presiding judge should first rule on their previous motion for inhibition. Instead of resolving the motion for inhibition, the presiding judge asked the comments of Atty. Lorenzo E. Coloso, counsel for the
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invoked their constitutional right to a speedy trial when the prosecution refused to present evidence until the court had ruled on the motion for inhibition. It was on their oral motion that the lower court ordered the case to be dismissed. There were no oppressive delays on the part of the prosecution. The prosecution's insistence that Judge Suplico rule on the motion to inhibit before further proceedings in the case was not dilatory. There is no reason apparent from the records why Suplico should vacillate or show anger on a matter that affects the subsequent course of the trial. He could have easily granted or denied the motion, giving sound reasons for his ruling. He could have required that the motion be submitted formally. The subsequent behavior of the former Judge, especially his precipitate dismissal of the case shows that his reaction was not mere impetuousness or pique. It bears the earmarks of bias and prejudice. As noted by Judge Cosico in his order dated November 27, 1987: ... A closed scrutiny of the foregoing chronology of facts that transpired at the Regional Trial Court does not show that the prosecution deliberately delayed the prosecution of this case nor does it appear that the prosecution was unprepared to present its evidence. The two (2) postponements requested by the prosecution appear to be reasonable. Moreover, it appears that on November 10, 1986, Mr. Angel Yu, principal witness for the prosecution, was then present and ready to testify. On the other hand, it appears that Atty. Lorenzo Coloso also asked for at least two (2) postponements. In invoking the right of the accused to speedy trial, Atty. Coloso is not therefore coming to this court with clean hands. Considering the two (2) postponements requested by Atty. Coloso, the accused in effect waived their right to speedy trial." Dispositive WHEREFORE, the petition docketed as G.R. 81861 is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The petition docketed as G. R. No. 83114 is GRANTED and the questioned orders of Judge Cosico dated May 22, 1987 and November 27, 1978 are AFFIRMED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 22, 1988 is SET ASIDE.
SAMSON v CA 103 Phil 277 PEOPLE v PANFILO LACSON G.R. No. 149453 RESOLUTION: May 28, 2002
FACTS The assailed Decision of the appellate court granted respondent Lacsons Second Amended Petition for Prohibition with application for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, (1) assailing the Order issued by Judge Herminia Pasamba of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 40, that allowed the continuation of the reinvestigation of the Kuratong Baleleng cases; and (2) praying for the dismissal of Criminal Cases entitled People of the Philippines v. Panfilo Lacson, et al. pending before Branch 81 of the RTC of Quezon City. - On May 18, 1995, then PNP Director-General Recaredo Sarmiento II announced, in a press conference, the killing of eleven (11) members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang (KBG) in a shootout with police elements near the fly-over along Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City at about 4:00 A.M. that day. - On May 22, 1995, morning papers carried the news that SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes had claimed that the killing of the eleven (11) gang members was a rubout or summary execution and not a shootout. - In an affidavit he executed the following day, delos Reyes stated that he was part of a composite police team called the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Force Group (ABRITFG) composed of elements of the National Capital Region Commandand headed by Chief Superintendent Jewel Canson; Traffic Management Command, headed by Senior Superintendent Francisco Subia, Jr.; Presidential AntiCrime Commission (PACC), headed by Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson; Central Police District Command, headed by Chief Superintendent Ricardo de Leon; and Criminal Investigation Command (CIC), headed by Chief Superintendent Romeo Acop - Delos Reyes claimed that the police team arrested the eleven (11) gang members in early morning of May 18, 1995 at the gangs safe house in Superville Subdivision, Paraaque; that after their arrest, the gang members were made to board two vans, their hands tied behind their backs, and brought initially to Camp Crame where a decision to summarily execute them was made, and later to Commonwealth Avenue where they were shot to death by elements of the Anti-Bank Roberry Intelligence Task Force Group - On May 26, 1995, SPO2 Corazon dela Cruz, another CIC investigator, executed an affidavit corroborating the material allegations of delos Reyes
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witness Corazon de la Cruz testified to affirm her affidavit. - On March 29, 1999, Judge Agnir issued a Resolution dismissing the Criminal Cases - On March 27, 2001, PNP Director Leandro R. Mendoza indorsed to the Department of Justice the new affidavits of P/Insp. Ysmael S. Yu and P/S Insp. Abelardo Ramos regarding the Kuratong Baleleng incident for preliminary investigation. On the strength of this indorsement, Secretary of Justice Hernando B. Perez formed a panel to investigate the matter. - On April 17, 2001, the respondent was subpoenaed to attend the investigation of said Criminal Cases - On May 28, 2001, respondent Lacson, et al., invoking, among others, their constitutional right against double jeopardy, filed a petition for prohibition with application for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, primarily to enjoin the State prosecutors from conducting the preliminary investigation. - The plea for temporary restraining order was denied - On June 6, 2001, eleven (11) Informations for murder involving the killing of the same members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang were filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City - The new Informations charged as principals thirtyfour (34) people, including respondent Lacson and his twenty-five (25) other co-accused in the original informations. The criminal cases were assigned to Judge Ma. Theresa L. Yadao. - On the same day, respondent Lacson filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari against Judge Pasamba, the Secretary of Justice, the PNP Chief, State Prosecutors Ong and Zacarias, 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Jamolin, and the People of the Philippines. The said petition was amended to implead as additional party-respondents State Prosecutor Claro Arellano and the RTC, Quezon City, Branch 81 - In the meantime, on June 8, 2001, respondent Lacson also filed with the RTC-QC Branch 81 (presided by Judge Ma. Theresa Yadao), a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause and in the absence thereof, to dismiss the cases outright. Respondent Lacson, however, filed a Manifestation and Motion dated June 13, 2001 seeking the suspension of the proceedings before the trial court. - The Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order enjoining Judge Yadao from issuing a warrant of arrest or conducting any proceeding or hearing in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112.
Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher. The amendment is made applicable to all cases pending in any court in which trial has not yet begun as of the date of its approval. - In Lacson v. Executive Secretary, respondent Lacson challenged the constitutionality of the amendment and contended that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the criminal cases. This Court, while dismissing the constitutional challenge, nonetheless ordered the transfer of the criminal cases to the Regional Trial Court on the ground that the Amended Informations for murder failed to indicate that the offenses charged therein were committed in relation to, or in discharge of, the official functions of the respondent, as required by R. A. No. 8249. - The Criminal Cases were raffled off to Branch 81 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, then presided by Judge, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, Wenceslao Agnir, Jr. - Before the accused could be arraigned, prosecution witnesses Eduardo de los Reyes, Corazon de la Cruz, Armando Capili and Jane Gomez recanted their affidavits which implicated respondent Lacson in the murder of the KBG members. - On the other hand, private complainants also executed their respective affidavits of desistance declaring that they were no longer interested to prosecute these cases. - Due to these developments, the twenty-six (26) accused, including respondent Lacson, filed five separate but identical motions to: (1) make a judicial determination of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest (2) hold in abeyance the issuance of the warrants (3) dismiss the cases should the trial court find lack of probable cause. - The records of the case before us are not clear whether the private offended parties were notified of the hearing on March 22, 1999 held by Judge Agnir to resolve the motions filed by respondent Lacson and the other accused. - During the said hearing, the private offended parties who desisted do not appear to have been presented on the witness stand. In their stead, Atty. Godwin Valdez testified that he assisted them in preparing their affidavits of desistance and that he signed said affidavits as witness. On the other hand, Atty. Aurora Bautista of the Philippine Lawyers League presented the affidavits of recantation of prosecution witnesses Eduardo de los Reyes, Armando Capili and Jane Gomez. Only prosecution
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cases against respondent Lacson are being revived within or beyond the 2-year bar. The reckoning date of the 2-year bar has to be first determined - - whether it is from the date of the Order of then Judge Agnir dismissing the cases or from the dates the Order were received by the various offended parties or from the date of the effectivity of the new rule. - If the cases were revived only after the 2-year bar, the State must be given the opportunity to justify its failure to comply with said timeline. The new rule fixes a timeline to penalize the State for its inexcusable delay in prosecuting cases already filed in courts. It can therefore present compelling reasons to justify the revival of cases beyond the 2-year bar. - In light of the lack of or the conflicting evidence on the various requirements to determine the applicability of Section 8, Rule 117, this Court is not in a position to rule whether or not the re-filing of the cases for multiple murder against respondent Lacson should be enjoined. Fundamental fairness requires that both the prosecution and the respondent Lacson should be afforded the opportunity to be heard and to adduce evidence on the presence or absence of the predicate facts upon which the application of the new rule depends. They involve disputed facts and arguable questions of law. The reception of evidence on these various issues cannot be done in this Court but before the trial court. Dispositive Case remanded
notices to the offended parties were given before the cases against the respondent Lacson were dismissed by then Judge Agnir. It appears from the resolution of then Judge Agnir that the relatives of the victims who desisted did not appear during the hearing to affirm their affidavits. Their affidavits of desistance were only presented by Atty. Godwin Valdez who testified that he assisted the private complainants in preparing their affidavits and he signed them as a witness. It also appears that only seven (7) persons submitted their affidavits of desistance. From the records of the case before us, it cannot be determined whether there were affidavits of desistance executed by the relatives of the three other victims. The same records do not show whether they were notified of the hearing or had knowledge thereof. To be sure, it is not fair to expect the element of notice to be litigated before then Judge Agnir for Section 8, Rule 117 was yet inexistent at that time. - The fact of notice to the offended parties was not raised either in the petition for prohibition with application for temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction filed by respondent Lacson in the RTC of Manila, to enjoin the prosecutors from reinvestigating the said cases against him. The only question raised in said petition is whether the reinvestigation will violate the right of respondent Lacson against double jeopardy. Thus, the issue of whether or not the reinvestigation is barred by Section 8, Rule 117 was not tackled by the litigants. - Nor was the fact of notice to the offended parties the subject of proof after the eleven (11) informations for murder against respondent Lacson and company were revived in the RTC of Quezon City presided by Judge Yadao. There was hardly any proceeding conducted in the case for respondent Lacson immediately filed a petition for certiorari in the appellate court challenging, among others, the authority of Judge Yadao to entertain the revived informations for multiple murder against him. - The applicability of Section 8, Rule 117 was never considered in the trial court. It was in the Court of Appeals where respondent Lacson raised for the first time the argument that Section 8, Rule 117 bars the revival of the multiple murder cases against him. But even then, the appellate court did not require the parties to elucidate the crucial issue of whether notices were given to the offended parties before Judge Agnir ordered the dismissal of the cases against respondent Lacson and company. - Indeed, the records of this case are inconclusive on the factual issue of whether the multiple murder
PEOPLE v PANFILO LACSON PEOPLE v PANFILO LACSON BULAONG v CA (PEOPLE) 181 SCRA 618 MEDIALDEA; January 30, 1990
NATURE Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of CA FACTS - In March 1984, petitioner Bulaong filed with the RTC of Zambales an action for sum of money against Vistan, Buenaventura and Sta. Maria. Later, Vistan also filed a complaint against Bulaong for rescission of contract with damages. The said cases were consolidated and are pending trial.
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-Only the prosecution presented its evidence. Petitioner-appellant waived the right to present evidence and submitted a Memorandum confirming the Stipulation of Facts. The Trial Court convicted petitioner-appellant. -On appeal, respondent Appellate Court upheld the Stipulation of Facts and affirmed the judgment of conviction. 1 ISSUE WON CA erred in affirming the decision of the RTC convicting the petitioner of the offense charged, despite the cold fact that the basis of the conviction was based solely on the stipulation of facts made during the pre-trial on August 8, 1985, which was not signed by the petitioner, nor by his counsel HELD YES. The CA committed a mistake. -The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which became effective on January 1, 1985, applicable to this case since the pre-trial was held on August 8, 1985, provides: "SEC. 4. Pre-trial agreements must be signed. No agreement or admission made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be used in evidence against the accused unless reduced to writing and signed by him and his counsel." (Rule 118) The Rule is mandatory. Under the rule of statutory construction, negative words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely directory (McGee vs. Republic). The use of the term "shall" further emphasizes its mandatory character and means that it is imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be enforced (Bersabal vs. Salvador). And more importantly, penal statutes whether substantive and remedial or procedural are, by consecrated rule, to be strictly applied against the government and liberally in favor of the accused (People vs. Terrado). -The conclusion is inevitable, therefore, that the omission of the signature of the accused and his counsel, as mandatorily required by the Rules, renders the Stipulation of Facts inadmissible in evidence. The fact that the lawyer of the accused, in his memorandum, confirmed the Stipulation of Facts does not cure the defect because Rule 118 requires both the accused and his counsel to sign the Stipulation of Facts. What the prosecution should have done, upon discovering that the accused did not sign the Stipulation of Facts, as required by Rule 118, was to submit evidence to establish the elements of the crime, instead of relying solely on
information or plead thereto, or do both and that, if the defendant moves to quash, without pleading, and the motion is withdrawn or overruled, he should immediately plead, which means that trial must proceed. If, after trial on the merits, judgment is rendered adversely to the movant in the MTQ, he can appeal the judgment and raise the same defenses or objections earlier raised in his MTQ which would then be subject to review by the appellate court. [b] An order denying a MTQ, like an order denying a motion to acquit, is interlocutory and not a final order, and thus, not appealable. Neither can it be the subject of a petition for certiorari. Such order of denial may only be reviewed, in the ordinary course of law, by an appeal from the judgment, after trial. [c] In Collins vs. Wolfe and reiterated in Mill vs. Yatco, the accused, after the denial of his MTQ, should have proceeded with the trial of the case in the court below, and if final judgment is rendered against him, he could then appeal, and upon such appeal, present the questions which he sought to be decided by the appellate court in a petition for certiorari.[d] Whether or not the alleged libelous statements in the reply-affidavit are covered within the mantle of absolutely privileged communications, is a defense which petitioners could raise upon the trial on the merits, and, if that defense should fail, they could still raise the same on appeal. The MTQ the information for libel on the ground of qualified privilege, duly opposed by the prosecution, is properly denied, as the prosecution is entitled to prove at the trial that there was malice in fact on the part of the petitioners Dispositive Petition is DENIED. CA decision is AFFIRMED.
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admissions which his counsel may have entered into without his knowledge, as he may have waived his presence at the pre-trial conference; eliminate any doubt on the conformity of the accused to the facts agreed upon. - Nevertheless, Uy cannot take advantage of the absence of his and his counsels signatures on the pre trial order. They did not object when the prosecution presented the plastic bags and said that it contained shabu. Uy cannot now raise it for the first time on appeal. Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Dispositive Decision affirmed in toto
evidence to the contrary; moreover in the absence of proof of motive to falsely impute such a serious crime against appellant, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, as well as the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, shall prevail over appellants self-serving and uncorroborated claim of having been framed - Moreover, the defense of denial or frame-up, like alibi, has been viewed by the court with disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in most prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. 2. NO. - Uys premise is that at the pre-trial he did not waive the Forensic Chemists testimony but only "stipulated on the markings of the prosecutions evidence." Indeed, the records disclose that during the pre-trial, conducted immediately after the arraignment on 21 November 1995, Uy, duly represented by counsel de parte Atty. Gerardo Alberto, and the prosecution stipulated on the markings of the prosecutions exhibits, and agreed to dispense with the testimony of Forensic Chemist Loreto F. Bravo. - During the pre-trial, prosecution and defense agreed to stipulate on the markings of the following prosecutions exhibits, thereby dispensing will the testimony of Forensic chemist Loreto E. Bravo. - It may at once be noted that neither Uy nor his counsel made express admission that the contents of the plastic bags to "be marked" contain shabu. That Uy agreed to dispense with the testimony of Forensic Chemist Bravo may not be considered an admission of the findings of Bravo on the contents of the plastic bag. Strictly, from the tenor of the aforequoted portion of the Joint Order, it is clear that Uy and his counsel merely agreed to the marking of the exhibits, and the clause "thereby dispensing with the testimony of forensic Chemist Loreto E. Bravo" must be understood in that context. - Even granting for the sake of argument that Uy admitted during the pre-trial that the plastic bags contained shabu , the admission cannot be used in evidence against him because the Joint Order was not signed by Uy and his counsel. Section 4 of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court expressly provides: SEC. 40. Pre-trial agreements must be signed. No agreement or admission made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be used in evidence against the accused unless reduced to writing and signed and his counsel. - The purpose of this requirement is to further safeguard the rights of the accused against improvident or unauthorized agreements or
PEOPLE v LARRANAGA G.R. No. 138874-75 PEOPLE v QUIAZON 78 SCRA 513 FERNANDO; August 31, 1977
NATURE Plea of Acting Solicitor Vicente Mendoza to acquit the accused. FACTS - Judgment of lower court convicted Antonio Quiazon of abduction with rape. Acting Solicitor General Vicente V. Mendoza, instead of filing a brief for appellee, submitted a Manifestation recommending that the judgment of the lower court be reversed and another be entered acquitting him, the need for a thorough study of the record became evident. - Events started in a chance encounter between complainant, Virginia Salazar de la Cruz (Virginia), and appellant while they were passengers in a Baliuag Transit bus, both of them being residents thereof and bound for San Jose City, Nueva Ecija. Virginia was quite friendly, and during the trip was leaning on Quiazon. Encouraged, Quiazon asked if he could visit her at home. Virginia said that instead they could meet in the public market of San Jose City. - Two days thereafter they met. Quiazon brought Virginia home and introduced her to his parents, announcing that she was going to be their daughterin-law. That same day they had sexual intercourse in the house of Quiazon. - After that day, it was not unexpected for such intimacies to be repeated. Every time Virginia visited Quiazon they had sexual intercourse.
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NO, his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt, and according to the Manifestation of the Acting Solicitor General, the evidence supports Quiazons innocence. Ratio Only if the judge below and the appellate tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crime has been committed precisely by the person on trial under such an exacting test should the sentence be one of conviction. It is thus required that every circumstance favoring his innocence be duly taken into account. The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the defendant could be laid the responsibility for the offense charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a crime. Moral certainty is required. Reasoning - Art. 3, Section 14 (2) (Constitution) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved xxx - It is precisely because of such notorious lack of any persuasive force in the testimony of complainant that the Manifestation asserted most emphatically that appellant could rely on the constitutional presumption of innocence, one of the most valuable rights of an accused person - The complainant alleges that on July 3, 1973 the accused, whom the complainant had never met before, suddenly grabbed her while she was in the public market of San Jose City and forced her to board a tricycle. Then he took her to the house of his parents where he ravished her. The abduction occurred in broad daylight, or at about 10:00 in the morning. The improbability of the complainant's charge is immediately visible from the time and locus where the crime was supposed to have been committed. The market, being a public place, was at its busiest at 10 in the morning. Virginia was also with a niece at the time. Any commotion would easily attract attention. In addition, there was a police outpost near the market. Dispositive Decision is reversed, and the accused is acquitted.
FACTS -Artemio Castillo, an employee of FILTEX and a member of the Samahan ng Malaya Manggagawa sa Filtex (FFW), was charged together with others in the MTC Makati with the offense of slight physical injuries, for his alleged involvement in a mauling and shining incident which occurred sometime in July 1964 at the height of a strike called by the SAMAHAN. During the pendency of the case, Castillo was suspended from his job. -July 8, 1964: FILTEX and SAMAHAN entered into a Return Work Agreement: >par. 3: company employees against whom court cases are filed or to be filed, shall be suspended by the company upon filing of such cases by the fiscal with the proper courts for as long as the said cases shall remain pending in court >par. 4: in the event said employees are found innocent by the courts, the COMPANY agrees to reinstate them to their respective jobs with back wages minus whatever earnings they earned during the period of suspension; otherwise, if found guilty they shall remain dismissed; -After trial, the MTC Makati found Castillo guilty of slight physical injuries. -CFI Rizal dismissed the case (November 28, 1966) because complainant failed to appear at the scheduled trial. -Castillo asked for reinstatement and back wages. When FILTEX paid no head to his demands, he instituted action in CFI Rizal, claiming that dismissal of the criminal case justified his reinstatement and payment of back wages, pursuant to paragraph 4 of the Return to Work Agreement. -FILTEX filed motion to dismiss; grounds: lack of cause of action and want of jurisdiction, the case being allegedly within the exclusive jurisdiction of CIR. This motion was denied. -Pre-trial: the parties defined the principal issue Is Castillo entitled to reinstatement and back wages after the dismissal of the charge against him in accordance with par. 4 of the "Return to Work Agreement? -Case was submitted for decision on the bases of the parties memoranda and stipulation of facts. CFI Rizal dismissed Castillos complaint, and ordered him to pay FILTEX P1thou as attorney's fees, plus costs. Reasoning: CFI Rizals dismissal of the case was only because of the failure of the complainant to appear at the scheduled trial. The agreement to reinstate an employee expressly states that there must be a
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comment was considered as answer, with the case being submitted for decision. ISSUE WON the accuseds constitutional right to procedural due process was violated. HELD YES. The Constitution requires that the accused be arraigned so that he may be informed as to why be was indicted and what penal offense he has to face, to be convicted only on a showing that his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt with full opportunity to disprove the evidence against him. - It is at that stage of arraignment where in the mode and manner required by the Rules, an accused, for the first time, is granted the opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts him. It is imperative that he is thus made fully aware of possible loss of freedom, even of his life depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him. At the very least then, he must be fully informed of why the prosecuting arm of the state is mobilized against him. It is a vital aspect of the constitutional rights guaranteed him. It is not useless formality, much less an idle ceremony. - Petitioner was not arraigned at all and was not represented by counsel throughout the whole proceedings in the respondent City Court. It is indisputable then that there was a denial of petitioner's constitutional right to be heard by himself and counsel. - An equally fatal defect in the proceeding had before respondent Judge Senining was that notwithstanding its being conducted in the absence of petitioner, he was convicted. It was shown that after one postponement due to his failure to appear, the case was reset for hearing. When that date came, without petitioner being present, although his bondsman were notified, respondent Judge, as set forth in the comment of the Solicitor General, "allowed the prosecution to present its evidence. Thereupon, respondent City Court promulgated thedecision. - It is the constitutional right of the accused to be heard in his defense before sentence is pronounced on him. Such "constitutional right is inviolate." There is no doubt that it could be waived, but here there was no such waiver, whether express or implied. - The provision in the present Constitution allowing trial to be held in absentia is unavailing. It cannot justify the actuation of respondent Judge Senining. Its language is clear and explicit. What is more, it is mandatory. Thus: "However, after arraignment, trial
HELD YES. Since the criminal case was ultimately dismissed, the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of the appellant should be applied. Castillos innocence need no longer be proved, since under the fundamental law his innocence is presumed. -While it is true that Castillo was convicted of the offense of slight physical injuries by MTC Makati, it is undisputed that on appeal, CFI Rizal dismissed the case for failure of the prosecution witnesses to appear. -ROC Rule 123, Sec 7: Trial de novo on appeal. An appealed case shall be tried in all respects anew in the courts of first instance as if it had been originally instituted in that court. -Applying this rule, the judgment of conviction rendered by MTC Makati was vacated upon perfection of the appeal, to be tried de novo in the CFI as if it were originally instituted therein. The phrase "to vacate" applied to a judgment means "to annul, to render void." -People vs. Dramayo: The starting point is the constitutional presumption of innocence - a right safeguarded the accused. Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent on the prosecution to demonstrate that culpability lies. Guilt must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. To such a standard this Court has always been committed. -There is need for the most careful scrutiny of the testimony of the state, both oral and documentary, independently of whatever defense is offered by the accused. Only if the judge below and the appellate tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crime had been committed precisely by person on trial under such an exacting test could sentence be one of conviction. -It is thus required that every circumstance favoring his innocence be duly taken into account. The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the defendant could be laid the responsibility for the offense charged; that not only did he perpetrate the
act but that it amounted to a crime. So it has been held from the 1903 decision of United States v. Reyes. Interpretation of par. 4 of Return to Work Agreement -FILTEX: said paragraph requires an express finding of innocence by the court in order to entitle an employee to reinstatement and back wages; no such finding of innocence had been made because the criminal case was dismissed on a mere technicality; interpretation of said agreement should not be stretched to include a "mere presumption of innocence under the law." -SC: Constitutional provision on protection to labor constrains courts to interpret the agreement in question in favor of the claim of the laborer and against that of management. Those who are less fortunate in terms of economic well-being should be given preferential attention. States obligation to protect labor is welfare state concept vitalized. (Art. 4, Labor Code. Art. 1700, NCC. ^_^ hehe! ) Dispositive CFI Rizal decision set aside. Remand to Labor Arbiter of NLRC for determination of the amount of back wages.
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