2

"
TH[ PH ILOSOPHY OF tANClJAQ
Two Dogmas of Empi ricism
OOnmuCIS iD a fie ld outside that of the physicaJ
and of the tlifhcuhiM- in
a n allc:mpl 10 in detail t heir
and interpretation .
IS. cr. Car nap (ICJ36- 37) . e:;peciatJy S and
10.
19. ( 1936-37). p. 452.
20. The M!l1leore 0 is what Carnap caUs the
r cpN'scnUllive Jell/ena o r Ihe: couple ronsisting
or Ihe kDte nces SI aou 51: ( 1936- 37). pro
450-53.
21. cr., for example. Camap ( 19-' 5) 1 and ( 19-45)2.
and espedalJy ( 1950). see and
Oppell heim ( 1945).
22. On simplicity, d. especially Popper ( 1935),
chapt er V; Reichenbach (19l!1) . 142; Goodman
(1949) 1. ( 1949)2. ( 950): on u planMor}' and
power , cr. Helllpt'l li nd Oppcnheim
(1948). pan IV.
REF ERENCES
Ayer , A. J . . Tru/h (lnd LU8K (London:
1936) 2d ed. 19.1'; .
Carnilp. R., "Testabili ty and Meani ng. Phi/wophy
()I Sdmcr. 3 ( 936) snd 4 (1937).
Carnap, R., "LogicKI Found:ni()lIs ()f the Unity 0 1
Science," in I lll ltrn,w ono/ S ncyrloptJiil of Uni
{ltd l. I (Chicago;
Carnap. R.. Fcwmdorion$ o/LAgic alld Murnl maria
(Chicago: t939) .
Carll ap, R., vOu ImJuctive Philosophy 0/
Scitllcc. 12 ( 1"'5). Referred 10 as in
Ihis arliclc..
R.. ' 'The T9I'o Concept, of Probability, "
Philo.IOp"y and Pht llom;:n% g/cal ReseaN.: /l. 5
(1945). Referred to as (1945)2 iD arTicle,
Camap, R., {.()gical 01
(Chicago: 19:"00).
Chisholm, R. M., '"The Comrary-Io-Fact CoIIIJ!
tiooal," Mind, S5 ( 1!,I'6).
Church, A .. Review of Aycr ( 1946), Tile JOWIIO/ of
Symbolic /,.()gic. 14 (194!1), 52-B.
Fe'gl, H., Reah. ,ic vs.
PhcnllmenaliMic i lnerprelalions, "
11 ( 1950) .
Goodlll lln. N .. 4TIIe Problem of CQunlcd ocwal
Coo<1i tional$." 'n,t Journu/ of 44
(1947).
Goodma!l, N .. "The Logical Simpt icuy 01 Predi
cate\." Th r Jou/III.I uf Logic. 1-1
(1949). Rdeue.oJ to (1949)1 in thi) Articl e:.
Goodman. N .. "Same: Reft cclium. on n ,col)' of
Systems, PIII/woph), and PhtntJmtl10l
Rtstarch. 9 Referred 10 n 0 94\l 1,
Ibis
Goodman. N., "An l mprovemell l in the Tboor,.
Slmplid ty," The /c'l4rnu/ of Symbolic Logrc IS
(195()). .
N., Facl, FICrio". and FOrKllSI (C .
hndge. Mass.:
Helmer, O . and P. Oppeuhei m. "A SymaaM:.!
Dehmhon of Probability lIud of Degret
Confirmat ion." The JOu m u/ ofSYIII/)lIl1t f..ox,c
10 (1945).
Hempel. C G, "A Lo<>,)c.a l Apprai1Nl! of
tiMaii slD," In A)'p*, cl) vf xirnrific ExpiIlrJ4b4"
(New York: 19(3).
Hempel. C. G" Theoretician's Oilernma: "
St udy in t he Logic 01 Theory COustructiOn:_
ASP/1 of &pliuwoon (Nt. Yort.;
19(5).
Hempel, C. G. ana P. Oppenheim, "St udies in 1M
t ...gic of Explanuion ," PhiloJoph,. of Scnw,
15 (1<,048).
Langrord, C. H .. in 1M Jm4f rlill of S._
botic wgie, 6 (194 1),
Lewis. C. I. , An A/Jalysis of I<MwltdKt _
Valuation (La Salle. III .: 1946).
MacCOIQuodalil. K. .md P F... "On I
Disti nct ion Betwccn Hypothetical Constndo
intervening f'JydroW!iaII "
,jew, 55 (l 94i!) .
Marg(nall . H . of Modern
Pni/(!Wpily of Se/l':ncr. ! ( 19.'5),
Nort hrop, F. S. C. Till' i..oel(' of the Sotnca ...
H UITwIUrics (New York:
OConnor. D. J, _"SOme COI'I'Cqucorno of ProfeMUJ
A. J. Ayer'$ Verifi catlon Pnnci plc." Anal",,
10 (1950).
Pap . A . Iemtnl)" of Analytic Ph ll()soplly
Yor k: : 1949).
Popper, K.. LoRik dcr Fomhung 19351
Popper. K., NOiC au Natural L.a\\s .ud So
Cal led Contrary-Ia. Fael CondiliOlli\ls':' MIlIIIi
58
Rei chenhach. H., Pililo)"opliit dcr RilUm-lril- l.t'"
(Bcl lin: 1928).
Reichenbnch. H _ElellJ.(I1rs of SymlxA,r / ,n.fK
York: :
B" Humu" (New YOI"k:
Scll lrck: , M. , "Me.aniull arId VerifiCMtion.' pluJtt.
fopllit:al 45 ( 1936), A ts() reprinttd III
Feigl_ I-l and W. Se ttaB. clb. ..
Philo.foplircal A/lalrs!! (New York: J9ot9).
Kennet h W., "The Nature of 'fhcOI!
COnStruChon In Con[empnrary Psydlolot:1.
51 (1944) .
Modem empiricism has been conditioned in
larJll part by two One is a beli ef in
I(lme fundament al cleavage belween truths
ahlCh are unaly,ie, o r grounded in meanings
indepcndcnl l)' of of raC1 , and
.tIich are s.Vl!lhefjc, or g.rounded in fact. The
oIbtr dogma is reductionism : the beli ef that
ach meaningful statement is equivalenl to
tOme logical OUIlSIrUcl upon terms which refer
to immediate experi ence. Both dogmas. I
wit argue, are ill-founded . One effect of
lbandoning them is, as we shall sec, a blurri ng
of the boundary between specu
la

rm: metaph)'osics and naturdl science. Another

effect is a !i hift IOward pragmati sm.
1. BACKGROUND FOR
ANALYTICITY
cleavage bet wee n analyti C and syn
daetic truths wa.\ foreshadowed in
dilt ll1(:lion bdwcen relalions of and
m.a.tters o f fact _ and in lE:ibnil.'s dis tinct io n
bcl'fteen Iruths of reason and trulli s of bel.
kibni1.1rIpokc of the truths of reason as true in
worlds. aside, this
n tl) r.a y Ihat the Inll hs of reason :He those
" 1Ch could not possibl)' be fa lse. In the same
'fte hear <I n.1Iytic st atement s defi ned
whose denials are !'oClf,"Ontradic'
tory. defi nition has small explanalOry
value; fo, the notinn of
w. V. QUINE
in the quil e hroad :.ense needed (or t his
defi nit ion of an:.li yti cil y. in exacll y the
same need of clari ficati on as does Ihe nOlion
of a rHt IYlicilY itself. The twO not ions are t h e
twO s ides o f a dubious coin .
Kant conceived of an 3Da tylK: StalemeOI 3S
one that 10 its subj ect no mo re than
already conceptually cont!\ined in It-.e
formulati on has two short comings: it
limits it'>elf to ur subjecl-predicate
form, and it to a notion of comainment
which is terl a t a melll phorieal k.vel. BUI Kant 's
intem. evide nt mo re from the use he makes of
the not ion of analyt ici ty than from his defini
ti on of i t . can be restated thus: a statemll1 is
analytic ""hen it is true hy \'i rIUC of
and iodepenJcml y o f fact . Pursuing Ihi s ti ne.
let uS examine the concept o f meaning which is
presupposed.
Meaning. te t us re member . is not to be
identified with naming. Flege\ example or
"Evening Slar" and "Morning Star ,- and
o{ '"Scou " and - Ihe author o f
ley." il!ust r:t le that terms can name the same
thing 001 d ifkr in meaning. The dislj nclioD
be lwecn meaning and naming is DO less
lmpOriant at the level of abstract terms. The
terms and "the number of the planets"
name one t he slime a bstract entity but
presumably muSI be reg-"rded as unl ike in
meaning: for astronomical .....as
ncedeJ . and not mere refl eclion on meanings,
from f,om .... los/cal Porlll of View. 2d ed. I-lM>'arC Urll>'efsitv PlesS, 196\ ).
"
'"
\0 dC1Crminc thc sameness of Ihe ent ity in
question.
The ",hove examples conSISt of smguhH
ter ms. concret e and abstract . With general
terms. or predi cates. thc situation is :.omewhat
different but parall el. Whereas il singular Term
purpori S 10 name an enti lY, lIbslracl or con
crete . a general te ml docs 11 01; bUI a general
lenn is lfueof an ent ity, or ofc.lt:h o f many. or
o( none. The of all cnl1lie.<; or which a
general term is true caJled the eXlens lem ot
the term. Now parall e ling t he cont rast be
tween the meaning of a term and the
entit y named, we must distingui sh equall y
the meaning of a general ter m and
The gcncTllilerms "crealure. wi th a
hl,;;1[I" and "creature wilh kldneys,- for exam
pie. ate perhaps alike In but unlike
in meaning.
Confusion of meaning wit h tJl lension, in
{he ca.c;e of gcnt ral terms . is oommon than
confusion o( meaning wit h naming in the case
01 singul ar terms. It ill indeed a commonplace
in philos.ophy to Oppose Intension (or mean
ing) to extt nsion. or. in II vari ant vocabulary.
cono.olal io n to dt nOULl ion.
The Ari scot t:lian noti nn of e5scnct was the
forenlnneT. no dOubt, of the modem notion or
intension o r meaning. r-or Aristotle it was
essenti al in me n to be ra tioned. accident al to
be two-legged. But there is an imrortil nl
difference between this ut titude and thc doc
t rine o f meani ng. Frol11 lhe latter poi nt of view
it may indeed be conceded (if only for the sake
or argument ) that rational it y is involved in the
mea ning of the word "man" while twO
legged ness is not ; hut Iwo-leggcdness may at
the !>lime t ime be vicwed as involved in the
meaning of " bi ped-' while rati onalit y is not.
Thus fmlll the point of vie\\' of Ihe doctrine o f
meaning it makes no sense to sa) of the actual
indivi dual, who is at once a man and a biped,
that hi s rll. ltonalilY is essential and his t\\o
aecidelllal or vice versa . Things
had fOf Amlolle. but only li nguistic
forms have mcanings Meamng is what es
sence becomel> whe n it is dlvOfl-ed from the
object of rdere nce and to lhe word.
For the theory of meaning a conspicuous
question is the nat ure of its objects: whal SOrE
THE PHILOSOPHY Of I.AN(;U"Q
of things arc meani ngs? A felt need for me..
entit ies may deri ve from an earlier failure fa
appreci atc thai meani ng and reference art
dist inct . Once (he theory of meaning is sharply
separated from the theory of it III
to recogni zi ng, .:lS Ihe primaf)
business of the theory of mea ning !imply the
synonymy of linguistic forms and the ana
lyti ci ty of ...tll teme ots ; mell nings themselves,.
obscure intcnnediary enti ties. may ....el l be
abandoned .
TIle problem of nn<1 lyti ci ty then conbonb
us anew. St atcment s which an: anal ytic"
genc r,1 1 phi losophical acclaim arc nOI. indeed.
fa r to seek. They fa ll inlo " vo classes. Those
of the first cl ass, which may be call ed logicaU,
(flU, are typified by:
(1) No unmarrioo man lIIi1rried.
The relevant feature of exwnplc is thai d
nlll mcrt ly is true 3S it stands. but remaim
true under any and all reinterpretallons of
" man " and "married.- If we $UPpol>c a prior
invenlory o{ logkol parti cle... , compnsinl
"no;' ' un .- ' no t ." "if," " then," -Rod," etc .
then in a logical trut h is a
whi ch is true and re mains true under d
of it s othcr than
thc logical particles .
But the re ..Iso a second cl!lS5 of analytic
t ypifi ed by:
(2) No bochel("or IS married.
The charactenslic of such <1 is that it
can he IUrnetl iOlO a logical truth by puttiDI
for thus (2) can be
turncd into (1) hy putting "unmarri ed matt
fur It s synonym "bachelor. " We still lad. ,
proper charact eri zati on of this second ol
analytic statement s, al)d there ..... ith of ana
1}1icity generally, inasmuch ao; we ha\o'e had:
the abovc descrirtinn 10 k an OJ! II noll
on
'synon:OID)' which is nO less in oeed 01
clarification than analYlici h' itself.
d ..
In recenl years Carnap has ten<k'
explain analytieit), by appeal to what he caIs
state. descriptio n:. . I A ...tate-<iescripcion b :;
ex hausti ...c assignment o f truth valucs to
atomic , or noncompound, of tW:
language. All other s1atements of th.. ""
.-JIH AND MEANINC
arc. Carnap assumes , built up of the ir
clauses by means of the fa milia r
I devices. in sueh a way that the (rmh
:::of :any is fi xed .for
by speCIfia ble logICal
It'"S- A statemcnt then explained as analyti c
.ben it cotncs out true .under cvcry. state
ddOiption. Thi s account IS an adaptallon of
UiJruz's "true in. all pOssible B.ut
* that thi s version o f serves liS
only if the atomic o f the
JlllU38C are. unli ke ' John is 3 hachelor" 3mJ
-Joha is mutuall y independent.
QdItfToise there would be a
sItdt lrS5igned lruth to "John b a
.-I to -John marri ed," and conseq uellil y
-No bachcl oN> are muried" would tu rn oul
sytlhctlC rather thao anal ytic under the pro
pGJed cri terion. Thus Ihe cri lerion of ana
in terms of state-descri plions serves
OIly fOf languages of el"tralogicul
".at)'m-pairs . such as ""bachel or" and "un
..med man--synonym-pairs of the type
wild! rise to the ' second class" o f analYli<:
..teRl.:nl5. Tht: l"riterio n in te rms o f state
dr:tcnptions is a reconst ruction ilt best Or
IoftaI truth. not of analyticity.
I do 001 mean to suggest that Ca rn::t p is
-.der any iIIusi(Jns on thi s point.
fJcd.modcllanguage with its st3t e dl;"seriptio ns
a-w primari ly not at the gener:l] proble m
of but at another purpose, the
cIwiflcatlOn of probabili ty and inducti on. Our
ho.....e\'er. is analyticit y; and the
-JOf dlfficult v lics not in the firs t class o f
the logical truthS, but
:a10 the scoond class , which d.:pc:nd) on
001100 of
2. DHl NITION
"IlIek are those who find it soothing to lIay
..tht anal)'t ic stateme nts of the secood
10 those of the fi r:.! clas;s, the Ingical
tnnft". by "bachelor ," for exam pl e,
'1.tnmarriec\ man ." Hut how do we
lid ttt.t "hacheklT" is defi ned as "unmarried
-'"""1 Who defined it thus, and when? Are
-10 appeal to Ihc nea rcllt dictio n3. ry. and
the lexicugrapher' s formulation as law?
<1
Clearly this would be 10 put the can befOre the
hone. The lC."1: ioographe r jj; an empirical sde n
tist , whose business is the recordingof anteced
cnt fa,\:.; and if he glosses '"bachelo r" as
" uomamed man" it is because o f his belie f
thaI Ihere a relal ion of synonymy between
those rorms, implicit in general or preferred
usage prior to hi s own work. The no ti on of
synonymy has still to be
clJ rified, presumably in terms relatin g to
lingui st ic behavior . Certainly Ihe 'defini tion'
which the lexicographer's report of an
observed synonymy cannot be taken as Ihe
gro und of the synonymy.
Definition 15 not, indeed. an acti Vity exclu
of Philmnphea and scien
tists rreq\lc ntl y have occasion 10 'define' a
recondite term by paraphr.. sing it into terms
of a morc famil iar vocabulary, But o rdi naril y
such a definit ion, li ke Ihe philologist 's, is pure
lexicography, affinning a relatio n o f synon
)"my antecedent to the exposition in hand .
JUSI what it means to affirm synonymy, ju.<:t
what the interCOGntt tions may be which are
occessary aDd sufficient in order that two
forms be properly delt\.Tihable as
synonymous, is far from clear; but , whatever
these ioteJconneCiions may be , o rdinarily they
'H' grounded in osage. Defini l ions reponing
se lected instances of synonymy come the n as
upon usage.
There is also, however , a variant type of
defi niti onal activity which does not limit itself
CO the repor ting of pre-existi ng synonymies. J
have ill mind whal Carnap calb explicotiQn
an acti vi ty to which phi lo:.ophers are given.
and Slientisls aiM> in their mo re philosophical
momenl5. In explica tion the purpose is not
merely to paraphrase the definie ndum into an
out lighl synonym. bill actuil Hy to improve
upon the definiendu m by refining or supple.
ment illg its meaning. Out even C" xpli ea tion,
though not merel y reponing a pre -existi ng
be tween deJi niendum and de
finiens , docs nevert heless on OIhn pre
exist ing synonymies. The mailer may be
viewed follows. Any word explicat
ing has some cont exts which, wholes . are
dea r and precise e nough to be useful : and
the purpose o f explicuti on is to preserve the
42
usage of these favored context) .... hile sharpen
in)!: the usage of ot her contexts. In o rder that
a given definition be suitable for of
explicatio n. therefore , what is r..:quired is not
that the defini endum in its antecedent usage
he with the defi ni ens, but JUSt
that each of these favored wntc:us of the
detilliendum, taken a whole in anteced
en! usage, be with the corre
sponding Cl)ntexl 0( the defini cns.
Two alt ernative defi ni cnlia may be equally
appropri ate for the of a given task of
expli cat ion aod yet nOI be synonymous wilh
each other; for they may interchange
ably wit hi n t he favored cont exts but diverge
elsewhere. By cleaving 10 onc of
definiclltia rathe r lhan the othe r, a definition
of expli Ci:l ti ve kind by fiat , a rela
tion of synonymy bet ween defi niendum and
definiens which did 0 0 1 ho ld hefnre. But such
a definition st ill owes explicat ive function,
as seen, 10 syno nymies.
There does, however , re main still an ex
\feme sort of definition which does nOl hark
back to prior at all : namely. the
explicitly conventional introJuction of novel
no tat ions for purposes of sheer abbreviation.
He re the defi nienJurn becomes
wit h the dcftnicns bi mply il has been
created exp res.sly for the pu rpose of being
with thc dcll niens. He re we hllve
a really transparent etl se of synonymy created
by definit ion; would that all r.pecie:. of synon
ymy we re intd Jigihle. For Ihe rest, defi ni
tion rests on synonymy rli t he r than explai ni ng
iI.
The word "dcfini tion" has come 10 have a
dangerously rC01ssuring sound, owi ng no doubt
10 Lts (rc4uc ni occu rrence in logj eal and
m(lfhematical Writi ngs. We shil l! do well to
now ioto II bri ef lIppraisal of the role Or
defi nitio n in formal work.
In and mat hema tica l either
of fWO mutual ly ant agoni st ic types of economy
m<:ly be stri ven for, li nd e;Ich has it s reculiar
practica l utili ty. On the one hand we may seek
eoonomy of practical expressio n-ease lind
brevity in !he bt;i te me nt of mul,ifa rio us rel a
tions. sort of economy (.'lI l1 s usuall y for
distinCt ive concise nOlllli ons for 3 wealt h of
THE PHtLOSOPHY OF LANcuAQ
concepts. $econJ , however , and opposj
we may seek in grammar
lary; we may tr y 10 find a minimum of ba.it:
concepts 5lIch that , once a disti nctive oota_
has been appropriated 10 each of them .
becomes possible to express any
ther concept by mere comhination and
tion or our basic notations. This second 'Drtaf
economy is impractical in one W3y, sillCt
poverty in basic tends 10 il
lengthening of discourse. But it h practical ill
another way: it greatly theoretical
discouNe II bout the language, through _
nUling the terms and the forms of
wherein the language
Both sons of economy, t hough prima faae
incompat ihle. are va luable in thei r stpariltc
The custom has cOllscquent ly of
comhining bot h surts of economy by forgllllill
eHea two languages. the one a pan of .
otber. The incl usive language , though re_
dant in grammar and vocabulary. ill econOlllt
cal in message while the pan , a DN
primilive notatio n. is economical in cram_
and vocabulary. Whole and pan lire conto
lated by rules of translO1 tion whereby _
idi om no t in primi ti ve notation is equaled"
some complex buil t up of nOlatMJD
These ntles of translation are the so-caUed
definitiolls which appear in formalized "...
terns. They a re "iewed not 8!> adjunct...
one language but as correlations between ""
Ihe one a part o r Ihe other.
But t hese correl ations are not arbtll'1lJ
They ar\:: supposed to 1>how how thc primt'"
nOlat ions can accomplish all purp0se5, sIW
brevit y and conve nience, of the redundllll
la nguage. He nce the delini endum and
defin iens may be expected, in each casco to III
related in one o r anolher of the ,Iuee .....aJS
lately noted. The may be a failhfll
of the dcfi niendum into th<:
rower notation, pleserviog adi rect synan)""
as of antecedent usage: or t he definiens!Dl1
in the spi ri t of elCplication, in'prnve upon "
antecedenl usage of the defi niendum: or
fi nall y, the defini endum may he a
created notalion, newly endowed with 01_
ing here li nd no"' . . .",
In formal and informal work liILke. thUS
JIlITH AND MEANING
inJ tbal definili.o?-except i? !he ememe
c# of the expliCItly conventtonal introduc
(lOll of new nmations-hinges on prior rela
IJolI1S of RecogniZIng then that the
"",tOn of defini tio n does not hold the key to
t,oonymy and analyticity, let Ub look lunher
..to synonymy and say no more of defini tion.
3. INTERCHANGEABILITY
A nJlural sugge!.tion, deserving close eXil miml
1tQII, is Ihlit Ihe synonymy of two linguisti c
formS consists si mpl y in their interchange
.bibty in aU contexts wi thout change ot
lruth vatue-inierchangeabili lY, in Leibniz's
p/u3!>t. JO/!'a Note that synonyms w
tonctl\'cd need nOI even be free from vague
long lIS the vaguenesses march.
But it is 1'10 1 quite true that thc synonyms
-becbetor" and "unmarried man" jre every
_here interchangeable sa/va
wflkh becomc fall>e under substilulion of
-unmarried man" ror "bachel or" are easily
conqruct ed with the help o r "bachtlor o r artS"
or bunoos"; al so wi th Ihe hel p of
qOOl:ation.
has less than tr::n tel tcrs.
Such rount eri nstances can. ho\\ever, perh aps
be set asidc hy trealing the phrases bachelo r
0( and "bachelor's bullons" and the
quotation -bachelor" each as a single ind ivjsi
Ne word and then stipUlating that the inl er
dJangeabillty salva veri/ale which is to be the
tOUchstone of synonymy is not su pposed to
to fragmentary occurrcllces inside o r a
t.urd. This accoum of synonymy, suppmi ng il
lCtept:able on other coullts, indeed the
drn'back of appeal ing to a prior conceptio n
0( .....ord Which can be coumed on (0 present
cWfirulties of formul ation in its lum.
lea 50me progress might he clai med in ha\'ing
the pOblem of s)'nonymy to it prob.
Ietn ol .....Oldhood. let us pursue Ihi s line j bil ,
taking 'Word' for granted.
!he queslion remai ns whether interchange.
4libty salva (apart from occurrences
"1Ihin Ito' ords) is it strong enough conditi on for
;::nymy. or whether , o n the COntrary, some
expressions mi ght be inter
"
changeable. Nnw let us be clea r thaI we are
no t concerned here wilh synonymy in the
sense of complele ident ity in psychological
or puclil' quali ty; indeed nn two
expressions arc synonymous in such a sense.
We are concerned onty with wbat may he
callcd ro8nili l' e synonymy. Just .....hat
cannot be said wilhom sucre1>sfully fini shing
the present sludy; bUI we know w melhing
about it from the need which arose for it in
con/'lectio n wilh analytici!}' in t. 11lc sort of
synonymy needed there was merel y such that
any analytic Slateme nt could be turned int o a
logical truth by pUlli ng synonyms for
onyms. Turning the tables and
analyticity, indeed, we could expl ain cogni tive
syno nymy of terms as follows (keeping tn the
familiar example): to say that "bachelor" and
' unmarried man" are cogni t ively synonymous
is to say no mOle no r less t han that the
sts lemenl :
(3) AU omy lITe unm<:lrrieJ men
is
What we need is an account or cognitive
synonymy nOI preslIpposing analytici ty-if we
arc hi explain amtl ytk it y (.'onven.ely wit h hdp
o f cognili ve ynonymy as under taken in
And indeed such an independent accoum o f
cogniti ve synonymy is al present up for consid
eration. namely, interchangeabilit y f(l/VD
ilUi e e\'crywhere cxcept within words. The
queslio.l before us, 10 resume Ihe thread al
13.'1t , whether inte rcha ngeabilit y a
sufficiellt conditio n fOf cognit i"c synonymy.
We can quickly assure ourselves that it is, by
exampleso{ the following sort . The Statement :
(4) Ne('\'.Ss;r ri l) all and ,\nty tKlChetors a . ..
baChelors
is evidentl y true , CVCD
so IlUn owly cOnstrued as 10 be trulY applicable
only to allalytic stat ements. Theil , if "bache
lor"- and man" are illterchange
able ;M/"''' verilOre. The result:
(5) NeC"n'l<l ri ly all 110<.1 onl} oo.chdors arc unmar
ried men
of putting "unmarried man" for an occurren{'e
o f "bachelor" in (4) must , like (4) . he true.

But 10 say thai (5) is true is to ,hal (3)
analytic, and hence thai "oochelor" SI nd
married man" arc cognitivel y
Lei us see what there is about Ihe above
argument Ihal gives il iu. tti t of hocus-pocus.
The condition of intC'rch,mgeabi lil Y )'Q/t,u
""rira,.: va ries in its force wit h variati ons in Ihe
richnC' ss of Ihe language al hand. The ahove
argument supposes we afe work ing with a
language rich enougb to cOnlai" Ihe adverb
thi s advC'rb being so conslmcJ
as to yield truth whe n and onl y when appli ed
10 an 3Dalylil: stat ement . Bul can wt: condone
a language which COII I:li05 such an adverb?
Docs Ihe adverb really make sense'/ To
suppo.e that it does is In suppose (hal we h11"'C
already made sa ti s{ltClory sense of ":'I nalytiC'.. "
Then what aTe we so h,Hd OJt work on right
now?
Our argumcnt is not flatly circular, but
somethi ng like it. (t has the form, tigur:ltively
speaking. of a closed curve in space .
!a/ va is meaning
less until rel<ltivized to a language whose eli tent
specified in relevact :Sptttl;. now
we con!'ider a language containing just the
foll owing materials. There is an indefini tely
large of one place predicates (for exam
ple. "p' where "Px" means that x is a man) and
predi ea teli (ror example. " C"
"" here "Gxy" means Ihal " loves y), most ly
having to do ",,<j t h extrulogical subj ect milner.
The (eSI of Ihe language is Logical. The atomi c
scnlences consist each of a predicate followed
byone ormore variabl es "x, " "y," etc.; and the
complcJ! Sentcoces lire bui ll up of Ihe :lIomie
ones by tru th hmct ions ("not." "or,"
etc.) and quaolificat ion. Tn effect a
enjuy:. tbe benefit s also of descrip
lions and indeed SingUlar terms generally,
these being contextually definable in known
ways. Eve n abst raCI singuhu tcrms naming
of elc., are coote) luaUy
derlllable in (;lISC the stock of predi
includes tn.: two-place predicale of class
membe rship. Such a language can be allequlIIe
to d<lssical mathematics and indeed to :.cien
tifie di!>Course generally, ext:ept in SO f;! r as the
latter dcbutllblc (IS
contrary\O-fact conditionilis or modal
THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANCUAQ
.Now 11 language of this tyPe
IS 10 thl.s sense: any IwO prethCllft
wh Ich agree ('l(ten"lona[l y (t hat is, arc tl"Ueo(
t!"le same obj ects) art: interchangeable fal
veri/OIl'_ 6 I'If
In !In el(tensionall;! nguage, therefore,lnler.
ehllngeabi lily sall'fl veri/tJle is no of
cogmli \e synonymy or Ihe desired typc ....
"ba.;:helor" and " unml1Jried man" 3re inter.
cb:lIIgcllble sa/va vuiw/(' in an eKtensioa.tl
language us of no more than that (.1).
true. There is no assurance hNe that lbe
agree ment (11" "'bache!or" and ...
married man" rests on meaning rather t_
merely on accidental matters of fact, as docs
the cxtemional agree ment of "creature With.
heart" and "crealUre with
For mns( purposes elilens.ional agrecme ...
the nc"rest appro>: immion to synonymy l1li
necd care ;!OOm. But the (an remai ns thai
extenSional agreement fa lls far of cogni
tive synonymy of the type required fOI" explailto
ing analytiell), in Ihe manner of J. The type
of cog.nilJ....e synO"}' my required there IS !lid
as to equate the synonymy of IDd
"unmorried man" with the analyticity of (3).
not merely with th e truth of (3).
So wc must recognize that imerchangeabd
ily m/.-u verr/al c. if in relation to.
eXlemio nallanguage, b nol a sufficient 00_
tion of eogni (ive s)'nonynl)' in (,COlI
needed tur derivi ng analyticity in !he manGel'
of I. If a language euntaim an in!cnsio"
ad\'erb "nC(:essari lv" ill the sellS[ lately n<lied.
or ot her to the same effect. tbel
interchangeablli t}' 5al...a In such.
language does afford " surticienl oondl!1OII of
cognil i\-e synonymy: but such a langu,aSC
inl elligible only in so far as the notion III
analytiellr is already understood in ad\'aTJOl.
The effort to explain cogni live
fi rst, for the sale of deri ving anaIYl icit) m
it afterward as in I. is perhups the
approach Instead we might try
sume how withoul appeal to cogar
ti ve synon\ m\' . Afterward we could
derive cogni;i ve \ynonymy from anal)(icItf
satisfactorily enough if desi red_ We ha\ ::
that cogni tive synonymy nf ....
"unm:mictl man" ClIO be explained as
yaUTH JIJ"lD MEANINC
ht;cttv
o
( (3). The same eKplanation for
Pair of one-place predIcates, of course.
: It can be eKtended in obvious fashion to
predicates . Othcr synt,u:tical cal e
1113 can also be accommodated in fairly
""raUel fasbion. Si ngular terms may Ix said to
: cognili,ely synonymous Yo,hen the state
,.eol of ident ity formed by putti ng
bdWCen Ihem i.s analyt1c. Statements may be
said si mply to be synonymo us
..tIen their bicondi tional (the result of joimng
IbtTO br "if and onl y i f') is anillyl ic.' If we
art to lump all categories IIlto a si ngle
formulation. al the expense o f :bsuming again
_ notion uf 'word' which was appeuled to
early in sect ion, we can descnhe any two
qwstic forms as cognitivcly synonymous
ne. thc IWO ronns are interehHngeable
(apart from occurrences within worlh. ) sal.-a
[110 longer vtri/mt' but) ullul)"liciltlll'. Certain
ltI:Mical quest ions arise. indeed. over cases of
lllbiguity olJ homonymy; Ie.t not pause for
diaD, however. for we are already digressing.
ld us rather turn our backs on Ihe problem uf
i)1IOII)'my .. nd address anew to Lhat
0( lIIa[yticit)'
... SEMANTi CAl RULES
at firs t seemed most naturally
*'-hle by appe:\1 to a realm of meamngs.
OI! fdincmcllt , the llppeal 10 meanings gave
"'-to an appeal to synonymy or definiti on.
Ita definition turned out to he a will -o' -the
.... and synonymy turned out to be besl
only by dint of a prior appeal to
-.!ytIClly itself. $0 we are back at the
PtabIem of analyticity.
I do OUI know whelher Ihe statement
'"Yerything green is extended" IS analytic.
,.,., does my IOdceision over this exampLe
,.., betray an incomplete understandi ng,
..
_ IfICompletc- grasp of (he 'meanings' , of
and -eKt ended'''! I tlunk not. The
is nOt with "green" ()r "eJi: tended,"
Yrith "analyt ic."
II ortcn hintcd thai the difficulty in
;::rating analytic statement s Crom synthet ic
In Ordinary language is due to the
ness of ordinary language and that the
"
distinclion is clear when we have a precise
IIrlificial l:lOguage with explicit 'semanlieaJ
rules'. hnweve r. a, 1 shall now attempt
10 show , confusi on.
Tho: noti on of analyticit y about which we
are \\'Orrying is a purported rdll ti()n between
and IAoguage!;: a statement S is
saill 10 be allaly/ic /<J r " language I., and Ihe
problem is 10 make sense of thi s relation
generally, Ihat fo r variahl e "S' nnd "L."
The gravity of problem is n()t percepti bl y
leu for arti ficial languages than (or nalUral
one:.. The prohle m of makinJ; l'Cnse ()f the
idio m hS i:. an<l lytie for L. -. wi th variable "S"
flnd " L ," retains stuhbornness even if we
limit the range of Ihe variable "L" IQ artifida l
language,;_ Lei me n() w tr y 10 make Ihi s point
evi dent.
For al ti fi cia llanguages and semantical rules
we look nalu rall y to Ihe ()f Carm,p.
His semanlical (ules t;l ke various fOlms, and
t() make my poinl I shall have to dist inguiSh
ce rtain of the forms. lei 1,1:. suppose, to he gin
wi th, an arti ficial hmguage Lf) whose seman
lica) rules have Ihe form explicill y of a
specllicati()n, by reeur:.iOD or ot herwise. of all
tbe anlllylie s(alements of 4. The tell us
IhaT such and such stalements. and onl y
arc Ihe anal),tic SI;Hemenls of Lo. Now here
(be difficult )' is simply th"t the con t;!in
the word "analytic, ,. which wc do 11 01 under
stand! We untkrstand what the
nil es :lttribute amdyticit}' 10, hut we do not
what the rules "\tribute to lhose
eKprcssions. In soort. before we can under
a rule which begins "A Slatement S is
:'!IIalytic for langu<lgc if and only i( ... ,"
we must understand the genenll relative term
"anillyti, for": we must understand "S is
II nalYlie [or L" wbere "S- and "L" are
vari able<;.
Alternat ively we may. iodced. view the SQ
cillJed rule !IS A conventi onal definilion of II
new simple symbol "anal yti c,forL."," whi ch
might better bc w(iuen untcndentiously as
"K"!'O as nO! 10 :.eem to throw light On the
word "analytic. O bviously any
number of cl asses K. M. N, et c. of statements
of Lo c<l n be specified for Vltrious or
for no purpose; what does it mean 10 say that
47
..
K, as against M, N, t tc .. the class of the
' analytic' stateme nt s of La?
By saying what statement s are analyti c fo r
Lo we explain "analyl ic.for. ' ''O'' hUI nOI "ana
lytic." not " analyt ic fOt'. " We do nut oegin to
explain the idiom '; S is analytic fo r L" wi th
variahle '- S" and " L, " even if we arc conlent
10 limit the range of . l)' to the realm of
artifi cial languages.
Actually we do know enough ahoul the
imended Signifi cance of "analytic" 10 know
thai analytic Slal cmenlS are to be
true. lei us then (Urn to a second form of
s<:mll nti l::l l rule, which says not th at and
such statements are analytic but simply t hat
such and statements are included among
the trut hs. Such a rule is no t subject 10 t he
cn\idsm of contai ning Ihe un-understood
word "analytic"; and ....< may grant (o r the
sa ke of argume nt Ihl'll {he re is no di fficult y
over the brooder term "Irue ." A !'>e manl ieal
ruJe ol lhi s second type, ::J rule of tru th, is nol
to specify all the trutb s of t he
language: it merel y stipul ates, or
('l lherwise, a cert ain multitude of statement s
which, along wilh o lhen. unspecifi ed, are to
count as true. Such a rule may be conceded to
be quile d ear. De rivat ive ly. afterward, ana
ly ticity can be demarcat ed thus: a stat ement is
ana lytic if it is (nOI merel y Ull e but) true
according to the semantical rule.
Sli ll there is reall y DO progress. Instead of
appeali ng to an une.q>laine: d word "unalyti e,"
we are now appea ling to an une;o: plained
phrdsc "scmantical rule." Not every true
statement which says that the o(
some cl ass are true call oount as 11 se m<l ntical
rule---otherv,:ise (Ilf Irulhs wo uld be 'analytk'
in t he sense of being t rue according 10
semunt ical ru les. Seman{i cal rules are distin
guishahle , apparently, onl y by the fact of
appe:lIi ng on a page ul1der the heading "Se
mant ical Rul es"; and thi s htading is it:.clf then
mell ningless.
We Cll n say indeed Ihat a statement is
allulytic-l or. L
o
if and if it is true according
10 such and soch. specifically appended 'seman
tical rules', but the n we ri nd oursch'cs back at
essent iall y t he same case whi ch ..... origin ally
discussed : "S is if and only
THE PHILOSOPHY or LANCUA,Q
if. , ' ." Once .....e M:ek to expl ain "S is anal)1i:
(Ot L" generally fur va ri able " C (eve.
all owing limi tation of "' L " to artificial ,.
guages), the explan;lIion "true a<.'COrdinl lO
the rules o r L-- is unavailing: lor
the rela tive term "semantical rule of" is
much in nccll of (;hlrifieation, at least,
"analytic for. "
11 may he instructi ve to compare the notioI
of semant ical rule wi th that of postulate,
Re lalive to a given 1>Cl of postulates, it is c-.,
to say whal Ii postulatc i:.: it isa member or ..
sel. Relative 10 a given sel of senumtical ru\cs,
it is equally what a ndt
is. S UI give n :;.impl y a notation, mathematical
or ot herwise. and indeed as thoroughly under
stood a nOl<\lion as yOu pleasc in roint of lbe
translations or truth conditions of its Stlte
mcnlS, who clin say whi ch of its true Stlte
ments rank as postl1l ates? Obviously dte
question is meaningless- as meaningless _
asking I, ...hich roi nts in Obio IHC stanif13
poi nts. Any li nite (or effective ly specifiable
infi nile) selection o f statements (preferably
true ones, f' trhaps) is IS much a sel tl
J>O"' tulates as aoy other . The word - J'IOlItulalC'
is significant only rel ative to all act of inquiry;
we apply the word 10 a set of sttHements JUi! it
so far as we happen , (or the year or lilt
moment , to be th inking of those smlemc:nllit
relation 10 Ihc st atements which can br
reached from them by some set of
tions to which we have seen fit to direct
atten lion. Now the norion of seman tical ruleill
as sfl siblc and meaningful as thMt of posm'
late, if (;llT\(;cived in a simil arly (tIl!!'"
spirit - relati ve, thi s time, to onc or anotillf
paI1ieular enterpri .<.e o f .<;ehuoling uneonvet'"
sant persons in sufficienl condilions
of Statements 01" some naturt ..1 or artificial
l:mguage L. But bom Inis pOi nt of ...,e*
one signali zat io n of a subcl asS of the tf\l thS GI
L is ... more a scmantic.l rule thl'
anothe r; and , 'if --analytic" means W
sem:l.nlic111 rules ," no one truth of L is
to the excl usion of anOther.
3

It might conceivably be protested thai ,
anificial lal1 guage I . ( unlike a natu ral one)"at
language in Ihe ordi nary sense pIllS a
explicit semanl ical rules- Ihe wbole CO
raLJlH .AND MEA ..... ING
. let us Sil y, an ordered pair; and Ih.ut Ihc
.... I ""les of 1_ the n are speCifia ble
,.. .
. as thc second component of the pan L.
the same token and more simply, we
BelI,y ' fi ' l l L
.... COn5true an arlllc, a anguage out-
nth' b an ordered pai r whose second compo
at'" i5 lhc d ass?( it s anal ytic SUlh,; ment s; and
tbeII lhe analyuc statements of L
tpecifiable simply as the m the
component of L. Or better we
-.., just stop tugging at uur bOO!Slrl1p!i
Not all the exp anallons 0 ana ylle ' l ),
-"'" I ' r I "
kDOWJ\ to C,arnll p and his readers have been
in the ahove consideratio ns,
1l1li the extcru;ion to other forms is not hard to
tee. JUl.t one addi tional factor be
meIItioncd which some ti mes some
a.cs the semantical rules are in efftct rules of
IlIIIIIation into ordinary language, in which
ast Ihe sratement s of the anif,(;i al
language are in effect recognized as such from
die Inal)11cily of thei r specified in
ordmary language. I k re rertainly Ihe re ca n
tar ., thought of an illumi nat ion of the
,..".. of anal yticity hom the side o f Ihe
M1i1cia:J language.
From the point ot' view of the proble m of
the notion of an anifici al language
with rules is a fru follet par
Semantlcal rules dete rmmil18 the
...,. o f an anificial lang\lagt
we at Int erest only in so filr as we alread}'
" bland. the noli on of analyt icity; t hey ale
at III help 10 gaining this unde rs. anding.
hypotheticll l 1(lllguages of an
aniItially Simpl e kind coukl be
= ':;larifYing analyticity, if lhe mt nt al or
Of" tuh ural factors relcvallt 10
)-whate\'c r they may be-were
into Ihe s.i Olpli fied model.
. ' IIodeI wtneh takes analytki ly me rel)' as
hall. IfttduClble characte r is u nlikely to th ruw
It :':.probkm of expliclll ing analyticity.
- ..... 11 lOllS that truth in ge neral depends
and ext ralingui stic racl. The
'-if Ibt Brutus killed Ciiesar" would be
bot
1tQrld had been in certain
....
, It lIfO
hlp uld also be fal se i( The word
pened rather to have the s\:nse of
"begat. ,. Thus one is templed to suppose in
(hat thc truth o f a statemenl is some
bow analyzable into a li nguist i ... component alld
a factual component . Given lhi ssupposit ion . il
next see ms reasonable th ai ;11 some
the factual component be null ; and
these are the aOl1l Ylic BUI . for all ilS
a priori reasonablene.<;s, n bvulldar}' between
anal ytic anJ Statements simply has
not been drolwn. That Ihere is such a di st inction
to be at all is an unemp irical rJ ogma of
empIricists, a metaphysical an icle of fai th .
5. THE VERIFICATI ON THEORY AND
REDUCTIO NISM
In the course of these somber retl ections we
hav\: taken a dim view nrst of the notion of
meaning. then of the notlOIl of cogllitj"e
synnnymy. ond fi oall y of The nm; on of ana
lytici ty. But what , it ma), be aske:d. of Ihe
verification theory of This phr3liC
has C:i tablished it self w fir ml y as i\ catchword
of empi ricism that we shoul d be very unscien
li fic indeed 1101 to look beoeat h it for i:I
key 10 the prohle m of meaning and
the probl ems.
1bc ve rification theory o( meaning. which
halo been in the lit erature from
Pt:irce onward, thl1t t he meaning of a
statement the met hod of empirically con
firming or infuming it. All analytic state ment
is thai limit ing case which is oonfi rmed no
m!l tfer what.
urgcd in I, we can as well pa ... over the
question of meanings entit its and move
straight to saml' ness of meaning, o r syno l1
ynl Y, Then whal the vcrifiC<l tion theory says is
that "atements are synonymous if and only if
t hey are alik e in polin of method of empirical
confi rmation or infi rm3lion.
This is <In account of cognitive synonymy
not 1) ( hnguisti c fo rm':> generall y, but of Slale
However, from the: concepl o f synon
ymy of we could derive the COl1cept
of for othe r lingui stic (onm, by
simIlar to t hose at
the end of Assumil1g the 11 0tion of 'word ,'
indeed, we could explain an}' t \\'o forms as
synonymous when the pUlli ng of the a nt form
49
'"
for an occurrence of the nther in ;Iny st ate
ment (apart from occurrences wit hin 'words')
yidds a synonymous stateme nt . Finally, given
tbe l"Om:cpt of synonymy thus for linguiM)C
fMms generall y. we CQuid define analyti L: ity in
terms of synon)my aod IOglt.: il l trulh as in I.
For that matter, we could ddine ana lytici ty
more si mpl y in terms o f just synonymy of
statements together with logical trUlh; it is not
to appeal to synonymy of linguistic
forms other than statemenb . For ;J statement
may he described as analytic simply when it
with a logicall y true
So. if the verificatio n theory can be ac
cepted as an adeq uah: account 01 S13 lcment
synonymy, the notion of is saved
after all . However, let us reflect. Stat ement
synonymy is said to be of method of
empiri ca l ronfirmation or infirmation. Just
what are these methods which are to be
compared for likeness? Whnt, in other words,
is the nntme of the relnti on bellveen 11
stat ement and the which contrib
ut e to or detract from its confirmation?
The moot \'iew of t he relation is that it
is one of direct report. This is radical
limu.f m. Every meaningful statement is held to
be translatable into a statement ( true or false)
about immedia te experienu. Radica l reduc
ti oni sm, in ont form or ano ther, wdl ant e
dates the verification IheQryo{meaningexpli c
itl y so called. Thus U:lcke and Hume he ld [hal
every idea must either originate directl y in
sense experi ence or else be compollnded at
ideas thus originating; and taking a runt from
Tooke we might thi s doctrine in
sc manticlll jargon hy !"lying that a term, 10 he
significant at all, must be eit her a name of a
sense dat um o r a compound of such oames o r
an obbreviatio n of a compound. So
stoted, t he docuioe remain!> :ambiguous :as
between dala as sensory events and
sense dat a as sensory quali ties; and it remains
vague as 10 the admi ssibl e ways of compound
in g. Moreovcr, the doctrine
and intolerably in the te rm-by-term
cri ti que which it imposes. More re:asonably.
ond wi thout yet exceeding the limi ts of what I
have call ed radical reductionism, we m:ay take
full 5Ialements as o ur signifi cant uni ts- thus
TH{ PHILOSOPHY OF LANGlJAQ
demanding that our statements bt
translatable int o sens.e-datum language. "
Dot they be ICI"m by tertii.
ThiS cmendatlon would unquestiOoablJ
have heen welcome to Locke and Burne ...
Tooke, but hiSToricall y it had to a...ait
. . . . .
Important reOrl ent all on m It-
ori entation whe rehy the primar}' H:hictt If
me ailing Cli me to be seen no longer in the trnt
but in the statement. Thi s reoriental",
explicit in Frege ([I) , 60), RUSSel)
concept of incomplete symbols defined in ..
also it is implicit in the veriliCittion thcnty If
meaning. since the objects of verificalion 1ft
statements.
Radical rt'ducli onism, conceived l1O\lo ..
statements liS units, set itsdf the 1m tf
II language and
ing how to translate the rest of
di scourse, statement by stat ement, into iL
Ca rnap emharked on thi s proj ect in die
Aujball .
The language whi ch Camap adopted u"
st arting point was not a sc nse-datum
in the n:arroweM conceivahle !;Cnse. f(W iI
included also the no tations of logic. ..
through higher set theory. In effect it inch"
the whole I"nguligc. of purl! mathematics .
ontology impli ci t in it (t hat is, the ranp ill
values of embraced not _
sensory events but classes, of d-.
and so on. Empiricists there are who .""...
boggl e at such prodigality. Carnap's stllrtIW
point is very parsimonious, howcvoef. in ill
exl ralogical or sensory part, In a seri oes II.
in which he ..
of modem logic wi t h much ingcnuirJ.
Carnap suCCds in defi('ling a wid\!
importanl additional sensorv (()IK"ePts ....
but for coostructio ns, would not bill
dreamed \l'ere defin:able on SO slender a
He was the tirst empiricist who, not co'*"
with the reducibilit y of
terms of immedi ate experi ence, took
steps tOwa rd carryin g out the reduction.
l( Camap's starling point is satisfacWIY'
sti ll hi s constructions were, he hl!..
onl y a fragment of the full progr...
The conslruct ion of even the
meors about the physical world was left
tJUTH AND MEANING
lChy slate. Carnap's suggestions on this
:p:i lIo'ere. despite thei r vcr y
He explai ned r. palnHemporaJ
nl_ins13nh as 4Uadruplu of re<11 numbers
(n,i\ilgeJ assignme nt of sen)t 4u:ahtie)
point_i.rlstanl s accordmg 10 certain
summarized, the plan was thaI
ahtioes should be to
::' .. uth a way as to achi eve the lalit.st .....orld
""palibk: with our experi ence, The prinei
, c " 'd '
pie of least acti on was to vo; ?ur gUI e m
constrllCting a \\orld from experience.
Camap di d not see m to recogni ze. how
C"U. tbat tn:atment of physical objects fell
.,., (l{ reduct ion nOt merely through sketcht
but in principle, Statcmeots of the form
"Quality q at point-instant x;y;z;(' .....ere,
IICCOI'ding \0 ClInons, to be apportio ned
tnllh \ aluts in such a way as to maXl mlZC li nd
mID/mile certain over<lll ,mu WI th
II'llwth of cXpl.: ri cnc:e tb e tr ut h values were to
tit revised in the same spirit. I
think is good schemat iz\Iion (deliber
*'Y o... to be sure) of whilt
tcience reall)' does ; but i[ rr(, \ ides no indica
lion. no( even the skl. .chiesl , of how a
llMemenl of thc form "Oull lilY q is at
c:o.Id evtr be InlOslated inlO inili al
ImJuage of sense data lind logic. The connee
"is remai ns an add.:d undelined
connective: thc canons co un Sel us In usc
bul noI in its elimination.
to bave appreciflled Ihis
PlInt afterv.'ard; ror in hi s lat er writings he
Ibaoooned all noti on of the translatabilit y of
statements ,Ihou! the physical worl d into
'Aatements about immediate experience, Re
in its radical fonn has long since
ca.ed to fi gure In Carn:a p's ph1losoph)',
tbe dognla of reduCl iooism has. in a
more tenuous form , contmued to
IIObot!. r lhe thought of The
, )'nthe ,mgers that to each St ht cment. or each
unique
tlC
Slatement, there It
that therange of possible sensory events
totbe likOtturrencc of any uf them would add
that lhe of truth of the statement. and
ranee o(e IS .asSQ(:ialed IIlso anolher uniq ue
renee- . POSSible SCnsorv evenll> whose occur
1Io('ul d detract that likeli hood. This
nOllon of course impli ci t in the "'erillell t ion
theory of meaning.
TIle dogma of reductionIsm survives in the
supposilion tha i c.;ldt statement . in
ooilition (wm Can admi t of
confirm;llion or infirmati on at all. My COUD
from CM
doctri ne of the physical worl d in the
Aufbll. lI , is that our statement s about the
externul world fl lec Ihe tribunal of
experi ence not individually but only <IS a
corporate hody. hi
TIle dogma of even in it s
anenuated for m. is intimately connected with
the other dOgm;l-thtlt !here b It cleavage
betwetn the analytic 0100 the synthetic . We
have found our!'tl\ es led. indeed. from th e
lauer probl em 10 the former through th e
vcrific;, tion theory of mcanlOg, More directl y,
the une dogma dearl y the other in this
way: long it is taken to he signifi cant in
general to of the oonfirm:ati on and
infi rmat ion of 11 stalemCllt, it seems significant
to ubo of a l[ ml lltlg kind of stlltement
which is vacuously confi rmed. ipso jacw, come
wh:a t may; and such a statement is analytic,
The tWQ arc: , IIIdced, lit ruut
ident ical. We lately refl ect ed Ihil l in general
the truth (If depend
both upon l:angu:age and upon extralinguisti c
fa ct; and we noted t hat this obvious circum
slHncc cilrIics in li S tram, nut logically but ll Jl
tOO naturall y, a feeling th,it the truth oC :l
:l ntll Y1'.3hle into a lingui s
tie component and :a factual component. TIle
fllclual component must , jf we lITe empincists,
w [i down to II range of confi nnat ury experi
cncelt, In the t:<trcme case lOo'here Ihe linguisti c
component i .. all that mail ers . a true St:llement
is llnal)'tic. But I hope we are now impressed
wi t h how slUbbornly the dist inct io n belween
anal yt ic and synthet1c has resisted any straight
forward drawUlg, 1 am impressed al so. :a part
from prda brir:lIt cd examples of blllck and
while bll lls in an urn. wit h how b ...fi'l ing the
problem hdS been of arriving at any
expliCIt theory of the empi ri cal confi rmation
of a synthet ic st atement. My present sugges
t ion ;$ that il is nonsense, and (he roo( of
much to speak of a linguist ic compo
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