Horrible Genius: Goebbels, Riefenstahl, and Nazi Propaganda

Bruce Smith History 309 ADS 2-29-06

If there is one entity that amassed more power during the 20th century than any political party or military operation it is the media. The power of visual imagery, words, and biased opinion can sway millions to believe in constructs and ideas that are neither logical nor realistic. In essence, he who controls the media controls the society under its influence. And as technology progressed over the course of the 20th century, the sophistication of mass media allowed many to wield a type of influential power never before witnessed in the history of humankind. Nobody was more aware of the tremendous force of media control than Josef Goebbels. As director of the Nazi propaganda machine, Goebbels dictated German cultural mores, beliefs, and paranoia for more than a decade. Though Goebbels was no doubt shrewd, his shrewdness was only equaled by his savvy when it came to exploiting the German public fears through propaganda. s Goebbels not only used conventional media (film, radio, print media) to convey Nazi ideology, but also more unconventional methods, such as public memorials that paid tribute to the German dead of previous wars (Allen 246). Goebbels was likewise keenly aware of the importance of showing Hitler as a national savior; a messianic figure who embodied the spirit and perseverance of the German people. In order to accomplish this with the most profound and patriotic effect, Goebbels employed many talented Germans, such as Leni Riefenstahl, to produce some of the most stylish and brilliant propaganda ever made. Through his use of mass media to not only portray Hitler as a messiah figure, but also to demonize minorities and dissenters, Goebbels, along with collaborators like Riefenstahl, was able to manufacture a frenzied hysteria in the Third Reich that helped to create and sustain public support for crazed Nazi ideology (Allen 206). Without question, Josef Goebbels was one of the most conflicting figures of the Third Reich. During his reign as Propaganda Minister, Goebbels used the media to rally Germans against inferiors, which not only included Jews, but the disabled as well. This is particularly disturbing since it is widely known that Goebbels had a clubbed foot. As a child, Goebbels suffered from pneumonia that was quickly followed by osteomyelitis. He was often referred to as a sickly little fellow, one who elicited pity from his deeply religious (Catholic) family (Reuth

8). Because of his deformity and small frame, Goebbels was often tormented at school by both his peer and instructors, some of whom were Jewish. To compensate for his handicap, Goebbels excelled in academics, particularly in his handling of language (Reuth 12). From an early age, Goebbels understood the power of words to distract others from paying attention to his physical disability. This, in essence, is the function of propaganda: to distract and divert attention away from the obvious. It is no wonder that Goebbels became such a mastermind at propaganda; the foundation for such a skill was cemented early in his life and based upon a physical condition that deeply affected his psyche and ideology. From the torment suffered at the hands of his classmates and teachers, Goebbels began to form a cruel outlook on life founded on bitterness and loneliness. Because he was unable to run or perform some physical activities, his peers often ostracized him. He began to withdraw more and more from society, instead focusing on his schoolwork. He strongly believed that expanding his intellect could offset his handicap, and he pursued academia with remarkable diligence and energy (Reuth 9). As Goebbels grew as an intellectual, he was simultaneously forming an ideology of contempt for humanity, largely due to his status as an outsider. He began reading works by historians such as von Treitschke, Lenz, and Erich Marks, all of whom incorporated Darwinian social theories to validate beliefs that the collective German destiny could only be fulfilled by expanding the fatherland cultural s influence, which they regarded as superior to that of other nations. Alone and insecure, these books helped to inspire a right-wing type of nationalism in young Josef (Reuth 11). Thus, his self-doubt and inferiority complexes became a psychological base on which he would ignite feeling of rage and despair among the German people during his tenure as propaganda minister (www.leninimports.com). It is important to examine this critical time in Goebbels life; it is from these lonely, frustrating, and philosophically formative years that humanity will be able to understand the psychology of one of the most vile men in history. Goebbels continually had to overcompensate intellectually to distract attention from his physical shortcomings. And his most important academic mastery was in language. Combine his power to distract, his mastery of

words, and a burgeoning hatred of society, and it becomes clear that Goebbels, in both skill and ideology, was the perfect man to run the Nazi propaganda machine. It is impossible to think that the Nazi rise to power could have been possible without the relationship between Hitler and Goebbels. When he joined the party in the early 1920 s, Goebbels was nothing more than an idealistic socialist in a rather obscure political party (Bramsted 9). He served as a personal secretary to Franz von Wiegerhaus, a Reichstag deputy, before being lured away by Gregor Strasser, who was in charge of Nazi propaganda and ran a publishing firm with his brother, Otto. Under the Strasser employ, Goebbels began to find his s voice within the party. He edited a small journal, organized party meetings, but more importantly, he began to spread the party message outside of northern Germany. He started to s address groups in large population centers like Hamburg and Berlin, which was quite important since the party message spread more quickly in urban centers as opposed to rural locales. In the s s mid-1920 Goebbels read Hitler Mein Kampf, and though fascinated by the book rhetoric s, s and anti-Semitic philosophy, Goebbels was not as impressed as one might have thought (Bramsted 10). Primarily, Goebbels considered himself a socialist more so than a nationalist (Bramsted 11). Strasser and Goebbels both believed that the party should be built upon the proletariat, to which Hitler strongly disagreed. Hitler also knew that warring factions among the party could not be tolerated (Shirer 126). In early 1926, Hitler called a meeting of party members in southern Germany knowing it would be difficult for leaders from northern German, particularly Strasser and Goebbels, to attend (though they did). Under pressure from Hitler and other party officials, Goebbels abandoned the socialist plan for the party (Shirer 128). This is one of the primary turning points in Goebbelscareer; it not only demonstrates his political shrewdness, but as a result, Hitler awarded him with the position of Gauleiter of Berlin (Shirer 129). By this time, Goebbels had become much more fascinated with the persuasive and egomaniacal Hitler, convinced that he was a political genius. More importantly, he began to focus on the common ground the two shared instead of their differences, especially anti-

Semitism. Though Hitler had been impressed with the work of young Josef thus far, he also knew that appointing the insecure twenty-something to such a lofty post would, in essence, woo Goebbels into his camp. In doing so, Hitler was able to appeal to Goebbelsdesire for power, as well as his intellectual vanity (Bramsted 13). Goebbelsfascination with Hitler as a new Messiah was a cornerstone of Nazi propaganda. Following his appointment as Gauleiter of Berlin in 1926, Goebbels began to regard Hitler as an instrument of divine will. This is the defining crux of the relationship between the two; it demonstrates the persuasive charm of Hitler, and simultaneously explains the manner in which Goebbels chose to portray the Fuehrer. At times, Goebbels even went so far as to link miracles with Hitler (Reuth 74). Goebbels wrote in his diary following a dinner with Hitler: Above us in the sky a white cloud forms a swastika. A shimmering light in the sky that can be t a star. A sign from fate? Because of this god-like image he had of Hitler, Goebbels also began to regard himself as an instrument of the divine, which could further explain why he relented to Hitler despite his own ideological convictions (Reuth 75). Once he was firmly in Hitler grasp, s Goebbels began his portrayal of Hitler as a beacon of hope, as hope is inherit to every messianic figure. The economic depression in Germany during the 1920 and 1930 provided vast s s opportunity for both Hitler and Goebbels to exploit the disenfranchised. Following the collapse of the Reichstag in 1930, Goebbels created a whirlwind propaganda campaign that promised to renew Germany through faith in Hitler programs. Included in this campaign were refusals to s pay reparations from the last world war, and most importantly, stamp out economic corruption that was heavily attributed to the Jewish population (Shirer 137). He increased the anti-Semitic rhetoric regarding the international Jewish financiers who were aligned with the west. By portraying the Jews as either communists or Western sympathizers, Goebbels was effectively able to associate them with the unfair policies of the Treaty of Versailles, which many Germans regarded as the primary reason for the nation economic hardships (www.leninimports.com). By s playing upon economic woes, Goebbels was able to achieve his primary goal in the Nazi

ascension to power a united people conditioned to think and act in uniform as instruments of the government (Reuth 172). When the Nazi party finally wrestled control of Germany away from the other political factions, freedom of the press was completely abolished. Goebbels was firmly in control of all forms of German media and could manipulate them in any way he and Hitler wished. But Goebbels regarded the term media in a much more liberal fashion than most, often using even the most obscure event to fuel the fires of German nationalism. One of his shrewdest campaigns occurred in November of 1933. Goebbels knew that most Germans despised the conditions of the Versailles Treaty, and he used the anniversary of its implementation to further fuel nationalist sentiment (Stromberg 197). Flags were ordered to fly at half-mast to commemorate the signing of the treaty. This was often accompanied by military parades and concerts to invoke German anger and patriotism (Allen 206). Indeed 1933 was a crucial turning point in the activities of the Propaganda Ministries. In preparations for the final solution, Goebbels turned up the antiSemitic propaganda more than ever before. Advertisements called for boycotts of Jewish-owned businesses, as the International Jewry had begun spreading its own propaganda against the German people (Allen 210). Goebbels had accomplished the important task of igniting German nationalism, and now he was able to create a scapegoat in the Jewish community, fueling Hitler s all-important racial war. Jews, through their racial inferiority and complicity with Western and communist forces, were the primary group to blame for national problems. Though frightening, this persecution is probably the best example of the power of media influence and Goebbels propaganda machine. He simultaneously accused Jews of not only destroying Germany on a national and political basis, but further persecuted them on the basis of racial inferiority. As millions of Jews were murdered, Goebbels made sure to keep the gruesome details of the Holocaust hidden; he called for Jewish annihilation, but kept the specifics of the concentration camps largely hidden from the public (Kimel). Goebbels created a common enemy in the Jews an inferior race that propagated the many social ills of Germany. In doing so, he manufactured

a hatred based on nationalist and racist resentment that was used to mobilize the masses (www.leninimports.com). Goebbels used many forms of the mass media to convey the Nazi message; everything from posters and pamphlets to parades and songs were employed. But his favorite medium was most likely film. When entertaining at home, Goebbels would often have films shown to his guests, and not just German films either. Though he publicly lambasted the America film industry, he privately held a rather positive view of Hollywood, admitting that American cinema was far more advanced than its German counterpart. He was particularly fond of actress Greta Garbo (a Swedish-American) and director Victor Fleming Gone With the Wind (Reuth 194). s Before the days of television, many people relied on cinema for both news and entertainment. Although radio was more accessible (and cheaper), film was a relatively new medium with an experimental and seductive quality not found in radio. And German filmmakers, not Americans, often conducted many of the most radical experiments in film narrative and camera work. Murnau, Wiene, and Fritz Lang were among the most experimental and important directors of the day, and all were German (www.leninimports.com). However, none of these filmmakers were propagandists; most of Germany highly respected filmmakers concentrated solely on narrative s fiction for their films. Yet there is one noteworthy exception to this eclectic group. Some of the most groundbreaking cinema of the era was produced as Nazi propaganda, and some of these films were so visually stunning that they were not to be surpassed for decades. Regardless of the cinematic achievement, the brilliance of these films will forever be overshadowed by the director close collaboration with both Hitler and Goebbels; indeed, infamy will forever diminish s any inherit theatrical brilliance. Enter Leni Riefenstahl (Maltin). Riefenstahl was a reluctant filmmaker; her goal in life had been to succeed as a ballet dancer. After a knee injury thwarted that dream, Riefenstahl became bewitched by the documentaries of Dr. Arnold Fanck, founder of the Mountain and Sport Film Company. Fanck made documentary films that showcased the various mountain terrains of Europe. His

photography and editing were considered revolutionary, and his influence on Riefenstahl later s works is profoundly evident (Sigmund 97). Through her connections with various friends, Riefenstahl was able to meet Fanck personally. The director was so impressed with the eloquent, charming Leni that he wrote an original screenplay for her entitled Der heilige Berg. Though her cinematic career began as an actress, it was not long until Riefenstahl found herself behind the camera. Her first film as a director, Das Blaue Licht (The Blue Light) from 1932, demonstrated the range of Riefenstahl talents; she also starred in, edited, and co-wrote the film. This is most s likely the film that launched Riefenstahl career as a film propagandist; Hitler counted The Blue s Light as one of his favorites (www.imdb.com). Ironically, Riefenstahl did not create the film as a means of propaganda; instead Hitler found the film appealing in Riefenstahl portrayal of s common people. As the Fuehrer later observed, Riefenstahl is doing the right thing; she selects her peasant actors herself in the villages (Sigmund 101). In all fairness, Goebbels and Hitler sought out Riefenstahl talents; she was not drawn to them based on her own political ideology. s In fact, many believe that Riefenstahl first true propaganda film, Victory of Faith, was made at s the request or insistence of Hitler himself (Koster). If Hitler admired Riefenstahl artistic merits, it was the calculating Goebbels who sought s to exploit them. The propaganda minister was thoroughly entranced with film, especially in regards to its use for Nazi political purposes. As economic depression continued to linger even after Hitler ascension to power, Goebbels needed a vehicle in which he could further inspire the s lyrical optimism the Fuehrer created (Stromberg 198). Goebbels and Hitler had Nazi officials contact Riefenstahl regarding the possibility of another propaganda film focusing on the Nuremberg Reich party rally in September of 1934 (Sigmund 102). What resulted was the only full-length film Riefenstahl produced for the Nazi party, one that has come to be regarded as the greatest propaganda film of all time Triumph of the Will (Koster). Though Riefenstahl had demonstrated through previous works her technical brilliance as a filmmaker, Goebbels had a difficult time relinquishing complete artistic control of the project to her. She had already shown

her genius in combining Nazi propaganda with a documentary style, but Goebbels argued continually that he should have final say regarding the film (Reuth 214). Though she would later deny it, Riefenstahl had a very friendly relationship with Goebbels (as well as Hitler), yet he found it difficult entrusting a woman to accomplish such a monumental task. Goebbels often tried to sway Hitler faith in Riefenstahl, but when the Fuehrer refused, Goebbels obediently s accepted Hitler word as a command (Reuth 215). s Without question, Triumph of the Will was an enormous success for the Nazi propaganda machine. Again, the overall theme of the film is nationalist pride more so than racial pride; though racial superiority is briefly mentioned, nearly all speakers seem to attempt to inspire each singular individual to rebuild the German homeland and economy rather than persecute the Jews (www.imdb.com). The film was so revolutionary at the time that it even won an award from the prestigious Venice Film Festival in 1935. The lack of a running narrative, along with visually striking camerawork, made Triumph of the Will a landmark in cinematic history. Though technically a documentary, it still serves as possibly the best example of celluloid propaganda ever made. Over the years, Riefenstahl tried to distance herself from the film despite its technical brilliance. In a 1993 interview she stated, I suffered anyway for over half a century and it ve will never end, until I die. It such an incredible burden, that to say sorry it inadequate, it s s expresses too little (Koster). Though she continued to make films well into her 90 s, Riefenstahl genius as a pioneering filmmaker will forever be overshadowed by her work with s Goebbels and Hitler (Sigmund 111). In conclusion, it is impossible for one to discern between media power and the rise of the Nazi party in Germany. For without mass media, Hitler fiery rhetoric and oratory would have s been confined to street corners and clandestine meetings. But Goebbels, as well as Hitler, understood the immense and persuasive power of media; more importantly, they both understood that by controlling all types of media, the Nazi could saturate the public with a message that s would, essentially, brainwash them. Goebbels called this mental mobilization, adding we

want to work on people until they can long no longer resist us (Reuth 172). And no doubt, he succeeded, at least for a while. From his deeply disturbed psychology (evident in his early adulthood), Goebbels attained skills that were instrumental in the success of the Nazi platform: create scapegoats, continually distract, saturate the audience with your message, manipulate and control the media, and fan the flames of nationalism and patriotism. Without these skills, which Goebbels and Hitler mastered so well, there would never have been a Third Reich. The propaganda machine, and particularly Leni Riefenstahl, will forever provide a cautionary warning: beware of the media. For as Triumph of the Will so perfectly demonstrates, a sinister message will spread more quickly when wrapped in a glamorous package.