Ag Aircraft Safety Review Complete

Civil Aviation Authority
Agricultural Aircraft Safety Review

December 2008
Table of Contents
Executive Summary ................................................................................................ 1 Chapter 1 - Introduction ......................................................................................... 5 Chapter 2 - The Lewis Report ................................................................................ 8 Chapter 3 - Regulatory Basis of Part 137 and CAM 8 ....................................... 15 Chapter 4 CAA Safety Data Review .................................................................. 27 Section 2 - Analysis by Type ............................................................................... 43 Chapter 4 - CAA Safety Data Review .................................................................. 60 Section 3 - Aircraft Comparisons. ....................................................................... 60 Chapter 5 - Unreported Incidents ........................................................................ 66 Chapter 6 - Turbine Conversions ....................................................................... 70 Chapter 7 - Certificate of Airworthiness Duration ............................................. 80 Chapter 8 - Re-use of Data Plates ....................................................................... 84 Chapter 9 - Industry Operational Issues............................................................. 86 Chapter 10- Emerging Technologies .................................................................. 95 Chapter 11 Airworthiness Directives Review ................................................ 102 Chapter 12 Conclusions .................................................................................. 103 Glossary of Scientific Terms ............................................................................. 112
Annexes: .............................................................................................................. 114 A Terms of Reference for Agricultural Aircraft Safety Review ........................... B Civil Aeronautics Manual (CAM) 8 ..................................................................... C New Zealand Civil airworthiness Requirements Part 2................................. D Air Transport Division Ministry of Transport Engineering Instruction ....................................................................................................... E FU24 Occurrences ............................................................................................... F Cresco Occurrences ............................................................................................ G 750XL Occurrences ............................................................................................. H GA200 Occurrences............................................................................................. I Air Tractor Occurrences .................................................................................... J Cessna Agwagon Occurrences .......................................................................... K Transavia PL-12 Airtruk Occurrences ............................................................... L Zlin Z-13T Occurrences ....................................................................................... M FU24 Fin Failures and Occurrences Summary .............................................. N FU24 Fin Structural Comparisons...................................................................... O Climb Performance .............................................................................................. P Landing Gear Considerations ............................................................................
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Executive Summary
The Civil Aviation Authority of New Zealand (CAA) initiated this Agricultural Aircraft Safety Review (the Review) in response to concerns expressed by CAA staff and industry stakeholders regarding the safety occurrence rate for fixed wing agricultural aircraft. Particular concerns related to Civil Aviation Rule Part 137 (Part 137), which permits an aircraft to be operated at a weight in excess of its maximum certified take-off weight (MCTOW).
The Lewis Report
The CAA commissioned Bernie Lewis FRAeS, an experienced industry consultant, to prepare a report on agricultural aircraft overloading as permitted by Part 137 (the Lewis Report). The Lewis Report concluded that fixed wing agricultural operations in excess of MCTOW, as permitted by Part 137, without compensatory safety measures, affected the safety of those operations. Following the conclusions of the Lewis Report, the Review was commissioned to examine the issue in more depth. The opportunity was also taken to widen the scope of the investigation to include a range of other issues affecting safety in agricultural aviation.
Part 137
The Review includes a detailed analysis of Part 137 and its effects. This analysis supports the Lewis Reports principal conclusion that Part 137 lacked sufficient safety measures to compensate for the effects of operating at weights beyond MCTOW. The Review also concludes that the Lewis Reports criticism of the way in which the United States Civil Aeronautics Manual No 8 (CAM 8) was incorporated into Part 137 is insufficient. The Lewis Report criticised the translation of CAM 8 into Part 137. The Review concludes that CAM 8 itself is an inappropriate basis for Part 137, since CAM 8 was a design certification guide, and Part 137 is an operational rule. Incorporating the intent of CAM 8 (or later derivatives) into the restricted category certification requirements of Civil Aviation Rule Part 21 (Part 21) would be an appropriate way to adopt the principle of high gross weight operation. The role of Part 137 would then be to describe agricultural operational requirements, based on aircraft issued with standard or restricted category certificates of airworthiness (COAs).
Occurrence Data Analysis
The second major focus of the Review is to determine the effects of implementation of Part 137 on the safety of agricultural aircraft operations. This required a major review of the CAAs safety occurrence data. The two main hypotheses tested were that The safety occurrence rate has deteriorated since 1994, and, The increase in accidents was linked to increased loads carried as permitted by Part 137. A method was developed to extract the required information about safety occurrence rates from the CAA database. More than 70% of the agricultural fixed wing aircraft operating throughout the 1970-2007 study period were Pacific Aerospace Ltd FU24 variants.
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Therefore the FU24 safety occurrence data was determined to be the single most reliable indicator of the overall industry safety occurrence rate. When plotted against time, the FU24 aircraft data displayed marked increases in the rate of take-off accidents, landing gear defects and other structural problems. This appears to support the first hypothesis that the safety occurrence rate has worsened in recent years. Testing the second hypothesis, that this increase was due to the overload as permitted by Part 137, proved to be more difficult. Most aircraft are not equipped with load measuring equipment, and there is no requirement to report the weight carried on each flight. Only the overall tonnage spread and the hours flown are reported quarterly to the CAA. However the load onboard the aircraft has a direct influence on the stress to which the undercarriage is subjected. In addition, the performance of the aircraft is inversely proportional to the load it is carrying. On this basis an assumption was made that analysis of the undercarriage failure rates, and the accidents in which aircraft performance was a factor, would enable an inference to be drawn about the loads being carried by the aircraft. Analysis of the FU24 indicated a statistically significant increase in the rate of both takeoff performance and landing gear safety occurrences coinciding with the introduction of Part 137. The Lewis Report hypothesis, that the omission of compensating safety factors from Part 137 would have a detrimental effect on safety, was shown to have occurred in practice. Furthermore, the types of safety failures that increased most markedly (undercarriage and aircraft performance accidents) were predictable considering Part 137 adopted an abbreviated version of the requirements of CAM 8. (See Chapter 3.) The FU24 undercarriage defect rate has been used in the Review as a yardstick to measure the relative effects of various other changes affecting the aircraft, such as larger hoppers, Part 137 overload, and turbine conversions. An engineering modification to increase the robustness of the undercarriage is practicable, it would address only one of the symptoms and not the root cause. The pattern evident in the undercarriage occurrence rate also manifests itself in the fuselage and wing defects, but the frequency of these occurrences and hence the resolution of the pattern is much lower. While the FU24 data was used as a first approximation to the fixed wing agricultural aircraft fleet, comparison of the FU24 occurrence data with other agricultural types revealed some issues that appear to be aircraft specific. For example the FU24 had 36% more undercarriage defects per flying hour than other types of agricultural aircraft. The New Zealand designed and built Cresco, derived from the FU24 but with a turbine engine and higher payload, experienced an undercarriage failure rate 4.5 times higher than other agricultural aircraft operated in New Zealand.
Turbine Conversions
Turbine converted aircraft, which, after widespread conversions conducted around 2000, now comprise almost half the FU24 fleet, were also considered in detail. The converted aircraft have suffered a consistently higher rate of defects than unconverted aircraft. The reasons for this are difficult to establish conclusively, although the 50% increase in available horsepower may have contributed to the increased defect rate. CAA approval of these conversions was conditional on the observation of existing weight and airspeed limitations to ensure there was no significant stress increase on the airframe. Operation at the existing weight was assumed to have been satisfactory since the
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development of the FU24-954 aircraft in 1979. The FU24-954 was an evolution of the original FU24 certificated in 1954, in which both engine power and weight were increased (3550lbs to 4860lbs). The existing weight at the time of conversion was taken to be the Part 137 overload of 6366lbs, which had been sanctioned for only four years at the time the conversions were proposed. The 31% increase that Part 137 permitted the FU24 to carry was slightly larger than for other types. However, the full 31% was probably infrequently utilised because of the limited ability of the piston engine to accelerate the fully loaded aircraft up to flying speed within the limits of a typical airstrip. Prior to conversion, few if any FU24 series aircraft would have been able to operate at weights approaching the full 31% overload. Accordingly, the turbine conversion was approved on an unsubstantiated assumption that operation at weights up to 31% had already been proven satisfactory and that continued operation at that weight with an engine substitution would have no detrimental effect. The effect of the turbine conversion was to increase take-off and climb performance so that higher loads (up to the maximum 31% overload) could be utilised on a regular basis. The superior performance of the turbine conversion may even have enabled operation at weights beyond those permitted by Part 137. Application of the abbreviated version of CAM 8 into Part 137 made the subsequent approval of the turbine conversion problematic, and is likely to have contributed to the two-stage increment evident in the FU24 undercarriage defect rates. In addition to undercarriage defects, the associated stresses on the turbine converted aircraft operating to the full extent of the weight increase permitted under Part 137 are likely to have led to a higher overall defect rate per flying hour for the turbine aircraft.
Industry Concerns
The Review canvassed industry opinions and obtained the candid views of leading industry stakeholders, pilots, maintenance engineers, designers and manufacturers. Although the range of opinions was wide and varied, there was a general dissatisfaction with the Part 137, particularly the overload provisions.
Conclusions
The principal conclusions of the Review are: By adopting the possible weight increase graph from CAM 8 and using it for Part 137 without the subsequent analysis, modification and flight-testing recommended by CAM 8, the safety provisions upon which the overload graph was predicated were effectively negated. Overloading, as permitted by Part 137, led to an increase in the safety occurrence rate, particularly for the New Zealand-designed FU24 and Cresco aircraft. Foreigndesigned aircraft operated in New Zealand, which complied with the full version of CAM 8 or its successors, have not experienced similar safety problems. Turbine converted FU24 aircraft were the worst affected aircraft. This experience is attributable to a combination of permitted overload, subsequent hopper capacity enlargement, and engine power increases.
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CAA should rewrite Part 137 in a way that recognises both the economic desirability of operating at weights above the standard category weight, and the commensurate decrease in aircraft performance and safety. This may be achieved by using the provisions of the restricted category COA to certify aircraft at the higher weight. The restricted category COA acknowledges a reduced level of safety but accepts it as suitable for the intended purpose, which, in this case, has a degree of inherent risk. The rewritten Part 137 need not consider overloading, as operations would be conducted in accordance with the limitations associated with the COA. As such, they would no longer be over loading.
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Chapter 1 - Introduction
Background to the Review
During 2004, General Aviation (GA) Group operational staff of the Civil Aviation Authority of New Zealand (CAA) and stakeholders in expressed concerns regarding the accident rate experienced in the agricultural aviation industry. In addition to a series of fatal accidents between 2001 and 2004, the CAA received reports of an increase in the number of aircraft defects. Stakeholders also expressed concerns about the practice of rrebuilding aging aircraft and, in particular, the use of older airframes with new components and significantly more powerful engines. The practice of re-engining aircraft principally applied to Pacific Aerospace Ltd Fletcher FU24 aircraft. The re-engined aircraft are generally more than 25 years old. Most FU24 aircraft operating in 2007 were built between 1970 and 1980: the oldest in 1967, the youngest in 1984. In some cases, the wings and sections of the fuselage have been re-skinned but the structure remains basically the same. The aircraft have given many years of service in rugged conditions. Modifications included lengthening the fuselage to keep the centre of gravity (CG) within limits because of lighter engines, and fuselage plugs are added to accommodate larger hoppers. In addition to providing the ability to carry significantly heavier loads out of the same airstrips, the increased power of the turbine engines are capable of driving the aircraft to higher speeds. Associated with the concerns about safety were reports (many of them anecdotal) that the rate of defects and failures was increasing in areas such as the undercarriage, vertical fin and rudder structure, wing spar and engine mounts. Another concern lay with the apparent lack of appreciation of aerodynamics and weight and balance by many agricultural pilots, in particular the need to reduce speeds, manoeuvre loadings (G) when operating at high all up weights.
CAA Safety Targets
The first step in the Review was to obtain the safety performance data for the agricultural aviation industry sector. (The CAA Safety Analysis Unit (SAU) monitors the safety performance of the different sectors of the New Zealand aviation industry.) When the Review was proposed in the first quarter of 2007, the SAUs analysis of recorded accidents and incidents in the previous 10 years indicated a significant loss of life. Expressed in economic terms for the purposes of comparison, the net cost to the nation of the lives and equipment lost in fixed wing agricultural flying was approaching $200 per flying hour. 1 This was approximately twice the cost per hour of accidents in either Other (non-airline) fixed wing commercial operations or private flying, which is usually considered a high-risk activity. Of even greater concern was the indication that the fixed wing agricultural
1 The social cost per unit of exposure is basically the annual cost of machines damaged plus the assumed costs of injury and the statistical value of human life, divided by the number of hours flown by the industry sector.
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accident rate was trending upwards, while other industry sectors, such as agricultural helicopter operations, were trending downwards.
Figure 1.1
Figure 1.2
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The two graphs above were taken from the SAUs January 2007 Safety Targets Report. (The scales of the graphs are not identical.) The social cost of agricultural helicopter flying was much lower per flying hour than fixed wing operations. As a helicopter is usually more expensive than a fixed wing aircraft of the same all up weight, the lower cost of helicopter operations represents a substantially smaller accident rate than the fixed wing equivalent. From the above statistics and the level of industry and public comment it was clear that a wide-ranging review of fixed wing agricultural aircraft operations was necessary.
The Review
The General Manager, General Aviation, CAA initiated the Agricultural Aircraft Safety Review (the Review) in March 2007. The purpose of the Review is to gather information, authenticate anecdotal stories, as far as is possible, and make recommendations regarding currently operated agricultural aircraft design, continuing airworthiness, maintenance and operational practices and techniques. The scope items of the Terms of Reference for the Review are reproduced in Annex 1. Each of the scope items forms the basis of a chapter of the Review. Conclusions and recommendations relating to each of the scope items are presented at the end of each chapter and summarised in Chapter 12.
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Chapter 2 - The Lewis Report

Scope item 1: Review the Bernie Lewis report commissioned and completed in 2005 and review the resultant recommendations.
Introduction
In August 2005, the Manager, Rotary Wing/Agricultural, CAA commissioned Bernie Lewis FRAeS, an experienced industry consultant, to report on the current Rule regarding aircraft overloading, the industrys interpretation of the Rule and to make recommendations as required. (The result report is referred to as the Lewis Report.) The Civil Aviation Rule in question is Part 137 Agricultural Aircraft Operation. Two provisions of Part 137 are of particular importance. These are Maximum take-off weight (137.103) and Overload Weight Determination (Appendix B).
Lewis Report Content
The CAA considers the Lewis Report to be well researched with sound underpinning engineering information. Anecdotal evidence gathered for the Review generally supports the observations of the Lewis Report. The Lewis Report primarily reviews agricultural aircraft overloading as permitted by 137.103(a). In its conclusions, the Lewis Report criticises the CAA for the way it has regulated the operation of agricultural aircraft, in particular, the omission from Part 137 of the 6% climb gradient performance limited take-off weight (PLTOW) that was required in the pre-1994 New Zealand regulatory system. After discussing a number of issues that have arisen since Part 137 raised the permissible overload from 12% to 31%, the Lewis Report recommends re-introducing safety factors not included in Part 137.
Review of Lewis Report Recommendations Recommendation 1:
The wording of Part 137 Appendix B Overload Weight Determination be written to remove the ambiguity of the wording original aeroplane load limit factor and provide warning to reduce airspeed by W (certified gross weight)/W (new gross 2 weight) x Vne. The term original aeroplane load factor, which was adopted from the United States Civil Aeronautics Manual No 8 (CAM 8), is ambiguous when applied to the Cresco and FU24 series because different load factors are listed in their flight manuals. One of these (the lowest) is for flight with flaps down, and so can be disregarded, leaving a choice of the normal flight load factor of 3.56 g or the restricted category load factor of 3.0 g. 3.56 g is the normal load factor for aircraft certified to the United States Federal Aviation Rule (FAR) 23, such as the Cresco.
2 Vno = Velocity Normal Operations. Va (Velocity Maximum Acceleration) is commonly referred to as manoeuvring speed as this is the speed at which the aircraft is capable of generating its maximum manoeuvring load factor (acceleration at 90 degrees to the direction of travel). At speeds above Va, control movements must be made carefully to avoid excessive stress on the airframe.
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The reduced load factor in the New Zealand restricted (agricultural) category is derived from Leaflet C.10-4 that constituted CAA policy on agricultural aircraft certification prior to the current rule system. Both the FU24 and Cresco were designed before Part 137 was introduced, and, according to the policy at the time, the manufacturer made provision for an Agricultural Overload of approximately 12%. This weight is listed in the flight manual as the restricted category weight. At the restricted category weight, the reduced load factor on which it was predicated must be observed. This is the origin of the two weights and two load factors in the flight manual of New Zealands two most popular agricultural aircraft. From the above, the Lewis Reports conclusion that the rule is ambiguous appears to be correct. However, the issue of which load factors to use is probably overshadowed by other problems with the Part 137 Appendix B graph, which is discussed in Chapter 4. The Lewis Report recommends that that an airspeed reduction be applied to aircraft operating in accordance with Part 137 Appendix B. This recommendation is reasonable if certification in accordance with CAM 8 were to be pursued. (CAM 8 details the reasons for reducing Vno to Va .) The FU24-954s Vno is restricted to 114 kts when operating in the restricted category in the United States.
Recommendation 2:
Aircraft should also be checked for handling, (as per CAM 8) and meet a minimum sustained rate of climb of 500 ft/min. This should be an annual certification in the logbook.
Recommendation 3:
An immediate Directive be issued warning operators of the need to reduce airspeed when operating at their maximum overload and to check that their aircraft can sustain a 500 ft/min rate of climb.
Recommendation 4:
I strongly recommend that a graph showing the speed reduction be included in the overload allowed by Part 137. It is a far better way of drawing a pilots attention to the reduction, rather than have him work it out for himselfManoeuvring speeds should also be reduced accordingly. These recommendations relate to adding measures to Part 137 to reduce ambiguity and reintroducing provisions of CAM 8. These recommendations have some support in industry in the form of the production of an Advisory Circular (AC), explaining how to account for the performance reductions that can be expected at the overload weight. However, while the Lewis Reports conclusions in this regard are valid and reasonably practical, they are essentially attempting to compensate for the fact that the graph from CAM 8 is being used in a way it was not intended to be. (This issue is discussed further in Chapter 4.) Implementation of the first four recommendations of the Lewis Report would provide more information to the pilot in those situations where 137.107 permits operations beyond the limits of the flight manual. However, as the aircraft would still be operated at the Part 137 Appendix B weights, it would still likely be subjected to loads above its certified design condition, with a commensurate increase in defects. The CAA supports the intent of these recommendations, but does not support their substance. .
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Recommendation 5:
All loaders should be fitted with a weight and load counter that could provide a print out at the end of the day. This could also act as a check for overloading. A load measuring device similar to that in the Zlin, should be compulsory in all topdressing aircraft. The CAA supports this recommendation as it would introduce greater certainty into the operation of agricultural aircraft as well as providing a means for CAA audit (in a similar way to baggage/freight loading manifests in Part 119 operations). Many of the loaders in service are fitted with load measuring devices either calibrated hydraulic gauges or the better digital load cell devices. Operators have historically opposed mandatory use of these devices on the grounds of their low reliability in service. It is likely that this objection is overstated. F fertiliser is billed by the ton delivered to the farm gate; this implies that a party in the supply chain has some reliable and accurate weighing equipment. (This comment was provided by an industry response and is detailed in Chapter 10.)
Recommendation 6
Companies should be given a specific time in which to fit tamper/proof hour meters, when they become available. The CAA and industry stakeholders generally accept the principle of tamper-proof hour meters being fitted to agricultural aircraft once suitable technology has been developed. (Chapter 11 discusses Time in Service Recorders in more detail and whether they are necessary for fixed wing agricultural aircraft.)
Recommendation 7:
The fatigue life of old aircraft, when fitted with turbine engines should be reassessed. This recommendation is controversial. Two views on this issue are summarised below. No Reassessment of Fatigue Lives: On the face of it, there is no need to reassess its fatigue life if a modified aircraft is operated within the existing flight envelope (i.e. same weights and speeds) and the power increase is small. The underpinning rationale is, if the aircraft travels through the air at much the same speed, with the same weight on board, with only small power increase such that it cannot sustain high load factor manoeuvres for appreciably longer than the original version, then the use of a turbine engine will not affect the integrity of the airframe. The other factor that complicates re-assessing the fatigue life of early model aircraft is that some were designed before fatigue assessments were a certification requirement. For these early design aircraft, assessment of the fatigue life would have to be done from scratch, rather than just recalculated. This would require access to the original aircraft design data. For older aircraft this is hard to obtain and difficult to work with for example, hand written calculations. It is also difficult for an applicant, who is not the type certificate holder, to obtain permission to use this data. It is self-evident that aircraft for which a fatigue assessment was not a certification requirement may experience metal fatigue. In fact their design predates the rapid increase in understanding of aircraft structural fatigue that took place in the early 1960s following
the De Havilland Comet accidents. The state of the art regarding design for fatigue resistance was not high at the time these aircraft were designed. In lieu of an assessment and prediction of the structural fatigue life, regular inspections are carried out to detect and correct any failures before they can become catastrophic. These planes are expected to be operated at relatively low stress levels in normal service, which, to some extent, negates the need for a detailed fatigue assessment. If the loads on the aircraft remain the same after re-engining (speed, weight, power), and the existing maintenance requirements have been adequate (no major failures recorded), arguably there is no need to perform a fatigue life re-assessment. Reassessment of Fatigue Lives: In September 1993, the United States Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) published Advisory Circular AC 23-14 (Type Certification Basis for Conversion from Reciprocating Engine to Turbine-Powered Part 23 Airplanes). AC 23-14 notes that, regardless of the power increase, turbine engine and propeller combinations may introduce a different vibration spectrum from that previously experienced by a piston powered airframe, and recommends an investigation of the horizontal stabiliser. In addition to unexpected vibratory responses introduced by the change of engine and propeller, where there is a moderate power increase or increase in utilisation, the frequency with which damaging loads are encountered may be increased. There is evidence that this has occurred on the FU24 turbine conversions. (See Chapter 5 Section 2. The effect of changes in the aircraft load spectrum are discussed more fully in Chapter 7.) In general, a turbine engine is fitted to an existing airframe either to increase performance beyond that achievable with a piston engines (for example the Lancair IV-P), or to allow the aircraft to continue in revenue service after it has become uneconomic to continue operating with a piston engine (for example the Convair 580). Therefore, without the turbine engine, the operator would most likely retire the aircraft; a turbine conversion permits a significant increase in service life. In the first case, increased loads on the airframe, which will require reassessment, are likely. In the second case, the continued operation of the airframe will ensure that fatigue damage continues to accrue. If the existing flight envelope and load spectrum is preserved, fatigue damage should continue to accumulate at the same rate. However, keeping the airframe in service increases the number of defects that can be expected. Therefore, it is reasonable at the time of conversion to assess the types service history, and address any concerns regarding the re-engined aircraft. A revised inspection program is a common way to achieve this. If the assessment of the airframe types service history reveals the occurrence of fatigue cracks that have not been adequately captured by the maintenance and inspection program, an assessment of the designs fatigue life may be necessary. In practice, a purely analytical approach to calculating fatigue life is notoriously difficult, and the predicted life varies considerably depending on assumptions made. It may be quicker, simpler and more reliable to design strengthening modifications for critical areas of the aircraft.
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Conclusion Fatigue Life Assessments Requiring the complete re-assessment of airframe fatigue lives when they are fitted with turbine engines would probably increase the safety of the modified aircraft, but in many cases would be impracticable. Nonetheless, FAA AC 23-14 recommends, in the case of turbine engine conversions, if engine power, airspeed limits, propeller rotational speed or number of propeller blades are changed, the applicant should provide substantiating data showing that the vibratory response of the horizontal tail assembly to the propeller slipstream environment will not result in fatigue failures.3 A fatigue assessment of the horizontal tail in accordance with FAA AC 23-14 would be more practicable than an entire airframe fatigue life re-assessment. In addition to a partial fatigue assessment of the horizontal stabiliser, it would be prudent to review the airframe types service history, and review the overall design for critical features.4 This may indicate other areas where fatigue re-assessments are necessary. Any Achilles heels in the existing design should be catered for by reducing the maintenance interval of the modified aircraft or the addition of reinforcing design features such as straps or doublers in the areas of concern. (Chapter 7 discuses the effect of turbine conversion on existing airframes in more detail including the requirement for a changed product rule.)
Recommendation 8:
Undercarriage legs are not adequate. Investigation should be directed towards dual wheels, larger wheels, and/or sturdier oleos. The Lewis Report notes an increase in undercarriage failures particularly amongst the FU24 and Cresco aircraft, and recommends an engineering investigation of the cause, and subsequent modification to reinforce the gear. (Chapter 5 examines the FU24 and Cresco undercarriage rates in detail, and verifies this observation of the Lewis Report.) To complete an engineering assessment of the undercarriage, it is essential to know the weight at which the undercarriage is intended to operate. Under a CAM 8 Appendix A certification effort, the weight selected from the wing load curve Figure 7-2 would be carried over into the undercarriage engineering analysis. Engineering Assessment of Undercarriage Loads. The usual design case for undercarriage on small to medium sized aircraft is assumed to be the hard landing case, where the aircraft is set up for a landing but the pilot does not arrest the rate of descent fully. FAR 23.473, for example, provides a means of simulating the load that could be expected under these circumstances. For regular private single engine aircraft, this is accepted as the highest load that it is likely to carry once or twice in the aircrafts lifetime, and equates to completing a normal 600 fpm approach without arresting the rate of descent just prior touchdown. For small aircraft, the maximum landing weight is usually assumed to be the maximum take-off weight, but may be no less than 95% of the maximum take-off weight. 5
3 The horizontal stabiliser usually manifests a higher aspect ratio than the vertical stabiliser, and hence is more critical for vibration, depending on construction. 4 An assessment of the aircraft types service history requires access to good occurrence data. The present limitations to accessing this data are discussed in Section 3 5 FAR 23.473(b)
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As take-offs are generally a smooth acceleration away from the earth, the loads generated during take-off are usually much less than those generated in a hard landing, if the weight at landing is no less than 95% of the take-off weight. The hard landing is such an infrequent event for normal aircraft that design for static strength under this condition usually provides sufficient margin against fatigue damage during the thousands of normal landings. However, for an agricultural aircraft the landing weight could be as low as 50% of the take-off weight. The landing speed of an unloaded FU24 is 55 knots from which it decelerates rapidly. Its take-off rotation speed could be as high as 70 knots. Acceleration to 70 knots is not rapid and, during those seconds, the gear is carrying a high load at higher speed across a much rougher airstrip than normal. Under these circumstances, the standard design case for the undercarriage may not be conservative. If the standard hard landing design criterion is used, at what weight should it be calculated? The only conservative way to cover the rough strip take off at agricultural weight case is to analyse the landing gear for hard landing at agricultural weight, or else develop a more rational analysis of the loads during take-off at agricultural weights. (The design considerations for landing gear, including the effect of uphill landings are explored further in Annex P.)
Recommendation 9:
The Industry Guidelines on Farm Airstrips and Associated Fertiliser Cartage, Storage and Application, should be implemented as soon as possible. This recommendation was implemented in December 2006 by the publication of the booklet Safety Guidelines Farm Airstrips and Associated Fertiliser Cartage, Storage and Application, a joint venture between the CAA and the Department of Labour,. The airstrip surface condition assessment in this publication suggests a motor vehicle should be able to be driven comfortably along the strip at 80 kph. By comparison, aircraft take-off speeds of 55-65 knots equate to 102-120 kph. The previously mentioned design case for undercarriage take-off loads should take into account this method of strip condition assessment. Conclusions on the Lewis Report
Conclusion 2.1
The Lewis Report provides a detailed assessment of certain issues faced by agricultural aircraft operating under Part 137. The opinions expressed in the Lewis Report are plausible and the aerodynamics calculations are correct.
Conclusion 2.2
The Review supports the principal conclusion of the Lewis Report that Part 137 does not provide an adequate basis for operations beyond MCTOW.
Conclusion 2.3
The Lewis Reports recommendations (1-4) on the CAA providing further guidance material to detail an aircrafts performance at the agricultural weight may improve safety but would not address the increasing equipment failure rate that is likely to be experienced when the aircraft is operated outside of its design envelope. The provision of further guidance material from CAM 8 is unlikely to be useful, firstly, because CAM 8 was not
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intended to be an operational rule, and, secondly, the FU24 and Cresco were not certified to CAM 8. .
Conclusion 2.4
The Review supports recommendations 5 and 6 of the Lewis Report regarding loading bucket weight devices and mandatory TSRs.
Conclusion 2.5
The Review conditionally supports recommendation 7 of the Lewis Report regarding fatigue assessments of aircraft refitted with turbine engines. (FAA AC 23-14 supports the re-assessment of horizontal stabiliser fatigue.) Turbine conversions represent a considerable investment in an old airframe, and operators expect such conversions to substantially extend the economic life of an aircraft. As such, re-engined aircraft are, in effect, a changed product. New Zealand currently has no clear changed product rule, but the need for one has been noted.
Conclusion 2.6
The Review supports recommendation 8 of the Lewis Report regarding engineering assessment of the undercarriage. The undercarriage should be assessed as part of a coordinated certification process at the nominated agricultural weight. To complete the engineering assessment of the undercarriage, a CAA policy on acceptable agricultural weight should be determined.
Conclusion 2.7
Recommendation 9 of the Lewis Report regarding publication of strip guidelines has been adopted with effect from December 2006.
Conclusion 2.8
Operation at weights beyond an aircrafts original MCTOW is feasible when an engineering analysis establishes that sufficient capability exists in the affected structural components, and satisfactory flight characteristics are demonstrated. If operations at high weights for agricultural purposes are to continue, there is a requirement for:
a) A suitable certification basis for the engineering assessments that takes into account the nature of agricultural operations, b) A suitable set of operational parameters including, but not limited to, climb gradient, take-off performance, and stalling speed.
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Chapter 3 - Regulatory Basis of Part 137 and CAM 8

Scope item 2: Review all New Zealand Civil Aviation Authority documented safety occurrences, findings and open actions relating to agricultural aircraft.
Introduction
Following the Lewis Report which criticised aspects of Part 137, the Agricultural Aircraft Safety Review (the Review was commissioned in March 2007. The primary aim of the Review was to review the safety performance of the fixed wing agricultural industry sector and in doing so quantify the criticisms voiced in the Lewis Report. If the Lewis Report highlighted some of the problems faced by the agricultural aviation industry, the AASR was essentially tasked with answering the question just how big is the problem? Given that the Lewis Report was essentially a review of operations conducted under Part 137 and the Review was a more detailed investigation of the same industry sector, an understanding of the regulatory basis for fixed wing agricultural operations is essential to comprehension of the AASR and its conclusions. To provide that information this chapter contains the following sections. A discussion of Rule Part 137 and in particular the provisions within Part 137 for operation beyond the aircrafts maximum certified take-off weight (MCTOW). The New Zealand regulations that preceded Part 137. An explanation of certification in the Standard and Restricted Categories. A detailed analysis of Civil Aeronautics Manual 8(CAM 8). Elements of this document, which was published by the United States Civil Aeronautics Administration (USCAA), the forerunner to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), are effectively incorporated in Part 137.
Part 137
Agricultural operations are governed by Part 137. Excerpts from the rule are listed below.
Description
Part 137 prescribes rules, that are additional to and exceptions from the general operating and flight rules prescribed in Part 91, for pilots performing or being trained to perform agricultural aircraft operations. Part 137 also prescribes additional instrument and equipment requirements for aircraft conducting agricultural aircraft operations, as well as requirements for the certification and operation of persons performing commercial agricultural aircraft operations.
The New Zealand Civil Aviation rule system is hierarchical, and many of the rule parts are complementary. Part137 must be read in conjunction with the preceding rules, in particular the General Operating Rule Part 91. Part 137 prescribes rules additional to and exceptions from Part 91. The exception to Part 91 concerning take-off weight is detailed in section 137.103.
137.103 Maximum take-off weight
(a) Notwithstanding Part 91 and subject to paragraph (b), a pilot performing, or being trained to perform, an agricultural aircraft operation in an aeroplane must not take-off at a weight greater than the MCTOW prescribed in the aeroplanes flight manual unless (1) the pilot complies with the procedures listed in Appendix B; and (2) the aeroplane is equipped with a jettison system that, in accordance with D.5, is capable of discharging not less than 80 percent of the aeroplanes maximum hopper load within five seconds of the pilot initiating the jettison action. (b) Where there is a third party risk as defined in Appendix A, the pilot must determine the maximum take-off weight in accordance with 137.107 and 137.109. In short, Part 137.103(a) provides an exemption to the requirement of the general flight rules Part 91 that the aircraft must not be operated at a weight greater than its maximum certified take-off weight (MCTOW). Notwithstanding the Part 91 MCTOW, pilots may operate the aircraft at any weight up to the weight shown on the graph in Appendix B to Part 137 provided there is no third party risk.
137.105 Take-off distance and flight path no third party risk
A pilot performing, or being trained to perform, an agricultural aircraft operation in an aeroplane where there is no third party risk as defined in Appendix A is not required to comply with the following: (1) the take-off distance specified in the aeroplane flight manual; (2) the take-off flight path gradient specified in the aeroplane flight manual. Part 137.105 states that while operating at this overload weight the pilot is not required to comply with the aircraft flight manual requirements for available take-off distance and obstacle free climb gradient. This rule was required because at the overload weight, the aircraft will not achieve the performance on which the flight manual figures are predicated. Observing the flight manual requirement to have a strip length of at least 400m is not possible if the aircraft will actually require 450m to get airborne. At the Appendix B overload weight the aircraft will require more strip length and lower obstacles on the climb-out path. How much longer and how much lower is left to the pilot to determine. No data for the aircraft performance at the Appendix B load is provided, so the distance below the normal take-off path that the overloaded aircraft will fly is not known. This is reason that the load dumping provisions of 137.103(a) 2 are included in the rule; when it becomes apparent to the pilot that he may not clear the trees he has the ability to dump the load and regain some aircraft performance. The Lewis Report reviewed these two particular sections of Part 137
Predecessor to Part 137
When considering the content of Part 137 it is useful to compare it to the previous CAA requirements for agricultural aircraft, which were New Zealand Civil Airworthiness
Requirements Part II leaflet C.10-1 through C.10-10. Copies of these leaflets are included as Annex C. Leaflet C.10-7 details the aircraft handling and performance requirements and requires that the aircraft be capable of achieving a climb gradient after take-off of at least 6%. 6 It also requires take-off distances to be calculated for the agricultural weight. The maximum agricultural weight is specified in Leaflet C.10-1 using a formula that takes account of the original aircraft maximum design manoeuvring load factor (G limit). For the FU24-950, the agricultural weight per Leaflet C.10-1 is 5430lbs, a 12% increase over the design weight of 4860lbs. This weight is shown in the flight manual in the Limitations section. Take-off and climb performance graphs up to and including the agricultural weight are also included in the flight manual. These graphs are still applicable under Part 137, but do not cover the range from 12% out to 31%. The CAA policy relating to the certification of agricultural aircraft in accordance with the Leaflets was amplified by Engineering Instruction EI-23, which is attached as Annex D. EI-23 notes that where an aircraft has been certificated in the United States with an agricultural category weight, the limitations imposed by the FAA are to be observed. EI-23 also sets out requirements for non-flying crew seats and requires the provision of information to the pilot on the weights, altitudes and temperatures at which the 6% climb gradient requirement can be met. By comparison Part 137 does not specify a minimum climb performance or require the provision of performance data for operations at weights above MCTOW.
Certification in Standard and Restricted Categories
As there are no exceptions or additions in Part 137 concerning Certificates of Airworthiness (CA), aircraft operating under Part 137 must have a CA issued in accordance with Rule Part 21 Subpart H. While it is technically possible for an aircraft with dispensing equipment to be issued with a standard category CA, in practice 21.177 requires that the aircraft be issued with only a restricted category CA if; the aircraft is internally equipped for dispensing substances on an agricultural aircraft operation and the extent of the internal equipment makes the aircraft inappropriate for use in an air transport operation. Although 21.177 (b) allows an aircraft to be issued with a dual category COA (standard and restricted) where the aircraft can be easily reconfigured, almost all fixed wing aircraft conducting agricultural operation do so while holding a Restricted category COA. As operations conducted under Part 137 are essentially performed by aircraft with restricted category COA, at this point it is worth clarifying the concept of restricted category airworthiness certification. This is also important for the discussion of the USCAA document CAM 8 as it provided guidance in the certification of aircraft in the restricted category as opposed to the standard category. The following is intended to clarify the concepts of standard and restricted aircraft certification.
6 1:17 or 3.4 degrees or slightly under 500 fpm for the FU24 at 80 knots best ROC speed.
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Standard and Restricted Certification An Analogy
Certification of an aircraft can be compared with the design of a building to meet the New Zealand building codes. Similar to building codes, the aircraft certification standards are a list of requirements that the aircraft design must meet such as strength, ease of operation and even the colours of instrument markings. Like building codes they provide a certain amount of commonality between designs as well as ensuring a minimum level of safety. The certification basis refers to the particular version of the certification standard that was used for a given aircraft design. Like building codes, the certifications standards are constantly updated and generally become more stringent as time pass, and accidents occur. To be eligible for a standard category CA, the aircraft design has to meet all of the requirements of the certification basis in effect at the time the design is certified. Only aircraft with a Standard category C A are eligible to carry fare-paying passengers (Air Transport Operations). If the aircraft meets most but not all of the certification requirements, it may be eligible for a Restricted category C A. This certificate is issued with some restrictions such as Essential crew only or Not for flight over built-up areas. Restricted Category aircraft are not eligible for Air Transport operations but may conduct private and certain commercial operations As an illustration, consider the design of stairs in buildings. To meet the building code requirements the stairs in New Zealand houses must conform to a certain set of guidelines that require them to be neither too steep nor too flat. This constrains the design of staircases within certain limits and ensures that most steps encountered will have similar rise and tread dimension. These dimensions have been found to be the easiest to walk up and thus ensure the greatest safety for people of different ages and abilities. It is of course possible for able-bodied people to climb steps almost as steep as a ladder. While the building code for domestic dwellings allows little latitude, in an industrial building where access is limited to authorised staff, a much steeper set of stairs may be permitted (although usually fitted with a cautionary sign). Normal category aircraft are required to have as stalling speed no higher than 61 knots 7 to ensure they are easy to land by pilots of average skill. An aircraft with a higher stall speed could be approved in the restricted category based on the requirement experienced pilots fly it. In this way the certification of an aircraft in the restricted category is analogous to the approval of steep steps in an industrial building; the design does not meet all the requirements of the standard (domestic) category and may be more difficult to use, but it is not unsafe for its intended special purpose.
Civil Aeronautics Manual 8 Background to CAM 8
Civil Aeronautics Manual 8 (CAM 8) was a document published by USCAA on 11 October 1950. USCAA was the predecessor of the FAA). CAM 8 contained the policies and interpretations of the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics (ACA) to Part 8 of the regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board. At that time Regulation Part 8 was new, and a significant departure from previous restricted category airworthiness requirements. Part 8
7 FAR 23.49 c) 1, single engine aircraft
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was the regulation governing the issue of type certificates and airworthiness certificates in the restricted category. The new Part 8 departed from the previous requirements, which required an equivalent level of safety as a passenger-carrying aircraft. The ACA accepted that for special purposes, in this case agricultural, compliance with restricted category requirements could be simplified, and the operating limitations could be tailored to the purpose of the operation. The ACA also accepted that for certain special purpose operations, such as fire fighting and crop dusting, an equivalent level of safety to passenger carrying aircraft could not be established, as the entire operation was inherently more dangerous. Although the removal of the equivalent level of safety criteria made certification of agricultural aircraft more practicable there was still a requirement that good engineering practice be maintained, and that no feature of the design or modification would render the aircraft unsafe. The idea behind Part 8 was to provide the greatest flexibility and minimum burden on the operator, consistent with public safety. 8 CAM 8 was intended to provide guidance in the interpretation of the Regulations. The document has an unusual layout in that the Regulation is set out with numbers 8.0 through 8.34. Each regulation is followed by the ACAs interpretive materials, which are identified by consecutive dash numbers appended to the regulation numbers. Thus section 8.0-2 is the second of the Administrators guidelines to interpreting Regulation 8.0.
Analysis of CAM 8
CAM 8 is a certification standard, not an operational rule. It was intended for use by FAA staff certifying aircraft in the restricted category, and was also available to applicants for restricted category certificates. CAM 8 sections 8.0 through 8.34 describe the administrative procedures for issuing a type certificate to aircraft in the restricted category. CAM 8 considers aircraft eligible for a restricted category type certificate to fall into one of the following classifications. (CAM 8 section 8.10 refers) 1) New aircraft designs not previously type certified, but shown by the applicant to comply with all those requirements of the any other (i.e. standard) category, except those which the Administrator find inappropriate for the special purpose. 2) Ex US or foreign Military aircraft whether or not such aircraft have previously been issued a type certificate. 3) An aircraft modified from a design previously certificated in another (standard) category. For aircraft designed after 11 October 1950, and applying for a type certificate in the restricted category without first obtaining standard category certificate (classification 1 above), certification in the restricted category is to be carried out as detailed in 8.10-1. This section requires certification to the requirements of one of the standard categories, LESS those requirements deemed inappropriate. Appendix B to CAM 8 may be used as a guide to selecting the appropriate requirements, In effect CAM 8 Appendix B provides a cut down version of CAR 3 and could be considered the minimum standard for certification of new agricultural aircraft (in 1950). Appendix B contains the same basic requirements of
8 Annex B contains a brief outline of CAM 8 Prepared by CAA Rules Specialist P Elton
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CAR 3 with relief in some area (such as stall speed and climb performance) and tighter requirements in other areas such as crew restraints. CAM 8 Appendix B does not include the wing load curve; instead it requires the new wing design to be fully substantiated for the intended restricted category operating weight, Aircraft in classifications 2 and 3 (the ex-military and modified standard category aircraft) were assumed to have been already proven to a reasonable standard of airworthiness. These aircraft could apply for a restricted category certificate considering only the changes made to them in their new special purpose role. (Section 8.10-3 refers). For these aircraft, the certification process to be used is described in 8.10-3 which refers to 8.10-4 and thus Appendix A to CAM 8.
Requirements Of CAM 8 Appendix A
CAM 8 Appendix A provides guidance on how to undertake the conversion of an existing aircraft to a restricted category agricultural aircraft. Section 1.22 of CAM 8 Appendix A provide the following list of steps to address in the conversion of an aircraft, and indicate the way CAM 8 Appendix A was intended to be used by the Administrator. 1.22 Suggested Procedure for the Conversion of a Personal type to an Agricultural type (a) Determine what is required. (1) Dusting equipment installation. (2) Spray equipment installation. (3) Combination of (1) and (2) (4) Pay load (hopper or tank capacity) (5) Engine Change (6) Increase in gross weight (7) Change in flight characteristics (8) Modification of landing gear (9) Change in geometric configuration of fuselage (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) Determine design of hopper or spray tank Determine design of hopper venturi or spray boom, Determine structural modification necessary for hopper or spray tank installation and how to accomplish Determine power source for pressure pumps or agitators, (wind or engine). Determine location and installation of agitators or power pump unit. Determine location and installation of spray booms. Determine materials to be used. Check weight change. Make preliminary weight and balance check. Check the alteration for flight characteristics. Check the conversion for cost.
This list is followed by sections 2.0 though 9.1 which provide guidance in making the determinations listed above. Section 7.0 discussed weight and balance and Figure 7-1 entitled Possible Weight Increases is provided to assist with the selection of an increase in gross weight per step (a)(6) above. Note that once the new weight based on the wings
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reserve strength has been selected from the graph, the engineering assessment of the rest of the aircraft continues in accordance with the list in section 1.22 of CAM 8 Appendix A. One way to understand CAM 8 figure 7-1 is to consider just the bolts that attach the wing to the fuselage. In level flight, the wings are developing a lift force that equals the weight of the aircraft. This force is transmitted from the wings to the fuselage via the attachment bolts. To manoeuvre the aircraft, the wings must develop a force larger than the aircrafts weight to accelerate it in the desired direction. The magnitude of this force depends on the desired rate of acceleration. For aircraft design purposes this manoeuvring acceleration is taken as value between 3.5G, which is uncomfortable, and 6G which is close to the limit of consciousness for most people. Accordingly the wing attachment bolts and all the wing components, are sized so that during a sudden manoeuvre, the wings can develop a force of three or more times the aircrafts weight and transfer that force into the fuselage. Given that wing attachment bolts have been designed to take a force 3.5 or even 6 times greater than the weight of the entire aircraft, Figure 7-1 proposes that this reserve strength for manoeuvring, which is unused in straight and level flight, be traded for the ability to carry a heavier load. Essentially, the wing attachment bolts wont know the difference between a hard turn at moderate weight or a moderate turn at a high weight. Section 7 goes on to detail the assessment of the effect of the new gross weight on landing gear and the flight characteristics. Section 7.10 mentions the need to assess changes in C of G position as it may increase the load distributions between main wheels and nose or tail wheels. This may also occur when the aircrafts gross weight is retained, but the C of G for that weight is altered. An example would be the fitting of a hopper into the forward bomb bay of a torpedo bomber. While the overall weight is the same, it is not suspended evenly from the front and rear hangers as a load of torpedoes was, so the C of G and load distribution changes. The case where the CG remains the same but the gross weight is increased is not mentioned in Appendix A, it was considered too obvious to require comment, in what is essentially a guide and not a complete certification basis.
Manoeuvring Speed Limitation
CAM 8 Appendix A Figure 7-1 shows how the manoeuvring load factor built into an aircraft, already certified in the standard category, can be traded for higher weight lifting ability when operated in the restricted category. The obvious caveat to this is that the manoeuvring load factor (the ability to turn sharply and pull G) must be reduced in restricted category operations. The simplest way to do this is to restrict the maximum flying speed to Va. At this moderate speed, to generate significant G forces the wings angle of attack must be increased substantially. However the wing stalls at a maximum angle of attack regardless of airspeed. When the wing reached that angle (12-15 degrees depending on airfoil section) it stalls and lift decreases. The lift developed (and hence load it applies) just prior to stalling is proportional to the airspeed at that particular moment. Hence restricting Va limits the lift and thus manoeuvring load factor (G) that can be applied. It can be appreciated that restricting the speed at which the aircraft can be manoeuvred is a simpler method of limiting loads on the airframe than requiring the pilot to monitor a G meter during
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manoeuvres. 9 This reduction in manoeuvring and pull-up speeds is detailed in section 7.11 of CAM 8 Appendix A. Part 137 does not require any reduction in manoeuvring speed Va or the maximum permissible speed Vne, although it cautions the pilot to avoid severe manoeuvres CAM 8 section 8.10-3(e) specifies a flight characteristics and handling check. Appendix A section 9.0 provides a guide to the reduction in climb performance that can be expected. Section 9.02 notes there are two sources of reduction in climb performance, the extra weight, and the additional drag of the external dispensing equipment. Testing of aircraft with and without dispensing equipment showed the converted aircraft experienced a climb reduction of 15-30%. The addition of increased weight further decreased the climb performance and Figure 9-1 shows the approximate maximum rates of climb available at various weights for several typical models used in agricultural operations. The results showed climb reduction of 45-75%, at a weight of 20% above that which was used as a basis for the analysis. Figure 9-1 was complied to list the climb performance of some common light aircraft types at the time and reduce the need for flight-testing of those types. For new aircraft types CAM 8 Appendix B section .122 specifies a minimum rate of climb of 8Vs or 300 feet per minute whichever is greater 10.
Summary of CAM 8 Appendix A
CAM 8 Appendix A was intended to be used for the certification of existing standard category (or ex-Military) aircraft in the restricted category after their conversion to agricultural aircraft types. 11 This was done to ease the burden on the applicant who was often not the original manufacturer. This route to certification required basic flight-testing in the modified (increased weight) configuration but only as a check, as the basic aircraft was assumed to have been extensively flight tested in its previous role. The curve in CAM 8 provides a guide to the modifying engineer and the certifying authority as to how much reserve capacity the wing has. CAM 8 notes that the curve represents a limit that should be approached with caution, not used as guarantee of safe operation. The curve considers only the wing load capability and the rest of CAM 8 Appendix A details other structural considerations that need to be made during the conversion from standard to restricted category operations. New aircraft not previously issued with a type certificate that applies for a type certificate in the restricted category are required to be type certificated in accordance with CAM 8 Appendix B.
9 CAM 8 section 8.30-1 authorises the administrator to prescribe limitations such as Vne reduction to Va 10 Rate of Climb (feet/min) = Stalling Speed (mph) x 8. For example at the maximum permissible stalling speed of 70mph (App B .121), minimum ROC = 560 fpm. 11 CAM 8 section 8.10-3 and 8.10-4 refer.
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Certification of the FU24-950 Comparison of Regulatory Requirements
The commonly used Pacific Aerospace Ltd FU24-950 provides an illustration of the different way in which certification of aircraft for agricultural operations has been handled between the New Zealand and United States systems.. The FU24-950 and 954 were designed as an update of the FU24 to include the 400HP eight cylinder Lycoming engine and were type certified in New Zealand on 11 December 1970. (New Zealand type certificate data sheet (TCDS) A3-Part 2 refers.) The certification basis was the former FAA standard Civil Aviation Rule (CAR) 3 dated 1956, carried over from the previous FU24 model. MCTOW was 4859 lbs in the standard category, and 5430lbs in the Agricultural Category. The agricultural weight represents a 12% increase over the standard category takeoff weight and was calculated in accordance with Civil Aviation Department leaflet C.10-7 In 1978 the then New Zealand Aerospace Industries Ltd was granted a United States type certificate for the FU24-954. (FAA type certificate A9PC refers.) The certification basis was FAR 21.29 in the normal category, FAR 21.25 in the restricted category, which included FAR 23 effective Feb 1965 (amendment 23-21). Compliance was also shown with the FAR 36 noise requirements. Possibly to comply with the Noise Control Act 1972 (required by FAR 36) the maximum all up weight was limited to 4600lbs in both normal and restricted category operations. 12 In restricted category operations the aircraft speed was limited to 114 knots, which was the maximum structural cruising speed (Vno or essentially the same as Va for this aircraft) A significant change between CAR 3 (May 1956) and FAR 23 amendment 23-21 (1965) was the introduction of a requirement to assess the airframe fatigue life. Accordingly the FU24-950/954 main spar was limited to 7200 flight hours, with the option to extend spar life with further approval by the FAA. The FU24-950/954 was not certified to CAM 8 in either the New Zealand or United States regulatory systems. Under the present FAA part 137 the FU24-950 is eligible for operation in the United States in the restricted category at a maximum weight of 4600lbs. By comparison CAA Part 137 states that an agricultural aircraft may be operated at a weight equal to the aircrafts certified weight multiplied by the appropriate factor taken from the graph in Appendix B (31% for the FU24 or 6366 lbs). The pilot may operate at this new maximum weight subject to his assessment of the prevailing conditions, particularly strip length and wind speed. Although the aircraft is now operating at a weight 31% above the weight the design was certified for, no engineering assessments or modifications to the basic airframe are required by CAA Part 137 or the TCDS. If certification of this aircraft in accordance with CAM 8 Appendix A was attempted, 13 the new maximum weight selected from the curve should have been used to complete all of the other checks listed in CAM 8 Appendix A section1.22, including substantiation of the landing gear and flight characteristics
12 Noise level is measured at certain distance from commencement of the take off run. The easiest way to keep the aircraft below a certain noise level is to lighten it, so it takes off sooner and climbs quicker. The aircraft continues to make the same actual noise, but as perceived by an observer at a fixed spot on the ground it is higher and further way and thus quieter. 13 Arguably as a new purpose built type it should have been certified under CAM 8 App B.
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If the curve is correct in predicting the wing reserve strength, operation at the Part 137 overload weight should not cause wing failures, but without modification of the other supporting structures an increase in their failure rates can be expected. The occurrence history of the FU24 will be examined in Chapter 5 of this report, but as a summary the results are: FU24 Aircraft, Defects reported to CAA 1970 -2007 Wing 7
Figure 3.3
Undercarriage 90
Considering the long service history of FU24 operations in New Zealand, there have been relatively few wing defects recorded despite the arduous flying conditions. In the same timeframe the number of undercarriage defects has been much higher. This is consistent with Part 137s application of the CAM 8 wing load curve without requiring any further analysis of associated structure such as the undercarriage. Part 137 Appendix B has only been in effect since October 1994. Section 5 Part 2 examines the FU24 undercarriage failure rate in detail and indicates an increase in the rate after 1994.
Current status of CAM 8
In February 1965, the FAA issued AC 20-22 which stated that the information in CAM 1, 3, 4a, 4b, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9,10,13 and 14 could be used in conjunction with specific sections of the CARs to which type were applicable. In effect this adopted CAM 8 for continued use with the new United States Code of Federal Regulations Approximately 10 years later, in March 1975, AC20-33A temporarily deleted the reference to CAM 8, but two months later it was re-instated by AC 20-33B for use with small restricted category agricultural aircraft certified under Part 21, 21.25. This policy continued until July 1981 when FAA order 8130.2 eliminated CAM 8 from being used for certifying new restricted category agricultural aircraft. In 1992 two manufacturers of agricultural aircraft petitioned the FAA to develop a new set of certification requirements strictly for agricultural aircraft. After a series of meetings, AC 21.25-1 was produced to detail the certification requirements. The agreement reached was that the certification requirements for agricultural aircraft would be all the requirements for FAR 23 (the standard light aircraft standard) less those requirements found inappropriate. An Appendix to AC 21.25-1 listed those requirements that were likely to be considered inappropriate. The test above was taken from the FAA AC 21.25-1. CAM 8 is no longer operative in the United States, although the current requirements for the certification of restricted category agricultural aircraft are a development of the intent of CAM 8 Appendix B.
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Summary of CAM 8 and Part 137
Part 137 exempts any aircraft engaged in agricultural operations from the normal take-off weight, strip length and obstacle-free climb-out requirements. Part 137 Appendix B contains a graph that indicates the certified take-off weight may be increased by up to 31% for the FU24 aircraft. Pilots are required to consider ambient conditions and their effect on performance, but no actual figures are provided. The graph in Part 137 Appendix B was taken from figure 7-1 of CAM 8 Appendix A. CAM 8 was intended as a guide to the certification of aircraft in the restricted category. CAM 8 was produced to detail the United States administrators policies with respect to Regulation 8 that governed certification in the restricted category. It was intended for use by USCAA staff and the aircraft designers working to produce or modify aircraft for agricultural operations. Appendix A provides a guide to certifying aircraft modified from existing (standard or ex-military) category aircraft. Appendix B details the requirements for purpose built agricultural aircraft. The suggested procedure for modifying an existing aircraft for agricultural operations is laid out in section 1.22 of CAM Appendix A. One of the initial steps in the process was to determine how much of a weight increase the original aircraft wings were capable of supporting. Figure 7-1 was a guide to selecting a new all up weight based on a trade-off between manoeuvring ability and weight carrying ability. This new weight was then to be used for the subsequent engineering and operational assessments, and finally listed on the restricted category Certificate of Airworthiness. Part 137 Appendix B has copied Figure 7-1 from CAM 8 Appendix A without requiring the subsequent engineering assessment and or modifications outlined in CAM 8 Appendix A. This is inconsistent with the intent of CAM 8. The use of figure 7-1 from CAM 8 as a guide to safe operations by Part 137, without requiring engineering changes is likely to lead to an accelerated failure rate of load bearing components other than the wing, including, but not restricted to, the undercarriage. CAM 8 was not an operational rule and does not provide guidance on the day-to-day operation of the aircraft or conduct of agricultural operations. CAM 8 has been discontinued in the United States since 1982 and is no longer used as a certification basis. The intent of CAM 8 has been captured by FAR 21.25, which is an aircraft certification rule. There are significant differences in the operating limitations placed on the FU24-950 in New Zealand and the United States. This suggests that Part 137 is not well harmonised with its equivalent in the United States. Neither the FU24 nor Cresco aircraft have been certified to CAM 8. United States agricultural aircraft produced since 1950 have been certified to CAM 8 or its successors at the restricted category weight listed in their type certificate data sheets. Notwithstanding the application of CAM 8 to Part 137,operation in the restricted category at weights higher than the MCTOW is feasible where the weight increase is supported by:
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a) A complete engineering assessment of the loads on the airframe at the increased weight. b) A flight operations assessment of the aircrafts performance and handling characteristics at the nominated increased weight. c) Publication of the Restricted Category Agricultural weight in the aircraft flight manual (usually by supplement). CAM 8 formerly provided guidance on conducting engineering and flight assessments at increased weights. Although it is now discontinued, the intent of CAM 8 has been incorporated into the current restricted category certification practices of the United States and other countries. Prior to the introduction of Part 137, the New Zealand Civil Aviation Department permitted operations at an Agricultural Category weight that was detailed in Leaflet C.10-7. This weight amounted to a 12% increase for the FU24 as a typical example. Operation at this weight required a 6% climb gradient and publication of take-off distance information in the flight manual.
Chapter 3 - Conclusions Conclusion 3.1
The overload provision of Part 137 do not provide an adequate basis for operations at weights beyond MCTOW.
Conclusion 3.2
The overload provisions of Part 137 do not adequately specify how a restricted category (agricultural) weight for a given aircraft type can be safely established.
Conclusion 3.3
The best way to establish a technically and operationally safe restricted category weight for the purposes of agricultural would be the establishment of a working grop consisting of industry representatives and operations GA operations staff, supported by ACU engineering staff.
Conclusion 3.4
There is a need to fully review current FAA practice for agricultural operations and current FAA certification requirements for new agricultural aircraft when developing the acceptable means. However, United States requirements should not necessarily be adopted without modification as New Zealand agricultural operations have unique and wellrecognised characteristics that should be taken into account.
Conclusion 3.5
CAD leaflet C.10-1 to C.10-4 could be considered as a basis for establishing an acceptable means of operation beyond MCTOW.
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Chapter 4 CAA Safety Data Review

Scope item 3: Review NZ airworthiness schedules for all agricultural aircraft types currently in operation or under certification.
Introduction
This was the most time-consuming and in the end the most important part of the Review. The review of the occurrences had two significant findings: a) b) The recorded occurrences show significant changes in the accident and incident rates, after changes in regulatory policies. The CAA management of recorded occurrence information could be significantly improved to provide more useful safety management information.
Because of the significance of the findings, it is necessary to understand how the information presented in this chapter was derived. For example it is not currently possible to interrogate the CAA database for a listing of Agricultural Aircraft Occurrences. A method of doing this had to be developed during the course of the Review. The method has application for future use by the CAA, as well as implications for the way safety occurrence data is handled, so it is detailed in Section 1 of this Chapter. Section 2 of this chapter discusses the results of the analysis of the data collected. Section 3 provides some supplementary information related to aircraft characteristics. This information assists in the interpretation of the data in Section 2.
Section 1 - Collection Method

This chapter details the data collection and analysis methods. Readers may wish to proceed to Section 2 which discusses the results and return to this section. The first problem in accomplishing the review of agricultural aircraft occurrences is that it is not possible for the CAA database to provide a list of Agricultural Aircraft Occurrences The database can list occurrences by aircraft model, or by occurrences type and various combinations, but Agricultural Aircraft is not a defined category for occurrences, although it is used by the Safety Analysis Unit SAU) as an industry sector category. It may be possible in future to categorise occurrences by industry sector or operational type, which would make the process employed by the Review much easier to perform.
Occurrence Types
The CAA database categorises safety occurrences into 14 types. Accident is an obvious occurrence type, and the category defects includes serious faults whether found in service or scheduled maintenance. The third type of occurrence considered by this review was the category incidents. An incident is as serious event that is not an accident. An example could be the loss of engine power in flight, followed by a successful emergency landing. Aviation Related Concerns (ARCs) were also considered as this is sometimes used a catch-
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all category, but there were not significant numbers of ARCs involving agricultural aircraft, apart from low flying complaints.
Identification of Agricultural Aircraft Types
All aircraft operators in New Zealand are required by Part 12 to report events that have safety implications. The CAA stores the occurrences in a database. 14 The occurrences are categorised into 14 types and the database can be interrogated to provide a list of all occurrences of a certain type or all occurrence types for any one aircraft model. To review all the occurrences involving agricultural aircraft, the first step was to determine which aircraft models can be classified as agricultural aircraft. While some of these aircraft models were reasonably obvious such as the Pacific Aerospace (PAC) Cresco and FU24 aircraft series, numerous other types have been involved in agricultural work over the years. Since 1994 agricultural operators have been required to submit returns to the CAA detailing the hours flown on agricultural operations, along with the aircraft type. This data proved useful in determining which aircraft types had been deployed on agricultural operations. It also provided some information about the relative exposure of certain aircraft types to agricultural operations, and the way in which this changed with time. This information was produced by the SAU and after manipulation in MS Excel, produced the following graphs (Figures 1,2 and3).
Figure 4.1
14
MS Access based
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Figure 4.1 shows the total hours reported on agricultural operations per year from 19942006, divided into fixed wing and rotary wing. It is notable that the total hours flown by fixed wing aircraft has remained almost constant while rotary wing aircraft have steadily increased their hours. It is also apparent the helicopter hours are being flown in addition to the fixed wing hours. Helicopters are probably moving into new areas of operation and not taking over the bulk spreading of solid fertiliser that is still the domain of fixed wing operations. There appears to be a long-term almost sinusoidal variation in both fixed wing and rotary agricultural operations. This cycle, which seems to be almost 10 years long, is probably linked to agricultural commodity prices, exchange rate, weather conditions or a combination.
Figure 4.2
Figure 4.2 takes the rotary wing hours portion of Figure 4.1 and breaks it down by helicopter type. This graph shows how some types such as the Bell 206 Jet Ranger, (mid blue) and the MD 369 Hughes 500(dark red) have performed an almost constant amount of work over the years while newer types such as the R22 (olive green) and its bigger brother the R44 (orange) have increased their operations in recent years. As the agricultural rotary wing accident rate was so much smaller than the agricultural fixed wing accident rate, the review has not examined rotary wing agricultural operations any further.
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Figure 4.3
Figure 4.3 takes fixed wing agricultural aircraft and breaks down the annual reported hours by type. A number of observations can be made from this graph. a. The two most numerous Pacific Aerospace aircraft types, the FU24 series and the 08-600 Cresco, have shouldered the burden of agricultural operations. In 2007 between them they contributed about 80% of the agricultural operating hours. The FU24 has slowly surrendered some of this workload to the 08-600 Cresco since its introduction in the early 1990s. Other significant agricultural types such as the Cessna Agwagon and AirTractor series have flown fewer hours in recent years,.
b. c.
Because the FU24 and Cresco comprise the bulk of agricultural hours, statistically it could be expected that 80% of the agricultural aircraft safety occurrences will involve either the FU24 or Cresco models. The following section examines the safety occurrence history of the FU24 and Cresco in more detail than some of the other types because they comprise such a significant proportion of the hours flown. The next most exposed types are the GA200, AirTractor series, Ag wagon and Zlin. Unfortunately for this analysis the CAA database counts the FU24 series as 15 different models, listed below, so the database had to be interrogated carefully and repeatedly to ensure all of the FU24 series occurrences where captured. The Cresco and 750XL and the various Air Tractor models were much more straightforward, only two Cresco models appear in database. It was realised that there is a function in the CAA Explorer under
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Reporting Operations then Analysis and Tools. This function requires a search by aircraft, one model per search, along with other event descriptors such as ATA fault code, so each model had to be searched several times. This became very cumbersome for the FU24 series, and did not pick up several occurrences that were already known to the author, because of the way the data for a given occurrence had been entered. For these reasons an alternative approach was developed as follows.
Popular_Name Fletcher Fletcher Fletcher Fletcher Fletcher Fletcher Fletcher Fletcher Fletcher Fletcher Fletcher Fletcher Fletcher Fletcher Fletcher Aircraft_Model FU24 FU24-950 FU24-950 FU24-950M FU24-950M FU24-950M FU24-954 FU24-954 FU24A-950 FU24A-950M FU24A-954 FU24-950M FU24-950M FU24A-950M FU24A-950M Model_Id 454 456 457 458 459 460 461 462 463 464 466 1091 1092 1097 1098 Manufacturer_Name Air Parts (NZ) Limited Air Parts (NZ) Limited New Zealand Aerospace Industries Limited Air Parts (NZ) Limited New Zealand Aerospace Industries Limited Pacific Aerospace Corporation Limited New Zealand Aerospace Industries Limited Pacific Aerospace Corporation Limited New Zealand Aerospace Industries Limited New Zealand Aerospace Industries Limited New Zealand Aerospace Industries Limited Fletcher Aviation Corporation Sargent Fletcher Company Fletcher Aviation Corporation Sargent Fletcher Company
Figure 4.4 FU24 Model ID Table
Figure 4.4 lists the 15 different Model ID numbers that have been assigned to the FU24 series. This was done intentionally as the aircraft differ in detail and ownership of the design has passed between different corporate identities. Note also that there is no unique model ID for FU24 that have been converted to turbine power, they are considered to be the same as the donor aircraft for reporting purposes. This makes it impossible to directly extract safety information for turbine powered FU 24 aircraft. Nonetheless due to the interest in piston vs. turbine FU24 accident rates, the SAU compiled a breakdown of the number of hours flown by piston and turbine variants and this information is shown in figure 4.5. This graph shows how turbine variants have increased their share of the total FU24 hours as the aircraft were converted in increasing numbers from 1998-2004. Since then approximately 50% of the hours reported for FU24 aircraft have been flown by turbine variants (primarily Walter M601D-11NZ under Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) 21E/98/15). Note also the total hours flown by the FU24 fleet has steadily declined. This is due to the fact the aircraft are no longer in production and there has been some attrition in the number of active aircraft. The attrition is due to both accidents and intentional retirement.
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Figure 4.5
Identification of the Significant Agricultural Types
From the reported hours statistics it was apparent that although there were more than 20 types conducting agricultural operation in the period 1994-2007, the analysis could be more usefully concentrated on those few significant types that contributed the majority of the operating hours. By combining the reported agricultural hours statistics with the recorded occurrences for each type the following table was produced. As expected the highest number of occurrences are recorded against the aircraft types that flew the most hours. This table also establishes that almost 99.9% of agricultural operations were conducted by nine aircraft types. This was a much more manageable number for review and comparison. Note the occurrence statistics go back to 1970 but the hours only to 1994, so this table cannot be used to determine occurrence rates per flying hour. This is also why the Airtruk has recorded a significant number of occurrences while not reporting many hours, these occurrences occurred prior to 1994, by which time the aircraft type had almost been retired. Accordingly, the Airtruk occurrences were not analysed any further. For reference Figure 4.8 contains an illustration of the Transavia Pl-12Airtruk and the recorded occurrences are listed in Annex K
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Type FU24 Cresco 750XL GA200 AirTractor Agwagon Zlin AgCat Airtruk Sub Total All Ag Hours Foreign Ag Hours
Figure 4.6
Hours 1994-2007 384478 130111 3001 31590 16237 15081 5174 4255 405 589928 590971 62908
% of Total Hours 65.08 22.02 0.51 5.35 2.75 2.55 0.88 0.72 0.07 99.85
Occurrences 1970-2007 609 341 31 32 9 106 45 8 15 1196
10.65
Graphically the relative percentages of the almost 0.6 million hours flown on agricultural operations between 1994 and 2007, are shown below in figure 4.7.
Figure 4.7
For aircraft types other than Pacific Aerospace types, the fleet size of each model was so small that meaningful analysis of the occurrence statistics is difficult. Accordingly to
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provide some meaningful comparison, the three most popular non-PAC types were grouped together as Foreign Ag Types which together made up just over 10% of the hours. This allowed some reasonable comparisons to be made between the FU24 (65%) Cresco (22%) and the foreign agricultural types (10.65%) which consisted of the Air Tractor variants, The Cessna Ag Wagon variants and the Gippsland GA200 Fatman variants.
Identification of Occurrences for Significant Agricultural Types
By the process described above, the various aircraft types, which could be considered significant agricultural aircraft were determined. This made it possible to interrogate the database to find all the occurrences recorded for these types. This produced a list of 1196 separate occurrence files to analyse. The significant agricultural aircraft types are illustrated on the following pages for reference.
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Significant Agricultural Aircraft Types in New Zealand
Figure 4.8 Pacific Aerospace FU24-950 Fletcher
Figure 4.9 Pacific Aerospace 08-600 Cresco
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Figure 4.10 Turbine Conversions Ltd FU24Walter Fletcher
Figure 4.11 Pacific Aerospace Ltd 750XL
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Figure 4.12 Zlin Z137T
Figure 4.13 Transavia PL-12 Airtruk
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Figure 4.14 Cessna A188 Agwagon
Figure 4.15 Air Tractor AT-402B
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Figure 4.16 Gippsland Aeronautics GA 200
Figure 4.17 Douglas DC-3 For reference, no longer used
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Occurrence Categorisation
By the process described all the CAA recorded occurrences, i.e., accident, incidents, and defects for the principal agricultural aircraft types were identified. This comprised 1196 occurrences listed in date order from 1970 to mid 2007. To analyse this data a means of sorting it had to be devised. While the review was being carried out the CAA also carried out an accident investigation on ZK-DZG, an FU24 aircraft that crashed in November 2006 killing both crew members. The accident investigation revealed that the fin had failed in flight, which generated interest in how many other fin failures, near failures or even slight defects had been recorded. Unfortunately the CAA database could not be searched reliably for occurrences attributed to defects of a certain component. While it was possible to search for occurrences involving a certain part number, this field was far from consistently filled in, particularly for occurrences prior to 1994. Searches by this method failed to find even those occurrences that the author was already aware of. Sometimes the defective part field was blank, other times the same component had been given various descriptions, i.e. Fin, Vertical Stabiliser, Rudder, Tail, 240253-1. To get any sort of useful meaning from this data a system of classification was required. The occurrence data for each model was classified by running a report in the database for each model using the same set of fields. The primary fields were Occurrence Number, Date of Occurrence, Aircraft Registration and the Description. The database report could be exported to a MS Excel spreadsheet to allow further manipulation. Once it was in the spreadsheet each occurrence was assigned a classification code from the following table. The classification codes were typed into the spreadsheet manually after reading the description of each event. Where the description itself was not clear enough, the occurrence itself could be opened back in database to get more details. This was time consuming process. The description was used to determine the classification according to the following table. The occurrence codes are arbitrary, fin related problems were a priority at the time so given the code 1, the next biggest concern was undercarriage, hence they were assigned a 2 and on down assigning a new code to each classification as they were encountered.
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Code 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Figure 4.18
Category Unknown Vertical Stabiliser (fin and rudder) Landing Gear Wing Attachments Engine Mount Turbine Engine Piston Engine Operational Error Propeller Performance Electrical Controls Fuel Horizontal Stabiliser Wing Fuselage Pilot Medical
Consideration of ATA Code Use
For the defects, the ATA code system could have been utilised. ATA codes were developed by the Airline Transport Association and are used to classify aircraft systems into categories to introduce some common formats into documents such as maintenance programs. The use of ATA codes is current practice by the Safety Investigation Unit when entering defects into the database. Some ATA codes are quite broad unless the sub codes are used, for example ATA code 27 Stabilisers would cover both the vertical fin and the horizontal stabilisers. In addition ATA codes are not applicable to the accident and incident occurrence types, such as operational error, performance, pilot medical. While the classification system developed for this project was essential to enable the following data analysis it was very time consuming to implement. In addition a reasonable amount of experience and judgement is required. As this process has produced some very useful information, that have potential uses for other operational areas, it is recommended that the CAA Safety Information Group consider how aspects of this method of data analysis could be incorporated into the CAA information management system.
Conclusion 4.1
The current CAA safety information management system does not permit easy analysis of certain safety data. The techniques used in the Review could be adapted to provide the CAA with enhanced research capabilities.
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Operational Error and Performance Classifications
Most of the classification codes are self evident except the following two that require explanation. At first glance there were a lot of occurrences that were clearly, no fault of the aircraft Typically these were accidents where a serviceable aircraft had collided with an object. These were originally given the code 7 Operational. As the classification process wore on it became apparent there were two subtypes of operation error. While some of the accidents occurred on landing, or in ground manoeuvring, there were a number that had fairly consistent description such as aircraft encountered sink on takeoff, sudden tail wind prevented aircraft from getting airborne, aircraft commenced dumping but hit fence at end of strip. The common feature of these accidents was that they occurred during or shortly after takeoff and involved combinations of high aircraft weight, and/or reduced aircraft performance. In short these were occurrences where the aircraft lost its ongoing battle to overcome gravity. These were quite different from the landing or ground handling accidents where the aircraft had performance to spare but was mishandled. While it would be unfair to say that all of the failure to remain airborne accidents imply the aircraft were overloaded, all of the operational occurrences due to overloading will be found in this group.
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Section 2 - Analysis by Type

Introduction Part 1 of this chapter detailed the methods used to extract from the database all the CAA recorded safety occurrences for the significant agricultural aircraft types operated in New Zealand since 1970. The final result was 609 occurrences for the FU24 series, 341 for the Cresco and 147 for the three principal foreign types combined. For aircraft types other than the FU24 and Cresco, the number of occurrences was too small to provide meaningful data on trends and rates. Hence some of the following analysis concentrates on the FU24. This is primarily because it was the largest single set of data, but also because the predominance of the FU24 as a type meant its occurrence statistics it could be used as a reasonable approximation to the whole of the industry. The concentration on FU24 statistics is not intended to suggest the type has particularly poor safety record except where a direct comparison is made between it and other types. Reporting Rates. There have been suggestions that industry is not reporting occurrences to the CAA as frequently as it used to. The investigation of unreported defects was scope item number 4 and is covered in Chapter 5. This review determined that reporting of defects to CAA, while certainly less than 100% of actual events provides a reasonable picture of events, and has not markedly reduced in recent years.
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Occurrence Category Breakdown - PAC Aircraft The following graphs show how the occurrences vary by category for the three Pacific aerospace types, the FU24, the Cresco and 750XL.
CAA Database Occurrences FU24 Series

200
180
160
140
120 Number of Occurrneces
100
80
60
40
20
0 Wing Attachments Performance Engine Mount Operational Error Turbine Engine Horizontal Stabiliser Vertical Stabilser Piston Engine Landing Gear Pilot Medical 16 Electrical Controls Unknown Fuel Propeller Fuselage 15 Wing 14
10
11
12
13
Figure 4.19
FU24 Series reported 609 occurrences from 1970 to 2007. Leading cause was operational error, followed by piston engine defects (this is all occurrences, not necessarily failures). Almost equal with piston engine defects are the number of landing gear defects (90). Vertical stabiliser defects are noticeably more evident than wing, or horizontal stabiliser defects. Performance occurrences are also common for this aircraft type. The FU24 data is analysed in more detail in the following pages.
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100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0
CAA Database Occurrences 08-600 Cresco
Rudder
Propeller
Performance
Engine Mount
Operational Error
Wing Attachments
Turbine Engine
Piston Engine
Horizontal Stabiliser
Vertical Stabiliser
1a
Landing Gear
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
Figure 4.20
For the Cresco, operational error occurrences decrease markedly, as do performance occurrences. When this graph was discussed with industry many agreed this was probably due to the fact that pilots graduated to the Cresco from the FU24 so were typically more experienced, hence a reduction in the operational error category. The superior performance of the 750 HP Pratt & Whitney PT6-34AG engine in the Cresco appears to have to reduced the number of performance occurrences. The Cresco has a good power to weight ratio which tends to decrease the occurrences of performance incidents. For a comparison of aircraft power/weight ratios, refer to Section 3 of Chapter 4. The more disturbing statistic from the Cresco graph was the high number of control system and landing gear defects. Considering the control systems category first, this category includes ailerons, elevators rudders, flaps and trim controls. Within this category many of the defects were with the trim system. The predominance of control system defects was a surprise to the CAA Aircraft Certification Unit and the manufacturer. Until this review defects had been investigated by the CAA on a case-by-case basis without grouping related failures. While the CAA and industry were becoming aware of a relatively high number of landing gear failures, the less dramatic control defects had gone unnoticed. It is worth considering that landing gear failures, while they can lead to a loss of control during a critical phase of flight (take-off or landing) can only occur on or very close to the ground, while control system failures can occur at any time in flight.
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Pilot Medical
Electrical
Controls
Fuel
Unknown
Fuselage
Wing
The 750XL shares many of the same parts from the Cresco, and although the total number of occurrences was very low, the data suggests already that some problems may have been carried over. For example its leading defect category is the control system.
Figure 4.21
In the preceding graphs note the vertical scale changes to reflect the lower overall number of occurrences for the Cresco and 750XL models, due mainly to their shorter time in service.
Figure 4.22
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The graph above shows the PAC aircraft faults category to the same scale. The different lengths of service for each type have an obvious effect on the absolute numbers of each occurrence category, but there are some common feature to the shape of the distributions. For example both the FU24 and Cresco have significant numbers of defects in the landing gear, engine mount and vertical stabiliser categories. The Cresco differs from the FU24 in the Operational Error, Controls and the Wing, Fuselage and Horizontal Stabiliser categories.
The Cherokee as a Control Case
The occurrence data for the three PAC products was shared with the manufacturer on 19 November 2007. Up until that time CAA contact with PAC had been on a occurrence by occurrence basis, so this sort of trend information had not been previously presented. In particular the relative number of control system problems caused concern, During that meeting PAC raised the valid point that the high incidence of control problems could be just a natural attribute of the way the data was collected, i.e. a very broad category that inherently collects many occurrences.
Figure 4.23
In response, the same data collation exercise was performed for the Piper PA-28 Cherokee series. The Cherokee was chosen as the control as it is an all-metal low-wing piston monoplane of similar configuration and vintage to the FU24. In addition, the FU24 designer, John Thorpe went on to design the Cherokee, and some aspects of their construction are similar, such as the simple oleo landing gear. The resulting distribution of defect occurrences is shown below.
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Figure 4.24
It can be seen that the distribution of defects is quite different between these otherwise similar aircraft types. The distribution of defects thus represents the true behaviour of a given aircraft design in service. From this graph the FU24 controls are more than twice as likely to give problems as the same items on the PA28, and the Cresco was even more likely than the FU24 to have control problems. It will be noted that the number of occurrences is comparable and the date range is the same and that both aircraft types were in service throughout 1970-2007. The high number of PA-28 electrical occurrences deserves explanation. A large number of these were radio problems. The PAC aircraft had reported only a few radio problems so Radio was not chosen as a separate category, they were combined with the relatively few other electrical system faults. When it came to categorise the PA28 occurrences, for consistency the radio faults had to be included with electrical. This is an example of how the analysis method developed for this review would need to be modified if it were to be used more widely by the CAA.
Conclusion 4.2
This comparison verifies the validity of the occurrence categorisation method as a way of comparing the relative service history of different aircraft designs. The distribution of occurrences is a function of both the soundness of the design and its operating environment. Together they represent the designs fitness for purpose or airworthiness.
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FU24 Detailed Occurrence Analysis. With the occurrences sorted by aircraft type and occurrence category, it was possible to further analyse categories of interest. The principal concerns expressed by industry for the PAC FU24 aircraft included, 15 Fin structural defects Undercarriage defects Engine mount defects,
In addition the CAA was concerned about possible overload related occurrences, particularly due to the conclusion reached by the Lewis Report. Scope item 2 of this report set out to review the CAA recorded occurrences to see if there was any basis for these stated concerns. To examine the validity of industry claims that defect rates were rising the various defect types were plotted against their date of occurrence to detect any significant change in the rate of occurrences over the available history. The following graphs show the cumulative number of occurrences plotted against date of occurrence. Thus the local slope of each curve gives the rate at which that defect is occurring, (i.e. defects per year). This data is not normalised for flying hours because of difficulties with the way the data was presented by the database and the fact that the occurrences go back to 1970 but agricultural hours have only been reported since 1994. However if the FU24 fleet hours of Figure 4.5 are kept in mind, which showed a steady reduction in FU24 flying hours since 1994, the effect of normalising would be to steepen all the FU24 curves in recent years.
15 Industry Concerns are detailed further in Chapter 9.
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Figure 4.25
Fin Defects.
Points with aircraft registration marks denote in-flight fin failures. In all cases severe directional control difficulties were experienced, but in 6 cases emergency landings were achieved. The pilot of ZK-BPY lost control during the landing and was seriously injured. The pilots of EGO and DZG were both killed after losing control of their aircraft. The blue crosses denote when a fin structural defect was reported. The in-flight failures prior to ZK-EGO were due to failures of the fin attachment fitting. No fitting failures or defects have been reported since they were replaced by steel items per Airworthiness Directive DCA/FU24/172. Both ZK-EGO, and ZK-DZG were failures of the skin outboard of (above) the fitting. Note increase in rate of reported defects since ZK-EGOs accident in 2001. While it is possible that this is true increase in defects due to aging aircraft it is more likely that industry have been more inclined to report defects since the fatal failures of ZK-EGO and ZK-DZG, or that the AD has raised awareness of the critical nature of these defects, or both of these reasons. Vertical lines indicate when the three ADs concerning FU24 fin airworthiness were released. A detailed summary of each of the fin failures on the FU24 and Cresco aircraft is included as Annex M.
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25
20
FU24 Engine Mount Defects
15
10
Engine Type
Lycoming IO-720 Walter M601D-11NZ Pratt & Whitney PT6
0 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Figure 4.26
Engine Mount Defects
Figure 4.26 displays the occurrence of engine mount defects for the FU24 series, including the engine type. There were only two engine mount defects recorded prior to 2000. The category Engine Mount Occurrences includes bolt fractures, and fractures of the engine mount structural elements. All but one of the failures since 2001 were of turbine converted aircraft for which the engine mount is a new part number, installed under a Supplemental Type Certificate, or modification approval. Individual occurrences are colour coded to denote the aircraft engine type. Walter engine conversions and Pratt & Whitney PT6 conversions have dominated the recent increase in engine defects, although failures of the original engine mounts are not unknown. Considering the failure rate of the turbine converted aircraft engine mounts, it is unlikely that the engine mount designer miscalculated the loads. Other explanations include the possibility that the certification load case does not adequately describe the loads seen in service, or that the installation was not carried out correctly. Some of these failures include fatigue fractures of the attachment bolts which was due to the intended installation procedure being unable to be followed. As a result an alternative was developed which resulted in the bolts being inadvertently installed with insufficient torque. This left them vulnerable to cyclic loading and resulted in fatigue failures. This problem has been addressed, in which case a levelling off in this curve can be expected. Note that this analysis has intentionally grouped failures of the engine mount tubes, gussets and bolts as they all represent a failure of the engine mount assembly to perform its intended function. As such they need to be considered together in assessing the overall airworthiness of the engine mount assembly. Appendix N discusses the method of grouping the failures of related systems with particular reference to the FU24 vertical stabiliser.
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Figure 4.27
FU24 Performance Occurrences
Figure 4.27 shows the cumulative total of the FU24 performance related occurrences plotted against the date of occurrence. The slope thus indicates the rate of occurrences with respect to calendar time. There is some noise in this curve (variability). This is due to the fact that there are a number of contributing factors for performance occurrences and they include environmental effects such as gusting tail winds and natural downdrafts. Nonetheless there are four distinct slopes to the curve. The three most significant are marked with dotted lines. The purple line indicates an almost constant rate from 1979 until 1994. In this period the FU24 fleet was largely composed of 400HP FU24-950 or the modified 950-M variants. Around 1994 the rate trends upwards, after the overload provision of Part 137 Appendix B increased the take-off weight from 5430lbs to 6366lbs. After 2001 the rate decreases sharply. This is likely due to the increasing numbers of turbine Fletchers entering service. With 550HP available for take-off and initial climb the aircraft have better performance making them are less likely to hit the fence at the end of the strip on takeoff. Note the rate of occurrences (slope) post 2001 falls back to a similar rate to the 400HP aircraft in the period 1978 to 1994. In the aircraft comparisons table of Chapter 4 Section 3, the power to weight ratio of the 400HP FU24 was 0.074 HP/lb at the pre 1994 Ag category weight (12% overload). It dropped to 0.063 at the part 137 overload (31%) weight and then rose to 0.086 under the Part 137 weight (31%) with Walter turbine engine. This confirms what most pilots would intuitive understand; the rate of performance related accidents is inversely proportional to the aircrafts power to weight ratio. The higher the power to weight the fewer performance related accidents.
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FU24 Landing Gear Occurrences
From the overall reported hours and overall number of occurrences the following was comparison was made between the FU24 and the foreign agricultural types as defined in Chapter 3 Section 1. Period Reported Agricultural Hours FU24 undercarriage defect rate Foreign Ag types undercarriage defect rate
Figure 4.28
1994-2007 590790 (0.6 Million)
0.151/1000 flying hours 0.111/1000 flying hours
FU24 undercarriage defect rate is 36% higher than Foreign Ag Types
While the FU24 could be expected to have a higher rate of undercarriage failures than the light private use PA28, it should have been comparable to other agricultural types. For more detail the occurrences were plotted against time, as shown below.
Figure 4.29
Undercarriage Occurrences
Figure 4.29 is a very interesting graph. The large number of defects (90) and long operating history of the FU24 makes it a particularly useful illustration. The striking feature of this graph is that it has two distinct sections of almost constant slope, with a
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transition in between. From 1977 to 1994 the rate of landing gear defects per year is a fairly constant rate. After 1994 there is a sudden increase in the rate, and from about 2000 the rate becomes almost twice as great as it was before 1994. Possible reasons for these changes include: In October 1994 Part 137 Appendix B was introduced which permitting a take-off weight up to 31% greater than the maximum certified takeoff weight. From 2000, appreciable numbers of FU24 aircraft were converted to Walter Turbine power (STC). Take-off (five minute) power rating was 550HP rather than the 400 HP of the FU24-950 series. The engine power does not directly affect the load on the landing gear. However if the aircraft was previously limited in the load it could accelerate to flying speed within the available strip length, then an increase in power would allow it to accelerate a greater load up to flying speed. During the takeoff roll with the heavier load, the landing gear will be subjected to increased stress from: Increased weight on board, The higher take-off speed, Longer ground roll. There is another distinct step in both the undercarriage and performance occurrence curves around 1978. Possible reasons for this step include the fact in 1978 the FU24-950 was modified to replace the 37 cu ft hopper with a 46 cu ft Hopper. (NZ Aerospace Industries (the manufacturer) modification AI/FU/0051 and flight manual supplement 19 dated 23 July 1978, refers.) The larger hopper was intended to accommodate poisoned carrots for rabbit control. Carrots have a relatively low density compared to superphosphate, and no increase in overall weight was approved. The commensurate increase in landing gear defect rates indicates that some operators at least attempted to exploit the larger hopper to carry increased loads of superphosphate. A further comparison of the various hoppers fitted to the FU24 series is contained in Chapter 10. The 400HP FU4-950/950M was introduced in 1970. Its MCTOW was increased to 4860lbs. Aircraft operating prior to 1970 were 250-300 HP six cylinder variants of the FU24, with a MAUW ranging between 3550 lbs (225HP) to 4000lbs (310HP).
Certification of Landing Gear Loads
The condition of the certification of aircraft in accordance with FAR 23.473 generally applies a limit load that is a function of the aircrafts landing weight and an assumed high rate of descent (600fpm or about the usual rate of descent for landing). This load case usually provides a load higher than all other loads likely to be encountered in normal operation. Designing to meet this criteria produces a durable landing gear design. An over-loaded agricultural aircraft carries a much higher load at take-off than it does at landing. The takeoff speed of an over-loaded agricultural aircraft is increased above the landing speed. Combined with the rougher strips of agricultural operations, these factors may combine to produce operational loads on the landing gear that are not covered by the FAR 23.473 case of a landing at MCTOW at high rate of descent.
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Hence operation of an aircraft using the overload provisions of Part 137 App B will increase the likelihood of generating loads on the landing gear that are close to or in excess of the design case. This is likely the cause of the increase in rate of failures after 1994. 16 . In practice the overload provisions of Part 137 Appendix B are limited by the ability of the aircraft to reach flying speed within the strip length available. Acceleration rate is a function of engine power, or strictly thrust. Hence an increase in engine power increases the load that can be carried out of a given airstrip. The heavier average aircraft load will increase the forces experienced by the landing gear. Comparing Figure 3 which shows significant numbers of turbine converted aircraft entering service in 2000-2001, with Fig x suggests a strong correlation between the advent of the turbine Fletcher and an increase in undercarriage defects. Figure 4.30 is an enlargement of the figure 4.29 showing the engine types of the FU24 variants that reported landing gear defects since 1990.
Figure 4.30
16 Chapter 3 details the background to Part 137 and its introduction of a 31% overload in place of the previous 12% increase permitted by CASO 4 prior to 1994.
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Cresco Detailed Analysis There are only two recorded occurrences where performance/weight was an issue for the Cresco, hence no trend analysis is possible (one was fatal, ZK-TMO near Gisborne 2001) Undercarriage failures for the Cresco are common, 67 occurrences since 1983 and 66 since 1993 The Crescos did not enter service in significant numbers until the PT6 powered variant was developed in the early 1990s. Cresco in service before 1994 were powered by the Lycoming LTP1-101 of 600HP. The release of the 750HP PT6 variant almost coincides with the introduction of Part 137, so the marked change exhibited by the FU24 is not so apparent. Still over the service life of the Cresco, the undercarriage defects rate can be summarised as follows: Pacific Aerospace 08-600 Cresco Undercarriage Defect Rate 67 defects 7 defects 130111 Ag flying hours 62908 Ag Flying Hours 0.515 failures/ 1000 flying hours 0.113 defects/ 1000 flying hours
The Cresco undercarriage defect rate is approx 450% of the rate for the foreign agricultural aircraft
Figure 4.31
In considering the Cresco undercarriage defect rate the following should be noted. The undercarriage of the Pacific Aerospace Cresco was certified to FAR 23.732 at the standard category weight of 6450lbs 17. Part 137 Appendix B permits it to be operated at 8256lbs. The undercarriage defect rate of the Pacific Aerospace Cresco is 4.5 times that of the foreign designed agricultural aircraft.
Figure 4.32 ZK-TML Cresco. Landing gear failure on takeoff 13 Nov 2006. CAA Occurrence 02/3231
17 New Zealand Aerospace Industries Report 08-40
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Foreign Agricultural Types Detailed Analysis

Air Tractor
With only 9 occurrences of all categories, no trend analysis of Air Tractor occurrences is possible, however they have been included in the Foreign Agricultural Types.
Gippsland GA200
The GA200 suffered seven performance occurrences in seven years between 1998 and 2005 a reasonably constant rate. There were only two recorded GA200 undercarriage failures. Note that significant overloading of the GA200 beyond Part 137 is not possible due to the physical size of the hopper (800 litres) which equates to 2115 lbs of superphosphate which generally keeps it within the agricultural operations weight listed on its type certificate data sheet.
Cessna Agwagon
Like the AirTractor and the GA200, the Cessna Agwagon uses solid spring steel landing gear legs as opposed to the oleo pneumatic legs of the FU24 and Cresco. The Cessna spring leg design was reportedly less robust and during the mid 70s when these aircraft were popular a number of failures were recorded. The failure rate appears to reduced with time most probably due to the fall off in number of Agwagons operating (recalling that this data is presented per calendar time not flying hour). Due to the small fleet numbers and fluctuations of the fleet size with time, analysis of each of the foreign aircraft occurrences was less useful; than it was for the FU24. Accordingly the three popular foreign types were combined to even out the fluctuations. Collectively the foreign agricultural aircraft equivalents to the FU24 data is shown in the following two graphs figure 4.33 and figure 4.34 From these two graphs it can be seen that there is no marked variation in landing gear failure rates of the foreign aircraft types in either 1994 or 2001, and there is only a slight step in performance occurrences post 1994, and none post 2001. This indicates that the steps in the FU24 occurrence rates are specific to the aircraft and not artefacts of the collection method, or an industry wide effect, such as climate change effecting strip surfaces. It is also worth noting the Agwagon had largely ceased operations by 2000, and both the GA200 and AirTractor hopper capacities limit their ability to exploit the overload provisions of 137 App B. See Chapter 11 for a discussion of hopper capacities
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Figure 4.33
Figure 4.34
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Data Analysis Conclusions:

Conclusion 4.3
The FU24 has suffered a high rate of landing gear failures, compared to the three most popular foreign agricultural aircraft types. The FU24 failure rate between 1994 and 2007 is 136% of the foreign agricultural aircraft landing gear defect rate.
Conclusion 4.4
The rate of FU24 landing gear failures has increased markedly since 1994 when Part 137 introduced the permissible overload graph in appendix B.
Conclusion 4.5
The rate of FU24 landing gear failures increased even more dramatically in 2001 when approx 50% of the fleet were converted to turbine engines. This is most likely because the 38% increase in takeoff power allowed the overload provisions to be more fully and more frequently exploited. This lead to higher average loads on the landing gear and more frequent exposure to very high loads.
Conclusion 4.6
The Cresco suffers a high rate of landing gear failures. The PT6-34 powered Crescos entered service after 1994, so there is not sufficient data to gauge the rate of failure before Part 137 App B. They have served their whole life under the provisions of Part 137 Appendix B . Since entering service it has suffered 0.515 failures per 1000 flying hours. This rate is 3.4 times higher than the FU24 rate and 4.5 times higher than the foreign agricultural aircraft landing gear defect rate.
Conclusion 4.7
The three foreign agricultural aircraft types when analysed the same way do not show significant increases in undercarriage failures in either 1994 or 2001, ruling out external factors as a cause of the increase. There is a small increase in the performance related accidents post 1994, which may have been due to operators exploiting or even exceeding the provisions of part 137 although the hopper capacities of the foreign agricultural aircraft has limited the degree of overload to approx 10% with superphosphate.
9 December 2008
Chapter 4 - CAA Safety Data Review Section 3 - Aircraft Comparisons.

During the course of this research it was necessary to consider the various aircraft types and their principal parameters. The following table was compiled from CAA and industry sources to provide a ready comparison of various aircraft parameters. This table lists the aircrafts vital statistics such as empty weight, maximum certified takeoff weight, engine power ratings, wing area and hopper capacities. These are all parameters relevant to agricultural operations. Other aircraft characteristics such as length height and wing span which were not relevant to their operations at high gross weights have not been included. These figures have been compiled from CAA records and industry sources an while all due care has been taken they should be taken as indicative figures only. In this table the FU24 and Cresco variants have an agricultural category weight. This was a weight applicable to restricted category operations that was published in the flight manual in addition to the maximum certified takeoff weight (MCTOW) for standard category operations. Chapter 3 details how this was derived by the then Civil Aviation Department, and how it was accompanied by a reduction in the permissible load factor, from 3.8 to 3 G. For the FU24 the agricultural category weight was 12% higher than the MCTOW. The PAC 750 XL was produced after 1994 and never had an Agricultural Category weight, hence it is shown as the same as MCTOW. For the Air Tractor, Ag wagon and GA200 aircraft (the foreign agricultural types) the agricultural category weight is taken as the Restricted Category weight as listed in the flight manual or type certificate data sheet.
Power to Weight Ratio
An interesting comparison that can be drawn from this table is the relative power to weight ratio. Generally the aircrafts performance and manoeuvrability increase with power to weight ratio. For example fighter aircraft tend to have a high power to weight ratio and transport aircraft have a lower ratio, which is reflected in their manoeuvrability. Annex O provides further details on the influence of power to weight ratio on manoeuvrability in the horizontal and vertical planes. The power to weight ratios of significant agricultural types is shown graphically in figure 16 .
9 December 2008
Agricultural Aircraft Specifications

Type Empty Weight (lbs) MCTOW (lbs) G limit Ag Category (normal cat) (lbs) Max % Pt 137 Weight (lbs) Engine 5 Min HP MCP Power loading (lbs/HP) Power Loading AG Power Loading (Pt137) Wing Wing Wing Area (Net Loading Loading (MCTOW) (Pt137) Sq.Ft) Hopper (Cu Ft) Hopper Hopper load limit load limit (lbs) for (lbs) Graph 25 25 25 25 25 37 37 37 37 43 66 66 66 66 93 53.4 53.4 53.4 66.8 66.8 28.25 28.25 66.25
1600/1850/214 1600/1850/214 1600/1850/214 1600/1850/214 1600/1850/214 1600/1850/214 1600/1850/214 1600 1600 1600 1600 1600 1850 1850
Super Capacity (lbs) 1150g/L 1795 1795 1795 1795 1795 2657 2657 2657 2657 3088 4740 4740 4740 4740 6679 3835 3835 3835 4797 4797 0 2029 2029 0 4758 0 0 1925 1436 0 3835 3835 2513 2513
Mass Vs (Clean) Va Ratio (Super)
Vne (CAS V cruise knots) (CAS knots)
Rate of Climb (ft/min) MAUW
FU24 (225) FU24 (240) FU 24 (250) FU24 (260) FU24(285) FU24(300) FU24(310) FU24-1060 FU24-950 (37) FU24 -950/954/M FU24-950 FC FU24-950TCL 08-600 LTP 08-600 PT6 750XL AG AT-402A AT-402B AT-402B AT-502B AT-502A GA-200 GA-200C Ayres S2R-T34 Cessna 152 Cessna A188 PA-25 Ag-Cat G-164A Ag-Cat 'FatCat' Zlin Z-137T Zlin Z-37T AirTruk PL-12 Beaver
1978 1978 1978 2000 2310 2310 2175 2600 2800 2800 3012 3030 2956 2956 3825 4000 4000 4000 4100 4100 1724 1874 3600 1160 1926 1556 2455 2455 2900 2756 1850 3150
3550 3740 3830 3900 4000 4000 4000 4860 4860 4860 4860 4860 6450 6450 7500 6000 6000 7000 8000 8000 2900 3360 6000 1640 3802 2899 4500 4500 5566 5566 3800 5099
3970 4175 4280 4360 4470 4470 4470 5450 5430 5430 5430 5430 7000 7000 7500 7000 7860 7860 9400 10480 3796 4400 7200
3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.56 3.56 3.47 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8
31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 28 28 26 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31
4651 4899 5017 5109 5240 5240 5240 6367 6367 6367 6367 6366 8256 8256 9450 7860 7860 9170 10480 10480
O-470-E O-470-M/N IO-470-G IO-470-D IO-520-A IO-520-F GIO-470-A PT6A-20 IO-720-A1A IO-720-A1A PT6A-15AG M601D-11NZ LTP101-600A-1A PT6A-34AG PT6A-34AG PT6A-11 PT6A-15 PT-6A-15,27,34 PT6A-34,36 PT6A-45
225 240 250 260 285 285 310 500 400 400 550 550 599 750 750 550 680 680 750 1100 250 300 750 118 300 235 550 751 600 600 300 450
225 240 250 260 285 300 310 500 400 400 392 430 565 633 633 550 680 680 750 750 250 300 700 118 285 235 500 657 600 600 300 450
15.78 15.58 15.32 15.00 14.04 14.04 12.90 9.72 12.15 12.15 8.84 8.84 10.77 8.60 10.00
17.64 17.40 17.12 16.77 15.68 15.68 14.42 10.90 13.58 13.58 9.87 9.87 11.69 9.33 10.00
20.67 20.41 20.07 19.65 18.39 18.39 16.90 12.73 15.92 15.92 11.58 11.57 13.78 11.01 12.60 14.29 11.56 13.49 13.97 9.53 15.20 14.67 10.48 0.00 16.60 16.16 11.05 8.09 12.06 12.06 16.59 14.84
266 266 266 266 266 266 266 266 266 266 266 266 266 266 267.8 306 306 312 312 312 192.4 211 326
13.35 14.06 14.40 14.66 15.04 15.04 15.04 18.27 18.27 18.27 18.27 18.27 24.25 24.25 28.01 19.61 19.61 22.44 25.64 25.64 15.07 15.92 18.40
17.48 18.42 18.86 19.21 19.70 19.70 19.70 23.93 23.93 23.93 23.93 23.93 31.04 31.04 35.29 25.69 25.69 29.39 33.59 33.59 19.75 20.86 24.11
3000 2140 2800 4100 2800 4100 4100 4410 3250 3250 3250 3250 4100 1865 2315 4638
10.91 12.73 8.82 11.56 10.29 11.55882 10.67 12.53333 7.27 9.527273 11.60 15.184 11.20 14.66667 8.00 13.90 12.67 12.34 8.18 5.99 9.28 9.28 12.67 11.33 9.6 0 13.33 12.34 8.18 0.00 0.00 13.63 12.22
3799 IO-540A1D5 4401.6 IO-540K 7860 PT6-34AG O-235 4981 IO-520-D 3798 O-540 6075 6075 7236 7236 R-985-AN1 M601E-11 M601Z M601Z
4000 2899 4500
3.8 3.8 4.2 4.2 3.7 3.7 3.8 3.8
31 31 35 35 30 30 31 31
202 18.82178 183 15.84153 328 328 392 392 13.72 13.72 14.20 14.20
24.66 20.75 18.52 18.52 18.46 18.46 19.68 26.72
26.8 20 53.4 53.4 35 35 26.8 35
1670 1200 2000 2000 1984 1984
4090 5500
4978 IO-540K 6679.69 P&W R-985
253 15.01976 250 20.396
3000 2140 2800 3555 2800 4100 4100 4410 0 3250 3250 3250 3250 4100 0 1865 2315 0 4638 0 0 1670 1200 0 2000 2000 1984 1984 0 0 0 0
1.122 1.122 1.122 1.122 1.122 55/57 1.436 55/57 1.436 55/57 0.886 63 1.242 63 1.103 63 1.333 1.693 61 1.156 67 1.156 67 1.514 69 1.180 1.180 1.180 1.476 1.170 1.088 0.876 1.026 65 65
96 96 96 96 96 96 96 115 116 116 116 116 124 124 132
143 143 143 143 143 143 143 168 145 145 145 145 173 173 171
114 114 114 114 114 114 114 134 116 116 116 116 1320/1150 137 770 137 770 141 1067 122 122 122 1170 1170 1630
122 122/153 122 122/153 122 122
53 56 77
105 113 109
135 141 138
108 113 109
900 950
1.152 1.197
56
101
157
125
1.917 1.917 1.267 1.267 #DIV/0! 1925 #DIV/0! #DIV/0! 2513 #DIV/0!
58 68
102
128
113 750
118 105
103 105
Figure 4.35 Power/Weight Ratio, Agricultural Aircraft Types
The blue bars depict the aircrafts power to weight ratio at its maximum certified takeoff weight. The red bars show how the power to weight ratio drops when operated at the agricultural/restricted category weight. The green bars show the aircrafts power to weight ratio if the provisions of Part 137 appendix B are applied. Considering the MCTOW (blue bar), the FU24 series show a gradual improvement in power to weight ratio through the various 6 Cylinder piston engines and the 8 Cylinder 400 HP FU24-950 continues this trend. The early turbine powered FU24-1060 is a marked increase in power to weight ratio and the contemporary Flight Care (FU24-950FC) and Turbine Conversions Ltd (TCL) variants are higher again. These contemporary turbine FU24s have a similar power to weight ratio to the early serial numbered AT402B, (MCTOW 6000 lbs ) this is reasonable as the Flight Care version uses the same engine. If the FU24 turbine versions are operated in accordance with the full extent of Part 137 Appendix B, as shown by the green bars, their power to weight ration drops to close to that of the old piston variants. The AT402B drops also, although its 400 gal hopper 18 prevents the full 137 App B load from being carried. With superphosphate the AT402B is volume limited to a weight only 10% more than its MCTOW. The AT502B which is basically a 402, same engine but with a 500 gallon hopper, is certified with a power to weight ratio only slightly less than what the turbine FU24 would achieve if operated at the old Agricultural load. The wing loading also make an interesting comparison, they are
18
53.4 Cu Ft, 3835lbs if filled with superphosphate, hopper load limit 3250lbs.
9 December 2008
almost the same for the Cresco and Air Tractor, while the piston powered FU24-950 is considerably less at 18.27 lbs/sq ft. The piston powered FU24 had a power loading of 12.15lbs/HP while the turbine FU24 variants are more in line with the turbine powered Cresco and Air Tractors at 8.6 - 10 lbs/HP. Power loading is in effect how much weight every unit of engine power (HP) has to lift. When the power loading is high, i.e. the engine has a lot of weight to lift, it needs the assistance of a bigger wing, hence a lower wing loading. Alternatively you can use the wing to carry a heavier load, increasing the wing loading, but youll need more power to keep that wing flying, hence the power loading goes down. They are inversely proportional. This is also useful when considering the effect of turbine conversions. Both of the turbine conversions have up to 550HP available. As the aircraft operating weight was not increased, the result is a large improvement in the power to weight ratio. The turbine FU24 conversions have a power to weight ratio almost equal to the PT-6 powered Cresco. The Cresco was originally produced with the 600 HP Lycoming LTP-101 turbine, although most Crescos produced were the later version with the 750 HP Pratt &Whitney PT6-34AG. The graph show both variants of Cresco, the LTP-101 version having the lower power to weight ratio. The Cessna 152 was added to this table for two reasons. Firstly it provided the author and readers with a known comparison. Secondly the agricultural aircraft returns have consistently featured a small number of hours logged in a Cessna 152. It turns out that over the years some operators have used C152 aircraft for crew training. The use of a C152 is cost effective and as this graph shows the performance of the C152 provides a conservative estimate of the performance of a fully Part 137 loaded Cresco. In short if you cant get up the valley in the C152, dont take a loaded Cresco there without your hand on the dump handle.
Structural Weight Ratio
The predominance of Pacific Aerospace products is largely based on their exceptional performance. Their performance is not exceptional in traditional terms such as speed or range, but they are world leading in the weight lifting ability or more particularly their ratio of maximum certified takeoff weight (MCTOW) to empty weight. MCTOW includes payload, fuel and crew, empty weight is the weight of the aircraft ready for service but without fuel or crew. This ratio is one that the designer strives to improve as it represent a measure of structural efficiency. The FU24 and its optimised derivatives the Cresco and 750 XL have achieved a remarkably high ratio of maximum all up weight to empty weight. Note that the inverse of this ratio can be read as a measure of the aircrafts ruggedness, and the comparatively light structural weight of the PAC products should be balanced against perceptions they are built like brick outhouses. The design has in fact been carefully optimised for structural efficiency.
9 December 2008
Figure 4.36
The light structural weight of the FU24 and particularly the derivative 08-600 Cresco and 750XL is due to some interesting design features which intentionally minimise structural weight. An example of this is a comparison of the FU24 wing structure, with the more conventional Cessna Agwagon Wing. Note the FU24 has only three full ribs compared with 12 in the Cessna, figures 4.37 and 4.38 refer.
9 December 2008
Figure 4.37
Figure 4.38
9 December 2008
The detail design of the Pacific Aerospace series incorporates features to minimise structural weight. One of these measures is a reduction the number of parts, which has the added advantage of reducing manufacture and assembly costs. Low structural weight enhances the aircrafts economic performance, if the wing has less aircraft structural weight to lift it can carry a greater payload. The low structural weight doesnt mean they are less strong, as the aircraft have met certification requirements. However the structure of the these aircraft demands careful attention to maintenance as the failure of any one component is relatively more serious than in conventional designs. Further explanation of this design philosophy and a comparison of the FU24 vertical stabiliser with other aircraft designs is contained in Annex M.
Conclusion 4.8
Relative to other common agricultural aircraft, Pacific Aerospace aircraft have a low structural weight in comparison to their MCTOW. While this is not unsafe, it highlights the need for the structure to be maintained to a high standard.
9 December 2008
Chapter 5 - Unreported Incidents

Scope item 4: To conduct a study in association with NZ agricultural aviation operators and pilots to further quantify possible unreported incidents, occurrences, defects and structural fatigue. There have been suggestions that industry is not reporting safety occurrences to the CAA as diligently as it used to. While the CAA does not expect all defects and incidents to be reported, aircraft safety would be affected if reporting significantly decreased. Under reporting is not necessarily due to dishonesty or non-compliance, some under reporting inevitably occurs due to misunderstandings or pressure of work. Nonetheless, a decrease in reports as a percentage of actual occurrences would signal serious problems for CAA and the industry. The April 2007 letter to industry stakeholders asked them whether they were aware of any incidents that were not reported to the CAA. This approach met with limited success, partly because respondents were not sure which occurrences the CAA knew about. As a result, the occurrence collation exercise described above was initiated. Once the list of known occurrences was compiled, it was sent to leading industry stakeholders for comment. Several responses were received and significant ones are included below. Due to elapsed time and scarce details, these reports proved difficult to follow up. However, they are similar in nature to the reported defects. For example, in the case of the Walter Engine failure, investigation of this event may lead to another failure being recorded but as can be seen the failure rate is already well in excess of the piston engine rate, little new information is obtained.. These occurrences are further examples of known issues - Walter engine reliability, fin LE skin cracks, inadequate maintenance program. The noteworthy exception is the last one concerning rear fuselage skin cracking. There are no reports of this defect in the CAA database and yet there is an AD, DCA/FU24/129 dating from 1958 that suggests it was once a problem that required an inspection of this area. ( Ann aircraft engineer, experienced on FU24 aircraft participated in the recovery of ZK-DZG from the forest near Whangarei. He recounted how during the recovery operation the skin of the upper rear fuselage tore easily by hand. While the aircraft was already extensively damaged, his assessment was that the material, felt quite different from the similar material on the lower rear fuselage. The lower fuselage skins had been replaced due to corrosion and damage from rough surfaces, and so were newer than the upper fuselage skins that he referred to. While unquantifiable, these were the observations of an engineer with many years experience in aircraft sheet metal work.) The following email responses have been rendered anonymous by removal of references to companies, individuals, aircraft registrations, locations or dates. Nonetheless they reinforce the assumption that not all occurrences are reported to the CAA. Therefore, the CAA must act on the information it does receive, as one report implies more than one incident. Email 1
We think there is an engine failure with {deleted} that is not on your list. {deleted} should be able to help with the date. {deleted} was on takeoff and he had a complete engine failure. He was very quick thinking and did not dump, which kept the aeroplane on the ground. He was able to brake hard but still ended up in a line of trees. The engine was totally destroyed.
9 December 2008
Email 2
It has been brought to my attention by a another concerned engineer that {deleted} are carrying out repairs to the side fuselage skins due to cracking on the frame which holds the fwd fin attachment. ZK-{deleted} has patches on both sides just above where the flat side skin meets the curved belly skins. From a distance they appear to be about 4 to 6 inches across. To the best of my knowledge the repair manual allows very minor repairs only and refers the operator to the manufacturer for anything that may affect integrity of structure. In field AC43 type repairs are not generally applicable to the FU-25-950 series. This hardening of skins and fracturing is caused by high operating cycles and loads. Repair will add stiffening but most likely increase hardening and fatigue in the adjacent panel. The 950 already has an inspection for cracking of skins one frame behind the small cargo door. I have been caught out with not finding cracks when one skin cracked all the way down the end rivets because the crack stayed in line with the rivets and did not show until we stripped the aircraft for overhaul. The pilot had reported that the aircraft felt mushy in a turn. On the same aircraft severe fretting of frames and interlocked skins was not evident until the fuselage was completely dismantled. Most of the skins and all the frames needed to be replaced. The frames are much softer material than the skins. This was the only skin cracking normally noted on the 950s.
Email 3 This email potentially sensitive, and was submitted in confidence-It described a further defect to the leading edge of a FU24 that was reported by the pilot but not reported to the CAA although the fin was subsequently removed from the aircraft and a replacement fitted. Email 4
Monday last week I was in {deleted} for a scheduled 100hr hour maintenance. The previous week at 100hrs I had a fin inspection done by the engineers at {deleted} and was told all was fine. A week later at xxx hrs they replaced the fin as they found a crack in it. I am not sure where the crack was as they did not tell me. I found out second hand from an engineer on the hanger floor. I presume they will forward an incident report to CAA. Do they still want to extend fin inspections ( yea right ). The fin was an unmodified one that was 26hrs from last inspection!!!
Email 5
Regarding 150 hr checks on Ag aircraft. We , and I speak for a few of the pilots in {deleted} do not agree with or want 150 hr checks. They have been slowly and very cunningly adopted by the management over a period of time. We have voiced concerns about this to management to no avail. As I understand the fin failure on {deleted} aircraft occurred approx 120 hrs from last inspection. Sure the Turbine engine does not require as much maintenance as the old 400hp piston but the airframe is working one hell of a lot harder. I do not rate any testing done by {deleted} as creditable as it is done in house with what I call the yes men. All testing should be carried out by independent assessors. As I understand it CAM 8 gives the guidelines to operate above the manufacturers weight limits, with the proviso that the pilot observes certain speed limits. Given that we must TRUST the PILOT to adhere to those limits. Given that the aircraft is GOING to be operated ABOVE the manufacturers weight limits ( if there is room in the hopper it is usually filled ) what are the maintenance issues that can arise. Q. Instead of 100hr checks, do we have 50hr checks? ( or do we extend to 150hr checks !!! ) Q. Do we have terminating C of A, eg 4 yearly. ( Like the old system ) Q. Do we have lifed components ? ( eg Zlin Z 37 and Z137 ) Surely if we are exploring and operating in areas above what the manufacturer has tested and certified there MUST be EXTRA maintenance REQUIRED and ORDERED to be done other than just trusting the pilot to adhere to a speed restriction. Management must shoulder some of the cost in extra maintenance required or we will see more structural failures and lifes lost, and I for one do not want to lose any more work mates for the sake of the mighty dollar.
9 December 2008
All we ask for is a safe work environment, not to be asked to carry weights far in excess of what some of these very old airframes were designed for. There are some of the new generation Ag pilot out there who were not even born when the tail fell off the first Cresco and we need to look after them as well. There are other issues with these Hotrods that I would like to talk with you about, and I look forward to a meeting with you
The opinion was expressed during the survey that the overall level of reporting to the CAA had dropped off in recent years and this was masking the true size of the problem. The Review did not find any evidence of this, despite the small number of significant defects noted above. To quantify this, the recorded occurrences for the FU24 were totalled up for each year on record and the following graph was produced. It shows that he reported occurrences per year for the FU24 have increased markedly in recent years. In the period 94/2007 at least, the hours flown by these aircraft has been steadily decreasing. This result could be seen as an increase in occurrences for the FU24 as they age, but certainly it does not support the assertion that the rate of occurrence reporting to the CAA has sharply declined.
45
40
All FU24 Occurrences

(Reported per Year )
35
30
25
20
15
10
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Figure 5.1
Summary and Conclusion
While the CAA can rely on receiving only a percentage of the true number of maintenance occurrences, it is advised of a significant number of them. Furthermore, the significant defects and the unreported occurrences are similar to the reported occurrences. As such they do not appear to affect the overall pattern.
9 December 2008
2006
Conclusion 5.0
Industry actively reports incidents of defects to the CAA. There is no evidence to suggest that overall reporting rates have declined significantly.
9 December 2008
Chapter 6 - Turbine Conversions

Scope item 5: Consider the airworthiness and operational implications of operating modified agricultural aircraft where old airframes are being fitted with more powerful turbine engines. Introduction This requirement came from anecdotal evidence that the turbine converted FU24 aircraft were suffering a high rate of engine airframe and operational incidents. Data Analysis The mail out survey of industry views indicated that 67% of respondents questioned the airworthiness of the FU24 turbine conversions. In addition, the investigation of the fatal accident involving ZK-DZG prompted a ministerial enquiry to examine the relative accident and defect rates of the FU24 and its turbine variants. In response a comparison of accident and rates was conducted by the SAU and is summarised below.
95 96 97 98 99 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 (1st 1/2 year) total: Overall Piston engined accident rate 0.663264 0.291646 0.179404 0.121515 0.180698 0.368156 0.475584 0.245836 0.211809 0.051354 0.10018 0.117254 0.079706 0.237173 Turbine engined accident rate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.166009 0.836115 0.078764 0.276871 0 0.075191 0.17359
Piston rate since 1998 (when turb introduced) 0.150637

Figure 6.1
The overall accident rate for piston engine FU24 aircraft between 1995 and the first half of 2007 was 0.237, which is higher than the rate for turbine powered FU24 in the same period. However, considering that the turbine powered FU24 were not developed until 1998 and significant numbers entered service in 2001, a comparison between the rate between 1998 and 2007 is noteworthy g. The piston rate is 0.151 or less than the 0.174 recorded by the turbine variants when compared over the same operating period. This accident rate data is more clearly understood from the following graph. A three-year moving average line has been added to compensate for the initial spike in the turbine accident rate, which was due to certain accidents occurring during a period in which a
small number of aircraft had been converted and reported hours were minimal. The early accidents distorted the per flying hour statistic. Nonetheless by 2005 where the number of aircraft of each engine type approaches parity, the turbine aircraft accident rate remains slightly above the piston aircraft rate.
0.9
0.8
FU-24 Accidents per 1000 hours

0.7 Piston engined accident rate Turbine engined accident rate 3 per. Mov. Avg. (Piston engined accident rate) 3 per. Mov. Avg. (Turbine engined accident rate) 0.4
0.6
0.5
0.3
0.2
0.1
0 95 96 97 98 99 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 (1st 1/2 year)
Figure 6.2
Accident data is sporadic due to the infrequent occurrence of accidents within a given fleet (total size approx 50 aircraft). Defects by comparison happen far more often than accidents, and are more useful for airworthiness analysis purposes. The following graph shows the rate of occurrence of defects, engine and airframe combined for the piston powered and turbine converted FU24 aircraft.
9 December 2008
3.5
FU24 Defects per 1000 flying hours
Piston Def Rate Tur Def Rate
2.5
3 per. Mov. Avg. (Piston Def Rate) 3 per. Mov. Avg. (Tur Def Rate)
1.5
0.5
0 95 96 97 98 99 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 (1st 1/2 year)
Figure 6.3
The turbine-powered aircraft have sustained a higher rate of reported defects since their introduction between 1998 and 2000. This is an unexpected result as the airframes are unchanged aft of the firewall. These results include engine defects, and the Walter engine did record a number of failures. Nonetheless it is unexpected that conversion from a piston engine to a turbine would produce an overall decrease in the reliability of the aircraft, as generally turbine engines are more reliable and less maintenance intensive than piston engines. The Walter conversion STC also suffered from a number of engine mount failures due to poor detail design and incorrect installation which is shown by the engine mount defect curve in Chapter 4 Section 2. While the high initial defect rate can be due to the teething troubles of a new design, after 9 years of service the combined defect rate of turbine converted aircraft remains higher than the unconverted aircraft. An essential assumption in the certification of the turbine conversion STC was that the airframe limits (maximum flying speed and maximum take-off weight) and the resulting airframe stress levels would not change. A plausible explanation for the unexpected increase in airframe defects follows. In practice, the lower thrust developed by the 400 hp piston engine compared to the 600 hp turbine, meant that often the load the aircraft could take-off with was less than the maximum limit due to the size of the airstrip, density altitude and other factors. With the extra thrust, turbine powered aircraft could carry higher loads (closer to the upper limit) more often. This would have the effect of raising the average load carried by the turbinepowered aircraft, while still observing the limitations. This is a possible cause of the increased rate of defects experienced by the turbine converted FU24 aircraft. Turbine Conversions Considerations Converting a piston-powered aircraft to a turbine is a major and expensive exercise. The turbine engine alone can cost $250,000-$500 000, compared to $75,000-$100,000 for an
9 December 2008
overhauled IO-720. So there have to be good economic reasons to do so. These reasons include: Increasing the aircrafts productivity and usefulness due to the expected greater reliability of the turbine. Better exploitation of the airframes performance potential due to the turbines ability to keep generating rated thrust in hot-high conditions (applies to flat rated turbines only) Extend the aircrafts service life when the piston engine is becoming obsolete and difficult to maintain. (This is particularly pertinent to radial engines, but the Lycoming IO-720 was never a large production engine and has become relatively expensive to overhaul.) To overcome the cost of installing the turbine engine instead of a replacement piston, the combined cost must be less than the alternative, which is to retire the airframe and purchase a newer turbine (or piston) powered aircraft. Turbine conversions necessarily extend the service life of the airframe of a converted aircraft. If a used airframe continues in service, the rate of airframe defects may not change, but is more likely increase due to: Increasing age Increase in utilisation due to the economics of operating a turbine Increased average load as described above. The first cause arises because re-engined airframes stay in service longer. A rise in defects recorded for that airframe type is attributable to longer service, rather than any special detrimental influence of the engine change. However in the case of the FU24, which is the major re-engined type in New Zealand, the increased defect rate relative to its piston engine contemporaries suggests that the other two causes are present. Therefore, before approving a turbine conversion, it would be desirable for the CAA to consider the above effects to determine whether the conversion is likely to have adverse effects on the airframe to which the new engine is fitted. To do this, the CAA would require an accurate information on the airframe types overall service history. Before the Review, that information was not readily available. Regulatory Requirements for Turbine Conversions Approval of turbine engine conversions in made in New Zealand under CAR Part 21 sub part E. CAR 21.505 defines the applicable certification basis for an STC. This rule defines the certification requirements for all aircraft design changes (modifications, repairs and STCs). By this circuitous route, designed for maximum efficiency in writing the rule but not clarity of purpose, the certification basis for the conversion can be one of the FAA requirements such as FAR 23, but need not be later than the certification basis of the basic aeroplane. The rationale for this is sound, when modifying an aircraft the modified design should be no less safe than it was before, but there is sometimes little to be gained by raising the certification standard. The classic example is fitting fireproof seat covers to an old aircraft covered in flammable fabric, clearly not a worthwhile safety improvement.
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However by tying the repair modification and STC certification requirements together there is a potential problem. The problem is that the scope of design changes encompassed by the categories repairmodification-STC is very large. Even within the category of STC, the design change can be as small as fitting an extra bracket to attach a shoulder harness, up to turbine engine conversions or re-winging. Hence the rule architecture used where all roads lead to one place is elegant for keeping the rule concise but tends to produce a one size fits none policy. Within the existing requirements of CAR 21.505 (a) and (b) there does not seem to be scope to apply a later (higher) certification basis to an airframe whose life is being extended by STC. However, the rules governing eligibility for an STC, CAR 21.119 (b), states: (b) A certificate issued by the Director under this Subpart may be subject to conditions as the Director considers appropriate in each particular case. This appear to enable the Director to impose additional conditions, including requirements from a later certification basis, in addition to the basic certification requirements. Therefore it should be possible to amend the STC approval procedures 19 to ensure that major STCs require an examination of the airframe types history to ensure that existing concerns are adequately addressed, even though those aspects of the design may be unchanged since approval under the original certification basis. Some care is needed in the application of this policy, as the airframe may have existing safety concerns that are not a result of the proposed STC. Nonetheless in the case of a major STC that significantly increase the utility of the aircraft it is in the interests of aviation safety to address any outstanding issues. Ideally, the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) would have addressed these safety concerns. In practice, as fleet numbers of aging and obsolete airframe types decrease, active management of the types continued airworthiness becomes less urgent for both the OEM and the regulatory authority. The CAA must use its limited resources to best effect. For example, if the safety of the De Havilland Austers in New Zealand were doubled, the overall safety of GA flying in New Zealand would increase marginally. It is assumed that these problems are small and decreasing with time. This concept underlies the regulatory practice of grandfathering, which excuses older aircraft from meeting the certain safety standards of new aircraft: for example, while new aircraft may require seatbelts rated to 16G, existing aircraft may continue in service with their original seatbelts good for 8G. It is not that the newer aircraft are likely to crash any harder, it is a pragmatic assumption that the older aircraft population will gradually retire and be replaced by increasing numbers of later aircraft, producing an overall rise in the average level of safety, without any further intervention by the regulator. The grandfathering policy becomes questionable when the assumed natural attrition is halted or reversed. An STC to install a reliable new engine or other equipment, such as spar replacement, can have this effect; they prolong the useful life of an otherwise
19 A CAA internal procedure since STC can only be approved by CAA and not delegation holders
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undesirable or uneconomic airframe. For these types of STC, some analysis of past service history is desirable. If such an analysis were to reveal an existing weakness in the design, particularly in comparison to the state of the art at time of STC application, it is arguable that the Director may invoke CAR 21.119(b) to require that they be addressed. Alternatively, if legal opinion is that the issue does not fall within the scope of CAR 21.119 (b), then it adds further weight to the call for a changed product rule. Conclusions 6.3 , 6.4 and 6.5 at the end of this chapter relate to the above section. Comparison of STC and TC Amendment Rules If the provisions of Part 21 Subpart E Concerning Supplementary Type certificates are compared with Subpart D concerning changes to Type Certificates an interesting point stands out. 21.95 relates to the amendment of an aircraft type certificates by the holder of the type certificate, who is usually the OEM. 21.95 states that if the TC holder seeks to modify the design in a significant way then a new type certificate must be applied for, with an updated certification basis based on the date of application. The design changes listed as significant include the change of nature of propulsive system. This means that if for example an aircraft manufacturer increased the piston engine capacity from 320 cubic inches to 360 cubic inches, the type certificate can be amended to include the new model. If the manufacture elects to change the propulsive system, for example create the Jet Provost from the Piston Provost, then a new type certificate and certification basis is required. There are obvious reasons for this. In the case of turbine conversions where a turbine engine is used to drive the propeller, the means of propulsion i.e the propeller is not changed so in accordance with the rules a turboprop model may be added as an amendment to an existing piston engined aircraft type certificate. In practice, considering the two turbine conversions proposed by Pacific Aerospace namely the development of the Cresco from the FU24 and the turbine engined CT4, CAA advised the original certification basis of the airframe would not be acceptable. The Cresco was certified in 1983 to FAR 23, yet the Turbine Conversion of the FU24 per STC 98/21E/15 approved 15 years later retained the 1954 certification basis of CAR 3 for the airframe. The turbine engine installation and associated new parts were certified to FAR 32 at a contemporary amendment status. The reason for this was that both of the manufacturer proposed turbine derivatives used the extra power of the turbine engine to increase the aircrafts weight and speed envelopes. The Walter turbine conversion STC was approved on the condition there would be no change to the aircrafts maximum weight or maximum speed and the corresponding loads, so the original certification basis would suffice for the airframe. Nonetheless a comparison of the manufacturer and third party turbine conversion projects illustrates the importance of the CAA maintaining consistent policies.
Turbine FU24 Assumptions and Outcomes
The composite certification basis of the Turbine Conversions Ltd STC 98/21E/15 has been criticised for using a composite certification basis that relied on the original aircraft certification basis. However the certification basis was acceptable because it was: Within the requirements of Part 21 Subpart E. The STC was approved on a no significant change assumption.
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This assumption was that the aircrafts flight envelope and certified take-off weight would remain unchanged by the STC. Although more engine power was available, pilot would throttle back on reaching the existing speed limitations. As the certified weight limit remained the same the airframe should not see any overall increase in loads. Service history to date at those loads had been satisfactory, (without a trend analysis), so flying at the same speeds and weights should have no detrimental effect. What this assumption overlooked was that the introduction of Part 137 in 1994 had extended weight increase privileges to the FU24 that it was never entitled to. Because of the way the curve in Appendix B works the FU24 was eligible for a 31% overload. The Cresco was permitted 28%, although, as detailed in Chapter 4, no substantiation of the structure in accordance with CAM 8 had been performed for either aircraft. The contemporary American aircraft such as the AirTractor 402A were also permitted to operate at up to 31% above the MCTOW. The difference is that they had been certified to this weight in accordance with CAM 8 (or FAR 23). In the case of the AT402B, the FAA certified restricted category weight is listed in the type certificate data sheet, along with associated life limitations, undercarriage modifications and speed limitations. In this sense they were entitled to operate at the Part 137 Appendix B weight, while the FU24 and Cresco were not. A 31% increase over the MCTOW puts considerable strain on an aircraft. At MCTOW, the payload (includes pilot and fuel) of an original FU24-950 is about 40% of the MCTOW. (Refer to the aircraft comparisons table of Chapter 4 Section 3.) The addition of the further 31%, as sanctioned by Part 137 Appendix B, permits a total payload of 175% of the original payload. It is unlikely that the designer of the original aircraft would have installed an engine capable of lifting 175% of the design payload. This is the case for the piston engine FU24. While Part 137 allows the weight to be increased beyond the previous 12% overload, a 400 hp engine is not sufficiently powerful to exploit the full 31% in normal agricultural operations. The other limiting factor to exploiting the provisions of Part 137 was the simple fact that while the existing 44 cu ft hopper could accommodate up to 3294 lbs of superphosphate which was just equal to the Part 137 allowable load. However the 44 Cu ft hopper could hold only 2114lbs of the less dense urea, or 18.8% less than the Part 137 allowable urea capacity. To overcome this problem, the FU24 conversion to Pratt & Whitney PT6 turbine power took the opportunity to fit a new 66 cu ft hopper. This was justified on the no change in all up weight basis; the extra capacity would only be used for dispensing lowdensity materials such as urea. And here is where the assumption of no change to flight weight and speed envelope was undermined by the previous application of the Part 137 weight increase. The 44cu ft hopper coupled with an engine limited to 550 hp allowed the aircraft to operate with the full Part 137 weight increase. No substantiation at the full Part 137 weight was required because that had in theory already been approved by Part 137 and demonstrated by four years of successful operations at that weight. 20 However, operations at the full Part 137 weight with the 44 Cu Ft hopper were unlikely for aircraft powered by piston engines.
20 This discussion explains the changes of slope in the FU24 undercarriage defect curves, in Chapter 4 Section 2. There is an increase post 1994 and a much more pronounced increase after 2001 when the turbines entered service.
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Effect of the Turbine FU24 on Agricultural Aircraft Industry The net effect of the FU24 turbine conversion was the availability of an aircraft that could carry more than a GA200, and at least 75% as much as a Cresco or Air Tractor for less than 50% of the cost of a Cresco. (Figures for PT6 stretched FU24 and assuming ownership of original donor airframe). The resulting aircraft although similar in performance to a Cresco would still be an older aircraft and could not be expected to have the same reliability or economic life remaining as a new Cresco. This raised the question in the authors mind, why sink money into a partly used almost Cresco? The answer given by one operator was that the turbine conversions represented a halfway step to enable owners of piston powered FU24s to improve the productivity of their aircraft. This would allow them to accumulate sufficient capital to purchase a Cresco as the eventual replacement for the FU24. Unfortunately for operators with this intention Pacific Aerospace has since ceased production of the Cresco. Several industry sources allege that the development of the various turbine powered FU24s led to closure of the Cresco production line as well as the cancellation of orders for the GA200C, which had been certified in Australia to FAR 23 in 1998. To verify these assertions the CAA register of aircraft was examined. By accounting for the initial registrations and deregistration the following graph was produced. The graph shows the total number of the aircraft types in question on the NZ register.
Figure 6.4 9 December 2008 Page 77 December 2008
The upper blue line shows the number of Crescos produced and registered in New Zealand steadily climbing in the early 1990s. After 1997 the number drops and fluctuates; this represents aircraft produced and then deregistered for export. The numbers increase again after 2001, but by 2002, production at PAC effectively finishes; the last three fluctuations represent aircraft produced for export as parachute machines. The middle red line shows GA200s being added to the New Zealand fleet steadily until about 2000 when a few are exported and some of those remaining in New Zealand are sold to gliding clubs. None have been imported since 2003. The larger and more expensive Air Tractor data is less clear. One was exported causing a small drop in numbers post 1997. 21 Because the CAA database was not configured to provide this data directly, the SAU adapted a query tool. (Anomalies in the way the registration data was entered should be noted.) Within the limitations of the analysis method, the assertion that the development of the turbine FU24 announced in 1998 and completed in 2002, caused a reduction in the adoption of newer aircraft types, cannot be dismissed. While the CAA cannot and should not decline the approval of a design change to protect the commercial position of existing participants, the importance of applying consistent policies and considering their likely wider effects is obvious. Chapter 6 Conclusions - Turbine Conversions
Conclusion 6.1
Since their introduction, the turbine-powered variants of the FU24 have suffered a slightly higher accident rate than the piston-powered variants.
Conclusion 6.2
The defect rate per flying hour of the turbine aircraft has remained higher than the defect rate for piston engine aircraft since their introduction.
Conclusion 6.3
STC approval procedures should include a review of the service history of the airframes to which new engines are fitted for issues that may be exacerbated or revived by the STC.
Conclusion 6.4
CAR 21.119 should be reviewed to determine whether the Director may impose additional conditions on the applicant for an STC if a review of the airframe types service history indicates additional conditions would be appropriate.
21 The graph software connects discrete numbers with a line. This implies that the numbers fell gradually from four aircraft to three, although in practice a step change occurred.
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Conclusion 6.5
Consideration should be given to the introduction of a changed product rule to clarify the conditions to be imposed on modifications that essentially change the nature of an existing product, such as the change of motive power or restarting production.
Conclusion 6.6
CAA policy relating to Part 21 subpart E regarding the Directors power to specify the special conditions or later certification basis for extensive STC modifications is not clearly defined. As a result CAA policies regarding amendments to type certificate and approval of STCs may have been inconsistently applied.
Conclusion 6.7
The introduction of Part 137 in 1994 extended privileges to the FU24 (and Cresco) that could not be substantiated. The impact of these privileges was obscured until the more powerful turbine engines were fitted in 2001. In this sense Part 137 undermined the assumptions used to approve the turbine conversion.
Conclusion 6.8
The combined effect of the Part 137 weight increase and the turbine conversions was a sharp increase in aircraft defect rates, particularly evident in the rate of undercarriage failures.
Conclusion 6.9
A further unintended effect of the turbine conversions may have been to halt the introduction of newer aircraft, such as the Cresco, GA200 and possibly the AirTractor.
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Chapter 7 - Certificate of Airworthiness Duration

Scope item 6: Consider the implications of current non-terminating certificates of airworthiness in the agricultural context.( i.e. vs. 4 yearly and 8 yearly rebuilds of days past) To understand the reason for this scope item, several pieces of regulatory history need to be considered.
Part 43 and Appendix C
Prior to the introduction of Part 43 in 1992, in particular, Part 43 Appendix C, most FU24 aircraft (and other types) were maintained in accordance with maintenance programs developed by operators and approved by the Civil Aviation Department (CAD). Part 43 introduced the option of maintenance in accordance with a generic schedule of inspection items that was included in Part 43 Appendix C. It is not obvious from a contemporary perspective why the CAD decided to move from a proven system of maintenance developed by operators to a generic list of typical aircraft inspection tasks. The intention may have been to to offer the Part 43 Appendix C schedule of maintenance for those aircraft types for which a manufacturers or operators maintenance program was not available. However, Part 43 only required GA aircraft to comply with the maintenance schedule set out in Appendix C. Despite the licence offered by Part 43, many experienced maintainers continued with their own versions of the old company schedules. (Customers appear to have accepted this approach on the grounds of purported reliability.) This approach was legal, as the company schedules were more specific than Appendix C. Therefore, a servicing statement that the aircraft had been inspected IAW Part 43 Appendix C was valid. Nonetheless, Part 43 Appendix C provided a simpler and lower cost, legal alternative for certain operators. This led to a general decline in the maintenance of certain agricultural aircraft after 1992. Part 43 Appendix C was widely regarded as inappropriate and was reserved in March 2007.
Non-Terminating Certificates Of Airworthiness
Another significant policy change was to move from issuing COAs that terminated after five years, to a system of non-terminating certificates of airworthiness, in 1992. The primary motivation for moving to non-terminating COAs was to reduce the burden on the CAA inspectors. (The CAA currently employs one full time aircraft inspector, although they contract the services of a retired ex-CAA staff member and also use professional engineers from the ACU to issue initial and export COAs. Re-issuing COAs would require substantially more CAA resources.) While a non-terminating COA may imply a lifetime warrant of fitness, the new certificates were accompanied by rule changes that made the non-terminating COA valid only while the aircraft continued to be inspected every 100 hours or annually (in accordance with Part 43 Appendix C) and passed an annual review of airworthiness (ARA). Inspection Authority (IA) holders were required to carry out an ARA and to
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provide an independent check of the aircrafts servicing records, but not necessarily a physical aircraft inspection. As the IAs responsibility was to ensure compliance with Part 43 Appendix C, even when it was contrary to his maintenance experience, the IA could not insist on a more thorough inspection if regulatory requirements had been met. The effect of ARAs was therefore limited by the requirements of Part 43 Appendix C. For these reasons, industry stakeholders proposed that the CAA should re-introduce terminating COAs, with re-certification being dependent on a CAA inspection. Implicit in this proposal was the understanding that the CAA would make a thorough teardown and overhaul in accordance with one of the old company schedules a pre-requisite for reissuing the COA. The April 2007 industry survey asked stakeholders whether they favoured a return to terminating COAs. A majority of respondents said they would. A clear bias between aircraft owners and aircraft pilots was discernible in the response, with most (but not all) of the calls for terminating COAs coming from pilots.
Figure 7.1
CAA representatives met operators from the south of the South Island in June 2007 to discuss the topic of terminating COAs. The South island operators shared three maintenance providers, who had continued with their own variations of the old company schedules (but in compliance with Part 43 Appendix C). The consensus of the meeting was that re-introducing terminating COAs would have no benefit for those operators and would increase compliance costs. Operators believed that, due to CAA staff constraints, a COA could be re-issued from Wellington, with formal but not substantial validity. Nonetheless, the meeting agreed that maintenance standards in other parts of the country could be improved, and examples of aircraft purchased from other operators were discussed. Further consensus was reached that, if the intent of re-introducing terminating COAs was to ensure FU24 and other agricultural types received the maintenance they require, the CAA should consider mandating a type-specific maintenance program for agricultural aircraft. It was agreed that this program should not be the original equipment manufacturer
(OEM) programs, as, in the cases of the FU24 and the Cresco, they were inadequate for agricultural operations. The meeting concluded that the CAA should compare the maintenance programs in use and compile a best industry practice maintenance program that should be mandatory for certain agricultural aircraft types. The CAA representatives suggested that the Agricultural Aircraft Association (AAA) could play a part in collecting and compiling a Best Industry Practice Program. Representatives of the AAA agreed in principle. After the meeting, samples of the maintenance programs were collected during visits to other maintenance providers. The CAA holds the OEM program for the FU24. It was confirmed by Pacific Aerospace Ltd (PAC) that the 1978 edition is current. .
Comparison of Maintenance Programs
A spreadsheet was used to compare maintenance tasks. By listing maintenance tasks down the page, a column showing the OEM interval for each task could be compared with a column showing each operators interval for the same task. In this way, alignment of the maintenance intervals should be immediately apparent. In practice, this procedure was more complicated than it first appeared. While the OEM program and the operators had used the basic Airline Transport Association (ATA) chapters to organise their programs, within each ATA section, the various inspections were in different order, used different taxonomy, or had additions or omissions relative to the OEM program or each other. For some OEM tasks, no equivalent tasks in the operators programs existed, and, for some operators, programs recorded maintenance tasks that were not included in the OEM program. Despite the use of ATA chapters, variations existed, such as the inclusion of rudder inspections in Chapter 27 Flight Controls or Chapter 55 Horizontal and Vertical Stabilizers.
Airworthiness Directives and Service Bulletins
The correct treatment of ADs and manufacturers service bulletins (SBs) also needs to be considered. It was concluded that it was best to put the SB/AD with the component grouping that it describes. Although these could be listed separately, (and this was the case in one operators program) listing them with their functional group highlighted the need in many cases for the OEM program to incorporate the AD (or SB) and thus permit it to be cancelled. The analogy may be drawn to a crossword puzzle certain boxes were left empty but could sometimes be filled in later when the particular maintenance item was discovered elsewhere in the program of interest. In practice, if the CAA were to conduct this alignment exercise, the operator applying for approval of a program could be asked to fill in the apparent blanks. As a proof of concept, the alignment was performed on the FU24 empennage, using the current (1978) PAC maintenance program and two of the leading maintenance providers own programs. An excerpt from this spread sheet is shown in the following Figure: For quick reference, where concurrence between a program and the OEM program was established, that inspection item was coloured green. Where a gap existed in either the
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FU24
Maintenance Program Comparison requirement Interval OEM SouthAir Phoenix Prog 1 Prog 2 100/200 200/400/800 200 100 100 100 400/4 500 200 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 200 100 100 100 100 100 100 12 months 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 1000 100 100 100 100 100 100? 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 24/48months 100 50 100 100 50/100 100 50 50 100
Item Undercarriage
Mainplane
Fuselage
Empennage
Sub item Assembly Torque links Torque links Torque links attach fitting Oleos MLG/NLG Struts MLG Attach Bolts MLG Axles MLG/NLG bearings NLG Steering Torque tube NLG Tyres Brakes Brake System Brake Mst Cyl Assembly Brake callipers External surface Control Surfaces Control Cables Control Rods/pulleys Fuel tanks Fuel tanks Fuel tanks Fuel tanks Fairings/tapes Attachments Aileron Tip Fairings External surface Internal Surfaces Structure Firewall Canopy Flight Controls Flap Torque Tube Flap Horn Assy Flap Horn Assy Cockpit Area Flap tube seal boots 1st Aid Kit Seats & Cushions Safety Harness Safety Harness Inertia reel Inst & Plumb ASI Lines Hopper Jettison Hopper Lever Skin STA240 Control Cables/rods Batteries Electrical Fuel System Elevatote trim rod Fin/rudder/elevator Tail Cone Elevator Elevator Elevator Trim Tab Control arm Elevator Trim Jack Stabilator Stab Hinges Stab Pivot Elevator Trim Tab Rudder Bushes Rudder Rudder Lwr Rib Rudder Rudder Rudder Controls Fin Fin LE Fin Skins LE Protection Fin Fin Assy Control Surfaces Aircraft
Prog 3
General
Clean examine Remove examine Replace bolts DCA/FU24/125 Change oil. Repressuris Examine attachments Replace bolts (1 of 4) Magnaflux DCA/FU24/137B regrease DCA/FU24/127A DCA/FU24/142A Examine 10x condition & pressure Discs/pads wear Examine Hoses/lines Condition & fluid level lubricate crack Check pins Examine Examine Examine for fraying, flats, tension Examine, free movement Examine conditon /Security Filters DCA/FU24/168 pt 2 Drain, remove & clean fiilters ../168 pt 3 Examine fillers, gauges, pipelines examine Inspect Inspect PACSB/FU/078 Examine Examine Examine Examine for condition/sealing Examine for condition cleanliness Examine & Lube Examine per DCA/FU24/164 examine x10 Crack Check PACSB/FU/089 Clean examine structure Examine & Lube Examine Examine conditon /Security Examine conditon /Security Proof load Operate, examine Examine for Condition Blow out, Leak test Examine conditon /Security/sealing Operate, examine, lube Operate examikne lock & detent Examine for cracks DCA/Fu24/129 Examine fraying/binding/freedom Check electrolyte, condition, securtiy Operate Remove examine Sump tank per DCA/Fu24/132 Lubricate at rear Blkhd Examine for condition/distortion/corrosion Remove/clean/examine Examine structure, mass balance, Hinges Lubricate Hinges Examine per DCA/FU24/135 End play, Seal, Lubricate, operat Remove Examine Fuselage fittings Replace bolts Examine cracks & corrosion Examine, check play, Lubricate Check Range of Movement, NLG clear of ground Examine in-situ Remove detach torque tube examine per DCA/FU24/134 Remove for Overhaul Examine, Cables, Pulleys Fairleads, Lubricate, Tension Remove Fwd Fairing and examine attach fitting per DCA/FU24/172 Inspect DCA/FU24/176 Inspect for cracks Inspect for security Remove Tip Cap, Inspect Upper ribd for cracks Remove, Remove Fin Cap,Inspect Internally & externally for corrosion, cracks wear & damage check Beacon, wiring Operate, Lubrciate, range of movement Repaint & reweigh
100 100
12 months 12 months 50 50 100 12 months 100 100 below 100 100
100 100 48 months 48 months 48 months 48 months 100 100 12months 48 months 12 months 100 100 100 48 months
below 12 months above 12 months 100
100 48 months
FU24
Item
Empennage
Maintenance Program Comparison

Interval
Sub item
Fin/rudder/elevator Tail Cone Stabilator Stabilator Stab Trim Tab Stab Trim Jack Stabilator Stab Hinges Stab Pivot Rudder Bushes Rudder Rudder Lwr Rib Rudder Rudder Rudder Controls Fin Fin LE Fin Skins LE Protection Fin Fin Assy Control Surfaces Aircraft
requirement
Examine for condition/distortion/corrosion Remove/clean/examine Examine structure, mass balance, check play in Hinges Lubricate Hinges Examine cracks & corrosion End play, Seal, Lubricate, operat Remove Examine Fuselage fittings Replace bolts Examine, check play, Lubricate Check Range of Movement, NLG clear of ground Examine in-situ Remove detach torque tube examine per DCA/FU24/134 Remove for Overhaul Examine, Cables, Pulleys Fairleads, Lubricate, Tension Remove Fwd Fairing and examine attach fitting per DCA/FU24/172 Inspect DCA/FU24/176 Inspect for cracks Inspect for security Remove Tip Cap, Inspect Upper rib for cracks Remove, Remove Fin Cap,Inspect Internally & externally for corrosion, cracks wear & damage check Beacon, wiring Operate, Lubrciate, range of movement Repaint & reweigh
OEM
50' 50/100 50 50 12 months 12 months 50 100 12 months 100 100 50* 100 100
Prog 1 100' 100 100 100*
Prog 2 100 100 48 months 100 48 months 48 months 48 months 100 100 12 months 48 months 12 months 50 100 100 48 months* 48 months'
100* 12 months above 12 months 50
50/100/annual
100' 48 months Concurr Exceeds Absent
General
OEM or the operators program, yellow highlight was applied. Where the intervals of an operators program exceeded the OEM requirement, the cell was coloured red. Green tasks (where agreement is reached) require no further analysis. Yellow boxes (where a task is absent) require more consideration. It is arguable that yellow boxes should be back filled, using the most stringent of the programs as the standard. However, some discretion is required as some maintenance tasks may be unique to a certain operator. For example, an operator conducting geophysical surveys may need to check a certain antenna for security, a task not applicable to standard aircraft. The yellow boxes represent areas where an assessment of the discrepancy needs to be made, and a decision reached. The red boxes highlight where an operators program exceeds the manufacturers requirement. In this example, the OEM recommends the horizontal stabiliser be removed every 12 months. Operator 1 apparently never removes it (yellow query) and operator 2 removes it at 48 months, four times the OEM interval. Once again, discretion and judgement is required. The OEM program in this case has not been revised since shortly after the aircraft was certified in 1978. In service, Operator 2s 48-month interval may have proven to be adequate. It may be more appropriate to revise the OEM program to 48 months, rather than aligning operator 2s program with what may have been a best guess in 1978. While painstaking, this method of analysis provides a ready comparison of the OEM and individual operator programs.
Conclusions: Chapter 7 Conclusion 7.1
Although favoured by many industry stakeholders, the reintroduction of terminating COAs is unlikely to raise maintenance standards. It would also increase costs for industry and the burden on the CAA.
Conclusion 7.2
A better means of raising the standard of airworthiness for agricultural aircraft is to recognise them as special purpose machines and require specific maintenance programs.
Conclusion 7.3
Expertise in agricultural aircraft lies with industry, and a comparison of leading industry maintenance programs could lead to the production of a best industry practice maintenance program. This would share expertise across the industry and raise overall safety. Such a program, along with relevant ADs and SBs, should be fed back to the OEM, and incorporated into the OEM maintenance program. This would become the reference standard for operator programs approved under 91.607. (This would still allow variation from the OEM program, but with explanations.)
Conclusion 7.4
There is a need to review the approval of maintenance programs for agricultural aircraft. Because of the demanding operations, and their predominance in the New Zealand agricultural industry, priority should be given to the New Zealand type designs
Chapter 8 - Re-use of Data Plates

Scope item 7: Review NZCAA policy of the re-use of data plates from crashed aircraft. The CAA policy on the re-use of dataplates is quite clear, and is contained in Part 21.807. This rule does not permit the re-use of data plates. The rule requires them to remain attached to the original aircraft except in certain circumstances for maintenance. Aircraft damaged in an accident retain their data plate, as it is essentially just another aircraft component. It is important that the data plate remain with the damaged aircraft to establish the identity of the aircraft and provide continuity of its maintenance records should it be restored to an airworthy condition. As such returning the data plate to the CAA in the event of an accident that renders the aircraft unserviceable is counterproductive. In terms of preventing the aircraft being flown it is not much more effective than returning the ignition keys. What this scope item really intended was to examine a proposal to return data plate to the CAA in the event of an accident, to prevent the aircraft from being operated until the CAA has reassessed its airworthiness. Implicit in this suggestion is that a non-terminating COA is not valid where the aircraft has been substantially damaged. The conditions of a nonterminating COA are that the aircraft be maintained in a condition fit for flight. Immediately after a serious accident, the aircraft is not in condition fit for flight, and so the COA is technically invalid. A more useful way to achieve the aim would be to leave the data plate on the aircraft wreckage, but return the COA to the CAA for revocation (or to be held in abeyance or some other processes). The Aircraft Certification Unit consider it would be desirable for aircraft that have been seriously damaged in to have their COA revoked, and reinstated subject to a satisfactory condition inspection by CAA staff. This would not only prove an assurance of airworthiness but also reduce the possibilities for confusion of aircraft records. This is particularly relevant when an aircraft is salvage by replacement of major components such as wings, or fuselages. The only problem with implementing this policy is providing a clear definition of an accident that requires revocation of the COA. While for major accidents, the case is clear, even a minor landing accident can render the aircraft unfit for further flight. Yet the undercarriage repair may only take a few days and the CAA would not want to have revoke and reissue COA for such cases. The problem becomes defining the boundary, and then the treatment of boundary cases. The principal thing to avoid is the creation of a climate where reporting of moderate accidents is suppressed to avoid the expense of reissuing the COA. A possible solution to this is to revoke the COA when an aircraft is written off for insurance purposes. The negative financial impact is to some extent balanced by the payout of insurance money to the owner. This has implications for the insurance industry, as the valid COA relating to a wrecked aircraft may constitute a large portion of the wrecks residual value. Further meeting with the insurance industry is needed to determine the way forward.
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Conclusions Conclusion 8.1
Returning the data plate to the CAA is unlikely to be a practical way of controlling the airworthiness of aircraft rebuilt from wrecks. Revoking the COA for aircraft that are written off may be a more effective means.
Conclusion 8.2
The CAAs ACU, Legal, and GA groups need to consider the legal aspects of revoking the COA for aircraft that are written off, and liaise with insurance industry.
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Chapter 9 - Industry Operational Issues

Scope item 8: Discuss with Industry broader operational safety concerns such as hopper size, compliance with Limitations, Appendix B Overload provision.
Introduction
This was done in several ways, including a mail out survey, group meetings, and interviews with maintainers, operators, and manufacturers. This section outlines the responses received.
Questionnaire
In April 2007, the CAA sent questionnaire form to all agricultural pilots and industry members. A total of 116 surveys were sent out and 29 responses were received. In addition, certain south island pilots and maintainers requested a meeting with the CAA team members.. Another 24 industry members attended the meeting held in the Otago Flying Club in June 2007, which provided further informal responses to the survey. The survey posed the following questions, which were related to the scope items in the Terms of Reference: 1. 2. 3. 4. Can you provide details of aircraft incidents that should be considered in the review? Should the FU24 Airworthiness Directives be split into separate schedules for the piston and turbine aircraft? Are you aware of any common, re-occurring, or unusual defects affecting the airworthiness of agricultural aircraft? Do you have any firsthand knowledge of any undesirable or unsafe design features or new maintenance issues that have arisen as a result of reenginning? Do you consider the current system of non-terminating Certificates of airworthiness appropriate for agricultural aircraft? a. How practical is the observance of flight manual limitations as a means of ensuring operational safety? b. Does the current Appendix B to Part 137 provide adequate guidance in the operation of agricultural aircraft at weights in excess of their maximum certified take-off weight? c. Are there any other operational issues the CAA should consider to improve the safety of agricultural aircraft operations? 7. Do you believe the safety of agricultural operations could be improved by the adoption of newer technologies?
5. 6.
Although the survey questions were based around the Terms of Reference, they were not well designed for collecting survey responses questions 1, 3 and 6c in particular
received wide ranging responses that did not lend themselves to statistical presentation. Responses to other five questions are represented below:
Re -engined issues
No Yes
33% 22%
Flight Manual Limitations Practical?

No Yes
Seperate Piston / Turbine ADs

No Yes
27%
67% 78% 73%
137 App B Adequate

No 8% Yes Not Sure
Terminating C of A
0%
Non term 4 years 8 years

33%
50% 42%
67%
Figure 9.1
Summary of Responses
Two thirds of respondents believed there were airworthiness issues with the turbine converted FU24 aircraft. Almost 80% of respondents thought the flight manual limitations were a poor means of ensuring operational safety. This question primarily relates to reengined aircraft in which the horsepower is increased but the existing airframe speed limitations are relied upon to avoid recertifying the aircraft for the higher speeds that can now be obtained. Separating the ADs was generally supported, although some good points against this were raised. Keeping them together but rewriting the applicability is probably viable. 50% of respondents thought Part 137 failed to provide adequate guidance for agricultural operations beyond the certified take-off weight. Several other responses, such as, who reads it anyway were classified under not sure. The two thirds of respondents in favour of a return to terminating COAs was not anticipated , as such move would increase compliance obligations. The reasons for this include the generally poor average condition of agricultural aircraft and a desire by pilots to see owners held to account for this. (Chapter 8 examines this issue in more details and concludes that the airworthiness of aircraft could be raised by tighter CAA control of the maintenance programs.) The responses to question 3, are you aware of any common, re-occurring or unusual defects affecting the airworthiness of agricultural aircraft, are represented below:
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This figure shows that the three leading industry airworthiness concerns, were turbine engines, undercarriage and vertical fins. (These topics have been addressed in detail in Chapter 5 section 2.)
7
Airworthiness Concerns
6
Airworthiness Concerns No Concerns

4
29 6
Walter Spar Undercarriage Vertical Stab Elevator rear Bulkhead
Engine mounts R22 spray overload Bell 206 Maint Hopper size
Flight Duty Time Farm Strip Enforcement Roll Over/cockpit
None
Figure 9.2
Industry Comments
Not all of the responses received could be correlated to the specific questions included in the questionnaire. These written responses are presented below. Responses have been made anonymous and are listed in groups against each of the survey the questions, with the question in italics.
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4 Re-engined Aircraft Issues Do you have any firsthand knowledge of any undesirable or unsafe design feature or new maintenance issues that have arisen as a result of re-engining? Fuel system in Walter! Should have at least had a non-return valve between inboard and outboard tanks. Why not have scavenge pumps that scavenge into inboard tanks. Cresco hopper in the Fletcher 2000!! The ability to get 100% Tq out of an engine thats installed in an airframe where the limit is meant to be 89% Tq No PT6 EX fuel lever can be inadvertently shifted past ground idle to shut-off. If left in ground idle more than 10 minutes pitch cable inner sleeve melts then jams when cold; also oil temp gets very high. As newly converted aircraft, I think these are good agricultural aircraft. However, I believe that, because these aircraft are so easy to operate outside safety parameters, that some years after the original conversion, problems can arise. Eg I would not like to be asked to fly one of these aircraft after it had been operated for several years by pilots who disregard Vno, Va, AUW and hopper weight restrictions. In 2005 I was asked by an Indonesian company to assist in familiarising some of their pilots with their newly acquired PT6 Fletcher EX. Using the NZ comprehensive handling notes, and lengthy written rating exam, I was able to demonstrate that these aircraft need to be operated carefully to give reliable long life. On returning home to NZ, I found that an earlier Walter turbo-prop conversion had crashed near Whangarei killing the pilot and driver. I have been informed that the fin ripped at the front and the fin wrapped around the all-flying tailplane. Perhaps NZ pilots who have mostly operated way outside the envelope need to be encouraged to have a look at the flight manual and the handling notes for these converted Fletchers. No comment, but all re-engined aircraft have more horsepower therefore just watch the load carrying of the airframe. Yes. The excessive nose down pitch in Walter powered FU24s at slow approach speeds, which gets worse as more flap is applied. No Extending maintenance to 150 hr checks when 1 minute per load is taken off the aircraft could well have flown between 175 - 200 hrs between checks. As noted we operate a FU24 Walter powered Fletcher. This aircraft has always been flown within the design parameters and as a result has required no more maintenance (either scheduled or unscheduled) than any other aircraft I have operated. No - although there is a question of reliability of Walter turbines. How many have failed to reach TBO? Air Services had 4 blow-ups. What happens if there is a fatality because of this - so far lucky. No
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5 Non-terminating Certificates of Airworthiness Do you consider the current system of non-terminating Certificates of Airworthiness appropriate for agricultural aircraft? (Consider the March 2007 revised rule 91.605 which requires maintenance to be carried out in accordance with an approved maintenance programme) No - all aircraft should operate under terminating C of A. This would give all parts finite life Provided the necessary items are covered in the maintenance schedule and when they need to be complied with then dont see a problem. Yes As a one-aeroplane operator I would prefer the non-terminating C of A, but at times I have seen some pretty rough aircraft around, and maybe a terminating C of A may lift the lower standard. An 8 year C of A is too long. A 4 year C of A would be better. NO. Ag aircraft operate in max loads, hard conditions to believe that everything can be fixed at progressive checks is false (usually by the company operating the aircraft). We need to remember some of these machines are getting close to 50 years old, what other operations within NZ re-use equipment this old and are legally allowed to repower, redesign; I can think of none. I have never seen a TK Bedford with 550 odd horsepower delivering 10t of fert to an airstrip. No, there needs to be a finite life to airframes. I personally think inappropriate, regardless of maintenance programs so ag aircraft are flying in what I consider a poor state. As long as it will fly people will fly them. I do believe that we should be looking at a fixed term C of A for Agricultural aircraft. Only non-terminating if outside authority responsible for annual inspections Non-terminating C of As are fine. Any maintenance requirement renders the C of A null and void until maintenance is completed and aircraft released to service. Yes No. Should go back to terminating C of As - 4 or 5 yr. Present system allows for no financial accountability. Present system open to interpretation by owners and engineers.
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6a Broader Operational Concerns How practical is the observance of flight manual limitations as a means of ensuring operational safety? For example, should the aircraft be fitted with further safety measures such as governors, airspeed warning horns, hopper limiters or weight recording devices? No, we are happy as things are out of flight manual Flight manual limitations dont help much on the job. What is required is weigh-bridges like at the quarries. Aircraft taxies on, loader fills hopper watching the weight. Weight indicators should be considered - even cockeys can weigh their cattle digitally Not very. Its not. Should be fitted with weight recording devices. I think in general what limitations that are in the flight manual dont mean too much to the operator, it is the competition and making money. Agricultural aviation is probably the only sector in NZ aviation where the financial success of the operation depends on the pilots performance. With a piston powered aircraft, the pilot, if he wishes, may overload the aircraft - that is fill the hopper to the top. Because of the gross overload the aircraft will not fly very fast, it cant turn much or pull any G so not too much damage can be done to the airframe. High powered turbine aircraft are a different kettle of fish. A pilot can carry a full hopper load of product every take-off day in day out year in year out in almost any conditions. A turbine powered aircraft can exceed Va at MAUW or beyond with only cruise power; lower the nose a few degrees and the aircraft is up to the Vne quick as a flash. I think that management and pilots may need some serious education on the stress on fully or overloaded aircraft. If operators charged a better hourly rate for their aircraft, pilots would not have to push themselves or their aircraft to extreme limits to achieve so-called financial success. Fit further safety measures. If you stick to flight manual limitations in a certified aircraft you should have no problems Not always practical in low level hill terrain. Airspeed warning horn would be a good step in the right direction. It is obviously up to the pilot to observe flight manual limitations. I do not believe we should have to install any additional devices to increase the operational safety of our operation. Tamper-proof flight recorders (F/W and Heli) Tq and temp recording - once made mandatory if the operator refuses to supply data then scrap the engine. These are not really workable in this type of operation I believe. More pilot education would be better.
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6b Broader Operational Concerns Does the current Appendix B to Part 137 provide adequate guidance in the operation of agricultural aircraft at weights in excess of their maximum certified take-off weight? How many pilots actually read this or understand it? No Yes I think it does ? No. Should do away with the ag overload Aircraft should only be loaded to manufacturers max take-off weight, not some overload weight plucked from the air. Yes I believe it does. Yes Yes There should be a max load limit to be carried in the hopper (same as trucks). This should be placarded for all to see. Absolute maximum load should be clearly marked for pilot and driver - very vague at the moment.
6c Broader Operational Concerns Are there any other aircraft issues that the CAA should consider to improve the safety of agricultural aircraft operations? I think CAA has done a good job in association with our industry in adopting the Code of Practice. All ag aircraft should have the pilot seated behind the hopper. No Duty time. Too many phone calls = not enough sleep. Roll protection. Pilot duty times need to be addressed. Many of us spend 3-4 hours after a days work phoning people for work, filing paper work, etc. It isnt uncommon for 15-16 hour days. Most maintenance problems are brought about by condition of strips and taxi areas. Safety of the Fletcher cockpit - safety frame as discussed as far back as 1979 - non-survivable in even low speed crash More teeth required to police farm airstrip standards Placing larger hoppers to carry bulky products should not be allowed. Hopper limiters very good idea. Competition amongst companies and pricing is a major point in the safety. Outside your scope probably but pay pilots % revenue or a per tonne basis and its pretty easy to work out, bigger load - more $ The Kiwi culture of load it up until it breaks Flight and duty times Recording/reporting defects between inspections Banning all ag ops in R22 helicopters, they were never designed for ag work.
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7 Technological Improvements Do you believe the safety of agricultural operations could be improved by the adoption of newer technologies such as, data recording, engine monitoring devices (HUMS). If so please detail. Yes These new technologies would not help much. The pilot monitors engine parameters constantly as well as rest of the aircraft and will report as soon as he observes something different. No - most safety issues are practical ones - airframe design - loads - speeds not designed for, etc. The fixing of tailplanes on Walters needs to be looked at. I do not think safety would be improved with the addition of newer technologies Yes, definitely. Easier policing of speeds and engine performance parameters Possibly? The recording (accurate) of flight time is one of the most important ways of getting the industry all on the same page. Any a/c that can be over-torqued or boosted should mandatorily have that parameter recorded.
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Other Comments CAA is basically held by the majority of the industry in contempt - they need to establish an enforcement unit like the CUIC of the LTSA that isnt trying to keep the industry coming along and be nice at the same time. Theyd only have to jump on a few operators and the rest would be happy to fall into line. None at this time Ag ratings to be endorsed on license. Industry-wide training syllabus. Topdressing and aerial spraying is the most dangerous peace-time flying operation. The reasons are obvious. This industry is almost guilty of accepting serious injury and death as just part of job. The economics point to the fact that a certain size load needs to be carried to make money and this is well above the MAUW. I would say it is common knowledge that we all overload. Only a matter of looking at flight logs. The ag industry seems to have been self governing for too long; how many pilots have been killed and nothing ever happens; very easy to blame someone who is no longer with us, than to find the real cause and fix the problem. I am getting the feeling from the tone of this letter that you are specifically targeting the upgraded Walter and PT6 powered FU24 aircraft. I think if you care to look, that a very high percentage of the maintenance issues involving this particular modification come from a particular operation in the {deleted} area. It is frustrating to me as an operator to have my aircraft branded because of the actions of one or two pilots that flout the flight manual limitations. As {deleted} operators of these aircraft appear to be operating them in accordance with the flight manual and maintenance appears to be carried out to a good standard - there seem to be very few issues. I believe the aircraft modification itself is of a good standard, and so long as the aircraft is operated sensibly and in accordance with the flight manual, that this aircraft can be operated quite safely. Replace u/s parts with new. Recently, {ZK-Deleted) was fitted with a -34 engine which was getting hot in a Cresco for req tq. Engineering decided it would be fine at the de-rated HP; after 50 hours it couldnt make tq at 550 HP so is parked up for 3 months or more til -11 is overhauled. Yes - I do believe re-introducing 4-5 year C of A for agricultural aircraft would definitely improve safety and keep aircraft in tip-top condition. Should stop old fins falling off - FU24 spars would get a decent check more often and generally the aircraft would present better than todays aircraft which generally are untidy. Summary and Conclusions
Significant numbers of industry members, including some of the most experienced members, have expressed strong concerns about aspects of agricultural aircraft safety.
Conclusion 9.1
The current rule regarding operation beyond MCTOW is not well regarded by aircraft crews
Conclusion 9.2
Airworthiness of the FU24 aircraft is a commonly expressed concern.
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Chapter 10- Emerging Technologies

Scope item 9: Consider the available technology to assist the measuring, recording and retrieval of hopper loads. Introduction The intent of this scope item was to determine if improvement in digital technology and load measuring devices would make it practical to require mandatory fitting of hopper load measuring devices to all agricultural aircraft. The reason for this is to provide a means of regulating the industry to prevent dangerous overloading by providing a record of the load on each flight. A full discussion of digital load measuring technology is an engineering project in its own right. In addition while consulting with industry on this project various other emerging technologies with safety applications to agricultural aviation were examined. Accordingly it was decided to broaden the scope from load measuring technology but limit the depth of the investigation. If necessary a detailed investigation of particular devices could be conducted as a separate project. In general while various technologies are emerging that will contribute to aviation safety, the gains to be made are small compared to the gains that can be achieved with improvement to the existing machinery and regulation of it. The following chapter discuss three significant technological improvement, hopper load measurement, global positioning system (GPS) tracking and Time in Service Recorders (TSRs), and examines how they might be applied to agricultural aviation.
Hopper Load Measuring Cells
The Pacific Aerospace 750XL-AG version was built with a 96 cu ft hopper that incorporates an on-board load-measuring device. This device displays the hopper load on a readout in the cockpit. Although this unit has had some reliability problems, it has proven satisfactory in service. Its functionality is required to enable the aircraft to meet the requirements of DCA/EQUIP/2A 22, as the hopper is behind the pilot and not equipped with a translucent window as previous agricultural aircraft have been. This aircraft was designed to be equipped with a load measuring system from the outset due to its configuration. Other attempts to equip existing hoppers with load cells have proved unreliable. An essential problem is that to provide sensitive and accurate load measurement, the hopper should be supported on reasonable flexible mounts, as the deflection of the mounts is being measured to calculate the weight in the hopper. The deflection to be measured occurs at an acceleration of 1 G while the aircraft is being loaded. However the hopper mounting structure has to be capable of withstanding manoeuvre and gust loads factors of at least 3 G, as well as crash loads of up to 12 G when the hopper is mounted behind the pilot. On a new design this engineering paradox can be overcome with difficulty. For existing designs where the hopper mounting is already accommodating existing engineering compromises, fitting a reliable hopper load measurement device becomes even more difficult.
22 Since 1979 Airworthiness Directive DCA/EQUIP/2A has required aircraft on agricultural operations to be provided with a means of indicating to the pilot the quantity of product on board.
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The other option that has been pursued is the measurement of undercarriage deflection, or the resulting increase in air pressure inside the air spring that supports the aircraft weight in an oleo-pneumatic piston undercarriage. Deflection measurement devices have suffered from the aggressive (wet, dirty) environment that the undercarriages are subjected to. The air pressure measurement should have proved more reliable but it has some issues to overcome as well. Due to friction in the undercarriage suspension mechanism, and the fact that the aircraft are not always level when they are loaded, the ratio of the air pressure signal to actual hopper contents is variable. An estimated readout from a single undercarriage le pressure sensor is shown in the following graph. A direct readout of this signal in the cockpit would not be useful. However with as sensor on each main undercarriage leg, and some appropriate software to sample and average the signals, it should be possible to obtain an estimate of the load on board. The friction in the undercarriage sometimes prevents an accurate signal being received at rest. As the aircraft starts taxiing the friction is overcome, although uneven ground will produce fluctuations in the air pressure. The software would need to recognise these fluctuation and calculate an average weight as shown by the dotted line on the graph.
Oleo Pressure
Landing Load Taxi Takeoff
In Flight cylinder pre-charge
Unloaded Weight
Loaded weight
Figure 10.1
Time
Although the measurement of on-board load is challenging, pinpoint accuracy is not required. It would be sufficient to measure a 1000 kg load to the nearest 10 kg, which represents a 1% scale error; +/- 20 kg or 2% would probably be acceptable. As one commentator noted in the industry response section, a farmer can get his live cattle weighed with sufficient accuracy for commercial purposes by a mobile weighing device, so the technology exists.
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Conclusion 10.1
The engineering challenges presented by on board load measuring are considerable but not insurmountable.
Conclusion 10.2
Onboard load measurement is more feasible if incorporated in the design from conception.
Conclusion 10.3
For existing aircraft designs, the undercarriage oleo pressure method may have potential for further development with appropriate software.
GPS tracking systems
In recent years a number of GPS base systems have been developed that provide near real time information about the position of an aircraft, some systems can also estimate speed and height. These systems could provide an increase in safety to crews, particularly when operating in remote areas. The aircraft position signal could be provided to the aircrafts base, or more usefully the loader driver. Agricultural aviation involves the operation of powerful machinery (up to 750 hp) at speeds of 120-180 kph by a single operator in rough and often isolated terrain. The occupational hazards are obvious. The loader driver is likely to be the nearest person in the event of an emergency. An in-cab display of the aircrafts position would alert the loader driver of any emergency. The loss of signal would be an obvious emergency, but in the recent accident near Opotiki, the sudden divergence of the aircraft from its regular track could alert the loader of an impending emergency situation, as well as pinpointing the crash site. For the information provided by a GPS tracker to be useful, the loader driver would obviously need suitable communication equipment at hand. Many operators do equip their loader tucks with safety equipment, but the provision of GPS tracking equipment may be desirable for remote area operations. Most of the aircraft accidents happen on take-off or landing, and the loader driver is likely to be the first on the scene, so the vehicle should be fitted with suitable safety equipment. The adequacy of this equipment is best addressed during certification of the operators 137 exposition. The communication requirements would clearly be different for an operator in the Waikato and an operator in the Marlborough hill country. A GPS tracker would provides some advantages over the existing requirement to fit an automatic emergency locator transmitter (ELT). Recent agricultural accidents have not had a good ELT success record. Often the ELT is damaged in the accident or simply the aerial is broken off preventing transmission of the signal. In the event of a successful ELT activation, it sends a signal on 121.5 kHz (soon to be 406 MHz) which is not always monitored by the loader driver. Although the loader driver will know within about 4 minutes that the aircraft has encountered a problem, due to its non-arrival, it could be some time before the signal is picked up though the rescue co-ordination centre and a location determined. 23
23 Up to an hour.
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The inherent engineering problem with ELTs is that they are required to do nothing for most of their service lives. In a brief moment, often while the rest of the aircraft is undergoing structural failure they are required to automatically activate and remain operational throughout the crash sequence. By comparison a GPS tracking device can be provided with normal aircraft power, operates under normal conditions without crash loading, mechanical damage or fire. If any of those do occur, the signal ceases, which provides the alert. Although the signalling technology is more sophisticated, the engineering design challenges are smaller. As such GPS tracking devices offer an enhanced level of safety over ELT and should be recommended for agricultural operations. The need to provide suitable safety equipment on the loader truck and ensure the loader driver is trained in its use was illustrated by the following incident (not recorded on CAA database). The hydraulic system of the loader truck failed as the full bucket was positioned above an FU24 24. Approximately 1000 kg of superphosphate and several hundred kilograms of loader bucket crushed the aircraft fuselage. The pilot was pushed forward onto the cockpit floor. He was trapped there because the rearward-sliding canopy was obstructed by the loader bucket and wrecked fuselage. In his displaced position, he could not reach the crash axe to break the canopy. The loader driver was unable to remove the loaded bucket. Luckily there was no fuel leakage or electrical ignition, before the farmer arrived with a tractor and dragged the loader clear of the wrecked aircraft.
Conclusion 10.4
GPS tracking systems may enhance the safety of agricultural operations in remote areas. To be effective, the loader driver should be trained and equipped to respond to emergency situations. Certification of Part 137 operators is an appropriate means of achieving this.
Time in Service Recorders
In the course of the Review, industry stakeholders and CAA staff raised the subject of mandatory TSRs repeatedly. The mandatory provision of a TSR that met the requirements of NZTSO 2001 would doubtlessly improve safety by providing an unalterable record of flight time and takeoff landing cycles. The current TSO does not require recording of the onboard load due to the difficulties discussed above, However the record of flight cycles provides a means of detecting overloading by comparison with the invoices for the amount of fertiliser spread. No viable device meeting the requirement of the NZTSO has yet been certified. The author of this review has also been involved in the TSR project. In discussion with manufacturers, including some very capable overseas organisations, the inherent problem is commercial viability. Even a simple device will run to approximately a hundred thousand of dollars to develop and certify. As the total market for device in New Zealand, assuming 100% market share is 1000 unit or less, manufacturers have not been in a hurry to develop such a
24 ZK-DMO
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device. The rule requiring the provision of TSRs may be approaching a critical decision point.
Are Time in Service Recorders Necessary?
Part 91.509(b)(4) requires aircraft conducting agricultural operations to be fitted with a TSR, although the rule is currently held in abeyance pending development of a device that meets the requirements of NZTSO 2001. Some of the agricultural aircraft in New Zealand have fixed component lives, but there is little concern that these are being regularly exceeded. The requirement of Part 91.509 for time in service recorders for agricultural aircraft was primarily intended to ensure maintenance interval were respected. However they do provide an indirect measure of excessive overloading. A TSR can only do this indirectly, by providing a record of the number of flights completed in a given calendar period, which could be compared with records for the quantity of material dispensed, to get an average load per flight. The only aircraft types in New Zealand suffering a significant number of occurrences that can be attributed to overloading, such as undercarriage problems, are the FU24 and Cresco series, although between them these two aircraft types together conduct 75% of the agricultural aircraft operations in New Zealand. These aircraft are operating under the provisions of Part 137 Appendix B which extended the privileges of CAM 8 to them without requiring certification to CAM 8 as was required by overseas authorities for the foreign aircraft types, as was discussed in Chapter 3. As the Cresco undercarriage was certified at the MCTOW of 6450 lbs and 137 permits operation at up to 8256 lbs many of the occurrences may be due to overloading within the provisions of Part 137. Therefore monitoring the operating weight via access to TSR data may keep operators below the Part 137 permitted limit, but still not significantly reduce the occurrence rate. If the operator disregarded Part 137 altogether, the volume of the hopper limits the all up weight of the Cresco loaded with superphosphate to 8554 lbs 25. By comparison the Flightcare and Turbine Conversions Ltd PT6 powered FU24s with the 66 cu ft hopper fitted have the same hopper volume as the Cresco and can accommodate 4942 lbs of superphosphate. Including the empty weight of the aircraft(3030 lbs), an hours fuel (+unusable fuel) and 180 lb pilot, the maximum weight possible with superphosphate is 7992 lbs or 25% more than its Part 137 legal overload weight. So when considering overloading beyond Part 137 with superphosphate or other common fertiliser blends, the cause for concern is essentially only the FU24 fitted with a 66 cu ft Hoppers. The other significant agricultural types in New Zealand cannot be significantly overloaded with superphosphate. See figure 11.2. With high density material such as lime the other aircraft can be overloaded, but the 66 cu ft version of FU24 does so to a much greater extent than comparative types.
25 For the Cresco, the hopper volume (66 c ft) limits the superphosphate hopper load to 4942 lbs and thus the all up weight to approximately 8554 lbs, which is only 3.6% over the 8256 lb Part 137 limit. (A full hopper of superphosphate exceeds the hopper load limit of 4100 lbs).
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Figure 10.2
Figure 10.2 shows the percentage over or under the Part 137 weight that the aircraft will achieve will a full hopper, 1 hours fuel and crew. This weight has been estimated for the FU24 with 44 and 66 cu ft hoppers, as well as the Cresco (66 cu ft), AT-402B (53 cu ft) and GA 200B (28.25 cu ft). The three sets of data show the full hopper loads with three common products. Lime is the heaviest with a specific gravity of 1.6, urea is the lightest at 0.77 (half the density of lime) and superphosphate is in the middle at about 1.2. 26 The standout feature from the figure 11.2 is how much the 66 cu ft FU24 can be overloaded beyond Part 137, in comparison with the other aircraft types. In figure 10.2, note the GA200B and AT-402B can be overloaded with superphosphate by about 10%. Both of these aircraft were designed primarily for spraying aqueous solutions, with densities almost equal to water. The GA200B has a hopper volume of 800 L with a placarded hopper maximum load of 854 kg, which with a pilot and an hours fuel takes the all up weight to 3827 lbs or only 0.72% over the maximum weight listed in its type certificate for restricted category operations. Superphosphate has a specific density of 1.151.2 so if the hopper is optimised for water based solutions, with the heavier super it will be able to be overloaded by about 15% which is close to what the graph shows. The FU24 with 66 cu ft hopper is optimised for a Part 137 legal load of urea but exceeds the Part 137 overload with anything denser. In summary, the use of TSRs as a means of detecting overloading is essentially a regulatory tool to prevent gross overloading of the FU24 with 66 cu ft hoppers. If Part 137 had not allowed operation at 31% overload there would have been no justification for fitting 66 cu ft hoppers, even for low volume materials. If the original 44 cu ft hopper of
26 Specific gravity is an expression for a materials density relative to the density of water. Water has a density of 1000 kg/m3. Superphosphate has a density of about 1200 kg /m3.
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the FU24-950 had been retained, the maximum all up weight with superphosphate would be limited to 6344 lbs, just within the 6366 lb Part 137 limits. With a 44 cu ft hopper the all up weight when full of urea would have been limited to 5164 lbs, which is comparable to the 5430 lbs or 12% MCTOW overload permitted prior to Part 137. Therefore, when spreading urea, a 44 cu ft hopper could take 2114 lbs, which was about 266 lbs short of the pre-Part 137 capacity, in effect the 44 cu ft hopper was limiting the aircraft to 88% of the pre-Part 137 permitted load of urea. When Part 137 was introduced, the 44 cu ft hopper became apparently only able to take only 43% of the Part 137 load, so it was argued that a bigger hopper was clearly needed, for urea. The hidden fact here is that with 3171lbs of urea in its new 66 cu ft hopper, a piston powered FU24 would have an all up weight of 6221 lbs and struggle to get airborne from most strips with the 400 HP engine. So now the 66 cu ft aircraft had a performance problem even with urea, let alone super. The solution was to add a more powerful engine. Of course with a more powerful engine, and the hopper only 75% full with a Part 137 legal super load, the potential to overload with super and other standard fertiliser products became ever present.
Conclusion 10.5
The current problem of loading in excess of Part 137 is partly attributable to the provisions of Part 137 itself, which led to the use of 66 cu ft hoppers. The use of TSRs for fixed wing aircraft may be less urgent if Part 137 were rewritten. The technology to develop a TSR has proved to be more complex and expensive than anticipated, and the outcome of the rewritten Part 137 should be considered before implementing the TSR for agricultural aircraft.. 27
27 This is not to say the TSR project is without merit. The TSR has very important applications for rotary wing aircraft. The airworthiness of rotary wing aircraft is predicated on flying hours which the TSR measures directly.
9 December 2008
Chapter 11 Airworthiness Directives Review

Scope item three from the terms of reference was to review all the airworthiness directives (ADs) applicable to agricultural aircraft types currently in operation or under certification. The legal basis of ADs, and the policy supporting them is explained below.
Airworthiness Directive Policy
The Director issues Ads in accordance with section 72I(3A) Civil Aviation Act 1990, which provides that where the Director believes on reasonable grounds (a) That an unsafe condition exists in any aircraft or aeronautical product; and (b) That condition is likely to exist or develop in any other aircraft or aeronautical products of the same design, the Director may, by notice in writing, issue an airworthiness directive in respect of aircraft or aeronautical products, as the case may be, of that design. The CAA controls entry of an aircraft design into the New Zealand civil aviation system by issuing a type certificate (or type acceptance certificate for foreign designs). The type certificate is issued subject to the design meeting certain standards, which are intended to ensure a certain level of performance and/or safety. Continuing airworthiness is the subsequent monitoring function which reviews the service experience of the design. The development of unsafe conditions is evidence that the design for various reasons has not achieved the level of safety that its certification intended. Therefore an AD may require design changes to return the overall design to compliance with the level of safety commensurate with its original certification.
Agricultural Aircraft ADs
In the course of the Review the ADs applicable to the Cresco and the FU24 have been examined, particularly those relating to inspection of the vertical fin. During this research it has become apparent that, while the Cresco schedule is reasonably current, the FU24 schedule contains certain redundant and obsolete ADs. The foreign agricultural aircraft AD schedules are up to date with the state of design ADs, although they will require regular monitoring. This function is undertaken by the Continuing Airworthiness Team. The Continuing Airworthiness Team has established a group operating project (9AL.AC29) to review the process by which foreign ADs are received and corresponding New Zealand ADs produced. Further work to review the schedule of ADs for agricultural aircraft and, in particular, those for which New Zealand is the state of design will be accomplished under this project. Accordingly the Review did not devote further study to the AD schedules.
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Chapter 12 Conclusions
The Review has reached the following conclusions, which are grouped by the chapter in which they are discussed. Chapter 1 Chapter 1 outlined the background to the review. There was a perception within the CAA and frequently expressed by leading industry members that the rate of defects and accident was high and increasing. The increasing accident rate was reflected in the CAAs social cost per flying hour measure for the fixed wing agricultural sector but not in the corresponding rotary wing sector. Accordingly the Agricultural Aircraft Safety Review was launched to quantify these concerns. Chapter 2 The Lewis Report The Lewis report was a review of the overload provisions of Part 137 carried out by an experienced independent industry consultant. The Lewis report had made a number of recommendations to improve the safety of operations conducted under Part137. Chapter 2 reviewed the recommendations of the Lewis Report and came to the following conclusions.
Conclusion 2.1
The Lewis Report provides a detailed assessment of certain issues faced by agricultural aircraft operating under Part 137. The opinions expressed in the Lewis Report are plausible and the aerodynamics calculations are correct.
Conclusion 2.2
The Review supports the principal conclusion of the Lewis Report that Part 137 does not provide an adequate basis for operations beyond MCTOW.
Conclusion 2.3
The Lewis Reports recommendations (1-4) on the CAA providing further guidance material to detail an aircrafts performance at the agricultural weight may improve safety but would not address the increasing equipment failure rate that is likely to be experienced when the aircraft is operated outside of its design envelope. The provision of further guidance material from CAM 8 is unlikely to be useful, firstly, because CAM 8 was not intended to be an operational rule, and, secondly, the FU24 and Cresco were not certified to CAM 8. .
Conclusion 2.4
The Review supports recommendations 5 and 6 of the Lewis Report regarding loading bucket weight devices and mandatory TSRs.
Conclusion 2.5
The Review conditionally supports recommendation 7 of the Lewis Report regarding fatigue assessments of aircraft refitted with turbine engines. (FAA AC 23-14 supports the re-assessment of horizontal stabiliser fatigue.)
9 December 2008
Turbine conversions represent a considerable investment in an old airframe, and operators expect such conversions to substantially extend the economic life of an aircraft. As such, re-engined aircraft are, in effect, a changed product. New Zealand currently has no clear changed product rule, but the need for one has been noted.
Conclusion 2.6
The Review supports recommendation 8 of the Lewis Report regarding engineering assessment of the undercarriage. The undercarriage should be assessed as part of a coordinated certification process at the nominated agricultural weight. To complete the engineering assessment of the undercarriage, a CAA policy on acceptable agricultural weight should be determined.
Conclusion 2.7
Recommendation 9 of the Lewis Report regarding publication of strip guidelines has been adopted with effect from December 2006.
Conclusion 2.8
Operation at weights beyond an aircrafts original MCTOW is feasible when an engineering analysis establishes that sufficient capability exists in the affected structural components, and satisfactory flight characteristics are demonstrated. If operations at high weights for agricultural purposes are to continue, there is a requirement for: a) A suitable certification basis for the engineering assessments that takes into account the nature of agricultural operations, b) A suitable set of operational parameters including, but not limited to, climb gradient, take-off performance, and stalling speed. Chapter 3 - Regulatory Basis of Part 137 and CAM 8 Chapter 3 follows on from the Lewis reports critique of Part 137 and makes a detailed review of the regulatory basis for Part 137 and compares it with the United States Civil Aviation Manual No 8 on which it is based. Chapter 3 concludes that there are anomalies and discrepancies in Part 137 that should be corrected as follows.
Conclusion 3.1
The overload provision of Part 137 do not provide an adequate basis for operations at weights beyond MCTOW.
Conclusion 3.2
The overload provisions of Part 137 do not adequately specify how a restricted category (agricultural) weight for a given aircraft type can be safely established.
Conclusion 3.3
The best way to establish a technically and operationally safe restricted category weight for the purposes of agricultural would be the establishment of a working grop consisting of industry representatives and operations GA operations staff, supported by ACU engineering staff.
Conclusion 3.4
There is a need to fully review current FAA practice for agricultural operations and current FAA certification requirements for new agricultural aircraft when developing the acceptable means. However, United States requirements should not necessarily be adopted without modification as New Zealand agricultural operations have unique and wellrecognised characteristics that should be taken into account.
Conclusion 3.5
CAD leaflet C.10-1 to C.10-4 could be considered as a basis for establishing an acceptable means of operation beyond MCTOW. Chapter 4 Section 1 - CAA Safety Data Review To determine if the deficiencies within part 137 or other factors were manifestly affecting the safety of agricultural operations, a detailed review of the CAAs safety occurrence data was undertaken. The First section describes how a new method of doing this was developed, and in the process makes the following recommendations.
Conclusion 4.1
The current CAA safety information management system does not permit easy analysis of certain safety data. The techniques used in the Review could be adapted to provide the CAA with enhanced research capabilities.
Conclusion 4.2
This comparison verifies the validity of the occurrence categorisation method as a way of comparing the relative performance of different aircraft designs in service. The distribution of occurrences is a function of both the soundness of the design and its operating environment. Together they represent the designs fitness for purpose or airworthiness. Chapter 4 Section 2 - Data Analysis Conclusions: The second section of Chapter 4 details the results of the occurrence data review and notes in several key areas the safety of agricultural operations had become worse in recent years. In particular the occurrence rate increased after the overload rule was introduced in 1994. The key conclusion were as follows:
Conclusion 4.3
The FU24 has experienced a high rate of undercarriage failures, compared to the three most popular foreign agricultural aircraft types. The FU24 failure rate between 1994 and 2007 is 136% of the foreign agricultural aircraft undercarriage defect rate.
Conclusion 4.4
The rate of FU24 undercarriage failures has increased markedly since 1994 when Part 137 introduced the permissible overload graph in Appendix B.
Conclusion 4.5
The rate of FU24 undercarriage failures increased even more dramatically in 2001 when approximately 50% of the fleet was converted to turbine engines. This is most likely
because the 38% increase in take-off power allowed the overload provisions to be more fully and more frequently exploited. This led to higher average loads on the undercarriage and more frequent exposure to very high loads.
Conclusion 4.6
The Cresco suffers a high rate of undercarriage failures. Since the PT6-34 powered Crescos entered service after 1994, sufficient data is not available to gauge the rate of failure before the introduction of Part 137 Appendix B. Since entering service the Cresco has suffered 0.515 failures per 1000 flying hours. This rate is 3.4 times higher than the FU24 rate and 4.5 times higher than the foreign agricultural aircraft undercarriage defect rate.
Conclusion 4.7
The three foreign agricultural aircraft types, when analysed in the same way, do not show significant increases in undercarriage failures in either 1994 or 2001. This rules out external factors as a cause of the increase in failures. A small increase in performance related accidents occurred after 1994. This may have been due to operators exploiting or even exceeding the provisions of Part 137, although the hopper capacities of the foreign agricultural aircraft have limited the degree of overload with superphosphate to approximately 10%. Chapter 4 Section 3 - Aircraft Comparisons During the review of the occurrence data it was necessary to compare aircraft chrarchteristics. This Chapter lists these chrarchteristics for easy reference and uses them to make some comparisons.
Conclusion 4.8
PAC aircraft have a low structural weight in comparison to their MCTOW. While this is not inherently unsafe, it highlights the need for the structure to be maintained to a high standard. Chapter 5 - Unreported Incidents
Conclusion 5.0
Industry actively reports incidents of defects to the CAA. There is no evidence to suggest that overall reporting rates have declined significantly. Chapter 6 - Turbine Conversions This chapter examined the wide ranging concerns regarding the various turbine engine conversions of the FU24 aircraft. The turbine powered aircraft have suffered a higher than expected defect and accident rate since their widespread introduction around 2000. The reason for this are complex and include technical, regulatory and operational issues. In the case of the turbine powered FU24, these factors have combined to produce a marked deterioration in the aircrafts safety and reliability.
9 December 2008
Conclusion 6.1
Since their introduction, the turbine-powered variants of the FU24 have suffered a slightly higher accident rate than the piston-powered variants.
Conclusion 6.2
The defect rate per flying hour of the turbine aircraft has remained higher than the defect rate for piston engine aircraft since their introduction.
Conclusion 6.3
STC approval procedures should include a review of the service history of the airframes to which new engines are fitted for issues that may be exacerbated or revived by the STC.
Conclusion 6.4
CAR 21.119 should be reviewed to determine whether the Director may impose additional conditions on the applicant for an STC if a review of the airframe types service history indicates additional conditions would be appropriate.
Conclusion 6.5
Consideration should be given to the introduction of a changed product rule to clarify the conditions to be imposed on modifications that essentially change the nature of an existing product, such as the change of motive power or restarting production.
Conclusion 6.6
CAA policy relating to Part 21 subpart E regarding the Directors power to specify the special conditions or later certification basis for extensive STC modifications is not clearly defined. As a result CAA policies regarding amendments to type certificate and approval of STCs may have been inconsistently applied.
Conclusion 6.7
The introduction of Part 137 in 1994 extended privileges to the FU24 (and Cresco) that could not be substantiated. The impact of these privileges was obscured until the more powerful turbine engines were fitted in 2001. In this sense Part 137 undermined the assumptions used to approve the turbine conversion.
Conclusion 6.8
The combined effect of the Part 137 weight increase and the turbine conversions was a sharp increase in aircraft defect rates, particularly evident in the rate of undercarriage failures.
Conclusion 6.9
A further unintended effect of the turbine conversions may have been to halt the introduction of newer aircraft, such as the Cresco, GA200 and possibly the AirTractor.
9 December 2008
Chapter 7 - Certificate of Airworthiness Duration

Conclusion 7.1
Although favoured by many industry stakeholders, the reintroduction of terminating COAs is unlikely to raise maintenance standards. It would also increase costs for industry and the burden on the CAA.
Conclusion 7.2
A better means of raising the standard of airworthiness for agricultural aircraft is to recognise them as special purpose machines and require specific maintenance programs.
Conclusion 7.3
Expertise in agricultural aircraft lies with industry, and a comparison of leading industry maintenance programs could lead to the production of a best industry practice maintenance program. This would share expertise across the industry and raise overall safety. Such a program, along with relevant ADs and SBs, should be fed back to the OEM, and incorporated into the OEM maintenance program. This would become the reference standard for operator programs approved under 91.607. (This would still allow variation from the OEM program, but with explanations.)
Conclusion 7.4
There is a need to review the approval of maintenance programs for agricultural aircraft. Because of the demanding operations, and their predominance in the New Zealand agricultural industry, priority should be given to the New Zealand type designs. Chapter 8 - Re-use of Data Plates
Conclusion 8.1
Returning the data plate to the CAA is unlikely to be a practical way of controlling the airworthiness of aircraft rebuilt from wrecks. Revoking the COA for aircraft that are written off may be a more effective means.
Conclusion 8.2
The CAAs ACU, Legal, and GA groups need to consider the legal aspects of revoking the COA for aircraft that are written off, and liaise with insurance industry. Chapter 9 Industry Operational Issues Significant numbers of industry members, including some of the most experienced members, have expressed strong concerns about aspects of agricultural aircraft safety.
Conclusion 9.1
The current rule regarding operation beyond MCTOW is not well regarded by aircraft crews
Conclusion 9.2
Airworthiness of the FU24 aircraft is a commonly expressed concern.
9 December 2008
Chapter 10 Emerging Technologies

Conclusion 10.1
The engineering challenges presented by on board load measuring are considerable but not insurmountable.
Conclusion 10.2
Onboard load measurement is more feasible if incorporated in the design from conception.
Conclusion 10.3
For existing aircraft designs, the undercarriage oleo pressure method may have potential for further development with appropriate software.
Conclusion 10.4
GPS tracking systems may enhance the safety of agricultural operations in remote areas. A solution may be to train and equip loader drivers to respond to emergency situations. Certification of Part 137 operators is an appropriate means of achieving this.
Conclusion 10.5
The current problem of loading in excess of Part 137 is partly attributable to the provisions of Part 137 itself, which led to the use of 66 cu ft hoppers. The use of TSRs for fixed wing aircraft may be less urgent if Part 137 were rewritten. The technology to develop a TSR has proved to be more complex and expensive than anticipated, and the outcome of the rewritten Part 137 should be considered before implementing the TSR for agricultural aircraft. Chapter 11 No relevant conclusions were made in relation to Chapter 11 Airworthiness Directives Review. .
9 December 2008
Glossary of Legal and Institutional Acronyms

AAA New Zealand Agricultural Aircraft Association
AC
Advisory Circular issued by the CAA to provide explanatory information and examples of how to comply with a Civil Aviation Rule
ACU
Aircraft Certification Unit of the CAA
AD
Airworthiness Directive issued by the Director of the CAA in accordance with section 72I(3(a) Civil Aviation Act 1990
ARA
Annual review of airworthiness. In effect an audit of the aircraft and its records to ensure the required maintence has been accomplished.
ARC
Aviation related concern
ATA
Airline Transport Association
CAA
Civil Aviation Authority of New Zealand. A Crown entity established in accordance with section 72A Civil Aviation Act 1990. Among other functions, the CAA establishes civil aviation safety and security standards, and monitors adherence to those standards
CAD
Civil Aviation Department, forerunner of the CAA
CAM
Civil Aeronautics Manual, maintained by the FAA
9 December 2008
CAR
Civil Aviation Rule issued by the Minister responsible for the administration of the Civil Aviation Act 1990 in accordance with section 28 of that Act
COA (or C of A)
Certificate of Airworthiness, now termed Airworthiness Certificate.
FAA
The United States Federal Aviation Administration
FAR
Federal Aviation Regulation issued by the FAA
GA
General aviation (see, for example, the GA Group of the CAA)
IA NZTSO
Inspection Authorisation. CAA endorsement of an Aircraft Engineers Licence to carry out certain functions. New Zealand Technical Standard Order; contains information about the minimum performance standard for equipment that the CAA considers acceptable to comply with an applicable rule
OEM
Original equipment manufacturer
SAU
Safety Analysis Unit of the CAA
SB
Service bulletin. Service information issued by a manufacturer.
STC
Supplemental type certificate
TSO USCAA
Technical Standard Order FAA performance standard for aeronautical equipment The United States Civil Aeronautics Authority; forerunner of the FAA
9 December 2008
Glossary of Scientific Terms

cg Centre of gravity
cu ft
Cubic foot. 1 Cu ft =28.31 litres,
Measure of acceleration as it effects items of mass. 1 G generates a force equivalent to that experienced by an item of mass at rest in the earths gravitational field at sea level. (9.814m/s2) Emergency locator transmitter
ELT
GPS
Global positioning system
hp
Horse power
knot
Nautical mile per hour
MCTOW
Maximum certified take-off weight
Payload
Useful load carrying ability of the aircraft. Equal to the MCTOW minus the aircraft empty weight , crew , fuel & lubricant. Performance limited take-off weight
PLTOW
ROC
Rate of climb
SG
Specific gravity. The ratio of the mass of a given volume of a substance to the mass of the same volume of water. Substances with SG > 1.0 will sink in water.
9 December 2008
Vs
Stalling speed. Minimum speed at which the aircraft can generate enough lift to supports its weight.
Va
Velocity maximum acceleration. This is the speed at which the aircraft is capable of reaching its manoeuvre G load limitations. At speeds below Va full control deflections are possible without exceeding the aircrafts manoeuvre limitations At speeds above Va care must be taken not to overstress the aircraft during manoeuvres.
Vno
Velocity normal operations, the maximum speed recommended for normal operations.
Vne
Velocity Never Exceed The maximum permissible speed.
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Annexes: A B C D Terms of Reference for Agricultural Aircraft Safety Review Civil Aeronautics Manual (CAM) 8 New Zealand Civil airworthiness Requirements Part 2 Air Transport Division Ministry of Transport Engineering Instruction FU24 Occurrences Cresco Occurrences 750XL Occurrences GA200 Occurrences Air Tractor Occurrences Cessna Agwagon Occurrences Transavia PL-12 Airtruk Occurrences Zlin Z-13T Occurrences FU24 Fin Failures and Occurrences Summary FU24 Fin Structural Comparisons Climb Performance Landing Gear Considerations
E F G H I J K L M N O P
9 December 2008
Terms of Reference for Agricultural Aircraft Safety Review
Table of Contents
Background ...................................................................................................................... 1 Purpose ............................................................................................................................ 1 Authority ........................................................................................................................... 1 Scope .............................................................................................................................. 1 Review Process ................................................................................................................ 2 Time Frame ...................................................................................................................... 3
27 January 2007
Page i

Background There is increasing concern in GA Group operational staff and sectors of the agricultural aviation industry regarding the rebuilding of aging aircraft and, in particular, the use of old airframes with new components and significantly more powerful engines. The aircraft being re-engined are generally very old. In some cases, the wings and sections of the fuselage have been re-skinned but the structure remains basically the same. The aircraft have given many years of service in rugged conditions. As well as lengthening the fuselage to keep the centre of gravity (CG) within limits because of lighter engines, fuselage plugs are added to accommodate larger hoppers. Little else is new. Such aircraft are stated to have a rejuvenated life, as if new. In addition to carrying significantly heavier loads, the powerful new engines are capable of driving the aircraft to much higher speeds. Associated with the concerns are reports (many of them anecdotal) of the rate of defects/ failures occurring in areas such as the undercarriage, tail fin/rudder structure, wing spar and engine mounts. Of added concern is the relative lack of appreciation of aerodynamics, weight and balance by many agricultural pilots, in particular the need to reduce speeds, manoeuvre and G loadings at high all up weights. The matter of deregistration of crashed aircraft and the re-use of data plates is also included in these concerns. Purpose The purpose of the investigation is to gather information, authenticate anecdotal stories as far as is possible and make recommendations regarding currently operated agricultural aircraft design, continuing airworthiness, maintenance and operational practices and techniques. Authority This review is sponsored by General Manager General Aviation (GMGA) John Lanham. The Terms of Reference for the review have been written by Manager Rotary Wing and Agricultural Operations (MRW/A) Unit John Fogden. Scope The scope of the review is to:

Review the Bernie Lewis report commissioned and completed in 2005 and to review the resultant recommendations. Review all New Zealand Civil Aviation Authority documented safety occurrences, findings and open actions relating to agricultural aircraft.
27 January 2007
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Review NZ airworthiness schedules for all agricultural aircraft types currently in operation or under certification. To conduct a study in association with NZ agricultural aviation operators and pilots to further quantify possible unreported incidents, occurrences, defects and structural failures and structural fatigue. Consider the airworthiness and operational implications of operating modified agricultural aircraft where old airframes are being fitted with more powerful turbine engines. Consider the implications of current non-terminating certificates of airworthiness in the agricultural context (i.e., vs four yearly and eight yearly rebuilds). Review NZCAA policy for the re-use of data plates from crashed aircraft. Discuss with industry broader operational safety concerns such as hopper size, compliance with Limitations, Appendix B Overload provision. Consider the available technology to assist the measuring, recording and retrieval of hopper loads.
Review Process The review team will be comprised of representatives from the CAA Aircraft Certification, Safety Investigation, Safety Analysis and Rotary Wing/Agricultural units. The team consisting of Jack Stanton, Bob Jelley, Ivan Harris and representatives from Safety Analysis (Peter Nalder) and Safety Investigation (Ian Stobba) with Elizabeth to assist as SAO is to conduct an investigation in accordance with these Terms and report to the GMGA. The team is to:

Conduct its reviews of documented occurrence, defect and accident reports, airworthiness schedules and the Bernie Lewis report, using internal CAA database material. Conduct its investigation of undocumented information, anecdotal evidence and opinion from reputable and appropriately experienced agricultural aviation sources. The investigation is to be conducted in a manner that supports a combination of document reviews, interviews of persons as appropriate and receiving of written submissions and responses as the team considers necessary.
The following steps must be followed by the Review team: 1.

Identify and confirm with MRW/A: that the Review team understands the proposed format and procedure of the review; that reputable and appropriately experienced aviation sources are identified and agreed on, for the purpose of industry consultation; and establish if there are potential conflicts of interest or difficulties regarding the disclosure of the identity of any potential industry contributors.
2.
Plan and pre-book (with SAO) regular meeting dates within the specified timeframe.
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3. 4.
Review and analyse existing documentation and information, establish any other documentation required, obtain that information, then review and analyse it. Establish a method and program of liaising with industry contributors that will be most cost and resource effective . Alternatively, the team may draft questionnaires for witnesses to respond to. Assess evidence collected and compile a draft report. Consider and recommend to GMGA whether a draft report should be made available to industry contributors or the agricultural industry at large.
5. 6.
NOTE: It can be anticipated that the Agricultural Industry Association (AAA) will wish to be closely consulted. It is important to the integrity of the review that consultation is not limited solely to senior AAA members and that a representative cross-section of the industry is considered during the review, particularly including employed pilots, their loader drivers and aircraft maintainers. After considering the final report, the GMGA shall make recommendations to the Director. The Director will consider the final report and the recommendations and make any appropriate decisions regarding ongoing agricultural aircraft design, continuing airworthiness, maintenance and operational practices and techniques. Time Frame This investigation should be completed as soon as the existing routine workload of the review team members allows. Preference should be given to this project when near to midterm work programmes are being established. MRW/A and GMGA shall be fully appraised of the progress of the investigation and shall be informed if any amendment is required to the specified time frame.
John Fogden Manager RW/A General Aviation Group 25 January 2007
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Annex B to Agricultural Aircraft Safety Review
CIVIL AERONAUTICS MANUAL 8 (CAM 8)

A Brief Synopsis Introduction CAM 8 was the policies and interpretations of the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics to Part 8 of the regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board, and became effective on October 11, 1950. At that time Part 8 was new, and a significant departure from previous restricted category airworthiness requirements. Part 8 was the regulation governing the issue of type certificates and airworthiness certificates in the restricted category. This new Part 8 departed from the previous requirements that were requiring an equivalent level of safety as a passenger-carrying aircraft. The Administrator accepted that for special purposes, in this case agricultural, compliance with restricted category requirements was simplified, and the operating limitations would be tailored to the purpose of the operation. Although that simplification eased the requirement to provide engineering data and so on, there was still a requirement that good engineering practice was maintained, and that no feature of the design or modification would render the aircraft unsafe. The idea behind Part 8 was to provide the greatest flexibility and minimum burden on the operator consistent with public safety. Part 8
Applicability
Established standards for the issuance of type and airworthiness certificates for aircraft in the restricted category. It also established operating limitations applicable to such aircraft.
Eligibility for type certificate
Addressed aircraft that were type certificated in another category, military aircraft, and modifications. Required conformance to good aeronautical practice and that no feature or characteristic of the aircraft rendered it unsafe when operated in accordance with the limitations prescribed for its intended use. 8.10(a)(1) addressed aircraft that had not been type certified in another category, and referred to Appendix B to CAM 8 as guidance for showing compliance with the applicable airworthiness requirements (eg CAR 3). 8.10-3 dealt with aircraft modified from a previously approved type. It contained requirements such as who could perform the modification, flight checking, hazards to avoid, and approval of the modification which included the Administrators agent or designee prescribing operating limitations. 8.10-4 dealt with agricultural aircraft modifications (to aircraft previously type certified in another category) and applied to aircraft where operations were normally conducted over open areas. It referred to the guidance contained in Appendix A to CAM 8. 8.20 dealt with the issue of airworthiness certificates where the aircraft has been type certified or modified per section 8.10, inspected by the Administrator, and the Administrator has prescribed operating limitations. This section was administrative and covered aircraft inspection, airworthiness directives, aircraft marking, repairs and alterations and their data, maintenance and maintenance facilities, and approval of major repairs and alterations.
CAM 8 Synopsis
Page 1
8.30 dealt with operating limitations that the Administrator must prescribe, in addition to those required in this section, as he finds necessary for safe operation and protection of the public. 8.30-1 required that the special purpose operations and operating limitations would be listed, along with the limitations in sections 8.31 through 8.34. For agricultural operations, examples of operating limitations were 1. The aircraft shall not be operatied in any manner which will endanger public life and property. The operator shall adjust the take-off weight to provide a safe margin of performance for the existing operating conditions, considering the take-off area, altitude, temperature, and terrain. For maximum capacities of hoppers and spray tanks see placards. 2. Maneuvers shall be limited to those normally performed in agricultural operations. 3. Agricultural and pest control operations shall not be conducted over densely populated areas, in congested air lanes, or in the vicinity of busy airports where passenger transport operations are being conducted, unless the Administrator finds it in the public interest to authorise such operation and has issued a Certificate of Waiver or Authorisation. 4. Persons and cargo shall not be carried for compensation or hire. 5. Persons other than the minimum crew necessary for the agricultural operations shall not be carried during these operations. 6. No person shall be carried in the aircraft unless a seat and safety belt, installed in accordance with good aeronautical practice is provided for his use. Examples of additional limitations were 1. A prohibition against sulphur dusting, unless special fire previention measures have been incorporated in the aircraft. 2. A statement in the area operating limitations that the aircaraft is not eligible for a waiver to operate over congested area because of uncertificated poerplant components. 3. Restricted engine speed (rpm) ranges, if a metal propeller stress survey indicates the need for such a restriction. 8.31 dealt with area operating limitations. This was regarding waivers to operate in congested areas, and was largely administrative. 8.32 dealt with economic operating limitations. This was regarding the ability to carry another person in transit (loader driver) and associated equipment without it being regarded as being for hire or compensation. 8.33 prohibited the carriage of passengers during special purpose operations. 8.34 dealt with separate operating limitations for multiple airworthiness certification, converting from one category to the other, the instructions, and the owners responsibility. Appendix A Restricted Category Aircraft Modifications
1 Structural Changes
Stated that is a practical guide in the structural considerations when modifying an aircraft for agricultural use. This section discussed the effects of alterations from structural and
CAM 8 Synopsis Page 2
aerodynamic perspectives, conversion of personal aircraft types to agricultural use, general rules for proper alteration of the aircraft structure, attachment of hopper or tank to primary structure, boom installations, and corrosion protection.
2 Dispensing Equipment Design Criteria
This section dealt with sources of information regarding equipment design, hopper materials, seams, doors, volume calculations, agitators, spray tank design, venting, baffles, spray booms, nozzles, cockpit draining, etc.
3 Powerplant Changes
This section dealt primarily the structural issues regarding the installation of a different engine type such as engine mounts with the associated change in weight.
4 Pilot Safety Items
This section dealt with the issues such as visibility, location of instruments, seat belts and harnesses, ventilation, and crash protection.
5 Electrical Systems
This section dealt with possible changes to the electrics and addressed generators, environmental conditions, cable selection, terminals, lights, switches. It also covered the installation regarding cable runs, bonding, etc.
6 Fire Protection
This section dealt with the fire hazards that could be encountered from the materials being dispensed such as sulphur. Areas covered were exhaust sparks, static electricity, and spraying of combustible liquid.
7 Weight and Balance
7.0 General This section stressed the importance of weight to the structure, of weight control and balance, and that if approved limits are exceeded then flight tests should be made 7.1 General Effects of Gross Weight Changes This section begins a discussion on the relationship between the design load factor and gross weight. It made the point that gross weights chosen should permit safe operation under all normal and emergency conditions. The chart that is currently reproduced in CAR Part 137 Appendix B is mentioned as a guide to determining gross weight provided the aircraft is flown in a restricted manner. 7.10 Effects of Gross Weight Changes on Aircraft Structure This section noted that the aircraft landing gear and supporting structure are particularly critical if the aircraft is landed overweight; and taxiing is very likely to be unfavourably affected by increased gross weights. With the increase in gross weight there must be a proportionate decrease in the load factor that can be reached in flight. It again notes that caution should be exercised in all flights at overload weights whether or not they are below the possible maximum. There was some discussion on the distribution of load with respect to the structural strain on the fuselage 7.11 Effects of Gross Weight Changes on Maneuvers This section notes that to prevent excessive loading the aircraft must be maneuvered cautiously, and that the stalling speeds are increased and stalls in turns are more easily encountered. A lower allowable load factor means restricting bank angle. Another factor is gust loads; the level flight and never exceed speeds should be reduced by the ratio of specification weight to overload weight but not below maneuvering speed. Again it advised caution in all flight conditions. There was discussion about pull-up speeds and the use of full deflection of control surfaces.
CAM 8 Synopsis Page 3
7.2 Weight and Balance Computations This provided guidance on aircraft weighing. 7.3 Effect of c. g. Position on Structural Strength This section discussed the effect of increased gross weight operation on structural strength, and in particular around the landing gear.
8 Powerplant Installation
The manual provided considerable guidance on design factors for the powerplant installation including the engine, cowling, firewall, propeller, fuel and oil systems, cooling system, induction and exhaust system. In addition the supply and control systems aft of the firewall, and instrumentation, are covered. This section was directed at the airworthiness evaluation of the powerplant installation, and ensuring satisfactory powerplant operation was achieved under the atmospheric conditions, altitudes, and maneuvers to be encountered. It advised the use of type certified engines and propellers. It also covered engine/prop vibration characteristics with respect to blade stress, and some performance aspects associated with differing propellers.
9 Flight Test
This section addressed flight testing and began by stating that There are certain principles in the field of aeronautical engineering wheich do not enter directly ino piloting but which are well for a pilot or an operator engaged in agricultural operations to understand in order to know what claims may reasonably be made for an airplane of known weight and power. These principles relate to performance which includes climb, distances required to take-off and land, etc. It made the point that aircraft used for agricultural operations have sufficient climb performance to avoid obstacles, and minimise stall/spin possibilities. The manual then went on to discuss the factors affecting climb performance, and used examples from aircraft of the time (Aeronca 7AC, Boeing 75, Navy N3N, Piper PA11, etc), and included a rate-of-climb correction chart for temperature and pressure. Appendix B Airworthiness Criteria for Agricultural and Similar Special Purpose Aircraft
.0 Basis and Purpose
These criteria were derived from CAR 3 and apply to single engine aircraft intended for low speed dusting or spraying or similar. Following subsections described the procedure for showing compliance, inspections and tests, changes, definitions, etc.
.1 Flight
Flight tests should be made to demonstrate the existence of satisfactory flight and ground handling characteristics. Weight and centre of gravity ranges should be established. Maximum weight should not exceed the weight selected by the applicant, the design weight for the structure, or the maximum weight at which compliance with the flight standards is demonstrated. Performance was dealt with for stalling speed (stalling speed limit at maximum weight 70 mph; recommended less than 55 mph at max weight), and normal climb (at least 8 times stalling speed or 300 feet per minute which ever is the greater, at max weight).
CAM 8 Synopsis
Page 4
Flight characteristics was dealt with regarding controllability in a variety of conditions. Topics covered were longitudinal control, trim, stability, static longitudinal stability in climb, static directional and lateral stability, dynamic stability, stalling (level and turning flight) Ground characteristics dealt with longitudinal and directional stability as well as shock absorption and flutter/vibration.
.2 Strength Criteria
This section contained an extensive list of load criteria (both limit loads and ultimate loads), safety factor, flight loads, design airspeeds, flight load factors, wing loadings under varying conditions, landing loads, structural criteria such as fuselage to wing attach points, dead weight items, control system design conditions, engine mount loads, landing loads, landing weight, landing gear loads and drop tests.
.3 Design and Construction Standards
This section contained criteria applicable to various design tasks such as control systems, crew protection, cockpit hazards, cargo provisions, toxic materials, corrosion protection, dispensing installations, and aircraft structure covering.
.4 Powerplant Installation
This section dealt with powerplant and propeller installation standards, and associated components and systems, such as fuel and oil tanks, and powerplant controls.
.5 Equipment
This section listed the required and recommended instruments and equipment.
.6 Design and Operating Limitations and Information
Design limitations were established and submitted to the (then) CAA for inclusion in the aircraft specification. They were airspeeds (Vne, Vm, Vfe), powerplant (rpm, manifold pressure, octane rating), maximum weight, and centre of gravity. This section also covered markings and placards.
.7 Identification Data
Required an ID plate to be attached to the aircraft.
CAM 8 Synopsis
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Annex C to Agricultural Aircraft Safety Review
C1
C2
C3
C4
C5
Annex D to Agricultural Aircraft Safety Review
OCC No 91/812 89/36 91/118 91/119 91/122 91/150 91/399 91/440 91/809 91/905
Code Sev Date Time UTC DEF MA 1/01/1901 ACC DEF DEF DEF DEF DEF DEF DEF DEF MA 6/04/1989 MA MA MA MA MA 1/03/1991 15/03/1991 24/03/1991 11/04/1991 12/08/1991
Reg EGX CTO EMB CBG EMB EMV DZM CBG EMV EMU
Location
Description
Part Defective
P/N
Part S/N
MA 25/08/1991 MA 5/09/1991 MA 30/09/1991
WHANGAR EI NR MOA Still under investigation CREEK NAPIER NAPIER NAPIER BLENHEIM MARSTERT ON NAPIER GISBORNE PALMERST ON NORTH
TAIC Class Reference 0 89-039 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
91/894 91/906
DEF DEF
MA 30/10/1991 MA 30/10/1991
CMN WHANGAR EI CMN PALMERST ON NORTH BOF CRY KAWERAU WHANGAR EI DLQ NOT STATED EGI MOSGIEL CRF UNKNOWN
0 0
11 12
91/1218B 92/174 92/1074 92/1107 92/1751 92/1671 92/2207 92/2434 92/4531
DEF DEF DEF DEF DEF DEF DEF DEF DEF
MA 29/12/1991 MA 4/02/1992 MA 27/03/1992 MA 14/04/1992 MA 15/05/1992 MA 5/06/1992 MA 27/06/1992 MA 10/08/1992 MA 29/11/1992
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
CBG NAPIER DMV UNKNOWN EUG UNKNOWN CMK WANGANU I
Annex L: FU 24 Occurrences
93/259 93/350B
DEF DEF
MA 11/01/1993 MA 28/01/1993
DLQ HAMILTON 10NM DANNEVIR KE EGK WANGANU I EMO PALMERST ON NORTH CQB MOSGIEL CMZ HAMILTON CMK Otupae Stn, tba 20 NE Ta DZO HAMILTON EMX HAMILTON BII DJE N Waimate Hamilton Immediately after becoming airborne the pilot of the Fletcher reported that he was making a precautionary landing. He landed safely in the lucerne beyond the grass runway and taxied back to the maintenance hangar. RCCNZ reported that Nelson Tower received a Mayday call from ZK-DZC. The aircraft was making a forced landing at Riwaka. The pilot later radioed the tower and advised that he had landed safely and did not require assistance 51108 DZF
0 0
22 23
93/901 93/793
DEF DEF
MA 29/01/1993 MA 11/02/1993
0 0
24 25
93/1507 93/1548 94/83
DEF DEF ACC
MA 22/02/1993 MA 18/03/1993 MA 13/01/1994
HUB
CT86
0 0 0
26 27 28
94/554 94/2122A 94/4694 02/2253
DEF DEF ACC INC
MI MI CR MI
3/02/1994 10/05/1994 22/12/1994 24/07/2002
0 0 0 0
28 29 30 31
05/3734
INC
MA 19/11/2005
DZC
Riwaka
32
07/4039
ACC
CR
10/11/2007 EGV Opotiki
The aircraft went overdue on a crop dusting sortie and was later found to have collided with some trees and crashed into a gully. The pilot was killed.
0 33
08/2505
DEF
MI
5/06/2008 EMW Hamilton
72/78
ACC
MA 22/08/1972
BIH
SuperAir Ltd reported that on an Lower R/H unscheduled maintenance phase Bracket found bracket 243665R (modified to TEL-02-008-4) cracked lower beside weld. REREWHAK During a sowing run the fin of the AAITU aircraft collided with a 12-gauge steel wire suspended 150 ft above a gully and carrying power to an electric fence in an adjoining paddock. the aircraft remained controllable and was flown back to the strip.
0 34
72-085
73/70
ACC
MA 8/05/1973
CMK MARYBANK In flight separation of the fin and rudder occurred during a ferry flight to base. severe corrosion had weakened the vertical spar to an extent that it failed during a lefthand turn. the aircraft then entered a lefthand spiral dive but recovery was made with sufficient height to enable an emergency landing to be made.
73-067
35
75/123
ACC
MA 17/11/1975
CZA
TAHORA
At end of sowing run pilot initiated a climb to make another run but found elevator jammed in forward position. forced landing made. aircraft touched down heavily on a small flat area on otherwise rugged terrain. investigation revealed that forward attachment of fin had failed due to progressive corrosion. fin and rudder had then folded backwards across the tailplane.
75-119
36
76/125
ACC
MA 4/11/1976
82/34
ACC
MA 30/03/1982
Failure of the forward fin attachment fitting due to severe corrosion caused the fin and rudder to separate in flight. control difficulties resulting in the aircraft being forced to land on inhospitable terrain and slide over a bank EGH MAUNGAK The fin forward attachment fitting ARAMEA failed in normal cruising flight. the pilot executed an emergency landing without further incident. a fatigue fracture had initiated from the heavily corroded surface of the fin fitting which had finally failed in tensile overload.
BSM PIRONGIA
76-121
37
82-025
38
83/102
ACC
MA 16/11/1983
BIX
WHARENUI At the completion of a sowing run STN the pilot flew the aircraft in a steep turn to position for a further run on the reciprocal track. during the turn he heard a 'bang' from the rear fuselage area and decided to jettison the remaining load and land the aircraft. inspection of the aircraft after landing revealed that its rudder had folded a fore and aft crack. Hit wire, damaged fin Encountered severe downdraft, hit wires NGATEA FIN FOUND 500M FROM CRASH SITE. VERTICAL STABILISER. PILOT ATTEMPTED TO LAND, LOST CONTROL = CRASHED. WANGANU The elevator hinge attaching to I the fuselage on the left hand side broke cracking around the rear bulkhead. This caused a complete separation of the hinge from the bulkhead. The pilot reported that the rudder pedal suddenly locked into a fully deflected position. He managed to land safely at Dargaville where he discovered that the whole tailfin had rotated through 180 degrees on its remaining bracket and was hanging off. Investigation of fin IAW DCA/FU24/173 found scratches and scoring around skin. Forward skin 242308-2 of Fin Wainui Orini RUDDER FIN FIN & RUDDER Fin attach fitting 242340 93
83-104
38
92/3231 92/3810 95/317
ACC ACC ACC
CR 9/10/1992 MA 13/11/1992 CR 16/02/1995
BDS BOF BPY
1 1 1
39 40 41
243017-2
97/1451
DEF
MA 11/04/1997
CZA
Elevator hinge
42
01/3269
DEF
MA 20/09/2001
EGV Dargaville
43
02/1578
DEF
MI
16/04/2002
EGS
Feilding
44
02/1167
ACC
CR
18/04/2002
EGO 6 SSE The tail fin separated in flight; the Tail fin Masterton aircraft struck a ridge and caught (vertical fire. The pilot was killed and the stabiliser) aircraft destroyed. EMN Gore The 'flutes' between the elevator Main beam hinge P/N 242235 and fitting P/N web 242237 were found cracked. 242208
45
03/1899
DEF
MI
29/06/2003
46
03/1964
DEF
MI
2/07/2003
DUJ
03/2967
DEF
MI
26/09/2003
Tail fin Masterton Several cracks were found in leading edge and central rib of the tail fin of a Walter powered Fletcher when it was removed for painting. EUH Wanganui Bad corrosion was found on the Corrosion vertical fin leading edge skin, in the area of the front mount bulkhead, during the aircraft's first 100 hour inspection. DUJ Masterton Multiple cracks were found in the Multiple skin and internal ribs of the cracks airframe. This is a Walter Fletcher. Masterton It was reported that the pilot Wing Spar heard a loud bang whilst in flight. Web The aircraft landed safely and was inspected by an engineer. The investigation revealed that the main wing spar web had fractured.
#REF!
242308-2
#REF!
03/3295
DEF
MI
13/11/2003
#REF!
04/3155
DEF
CR
29/09/2004
JLU
234
#REF!
05/3727
ACC
CR
22/11/2005
DZG Whangarei RCCNZ reported that the aircraft was carrying out a transit flight from Kaikohe to Whangarei and was reported to be missing. After an extensive search the aircraft was found destroyed in Pukenui Forest.
#REF!
06/556
DEF
MA 8/02/2006
JLU
Masterton The internal ribs of the Walter Fletcher vertical stabiliser were found to be broken and cracked. A crack was found on the fin leading edge skin starboard side between the leading edge and middle rib doubler P/N 242337R. The crack was on the doubler centre line in a horizontal direction and about half an inch long While the aircraft was in for a scheduled 100 hour inspection a large number of 'working rivets' were noticed on the stabilator.
Internal Ribs 242340
#REF!
06/2830
DEF
MI
14/07/2006
CML Hamilton
Leading edge 242308 - 2 skin
#REF!
06/3094
DEF
MI
15/08/2006
DJE
Nelson
stabilator
#REF!
06/3537
DEF
MI
7/09/2006
EMT Palmerston Whilst complying with DCA/FU24/ Leading edge North 176 cracks were found on the skin and ribs leading edge skin from working rivets. Chafe marks made by the dorsal fairing were also evident. EGI Gore It was reported that the aircraft Leading Edge 242308-2 was under going 4 yearly Fin inspection when the leading edge fin was found to have crack in it. While the aircraft was making a normal landing the right undercarriage leg separated. the aircraft slewed to the right, incurring substantial damage. 2147
#REF!
06/3543
DEF
MI
20/09/2006
#REF!
70/33
ACC
MA 10/03/1970
CTI
HASTINGS
70/72
ACC
MA 10/08/1970
CFQ
TAURANGA During takeoff an undercarriage leg separated but remained attached to the aircraft by the brake line. the underside of the aircraft was damaged by the loose wheel during the subsequent landing. separation of the leg was due to a torque link bolt failure. TUTIRA While making a lefthand turn to position for takeoff during topdressing operations from a steep strip, the left wheel brake failed and the aircraft swung to the right into scrub, eventually coming to a sudden stop against a tree near the lower end of the strip. pin-hole corrosion was found in the brake line (part no. ja/fu24/38-2) and had resulted in loss of fluid. Failure of the lower steering tube resulted in a violent nose-wheel shimmy during the landing roll. this caused the check cables to fail and allow the oleo piston-nosewheel assembly to separate from the aircraft. Just after a touchdown on an uphill slope the nosewheel tyre burst causing damage to the nose leg and firewall before the aircraft could be brought to a stop.
2152
70/76
ACC
MA 25/08/1970
BXZ
2154
72/29
ACC
MA 25/02/1972
BIK
TWIN BRIDGES
72-025
74/27
ACC
MA 24/02/1974
BHJ
TAIHAPE
74-061
76/18
ACC
MA 21/01/1976
76/41
ACC
MA 9/03/1976
DEQ PALMERST The left hand wheel assembly ON NTH separated from the aircraft at liftoff due to failure of the brackets (p/n 245146) which attach it to the scissors link. BHY WHANARU During a takeoff run the starboard A BAY undercarriage leg collapsed due to a fatigue failure of one of the lower clamping bolts. loss of tension in the bolt and operation on rough airstrips was the probable initiating factor in development of the fatigue crack. CMK PAHIATUA Following an 'explosion' during the takeoff run a persistent vibration influenced the pilot to jettison the load and make a forced landing straight ahead. the vibration resulted from a nosewheel tyre blowout. CWQ WAIRAMAR During the landing roll the left AMA wheel separated from the aircraft due to the failure of the 3 bolts attaching the lug to the piston. one of these bolts had broken some time previously. BIK NR The right mainwheel separated GISBORNE from the airframe during takeoff. the pilot returned to gisborne airport and made an uneventful emergency landing.
76-014
76-037
77/45
ACC
MA 12/03/1977
77-045
77/71
ACC
MA 11/05/1977
77-074
77/137
ACC
MA 25/11/1977
77-137
78/55
ACC
MA 28/03/1978
DYX
NR KAITAIA After a normal touchdown, one undercarriage leg slowly collapsed. four attaching bolts had sheared in overload probably as a result of the wheel hitting a small ridge several days previously. On the first flight of the day the pilot selected a takeoff heading which resulted in the aircraft travelling over two pronounced depressions to the right of the correct takeoff path. contact with the far slope of these depressions resulted in substantial damage to the left undercarriage and adjacent wing area. During a break in operations, two sheep followed some resupplying fertiliser trucks onto the airstrip. the pilot failed to check the convex strip was still clear of stock prior to recommencing operations and the aircraft struck one of these sheep on the first takeoff. one undercarriage leg collapsed during the subsequent landing at the base aerodrome.
78-059
10
78/56
ACC
MA 28/03/1978
DEQ MILTON
78-065
11
78/57
ACC
MA 29/03/1978
CBE
TE AKAU
78-052
11
10
78/84
ACC
MA 27/06/1978
DUH OTAMARAK The right wheel fell from the AU undercarriage on liftoff and the aircraft settled onto one flap during the subsequent landing. the lower scissor bolt had sheared, having been weakened when the wheel struck an obstruction on an earlier occasion. BHK KUROW One of the aircraft's tyres was punctured by a sharp stone during takeoff. in the subsequent landing with a flat tyre, the aircraft slewed into an adjacent fence, and the undercarriage collapsed. The aircraft sank after liftoff and the left main wheel struck some ditch diggings damaging the undercarriage. on landing the damaged undercarriage leg separated from the wing The left undercarriage leg collapsed after landing. one attachment bolt was found to have been partially fractured before landing and the final failure of this bolt resulted in overload failures of the remaining bolts.
78-087
12
78/141
ACC
MA 31/10/1978
78-142
13
79/114
ACC
MA 26/09/1979
DJF
SPRINGS JNCTN
79-117
14
80/102
ACC
MA 19/09/1980
EMA NR OAMARU
80-111
15
81/55
ACC
MA 10/05/1981
EMD TIRAUMEA When the aircraft was approaching to land in gusty wind conditions it struck the ground heavily just before the threshold and the right main undercarriage separated from the wing.
81-054
16
11
82/65
ACC
MA 13/07/1982
DSL
MAUNGAN A brake caliper failed on landing. UI to avoid over-running the strip and going down the steep hillside the pilot deliberately collided with the fertiliser bin. MAHOENUI During the takeoff run the aircraft started pulling to the right so the pilot jettisoned the hopper load. the aircraft then became airborne norm ally but when it landed its right mainwheel fell off.
82-066
16
84/14
ACC
MA 1/02/1984
CLO
84-012
17
84/85
ACC
MA 24/08/1984
DUH NR Several sheep were standing near TANEATUA the threshold of the strip when the aircraft arrived overhead. the pilot attempted to land over the sheep but a wheel hit one damaging the undercarriage leg which folded rearwards. EGS NR As the aircraft became airborne MASTERTO the right hand main oleo leg N separated from the wing. the aircraft was landed at masterton aerodrome but the wing flap was damaged at the end of the landing run EGU WHANGAR While landing at his base EI AD aerodrome during evening civil twilight, deteriorating light conditions caused the pilot to misjudge his roundout. the nosewheel struck the ground just short of the runway and collapsed. the aircraft slid onto the runway on its nose.
84-086
18
85/37
ACC
MA 19/04/1985
85-040
19
86/44
ACC
MA 12/05/1986
86-043
20
12
86/54
ACC
MA 4/07/1986
EMD IHURAUA
The right tyre burst during takeoff. aircraft ran off the side of the airstrip and down a steep bank. During takeoff an undercarriage bolt failed causing a swing to the left. the aircraft became airborne off the side of the strip and was landed on two wheels at its base aerodrome.
86-055
21
88/7
ACC
MA 11/01/1988
JAC
NR KAIKOHE
88-007
22
88/35
ACC
MA 8/04/1988
EMO OTAMAURI A tailwind caused the aircraft to sink after takeoff. the left main undercarriage struck a bank and separated from the aircraft. BIV HIKATAIA The aircraft's left undercarriage leg rotated in azimuth on the takeoff run on a sloping airstrip. the pilot was unable to prevent the aircraft running off the strip and plunging down a 75 m drop. the main undercarriage leg had failed due to a previous overload. During takeoff the left tyre blew out causing the aircraft to swerve. the pilot abandoned the takeoff but was unable to stop the aircraft before it struck a ditch and a bank where it came to rest.
88-035
23
89/48
ACC
MA 11/05/1989
89-049
23
89/85
ACC
MA 29/10/1989
EGW NR OPUNAKE
89-089
24
13
90/88
ACC
MA 18/06/1990
JAL
NR After takeoff the left main wheel RUAWARO and piston assembly detached from the aircraft. the fletcher was flown to hamilton aerodrome where it was landed without further damage. the lower link attachment bolt had failed due to torsional fatigue caused by the bolt binding in its surrounding bush. Nose gear collapsed after landing
90-090
25
90/107 92/1942
ACC INC
MA 19/09/1990 MA 28/06/1992
DMS Glen Lyon DMV INBOUND FIELDING
2 2
26 27
94/1205 94/4476 94/4454
INC ACC INC
MA 26/02/1994 CR 24/11/1994 MI 1/12/1994
94/4689 95/1002
DEF ACC
MI CR
16/12/1994 12/04/1995
RECEIVED JOINING INSTRUCTIONS FOR LEFT BASE RWY 7. PIC ADVISED HAD NOSE WHEEL PROBLEM. A/C LANDED SAFELY AT 2055 CKA TAHAROA . Port wheel JAC Kaikohe Ad Undercarriage collapsed UPPER LINK BOLT EMT NEW PILOT RANG TO ADVISE ARRIVING PLYMOUTH WITH POSSIBLE FLAT TYRE. LANDED NO PROBLEMS DZN WANGANU NOSE WHEEL STEERING LINKS I DLQ NEW JOINS OVERHEAD NORDO Bolt PLYMOUTH OBSERVED PORT UNDERCARRIDGE MISSING EMERGENCY SERVICES ACTIVATED. AIRCRAFT LANDS SUCCESSFULLY.
AN6-26
2 2 2
28 29 30
245235
2 2
31 32
14
95/2830
DEF
MA 14/08/1995
MAT S During take off run top LUG & BOLT WHITIANG undercarriage leg socket Part No. A 245106 failed (right mainwheel), allowing wheel to rotate 90. This caused loss of directional control. Oleo subsequently dropped out of cylinder and aircraft came to rest with one wing resting ong round. EMT Parihaka At lift off the starboard main Torque link undercarriage separated from the bolt acft due to failure of the upper bolt. On the subsequent landing the starboard outer panel was damaged after contacting an earth bank. subsequent minor damage to rib end of centre section as sembly found.
245106
32
96/1589
ACC
CR
4/05/1996
33
96/1878
DEF
MA 17/06/1996
EGU NGAROMA A 'bang' was heard from nose gear LINK ASSY vicinity on rotation, rudder peddles felt different, from past experience I was aware the steering linkage had broken. Ascertained nose gear was still on aircraft (shadow on ground), made decision to proceed to Hamilton f or repairs. DHD Pourere Road Landing uphill on topdressing strip, in sink, hit lip of depression in strip. RH u/c leg collapsed.
245235
34
96/2414
ACC
MI
7/09/1996
35
96/3572
DEF
MA 7/12/1996
CZA
WANGANU Brake Disc. Corrosion around weld Disc I area attaching cup shaped mild steel pressing to disc, causing failure and separation of disc.
36
15
97/650
DEF
MA 14/02/1997
DHE AUCKLAND The incoming crew reported the aircraft was slow to taxi and required more power than usual. A noise was heard when applying the parking brakes. On a walk around the crew found that the number 4 main wheel inner shaft was fractured. BOG LUMSDEN Suspected acft starboard wheel missing. Local standby implemented. Acft landed successfully with all wheels intact. Emergency services stood down. ZK-EUF(Fletcher) had just finished doing some top dressing and was landing on a strip. Once the aircraft's wheels touched the ground the nose leg gear collapsed causing substantial damage to the aircraft. The aircraft approached in a slight downwind and encountered a downdraft close to the ground. The pilot undercorrected and the right main landing gear became detached when it touched down short of the airstrip. The right wing was damaged as it settled ont o the strip surface.
Wheel
2605759
37
97/1316
INC
MI
22/04/1997
38
98/3041
ACC
CR
10/11/1998
EUF
Geraldine
38
99/234
ACC
MA 8/02/1999
DZC
Paturau
39
00/92
ACC
MA 17/01/2000
DUJ
Wangaehu On landing the front oleo V collapsed, and the aircraft flipped.
40
16
00/1002
DEF
MI
15/03/2000
DEQ NORTHLAN An inspection was carried out as Torque tube D required by DCA/FU24/142A and cracking was found around the torque tube bearing face. DEQ KOHUKOH Once the aircraft touched down it Lug bolts U began to roll to the left followed by the right wing moving down contacting the ground. Pilot was unable to raise the flaps in time and aircraft suffered minor damage to flaps and outer wing panel. A visual check confir med that the right main undercarriage leg had come off. DZN Wanganui The right hand brake calliper mount broke while the Fletcher was turning in the loading area. While taxiing on a farm strip the nose wheel steering link shaft broke off at the lower pin clevis hole. As the Fletcher Fu24 took off the left lower undercarriage leg, piston and wheel fell off. Brake caliper mount
245259-4
#REF!
00/2483
DEF
MI
27/03/2000
AN5-36A
Lug 245106
#REF!
01/2216
DEF
MI
28/05/2001
#REF!
01/3898
DEF
MA 5/10/2001
LTF
Wanganui
Steering link
#REF!
01/3701
DEF
MA 30/10/2001
EME Dargaville
AN6 bolts
#REF!
17
01/4100
ACC
MA 12/12/2001
EGO Rangituma The pilot was positioning the u aircraft for agricultural operations, and was making his first landing for the day on the strip. The oneway strip was relatively short, and the pilot anticipated poor braking action because of the long, dewy grass. On touch down, the left main undercarriage struck a sharp lip at the threshold of the strip; the lip was concealed by the long grass. The undercarriage leg separated from the aircraft which slid to a halt on its left wing.
#REF!
02/75
ACC
MA 15/01/2002
DDW Waikaia
While on take-off roll, it seemed that a tyre blew out, slewing the aircraft off the strip. The right undercarriage leg folded and there was also damage to the righthand flap. There was only half a load onboard.
#REF!
18
02/2051
ACC
MA 2/05/2002
EFM Masterton The left hand main undercarriage Top sissor link AN6-26 collapsed on landing on a farm bolt strip after the top sissor link attachment bolts snapped. Damage was sustained to the left hand undercarriage, outer wing, aileron and flap. Repairs were carried out to enable the aircraft t o be ferry flown back to Masterton. Extensive repair work was carried out at Masterton including disassembly of the centre wing. CCT Hamilton The top undercarriage link bolt broke in half when the a/c was turning on muddy ground. It was sent for analysis and replaced. The left undercarriage leg had leaked out its hydraulic fluid and lost its pressure. Inspection revealed a crack below the lower clamp. The port tyre blew on takeoff. The pilot was unaware and contiued the sortie normally and on landing was able to maintain directional control. The aircraft had just landed when the port undercarriage leg collapsed causing minor damage. The pilot was not injured. Top link bolt MS 2125006036
#REF!
02/1581
DEF
MI
13/05/2002
#REF!
02/1643
DEF
MI
15/05/2002
EGK
Wanganui
Main U/c cylinder
24 5120
#REF!
02/3585
DEF
MI
14/11/2002
DZN Stratford
Tyre
#REF!
02/3428
DEF
MA 25/11/2002
EMG Owaka
Scissor link lower bracket.
#REF!
19
02/3689
ACC
MA 19/12/2002
DZC
Nelson
Significant event. The pilot was Scissor Link engaged in topdressing when just Top Bolt after take off from the airstrip the pilot realised that the port main landing gear was missing. The pilot flew to Nelson Airport where he made a sucessful landing on the remaining underca rriage. The pilot noticed a major vibration from the left wheel during the take off so the load was dumped. As the aircraft became airborne he noticed in the mirror that the main left wheel and oleo had fallen off During the landing rollout the pilot had difficulty steering the aircraft. JAL hit a rock on takeoff breaking the caliper attach pins and the hose fittings from the cylinder assembly. The left main under carriage cylinder and clamp were found badly corroded during this new aircrafts first 100 hr check. Lower torque AN6-53 link bolt
#REF!
03/1339
ACC
MA 4/02/2003
CZB
Ashhurst
#REF!
03/825
INC
MI
17/03/2003
DMU Napier
Not established
#REF!
03/958
DEF
MI
23/03/2003
JAL
Hamilton
#REF!
03/2968
DEF
MI
26/09/2003
EUH Wanganui
MLG Cylinder
#REF!
03/3040
ACC
MA 26/10/2003
JLU
Bideford
As the aircraft took off it sank back onto its right main undercarriage, which broke the leg off the aircraft.The was load was spread and it then flew back to to Masterton and made a safe landing with no other reported damage
#REF!
20
03/3205
ACC
MA 11/11/2003
JLU
Hinakura
Just before touchdown the aircraft Nose steering 245235 experienced a down draught and Link struck the airstrip hard. It assyembly bounced approximately 60 meters before touching the ground again when the aircraft's nose wheel collapsed and folded back and the aircraft slid about another 6 0 meters up the airstrip on the aircraft's propeller. It was reported that the bottom NAS Bolts u/c forward under carriage clamp bolt cylinder broke which allowed the outer attach portion of the lower clamp to go rearwards, bending the lower back bolt allowing the cylinder to go rearwards. It was reported that half of the Hub rim main wheel rim broke off on take- broken off with load. It was reported that on roll out after landing the starboard wheel dropped into a 10 inch slump in the airstrip, resulting in the main undercarriage leg breaking at the cylinder 5 inches below the skin at the wing. The aircraft slid for 30 metres before c oming to rest. It was reported that the hub rim Wheel Hub separated from the base. This was found on landing. 245240-2
234
#REF!
04/307
DEF
MI
23/01/2004
CBA
Unknown
#REF!
04/854
DEF
MI
5/03/2004
EMG Gore
#REF!
04/1117
ACC
MA 12/03/2004
EMW Kinohaku
#REF!
04/1639
DEF
MI
26/04/2004
BDS
Otapiri
#REF!
21
04/1966
DEF
MA 6/06/2004
EMC Hamilton
It was reported that during Nose Steering 08-45661-1 repositioning in the hanger, a loud bang was heard. It was found that the steering post/tube assembly had fractured within the lower bearing block. It is evident that this has been fractured for some time. The aircraft rolled up to the Left Hand 069-00200 loader after landing for another Brake Caliper load and did a right hand turn. During this turn the left brake was applied but the pedal went straight to the floor with no effect. The aircraft was therefore unable to stop so a decision wa s made to take off again. Upon return to base it was found that the left calliper was missing.
#REF!
04/3632
DEF
MI
28/10/2004
EFM Masterton
#REF!
05/354
DEF
MI
5/01/2005
NZS
Christchurc The nose steering/rudder steering steering post 245259-1 h post was found cracked as per DCA but was found to have been bent while in service and therefore they were both at different angle positions. Hamilton Super Air reported that the pilot Bottom Pivot AN8-53 noticed that there was a problem Bolt with his wheel. The aircraft was stopped and the wheel was seen to be on a slight angle. The bottom bolt had broken allowing the wheel to pivot.
#REF!
05/347
DEF
MI
11/01/2005
CBA
#REF!
22
05/374
DEF
MI
8/02/2005
EGK
Wanagnui
It was reported that the right hand RH Brake brake calliper spigot bolt broke off Caliper around the spigot bolt. While working off a rough strip the nose wheel steering post broke off at the lower bearing. The nose wheel steering links lower bolt broke. The Fletcher FU24 - 954 ( Walter ) inner wheel half rim broke off on the airstrip when loaded for the take off; this caused the tube to puncture. The aircraft's nose wheel steering link broke just as power was applied directly after loading. The nose wheel steering linkage broke on the take off roll. Steering Post
091-10200
#REF!
05/1342
DEF
MI
15/04/2005
EGK
Wanagnui
#REF!
05/1578
DEF
MI
14/05/2005
EGK
Wanganui
Steering link lower bolt Main Wheel 161 - 02200
#REF!
05/2021
DEF
MI
25/05/2005
EML Unknown Airstrip
#REF!
06/2386
DEF
MI
27/01/2006
CKA
New Plymouth
06/2387
DEF
MI
15/02/2006
CKA
New Plymouth
06/1341
DEF
MI
12/04/2006
EUH Wanganui
06/3067
DEF
MI
17/07/2006
EMW Te Kopia
The MLG lower torque link bolt was found to have the head sheared off. Super Air reported that during the Nose Gear landing roll the pilot found that steering was limited. On inspection it was found that the nose leg had a broken tube on the steering linkage assembly and one of two safety wires were almost broken through and only hold ing by only a few strands.
Lower steering torque tube ass Nosewheel steering torque tube Lower Torque AN6-53 Link Bolt 245207
#REF!
#REF!
#REF!
#REF!
23
06/2937
DEF
MI
3/08/2006
EMW Hamilton
Super Air reported that the pilot was unable to steer the aircraft during the landing sequence. It was later found that the tube assembly was broken.
Nose wheel steering
245207
#REF!
06/3431
DEF
MI
31/08/2006
WLN Lawrence
It was reported that the aircrafts RH 11-40009-1 undercarriage leg broke off undercarriage abbout 50mm above the axle after piston a normal landing. Just after the aircraft had landed Oleo the right main landing gear bottom half broke off causing the aircraft to slide a few meters before coming to rest. One attachment lug broke from the wheel brake cylinder allowing it to detach from the main undercarriage. When the aircraft was on the landing roll and the brakes were applied the RH brake did not work. This resulted in the aircraft narrowly missing the loader. Wheel brake cylinder
#REF!
06/3385
INC
MI
10/09/2006
WLN Evans Flat
#REF!
06/3609
DEF
MI
23/09/2006
DMU Napier
#REF!
06/4746
DEF
MI
10/12/2006
EMW Waiotira
Main wheel inner hub
245240-2
#REF!
06/4830
DEF
MI
22/12/2006
CML Rerewhakai Steering tu During take off the pilot felt the Linkage steering through the rudder Assembly pedals change. The flight was continued as normal and the load sowed but the landing was carried out slow and short to reduce wheel slewing.
245235
#REF!
24
07/379
DEF
MI
21/01/2007
EMW Purua During the takeoff a small bang Attachment Whangarei was heard and the aircraft veered bolts to the right. The load was spread and the right hand leg was seen to be over extended. Whilst returning to Whangarei the whole leg assembly fell out retained only by the brake hose. During landing the wheel bounced up destroying the right hand flap. EMW Purua, Northland The aircraft was turning to approach the loading bin when a noise was heard from the undercarriage. During a routine check the main undercarriage bottom leg attachment fitting was found to be corroded on the lower surface each side of the front attachment bolt hole The aircraft was loaded and taxiing when the RH main wheel assembly appeared to give way. Engineering investigation revealed that wheel outer hub half had failed around the rim circumference. Super Air reported that over a 20 hour flight period during early December 07, aircraft has gone through two sets of brake pads. Super Air Ltd reported steering linkage broke on landing, stopped as soon as possible - assessed and flew to HN for repair. RH Main wheel
AN5-36A
#REF!
07/606
DEF
MI
24/01/2007
245240-2
#REF!
07/484
DEF
MI
13/02/2007
EGV Hamilton
MLG bottom 245106 leg attach fitting
#REF!
07/4050
DEF
MI
24/10/2007 EMQ Karitane
Outer wheel 162-02000 half assembly
2 #REF!
07/4762
DEF
MI
15/12/2007 EMW Rotorua
Brake Pads
2 #REF!
08/1316
INC
MI
25/01/2008 EMW
245207/24 5204
2 #REF!
25
08/1320
ACC
MI
12/03/2008 EMQ Manitoto
Upon landing the left hand Oleo Cylinder 245120 undercarriage leg failed resulting in the aircraft vacating the airstrip and coming to rest on the left wing with substantial damage incurred.
2 #REF!
08/1234
ACC
MA
26/03/2008 EMT Dannervirk As the aircraft rotated for take-off AN5-36A e whislt engaged in agricultural Boltsx3 operations the left main undercarriage leg failed and fell from the aircraft. The pilot diverted to Dannevirke and landed safely with minor damage to the wing flap horn and stabilator. 4/04/2008 EMW Horohoro The aircraft was becoming L/H wheel airborne with the fifth load of the assembly job when the pilot felt the LH 245153 undercarriage sink more than normal. Suspecting an undercarriage problem he contacted his loader driver and asked him to have a look at the left wheel assembly wh en he flew past,.The driver reported that the left main tyre was mostly off the rim. The pilot flew to HN for repairs and landed successfully. 245240-1
2 #REF!
08/1480
INC
MI
2 #REF!
08/1539
INC
MI
8/04/2008 EMW Rerewhakai During the ferry flight to the first tu job of the day the right brake pedal pressure was lost.On landing the pedal went to the floor with brake pressure lost. Machine was flown to Hamilton for repair.
2 #REF!
26
08/1695
DEF
MI
08/3556
ACC
MI
20/08/2008 EGK
Taranaki
08/3917
INC
MI
6/09/2008 JLU
Rotorua
During pre flight PIC noticed brake MS28775-218 061-01200 fluid below the RH brake caliper. When he checked the brakes before start up the RH brake pedal pressure was lost. Wanganui Aero Work reported to RCCNZ that ZK-EGK developed a minor problem that caused aircraft to land in a field in Taranaki. Nose wheel collapsed and prop touched. Minor damage to aircraft, no injury to PIC, Engineer present. Full report to follow Superair reported during the takeoff phase, a shudder was felt. Pilot continued the takeoff, sowed the load, and landed after making some checks. Found the bearing caliper had broken off, broken the tyre rim and slashed the tyre. 245207
2 #REF!
PWilliams
2 #REF!
2 #REF!
08/4119
DEF
MI
15/09/2008 DZO Waikawau Superair reported that upon Tube Assy landing on airstrip, scissor link on nose leg failed resulting in nose wheel being inoperable from pedal inputs, and wheel free to wander. Aircraft was in slow taxiing role; pilot was able to stop aircraft quickly therefore no risk of leaving rwy. DZN WANGANU Right hand outer wing panel rear I mount was found broken off during a 100 hour inspection, cause unknown. Outer panel rear mount
2 #REF!
97/2414
DEF
MA 5/08/1997
241311
27
01/2934
DEF
MI
8/07/2001
CZA
Wanganui
During 4 yearly airframe RH lowere inspection Right Hand lower outer mount lug panel mainplane mount lug was found to be badly corroded having wasted to half original thickness.
241573L
01/3044
DEF
MA 8/08/2001
05/2284
DEF
MI
11/07/2005
EFM Palmerston Exfoliation corrosion found in North wing/fuselage attachments causing distortion to adjacent rearward frame on left hand side. Photos supplied. Fittings, both left and right sides have been replaced BXS Feilding During an inspection severe wear was found in the left hand wing rear spar to the fuselage mounting attachment fittings. BHK Mosgiel On inspection bracket was found with crack near bolt hole.
Wing fittings 243039 & 253057-2R
Rear Spar attachment fittings
07/843
DEF
MI
14/02/2007
07/1478
DEF
MI
24/04/2007
93/5299
DEF
MA 25/10/1993
96/2980
DEF
MA 21/10/1996
00/1760
DEF
MA 11/05/2000
Rear Wing Outer Panel Attachme Outer Wing DZO Hamilton Super Air Ltd reported that the outer wing attachment fitting was Rear Fitting discovered with a crack about 20mm long near the attachment bolt hole. DJE WANGANU ENGINE I MOUNT BOLT LUG DZM MASTERTO Engine mount - top left mount Engine mount N plate. Plate broken away from tube. DZN WANGANU engine mount I frame EGK Wanagnui Engine Engine mount frame top RH Mount engine mount bolt attachment broke off leaving engine mounted on only three bolts.
241311
241311
24 3663
2436663
01/1410
DEF
MA 12/03/2001
24 3661
28
01/1377
DEF
MI
15/03/2001
CKA
Hamilton
Bracket 24664 crackedbehind the Bracket weldon the FWD plate attaching engine bolt to bracket. Bracket cracked see 01/1377 Bracket
243664 LH
01/1378 02/3756 02/3293
DEF DEF DEF
MI MI MI
16/03/2001 24/10/2002 31/10/2002
CCT DUJ DUJ
Hamilton
243664 LH 196
4 4 4
6 7 8
03/742
DEF
MA 23/02/2003
CKA
Masterton The top left engine mount lug was found cracked. Masterton Engine mount bracket installed in top R/H postion in fuselage was found broken. A crack was found to propogate from a half drilled hole. Matematon The pilot noticed a vibration from ga the engine. After landing it was found that two bolts from the right hand engine mount had come off. They were refitted and the aircraft was flown back to base for further investigation. New Plymouth Two lower engine mount bolts came out due to loss of nuts. Pilot landed aircraft and nuts were replaced. nr The pilot heard a loud bang and Masterton noticed a gap between the firewall and engine cowling of Fletcher FU24 Walter ZK- DUJ He landed immediately and found the top left hand engine mount to firewall attachment bolt had failed allowing the engine and mount to b e displaced.
Engine mount lug Engine mount 243664 attachment bracke
Engine Mount Bolt Nuts
22541N100
03/613
DEF
MI
24/02/2003
CKA
Engine mount attachment
10
03/1310
ACC
CR
5/05/2003
DUJ
Attachment bolt
NAS660656
10
29
03/1889
DEF
MI
24/06/2003
EMG Gore
The pilot noticed that a one of 15 Rivets rivets were missing from the top left engine mount bracket and two were loose. A crack was found in the engine mount upper left attachment lug starting at the lower edge and propagating upwards. It was reported that the right hand bottom mount on the fire wall was found to be broken. Pheonix Aviation Maintenance Ltd. reported that the lefthand engine mount on EMN's firewall was broken during the aircraft's 100 hour inspection. During a routine 100 hour inspection, the righthand engine mount was found cracked. Attachment lug TCC07-001
11
04/643
DEF
MI
18/02/2004
EMG Gore
12
05/2918
DEF
MI
8/09/2005
JSW
Gore
06/4372
DEF
MI
22/11/2006
EMN Gore
Bottom RH Engine Mount Engine Mount
243665r
13
14
07/225
DEF
MI
17/01/2007
JSW
Gore
Engine Mount
TCL 02-0081
15
07/1137
DEF
MA 2/04/2007
Auckland
The pilot reported that the aircraft Strut support expereinced vibration and flutter during the cruise, approximately 400 nm west of Auckland. A PAN PAN call was made a decision was made to return to Auckland. Vibration remained until landing but became less noticeable as airspeed was decreased.
16
30
07/1292
DEF
MA 3/04/2007
JNX
Te Akau
The Operator reported that the an Engine engine mount bolt broke causing attachment the engine to tilt 50mm during the bolt takeoff run. This in turn jammed all the engine controls which prevented the pilot from shutting down the engine or feathering the prop. He jettisoned the load and ground looped the aircraft. He stayed in it until it was stropped to the ground and shut down later.
NAS 660656
16
07/2577
DEF
MI
18/07/2007
EMG Gore
07/3284
DEF
MI
30/08/2007 WLN Taieri
Phoenix Aviation reported that a crack was found at the aircraft's engine mount. During a routine inspection, a small crack was detected originating from the top outboard radius of the top LH engine mount bracket in the fuselage.
Engine Mount Top LH Engine Mount Bracket
TCL-02-0102 TCL 02-0102
17
4 18
07/3702
DEF
MA
27/09/2007 EUF
Geraldine
01/1631
DEF
MI
6/04/2001
DUJ
01/2958
DEF
MI
24/07/2001
DUJ
The aircraft aborted the takeoff due to the top left hand engine mount bolt nut failing. Masterton As part of a turbine engine conversion extra fuel tanks were fitted outboard of the original tanks. Over time a metal panel between the tanks has chaffed against the welding in the fuel tanks body Masterton Report of frequent "Beta" solenoid failures when in flight in the approach regime.. If pin is not fully engaged then the coil burns out.
Attachment MS Bolt and Nut 21043L6 Nut Fuel Tanks
4 19
Solenoid
31
02/1052
DEF
MI
2/10/2001
CBA
Hamilton
The radial flow compressor casing radial flow was found cracked. This is a compressor known defect. casing
M601-154- 863036 8
01/3702
DEF
MA 30/10/2001
CML Tahuna
The pilot reported that the aircraft Jam nut experienced a significant power loss just after takeoff on his 4th sortie of the day. He jettisoned the load and turned back but realised the power available was not sufficient. He made a successful emergency landing i n a nearby paddock. After the fuel pressure low fuel filter pressure light came on, pilot then drain spooled the engine down to 40% and carried out a precautionary landing back onto the airstrip. Radial flow compressor PT wheel and blades M601-154- 873006 8 863019
01/3939
DEF
MI
12/11/2001
DZG n/k
02/1054
DEF
MI
14/11/2001
DUJ
02/1055
DEF
MI
5/02/2002
JLU
Masterton The radial flow compressor casing was found cracked. This is a known defect. Hamilton Several small nicks were found on the outer circumference of the Power Turbine wheel.
02/1539
DEF
MI
8/05/2002
EFM Masterton While maintenance was being Wing internal 08 - 03066 carried out inside the wing it was cleats noticed that the cleats previously installed when modification P.A.C - FU-0299 was incorporated had been cut/removed from inside the wing. These cleats were removed when the aircraft had the Walter STC incorporated
32
02/3203
INC
MA 8/11/2002
EUD Queenstow The pilot reported that while n climbing through 5500ft the engine started to lose power. PiC instructed the parachutists to jump out. The engine then stopped and pilot made a successful forced landing onto Queenstown airport. EMN Winton The aircraft had an engine failure on takeoff as a result of water contaminated fuel being pumped into the tanks from a custom built mobile fuel storage tank. The aircraft did not suffer any damage and its fuel lines were flushed out. The storage tank has now been modified by replacing the top cover seal and making the fuel drain accessable. Operator reported that at 10ft agl FCU engine torque dropped below 20%, with the "Power Turbine" (NG) also declining. Pilot cycled power lever to idle then full power but got no response from the engine. A set-up for landing was made, successful landing ini tiated. During an engine ground run, after Power a F.C.U. adjustment and engine at Turbine Blade 88% torque. A loud explosion occurred followed by engine spooling down and lots of PT blade material coming out of the exhaust. Engine shut down. 863036
02/3899
INC
MA 18/11/2002
02/3867
DEF
MA 29/12/2002
EUD Jardiines Airstrip
03/273
DEF
MA 1/02/2003
CKA
Hamilton Airport
10
33
03/869
DEF
MA 18/03/2003
DZG Port Waikato
While investigating a high ITT ITT probe resistance it was suspected that the ITT probe broke and went out through the power turbine and damaged the blades. During takeoff from an agricultural airstrip the engine stopped producing power. The aircraft was force landed without power onto a river bed with no injuries to the two crew although the aircraft was damaged. Comp. turbine blades 844042
11
04/2142
ACC
MA 4/07/2004
JNX
Hicks Bay
12
05/32
ACC
MA 12/01/2005
05/184
DEF
MA 17/01/2005
EFM Mauricevill During take off the aircraft's e engine burst into flames. The aircraft then veered off the strip and through a fence, damaging the propeller. EMG Gore The Walter powered Fletcher had a major engine failure while it was taxiing on the ground. NZS Pudding Hill
#REF!
06/696
DEF
MA 27/02/2006
GT guide vane supporting ring The aircraft was climbing out and Compressor established on a crosswind turbine heading at 800 feet when a loud blades bang was heard followed by total power loss. A landing was then made on an adjacent runway. Minor damage was sustained to the flap on touch down.
894004
13
893013
14
34
06/999
DEF
MA 16/03/2006
JLU
Danevirke
When power was being applied Power for take off a loud howling sound turbine was heard from the engine. The take off was subsequently aborted. Inspection revealed that the tip of one power turbine blade was missing. It was reported that during a non Outer flame routine boroscope inspection, tube damage was noted along with a piece missing from the number 1 compressor turbine blade and also what appeared to be cracking in the compressor heat shield. Airways reported that ZK-JNX was Fuel Control a VFR flight into NZHN. On landing Unit on grass RWY25, the aircraft was observed to strike a threshold marker board. The pilot advised that the flight had suffered minor engine problems. It was reported that the engine Fuel control lost power on takeoff and the pilot unit FCU landed the aircraft and went through a fence. Minor damage was sustained to the propeller, tail cone and wing skin.
883004
15
06/1417
DEF
MI
15/04/2006
DJE
Nelson
863035
16
06/2183
INC
MI
11/06/2006
JNX
Hamilton
LUN6590.0 881023 3-8
17
06/3198
DEF
MI
25/08/2006
EMQ Moutere Station
18
06/3428
DEF
MA 11/09/2006
DUJ
GT guide Masterton During the ground run after a compressor wash the engine blew vane ring up. Flames and smoke were observed coming from the exhaust ducts.
852052
19
35
06/3606
DEF
MI
20/09/2006
CCT
Hamilton
During a scheduled inspection of ITT the Walter turbine engine the ITT Connection probe mounting bushings were bushing found to be loose.
19
06/4630
DEF
MI
4/12/2006
EUF
07/2059
DEF
MI
17/04/2007
07/1280
DEF
MA 18/04/2007
During beta operation while BC Lever taxiing after landing the "BC" lever failed. CCT Hamilton It was reported that during the climb out from takeoff from runway 25L the aircraft experienced loss of power and was forced to return for landing. Unanymous EMW Maungatur The PT6 turbine engine oto experienced an uncontrollable overspeed on the turbine. To prevent the airspeed from exceeding the redline the pilot had to shut the engine down and start a glide back to home base. He then had to restart the engine several times to gain height and get close enough to carry out a dead stick landing. Pilot reported engine down on power. Superair Ltd reported PIC noticed occasional squeak on takeoff which gradually increased to most phases of flight, mainly takeoff and landing in turbulent flight. Flew to Hamilton base for investigation.
Unknown
20
21
22
07/3172 08/334
DEF INC
MI MI
26/08/2007 EMN 17/01/2008 JNX Raglan
5 23 5 24
36
08/315
ACC
MA
30/01/2008 JNX
Raglan
The pilot reported that just before he rotated there was a bang from the engine and he saw flames. The aircraft passed through two fences before coming to a stop down an embankment. The pilot vacated the aircraft before it was destroyed by fire. PIC (K evin Young) reported earlier this month (21/01/08) that he noticed occasional squeak on takeoff which gradually increased to most phases of flight, mainly takeoff and landing in turbulent flight. Flew to Hamilton base for investigation.
5 25
08/2327
INC
08/2439
DEF
70/34
ACC
On the first takeoff after a 150 hour inspection the engine did not produce full power. The pilot elected to continue the take-off and circuited for an uneventful landing MI 4/06/2008 EGW Super Air Ltd reported that engineers has reported the FCU Finger filter had been fitted back to front sometime in the past. Found on check. MA 10/03/1970 CDX WHATAWH When the pilot closed the throttle ATA prior to landing, the engine stopped. a forced landing was made in a ploughed paddock beyond the end of the strip.
MA
22/05/2008 EME Hamilton
5 25
5 26
2107
37
70/90
ACC
MA 10/11/1970
BVU WHATAWH During a topdressing operation, ATA engine lost power and stopped, meaning a forced landing on unsuitable terrain. pilot admitted he omitted to refuel aircraft. the aircraft would normally have been refuelled at base and end of previous day but underground tank was empty and pilot going to refuel from loader vehicle at strip in morning. sufficient fuel to reach a.s but need to refuel overlooked. CRX MANGAITI Engine stopped through fuel exhaustion during a topdressing sortie. pilot attempted down-hill landing on the strip but found it impossible and the aircraft collided with a hedge and plunged into a gully.
2170
71/34
ACC
MA 24/03/1971
71-032
72/86
ACC
MA 13/09/1972
CLM NGAROMA Just after takeoff on a topdressing sortie the engine failed completely. the load was jettisoned and a heavy landing made in hilly country. strip examination of the engine revealed a fatigue failure of the crankshaft gear disrupting the drive to the camshaft and t
72-082
38
73/56
ACC
MA 29/03/1973
CKJ
L Following a power loss the pilot ROTOMAH attempted a forced landing on a ANA relatively level hilltop, but during the roll the nosewheel entered a deep depression and was forced rearward and upward into the cockpit floor. fire broke out in the engine bay immediately thereafter and flashed back into the cockpit as the pilot opened the canopy to escape. PARIHAUH An engine failure due to a failed AU piston pin necessitated a forced landing in a small paddock in steep hill country. seeing that we would be unable to stop the aircraft from over-running the paddock and capsizing in a deep gorge, the pilot intentionally guided the aircraft into a tree. his action prevented destruction of aircraft and serious injury or death to both occupants.
73-049
73/87
ACC
MA 20/07/1973
BXZ
73-089
39
73/130
ACC
MA 29/10/1973
CDW NR ORAKEI Earlier that day 2 forced landings resulted from severe engine vibration and power loss shortly after takeoff. ground runs after rectification work indicated that engine was operating normally. after takeoff from a field, reoccurrence of fault momentarily confused pilot. aircraft stalled and struck ground in incipient spin. sticking valve probably caused rough running CBA MATAPARA When the aircraft engine ran roughly a forced landing became necessary. a heavy landing on a soft surface caused collapse of the noseleg. the engine malfunction was due to fuel starvation. due to an incorrectly routed fuel line, 4 gallons remaining in the tank was unusable. NR TE MATA During a spraying run the engine ran roughly and a forced landing was made on a gorse-covered ridge. the top piston ring of one cylinder had broken and pieces of ring were found throughout the engine. one piece lodged under a valve is believed to have caused the malfunction.
73-129
75/3
ACC
MA 2/01/1975
75-016
75/87
ACC
MA 9/08/1975
BYC
75-085
40
75/116
ACC
MA 28/10/1975
DUG KAIMAI
En route to the sowing area the engine stopped and a forced landing was made in a small paddock, the aircraft then passing through a fence. incorrect application of sealant material when the fuel sender units had been replaced had allowed some of this material to enter the tanks and had blocked the outlet of both tanks, thus depriving the engine of fuel.
75-113
76/93
ACC
MA 17/08/1976
EFS
NR Location: nr moenjodaro, MOENJODA pakistan. while the aircraft was on RO a spraying run at low level the engine cut without warning.
76-090
77/81
ACC
MA 11/06/1977
DHY WAIMANA On takeoff after the aircraft had been refuelled, a bang was heard and the engine lost power. a forced landing was carried out in a swamp. a large quantity of water was drained from the aircraft's fuel system. DHD SCARGILL The castellated nut on the throttle butterfly shaft vibrated loose and engine power suddenly reduced to idle during a sowing run. in the ensuing forced landing the aircraft rolled into a ditch incurring substantial damage to the nose section.
77-083
10
77/86
ACC
MA 23/06/1977
77-090
11
41
78/82
ACC
MA 12/06/1978
CBA
TE AKAU
During a sowing run the aircraft's engine spluttered and then stopped, necessitating a forced landing in rough country. Shortly after liftoff the aircraft's engine cut due to fuel starvation. uneven fuel feeding was evident on the fuel gauges. a bee was found jammed in the outlet of one tank causing the uneven fuel feeding and subsequent fuel starvation.
78-081
12
79/47
ACC
MA 7/03/1979
CDX
NR TE ANGA
79-045
12
79/151
ACC
MA 10/12/1979
EHX
NR During the takeoff run an engine OWHANGO power loss caused the takeoff to be abandoned. the aircraft could not be stopped within the remaining airstrip length and slid sideways into a ditch. the power loss was probably caused by a vapour lock in the fuel system. PUKAPUKA Following an engine failure the pilot made a forced landing during which the aircraft ran over a bank. the engine failure was caused by a fatigue failure of a connecting rod.
79-148
13
82/48
ACC
MA 28/04/1982
JAA
82-049
14
42
82/50
ACC
MA 5/05/1982
DZN WAIMIHA
On the 21st takeoff that morning, the engine stopped because of fuel exhaustion. a forced landing was made straight ahead between obstructions. the pilot's attention was distracted from the aircraft's fuel state by a freshening tail wind which he knew could cause difficulty when operating from this strip.
82-052
15
87/60
ACC
MA 9/06/1987
VAL
87/109
ACC
MA 25/11/1987
The aircraft was damaged during a forced landing after fuel pump failure. BOE CHASLAND At the commencement of a sowing S run the engine began to 'over rev'. and shortly afterwards it stopped. during the ensuring forced landing the left undercarriage leg was torn out. a strip examination indicated that the oil gallery to the engine's no. 3 and no. 4 main bearings had been blocked resulting in failure of the no. 7 connecting rod. Rotomahan Power loss, thistles jammed a Block Ad aileron, control lost. Refer to TAIC report 90-011T. CML ROCTR SHORTLY AFTER TKOF ACFT EXPERIENCED ROUGH RUNNING ENG, LANDED RWY 01. CRF GISBORNE PILOT REPORTED ON FINAL WITH ROUGH RUNNING ENGINE
PATOKA
87-064
16
87-119
17
90/134
ACC
MA 10/12/1990
BIX
90-011T
18
91/640
INC
MA 23/09/1991
18
92/1158
INC
MA 15/04/1992
19
43
93/1506
DEF
MA 15/02/1993
CQB MOSGIEL
93/3652 93/3651 93/5152 93/5987 94/2736
DEF DEF DEF DEF DEF
MA 22/07/1993 MA 28/07/1993 MA 9/09/1993 MA 14/12/1993 MI 9/06/1994
SHORTLY AFTER TAKE OFF AS THE CONNECTING A/C TURNED AT 200FT A LOUD ROD BANG WAS HEARD. THE ENGINE RAN ROUGH. CML NZHN COUNTERWEI 73810 GHT BUSH DZG HAMILTON PISTON LW10207 KAWERAU HAMILTON Crankshaft AUXILIARY 8123-H FUEL PUMP UPPER VALVE LW10076 SPRING S MAGNETO IGNITION COIL LW11775
20
6 6 6 6 6
21 22 23 24 25
BOF BIF
DLQ HAMILTON ROUGH RUNNING: LOW COMPRESSION NR5 CYLINDER DZD MOSGIEL
94/3034
DEF
MA 19/07/1994
26
94/4646
DEF
MI
20/10/1994
EMT PALMERST LOSS OF OIL PRESSURE ON ON NORTH TAKEOFF. DYJ PALMERST LYCOMING ENGINE IO-720 ON NORTH PALMERST During scheduled maintenance of Camshaft / ON NORTH a Lycoming IO-720, 8 cylinder, 400 tappets horse power air cooled engine, camshaft lobes were found to be worn after only 98 hours of service life. Two inlet tappets (numbers 3 and 4) were badly spalled, on the tappet contact are a, after only 98 hours of service life. Metal fragments were found in the oil filter element. Tubular mount
27
94/4648
DEF
MI
29/11/1994
50-15/3813 LW13879
L885-54A
28
95/1170
DEF
MA 27/02/1995
CDZ
28
95/702
DEF
MA 12/03/1995
DZM MASTERTO . N
29
44
95/1164 95/1164 95/2574
DEF DEF DEF
MA 22/03/1995 MA 22/03/1995 MA 29/08/1995
DBG DANNEVIR No1. CONROD BOLT FAILURE. KE DBG DANNEVIR No1. CONROD BOLT FAILURE. KE DJE WANGANU . I DHE HAMILTON . EGQ PALMERST . ON NORTH
Con-rod bolt Con-rod bolt Exhaust Valve LW16475Spring Cap KL1-0 Magneto screw Camshaft 10-349652 L641-54
6 6 6
30 31 32
95/2630 95/3351
DEF DEF
MA 5/09/1995 MI 26/09/1995
6 6
33 34
95/3670 96/270
DEF ACC
MA 13/11/1995 CR 30/01/1996
96/1037 96/3646
DEF DEF
MA 1/04/1996 MI 16/04/1996
Valve cap EMC WANGANU . I EGW PIO PIO While in cruise from a farm airstrip to Te Kuiti aerodrome EGW suffered an engine failure necessitating a forced landing in a paddock. DZO HAMILTON During routine inspection, metal ENGINE found in oil filter. HAMILTON Duriing routine inspection metal ENGINE particles found in oil filter. CBA HAMILTON During routine inspection of oil filter flat metal particles found. conrod bearing
69532 KL10
6 6
35 36
L690-54 L1140-54A
6 6
37 38
96/1150
DEF
MA 22/04/1996
39
96/1597
DEF
MA 11/05/1996
EOE
NEW 0144 ZK-EOE reported south of the Spark plug PLYMOUTH city joining with engine problems requesting straight in rwy 05 (opposite to duty runway). No emergency declared. Aircraft landed safely 0149. Upper Conrod Bushing
39
96/1562
DEF
MA 5/06/1996
MAT HAMILTON Conrod #2 cylinder position LW10646.
40
45
96/3007
DEF
MI
24/10/1996
97/704
DEF
MI
3/03/1997
EMC WANGANU Engine Lycoming IO-720-A1B Induction I induction pipe cracked at weld pipe repair. JAL HAMILTON While on a ferry flight from Spark plug Pirongia to Hamilton, the engine began to misfire slightly. The aircraft was cleared to enter Hamilton controlled airspace and to descend to 500 feet. On reaching this altitude the pilot requested a climb to 1000 feet, which was given. The pilot was asked if he required RFS assistance and whether he required a left base onto an alternative grass vector. These offers were declined and the aircraft landed safely. DZG 2NM E ROTORUA At 0257 DZG advised engine Conrod failure and was landing in paddock just east of RO AD. Twr observed descent and landing. After landing pilot advised safe on ground.
41
RHb37e
42
97/986
DEF
MA 3/04/1997
43
97/1708
DEF
MI
17/04/1997
CKA
HAMILTON During 100hrs check, metal found Bearing in suction filter, metal peeling off shell in round pieces.
LW13683
44
97/2106
DEF
MA 16/05/1997
DZN WANGANU The engine driven fuel pump failed fuel pump I during flight. This caused the engine to fail. The engine was restarted using an electrical pump. DDW INVERCARG Bearing metal in filter at routine ILL inspection traced to failure of #7 conrod bearing. #7 Conrod Bearing
RG17980
45
97/1607
DEF
MI
19/05/1997
46
46
97/2575
DEF
MA 20/08/1997
EGU PALMERST Cylinder failure on engine fitted to #5 CYLINDER ON NORTH ZK-EGU. Engine ran rough #5 cylinder found to have loose exhaust seat which had jammed open the exhaust valve and bent the push rod. Cylinder changed. CRF PALMERST Engine removed due metal ON NORTH contamination. MOSGIEL PISTON AND RINGS DISTRIBUTOR 10-391588 BLOCK Engine Casing
L874-54A
46
97/2576
DEF
MA 20/08/1997
L615-54A
47
97/3124 98/1842
DEF DEF
MI
14/10/1997
EUF
MA 7/04/1998
98/2382
DEF
MI
10/08/1998
Distributor gear bush in block found very loose. DDW WOODLAN DURING FLIGHT OIL SPLATTERED DS ON TO THE WINDSCREEN. THE FLIGHT WAS TERMINATED SAFELY. LYCOMING REPLACED THE CRANKSHAFT DLS PALMERST Engine strip report shows signs of ON NORTH detonation. EUH Rahotu Towards the end of a 'sowing' sortie the fuel pressure guage indicated extreme fuel pressure. So the pilot decrease the throttle and headed back to the strip to land. Once on short finals the pilot had to increase throttle to maintain altitude, howevert he engine went to idle and this caused the pilot to stall the aircraft just short of strip threshold.
6 6
48 49
Bearings
50
98/2939
ACC
CR
29/10/1998
51
99/1009
DEF
MA 17/03/1999
99/3145
DEF
MI
27/10/1999
EUH NEW There was a major defect found VALVE PLYMOUTH with a cylinder in the engine of the ROCKERS aircraft. MAT THAMES Metal was found in both oil filters. Con Rod Bearing
17 F 21187
52
74309
53
47
00/636
DEF
MI
10/03/2000
01/1232 01/1625
DEF DEF
MA 18/02/2001 MI 19/03/2001
01/2019
DEF
MA 1/05/2001
01/2020
DEF
MA 15/05/2001
DZM PALMERST The engine was removed due to a ON NORTH knocking noise and low oil pressure. Engineering found that the oil filter had significant metal in it. BOG Gore The aircraft engine began rough running. EGS Masterton The number 5 bearing shells in the Fletcher Lycoming IO-720 AIB engine suffered a catastrophic failure resulting in cracking of the crankshaft. . EMW Palmerston The engine was removed from North service due to metal found in the oil filter. When the engine was stripped down it was found that the main bearings camshaft and tapppet bodies had failed prematurely and caused other engine damage EGO Palmerston The engine was removed due to North metal contamination. It was found that an exhaust valve seat had dropped in No 5 cylinder However, it is suspected that vibration, detonation, and excessive heat had caused this in the first place.
bearings
L 1086-54A
54
Exhaust valve LW 16740 Main bearings LW-13683
6 6
54 55
Main Bearings
LW 13683
56
Cylinder
L886-54A
57
01/2206
DEF
MI
21/05/2001
Spark plug EME Palmerston The body of a brand new spark North plug fractured between its threaded portion and the upper body as it was being tightened. Fifty eight plugs were returned to the manufacturer for replacement
URHB37E
58
48
01/2028
DEF
MA 7/06/2001
01/4052
DEF
MA 15/10/2001
02/2046
DEF
MI
21/02/2002
Metal was found in engine oil filter at the second filter check after overhaul. On strip down the main front bearings were found to have delaminated. EGO Palmerston The engine was bulk stripped and North the fifth order counterweight blade was found to have failed through the trailing blade bush hole. DDW Dunedin The engine had only run 2-3 hours after a complete overhaul when the pilot reported an oil leak from a crankshaft seal. Investigation revealed aluminium in the oil filter due to a failed crankshaft bearing shell. CCT Mahoenui
EGO Feilding
Front Main Bearings
LW 13885
59
Crankshaft counterweigh t bush
60
Crankshaft
60
02/1218
DEF
MA 15/03/2002
During the takeoff roll the Walter Compressor turbine engine made a loud noise Turbine and emitted some smoke. The takeoff was aborted and the aircraft came to a safe stop. Engineering found that the compressor turbine had failed. Compressor casing Oil filter housing M601154.8
841089
61
02/1177
DEF
MI
20/03/2002
EUF
02/1982
DEF
MA 14/06/2002
A 3 " crack was found on the Walter turbines compressor housing. EMT Palmerston The engine was removed following North a loss of oil pressure. It was found that the oil filter housing retaining bolt had failed.
Taieri
874037
62
63
49
02/1983
DEF
MI
16/06/2002
EMT Palmerston The pilot found that power would Air intake North not increase above 2200rpm. ducting Investigation revealed that a section of SCAT hose had collapsed and was restricting airflow to the engine. EUH Palmerston The engines number 4 and 6 main North bearings were found to have failed prematurely due to bearing overload. DZO Waikato The engine seized while the aircraft was on the ground at the loading site. Investigation revealed that the crank case halves had fretted causing the centre main bearing to come loose. CZA Te Kuiti Main bearings
SCAT 16
64
02/2884
DEF
MI
9/09/2002
LW 13683MO3
65
02/3350
DEF
MA 17/09/2002
Crank Case Halves
RL495-54R
66
02/2906
DEF
MI
23/09/2002
The left magneto was found loose Magneto during an Audit Inspection. While looking for an oil leak the Cylinder base 76220 pilot noticed that several cylinder studs base studs were broken. LW 13756
67
02/3352
DEF
MI
15/10/2002
JAL
Waikato
67
03/1336
DEF
MA 8/05/2003
EGW near The aircraft was accelerating for Connecting Whangarei take off when the engine suffered rod cap an internal failure that resulted in a hole being made in the top of the crankcase. The aircraft was then brought to a safe stop on the remaining part of the airstrip.
68
50
03/2482
ACC
MA 28/08/2003
DZM Rewarewa The Operator reported that the aircraft lost power after takeoff and the pilot made an emergency landing into a paddock. The right outer wing then hit a sheep which caused damage. DUJ Bideford Operator reported that on takeoff, Turbine the engine failed. The pilot Blades gas applied the brakes, but overran generator the airstip and went through a fence and came to rest in a bush.
69
03/3011
ACC
CR
23/10/2003
70
03/3341 03/3922
DEF DEF
MA 20/11/2003 MI 3/12/2003
PIC reports low manifold pressure induction air filter and high fuel flow DZN Palmerston The engineer reported excessive Bearings North bearing wear, posibly due to lubrication breakdown resulting from operation of the engine in the upper range of temperature limits. EUC Napier DZM Masterton Pilot reported smelling oil in-flight Crankcase during agricultural operations. On inspection it was found the studs had failed on a cylinder allowing it to shift from the crankcase.
6 L836-54 6
71 72
03/3638
DEF
MA 3/12/2003
L-835-54A
73
51
03/3802
DEF
MI
17/12/2003
BXZ
Farm Strip The pilot reported an engine oil Cylinder Base 38.13 leak . An inspection found the top Studs and rear nut off, the bottom through- Bolts bolt broken, top middle studs broken, lower two middle studs pulled out of the case and foward stud broken. The cylinder was removed and inspected; helic oil inserts and replacement throughbolts were fitted; the oill filter was checked and no metal found; the engine was ground run and performed satisfactorily. It was reported that the camshaft Gear Bolts gear bolts were found too soft and yeilding before torques value. A similar defect was found on another Hawker Pacific batch number in 2002. The engine filter was found to contain metal. The engine was removed and stripped. It was reported that the pilot found an oil leak coming from the number 5 cylinder. It was reported that the aircraft's fuel line was found cracked and leaking. A new CFO-100-1 oil filter and seals were installed on the engine during a routine inspection. On starting the engine oil was pumped out of the engine from the oil filter housing and adaptor. Con Rod Bearings Cylinder STD1791 Bolt
L852-54
73
04/1629
DEF
MA 29/01/2004
BHK Unknown
74
04/588
DEF
MI
15/02/2004
BHK Taieri
74309
75
04/3119
DEF
MI
25/08/2004
JAL
Te Kuiti
76
05/673
DEF
MI
2/03/2005
EUH Wanganui
Fuel Line
77
05/1303
DEF
MI
17/04/2005
CRY
Hamilton
Oil Filter CFO-203 Housing Seal
78
52
05/2115
DEF
MA 20/06/2005
SFL
Port Waikato
A loud clonking noise was heard coming from the engine in flight.
Crank shaft
LW-10842- 598H 85
79
05/2336
DEF
MA 22/07/2005
EMY Mount Palm
The pilot reported that the aircraft Auxiliary Air was positioned on a medium steep Valve. strip for take off after completing a job. The brakes were released and the throttle was opened. The engine suddenly died and the aircraft came to rest 15 metres from the end of the run way. AG Aviation Ltd reported that engine began cutting out. Made a precautionary landing on closest airstrip. Fuel hose leaking under pressure. Had exhausted fuel tanks. The pilot was testing newly installed spray gear and flying low past a hangar to allow an engineer to view the spray pattern. the pilot's preoccupation with the spray controls resulted in the aircraft colliding with a hangar, damaging the undercarriage and tailplane. 2080
80
07/1727
INC
MI
11/05/2007
EGT
Hawkes Bay
80
70/6
ACC
MA 21/01/1970
CBG KAITAIA
53
70/7
ACC
MA 23/01/1970
BHV KAIPARA FLTS AD
Forward visibility was reduced by rain on the windscreen. the pilot rounded out too high and the aircraft landed heavily on one side of the strip, causing the right undercarriage leg to separate. the aircraft then skidded along the strip, incurring damage to both mainplanes and rear bulkhead.
2086
70/12
ACC
MA 3/02/1970
BHJ
70/14
ACC
MA 4/02/1970
CLA
A loading vehicle struck the left elevator when backing away after filling the aircraft. the loader continued to back, twisting the aircraft's elevator and badly damaging the rear fuselage assembly HEREKINO During a topdressing run, the aircraft collided with power wires of which the pilot was aware but believed he had enough height to clear. collision partially jammed the elevators and the pilot was forced to land in a restricted area, the aircraft being further damaged when its left wing struck a tree. A deer emerged from tall cover on the edge of the airstrip and collided with the aircraft which had just landed. the pilot was unable to take safe avoiding action
KAITIEKE
2096
2088
70/19
ACC
MA 13/02/1970
BVU SOUTH HEAD
2144
54
70/23
ACC
MA 15/02/1970
COA TUATAPERE When the pilot flew overhead, the spraying area was covered by fog and a landing was made in a paddock. owing to wet grass, braking was ineffective and the pilot was unable to stop the aircraft before it struck a fence. CDW KIWITAHI Due to a faulty spray pressure gauge, the pilot's attention was diverted to the spray boom. the nose wheel struck rising ground and the forward part of the fuselage was damaged. The aircraft struck power wires which were difficult to see against a background of bush and scrub.
2145
70/29
ACC
MA 26/02/1970
2146
70/43
ACC
MA 14/04/1970
CDW HUNTLY
2149
70/47
ACC
MA 21/04/1970
BVU MANGAPE While the aircraft was stationary HI in the loading area, it was struck heavily by the loading vehicle. substantial damage to the right flap and fuselage resulted. CMZ WHANGAR While flying to an operational area URU at sowing height, the aircraft struck a power wire, presence of which, the pilot was unaware, strung between the mainland and an island CKB ROTOKAKA The loader driver omitted to raise HI the loader bucket before moving toward the aircraft. the collision caused substantial damage to the fuselage.
2148
70/52
ACC
MA 7/05/1970
2140
70/58
ACC
MA 10/06/1970
2142
10
55
70/70
ACC
MA 4/08/1970
BHY
WAIMAHA While a loader vehicle was backing KA away from the aircraft, one of its wheels sank in a depression and the loading bucket struck the top of the fuselage. TAHORA During a landing, the rear fuselage struck the ground and was damaged. An inexperienced loader driver inadvertently lowered the bucket onto the top of the aircraft.
2153
11
70/73
ACC
MA 11/08/1970
CCT
2160
12
70/74
ACC
MA 11/08/1970
BXZ
FERNHILL
2156
13
70/100
ACC
MA 23/11/1970
CTH
NR Aircraft had been topdressing area MOSSBURN nr lake te anau for most of day. at approx 1730 hours the pilot, with loader driver as pax, took off for winton, 47 m sse, where a start was to have been made on another job. the aircraft failed to reach destination and was located early next day in steep tussock country 1900 ft asl, 8 m from departure point. both occupants killed. the accident was caused by loss of control incurred during a very steep turn made at a height which precluded recovery. TANGOIO Aircraft collided with a power wire at the end of a sowing run. the fin was almost completely severed but the pilot maintained control and diverted to napier to make a landing without further damage.
2174
13
71/28
ACC
MA 7/03/1971
CBE
71-026
14
56
71/52
ACC
MA 14/05/1971
COB MIMIWHA While taking off from a razor-back NGATA BY strip in a cross wind the aircraft was forced by a sudden updraught under the right wing into an almost vertical bank. loss of control resulted and could not be regained before the aircraft struck a hillside. CBE ARGYLE EAST While attempting his first landing on this strip the pilot misjudged his approach and allowed the aircraft to sink below strip level. the resulting impact, 12 inches below the level of the end of the strip, bent the main landing gear rearwards and caused damage to the flaps. On completion of a ferry flight the pilot landed uphill on a 350 yard airstrip with a slight tail-wind component. the strip was wet and the aircraft could not be stopped before it collided with a fence at the top of the strip.
71-050
15
71/53
ACC
MA 18/05/1971
71-052
16
71/54
ACC
MA 18/05/1971
BXQ TAKAPAU
71-053
17
71/58
ACC
MA 3/06/1971
CRP
HALCOMBE During positioning for a spraying run the aircraft encountered an area of unexpected turbulence which caused it to depart from its intended flight path and to collide with a tree from which there would, at best, have been minimal separation.
71-057
17
57
71/80
ACC
MA 29/08/1971
BVU MANGAITI During an approach to a landing under marginal conditions for the particular airstrip, wind eddies in the lee of tall trees bordering the strip caused the aircraft to collide with one of these trees 40 ft above ground level. CPY NR On arrival at an airstrip to DANNEVIR commence a day's operation an KE area of sink was encountered on finals. corrective action failed to prevent an undershoot and both main undercarriage legs were dislodged when they struck the lip of the strip. HILLEND During the third of a series of spray runs in a gorse-covered gully the aircraft collided with a power wire. control was maintained and an emergency landing made. During a ferry flight to base rapid formation of fog forced the pilot to attempt a landing on difficult terrain. a successful touchdown was made but the aircraft collided with a fence during the landing roll.
71-080
18
72/16
ACC
MA 24/01/1972
72-113
19
72/21
ACC
MA 11/02/1972
BXT
72-019
20
72/27
ACC
MA 22/02/1972
BXQ KAITAIA
72-024
21
58
72/35
ACC
MA 3/03/1972
BVA TE KUITI AD The aircraft which was picketed on the airfield was unlawfully converted to his own use by a farmer's son. it became airborne and had reached about 100 ft agl when it stalled and nose-dived into the ground. it is believed that the occupant had had no previous flight instruction. CFK TE AKAU On completion of a ferry flight the pilot attempted a landing on an exposed airstrip in a strong gusty crosswind. at roundout a gust of wind under the starboard wing rolled the aircraft violently onto its side. the left wing hit the strip and the outer wing panel separated. the aircraft then cartwheeled off the airstrip.
72-029
22
72/45
ACC
MA 12/04/1972
72-042
23
72/68
ACC
MA 27/07/1972
CLI
NR Aerial inspection of area to be WANGANU sprayed made and no obstructions I observed. contour of land meant that spraying runs had to be made directly toward a low sun. towards end of first spray run, aircraft entered area of shadow and pilot noticed a solitary pine tree ahead which he could not avoid. a wing collided with tree but aircraft remained controllable and was flown back to base.
72-067
24
59
72/71
ACC
MA 31/07/1972
CZC
MAHURAN After completing an inspection of GI an area to be topdressed the pilot flew down a large gully. flying under a string of power wires crossing the gully the aircraft collided with another string of wires tied to the base of a pole. the pilot knew of the existence of those wires but believed they were further down the gully. NR FAIRLIE Loss of control occurred (precipitated by circumstances undetermined but in which the consequences of a coronary occlusion cannot be excluded) while the aircraft was in a steeply banked attitude close to the ground.
72-070
25
72/80
ACC
MA 30/08/1972
CFQ
72-077
26
72/116
ACC
MA 27/11/1972
73/32
ACC
MA 5/02/1973
CQB MANGARA While the aircraft was turning to TA RIVER line up with the airstrip the stabilator struck a reversing loading vehicle. BIH PIAKOITI The accident resulted from loss of RIVER control at a low altitude. no evidence was obtained to suggest or show that this was due to any mechanical cause. physical incapacitation of the pilot before impact is regarded as the probable cause of the accident.
72-122
27
73-023
28
60
73/60
ACC
MA 8/04/1973
BHJ
MAKURI
Operating in marginal weather conditions the aircraft encountered a gust just short of the threshold which caused the port wing to drop and the port undercarriage leg to be torn off when the wheel impacted against the runway lip.
73-050
29
73/124
ACC
MA 14/10/1973
BWV NR The pilot landed too far in on a MASTERTO hillside strip. lush growth reduced N braking effectiveness. a ground loop was initiated but one wheel hit an obstruction and broke off. the aircraft slewed into a fence. DPF OTOKO On arrival at a short steep strip the aircraft landed too far in. a groundloop was initiated to avoid another aircraft parked on the strip and the aircraft overran the edge of the strip.
73-123
30
74/14
ACC
MA 28/01/1974
74-012
31
74/17
ACC
MA 1/02/1974
CMK NGAMATA Unable to position the loader POURI bucket directly over the hopper mouth the driver backed his vehicle away to make another approach. the pilot, believing the aircraft had been loaded and that the loader was clear, applied power to taxi and the aircraft fin struck the loader bucket.
74-060
32
61
74/21
ACC
MA 12/02/1974
CMK WHANGAM A precautionary landing was being OMONA made on a farm strip due to failing light but the brakes were ineffective in slowing the aircraft on wet grass and during an attempted groundloop the aircraft slid over a 20 ft bank. BVB PUKEKOHE During a low level run made over EAST an airstrip to influence grazing cattle to move away from the landing area, the aircraft struck one of the animals and afterwards collided with a building, an outer wing panel being dislodged. it then dived into the ground. MAPIU On short finals for a hillside airstrip landing, low morning sun restricted the pilot's view ahead. the aircraft touched down well into the strip and could not be stopped before it collided with a loading bin WAIOTAPU During a familiarisation flight over an area to be sown the port wing of the aircraft collided with and severed 33,000 volt high tension cables. although damaged the aircraft remained controllable and was flown back to the strip.
74-074
33
74/38
ACC
MA 24/03/1974
74-034
34
74/45
ACC
MA 31/03/1974
DBZ
74-039
35
74/66
ACC
MA 20/05/1974
BXS
74-064
36
62
74/68
ACC
MA 22/05/1974
BXQ NR KAITAIA Deteriorating weather halted AD topdressing operations and pilot attempted to return to base. landings were made on several intermediate airstrips because of the weather. when he was landing on 3rd such airstrip cattle ran out of scrub and pilot landed beyond them. there was no effective braking on flat waterlogged strip and aircraft skidded into a fence. DJD TARINGAM The port wheel struck the lip of OTU the strip during an approach and as a result the leg folded rearward during the roll. NR The pilot, comparatively RUATORIA inexperienced in agricultural flying operations, misjudged the turning radius of his aircraft which, during a steep turn, collided with a hillside MAUNGATI While the pilot was flushing out the spray gear and flying above a gorse fence the aircraft collided with power lines strung in a 34chain span across a broad valley. he had not been informed of their presence nor had he previously noticed them.
74-068
37
74/78
ACC
MA 28/06/1974
74-076
38
74/112
ACC
MA 1/10/1974
CZC
74-107
39
74/142
ACC
MA 17/12/1974
DSL
74-139
40
74/144
ACC
MA 20/12/1974
BWV NR The aircraft undershot on PONGORO approach and the wheels struck a A bank on the threshold. the wheels separated and the aircraft came to rest on the strip.
74-141
41
63
75/11
ACC
MA 11/01/1975
BHJ
75/17
ACC
MA 27/01/1975
BIT
PONGAROA During an overshoot to avoid the animal, the aircraft struck a lamb which had run across the landing path. RAETIHI Owing to a low sun directly ahead the pilot chose to land on the reciprocal vector in calm conditions. trees in line with the approach path reduced the effective strip length and this, coupled with poor braking effect on wet grass, allowed insufficient ground run to bring the aircraft to rest normally. MOKAUITI Several 'clean-up' sowing runs were made up the lee side of a hill. on the third run the aircraft was unable to clear the top of the hill and while it was turning away from it the outer wing panel collided with a tree. the aircraft remained controllable and was flown back to the strip. MATAIKON During the takeoff run the pilot A observed sheep crossing the strip. he closed the throttle and turned the aircraft towards rising ground on the right side of the strip but as the nose wheel ran up the slope the tail was brought into contact with the ground.
75-007
42
75-014
43
75/122
ACC
MA 16/11/1975
CYN
75-118
44
76/57
ACC
MA 14/04/1976
DJY
76-051
45
64
76/64
ACC
MA 14/05/1976
DMT TE AKAU
After landing on the strip to commence operations the aircraft was travelling too fast when an attempt was made to turn around at the end of the strip. control was lost on frosty ground and the aircraft slid into a fence. When the aircraft was landing on a short steeply sloping strip prior to commencement of operations, a strong downdraught was encountered on short finals. the aircraft landed heavily on the lip of the strip and an undercarriage leg collapsed. While turning on to a sowing run the pilot mistook a set of power wires for another he had crossed previously. on descending to sow the aircraft collided with wires, a portion of the fin and rudder separated, but the aircraft landed without further incident. During a landing on a greasy strip with a cross/tail wind, a gust caused loss of directional control. the aircraft veered off the strip and the nose leg ran over a 2-3 ft bank and collapsed.
76-065
46
76/71
ACC
MA 28/05/1976
CWQ POLLOK
76-067
47
76/89
ACC
MA 2/08/1976
BXQ WAINUI
76-088
48
76/108
ACC
MA 17/09/1976
CBG RUAPUKE
76-104
49
65
77/30
ACC
MA 14/02/1977
CLI
ARIA
Just prior to touchdown on a shaded strip the pilot found the area unsuitable while avoiding the area he failed to maintain his landing direction and the aircraft's right outer wing section struck the loading vehicle. On returning to base for the fourth time during the day's operations, the pilot noticed that all sheep were gathered on one side of the strip. as the aircraft touched down one sheep ran clear of the others and was struck by the left main wheel of the aircraft.
77-029
50
77/67
ACC
MA 29/04/1977
CDZ
KAIPARA FLTS AD
77-070
51
77/72
ACC
MA 24/05/1977
CZB
NR The pilot was distracted by talking WAIKANAE to the farmer during loading. he commenced taxiing before loading was complete and the elevator struck the loading vehicle. After touchdown braking proved to be ineffective on the wet grass surface and the aircraft slewed sideways over a bank beyond the loading bay.
77-075
52
77/144
ACC
MA 22/12/1977
DBG NR SEDDON
77-150
53
66
77/145
ACC
MA 23/12/1977
DUJ
MAURICEVI The pilot who had been operating LLE from the airstrip during the day, following his usual landing approach pattern, failing to realise that the tailwind component had increased to some 20 knots. owing to previous heavy rain, braking action was ineffective on the wet grass surface and the aircraft overran the end of the strip, sustaining substantial damage. TAIHAPE During an early morning flight the aircraft collided with two paradise ducks, one of which penetrated the front windscreen.
77-153
54
78/39
ACC
MA 7/03/1978
CZA
78-044
55
78/73
ACC
MA 14/05/1978
DZM WESTMERE When the aircraft was landing on a wet airstrip, the brakes locked as the pilot applied light braking and the aircraft slid into a fence. CWQ PAUA The wind increased considerably while the aircraft was away spraying and a quartering tail wind was blowing when it landed back on the wet and greasy strip. towards the later part of the landing roll the pilot lost directional control of the aircraft and it commenced to groundloop. one wing struck a fence.
78-072
56
78/93
ACC
MA 20/07/1978
78-094
57
67
78/106
ACC
MA 21/08/1978
DDA NR OWAKA During a grass seeding operation the aircraft struck a tree at the end of a sowing run. the complete left wing separated from the aircraft which then rolled and dived into the ground. the aircraft burnt out. EGU MAUNGAT The aircraft was landed in a gusty APERE tailwind. the airspeed was higher than normal and the aircraft touched down well beyond the threshold of the airstrip. the braking action on the wet grass was poor and the aircraft could not be stopped before it collided head-on with the loading vehicle which the passenger was planning to drive to another area. CAY HIKURANGI The aircraft was landing with a tailwind and touched down well up the strip. as the pilot considered the aircraft could not be stopped in the remaining distance, he attempted to ground loop the aircraft on the loading area, but the aircraft's right wing collided with a bank.
78-105
58
78/108
ACC
MA 23/08/1978
78-107
59
78/142
ACC
MA 1/11/1978
78-140
60
68
78/144
ACC
MA 8/11/1978
BHL
GLADSMUI In course of topdressing operation R STN company pilot agreed to loader driver's request to complete days sowing. loader driver a commercial pilot with a type rating for aircraft but unauthorised by company to fly aircraft. during a turn between sowing runs, across face of sloping paddock pilot lost control of aircraft which struck ground heavily and destroyed on impact. KAKATAHI Aircraft was one of two engaged in a topdressing operation. pilot of second aircraft was returning to sowing area when he saw other aircraft heading away into a blind valley. shortly afterwards it attempted a steep climbing turn and disappeared from view. when pilot of second aircraft arrived over the area the wreckage was on fire. While sowing superphosphate along a road boundary the aircraft collided with an electric power conductor. the wire broke and whipped across the windscreen. the conductor was suspended some 250 feet agl.
78-143
61
78/147
ACC
MA 17/11/1978
DZL
78-145
62
79/19
ACC
MA 30/01/1979
EHX
KIRIKAU
79-026
63
69
79/24
ACC
MA 4/02/1979
CZA
SILVERHOP The pilot decided to make an E unscheduled landing on a company airstrip due to unsuitable weather during a ferry flight. the surface of the strip was wet and the pilot lost directional control of the aircraft during landing. he was unable to prevent the aircraft from colliding with one of a line of concrete power poles running parallel to the strip.
79-024
64
79/59
ACC
MA 29/03/1979
BXQ WAIOTAHI A tailwind necessitated taxiing to the far end of the strip and taking off back towards the loading area. starting work after a frustrating refuel the pilot lost his concentration and attempted to takeoff downwind. when he realised his mistake the aircraft could not be stopped in time and it ran down a bank into some cattle yards. CAY NR The aircraft struck a fence while PAPARATA taking off on an agricultural sortie and the resultant damage caused it to roll into an inverted attitude and dive into the ground. MAHOENUI A very low approach to a ridge airstrip was made because of low stratus cloud which covered the top end of the strip. the pilot landed parallel to the edge of the strip but was unable to follow the curved strip and ran off the side.
79-057
65
79/61
ACC
MA 9/04/1979
79-060
66
79/79
ACC
MA 27/05/1979
DUI
79-077
67
70
79/85
ACC
MA 13/06/1979
CPN HOROHOR Whilst on a topdressing sortie the O aircraft struck a transmission power line and crashed inverted into pokaitu stream. CZA NR The pilot was aware of the power EKETAHUN lines across the area being A topdressed. however the aircraft struck and severed the conductors when the pilot became preoccupied with sowing around some trees MANGATA While making a procedure turn RERE VLY the aircraft assumed a steep nose down attitude and impacted heavily on the terrain. the pilot was fatally injured and the aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and fire. STIRLING After touchdown in crosswind conditions on a wet and greasy strip the pilot lost directional control of the aircraft which slid sideways into a gully. Pilot took property owner's daughter on survey flight to point out boundary of area to be topdressed. after flight pilot told her to leave aircraft by stepping over trailing edge of wing. however after leaving seat and climbing onto wing she hesitated briefly then jumped over leading edge of wing walked into path of rotating propeller: received serious injuries and died later
79-083
68
79/119
ACC
MA 6/10/1979
79-123
69
79/145
ACC
MA 4/12/1979
CRX
79-143
70
80/10
ACC
MA 16/01/1980
EGI
80-010
71
80/12
ACC
MA 26/01/1980
EMC NR TAIHAPE
80-012
72
71
80/24
ACC
MA 1/02/1980
CPY
NR TEMUKA
Aircraft collided with a tree while in a turn to the left. fuselage structure forward of cockpit was demolished and seriously injured pilot was freed from aircraft with assistance of local emergency services. no fire. accident survivable only because pilot was wearing a full safety harness and crash helmet.
80-022
73
80/53
ACC
MA 8/04/1980
CLO
80/80
ACC
MA 3/07/1980
80/85
ACC
MA 17/07/1980
Due to sun glare the aircraft landed some 30 degrees off the airstrip heading and collided with a bank. CMM BANKS The aircraft collided with the PENINSULA loading vehicle as the pilot commenced taxiing. CRP NR During a ferry flight from kaitaia to KAIKOHE whangarei the aircraft made several low runs over the pilot's parents' property. at the completion of a turn made after a run up the side of a hill the aircraft disappeared from sight behind a ridge. a short while later the occupants of a passing helicopter noticed the aircraft wreckage in steep bush covered terrain. EMV MORRINSVI After touching down the pilot was LLE unable to prevent the aircraft overrunning the runway.
PAPONGA
80-051
74
80-079
75
80-082
76
80/109
ACC
MA 8/10/1980
80-107
77
72
81/3
ACC
MA 9/01/1981
DJE
NR Aircraft operating from a 450 m MANGAMA grass airstrip on a topdressing HU operation in calm conditions. aircraft touched down on the wet grass but was travelling too fast for the calm conditions and poor braking action. as a result it skidded into a superphosphate bin located at the end of the airstrip. TINUI During the takeoff roll the aircraft struck a sheep but became airborne safely with a damaged stabiliser. after a low pass during which the damage was described by the loader driver the pilot landed the aircraft normally.
81-003
78
81/6
ACC
MA 14/01/1981
EGS
81-006
79
81/21
ACC
MA 17/02/1981
DLV
WHANGAE During a right turn, to position the HU RVR aircraft near the loading vehicle after landing, the pilot misjudged the aircraft's distance from a fence strainer post. the outer portion of the left wing was damaged in the collision. OTANGIWA The aircraft collided with a high I tension power conductor during a topdressing sortie. the collision caused the aircraft to dive into the ground out of control. the pilot received fatal injuries in the accident.
81-019
80
81/30
ACC
MA 1/03/1981
DUI
81-028
81
73
81/59
ACC
MA 29/05/1981
CBE
NR RAGLAN The aircraft touched down too far along the wet airstrip and could not be stopped before it passed its normal loading position. while the pilot was turning it to avoid the loading vehicle, the aircraft passed over a small retaining wall which tore off the hopper box and tipped the aircraft onto its right wing tip.
81-058
82
81/90
ACC
MA 4/11/1981
DHY NR While on a survey flight the pilot CAMBRIDG dived the aircraft to attract the E attention of another farmer client who was cultivating a paddock on the valley floor. during the descent the aircraft struck 3 copper power conductors which the pilot had not sighted against the brown earth background. EMA POOLBURN While landing, still banked to the right, the aircraft's right wing hit a protruding rock off the side of the strip. EMR ONEWHER After bringing the aircraft to a stop O the pilot decided to taxi around to refuel. the aircraft's tail struck the loader vehicle which had moved in without his being aware of it.
81-119
83
82/45
ACC
MA 23/04/1982
82-043
84
82/59
ACC
MA 18/06/1982
82-051
85
74
82/63
ACC
MA 28/06/1982
BIO
PUKEATUA At the end of a sowing run the aircraft entered a climb and rolled into a reversal turn to the right. part way through the turn the aircraft was observed to descend steeply and it struck a power pole before impacting heavily in an adjacent paddock. the pilot was seriously in the accident and died in hospital the next day. WHITEMAN While the aircraft was turning in a S VLLY valley between sowing runs it struck a ridge and a fence then cartwheeled and dived into the ground. the pilot was fatally injured in the accident. NR The pilot initiated a climb from the MANGAMI end of a sowing run and then NGI commenced a turn to the right. during this manoeuvre the aircraft entered a steep dive and collided with the terrain . While taxiing from the loading bin the aircraft commenced sliding sideways down the slippery clay surface of the airstrip. the pilot shut down the engine and the aircraft slid down a bank and came to rest in contact with a fence. The aircraft departed in low ceiling conditions and collided with the terrain 2km from the aerodrome.
82-064
86
82/116
ACC
MA 8/12/1982
BPZ
82-115
87
83/24
ACC
MA 28/02/1983
CLI
83-025
88
83/54
ACC
MA 2/06/1983
EGH NR RAWENE
83-054
89
84/35
ACC
MA 20/03/1984
EMI
NR WAIMATE AD
84-035
90
75
84/36
ACC
MA 21/03/1984
JAB
WAIPUKUR During a cross-wind takeoff the AU AD pilot allowed the left wing to drop and collide with the runway as the aircraft lifted off. the ensuing circuit and landing was completed uneventfully. The pilot misjudged his approach and the aircraft touched down, too far up the strip at an excessive speed. in an attempt to retrieve the situation the pilot applied full power but the aircraft became airborne too late and collided with the terrain. During takeoff the left wing of the aircraft struck several cattle which had wandered onto the airstrip but were not visible from the takeoff point. the aircraft remained controllable and was flown on to balclutha. While positioning for a spray run the aircraft was rolled inverted by turbulence. the pilot recovered the aircraft to a level attitude but was unable to prevent it squashing into bush on the valley floor
84-037
91
84/41
ACC
MA 9/04/1984
DUG PURUA
84-042
92
84/84
ACC
MA 16/08/1984
DZF
HILLEND
84-085
93
84/88
ACC
MA 14/09/1984
EUE
TE MIRO
84-091
94
76
84/100
ACC
MA 27/10/1984
DJF
NR HOKITIKA AD
During an attempted closely sequenced descent of four parachutists the first jumpers reserve chute was inadvertently released. he was pulled into the tailplane and the aircraft went out of control. the parachutists landed safely but the pilot who was not wearing a parachute was killed in the ground impact. After loading the aircraft by hand, the pilot walked to the edge of the strip to clean his hands. the aircraft commenced to move across the loading area and could not be stopped. it rolled off the side of the strip and down a steep bank. the reason for the park brake's release was not determined. During a turn at the end of a sowing run the left wing tip collided with a tree. The aircraft's tailplane struck the loader vehicle while the pilot was lining the aircraft up for takeoff. During a spray run, the tip of the aircraft's spray boom caught in an electric fence feeder wire. several aircraft components received substantial damage when the wire separated.
84-106
95
86/49
ACC
MA 10/06/1986
DSL
NR KAIKOHE
86-050
96
87/78
ACC
MA 17/08/1987
DLV
87/101
ACC
MA 5/11/1987
CKA
NR MASTERTO N OTOROHA NGA
87-084
97
87-110
98
87/102
ACC
MA 16/11/1987
DMT TIRAU
87-111
99
77
87/115
ACC
MA 15/12/1987
CWQ NR WAIRAKEI
The trainee pilot was sowing over a small prominent hill. on the last run he made a steep turn to avoid the hill but the lower wing struck the ground. the aircraft cartwheeled and rolled down the hill.
87-125
100
88/50
ACC
MA 20/07/1988
88/54
ACC
MA 2/08/1988
CMK WAITANGI The pilot lost directional control of RUA the aircraft after landing downwind on a wet, uphill strip. it slid off the strip into an adjacent building. CLO TE AKAU During a spray run up a hillside in misty rain, the right wingtip struck a fencepost dislodging the aileron. while rolling out of control, the aircraft passed through a fence which arrested its forward speed, allowing it to slide down a hill to a halt. EGW URITI VALLEY The aircraft struck a wire which ran from a hill top tv aerial to a house in a nearby valley. The air was calm on the approach but a strong gust was encountered as the aircraft crossed the threshold. the pilot attempted a go-around immediately but the aircraft's angle of climb was insufficient for it to clear a row of trees. after the resulting collision the aircraft remained flyable but the limited control available dictated an immediate forced landing.
88-051
101
88-055
102
88/75
ACC
MA 27/10/1988
88-077
103
89/41
ACC
MA 14/04/1989
CTS
MOTEA
89-044
104
78
89/80
ACC
MA 6/10/1989
DIL
ALBURY
As the loader backed away from the loaded aircraft it stalled. the pilot failed to notice the vehicle was not clear of his aircraft and commenced takeoff, causing the tailplane to strike the vehicle. When the aircraft 'fish tailed' during the landing roll the pilot attempted a go around. the left wing collided with a gorse bush yawing the aircraft and causing it to descend down the side of a ridge into thick gorse.
89-082
105
90/101
ACC
MA 7/08/1990
BII
PEEL FOREST
90-075
106
91/145
ACC
MA 19/04/1991
BDS
nr Landing, hit loader, outer wing Ruatahuna damage Collided with hill 7W Turangi EYREWELL A/C SPRAYING POISON. HIT SOME WIRES. A/C ON GORUND TAXYING UP TO HOUSE. J SCOTT DAGNAM FARM DONCASTER RD OXFORD TE HOE ON APPROACH DOG OBSERVED RUNNING DOWN MIDDLE OF STRIP. FULL POWER APPLIED AND A TUNE TO LEFT INITATED. GUSTY CONDITION W/TIP PASSED THRU WIRE OF FENCE Hit loader vehicle, damage to tailplane Wet slippery strip, hit vehicle Collided with terrain, cause unknown 93-012
107
91/790 92/2055
ACC INC
MA 20/10/1991 MA 12/07/1992
EHX BII
7 7
108 109
92/3812
INC
MA 2/11/1992
BXZ
110
93/1420 93/2836 93/4359
ACC ACC ACC
MA 18/03/1993 MA 24/06/1993 CR 28/09/1993
EMT Kina Rd 5 SW Blenheim BHU 1 SE Tauwhare BHJ
7 7 7
111 112 113
79
93/5997
INC
MI
9/12/1993
CML HINUERA
DURING SHALLOW TURN CLIPPED A STRAINER POST WITH PORT OUTER WING TIP. DAMAGING LOWER OUTER AILERON SKIN.
114
94/744 94/2369 94/3123 94/3485 95/262
ACC ACC ACC ACC ACC
MI MI MI MI CR
1/03/1994 6/05/1994 27/07/1994 25/08/1994 9/02/1995
CMZ nr Hastings Landing, overran airstrip BHK Stratford Ad CBA Waihi Bch DHE Otutira BIF NIHANGA RD, MANGAKIN On landing, hit hedge After landing, hit utility vehicle at end of strip Collision with loader WIRE STRIKE CAUSING A CRASH
7 7 7 7 7
115 116 117 118 119
95/560
ACC
CR
5/03/1995
95/2448
ACC
CR
30/08/1995
96/11
ACC
CR
2/01/1996
EGO NGAPURU WHILE LANDING AT A FARM AIRSTRIP THE FU24-950 WAS CAUGHT BY A WIND GUST FROM THE REAR CAUSING THE PILOT TO LOOSE CONTROL. CMY 454 An aircraft was landing empty, RANGANUI when it was caught by gust of BLOCK R cross wind and blown off side of the strip down a bank. DZM Masterton Narrow ridge top airstrip, Waimanu Farm. Landing, reasonably strong cross wind which swept up bank under starboard wing. Rolled acft almost onto port wing. Broke dihedral 10 inches outside attachment bracket, broke wing almost in half, broke rear attachme nt point. EGM 4 S Piopio A top dressing aircraft nose impacted then cart wheeled.
120
121
122
96/522
ACC
CR
29/02/1996
123
80
96/831
ACC
MA 20/03/1996
EMX Otaua
Aircraft landed well into the strip and could not stop using normal braking. Attempted ground loop and shut engine down. Aircraft came to rest with tail down hill.
124
96/1640
INC
MA 5/04/1996
96/1790
INC
MI
7/07/1996
EGQ RAI VALLEY Acft rolled off strip whilst unattended -substantial damage. Parking brake not properly applied. JAL HAMILTON ZK-JAL 1935/1940 overdue action commenced 15 mins after aircraft should have reported vacating the zone. Contact established 2 mins later by another aircraft and AA supervisor advised. Cause - lapse of memory by experienced pilot. JAA WHAREHIN On take off acft started slewing to E left out of pilots control. Reduced power but acft continued through down hill fence. 96-016
125
126
96/2110
ACC
MA 4/08/1996
127
96/2236
ACC
CR
23/08/1996
EGQ 10 NM SW While on a routine sowing run, 16 Motueka km south-west of Motueka, the left wing-tip of the aircraft struck a lone pine tree damaging the left aileron. Control difficulties resulted and the aircraft collided with the face of a steep ridge. The aircraft was des troyed and the pilot lost his life in the accident. DDW 7 S Clinton Coming in to on land top-dressing strip. Aircraft landed off centre line and hit an earth bank.
128
97/462
ACC
MA 14/02/1997
129
81
97/3164
ACC
CR
20/10/1997
DZC
Neudorf
Returning to the airstrip after spreading a load the engine stopped due to the aircraft running out of fuel. When the engine stopped I landed straight ahead on a flat paddock. There was a young bull in the paddock and I was unable to avoid him. The fieldw as quite short and the longest distance I could get to stop in was the same path the bull took. I collided with the animal in a semi ground loop and the aircraft stopped. Damaged to the propeller was sustained.
130
97/3767
ACC
MA 12/12/1997
CQB Henley
98/115
ACC
MA 27/01/1998
JAB
On take off in gusty conditions the wing dropped and contacted the ground. As the aircraft was airborne the flight continued uneventfully to Dunedin aerodrome 14 SE The pilot elected to land on his Waipukura home strip with a 10 knot u tailwind. On short final the aircraft lost height; the starboard undercarriage struck the end of the strip and was torn off.. The pilot elected to go around and land on a more suitable area (paddo ck) about two miles to the east. During the landing the starboard flap was further damaged.
131
132
82
98/2669
ACC
MA 17/09/1998
BOG Lumsden
98/3403
DEF
MI
4/11/1998
EMG GORE AERODRO ME
Sheep ran across landing strip during landing and struck aircraft. tore spreader off and damaged flaps and holed fuselage. Stock often present at this Lumsden base strip but normally cleared by low pass Aircraft ZK-EMG (Fletcher) was parked in front of the fuel pump on Gore airfield unattended. A Cessna-206 came over and parked behind ZK-EMG with its motor still running. While its pilot attempted to move ZK-EMG from the refueling area, the pilot accid entally knocked off the park brake of the Cessna --- thus resulting in the aircraft to move forward and its propeller to chop into the tail section of ZK-EMG.
133
134
99/1313
ACC
MA 8/05/1999
EUH STRATFORD This aircraft was carrying out a landing at a top dressing strip, when the pilot notice piles of road metal/seal near the threshold. The pilot was unable to to avoid the piles of metal and hit them causing damage to right hand wing, flap, and undercarria ge.
135
83
00/159
ACC
MA 25/01/2000
JAA
South Kaipara
After the aeroplane had been loaded, the pilot began taxiing for take-off. He had moved about one metre when the left tip of the tailplane struck the loading vehicle, which had moved in towards the aeroplane again unbeknown to the pilot. During loading, the aircraft was struck on the left side by the loading vehicle. The aircraft was sowing lime on a property when it collided with wires in a gully. The impact was taken on the nosewheel, which collapsed back against the fuselage. The pilot flew to a suitable field, shut down the engine and made a forced landing. The loading vehicle was reversing away from the aeroplane after loading, and collided with the outer leading edge of the tailplane. On takeoff the pilot experienced sunstrike the aircraft hit a strainer post near the end of the strip causing minor damage to the tail cone area and underneath the rear fuselage.
136
00/615
ACC
MI
27/02/2000
EGI
Owaka
137
00/532
ACC
MA 2/03/2000
EUF
Motunau
138
00/617
ACC
MA 11/03/2000
EUH Urenui
139
00/945
ACC
MA 26/03/2000
EGU Stratford
140
84
00/4522
ACC
MA 7/11/2000
EUC
Napier
An increased tail wind on landing caused the Fletcher to over run the airstrip and collide with a fence post. The aircraft sustained damage to the propeller, left fuel tank and left outer wing panel.
141
00/4421
ACC
MA 10/12/2000
BOG Five Rivers The aircraft failed to stop before the end of the paddock & skidded sideways into an embankment, which caused the port main leg to collapse, and the propeller to contact the ground. EUC Patoka While starting a take-off roll, the aircraft's right-hand aileron contacted the ground. Pilot aborted the take-off and the damaged aileron was replaced and aircraft returned to Napier for repairs to be completed. ZK-CML landed into wind on a downhill slope airstrip. However the grass was slightly wet and it skidded off the end of the airstrip and over a bank.
142
01/2307
ACC
MI
14/01/2001
143
01/191
ACC
MA 21/01/2001
CML Honikiwi
144
85
01/755
ACC
MA 7/03/2001
DHE Puketutu
The tailwind increased when the aircraft was about 5' above the ground. The pilot elected to continue in the belief that he would be able to stop in time. However, dew and lush grass caused poor braking performance and the aircraft slid about 180 m until the left wing hit a post which turned it 90 degrees and sent it down a small gully. It was substantially damaged. After completing a job, pilot Rear skin & uplifted farmer to fly round and Stringer survey another block to be topdressed. Pilot's intention was to take the farmer and no fertiliser however the loader driver unexpectedly brought the loader to the aircraft, unobserved by the p ilot. When power was applied, the aircraft moved forward and the tailplane came into contact with the loader's cab, causing damage to the RH stabiliser tip, fuselage skin and one stringer. 243034L 7
145
01/3117
INC
MA 5/09/2001
CQB Taieri Mouth
146
86
01/4022
ACC
MA 19/11/2001
CMK Tokoroa
During spray ops, the pilot realised that he had taken longer than anticipated and decided to return to the strip for fuel. On the way back the fuel pressure gauge flickered, so he decided on a precautionary landing on a forestry road. During the landin g the right wing struck a tree stump causing the aircraft to swing off the road and into 4-foot high pine trees. The aeroplane was substantially damaged but the pilot was uninjured.
211
147
01/3886
ACC
MA 20/11/2001
UTE
Kohukohu
The aircraft was approximately a third of the way down the airstrip on its takeoff run when the pilot became aware that the control lock was fitted, but he was unable to remove the device. The rough surface of the airstrip coupled with sufficient nose do wn force to the nose resulted in collapse of the nose gear, and substantial damage to the aircraft.
148
02/2324
INC
MI
20/02/2002
DZG Wairamara During the takeoff, from a strip, ma some sheep ran across the front of the aircraft. In avoiding one sheep the left wing hit another.
149
87
02/1428
INC
MI
16/04/2002
JNX
Ngakuru
During the takeoff roll the nose wheel entered a small depression that compressed the oleo strut and caused a prop strike.
150
02/2050
ACC
MA 18/04/2002
DZM Mauricevill The aircraft landed on the farm e strip a little right of the centre and the propeller and nose wheel hit a bank, which resulted in substantial damage. EOE Thames The Walter Fletcher was spraying a paddock when the right wing struck an outstanding branch, the aircraft then collided with a row of trees, rolled and impacted the ground inverted. The pilot did not survive the accident. The aircraft was witnessed by the loader driver to be in a steep left turn (possibly after conducting a go around from the landing approach). It then collided with rocks on high ground and rolled inverted and slid down a hill seriously injuring the pilot. The aircraft was left running and unattended while the pilot spoke to his engineer. Blustery conditions caused the brakes to let go and before the pilot could intervene it moved forward and hit the hangar. Damage was done to the propeller and the starboar d wing leading edge.
151
02/2248
ACC
CR
24/07/2002
152
02/3469
ACC
CR
30/11/2002
EMO Lindis Valley
153
03/463
INC
MI
8/01/2003
EMN Tairei
154
88
03/741
INC
MA 14/02/2003
CKA
03/843
ACC
MA 24/03/2003
DUJ
Pomerangi The tailskid area of the rear fuselage made contact with the ground while landing on a steep airstrip. Eketahuna The aircraft was engaged in a sowing run when it hit some high tension lines 200' AGL. The pilot was able to fly 25nm with limited aileron control and land safely at Masterton Aerodrome. 10 NE Stratford The aircraft was engaged in its last sortie of the day before returning to Stratford. It was reported overdue and the wreckage found in the early hours of the morning. Both occupants were dead and the aircraft was destroyed. The aircraft was taxiing on the western grass when the left wing struck a sign at holding point 'Whiskey' causing damage to the wing. Operator reports that during an agoperation the fertiliser loader bucket struck the side of the fertiliser concrete bin. Broken pieces of concrete went into the aircraft hopper with the fertiliser. While spreading, a piece of concrete impaled itself in to the wall of a house on the property being sown. No injuries occurred.
Rear Bulkhead
243011 and 243239
155
156
03/976
ACC
CR
4/04/2003
LTF
157
03/1180
INC
MI
15/04/2003
DJE
Nelson
158
03/2941
INC
MI
28/05/2003
BDS
Opotiki
159
89
03/2679
ACC
CR
20/09/2003
BDS
Matawai
HSE-It was reported that the aircraft encountered low cloud and poor visibility during the flight so the pilot decided to turn back. It was during this turn that a high sink rate was encountered which caused the aircraft to collide with a hillside. Both o ccupants were injured. The Fletcher was landing when a 241339L & crosswind gust, from the left, 241538L caused the aircraft to weathercock towards the boundary. The pilot applied full right rudder but the aircraft continued to slide and the underside of left wing to scraped over 4 fence posts c ausing some wing damage to the aircraft.. The pilot landed the aircraft with a tailwind well into the strip the long grass surface of which was affected by dew. The pilot ran the aircraft off the side of the strip to avoid the loading truck causing damage to the tailplane. 278
160
03/2852
ACC
MI
29/09/2003
EMX Ngakuru
161
03/3286
ACC
MI
31/10/2003
EGW Kirikopuni
162
04/2195
INC
MI
3/06/2004
JAA
Paengaroa The pilot flew the aircraft down a gully at a lower level than normal to minimise the drift of the fertiliser being sown. The aircraft struck an electric fence wire, strung between the tops of adjacent ridges. The wire broke limiting the damage to superf icial scratching of the wing.
163
90
04/3919
INC
MI
28/10/2004
EGW Whangarei 5E36 It was reported that ZK-FVD had just landed on runway 06 at Whangarei and had rolled past the appron exit to the turning bay to turn around and backtrack. During this time a ZK-EGW landed on run way 06 while FVD was still on the runway. CRY Waikeke Super Air reported that the aircrafts elevator was clipped by a loading vehicle as it was taxing off. It was reported that the aircraft veered off the runway during landing and crashed into some trees. It was reported that the aircraft initiated the take off before the loader has cleared the area. This resulted in the aircraft's elevator hitting the loader, which caused it to be out of alignment and damaged the port rear fuselage about the elevator hing e point.
164
04/4277
DEF
MI
1/11/2004
165
05/138
ACC
MI
24/01/2005
CLO
Heriot (West Otago)
166
05/665
INC
MI
28/01/2005
EMN Owaka
167
05/963
INC
MI
9/02/2005
EGS
Dannevirke The pilot reported that whilst taxing on a farm airstrip the distance to a fence line was misjudged and collided with a strainer post impacting the right aileron and outer panel
168
91
05/385
INC
MI
14/02/2005
EGP
Owhata
The pilot landed the aircraft too far into the paddock with a quatering tailwind . Wet grass also decreased braking effectiveness and the aircraft overran the runway through a fence and came to rest some 40 metres beyond the landing area. Taupo Unicom reported that the Fletcher flew through the parachute drop zone after being advised by a parachute drop pilot not to join overhead. The aircraft was approaching the loading area just after landing when the pilot attempted to slow the aircraft down by selecting beta but there was no response. Full reverse was then applied and the aircraft stopped successfully before reversing itself d own a slope.
169
05/644
INC
MI
16/02/2005
CRF
Taupo
170
05/689
ACC
MI
5/03/2005
JNX
Rotorua
171
92
05/1353
ACC
MA 5/04/2005
DHD Wanstead Airstrip
While landing on a short airstrip possible wind shear was experienced. The aircraft sank rapidly and full power was applied which had no effect. The aircraft hit the ground heavily resulting in substantial damage. The wind at the time was near maximum c ross wind and swinging. The chief pilot spoke to the pilot and made him aware of the risks in operating in marginal conditions.
172
05/1214
INC
MI
7/04/2005
DZG Hamilton
05/2339
ACC
MA 25/07/2005
The Fletcher Fu 24-950 was taking off and touched the tail skid on the airstrip EGV Manawahe RCCNZ reported that during the landing roll the aircraft went off the edge of the private airstrip during this time the propeller and tail were damaged. EGW Te Kuiti Super Air reported that the aircraft required a tighter turn than normal to miss a large hole which had developed in front of the picket line. Subsequently the right hand wing tip caught the fuel pump and damaged the fibre glass tip. No damage was done to the pump. Whilst landing at Thorpe's Airstrip in a rain shower a gust caused the right wing tip to touch the ground before the pilot could arrest its descent.
173
174
05/4387
INC
MI
18/10/2005
175
05/4386
INC
MI
17/12/2005
EMW Rotorua
176
93
06/464
ACC
MI
17/02/2006
EGS
Pahiatua
The aircraft caught the loader bucket when the take off run was commenced. Substantial damage was sustained to the rear bulkhead, elevator attachments, rear fuselage and elevator. It was reported that the aircraft went through 2 strands of lowered electric fence wire that had not been removed from the airstrip. It was reported that the aircraft's prop struck the ground during manoeuvring on the loading area while lining up for a load of fertiliser. The aircraft taxied into a soft depression on the airstrip loading area after refuelling causing minor damage to the propeller. The cause was attributed to a rough, soft and undulating airstrip loading area. It was reported that there was a sudden gust of wind which pushed the aircraft off the strip during the landing. The left hand aileron hit the fence causing it to skid to the right
177
06/2392
INC
MI
7/05/2006
EGW Waikato
178
06/2393
INC
MI
9/05/2006
EGV Ohiwa Harbour
179
06/4204
INC
MI
31/10/2006
CKA
New Plymouth
180
06/4206
INC
MA 1/11/2006
CRY
Hukrenui
181
94
07/1585
INC
MI
7/04/2007
EUD ROTORUA
The pilot had dropped the fuel card on floor of cockpit. The park brake was applied, and propellor condition lever was taken through to full feather, the pilot had his head down below the seat. While trying to locate the card, the pilot knocked the pr opellor condition lever back to flight idle, causing aircraft to taxi forward 5 metres in an arc due to one wheel brake not holding. The right hand wing leading edge contacted a metal ladder causing minor damage.
182
07/1191
ACC
MA 16/04/2007
JNX
Te Poi
The pilot was using the airstrip for the first time. On landing he misjudged the line of the airstrip and landed in a depression towards the side of the airstrip. This resulted in the spreader contacting the ground and being torn off causing damage to th e fuselage, left flap and elevator. Super Air reported that the aircraft hit a sheep during the takeoff. Super Air reported that the aircraft expereinced a heavy landing which dislodged the spreader attachment. Super Aid Ltd reported pilot pulls away from loader truck too quickly striking elevator on truck guard.
183
07/2254
DEF
MI
12/06/2007
EGV New Zealand EGW New Zealand
184
07/2255
INC
MI
20/06/2007
185
08/836
INC
MI
10/01/2008 JAA
Papamoa
7 186
95
08/834
INC
MI
21/02/2008 JAA
Te Puke
08/2101
INC
MI
24/04/2008 DZO Kairangi
Super Aid Ltd reported pilot taxiied into hole off side of airstrip. Loader driver drove into aircraft RH Flap in "sun-strike" while loading aircraft with fertilizer.
7 187
241600R
RL488
7 188
71/51
ACC
MA 10/05/1971
DEQ CAPE A forced landing became RUNAWAY necessary following what the pilot believed to be a fall off in engine power. the integral actuating pin of one propeller blade was found fatigued and although it could not be established that this component failed in flight, the evidence suggests that it did. reports of similar in-flight failures overseas support this conclusion. CMY WAOTU One blade of the mccauley d2a 34c58/5-90at-4 propeller failed at the root end during takeoff. unbalance then caused the crankshaft to fail behind the propeller attachment flange. PROPELLER E49192 BLADE PITCH CHANGE K PITCH HC-C3YRCHANGE PIN IRF/F8475R
71-048
73/58
ACC
MA 2/04/1973
73-073
94/1428
DEF
MA 5/04/1994
EGU PALMERST ON NORTH
94/3486
DEF
MA 22/08/1994
94/3635
DEF
MA 26/08/1994
CML HAMILTON Pilot noted engine vibration and airspeed washing off on topdressing sortie. BOE MOSGIEL Propellor blade pitch change peg Pitch change HC-C3YR-1 DY2691A failed during topdressing run knob causing severe vibration and loss of thrust. Aircraft returned to strip at full power in order to maintain 60 knots
96
00/4517
DEF
MA 8/12/2000
EGT
Waipukura The propeller blade pitch change Blade u knob failed while the aircraft was taking off. The whole propeller has been sent to Hartzell for further investigation.
01/3972
DEF
MA 29/11/2001
DMO Beaumont The Fletcher took off on a spraying prop pitch sortie when the aircraft change spigot experienced a severe vibration. The pilot managed to jettison the load and land on a plateau causing substantial damage to the undercarriage. He was not injured. DZC Tapawera The pilot reported that just after a Pitch change HC-C3YRload-drop the engine started to knob 1RF run rough. The engine was shut down and a force-landing was made into a paddock The aircraft slid down a back causing minor damage. All work relating to this prop failure to be logged u nder previous occurrence 01/3972. The pilot felt shake in nose area Propellor during start of take-off which was Blade considered a nose wheel tire flat. Pilot pulled up wheel and aircraft was still shaking. Engine was shut down and pilot observed approxiamately 1/3 of Propeller Blade missing. During an inspection the propeller Governor governor drive gear was found to drive gear be cracked. F8475R DY5361A
03/547
DEF
MA 26/02/2003
03/1023
DEF
MA 5/04/2003
DMU Patoka
03/1971
DEF
MI
18/04/2003
EGP
Kerikeri
10
97
03/1271
DEF
MI
22/04/2003
CMK Wanganui
No 5 Cylinder Intake Pipe found badly cracked around top flank. Propeller Blade F8475R DY3424A
11
05/3737
DEF
MA 17/11/2005
EGW Hangawera The pilot experienced a severe vibration in the aircraft. The load was jettisoned and the aircraft returned to the airstrip. EUH Stratford It was reported that the aircraft propeller picked up a stone during loading and broke off aone tip of the blades. This was not discovered unitll there was a stopage for lunch.
12
06/4205
INC
MI
30/10/2006
13
07/911
DEF
MI
7/02/2007
DZC
Safe Air, Blenheim
The B4776 repair bush in the Repair Bush engine side of the hub has become P/N B4776 completely displaced from the counter bore in the hub. At the end of a topdressing run at Propeller approximately 100 feet above the blade ground a loud bang was heard. This was followed by a severe vibration and loss of engine power. A forced landing was made in very rough country that resulted in severe damage to the aircr aft but no injuries to the il t
HC-C3YR1RF
DY 3839A
14
07/2080
ACC
MA 10/06/2007
EMC Raupunga
F8483
J75739
15
98
07/4763
DEF
MI
Superair Ltd reported three Tacho separate prop indicated overspeeds. Aborted each takeoff. Engineer to RO to fix shorted wires. On the next start, smell of burning wires and panel went blank so aborted the start. Earth wires shorted. Main earth wire was f ound to have corrosion between firewall and earth wire. During the first takeoff from the airstrip the aircraft was slow to accelerate. jettison action was taken but the aircraft sank off the end of the strip and collided with a fence. 71-035 9
8 16
71/36
ACC
MA 26/03/1971
CRF
NR TAIHAPE
71/43
ACC
MA 23/04/1971
71/55
ACC
MA 20/05/1971
71/62
ACC
MA 21/06/1971
The aircraft sank after liftoff and before the load could be fully jettisoned the aircraft struck a ridge ahead. BVU TE MATA The aircraft experienced a sudden tail-wind gust as it became airborne, sank off the end of the strip and collided with a ponga tree. it remained airborne and returned to base CLO DANNEVIR On takeoff the aircraft collided KE with a fence at the end of the strip. the pilot jettisoned his load and flew the aircraft to base.
CBG KAHAROA
71-042
71-054
71-061
99
72/18
ACC
MA 3/02/1972
BVC
PARAHEKA During sowing of superphosphate over hilly country, pilot found he had no alternative but to deviate from planned route, jettison load and attempt to climb over high ground ahead. with insufficient power to do so he was then committed to making a climbing turn, during which the aircraft stalled, squashed against the hillside, then slid down the slope. The pilot was spraying a large flat paddock of maize. on the second sortie a steep approach was made over a small group of boundary trees 80-100 ft high. the aircraft squashed into the crop, coming to rest half way along the paddock. Following a snowfall, snow was brushed from the leading edges of the wings and a takeoff was attempted with nearly a full load. the jettison was operated to facilitate becoming airborne but the aircraft collided with the top of a fence. being unable to remain airborne the pilot closed the throttle and the aircraft came to rest in a ditch.
72-015
72/28
ACC
MA 24/02/1972
BWD KAIPAKI
72-027
72/72
ACC
MA 3/08/1972
CTO NR L TEKAPO
72-069
100
72/76
ACC
MA 20/08/1972
DDA OTANE
The pilot attempted a spray run up the side of a hill. the height difference between the bottom and the top of the hill was 600 ft. at the end of the spraying run the airspeed was so low that the aircraft squashed on to a ridge just beyond the brow of the hill. When the aircraft failed to return from a topdressing sortie a search revealed that it had crashed shortly after takeoff killing the pilot. the aircraft had stalled during climb-out, loss of control ensuing at a height which did not permit recovery before the aircraft struck the ground. On the 11th takeoff from an airstrip progressively thawing out the aircraft accelerated more slowly than previously. partial jettisoning of the load was initiated at a point where the aircraft had formerly become airborne. as it was becoming airborne the aircraft collided with a fence. no evidence of unintended overload found. after examination no explanation found.
72-074
73/36
ACC
MA 15/02/1973
BXT
WAIHOLA
73-029
73/94
ACC
MA 7/08/1973
DHO HOWARD RIVER
73-095
10
101
75/102
ACC
MA 27/09/1975
CYZ
NR Aircraft taking off from strip and WAINGAKE climbing in circular pattern to cross ridge approx 100 ft higher than takeoff point. as aircraft approached ridge it entered a downdraught. pilot turned level with ridge and attempted jettison but unable to prevent aircraft from striking side of gully. fuselage and wings forward of hopper destroyed by fire after pilot escaped by breaking through jammed canopy. NR The pilot stated that he had PAHIATUA noticed some frost on the wings and tail surfaces before the aircraft was loaded but had not removed it before takeoff. after becoming airborne the aircraft failed to gain height and collided with several fences before coming to rest.
75-097
11
76/77
ACC
MA 25/06/1976
BHJ
76-073
12
77/12
ACC
MA 25/01/1977
DMV ELSTHORPE The aircraft sank back onto the topdressing strip just after takeoff and the right aileron struck a gate post. the aircraft load was jettisoned and the pilot decided to remain airborne, flying to a nearby airport without further incident.
77-014
13
102
77/50
ACC
MA 17/03/1977
BHY
77/57
ACC
MA 28/03/1977
CLO
NR KAIKOU After liftoff on a topdressing sortie the aircraft was seen to drop a wing which carved a swath through tall scrub. the aircraft then rolled into an inverted attitude and dived into the ground FLEMINGT The aircraft encountered a ON downdraught after takeoff and although the pilot attempted to jettison the load he was unable to prevent the aircraft from colliding with the adjacent terrain. NR KAEO A hang up occurred while sowing wet lime. the aircraft had received an unintended overload which could not be released while sowing a blind valley. the aircraft struck a ridge at the head of the valley and dived down a bank. The aircraft failed to lift normally during the 6th takeoff from a wet strip. the flaps elevator and fuselage were damaged in a collision with a boundary fence despite the pilot's attempts to clear this obstruction by lowering further flap and making efforts to jettison the damp potash/superphosphate load.
77-048
14
77-057
15
77/61
ACC
MA 23/04/1977
BII
77-063
16
77/107
ACC
MA 3/09/1977
CLI
RAHOTU
77-107
17
103
77/141
ACC
MA 5/12/1977
CMI
NR An inexperienced topdressing pilot DARGAVILL did not select the best way to sow E a block. he encountered a downdraught while turning onto the sowing run and retained his load until over the property to be sown. when the load was jettisoned he was too low to avoid high ground ahead. GLENAVY While taking off from a level airstrip in a gusty tailwind, the aircraft took a longer run than normal and the load was jettisoned. the rear fuselage struck the fence as the aircraft became airborne in a tail-down attitude. Although inexperienced, pilot had no difficulty with this strip for 25 loads. on 26th flight aircraft didn't lift off by the normal position along strip. company manager believed pilot's technique of allowing aircraft to adopt an excessively high nose attitude at liftoff combined with late decision to jettison caused tail of aircraft to collide with fence at end.
77-142
18
78/67
ACC
MA 27/04/1978
DSL
78-064
19
78/69
ACC
MA 3/05/1978
CBG PURUA
78-068
20
104
78/127
ACC
MA 8/10/1978
BIK
PAERATA
On the second load after refuelling the aircraft sank after liftoff. the jettison was left too late and the aircraft struck a fence. on returning to the strip after sowing the load the pilot noticed that a light tailwind had developed. the wind was not indicated on the wind sock as it was made from material too heavy to respond to light winds Takeoff run appeared normal until failed to become airborne at rotation. pilot jettisoned some of load and aircraft lifted off but too late to avoid collision with fence at end of strip. remaining load dumped and pilot able to fly aircraft back to the strip for uneventful landing. probable that tail wind drift affected aircraft during latter stage of the takeoff. While topdressing close to a residential area aircraft was observed to enter a steep turn at low altitude. the turn was progressively tightened and the angle of bank increased with the aircraft in a nose high attitude. during the turn aircraft stalled and although pilot jettisoned the load insufficient altitude available for recovery before colliding with terrain.
78-131
21
79/52
ACC
MA 19/03/1979
EGB
BIDEFORD
79-055
22
79/57
ACC
MA 27/03/1979
CTI
FAIRFIELD
79-054
23
105
79/83
ACC
MA 11/06/1979
DMJ NR MILTON The aircraft failed to become airborne on a topdressing sortie. the pilot in command was fatally injured when the aircraft rolled some 70 m downhill beyond the strip and impacted heavily on a small ledge. EMF NR On the first sortie of the day, the WAIPUKUR aircraft was seen to climb towards AU the sowing area in a steep nose up attitude. just short of the area to be sown the aircraft stalled, a wing dropped and the aircraft struck the ground inverted. a severe fire broke out at impact. EGV NR ROTORUA While working off a level airstrip in varying tailwind conditions the aircraft lost height after takeoff and collided with a fence.
79-081
24
80/29
ACC
MA 7/02/1980
80-027
25
80/44
ACC
MA 20/03/1980
80-032
26
81/86
ACC
MA 21/10/1981
CCT
ORMONDVI After takeoff the aircraft turned LLE into a downdraught on the lee side of a ridge. the pilot attempted to jettison the load and turn away from the area but the aircraft continued to sink until it collided with the ridge. NR While taking off from a farm MATAMAT airstrip on the 14th sortie of the A day the aircraft struck a fence. it became airborne briefly before striking a substantial tree and diving steeply into a gully.
81-083
27
84/108
ACC
MA 11/11/1984
BIK
84-114
28
106
85/45
ACC
MA 9/05/1985
BVU NR After takeoff the pilot made a GISBORNE steep left turn. the aircraft sank and rolled left so he jettisoned the load. the aircraft continued to sink and the left wing struck the ground and it cartwheeled. DHE WHAREPU While the pilot was turning in his HUANGA seat to look at a loader, one of his boots became jammed in a rudder pedal. he was unaware of this until after the takeoff was started. the load was jettisoned as the aircraft became airborne off the side of the strip, damaging the elevator and wing on the edge of the strip. CBI NR During the first takeoff from a MATAKANA topdressing strip the aircraft's tailplane collided with a boundary fence. part of the tailplane subsequently separated in-flight and the aircraft dived into the ground out of control. the pilot received fatal injuries in the accident. probable cause was that the pilot failed to jettison the load early enough to restore the aircraft's takeoff performance which had been degraded by the kikuyu grass on the airstrip. WHAKAMA The aircraft struck the ground RU after takeoff due to a tailwind gust.
85-045
29
86/33
ACC
MA 20/03/1986
86-031
30
87/53
ACC
MA 6/05/1987
87-055
31
87/108
ACC
MA 24/11/1987
BIX
87-118
32
107
89/77
ACC
MA 15/09/1989
90/17
ACC
MA 19/01/1990
BWV WHAREOR During takeoff wheel drag was A experienced due to boggy areas on the downhill airstrip. the pilot abandoned the takeoff but could not prevent it overrunning through a fence During the second takeoff of the DUF NR TE ANGA day a tailwind gust occurred. the pilot's attempts to jettison the load of wet lime were unsuccessful and the aircraft sank off the end of the strip into a swamp. BHV KERIKERI AD During takeoff from a long level airstrip a slight power loss occurred which degraded the aircraft's acceleration. the load was jettisoned but this did not prevent a collision with some scrub which caused the aircraft to slew and impact onto a road.
89-079
33
90-016
34
90/89
ACC
MA 19/06/1990
90-085
35
90/92
ACC
MA 4/07/1990
DGE HIGH PEAK Towards the end of the takeoff a STATION, C strong tailwind gust and downdraught was encountered. the aircraft's tailplane struck a fence and the fletcher sank down a steep face before striking the ground with its left wing and coming to rest against a tree. CZA Pahiatua DHD nr Waikaremo ana EGH nr Dannevirke Takeoff, hit fence Heavy, slow, stalled
90-093
36
91/453 92/1017
ACC ACC
MA 28/08/1991 MA 20/04/1992
9 9
37 38
92/3804
ACC
MA 12/11/1992
Hit fence on farm strip takeoff, diverted, crashed
39
108
93/350A
ACC
MA 28/01/1993
DZF
10 N Poor takeoff performance, jettison Dannevirke system failed 94-010
40
94/1155
ACC
CR
29/03/1994
94/1789
INC
MI
19/04/1994
94/2081 94/3633 94/4134 95/1273
ACC ACC ACC ACC
CR
11/05/1994
MA 18/09/1994 CR CR 3/11/1994 7/05/1995
95/1541 95/1708
ACC ACC
CR CR
8/05/1995 6/06/1995
2S Manoeuvring low level, incipient Ngaruawah spin, hit ground ia DZO TE ANGA ON T/O A/C RAN INTO AN AREA OF DOWN DRAUGHT AND SANK SLIGHTLY CAUSING ONE MLG TO HIT A FENCE POST. CMG Argyll East Turbulence, aircraft sank, hit ground heavily EGX Okaihau Excessively wet material, dump failed, hit hill EFO Kaikohe Crashed shortly after takeoff EMB 8NM NE TOPDRESSING ACFT ON THE THIRD TAUPO SOWING RUN OF THE DAY IMPACTED ON LEVEL GROUND SOME 8KM NORTH EAST OF TAUPO. JAL TE AKAU AIRCRAFT OVERRAN RUNWAY AND CAME TO REST IN A BANK. EMU LAKE AIRCRAFT FOUND BURNT OUT GRASSMER AFTER COLLISION WITH THE FACE E OF A HILL
DZB
41
42
9 9 94-025 95-007 9 9
43 44 45 46
9 95-010 9
47 48
109
95/3614
ACC
MA 24/10/1995
BHJ
HOKITIKA
A Fletcher top dressing aircraft was engaged in agricultural operations sowing lime from the Raft Creek airstrip in the Kokatahi Valley on the West Coast of the South Island. Satisfactory performance was being achieved with 14 loads of one tone each for4 5 minutes. On the 15th consecutive load the aircraft failed to reach decision point speed and despite an attempted jettison of load the aircraft impacted with a fence at the end of the strip as the aircraft was becoming airborne. The jettison was completed and the aircraft landed for inspection.
49
95/3133
ACC
CR
1/11/1995
EUG RANGOIO STATION EMN Otapari Gorge
Aircraft impacted with ground during topdressing operations. During take off run aircraft outer panel hit fence post. Minor damage to elevator trim tab.This was the first take off of the day on a wet strip and it appears the pilot may have miscalculated the takeoff distance.
95-018
50
96/1145
ACC
MA 23/03/1996
51
110
96/2415
ACC
MA 6/09/1996
BDS
Manawahe Topdressing aircraft was flying into a narrowing gully and towards a ridge. Pilot realised too late there was insufficient performance to clear the ridge. Attempted to dump the 750 kg load. Did not release. Hit top of hill. PUIRI Failed to get airborne - due wind gust. Engine operating normally. Whilst conducting topdressing operation, aircraft impacted with terrain in descending turn. 1 Fatal, aircraft destroyed.
52
96/2551
ACC
MA 21/09/1996
CDZ
53
97/91
ACC
CR
21/01/1997
EHX
8 WSW Taihape
54
97/492
ACC
MA 24/02/1997
DZF
East The pilot was sowing into a Dannevirke narrow, rising valley when he encountered heavy sink. Unable to turn within confines of valley and despite application of full power, 20 degree flap and payload dump, he failed to establish a climb. Aircraft stalled and impact ed valley side. Pilot injured. Aircraft destroyed. FAIRLIE While positioning for a spreading run, aircraft encountered loss of lift. Crashed into paddock 5nm South East of Burkes Pass. Substantial damage.
55
97/2568
ACC
CR
29/08/1997
DIL
56
111
99/1481
ACC
MI
19/03/1999
DLQ Waituna West
The aircraft encountered sink during the takeoff and stuck a fence post at the end of the runway. It remained airborne and was flown back to base. Damage was caused the right hand flap. 99-002
57
99/732
ACC
CR
27/03/1999
EMV nr Significant event: The aircraft, Riversdale with a 23-hundredweight load, Beach became airborne but sank rapidly off the end of the strip in a nosehigh attitude. It collided with a fence, damaging the left wing spar and the tailplane. At this point load jettisoning wa s observed, and the aeroplane climbed briefly before rolling to the left and striking the ground inverted. The pilot was killed in the final impact. DLS Raetihi The pilot reported that, on the take-off roll, the engine appeared to overspeed and the aircraft failed to take off. It sank into a shallow gully off the end of the strip On the first flight after refuelling, the aeroplane was taking off on an uphill strip with a quartering tailwind. The pilot commenced jettisoning the load when he realised he was not going to get airborne. The aeroplane collided with a deer fence and a trough on the lower side of the strip. The pilot was not injured.
58
99/2831
ACC
MA 28/09/1999
59
00/614
ACC
MA 9/03/2000
LAY
Te Miro
60
112
00/4078
ACC
CR
14/12/2000
BHL
01/2183
ACC
MA 26/06/2001
01/2806
ACC
MA 19/08/2001
Raglan, Te The aircraft took off from an Akau airstrip near Raglan (Te Akau) failed to become airborne and crashed into the hillside. The aircraft was destroyed in the accident EMW Mangapai The aircraft sank after takeoff and hit a fence post with the left wing, which damaged the aileron. The pilot managed to circuit and land safely. EMN Dipton On the 17th flight from the strip, West the right main undercarriage struck a clump of tussock or similar obstruction and became partially detached. The pilot reported also that a rectangular hole was torn in the top surface of the wing. He diverted to Gore (company base) where the trailing wheel caused further damage to the right flap on landing. The aircraft failed to become airborne within the length of the airstrip. The left wing struck a fence then scraped the ground. The pilot jettisoned the load and became airborne but was unable to control the aircraft and prevent it from impacting ground .
61
62
63
01/3065
ACC
CR
7/09/2001
CMN Waiotira
64
113
01/3127
ACC
MI
14/09/2001
SAJ
Mangatahi The Fletcher clipped a fence at the end of the airstrip on takeoff. The pilot jettisoned the load and carried out an emergency landing in an adjacent paddock. Damage was limited to the undercarriage and the the fuselage underbelly. Pahoia During the 3rd takeoff run the pilot realised he may not clear the fence so he jettisoned the load. The aircraft lifted off but the tail cone just clipped a fence. The pilot landed and inspected the area for any damage and then flew back to the maintenan ce base for a further inspection.
65
01/4371
INC
MI
4/12/2001
JAA
66
01/4194
ACC
CR
23/12/2001
MAT Hukerenui The aircraft took off from an airstrip with a load of lime. The pilot then entered the sowing area which was a valley system in hilly terrain. The pilot attempted to dump the load but the aircraft hit some trees then the ground and caught fire. The pil ot was killed. EUH Opunake During the takeoff the pilot realised that the aircraft was not accelerating as it should . He dumped the fertilizer became airborne but clipped the fence with the right wing. The pilot decided to divert to Stratford where he landed safely. The aircraf t sustained minor damage.
67
02/1262
ACC
MA 25/04/2002
68
114
03/15
ACC
MA 7/01/2003
DMO Waitahuna The pilot lined up on the sloping airstrip, but picked the wrong reference point on terrain visible beyond the crest. On the takeoff roll, he found that as he came over the crest, he was about 25 degrees off the line of the strip. He commenced jettisoni ng the load but was unable to clear the head of a small gut adjacent to the strip. The aeroplane was substantially damaged, but the pilot was uninjured. BXZ 10 SW Te Kuiti The aircraft descended after takeoff and flew into a small ridge a few degrees off the runway centreline fataly injuring the pilot. The pilot reported that the aircraft experienced a lime hang-up while sowing a 35 tonne of lime, the product would not flow from the hopper door. It was reported that an aircraft carrying out agricultural operations has had a fatal accident near Brass Road, Kaitaia. There was only the pilot on board. Left flap trailing edge contacted the top of a fence post during a takeoff sustaining minor damage.
69
03/3733
ACC
CR
19/12/2003
70
05/2301
INC
MI
30/04/2005
BHK Lumsden
71
06/1135
ACC
CR
31/03/2006
EGP
Kaitaia
72
08/984
INC
MI
27/02/2008 EGT
Wanstead
9 73
115
08/1400
ACC
MI
3/04/2008 DLQ Opotiki
The aircraft was taking off from a farm strip when it was caught in a downdraught as it crossed a small gulley.Despite the pilot initiating a jettison of the load the aircraft the aircraft continued to sink and struck a fence. The impact caused a main un dercarriage leg to fold rearwards. The pilot flew on to Opotiki and made a successful landing. The topdressing aircraft collided with terrain during the take-off. The pilot lost control soon after the collision and during the ensuing accident he was seriously injured and the aircraft was destroyed. TRANSISTOR IMcClellan
9 74
08/1714
ACC
CR
25/04/2008 DZC
Kaihoka Lakes
9 75
93/2205A 95/1821
DEF INC
MI MI
17/08/1993 22/06/1995
95/1906
DEF
MI
22/06/1995
EMX ARDMORE DLQ NEW A/C HEARD CIRCLING THE PLYMOUTH AERODROME. NO CALLS RECRIVED, A/C DID STANDARD O/H REJOIN FOR RWY 23. GIVEN GREEN LIGHT TO LAND. PILOT REPORTED TO TWR HAD DIVERT DUE WX AND HAD RADIO FAILURE BHG HAMILTON A new emergency locator transmitter self activated whilst aircraft on ground and not being worked on.
10 10
1 2
Emergency locator transmitter
53501
10
116
04/2783
INC
MI
27/08/2004
JAA
Tauranga
Airways reported that ZK-JAA called 10NM to the west of NZTG. During the transmission, the transmission cut out and only carrier wave was received. However, the TG TWR controller issued zone entry instructions. The flight called again at the sports ground and circuit joining was provided. However, light signals were used to confirm landing clearance when the aircraft was on final. Airways reported that the aircraft Radio taxied onto grass 25 and got airborne without making any RTF contact with the tower, which had been on watch for ten minutes. The pilot reported that he made calls and saw people in the Tower as he flew past. He called t he Tower from his destination and established he had a radio problem. Airways reported that the aircraft experienced communications failure and squawked 7600, entering WB CTR at Okaramio and subsequently flying the DOMES arrival to NZOM. On retraction to Flaps 2 the Leading edge amber light remained illuminated loose switch H/O 1026-2 9025
10
04/2805
DEF
MI
29/08/2004
JAA
Tauranga
10
07/395
DEF
MI
7/02/2007
EML
10
07/1990
DEF
MI
2/05/2007
DHE Auckland
10
117
07/1987
DEF
MI
23/05/2007
DHE Auckland
Asian Express Airline reported that Broken during the climb just after takeoff Wiring from Auckland the aircraft failed to pressurise. A fuel dump was carried out and the aircraft returned to Auckland. The pilot reported that while airbourne he noticed that the Generator was not charging. On landing he found that the Starter/Generator had detached from it's mounting point. ELT antenna broken just above antenna block (diode). During a functional ELT self check the "G" switch was found not working. Aviation Maintenance reported an Antenna broken after 70hrs in service. Broken just above diode block on Antenna. Refer to Engineering. Superair Ltd reported on DUJ's ELT follow-up ME406 - went off by itsellf (first time this had happend). Two days later it went off again. Superair Ltd reported remote ELT switch LED light on permanently. Starter/Gener LUN2132.0 5830920 ator 2-8
10
08/391
DEF
MI
28/01/2008 EME Taupo
10 9
08/1462 08/1883
DEF DEF
MI MI
4/04/2008 JSW 28/04/2008 DUJ
Gore Hamilton
Antenna Me406 "G" switch Antenna
110-773 453-6603 01952
10 10 10 11
08/2224
DEF
MI
23/05/2008 EMG Gore
110-773
10 12
08/3477 08/3682
DEF DEF
MI MI
13/08/2008 DUJ 20/08/2008 DUJ
Pukehoe East Hamilton
Me406 Artex ELT
10 13 10 14
08/3056
DEF
MI
17/07/2008 DUJ
Hamilton
453-6603
07437
10 4
118
92/830
INC
MA 31/03/1992
94/1345
DEF
MA 15/02/1994
94/4207
DEF
MA 6/11/1994
SHORTLY AFTER TKOF RWY 25 BOUND YP ACFT REQUESTED LDG RWY 25 DUE SERIOUS NOSE UP PROBLEM, EMERG SERVICES ALERTED AND ACFT LANDED SAFELY JAC WHANGAR A CONTROL CABLE HAD BROKEN CABLE CAB-D-14EI THROUGH MORE THAN HALF ITS 83-2624 BRAIDS. EMN INVERCARG CONTROL CABLES PREMATURE FLT CONTROL ILL WEAR. CABLES EGV CBA OROPI IN FLIGHT RUDDER JAMMED IN RUDDER NEUTRAL POSITION. While aerial topdressing rudder TORQUE pedal's went slack. Realizing still TUBE had control of aircraft proceeded back to airstrip. Discovered rudder torque tube broken. THROTTLE CABLE 24 2401 242409
CDZ
PMCTR
11
11
11
94/4246 95/2389
DEF DEF
MA 9/11/1994 MA 7/08/1995
11 11
4 5
96/1574
DEF
MA 4/06/1996
97/2864 97/2865
DEF DEF
MA 16/09/1997 MA 16/09/1997
EGU HAMILTON Throttle cable appears to have fatigued and subsequently broken approx 12 inches from engine throttle fork end. Suspect routeing fault. DHD Fielding Elevator trim system found to be installed incorrectly. DHD DANNEVIR Flight control cables found to be KE installed grossly over tensioned.
243357-2
11
Trim drum Cable tension
11 11
7 8
119
97/2863
DEF
MA 25/09/1997
DHD FEILDING
Aircraft elevator cable worn excessively and over tensioned from rebuild. Also trim assembly jammeing and found to be assembled incorrectly. Concerned at the potential for fatal accident. Aircraft was rebuilt at United Aviation but was sent to Aero Suppor t Fielding where fatal flaws were found.
11
99/3510
DEF
MA 10/12/1999
EOE
NEW The Fletcher FU24 pilot called at Rudder Cable PLYMOUTH Oakura, west of New Plymouth, to advise he was joining and had a broken rudder cable. He was anticipating handling and control problems on finals and after landing. A local standby was declared however the aircraft landed safely. GORE Engineering noticed abnormal wear in the Power Lever and Quadrant Gate in the cockpit that required the removal and replacement of both items. On the pre flight check the pilot noticed stiffness in the elevator. After a few movements and a small amount of force the stick moved freely without any further problems. On take-off the aircraft was extremely nose heavy. The aircraft re-circuited and l anded safely. Power Lever & Quadrant Gate TCL 06-0041
11
10
00/3448
DEF
MA 30/10/2000
JSW
11
11
03/3950
DEF
MI
29/12/2003
DHD Fielding
Horn Trim Tab
242532-8
11
12
120
04/1028
DEF
MI
10/03/2004
EUH Wanganui
04/2760
DEF
MA 19/07/2004
EUH Wanganui
It was reported that during the 100 hour inspection the flap control handle ratchet was found cracked where it is welded to the tube. Wanganui Aero Work reported that the aircraft's direct aileron cables were found badly worn.
Handle ratchet mount
08-45911-1
11
13
Aileron 242597 Control Cable
11
14
04/4278
INC
MI
4/11/2004
EGV Hamilton
Super Air reported that ZK-EGV Maintenance just had a new electric trim switch error fitted. Shortly after take off the pilot applied forward trim which evidently resulted with the opposite occurring and the nose of the aircraft lifted. It was reported that the right hand aileron cable, fitted at 7512 hours, was found worn after 7986 hours TIS. It was reported that the aircraft pulley bracket that is holding the aileron pulley to the side of the cockpit has a crack at the attachment end. During a routine maintenance aileron cable inspection, as per DCA/FU24/174, it was revealed that several aileron control cables were worn to M.M limits some with broken wires. The pilot reported that the elevator control was noisy and notchy. During inspection it was found the plug in the end of the aileron push rod was working. Aileron Cable
11
15
04/4111
DEF
MI
22/11/2004
EGS
Aero Support
11
16
04/4099
DEF
MI
30/11/2004
CRY
Hamilton
Pulley bracket
11
17
05/195
DEF
MI
28/01/2005
EUC
Napier
Aileron Cables
242671, 672, 597
11
18
05/1216
DEF
MI
7/04/2005
JNX
Hamilton
Elevator pulley Aileron push 242502 pull rod
11
19
05/1274
DEF
MI
11/04/2005
EMG Gore
11
20
121
06/2388
DEF
MI
19/03/2006
EMW Rotorua
During landing a problem with the Flap torque flaps was experienced. tube An investigaation into an inservice Throttle defect found that the throttle Cable cable was found broken.
242552
11
21
06/1304
DEF
MI
2/04/2006
EUH Wanganui
24 1624-1
11
22
06/2482
DEF
MI
3/06/2006
EUH Wanganui
The aircraft's hopper control lever Hopper 249479 broke off during a ground run. control lever Elevator rear pulley
11
23
07/436
DEF
MA 7/02/2007
07/2685
DEF
MI
07/3839
DEF
MI
EGV Whakatane The pilot reported that during the take off the elevator became stiff to operate. 8/07/2007 EFM Hamilton Super Air reported that riverts found to be very loose which caused aileron control loss. 17/10/2007 EME Taupo It was reported that pilot noticed a vibration in the Rudder Pedals. The vibration was difficult to replicate on demand but was noticeable in the climb at climb power settings with 3 notches of flap at 70-80 kts. 14/02/2008 EMW Rotorua Super air Ltd reported trim failed over a couple of days would work for a while and then stop again. Flown to HN where the trim motor was replaced.
11
24
11
25
Hopper Fairing
256
11 26
08/1385
INC
MI
11 27
08/2286
DEF
MA
20/05/2008 EMX Hamilton
Defect report - Submitter reported SPAR 241506- 241538L Aileron L/H spar found cracked 2L during routine inspection.
297
11 28
122
08/3992
DEF
MI
25/08/2008 EMW Hamilton
SuperAir reported over a period of Aileron time, the pilot noticed a slight jamming of the control column and this got progressively worse to where the pilot had to move it to the left and then back to the right to get free movement. Jamming was always when tryi ng to roll to the right from a LH turn. Once fixed it was very noticeable how free and light the control column movement was. 12
11 29
91/1218A
INC
MA 29/12/1991
93/2461
INC
MA 3/06/1993
00/3286
DEF
MI
20/09/2000
KAWERAU FORCE LANDED DUE ENG PROBLEM. PILOT SUSPECTED FUEL SABOTAGE. Nature of the occurrence DYJ GISBORNE A/C JUST AIRBORNE RETURNED TO LAND WITH STRONG SMELL OF AVGAS IN COCKPIT. EMN GORE During an inspection it was found Barrel nuts that 2 of the stabiliser balance weight attachment lock nuts were loose. This was possibly due to repeated use or incorrect tightening in the past. EUH Taranaki area It was reported that the aircraft's LH Leading tailplane just clipped a cow before edge touchdown while landing on a farm strip. The leading edge skin and ribs were badly damaged so the elevator was replaced.
BOF
12
1452-048
13
03/3946
INC
MI
15/12/2003
13
123
07/3028
DEF
MI
20/08/2007 EUF
Taieri
During a routine inspection a crack Angle - Main 242209 1 1/2 inches long was found on Beam - Top the stabilator spar main beam top angle just inboard of the RH upper skin attachment.
13 3
08/937
DEF
MA
20/02/2008 CRY
Hamilton
02/3757
DEF
MI
24/10/2002
DUJ
Super Aid Ltd reportedf further investigation around area of working rivets on RH outer panel revealed outer RH spar web and lower cap cracked at 100 hr inspection at Hamilton Hanger (Super Air Ltd) Masterton After finding other cracks in the airframe the engineers removed the hopper and found several more stress cracks in areas which cannot be normally seen in a standard 100 hour check. Huntly
14 1
Fuselage components
196
15
06/396
INC
MI
11/01/2006
JNX
06/479
DEF
MI
4/02/2006
JNX
Rotorua
Super Air reported that the hopper lid detached due to cracking in the framework during the flight. Super Air reported that the Hopper Lid hopper detached itself from the aircraft during flight. It was left in place only by a piece of rope.
15
15
07/364
INC
MI
21/01/2007
CRY
Matammat The aircraft was in the cruise when Canopy a the bottom of the lift up canopy flew up and caused damage to the right hand side before detaching and falling to the ground. Fertiliser deflector plate attached TCL 09 101 1 TCL-09-101under the aircraft was seen to be 6 flexing during flight.
15
08/2143
INC
MI
20/05/2008 EME Taupo
15 5
124
87/24
ACC
MA 13/02/1987
DZA
NR ORARI GORGE
After 100 tonnes of fertiliser had been sown on a hill country station, a spreader unit was attached to aircraft and pilot took off to sow pellets on higher country on same property. 5 mins later the aircraft landed and came to rest abruptly on a spur. personnel who reached the aircraft with a minimum of delay found aircraft extensively damaged and pilot dead. probable cause was an inflight medical incapacitation which prompted the pilot to attempt to land without delay.
87-046
16
88/100
ACC
MA 27/12/1988
EMZ NR The pilot was engaged in spraying RANGITATA a potato crop. towards the completion of this task the aircraft dived into the ground during a turn. probable cause of the accident could not be established. findings; aircraft dived into the ground during a reversal turn. the mixture of chemicals being sprayed contained a concentrate classified in toxicity as a dangerous poison. pilot did not ensure he was fully protected against the mixture during loading. not determined if any (f3 for more)
88-098
16
125
06/1021
INC
MI
25/03/2006
DJE
Motueka
The pilot felt some chest discomfort after take off and after a couple of minutes decided to descend and land. About 3 hrs later after feeling worse he was taken to A&E where he was diagnosed with a collapsed lung. The pilot had suffered a chest infection prior to this event that had been treated with antibiotics.
16
126
OCC No 91/35 91/256 91/1278 91/900 91/901 91/902 91/903 91/897 91/898 91/899 92/2575 92/4522 92/4527 92/4528 92/4529 92/4530 93/902 93/1811 93/1472 93/1423 93/2339 93/2459B 93/2728 93/2729 94/1716A 94/3956 95/3668
Code DEF DEF DEF DEF DEF DEF DEF DEF DEF DEF DEF DEF DEF DEF DEF DEF DEF DEF DEF DEF DEF DEF DEF DEF DEF DEF DEF
Sev MA MA MA MA MA MA MA MA MA MA MA MA MA MA MA MA MA MA MA MA MA MA MA MA MA MI MA MI MA
Date Time UTC 10/01/1991 25/05/1991 14/10/1991 14/10/1991 14/10/1991 14/10/1991 14/10/1991 23/10/1991 23/10/1991 23/10/1991 20/03/1992 23/11/1992 23/11/1992 6/12/1992 6/12/1992 6/12/1992 16/02/1993 26/02/1993 11/03/1993 17/03/1993 12/05/1993 2/06/1993 8/06/1993 8/06/1993 18/04/1994 19/09/1994 13/09/1995 25/03/2001 19/08/1996
Reg LTR LTQ LTS LTS LTS LTS LTS LTR LTR LTR LTS LTS LTS LTR LTR LTR LTR JAD LTQ LTS TMN JAD LTP LTP JAD LTS LTR LTT LTR
Location WANGANUI INVERCARGILL WANGANUI WANGANUI WANGANUI WANGANUI WANGANUI WANGANUI WANGANUI WANGANUI UNKNOWN WANGANUI WANGANUI WANGANUI WANGANUI WANGANUI WANGANUI TAUPO INVERCARGILL WANGANUI HAMILTON TAUPO NAPIER NAPIER HAMILTON WANGANUI WANGANUI Napier WANGANUI
Description
Part Defective P/ N
Part S/N TAIC Ref Class 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Total 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1
01/1783 DEF 96/2641 DEF
FLANGE 08-40027-2 Bell crank 08-11219-1 mount tube Angle capping cracked at l/h side from relief cut out. Angle Capping Rear fuselarge frame P/N 08-11125-12 Frame 08-11125-12
Annex F: Cresco Occurrences
Page 127
OCC No
Code
Sev MA
97/3830 DEF
Date Time UTC 1/12/1997
Reg LTW
Location MALAYSIA
Description During maintenance the rudder almost came off when an engineer applied pressure to the top rudder hinge. During maintenance the rudder almost came off when an engineer applied pressure to the top rudder hinge. During maintenance the rudder almost came off when an engineer applied pressure to the top rudder hinge. A pilot of a light aircraft noticed that the top of the rudder had a lot of side movement. n/a During a routine inspection (100 hour) the rudder top attachment was noted to be lose. On removal it was found that the anchor nut was torn away from the rib. It appears that there was at least four holes drilled 2 leg anchor nut During routine inspection, the rudder tip attatchment plate was found to be missing riviets on both sides. The vertical fin skin had a 6 inch long cracked from adjacent the top of the rudder mount bracket. It is suspected excessive loads have been imposed on skin.
Part Defective P/ N top hinge 08-32037-1
Part S/N TAIC Ref Class 1
Total 2
97/3831 DEF
MA
1/12/1997
JAD
MALAYSIA
Top hinge
08-32037-1
97/3832 DEF
MA
1/12/1997
LTQ
MALAYSIA
Top hinge
98/1059 DEF 99/780 DEF 99/1892 DEF
MI MI MA
9/04/1998 17/03/1999 15/06/1999
TMM TMM LTX
TAUMARUNUI HAMILTON NAPIER
RUDDER TOP RIB UPPER RIB Rudder top attatchment
1 08-33035-1 1 1
5 6 7
99/2731 DEF
MA
16/08/1999
LTX
NAPIER
Rudder
00/1690 DEF
MA
22/05/2000
LTU
NAPIER
SKIN CRACKED 08320014
014
00/1769 DEF
CR
26/05/2000
LTT
MATAMATA
Significant Event. During topdressing operation, fitting loader driver noticed vertical fin movement during forward fin taxi up to loading area and previous take-off. attach. Examination of area revealed fractured vertical stabiliser Forward fitting. Forward location only held by dorsal fin attachment screws most of which were ripped out.
2430172
NSN
10
Page 128
OCC No
Code
Sev MA
01/3778 DEF
Reg WAT
Location Christchurch
Description During the pre-flight inspection the pilot noticed excessive movement of the rudder at the upper pivot bolt location. Closer inspection revealed that the upper pivot bolt nut had detached and caused elongation of the bolt hole in the rib. During a check of the upper rudder hinge bracket a crack was found in the rib pivot attachment. During routine maintenance inspection of the rudder top hinge location revealed a cracked rib. The rib was renewed. The rudder top rib was found cracked around the anchor nut periphery during a routine inspection. The upper rib was found cracked around the counter sunk rivet head location that holds the upper pivot bolt anchor nut. As previously reported the ribs thickness does not seem to contain any fatigue.
Part Defective P/ N Rudder attachments.
Total 11
02/2467 DEF
MI
8/08/2002
LTT
Napier
Upper rudder rib 08-33035 Rudder rib
12
03/835
DEF
MI
4/03/2003
LTE
Napier
13
03/1896 DEF
MI
8/06/2003
LTE
Napier
Rudder top rib 08-33035-1
14
03/1996 DEF
MI
30/06/2003
LTA
Napier
Rudder top rib 08 33035 1 08-33035-1
15
03/2355 DEF 03/2847 DEF
MI MA
23/07/2003 9/09/2003
LTX TML
Napier Hamilton
Upper Rib During a routine inspection of the rudder area the upper rib was found to be cracked. The pilot noted the aircraft's rudder sitting at a rudder upper abnormal angle after delivery for a 100hr inspection. rib It was reported that the rudder spacer was found Spacer with side flanges cracked. It was reported that during the 100 hour inspection Front Mount the veretical fin front mount was found broken off. It was reported that whilst changing the fin mount from aluminium to steel, the original fitting was found cracked one third to half way across. Front Mount
08-33035-1 08-33035-1
1 1
16 17
04/1665 DEF 04/1305 DEF
MA MI
23/03/2004 21/04/2004
LTX LTY
Napier Wanganui
08-33041-1 243017-2
1 1
18 19
04/1803 DEF
MA
31/05/2004
LTH
Wanganui
243017-2
20
Page 129
OCC No
Code
Sev MI
05/1415 DEF
Reg NZO
Location Queenstown
Description There were a number problems found whilst trying to fit modification PAC/CR/0427 to a Cresco 08-600 aircraft. During a scheduled inspection of a Cresco aircraft the fin leading edge skin was found to be cracked at the top of bulkhead P/N 242305-2 attachment.
Part Defective P/ N Rudder top hinge Fin Leading Edge PAC MOD CR 0427 08-32001-4
Total 21
05/2942 DEF
MA
24/08/2005
LTX
Napier
22
07/1266 DEF
MI
2/04/2007
EEL
Taieri
83/34
ACC
MA MA
19/03/1983 3/06/1993
LTR JAD TAUPO
L TAUPO
93/2459A INC
Fin leading edge skin found cracking from top of cut- Leading Edge out area for PN: 242305-2 bulkhead. Skin The right wheel and oleo piston separated from the aircraft as it touched down during the landing run following a topdressing flight. ON T/O WITH FULL LOAD, PILOT FELT KNOCK UNDER A/C, DISCOVERED WHEEL MISSING UNDERTOOK EMERGENCY LANDING WITH MINIMAL TO NO DAMAGE. DAMAGE LANDING GEAR NOSE WHEEL STEERING POST MLG LUG ATTCHMENT BOLTS Right undercarriage leg collapsed on landing PILOT REPORTED PORT MAIN LANDING LEG AT AN UNUSUAL ANGLE
242308-3 83-036
1 2
23 1
93/4005 DEF 93/5343 DEF
MI MA
20/08/1993 7/11/1993
TMN LTS WANGANUI
245106 08-45661-2
2 2
3 4
93/5724A DEF
MA
9/12/1993
TMN
OKAHUKURA
AN5-37A & AN5-40A
93/5724 ACC MA 10/12/1993 TMN 5 N Taumarunui 94/4528 DEF MA 1/12/1994 TMN HAMILTON 95/2061 DEF 96/584 DEF 96/3649 DEF MA MA MA 19/04/1995 15/02/1996 26/10/1996 LTR LTP LTT WANGANUI NAPIER MALAYSIA
ATTACHMENT NAS 1306-78 BOLT 08-45661-2 AN5 -40A 08-40027-3 CLMG 006
2 2 2 2 2
6 7 8 9 10
. Steering post Masin landing gear. Bolt head separated from stem. bolt Aircraft parked overnight and observed the next day CYLINDER to have undercarriage collapsed on the RH side.
Page 130
OCC No 97/593
Code DEF
Sev MA
Reg TMN
Location TAUMARUNUI
Description Three MLG attach bolts failed allowing gear to rotate rearward, which caused flap, rear spar and skin damage. these bolts have failed before on this aircraft but no other Cresco is having this problem. Nose wheel steering post cracked at lower bearing flange. The main wheel axle was found to be badly cracked at the mounting. The flange was very close to breaking off. Nose wheel steering post cracked at lower bearing flange. During maintenance the LH main landing gear was found cracked. During normal landing the right hand main landing gear assy departed the aircraft. The aircraft's right aircraft hand wing slid down onto the ground and the aircraft came to a stop. n/A The right hand main landing gear lug attachment bolts (3) the rear bolt with head missing found by Pilot during preflight inspection.
Part Defective P/ N BOLTS 3 MA2125006078
Total 11
97/1711 DEF 97/2107 DEF
MI MA
4/04/1997 7/05/1997
LTS LTS
WANGANUI WANGANUI
Steering post Axle
08-45661-2
2 2
12 13
97/1710 DEF 98/3774 DEF 98/3775 DEF
MI MI MA
8/05/1997 24/02/1998 5/03/1998
LTR LTU LTT
WANGANUI NAPIER New Zealand
Steering post left hand cylinder cylinder
08-45661-2 08-40027-3 08-40027-3 CLGM00 9 clmg 003
2 2 2
14 15 16
99/874
DEF
MI MI
10/02/1999 30/08/1999
EEL TMM
TAIERI HAMILTON
99/2570 DEF
08-40021-1 AXLE Bolt
08-40021-1 NAS1305-58
2 2
17 18
00/227
DEF
MA
17/01/2000
TMM
HAMILTON
During routing maintenance the cylinder flange at Cylinder the torque link was found cracked. On dismantling a piece was found completely adrift. The manufacturer has the unit for investigation. In carrying out check as per Service Bulletin cracks were found on the main landing gear axles. Nose wheel steering tube broke off at weld. Axles
08-40051-1
19
00/448
DEF
MA
15/02/2000
PWT
NAPIER
08-40021-1
20
00/2854 DEF
MI
2/08/2000
LTY
WANGANUI
Steering tube 2x 5235-2
21
Page 131
OCC No
Code
Sev MI
00/2631 DEF
Reg LTT NAPIER
Location
Description Durning routine inspection, righthand MLG cylinder lower flange found with section of flange including rear lefthand lug attachment bolt hole cracked off. This is a known fault. The nose wheel steering pivot pin was found broken at the clevis pin cut out. The hopper 'stress band' was cracked at its left and right hand extremities. The left hand main under carriage cylinder was found to be cracked vertically under the lower clamp joint. During an inspection the main landing gear cylinder flange was found to be cracked near the forward bow hole. The left hand main under carriage was found to be leaking fluid due to a cracked leg cylinder cylinder. While landing on an airstrip the left main undercarriage leg broke off causing the aircraft to slew left and stop short of departing the airstrip. Engineers later jacked the aircraft up, replaced the leg and had it flown back to Wanganui.
Part Defective P/ N cylinder 08400511
Part S/N TAIC Ref Class 048 2
Total 22
00/4495 DEF 01/366 DEF
MI MI MI
22/11/2000 9/01/2001 20/02/2001
LTY WAT LTV
Wanganui NAPIER Wanganui
Pivot pin Stress Band Cylinder
08-45711-1
2 2
23 24 25
01/1254 DEF
08-450051-1 C4MG 021
01/2162 DEF
MI
11/05/2001
LTT
Napier
Cylinder flange
26
01/3431 DEF
MI
6/09/2001
LTS
Wanganui
cracked cylinder L/H Main 08-40051-1 072
27
28
01/3432
ACC
MI
4/10/2001
LTC
Hunterville
01/4053 DEF
MA
4/12/2001
LTX
Napier
As the Cresco taxied from the loading area, the pilot MLG felt the left main landing gear collapse. The aircraft returned to base where it was found that the cylinder had cracked circumferentially below the lower clamp. The Cresco was turning in the loading area when the right main undercarriage leg broke off without any prior warning. The Cresco's landing gear axle was found cracked in the flange radius. The pilot reported that the right main landing gear cylinder was leaking oil. R/H Main u/c cyclinder Landing Gear MLG Cylinder 08-40051-1 77
29
02/238
INC
MA
29/01/2002
LTZ
Hunterville
30
02/842
DEF
MI MI
15/02/2002 16/02/2002
LTZ TMN
Palmerston North Taumarunui
2 2
31 32
02/1079 DEF
Page 132
OCC No 02/699
Code DEF
Sev MA
Reg TMN
Location Hamilton
Description During a 100 hour inspection it was found that the right rear main spar attachment and the associated area were all excessively worn.
Part Defective P/ N Right main spar
Total 33
02/850
DEF
MI MI
5/03/2002 23/07/2002
LTA LTX
Napier Napier
02/2318 DEF
While complying with an SB an undercarriage MLG MLG cylinder cylinder was found cracked. During a routine inspection of the main landing gear Axle 08-40021a crack was found round the root radius of the axle 1 stub. Axles Flight Care supplied two Cresco axles for fitting to the aircraft. It was found, by magnetic particle inspection, that both axles were cracked in the flange radius area. NOTE: Duplicate of 3/SAI/186. Oleo The near new Cresco was taking off when an undercarriage leg collapsed causing the aircraft to veer of the strip and down a bank where it suffered major damage. The pilot was not hurt and the weather was fine and airstrip condition good.
2 2
34 35
02/2901 DEF
MI
20/09/2002
LTX
Wanganui
36
37
02/3231
ACC
CR
13/11/2002
TML
Aria
02/3578 DEF
MI
26/11/2002
TMN
Hamilton
During routine inspection axles removed for magnetic particle inspection. Both LH and RH MLG axles found cracked.
Axle
08-40021-1
38
03/779
DEF
MA
13/03/2003
LTY
Wanganui
While stopping to refuel it was noticed that the right Lower Front hand main undercarrage leg was on an angle. On Mount Bolt inspection it was found the lower front leg mount bolt had failed.
NAS 1306 78
39
03/837
DEF
MA
16/03/2003
LTL
Wanganui
The right hand main undercarriage cylinder was found to be cracked around the lug mount flange.
RH Main 08-40085-1 Undercarriage Cylinder
011
40
Page 133
OCC No
Code
Sev MA
03/1369 INC
Reg LTA
Location Gisbourne
Description The pilot declared a MAYDAY with the intention to land at Gisborne so a full emergency was declared. On arrival, the flight carried out a low pass in front of the tower for an assessment of the nose wheel, which appeared to be normal. The flight then land ed safely on grass runway 14.
Part Defective P/ N
Total 41
03/1446 DEF
MI
8/05/2003
TML
Hamilton
The right hand axle was found to be cracked around Axle its axis during a magnetic particle inspection. The nose wheel steering port to yoke pin was found steering yoke broken off. attachment Suspected that pin hole had been filed larger at pin some stage, which is a normal practise. During maintenance some suspicious pit markings Oleo piston were noticed on the chrome of the main landing gear oleo piston. . The protective coating was removed from the main Leg cyclinder landing gear cylinder revealing corrosion between the rosette welded lower flange and the cylinder. A undercarriage cylinder was found badly corroded. Leg Cylinder It was reported that whilst operating from a rough strip the RH main undercarriage torque link lower bolt head sheared off. Torque link lower bolt
08-40021-1
42
03/2218 DEF
MI
11/07/2003
LTH
Wanganui
08-45711-1
43
03/2400 DEF
MI
8/08/2003
TMN
Hamilton
11-40009-1
44
03/2614 DEF
MI
1/09/2003
LTL
Wanganui
08-40085-1
12
45
03/2846 DEF 04/1229 DEF
MI MI
11/09/2003 5/04/2004
LTN LTS
Wanganui Kaipara
08-40085-1 NAS1307780
005
2 2
46 47
04/1393 DEF
MI
19/04/2004
LTY
Taumarunui
It was reported that whilst operating from a rough Torque link strip the right main undercarriage torque link lower lower bolts bolt head sheared off.
NAS130778D
48
Page 134
OCC No
Code
Sev MI
04/3232 DEF
Reg LTS
Location Wanganui
Description The aircraft's nose landing gear steering pin was found cracked during a 500 hour inspection. A crack was found in the main landing gear axle during a 500 hour magniflux crack inspection. A crack was found in the main landing gear axle during a 500 hour magniflux crack inspection.
Part Defective P/ N Steering Pin 08-45711-1
Total 49
05/351
DEF
MI
26/01/2005
LTH
Wanganui
Axle
08-40021-1
LTS-8
50
05/353
DEF
MI
26/01/2005
LTL
Wanganui
Axle
08-40021-1
LTY-1
51
05/686
DEF
MI
1/03/2005
LTA
Gisborne
05/817
DEF
MI
16/03/2005
LTX
Napier
05/1341 DEF
MI
4/04/2005
LTY
Wanganui
It was reported that the aircraft was found to have MLG Cylinder an MLG Cylinder broken adjacent to the LWR mounting Clamp. It was reported that the undercarriage piston was Piston found to be bent and approximately 7/16 inches over its length. During a 500 hour inspection of a Cresco aircraft the Axle 08-40021-1 08 40021 1 main landing dear axle was found cracked. The lower torque link bolt was found to be cracked during the 100 hour inspection. The main landing gear lower torque link bolt was found cracked during the 100 hour inspection. The nose wheel steering pin was found cracked during the 500 hour inspection. Lower Torque Link Bolts Lower Torque Link Bolts Steering Pin NAS 1307 78D NAS 1307 78D 08-45711-1 08-40021-1 08 - 40085 - 157 1 08-45711-1 08-40021-1 LTV-5
52
53
54
05/1340 DEF 05/1579 DEF
MI MI
18/04/2005 16/05/2005
LTL LTL
Wanganui Wanganui
2 2
55 56
05/1580 DEF 05/1881 DEF 05/2118 DEF
MI MI MI
16/05/2005 27/05/2005 23/06/2005
LTL LTX LTY
Wanganui Napier Wanagnui
2 2 2
57 58 59
The Cresco aircraft axles were found to be cracked. Axle During the 100 hour inspection the nose undercarriage cylinder was found cracked at the lower flange. Nose Landing Gear cylinder
05/4394 DEF 05/4393 DEF
MI MI
24/11/2005 19/12/2005
LTH LTY
Wanganui Wanganui
During a 500 hour magniflux inspection the NLG Steering Pin steering pin was fond to be cracked. During a 500 hour magniflux inspection the axle was Axle found to be cracked.
2 2
60 61
Page 135
OCC No
Code
Sev MI
05/4392 DEF
Reg LTV
Location Wanganui
Description During a 500 hour magniflux inspection the MLG axle was found to be cracked.
Part Defective P/ N Axle 08-40021-1
Part S/N TAIC Ref Class LTZ-3 2
Total 62
05/4317 DEF
MI
23/12/2005
TMM
Tiroa
Taumaranui Aerial Co-Operative reported that the Undercarriage 08-600 starboard wing was noticed to be lower than normal Leg during the take off roll during the 11th load of the day. It was found that the undercarriage leg had partially collapsed. During a 500 hour NDT inspection a MLG axle was found to be cracked. During a 500 hour magniflux inspection a MLG axle was found to be cracked. The aircraft taxied forward away from the loader, when the nose wheel ran through soft gravel with the propeller striking a large stone in the soft ground. The pilot commenced a takeoff on a sowing run and as the aircraft was rotating a thud was heard on the L/H main undercarriage. The view through the hopper mirror revealed the L/H main undercarriage was hanging there and damage to the L/H flap. The load wa s spread and the aircraft flew to Wanganui Airport where a landing was made with emergency services on standby. Investigation revealed the aircraft had hit a lamb on takeoff and the impact had caused the L/H main landing gear attachment bolts to shear off. This allowed the main leg to contact the flap causing the damage. A warning has been sent out to all pilots on the use of airstrips with stock around. Axle 08-40021-1
037
63
06/1165 DEF
MI
2/03/2006
LTS
Wanagui
LTH-2
64
06/2004 DEF
MI
4/04/2006
LTN
Wanganui
Axle
08-40021-1
LTN1
65
06/4496 DEF
MI
20/11/2006
LTZ
Hunterville
Propeller
HC B3TN 3D BNA260 HC-B3TN-3D 13
66
07/2448 INC
MI
7/07/2007
LTL
Wanganui
67
Page 136
OCC No
Code
Sev MA
98/3773 DEF
Reg TMO
Location HAWKES BAY
Description During take off the engine suffered significant power loss, to avoid obstacles the load was dumped and avoidance action taken. The aircraft landed without any damage. Crack found on routine maintenance. Indication of crack: paint split and exuding inhibitor fluid.
Part Defective P/ N bleed valve diaphram
Total 1
3100829-03 20A324
99/304
DEF
MI
3/02/1999
LTV
NAPIER
99/305
DEF
MI
3/02/1999
TMO
NAPIER
Crack found on routine maintenance. Indication of crack: paint split and exuding inhibitor fluid. Crack found on routine maintenance. Indication of crack: paint split and exuding inhibitor fluid. On routine maintenance, the engine mount was found to have a crack at the centre isolator attachment bolt bushing. On routine inspection (100 hour) a crack was detected in the engine mount at the left hand side isolator attachment cluster. The pilot reported that the right hand lower engine mount attachment was cracked at the weld. A new part was fitted and PAC have the old one for analysis. During routine maintenance the lower right hand engine mount bracket was found cracked.
LH & TOP ENGINE MOUNT BOLT ATT LH ENGINE MOUNT BOLT ATTACHMEN LH ENGINE MOUNT BOLT ATTACHMEN ngine Engine Mount
99/306
DEF
MI
3/02/1999
TMN
NAPIER
99/ 094 F 99/2094 DEF
MI
3 /05/ 999 31/05/1999
TMO
NAPI R NAPIER
99/1893 DEF
MI
22/06/1999
TMN
NAPIER
Engine Mount 08-57017-1
99/3693 DEF
MA
23/12/1999
TMM
HAMILTON
Engine mount 243665-4R
00/1005 DEF
MI
16/03/2000
WAT
NAPIER
Engine Mount 24 3665-4R
00/1641 DEF
MI
3/05/2000
LTU
GISBORNE
During routine maintenance the right hand bracket BRACKET was found with a crack adjacent to weld along the full length of the weld. The fire wall was cracked just below right hand lower engine mount tube attachment at the rear.
24366654R
Page 137
OCC No
Code
Sev MI
00/1644 DEF
Reg LTX
Location GISBORNE
Description During routine maintenance the right hand bracket was found with a crack adjacent to weld along the full length of lower side weld. During 100 hour inspection the righthand lower engine mount was found broken off. Engine mount righthand fuselage bracket forward face cracked.
Part Defective P/ N BRACKET 2436654R
Total 10
00/1829 DEF
MA
29/05/2000
LTY
WANGANUI
RH lower 08100941 mount bracket RH lower 08100941 engine mount bracket A/F engine mount
11
00/2179 DEF
MA
30/05/2000
LTZ
WANGANUI
12
01/4075 DEF
MI
27/11/2001
LTV
Wanganui
The right lower A/F engine mount bracket was broken off.
13
02/1538 DEF
MI
9/05/2002
LTY
Wanganui
The right lower airframe engine mount bracket had mount bracket broken off. Engine Bracked Mount (right/hand lower A/F) found R/H Lower A/F 08-10094-1 cracked. Engine Bracket
14
03/244
DEF
MI
14/01/2003
LTZ
Wanganui
15
04/852
DEF
MI
3/03/2004
LTA
Napier
It was reported that the aircon compressor mount bracket was found fractured in two.
Compressor 08-74285-1 Mount Bracket
NSN
16
04/1483 DEF
MA
29/04/2004
LTE
Napier
During topdressing operations in flight the pilot Engine mount 08-10271-2 heard a loud "crack" sounding like a rifle shot. The strut aircrafts engine was noticed to have slightly displaced. An engineering inspection revealed the LH engine mount strut was found broken adjacent to the f orward attach bolt fitting. The left hand side longeron was also found cracked at the strut attachment.
17
Page 138
OCC No
Code
Sev MA
04/1483 DEF
Reg LTE Napier
Location
Description
Part Defective P/ N
Total 18
04/1581 DEF
MA
3/05/2004
JOF
Napier
Engine mount 08-10271-2 During topdressing operations in flight the pilot heard a loud "crack" sounding like a rifle shot. The strut aircrafts engine was noticed to have slightly displaced. An engineering inspection revealed the LH engine mount strut was found broken adjacent to the f orward attach bolt fitting. The left hand side longeron was also found cracked at the strut attachment It was reported that the top left bolt attaching the Attach Bolt AN6-54A engine mount frame to the engine mount strut broke through the treaded area at the base of the nut. During the take-off roll, a loud bang was heard and Strut/longeron 08-10271-3 the aircraft aborted the take-off. The left engine mount strut was found fractured and the longeron cracked. The inspection as per the ADand SB revealed Longeron cracking of the longeron at the 1/4 inch bolt location on the engine mount strut. An inspection as per the ADand SB revealed a cracked longeron at the 1/4 inch bolt hole location on the engine mount strut. An inspection of the engine mount strut and associated longeron revealed cracking of the longeron through the1/4 inch rear bolt hole strut attachment The left hand strut was removed for inspection as per the SB and AD.The engine mount attachment bolt AN6-54A was found bent in the engine mount strut, predominantly toward the treaded end. Longeron 243019-3L NSN
19
04/1967 DEF
MA
13/06/2004
LTA
Gisborne
20
04/2141 DEF
MI
17/06/2004
LTT
Napier
21
04/2144 DEF
MI
17/06/2004
LTU
Napier
243019-3L
22
04/2139 DEF
MI
20/06/2004
WAT
Napier
Longeron
243019-3L
NSN
23
04/2140 DEF
MI
25/06/2004
WAT
Napier
Strut
08-10271-3
24
Page 139
OCC No
Code
Sev MI
04/2145 DEF
Reg LTU Napier
Location
Description
Part Defective P/ N 08-10271-2
Total 25
During compliance with the AD and SB a crack was Strut found in the strut at the known fracture area. This is the interface of the engine mount attachment bolt tube and the main tube, through the weld. It was reported that the strut failed at the welded junction between the tube section and rear foot assembly. Super Air reported that the engine mount P/N 0851071-1 was found to be cracked at the cluster formed at tubes adjacent to the engines lower pickup attachments. Engine Strut Assy L/H
04/4180 DEF
MI
23/12/2004
LTX
Napier
08 10271 3
26
05/3739 DEF
MI
14/11/2005
LTQ
Hamilton
Engine Mount 08-51071-1
005
27
06/119
DEF
MA
22/01/2006
LTE
y Anaura Bay
y g g p g The aircraft was carrying out agricultural operations Engine mount AN6-60A when a loud noise was heard. The pilot made a to firewall bolt precautionary landing on a nearby beach. It was discovered that the top L/H engine mount to firewall attachment bolt had broken, causing substantial dama ge to the engine mount frame.
28
06/2975 DEF
MI
26/07/2006
LTC
Wanagaui
During a 200 hour dye penetrant inspection of the Engine Mount 08-10272-4 engine mount struts the LH engine mount strut was strut found to be badly cracked.
29
79/41
ACC
MA
27/02/1979
LTP
NR CAMBRIDGE
A complete loss of engine power occurred during the aircraft's maiden flight. in the course of the ensuing forced landing it passed through three fences. the design of the main fuel filter mounting and drain line caused a failure of the fuel line through propagation of a fatigue crack.
79-039
Page 140
OCC No
Code
Sev
Date Time UTC
Reg
Location
Description Aircraft engine flamed out seconds after pilot completed reversal turn at end of sowing run. during ensuing forced landing undercarriage collapsed when aircraft ran across drain. major damage to fuselage confined to structure forward of firewall. cockpit structure intact. subsequent investigation indicated engine flamed out due to ingestion of air through fuel selector valve
Part Defective P/ N
Part S/N TAIC Ref Class 80-144 5
Total 2
80/145
ACC
MA
30/12/1980
LTQ
NR OHURA
94/535
DEF
MI MA
7/02/1994 26/02/1998
LTP LTQ
HAMILTON MALAYSIA
COMPRESSOR The main oil cooler line ruptured, fortunately while OIL COOLER LINE the aircraft was on the ground. The pilot shut the engine down. During routine maintenance a small section of metal large exit duct 310926302 was found on top of the rear combustor drain when it was removed. Failure of rear bearing of air conditioning drive pad Drive assembly 6005-2RS seal, filled cavitiy between seal & drive pad 08bearing 74281-1 migrated down drive spline, around and through rear bearing, washing grease from bearing leading to failure. Pacific Aerospace (John Garwood let ter 21/06/2001) have investigated at length and is assessing modifications to achieve a resolution. Apparently this is not the first such problem with ZKLTX. Engine air conditioning drive pulley failed. During flight the Airconditioning system failed. Air con drive Drive adapter pulley assembly NSN
5 5
3 4
98/1863 DEF
00/2605 DEF
MI
19/07/2000
TMO
NAPIER
01/2983 DEF
MI
13/06/2001
LTX
Gisborne
01/2374 DEF 02/844 DEF
MI MI
17/06/2001 27/02/2002
LTX LTE
Gisborne Hawke's Bay
5 5
7 8
Page 141
OCC No 03/780
Code DEF
Sev MA MI
Date Time UTC 13/03/2003 30/06/2003
Reg LTY LTA
Location Wanganui Napier
Description The engine would not accelerate from ground idle because the P3 airhose was U/S.
Part Defective P/ N P3 air hose 3026687
Total 9 10
03/1990 DEF
During an inspection several cracks were found Exhaust duct around the bolt holes of the exhaust duct outlet flange flange. This same defect has been noticed before on other Cresco aircraft. During a hot section inspection the B.O.V. diaphragm was found to be chaffed through in two places and the bleed valve was not closing completely. During flight operations the operator observed the RH exhaust stack panting. p p It was reported that the aircraft lost power dramatically on two successive take offs. Wind gust, aircraft left strip APPROACHED AIRSTRIP TO COMMENCE DAYS TOPDRESSING, ON APPROACH AIRCRAFT SPEED SLOWED, HEAVY LANDING Aircraft suffered damage to prop and fuselage while Cam follower landing on wet grass. ZK-JAD in Malaysia has had a motor cyclist ride out in front of the aircraft on take off. The propeller struck the motor cyclist who died as a result of the injuries. While turning In a confined loading area the right STARBOARD wheel entered a hollow caused the aircraft to drop FLAP which allowed the starboard flap to catch on a fence post, damaging the flap. The Operator reported that the confined area and ground erosion, after heav y rain, were factors. Bleed valve diaphram
3111780-01 in098
03/2004 DEF
MI
2/07/2003
LTT
Napier
3103347-01
11
03/3596 DEF
MI
9/11/2003
LTE
Napier
Exhaust Stack 08-51087-1
12
/ 03/3911 DEF
MA
/ / 19/12/2003
LTC
g Wanganui 3 S Omarama NGAMATEA STATION
Fuel Control Unit
3049635-02 C22346
5 7 7
13 1 2
93/1238 ACC MA 12/03/1993 LTQ 94/327 INC MI 3/02/1994 LTS
96/2714
ACC
MA
10/10/1996
LTR
20 NE Wanganui
7 7
3 4
97/3003
ACC
MI
2/10/1997
JAD
Malaysia
00/4250
ACC
MI
18/12/2000
LTS
Te Wera
Page 142
OCC No
Code
Sev
Date Time UTC
Reg
Location
Description While ZK-LTT was engaged in aerial topdressing operations the low pressure "fuel" light illuminated followed shortly by a flameout. The pilot attempted a relight but due to the low height the aircraft was secured for a precautionary landing; the landing was made on a soft, uphill slope. The pilot stated that it was apparent that low fuel quantity may have contributed to the flameout. The pilot escaped from the substantially damaged aircraft safely. This aircraft was coming into land at Ora Station airstrip and just before it touched down the aircraft encountered a strong 'down-draft' which resulted in a heavy landing. The pilot made several low passes to clear sheep and then had to re-circuit because of a wind change. On that approach he encountered wind shear and turbulence that caused the aircraft to lose height and the right wing tip to scrape the ground. A go aroun d was made and a safe landing made next time. Only minor wing tip damage was caused.
Part Defective P/ N
Total 6
01/1966
ACC
CR
6/06/2001
LTT
Wairoa
01/2182
ACC
MA
26/06/2001
PWT
Weber
02/1158 INC
MI
17/02/2002
PDZ
Jardines
02/1366
ACC
MA
2/05/2002
LTS
Piopio
The aeroplane was on a normal approach to the airstrip, and with a tailwind of 8 - 10 knots, the pilot was aiming to touch down in the first quarter of the strip. The right mainwheel clipped the threshold of the strip and broke off. The aeroplane slid u p the strip and collided with an embankment.
Page 143
OCC No
Code
Sev MI
02/3386 INC
Reg PKB
Location East Otago
Description The aircraft was landing in know gusty tailwind conditions and was caught in a downdraught, which resulted in a heavy landing. It is reported that the aircraft (ZK-TTS) took off on rwy17 while ZK-EAI was on short finals. The pilot of EAI carried out a go-around due to TTS being on rw17 while EAI was on final for rwy17. It was reported that the loader struck the aircraft damaging the starboard flap. The loaders brakes failed due to a failure of the brake pedal unit in the rear cab. The pilot was trying to land after dark on an unlit airfield and with his landing light deliberately switched off (d t glare on propeller). Even it h d ff (due to l ll ) E though he was familiar with the field he became disoriented and flew away from above the runway and landed on the racecourse back straight boundary fence Airways reported that ZK-LTG was an arriving VFR flight at NZGS. The flight landed on RWY14 and rolled clear before the pilot reported a punctured tyre. The flight shut down at the drain adjacent to Farmers Air and clear of the main runway for approximate ly forty minutes while the puncture was repaired. No other aircraft were affected.
Part Defective P/ N
Total 10
03/3619 INC
MI
7/12/2003
TTS
Taupo
11
04/2151 INC
MI
24/05/2004
LTZ
R. Louries Airstrip
Right Hand Flap
12
04/2352 INC
MA
26/07/2004
LTY
Te Kuiti
13
05/197
DEF
MI
28/01/2005
LTG
Gisborne
Tyre
14
07/1005 INC
MA
27/03/2007
LTZ
Te Hekenga Stn
The pilot and loader driver got out of the aircraft to inspect loader for mechanical defect. The aircraft rolled backwards off side of strip and down steep hillside. The park brake was not applied.
15
Page 144
OCC No
Code
Sev MA
01/2140 DEF
Reg PDZ
Location Queenstown
Description
Part Defective P/ N
Total 1
01/2053
ACC
CR
13/06/2001
TMO
17 W Gisborne
Beta Rigging The pilot made a Mayday call because of a rough running engine. He was given a clearance to use the runway of his choice and he landed safely on runway 23. The Cresco had to be towed clear once it had stopped. Significant event. The Cresco aircraft had just taken off from the airstrip and initiated a dump during a steep left turn in order to remain clear of the surrounding terrain. However, the aircraft continued to lose altitude and there was insufficient he ight remaining to recover the situation. The aircraft subsequently struck the ground and a fence post then cartwheeled across a road and caught fire. The aircraft was destroyed and the pilot was killed in the accident.
02/896
ACC
MA
27/03/2002
LTV
nr Taihape
The Cresco had been operating off the strip for about two and a half hours, and was on its fifth flight since refuelling. It became airborne at the same point as on previous takeoffs, but shortly after takeoff, encountered "sink". The pilot was unable t o prevent the aeroplane colliding with the fence at the end of the strip and touching down in the next paddock. He applied reverse thrust which reduced the effects of subsequent collisions with further fences and a set of cattle yards. Conditions had been calm up to the time of the accident, and the pilot was certain that there was no power loss.
Page 145
OCC No
Code
Sev MI
93/4118 DEF
Reg LTS
Location HAMILTON
Description
Part Defective P/ N
Total 1
99/1281 DEF 03/1341 DEF
MI MI
26/04/1999 25/04/2003
LTX LTY
HAWKES BAY Wanganui
04/1580 DEF
MA
30/03/2004
JOF
Napier
04/2125 DEF
MI
28/06/2004
JOF
Napier
AUXILEC 524-010 234 STARTER/GEN ERATOR DC generating system voltage increased to GCU trip Circuit breaker voltage. An electrical wire from the no1 relay to the GCU GCU Electrical circuit breaker burnt out, filling the cockpit with Wire smoke. While carrying agricultural operations an electrical Gen field wire burning smell was evident and smoke emitted from the instrument panel. The pilot noticed that the discharge light Connector MS3126E-14- NSN illuminated, low pressure fuel light illuminate on Wiring 125 take off The voltage of the batteries was found to be at 22 Volts DC and there had been a hot start. While engaged in certification test flying the pilot of the prototype cresco aircraft encountered speed control difficulties which were immediately followed by in flight structural failures. the pilot baled out and the aircraft descended out of control and exploded upon ground impact. ELEVATOR 08-11229-1 MOUNTING AND 08-1 DRAG ANGLES FLAP CABLE CAB-F-61-91 POWER LEVER CAB-3-1 CONTROL CABLE HORIZONTAL STABILISER ATTACHME AH4H-7A 79-146
10 10
2 3
10
10
11
79/150
ACC
MA
10/12/1979
LTP
NR MARAMARUA
93/3844 DEF
MA
29/07/1993
LTS
WANGANUI
11
93/3863 DEF 93/3668 DEF
MA MA
29/07/1993 11/08/1993
LTS LTP NAPIER
11 11
3 4
93/4006 DEF
MI
20/08/1993
TMN
11
Page 146
OCC No 94/610
Code DEF
Sev MA
Reg LTR
Location WANGANUI
Description
Part Defective P/ N ENGINE CONTROL CABLE CABLE 1916240022 5 CAB-1-61-911196 243300-2. 0832001-2 243300-2. 0832001-2 CAB-F-61-911196 08-45661-3 CAB-P-14-832900 P-N-14-832929 CAB-F-61-911196 CAB-F-61-911196 08-32037-1 CAB-D-82-143262MAS AN5-36A
Total 6
94/1916 DEF 94/1716 ACC
MI MI MI MI MI MI MI
10/04/1994 18/04/1994 18/04/1994 9/05/1994 19/09/1994 19/09/1994 19/09/1994
LTR JAD JAD LTS LTS LTS LTS
WANGANUI Te Akau Te Akau WANGANUI WANGANUI WANGANUI WANGANUI Canopy detached during turbulence Canopy detached during turbulence
11 11 11 11 11 11 11
7 8 9 10 11 12 13
94/1716 DEF 94/2335 DEF 94/3946 DEF 94/3947 DEF 94/3951 DEF
CANOPYSTABILISER CANOPYSTABILISER CABLE CABLE STEERING POST ELEVATOR CONTROL SYSTEM ELEVATOR CONTROL CABLE CABLE CABLE HINGE Rudder cable
94/3953 DEF
MI
19/09/1994
LTS
WANGANUI
11
14
94/4425 DEF 94/4424 DEF 94/4488 DEF 96/337 DEF
MI MI MI MA
9/11/1994 24/11/1994 27/11/1994 7/02/1996
LTS LTS LTP LTT
WANGANUI WANGANUI NAPIER NAPIER
FLAP CONTROL SYSTEM FLAP CONTROL SYSTEM RUDDER HINGE CRACKED ALONG SIDE FLANGES. BOTH SIDES HAD HALF INCH CRACKS. Rudder control cable p/n CAB-D-82-14-3262 MAS. Right Hand On take off acft became uncontrollable. Major damage. Nosewheel steering. Elevator Control
11 11 11 11
15 16 17 18
96/430 96/954 96/952
ACC DEF DEF
CR MA MA
22/02/1996 13/03/1996 19/03/1996
JAD LTS LTR
MANGAKINO WANGANUI WANGANUI
Bolt
11 11 11
19 20 21
Link assembly 245235-2 Control cable CAB-P-832929
Page 147
OCC No 96/953
Code DEF
Sev MA
Reg LTR
Location WANGANUI
Description Elevator Control Whilst at rest on a farm strip with the engine running, the parking brakes failed and aircraft started running forward. Pilot made an immediate take off, during which the aircraft departed the strip, sustaining the loss of the LH main gear and related dam age. Once airborne aircraft routed to Wairoa and made an emergency, deadstick landing.
Part Defective P/ N Cable CAB-P-14-832900
Total 22 23
96/816
ACC
CR
24/03/1996
TMO
Wairoa
96/1668 DEF 96/2633 DEF 97/1706 DEF
MA MA MA
17/04/1996 19/08/1996 16/04/1997
LTS LTR LTV
WANGANUI WANGANUI WANGANUI
Elevator cable CAB-P-14-832900 Horizontal stabilizer P/N 08-3011-2 Hori stab 08-3011-2 Elevator control cable inspected and broken strands Elevator cable CAB-14-83found. 2900 During a 500 hour inspection the elevator control on Cables inspection was found to have broken strands. cab-d-14-832900
Elevator Control
11 11 11
24 25 26
97/1712 DEF
MI
7/05/1997
LTS
WANGANUI
11
27
97/2214 DEF
MA
10/07/1997
LTS
WANGANUI
Elevator control cable removed for 500hr inspection, elevator cable CAB-14-83broken strand found so a new cable was fitted. 2900 During normal 100 hour inspection corrosion of rivets was found in the elevator control system. Some rivets had corroded off. During normal 100 hour inspection corrosion of rivets was found in the elevator control system. Some rivets had corroded off. During flight the trim function failed. During flight the trim function failed. During maintenance the top and bottom flap skin was split along the trailing edge. ALLOY TUBE CORRODED ALLOY TUBE CORROSION Broken inner drive trim. INNERDRIVE TRIM Skin 08-45079-1
11
28
97/3826 DEF
MI
1/12/1997
LTQ
MALAYSIA
11
29
97/3827 DEF
MI
1/12/1997
JAD
MALAYSIA
11
30
97/3828 DEF 97/3829 DEF 97/3836 DEF
MI MI MI
1/12/1997 1/12/1997 2/12/1997
LTW PNX PNX
MALAYSIA MALAYSIA MALAYSIA
11 11 241606 11
31 32 33
Page 148
OCC No
Code
Sev MI MI MI
97/3837 DEF 97/3838 DEF 97/3839 DEF
Date Time UTC 2/12/1997 2/12/1997 2/12/1997
Reg JAD LTQ LTW
Location MALAYSIA MALAYSIA MALAYSIA
Description During maintenance the top and bottom flap skin was split along the trailing edge. During maintenance the top and bottom flap skin was split along the trailing edge. During maintenance the top and bottom flap skin was split along the trailing edge.
Part Defective P/ N skins skins skins 241607 241607 241606
Part S/N TAIC Ref Class 11 11 11
Total 34 35 36
00/429
DEF
MA
17/02/2000
TMM
TAUMARUNUI
During his pre flight inspection the pilot noticed that Aileron Hinge 241421 the L/H aileron outer hinge attachment support Attachment steel gussot had broken. Engineering consulted the manufacturer and repaired it. During inspection an elevator control cable was found to have broken strands sufficient to exceed serviceability limits. Cable CAB-D-14-832906 CAB-P-14-832906
11
37
00/4494 DEF
MI
27/03/2000
TMM
Wanganui
11
38
01/1409 DEF 01/1407 DEF 01/1632 DEF 01/1802 DEF 01/2390 DEF
MI MI MA MI MI
11/03/2001 13/03/2001 6/04/2001 1/05/2001 17/06/2001
LTV LTY LTY LTY LTZ
Wanganui Wanganui Wanganui Wanganui Wanganui
ELevator contol cable found to have broken strands Elevator control cable During 100 hour inspection elevator cable found to be us due broken strand. The elevator trim drive cable broke. The flap control handle ratchet mount was cracked around a weld. Flap control handle ratchet mount tube P/N 08 45911-1 cracked around weld allowing ratchet quadrant to pull off. Flap control handle ratchet mount tube P/N 08 45911-1 cracked around weld allowing ratchet quadrant to pull off. During maintenance the elevator cable was replaced because it was found to have several broken strands on it. Elevator cable Drive cable Flap handle Flap control ratchet mount Flap control ratchet mount
11 11
39 40 41 42 43
08-45241-3
11 11 11
01/2390 DEF
MI
17/06/2001
LTZ
Wanganui
11
44
01/2211 DEF
MI
20/06/2001
LTS
Wanganui
11
45
Page 149
OCC No
Code
Sev MI
01/3415 DEF
Reg WAT Napier
Location
Description
Part Defective P/ N
Total 46
The flap control cable was found damaged in several Flap cable places and worn through 50% in other places, due to contacting various fasteners and structure. During a 4 yearly inspection of the elevator control Rear elevator system the rear bell crank was found badly corroded bell-crank. and the mounting lug was cracked. The operation of the elevator trim was found to be erratic and the tab travel was operating out of sequence. The elevator trim would not work electrically or manually. During an inspection the elevator control rear bell crank was found cracked and badly corroded internally . i t ll Pilot was unable to fly aircraft in a balanced condition - rudder control was stiff. Elevator lower control cable found un-serviceable. Elevator and trim control Elevator trim Rear bell crank mount Push rod assembly Elevator Control System Flap cable 08-45653-1 CAB-D-14-832906 CAB-F-36-900892 MS25273-D1 08-45035-1
01/3797 DEF
MA
12/10/2001
LTS
Wanganui
11
47
02/419
DEF
MI
12/01/2002
LTE
Napier
11
48
02/422 02/848
DEF DEF
MI MI
21/01/2002 28/02/2002
LTE LTC
Napier Wanganui
11 11
49 50
02/2634 DEF 02/3603 DEF
MI MI
18/08/2002 1/12/2002
LTE LTH
Napier Wanganui
11 11
51 52
03/833
DEF
MI
4/03/2003
LTE
Napier
The flap control cable was found to have damaged wires in four locations. A new cable was fitted.
11
53
03/1618 DEF 03/2821 DEF
MI MI
19/05/2003 5/09/2003
JOF LTE
Napier Napier
The electric elevator trim failed to operate in the up Trim relay mode. Engineer reported that the aft cable link was found Link - Aft to be fitted at the Aft postion where another link (# Cable 08-45027-1) would normally be fitted. The aileron direct cables were found badly worn with some broken strands during a 4 yearly inspection.
11 11
54 55
03/2969 DEF
MI
2/10/2003
LTY
Wanganui
Aileron cables CAB-D-83-34- CAB-Ddirect 1850 83-341850
11
56
Page 150
OCC No
Code
Sev MI
03/3343 DEF
Reg LTY
Location Wanganui
Description
Part Defective P/ N CAB-D-14-832906
Total 57
The elevator lower control cable was found U/S due Elevator to broken strands. control cable
04/108
DEF
MI
5/12/2003
LTS
Wanganui
03/3640 DEF
MI
9/12/2003
LTL
Wanganui
The engineer reported that the aileron control cable was found very badly worn. The wear was mainly damaged strands. The flap control handle ratchet mount tube found badly cracked. This is possibly due to the ratchet mount weld being overloaded. The engineer reported that the aileron control cables were found very badly worn. The wear consisted of mainly damaged strands. It was reported that the rudder rod end bearings were found very tight on the push rod. The attach bolts were found to be working causing the bolt to wear against steering post causing damage to the stearing post and bolts. It was reported that the bolts retaining the control column in the quadrant were found to have not been fitted since new. The bolt holes were full of paint.
Aileron Control Cable Handle Ratchet Mount 08-45911-1
11
58
11
59
04/107
DEF
MI
7/01/2004
LTC
Wanganui
Aileron CAB-D-83-34Control Cable 1850 Rod end bearings 08-45653-1
11
60
04/488
DEF
MI
5/02/2004
JOF
Napier
11
61
04/754
DEF
MI
25/02/2004
LTN
Unknown
Control Column
08-45031-1
11
62
04/717
DEF
MA
1/03/2004
LTX
Napier
04/1643 DEF
MA
12/04/2004
WAT
Christchurch
Cables, 242671/72 It was reported that during compliance with AD DCA/CRESCO/06 on aileron cables, it was found that balance the balance cables were worn to limits at fairlead locations throughout wing with major wear was at the root location. It was reported that the aileron balance cables were Balance Cables 242672/2426 found worn at the fairlead locations. The direct 71 cables were found statisfactory.
11
63
11
64
Page 151
OCC No
Code
Sev MI MI
04/2764 DEF 04/2904 DEF
Date Time UTC 27/08/2004 9/09/2004
Reg EEL LTY Taieri
Location
Description
Part Defective P/ N
Total 65 66
Wanaganui
Cross Tube It was reported that the aircraft's cross tube Assy assembly was severely corroded internally. It was reported that during a 4 yearly airframe Aileron Cable inspection, an aileron cable was found badly worn. It was only 576 hours since it was new. It was reported that the elevator trim was found to be inoperative. Whilst carrying out a 700 hour inspection an elevator control cable was found unserviceable. Trim Elevator CAB-P-83Control Cable 2935
05/664
DEF
MI MI
11/01/2005 18/01/2005
JOF LTH
Napier Wanganui
11 11
67 68
05/1348 DEF
05/268
DEF
MI
21/01/2005
LTE
Napier
CAB-D-83-34During routine inspection both left and right aileron Aileron control cables were found worn at the centre wing Control Cables 1850 fairleads. The cable wear up to 50% of the strand with some broken wires evident on both cables. The pilot reported that the flap handle was bending Flap Handle during operations. It was reported that ZK-LTU left hand rudder pedal inputs failed during landing. Whilst carrying out a 700 hour inspection of the elevator control cable it was found broken. It was reported that the predrilled holes in the elevator trim tab were too close to the hinge. New aileron hinges arrived from the aircraft manufacturer for a Cresco aircraft with pivot holes drilled to 5/32" they should have been 3/16" in diameter. During a 700 hour inspection the elevator control cables they were found unserviceable.. Rod end Elevator Control Cable Elevator Trim Tab Hinge 09-31209-2 08-4-5919-1
11
69
05/2521 DEF 05/818 DEF
MI MI MI
28/02/2005 11/03/2005 18/04/2005
TML LTU LTH
Hamilton Napier Wanganui
11 11 11
70 71 72
05/1339 DEF
05/1414 DEF 05/1413 DEF
MI MI
19/04/2005 26/04/2005
NZO NZO
Queenstown Queenstown
11 11
73 74
Aileron Hinges 241546-1
05/1449 DEF
MI
3/05/2005
LTN
Wanganui
Elevator CAB-P-14-83Control Cable 2906
11
75
Page 152
OCC No
Code
Sev MI
05/1867 DEF
Reg LTL
Location Wanganui
Description
Part Defective P/ N 242672
Total 76
During an inspection the aileron cables P/N 242672 Aileron Cable and CAB-D-83-34-1850 were found to be unserviceable. During compliance with AD DCA/CRESCO/6 the aileron control cables was found unserviceable.
05/2289 DEF
MI
14/06/2005
LTH
Wanganui
Aileron 242672 Control Cables 08-04225-1
11
77
05/2948 DEF
MI
23/08/2005
LTX
Napier
During scheduled maintenance the doubler strap on Flap torque the flap push pull rod torque tube attachment was tube found to be cracked. The right hand aileron push rod, aft rod end fitting attachment rivets were found to be loose in the tube although tight in the fitting. An agricultural operator reported that the aileron fibre glass tip came loose and parted from the aircraft during the flight. Aileron push rod
11
78
05/3369 DEF
MI
3/10/2005
LTG
Napier
08-24015-1
11
79
06/387
DEF
MI
27/01/2006
LTQ
Te Kuiti
Aileron Fairing 08-24112-1
11
80
06/1166 DEF
MI
20/03/2006
LTY
Wanganui
During an inspection of the aileron cables Aileron Cable inaccordance with AD DCA/CRESCO/6 aileron cables P/N 242671, 242672 and D-83-34-1850 were found to be badly worn with broken strands.
242671/2426 72/
11
81
06/1168 DEF
MI
22/03/2006
LTV
Wanganui
During an inspection of the aileron cables Aileron 242671/2426 inaccordance with AD DCA/CRESCO/6 aileron Control Cable 72 cables P/N 242671, 242672 and D-83-34-1850 were found to be badly worn with broken strands. During an inspection of the aileron cables Aileron 242671/2426 inaccordance with AD DCA/CRESCO/6 aileron Control Cable 72 cables P/N 242671, 242672 and D-83-34-1850 were found to be badly worn with broken strands.
11
82
06/1167 DEF
MI
24/03/2006
LTZ
Wanganui
11
83
Page 153
OCC No
Code
Sev MI
06/1626 DEF
Reg LTT Taupo
Location
Description During agricultural operations the pilot lost use of his elevator trim. When complying with AD DCA/CRESCO/6 aileron cables P/N 242071, 2422072 and CAB - D - 83 - 34 1850 were found worn with broken strands. The pilot had reported that the right hand brake pedal was not fully returning after the brakes had been applied. During an AD inspection complying with DCA/Cresco/6 aileron cables P/N 242671, 242672 and CAB-D-83-34-1850 were all found with many strands broken. Fuel system. Float came off L.H. rear fuel tank sender unit and chaffed itself into small pieces contaminating tank. The pilot noticed that the low fuel pressure and rear boost pump warning lights were on and that there was no inlet fuel pressure. 1. Red low pressure fuel light illuminated - Green rear pump Ops light still on. Emergency switch activated - Front pump on. Post refuel - rear pump CB tripped. 2. Rear pump failed to cease operating and Front pump failed to start up It was reported that white vapour was noticed trailing from the right side of the aircraft on departure. The aircraft was informed and returned for landing. A safe landing was made. Nothing abnormal was found. The aircraft had been refuelled just before the flight and it was thought that some surplus fuel venting may have been seen.
Part Defective P/ N Trim Indicator Shaft Aileron 242071/2420 Control Cables 72
Total 84
06/2483 DEF
MI
7/06/2006
LTL
Wanaganui
11
85
06/4632 DEF
MI
3/12/2006
WAT
Napier
Brake Master Cylinder
10-51A
11
86
07/822
DEF
MI
9/03/2007
LTK
Wanganui
Aileron cables 242671/2426 72
11
87
97/1707 DEF
MI
16/04/1997
LTV
WANGANUI
Fuel tank sender unit Aux FUel boost pump Rear Aux Fuel 08-57135-1 Pump & Relay or 2C6-2 4AT2
12
02/1128 DEF
MI
10/03/2002
LTX
Napier
12
02/3575 DEF
MI
18/11/2002
LTT
Napier
12
04/595
INC
MI
13/02/2004
TTS
Taupo
12
Page 154
OCC No
Code
Sev MI
04/1043 DEF
Reg NZO
Location Queenstown
Description A film, possible fine carbon dust, was found on the sides of the engine driven fuel pump inlet filter bowl. During a scheduled inspection of Cresco aircraft the rear fuel pump was found to be seized and the brush holder melted. During a routine maintenance inspection a fuel leak was noted coming from the sump tank. Horizontal stabiliser main spar web cracked from right hand mounting bracket rivet holes.
Part Defective P/ N Filter Bowl/Filter Rear Fuel Pump Fuel Tank AN6235-3A
Total 3
05/2993 DEF
MI
29/08/2005
LTT
Napier
2C6-2
10AV5
12
07/2670 DEF
MI
19/07/2007
TMM
Hamilton
08-57215-1
12
97/2772 DEF 97/2773 DEF 97/3824 DEF
MI MA MA
8/09/1997 8/09/1997 1/12/1997
LTS LTV JAD
WANGANUI WANGANUI MALYSIA
MAIN SPAR WEB
08-30027-1 08-30027-1
13 13 13
1 2 3
Horizontal stabiliser main spar web cracked from left MAIN SPAR hand rear mounting bolt hole WEB During t/o the pilot could not move the elevator back to neutral position because the elevator had been damaged by rocks thrown back from the wheels. During t/o the pilot could not move the elevator back to neutral position because the elevator had been damaged by rocks thrown back from the wheels. The elevator pivot bolts were loose. The elevator pivot bolts were loose. The elevator pivot bolts were loose. During topdressing operations, pilot intuitively felt some problem with the elevator. Pilot inspected elevator and observed attachment looseness. Horizontal stabiliser RH mounting bolt badly corroded and broken off.
Tailplane/Elev 08-45079-1 ator
97/3825 DEF
MA
1/12/1997
LTQ
MALAYSIA
ELEVATOR/TAI 08-45079-1 LPLANE
13
97/3833 DEF 97/3834 DEF 97/3835 DEF 00/2517 DEF
MI MI MI MI
2/12/1997 2/12/1997 2/12/1997 30/07/2000
LTW JAD LTQ LTA
MALAYSIA MALAYSIA MALAYSIA GISBORNE
Pivot bolts PIVOT BOLT PIVOT BOLT centre bearing assembly
13 13 13 13
5 6 7 8
00/4524 DEF
MA
18/09/2000
LTY
Wanganui
13
Page 155
OCC No
Code
Sev MI
01/1755 DEF
Reg LTX Napier
Location
Description
Total 10
During routine maintenance it was noticed that the front Spar & elevator tips attachment screws were loose in the ribs spar area. Further investigation revealed cracking in two associated places. The elevator tip ribs were found cracked at the outer rear flange corners. Horizontal stabiliser LH mounting bolt badly corroded and possibly cracked. Left hand elevator outer rig found cracked top and bottom at spar attachment (08-31193-1). NAS 6604-8 bolt Elevator outer rig
01/1801 DEF 01/2391 DEF 01/2938 DEF 01/2993 DEF
MI MI MI MI
1/05/2001 17/06/2001 4/07/2001 16/08/2001
LTA LTZ TMN LTY
Hawkes Bay Wanganui Hamilton Wanganui
13 13 13 13
11 12 13 14
During 100 hour inspection rear mounted horizontal Rear mounting NAS 6604-23 stabiliser bolts with 317 TTIS, in last 4 months, was bolts found to be badly corroded. The elevator tension clip was found to be cracked. A stone off the main wheel damaged the left lower outboard skin panel and trailing edge spar cap extension of the tailplane. The horizontal stabiliser main spar centre web was found cracked near a mounting bracket. During maintenance a horizontal stabiliser rear mount bolt was found badly corroded after only 9 months (510 hrs) in service. During an inspection it was found that the elevator spar and outer rear rib were both badly cracked. The outboard elevator tip fell off in flight because the outer rib was cracked. tension clip Skin & Spar cap Horizontal stabiliser bolt
01/4061 DEF 01/3903 DEF
MI MI
25/09/2001 13/11/2001
LTX TMN
Napier Hamilton
13 13
15 16
02/841
DEF
MI
12/02/2002
LTY
Wanganui
13
17
02/1140 DEF
MI
26/03/2002
LTZ
Wanganui
13
18
02/1475 DEF
MA
23/04/2002
LTZ
Wanganui
08-31193-1 / 08-31137-1 Elevator end rib
13
19
02/1536 DEF
MI
8/05/2002
LTY
Te Kuiti
13
20
Page 156
OCC No
Code
Sev MI
02/1838 DEF
Reg LTE Napier
Location
Description Following similar faults in other Cresco's the elevator (GRP) fibreglass tips were both found cracked along with the right spar on one of them. The horizontal stabilizer rear mounting bolt corroded.
Part Defective P/ N Elevator end rib
Total 21
03/630
DEF
MI
27/02/2003
LTN
Wanganui
Tailplane mounting bolt
13
22
03/2884 DEF 03/2970 DEF
MA MA
27/08/2003 9/10/2003
TMM LTC
Hamilton Wanganui
Brackets 08-11217-1 Excessive movement in the tailplane attachment during 100 hour inspection. The spar top cap of the main spar in the horizontal main spar top 08-30023-2 stabiliser was found to have broken through. Stress cap. corrosion during its life is suggested as a cause.
13 13
23 24
03/3533 DEF
MA
1/12/2003
WAT
Napier
03/3536 DEF 05/2442 DEF
MA MI
2/12/2003 8/07/2005
WAT LTX
Napier Napier
During inspection of horizontal stabilizer rear spar in accordance with bulletin PAC SB/CR/032. Centre web found cracked. Rear spar top cap part number08-30023-2 found cracked at Station 8 RHS. The Cresco horizontal stabilizer rear spar attach bolt was found to be broken in two places.
Web
08-30027-1 08 30027 1
13
25
Top spar cap Stabilizer attach bolt
08 30011 4 NAS6604-23
020
13 13
26 27
97/944 99/770
DEF DEF
MA MI MA MA
14/03/1997 15/02/1999 11/10/1999 5/12/1999
TMN TMM LTT LTU
HAMILTON Hamilton NAPIER NAPIER
99/3611 DEF 99/3612 DEF
99/3613 DEF
MA
5/12/1999
TMO
NAPIER
Pilot reported a fuel leak. Fuel was leaking from port RIB leading edge tank during flight. fitting LH wing outer panel rear spar fitting found worn during inspection. Cracking found in wing outer panel. Wing Outer Panel Cracking found on the left hand wing outer panel. Left hand (See also WR 0/SAI/905). Wing Outer Panel Cracking found in right hand wing outer panel. (See Right hand also WR 0/SAI/905). wing outer panel
08-20071-1 08-20143-1 08-21101-1 08-21101-1 014 (aircraft) 012
14 14 14 14
1 2 3 4
08-21102-1
14
Page 157
OCC No
Code
Sev MA
99/3614 DEF
Reg PWT NAPIER
Location
Description Cracking found in left wing outer panel. (See also WR 0/SAI/905). During centre wing spar change the outer sections of web were found crcked. Cracks were extending from attachment rivets to outer edges and also down the flutes. Some crack up to 3/4" long at the flutes. Pilot reported fuel leak investigation found lh leading edge tank outboard rib cracked crack located in radius of flange forward bottom approx 2" long repaired by back to back angle section. The front fuel tank had an excessive leak that was traced to area of the spar web near the upper cap. Several rivets were f S l i t found l d loose i th t area with in that ith other showing signs of impending looseness. There have been a few unreported cases of structural damage to Cresco aircraft. ZK PWT has suffered severe wing deformation. During an inspection of the spar web on the left hand wing outer panel it was found to have a cracked flute first from the inboard end. During an inspection the front fuel tank baffle ribs were found cracked from the transfer holes of all the baffles.
Part Defective P/ N Left hand wing 08-21101-1 outer panel Web Outer Sections 08200231/0820024-1
Total 6
00/3838 DEF
MI
22/11/2000
LTA
Hamilton
14
00/4288 DEF
MI
21/12/2000
TMN
Taumarunui
Rib
08-20071-1
14
02/2262 DEF
MI
18/07/2002
WAT
Napier
Fuel Tank
14
03/1772 DEF
MA
18/06/2003
PWT
North Island
Wing
14
10
03/2366 DEF
MI
26/06/2003
WAT
Napier
wing outer panel Spar Web
08-21101-1
019
14
11
03/2423 DEF
MI
12/08/2003
LTA
Napier
Wing tank ribs 08-20073-1, 2, -3 08-21102-2 033
14
12
03/3161 DEF
MI
12/10/2003
LTE
Napier
The spar web was found cracked at the inboard flute Spar web of the outer wing panel. It was thought this was due to fatigue. The right hand forward wing attachment bolt head was found sheared off. This was possibily due to a previous fence strike. Wing attach bolt
14
13
03/3342 DEF
MI
17/11/2003
LTX
Napier
ANS-24A
14
14
Page 158
OCC No
Code
Sev MA
04/1484 DEF
Reg LTU Napier
Location
Description It was reported that the rear spar outer panel attachment fitting on the centre wing was cracked at the bolt hole.
Part Defective P/ N Outer panel attach fitting 08-20143-1
Total 15
05/2333 DEF
MI
14/07/2005
LTU
Napier
The Cresco aircraft was found to have a stress band Belly Stress cracked at the out board ends. Band During an inspection of the Cresco aircraft the outboard .leading edge rib of the right hand fuel tank was found t cracked at the upper camber flange and the outboard leading edge fuel tank baffle was cracked at the lightning hole. Th wing l di edge rib was f The i leading d ib found t b cracked d to be k d in five places at the leading edge skin attachment flange. This rib is also the fuel tank outboard rib. Fuel tank LE Ribs
08-10193-2
14
16
05/2332 DEF
MI
15/07/2005
LTX
Napier
14
17
05/3478 DEF
MI
19/10/2005
LTA
N i Napier
Wi rib Wing ib
08 20072 2 08-20072-2
14
18
05/4391 DEF
MI
10/11/2005
LTT
Napier
During a periodic inspection corrosion was found at Centre wing the left hand outboard flap hanger. Upon further components inspection externally and internally, extensive corrosion found internally throughout the centre wing.
Wing 032
14
19
07/2426 DEF
MI
15/06/2007
LTE
Napier
Working rivets were found on the left hand wing Wing spar spar cap from BL 26.5 to BL 64 and the main landing rivets gear rib at the attachment to the main spar. These rivets go through into the forward fuel tank and have become loose allowing fuel from the forward tank t o seep through into the wing.
14
20
Page 159
OCC No
Code
Sev MA
99/1421 DEF
Reg TMM
Location HAMILTON
Description
Total 1
During routine inspection a 3/4 inch crack was found ANGLE in the angle capping. The crack was on the left hand CAPPING side of the aircraft and initiated at a radius, extending the aircraft. A double repair was carried out with the manufacturers approval. This is t he first and only such defect. Fertiliser leaking in to the Cargo compartment was Fertiliser traced to a vertical crack in the rear hopper panel. It Hopper has since been repaired. The hopper outlet control system failed during operations. pp y The hopper handle assembly cracked at the cross shaft connection on both sides. This type of failure has occurred before a multitude of times on Cresco's. During maintenance cracks were found in the left fuselage angle capping. Lever Handle assembly pp Hopper Handle
00/418
DEF
MI
7/02/2000
LTY
NAPIER
15
00/3445 DEF / 01/1745 DEF
MA MI
27/10/2000 / / 30/04/2001
LTA LTA
GISBORNE Gisborne
08-48043-1
NSN
15 15
3 4
02/1841 DEF
MI
10/06/2002
LTE
Napier
08-10161-1 Angle capping
15
03/3164 DEF
MI
28/10/2003
PDZ
Queenstown
A 10" crack was found in the fuselage skin just aft of Skin the skydiving door. It is suspected that skydivers pressing against the skin prior to jumping are pressing on the skin in this area. During a scheduled inspection and with the hopper removed the stress bands were found cracked out board of the longerons. Both longerons were found cracked on the bend radius between Stations 115.34 and 118.84. Longeron stress band 08-10193-2
15
03/3344 DEF
MI
16/11/2003
LTX
Napier
15
03/3349 DEF
MI
16/11/2003
LTX
Napier
Longerons
08-11021-2 08-11
15
Page 160
OCC No 04/486
Code DEF
Sev CR
Reg NZO
Location Queenstown
Description
Part Defective P/ N
Total 9
During parachute operations of the Cresco aircraft Parachute the parachute door came off its tracks. The door was Door restrained only by drive strap jamming against rear attachment support.. It was reported that the fuselage rear frame P/N 08- Rear frame 11125-2 and frame bracket were found cracked when the horizontal stabilizer was removed for a spar inspection in accordance with AD DCA/CRESCO/4 It was reported that the LH longeron was found Strut fractured at the rear attach 1/4 bolt hole of the strut. In addition, the LH bush was missing, and both struts were found filed to assist the bolt head nesting. Both bolts were also found bent under the head. The pilot heard a loud bang during the pull-out after Longeron and a lime sowing run. Frame It was reported that during inspection the longeron Longeron was found to be cracked at the rear bolt attachment of the welded strut. It was reported that the parachute door came off the tracks. The door was restrained only by drive strap jamming against the rear support. It was reported that the cockpits left hand top longeron was found to be cracked from the engine mount strut small hole during strut inspection per PAC/CR/040 iss 3. Parachute Door 08-11221-1
04/487
DEF
MI
20/01/2004
LTU
Napier
15
10
04/1861 DEF
MA
31/05/2004
PWT
Napier
08-10271-2
NSN
15
11
05/376 05/367
DEF DEF
MA MI
19/01/2005 2/02/2005
TML TMM
Taumarunui Hamilton
15 15
12 13
05/1484 DEF
MI
5/02/2005
NZO
Queenstown
15
14
05/631
DEF
MI
11/02/2005
LTL
Wanganui
Cocpit Left Hand Longeron
15
15
Page 161
OCC No
Code
Sev MI
07/1334 DEF
Reg TMM
Location Hamilton
Description
Total 16
Aeromotive LTD reported that during the 100 hour Longeron inspection the left hand longeron was found to be cracked through the rear attachement 1/4" bolt hole for the welded strut P/N 08-10271-4. The crack length was right around the longeron except the inner edg e.
93/5540 DEF
MA
19/11/1993
TMN
Bolt NAS 1306- 245116 78
17
Page 162
OCC No Code Sev Date Time Reg Location UTC 05/1291 DEF MI 13/04/2005 JPP Switzerland
Description
Part Defective
P/ N
Part S/N
TAIC Ref Class 2
The grease nipple was not installed on the nose landing Grease nipple gear pivot bolt P/N 08-457-11-1. Excessive wear was found on the associated bushings. JPU-During 1000 hour routine inspection, found the MLG (RH) lower torque link one leg broken off at the centre pivot point. The Inertial Partical Seperator was found inoperative. Torque link
07/1665 DEF
MI
2/05/2007
JPU Hamilton
06/1971 DEF
MI
4/05/2006
FNZ Napier
Inertial Partical 11-50089-1 Seperator Tailplane/ Parts of Fuselage 106
04/2143 ACC
MA 4/07/2004
JPP
Switzerland
14 skydivers were completing a jump in three groups, the first group departed successfully. During the second groups departure one skydiver struck the aircraft tailplane. He was uninjured but the aircraft received damage to the tailplane area.
05/2097 DEF 06/1129 INC
MI MI
29/06/2005 JPP
Switzerland
Pilatus reported that the tail cone section of the aircraft Tail Cone contacted the ground. A pilot landing an aircraft on grass runway 11 at Taupo made the appropriate calls whilst on approach. During this time trhe pilot of a second aircraft called and taxiied his aircraft onto grass runway 11/19 to back track and taxi for runway 35. The pilot taxied his aircraft outside of the coned grass taxiway area close to runway 17/35. The pilot was advised, after a similar event the previous day, to use the correct area .
7 7
26/03/2006 FNZ Taupo
06/1747 INC
MI
1/05/2006
TTL
Taupo
Annex G: 750XL Occurrences
163
OCC No Code Sev Date Time Reg Location UTC 06/1986 INC MI 20/05/2006 TTL Taupo 07/1846 INC 05/4370 INC MI MI 8/05/2007 TTL Taupo
Description Taupo Unicom reported that ZK-TTL took off on runway 17 without making any radio calls. Airways reported that TTL was observed climbing after clearance was not given. The aircraft failed to climb out of ground effect while taking off and the lower dorsal fin struck a fence. There was no structural damage to the aircraft.
Part Defective
P/ N
Part S/N
TAIC Ref Class 7 7 9
20/12/2005 JPU Taumarunui
05/3124 DEF
MI
20/09/2005 JGI
Goteborg City
Wiring Loom After turning on the electrical master switch during unscheduled maintenance work a sparking sound occurred. A maintenance technicians noted some flashing light from the centre consol in the cockpit. The power was immediately switched off. The pilot of the Pacific Aerospace 750XL declared a full Aileron controls emergency because the right aileron jammed. Fortunately the aircraft managed to land safely. While ZK-XLA was carrying out a test flight from NZHN, the pilot reported as being unable to trim the aircraft which became unstable. A PAN call was made. The aircraft subsequently carried out a safe landing at NZHN. Push Rod It was reported that during a routine 150 hour Assembly inspection, both right hand aileron push rod fittings were found loose in the rod. It was noted that the 1/8 inch TLP-D rivets were loose as if they had not pulled up the correctly, and the fittings were not a tight fit in the rod. It was reported that the flaps would not extend or Flap Actuator retract. 164
10
01/3774 DEF
MA 12/11/2001 XLA Hamilton
11
02/1568 INC
MA 17/05/2002 XLA Hamilton
11
04/2152 DEF
MI
23/06/2004 TTL
Hamilton
11-45121-2
11
04/2329 DEF
MI
13/07/2004 FNZ Napier
NPC-01280
11
OCC No Code Sev Date Time UTC 05/3655 DEF MA 1/11/2005
Reg Location XLA Hamilton
Description
Part Defective
P/ N
Part S/N
TAIC Ref Class 11
The pilot reported that the aircraft was taxied normally Rudder and lined up on the grass runway 18 at Hamilton. The take off was commenced and as power was applied and the speed increased the aircraft began to drift to the left of the centre line. Full reverse was applied and the take off was aborted. The aircraft was taxied back to the line up position and another take off commenced. Left drift was again encountered and momentarily corrected with the use of right wheel brake. When airborne and right rudder was applied to correct for the left drift the aircraft yawed further to the left. It was then apparent that the aircraft's rudder was operating in the opposite sense. The aircraft completed on circuit and landed without the use of the rudder.
06/3646 DEF 07/593 DEF
MI MI
27/09/2006 JPU Hamilton 18/01/2007 FNZ Napier
During a routine inspection the right hand flap remained stationary. Flight Care reported that the rear flexi - cable was too long causing it to rub on the elevator trim jack bellcrank. The outer sheath was broken at the point it crosses the bellcrank however had spiral-wrap over it hiding the defect. The inner cable was u ndamaged still allowing normal operation of elevator trim.
Flap torque tube Elevator Trim Flexi - Cable
11-45631-1 1434-0041.00
11 11
07/435 07/823
DEF DEF
MI MI
2/02/2007
JPU Taumaranui
14/02/2007 JOA Hamilton
The pilot reported that the flap circuit breaker was Flap actuator tripping. Pilot reported a failure of the autopilot system during a routine test flight causing the auto-pilot to disconnect without warning.
11-45505-1
11 11
165
OCC No Code Sev Date Time Reg Location UTC 07/2252 DEF MI 29/05/2007 JPP Christchurch
Description
Part Defective
P/ N
Part S/N
TAIC Ref Class 11
During scheduled maintenance it was found there was Aileron chafing between the flap and the aileron. J51-2 7674P
07/2295 DEF
MI
6/06/2007
03/3794 ACC
CR
During a routine 100 hour inspection the elevator trim Planatary system was checked and found to be making a grinding gearbox noise. 26/12/2003 UAC 341 SSW KSFO The pilot of the ferry flight advised that he had a fuel problem and would not be able to complete the leg from Hawaii to mainland USA. A US Coast Guard C-130 was dispatched and rendezvoused with the aircraft, which ditched under the observation of the U SCG crew. The aircraft tipped onto its back on touchdown and the pilot did not surface. Pararescue swimmers dropped later from an Air National Guard MC-130 found the pilot dead. It was reported that during the 300hr inspection, the airframe fuel filter element was found to be the incorrect part number. Fuel was seen dripping out of the fuselage when the aircraft was parked on the ground. A hole in a new part was found to have been missdrilled by the part manufacturer. A PAC 750 XL currently operating in Europe was found to have corrosion on several steel parts. This was found after the aircraft's first annual inspection. Fuel Filter Element Hose Cross Feed Elevator hinge bracket Outer panel attach fittings
JPU Hamilton
11
12
04/678
DEF
MA 22/02/2004 FNZ Napier
1743045-01
12
04/4297 DEF 05/2398 DEF 05/1206 DEF
MI MI MI
18/08/2005 FNZ Napier 13/07/2005 JPU Hamilton 13/04/2005 JPP Switzerland
11-57115-1 08-31169-3
12 13 14
06/4970 DEF
MA 2/02/2007
JPU Hamilton
During investigation of a flap defect the wing rear spar was found to have to sheared fasterners and cracking.
Wing rear spar 11-200311/11-20032-
14
166
OCC No Code Sev Date Time Reg Location UTC 02/1786 DEF MA 10/06/2002 XLA Hamilton
Description Several faults were found in the rear fuselage and horizontal tail surface after the aircraft had completed the spinning phase of its test flights. During an inspection it was found the cockpit door had loose hinges and a delamination of the outer skin from the inner skin. A fuel pipe for the fuel system located in the cabin left side wall area has been damaged by chafing. No leakage had occurred at the time of detection but wall thickness for the pipe has been locally quite decreased.
Part Defective Frame STA 369 & Horiz bulkhead Door Hinges and skins Fuel Pi[pe
P/ N
Part S/N
TAIC Ref Class 15
05/2096 DEF
MI
29/06/2005 JPP
Switzerland
15
07/2557 DEF
MI
5/07/2007
JGI
Gothenborg Sweden
15
167
OCC No 04/757
Code DEF
Sev MI
Reg JPC
Location Wairamarama
Description
Class
Total 1
06/2193
INC
MI
30/05/2006
JPC
Opotoki
97/1997
DEF
MI
27/06/1997
MAW Blenheim
2 The pilot heard a loud bang from the undercarriage on take-off roll. The bungy assembly in suspension had failed by the support lug breaking. The wire cable back up cords also broke. The pilot reported that the left-hand main wheel rim 2 cracked after going over going over a rabbit hole with full AUW. Impulse coupling defects are worn and loose pawl pivot 6 pins. Drive gear support bearings located in rear of crankcase have also been found defective. In the magneto we have had distributor low speed gear bearing bush worn out at 300hrs since new. Also the nylon drive gear located on rotor shaft worn on drive tongue allowing 15 to 20 of free movement. We have also had an impulse coupling retaining nut to shaft thread stripped. Nut only retained by split pin. Impulse coupling defects are worn and loose pawl pivot 6 pins. Drive gear support bearings located in rear of crankcase have also been found defective. In the magneto we have had distributor low speed gear bearing bush worn out at 300hrs since new. Also the nylon drive gear located on rotor shaft worn on drive tongue allowing 15 to 20 of free movement. We have also had an impulse coupling retaining nut to shaft thread stripped. Nut only retained by split pin. Impulse coupling defects are worn and loose pawl pivot 6 pins. Drive gear support bearings located in rear of crankcase have also been found defective. In the magneto we have had distributor low speed gear bearing bush worn out at 300hrs since new. Also the nylon drive gear located on rotor shaft worn on drive tongue allowing 15 to 20 of free movement. We have also had an impulse coupling retaining nut to shaft thread stripped. Nut only retained by split pin.
97/1998
DEF
MI
27/06/1997
DMC
Blenheim
97/1999
DEF
MI
27/06/1997
CMC
Blenheim
Annex H: GA200 Occurrences
168
OCC No 98/3074
Code DEF
Sev MI
Reg CMC
Location TIMARU
Description The engine was in the workshop for a bulk strip due to a history of vibration causing constant Magneto defects. The rough running engine, cut out as power was reduced on approach. The aircraft made a perfectly successful forced landing 2nm south Woodbourne. Not reported by operator. Defect report sent by maintainer. Investigation of dead cut L/H magneto revealed the contact assembly "spade" terminal to which the primary lead, from where the coil pushes on, was found to be broken. Broken valve springs found during routine servicing (oil & filter change). The operator reported that the right exhaust needed inspection. It was found that there was a piece missing from the pipe. Engineer reported the aircraft's engine was rough running during ground Mag Checks. PIC reported the aircraft had very high fuel flow during topdressing operations. The engine cut out with idling power. Applying the axillary fuel pump restored normal fuel pressure. It was reported that the engine was running out of fuel without the collector tank low fuel light illuminating. The wiring terminals for indication system were found corroded in the collector tank. The engine magneto drive bearings had failed and the left and right hand magnetos were found destroyed inside.
Class 6
Total 4
99/2333 01/2118 01/2975 02/1576
DEF DEF DEF DEF
MI MA MI MI
8/08/1999 19/06/2001 10/08/2001 17/04/2002
CMC
TAKAKA
6 6 6 6
5 6 7 8
MAW Woodbourne PGH Rangiora
MAW Omaka
03/408 03/486
DEF DEF
MI MI
14/01/2003 17/01/2003
RMW RMW
Feilding Feilding
6 6
9 10
03/2414 03/3339
DEF DEF
MI MI
18/07/2003 4/11/2003
PGH FJN
Tokoroa Parnassas
6 6
11 12
04/1230
DEF
MI
19/03/2004
NTO
Unknown
13
04/1174
DEF
MI
31/03/2004
PGH
Unknown
14
04/3122
DEF
MA
14/09/2004
DMC
Lawrence
It was reported that the aircraft experienced power loss 6 directly after take off with only 2100 RPM. Smoke was seen coming from the exhaust and in the cockpit. The load was jettisoned and the aircraft returned to the strip.
15
169
OCC No 06/1823 07/1124
Code DEF INC
Sev MI MA
Date Time UTC 6/05/2006 23/03/2007
Reg NTO EMD
Location Feilding Pahiatua
Description
Class
Total 16 17
The engine number 5 cylinder was removed due to an oil 6 leak from the base of the cylinder. The pilot reported that the aircraft was returning to base 6 when the engine lost all power. A forced landing was then carried out in a paddock. During the landing roll the aircraft went through a fence before coming to rest. The aircraft engine experienced an excessive magneto mag drop. 6
07/1700 99/1200
DEF ACC
MI MA
21/05/2007 2/05/1999
NTO FMC
Feilding Akaroa
18 1
During transit between operating sites, via the south coast 7 of Banks Peninsula, the pilot encountered an approaching front. He turned back to his departure point only to find that the weather behind had deteriorated. He landed on a farm property at the head of Peraki Bay, but the aeroplane sustained damage to the undercarriage, one wing, the forward fuselage and propeller on landing. The pilot was uninjured. En route to Palmerston North, the pilot encountered 7 worsening weather conditions south of Levin. Rather than turn back, he elected to land the aeroplane in a farm paddock. Poor braking action due to long wet grass resulted in the aeroplane overrunning t he available landing space and colliding with the boundary fence. The pilot was uninjured. The aircraft landed on a sloping topdressing airstrip in 7 calm conditions and failed to stop due to excessive dew on the grass. The right hand wing tip contacted the bank causing minor damage to the wing and and propeller tips. THE ENGINE LOST POWER ON TAKEOFF. THE LOAD OF WATER WAS DUMPED AND THE AIRCRAFT MADE A SAFE LANDING. 9
99/1526
ACC
MA
27/05/1999
FMC
Ohau
99/2833
ACC
MI
23/09/1999
CMC
Awatere Valley
98/1840
DEF
MA
28/06/1998
PRT
Westport
170
OCC No 00/655
Code ACC
Sev MA
Reg PGH
Location Lake Brunner
Description The pilot was conducting supervised spraying operations from a sealed strip with a grass extension at either end. The supervising pilot had been taking 600-litre loads throughout the morning, and it was the intention of the pilot under supervision to sta rt with 500 litres. However, 600 litres was loaded inadvertently on the first flight of the afternoon, and the pilot decided to continue with that load. The take-off run started from the grass short of the sealed strip, but when the aircraft ran on to the seal, a slight tailwheel shimmy developed. The pilot applied light braking to assist in raising the tail, but then encountered directional control problems on the cambered strip, exacerbated by a quartering crosswind. The aircraft failed to become properly airborne, over-ran the departure end of the strip and collided with a fence, sustaining substantial damage. The pilot was not injure
Class 9
Total 2
01/41
ACC
CR
10/01/2001
PGH
Amberley
01/308
ACC
CR
29/01/2001
FMC
Guards Bay
02/2082
ACC
MA
28/06/2002
RMW
Waituna West
Significant event: ZK-PGH had completed a downhill spray 9 run. As the aircraft climbed up the other side of the gully it crashed into the ground. ZK-FMC had its propeller strike the ground just before lift 9 off from a fairly steep topdressing airstrip. The pilot immediately jettisoned the load and endeavoured to complete a forced landing on the beach below the strip but failed to reach the area a nd subsequently ditched into the sea The aircraft failed to become airborne off the farm strip 9 after the pilot jettisoned the load, and it clipped a fence post. The hopper door was flung back, damaging the cockpit floor, and putting two holes in the fuselage fabric. It was reported that the aircraft's wing tip touched the ground on take off after experiencing some sink. Damage was found on the outer wing so the aircraft was flown back to base for repairs. 9
04/3022
INC
MI
18/09/2004
JPC
Glenmarry Airstrip
171
05/3596 04/3251 06/2675
ACC DEF DEF
MI MA MI
6/11/2005 7/10/2004 29/06/2006
EMD
Pongoroa
MAW Blenheim PGH Rotorua
9 It was reported that the aircraft hit a hill whilst top dressing. It was reported that during a 100 hour inspection the 11 rudder cable was found to be almost severed. The aircraft was sowing urea when at the end of a sowing 15 run the A frame on the hopper door opening broke on both sides of the hopper door. The front of the spreader dropped down and caused a vibration. Power was reduced and the aircraft landed back on th e strip.
7 1 1
172
OCC_No 07/384 07/1523
Code DEF ACC
Sev MI MA
Date Time UTC 16/01/2007 8/05/2007
Reg JHG MAA
Location Feilding Five Rivers
Description The aircraft tail spring broke during the takeoff run. The aircraft had an accident on takeoff during an agricultural operation, which caused substantial damage. Refer to Engineering. Pilot reported Vibs onlandingthroughLH brake pedal. Vis inspection found dust cap axle nut and outer bearing caged missing.
Part Defective Unknown Fin Structural Failure
Class 2 2
Total 0 1
Rudder
08/828 08/2284 07/2325
DEF DEF DEF
MI MI MA
11/02/2008 8/05/2008 29/06/2007
JHG JHG PTK
Woodville Feilding Napier
Routine inspection found RH rear u/c clamp Landing Gear Structural Failure attachment weld cracked. The aircraft was top dressing 3nm West of Wing Attachmnets Napier airfield when the pilot reported an engine failure. The aircraft then joined for grass runway 07 and landed without incident or damage. Aircraft had taken off from greasy Engine Mount agricultural strip with pilot not realising the park brakes were not fully released. Aircraft subsequently nosed-over when landing on sealed runway at Masterton destroying the propellor and damaging internal engine compo nents.
2 5
2 3
01/2927
INC
MI
6/07/2001
JHG
Masterton
06/3660
INC
MI
28/09/2006
SAT
Lavericks Bay While spreading super-phosphate around a Turbine Engine farm the pilot accidentally flew the aircrafts' undercarriage into the "Orion Network" High Voltage 11kVt overhead powerline spanning across the valley. The line broke due to 'wire-cutters' on undercarriage severi ng the cable. Napier The propeller gaskets were found to be defective during an inspection. Piston Engine
06/985
DEF
MI
2/02/2006
PTK
Annex I: Air Tractor Occurrences
173
OCC_No 07/935
Code ACC
Sev MA
Reg PTK
Location Waipoapoa Station
Description
Part Defective
Class 9
Total 7
The aircraft encountered sink after Operational Error becoming airborne and the pilot initiated a load jettison. However the aircraft struck a fence and caused substantial damage to the rear wing spar and ailerons. The pilot made a successful out landing in a paddo ck approximately 3 miles away.
Annex I: Air Tractor Occurrences
174
OCC No 70/26 70/28 70/67 70/84 70/105 71/12 71/26
Code ACC ACC ACC ACC ACC ACC ACC
Sev MA MA MA MA MA MA MA
Date Time UTC Reg 30/10/1989 13/09/1991 13/10/1991 6/07/1992 21/07/1992 16/11/1992 5/02/1971 CSC ESL DPA DSA DSA DPW CSF
Location OMAHUTA FOREST NOT KNOWN TAUPO UNKNOWN UNKNOWN MOSGIEL NR MASTERTON
Description
Part Defective
Code 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 1 2 3 4 5 6 1
Collapse of the tailwheel mounting tube caused loss of directional control on takeoff. the pilot vacated the aircraft to investigate and the unattended aircraft rolled down a bank. one undercarriage leg collapsed and the aircraft dropped onto one wing. At the start of the takeoff roll the tailwheel jammed in the fully deflected position. directional control could not be maintained on the slippery surface and the aircraft groundlooped into a fence and slid backwards into a gully. Failure of the righthand main leg saddle bolts during the landing roll caused the pilot to lose directional control, as the result of which the aircraft groundlooped and the leg folded underneath the fuselage. The right undercarriage main attachment bolt failed during takeoff but the pilot was able to maintain control and made a landing back at base with minimal damage. The pilot reported that when landing from a topdressing sortie the tail sank lower than usual. inspection revealed that the tail spring had broken in the vicinity of station 224.
71/38
ACC
MA
21/07/1971
CSE
CHEVIOT
71/42
ACC
MA
29/01/1973
CSK
OTAKI
71/67
ACC
MA
23/07/1973
CQY
TUAPEKA WEST
71/98
ACC
MA
9/09/1973
CQZ
THE KEY
Annex J: Cessna Agwagon Occurrences
175
OCC No 72/38
Code ACC
Sev MA
Date Time UTC Reg 19/11/1973 CSD
Location AWATOITOI STN
Description Aircraft about to lift off from topdressing strip with 15cwt load of superphosphate when port undercarriage leg separated. metallurgical examination of the fracture surfaces revealed a brittle fracture which had been initiated by a small fatigue crack in a fretted area on the The pilot was completing a ferry flight with his loader driver to begin operations from the strip. the aircraft bounced on landing and touched down again on the rough verge. the left undercarriage leg collapsed when the aircraft was brought to a stop and the aircraft then ran backwards over the side of the strip. At touchdown the lefthand main wheel collapsed and in the ensuing ground loop the starboard wing and nose of the aircraft were extensively damaged. Shortly after starting a takeoff run down the steep slope of the strip the pilot heard a bang and felt vibration throughout the aircraft. he abandoned the takeoff. during a ground loop made to stop the aircraft, one undercarriage leg collapsed. the tail wheel pivot bolt was found to have failed from fatigue, thereby allowing the tail wheel to become detached. To avoid going over the side of the strip when the aircraft began to veer to the left after landing the pilot initiated a groundloop in the same direction. separation of the lefthand leg during the loop was found to have been caused by prior overstressing of the saddle forward attachment bolt. A groundloop occurred while the aircraft was being manoeuvred for takeoff as the result of which the righthand main undercarriage collapsed. The aircraft lost a wheel during the takeoff from a strip and was damaged in the subsequent landing.
Part Defective
Code 2
Total 6
72/79
ACC
MA
31/01/1974
CSD
LONG BUSH
72/118
ACC
MA
5/03/1974
CSA
AWAKINO
72/122
ACC
MA
19/04/1975
CQM
AHUROA
73/23
ACC
MA
2/03/1976
CQV
AWAKINO
10
73/29
ACC
MA
19/03/1976
CSK
COLYTON
11
73/48
ACC
MA
30/11/1978
DMD
AWARUA
12
176
OCC No 73/79
Code ACC
Sev MA
Date Time UTC Reg 23/03/1980 DOE
Location KAIHU
Description On landing a fatigue crack caused the aircraft's tailwheel spring to fracture during the landing roll. The aircraft ran off the side of the strip when the right brake failed during a down wind landing. The aircraft's right undercarriage leg separated on takeoff and the pilot made a successful precautionary landing at his base airfield. the fatigue fracture of the leg had initiated at corrosion pits on the surface of the metal. On landing the aircraft ran through a concealed drain on the strip. the right undercarriage leg separated and the aircraft came to rest nose down. On landing the aircraft bounced then sank to the left when the left undercarriage spring leg fractured at the mudguard attachment bracket. the failure was due to a fatigue crack originating from a corrosion pit. The right mainwheel separated from the aircraft after takeoff due to the failure of unsuitable retaining nuts fitted to the axle retention bolts. the aircraft tipped onto its nose and left wing tip at the end of the subsequent landing run. FIRST LANDING ON STRIP FOR START OF TOP DRESSING OPS. ARRIVED A LITTLE FAST AND HAD TO SWERVE TO AVIOD HITTING LOADER GRASS VERY WET ONE MLG LEG COLLAPSED
Part Defective
Code 2
Total 13
73/88 73/100
ACC ACC
MA MA
8/10/1980 3/03/1982
DMD DOE
OMAMARI NR TAUMARUNUI
2 2
14 15
73/140
ACC
MA
11/05/1982
DME
EAST STRATFORD
16
74/15
ACC
MA
8/03/1984
DOE
PIRIAKA
17
74/30
ACC
MA
24/10/1985
DOZ
WAIRAKEI
18
74/71
ACC
MA
11/04/1995
LDZ
SOUTH OTAGO
19
74/82
ACC
MA
28/11/1996
JCR
WANGANUI
Six brake discs were found to be cracked during a Brake routine inspection. Corrosion was found around the weld area attaching the cup shaped mild steel pressing to the disc. This had significantly weakened the weld. This was considered to be a manufacturing f ault and due to lack of protective coating.
20
177
OCC No 74/110
Code ACC
Sev MA
Date Time UTC Reg 16/11/1997 LDZ
Location Dunedin
Description During the landing of a light aircraft the aircraft spun 270 degrees to the left and ended east of the runway. Damage to the right side of the undercarriage occurred. After liftoff the windscreen became covered with oil, engine began to overspeed and propeller thrust become '0'. in forced landing, initial impact taken by right wing against steep slope. aircraft cartwheeled and came to rest inverted in a stream where it caught fire. pilot retained consciousness and was able to extricate himself and move away. (investigation details in summary A complete and sudden power loss during a gorsespraying operation necessitated forced landing on rough terrain. cause of the power loss was fatigue failure of no. 4 connecting rod. The aircraft was extensively damaged during a forced landing on rough terrain following a total power loss during a flight to the sowing area. a strip examination revealed the top land of no. 5 piston worn away and pieces of broken ring in the combustion chamber. Following an engine and power loss at low level the aircraft collided with a wire and spun to ground level. Engine failure, forced landing Engine failure, forced landing On flight in company with DEP from Fielding to Hastings. Had engine failure and put down in scrub without injury. The aircraft destroyed by fire While AD DCA/Con/140a was being executed it was found that the IO-520 exhaust valves were excessively corroded.
Part Defective
Code 2
Total 21
74/116
ACC
MA
15/07/1970
CQQ
TARAPATIKI
74/122
ACC
MA
6/12/1972
COT
ASHLEY GORGE
75/54
ACC
MA
30/09/1974
COQ
NR RAETIHI
75/60
ACC
MA
14/04/1989
DMA
NR TE PUKE
75/133 75/137 76/39
ACC ACC ACC
MA MA MA
13/03/1993 29/03/1994 14/11/1995
EJL DSA DPA
Cheviot Masterton TAIHAPE
6 CONROD,CR 6 ANKSHAFT 6
5 6 7
76/40
ACC
MA
14/09/2001
JCR
Feilding
Exhaust Valves
178
OCC No 76/42
Code ACC
Sev MA
Date Time UTC Reg 31/10/2001 EJL
Location Culverden
Description At the conclusion of the topdressing job the pilot landed and shutdown the aircraft so he could load some personal gear on board. It was at this time he heard a fluid 'running' sound and saw that oil was pouring from the engine area. It was found that a h ose clamp had come loose and allowed the remote oil cooler pipes to wear against the sump. The Agwagon had just got airborne when a loss of power was experienced and the pilot made a forced landing. Pilot noticed a loss in power on take-off, managed to negotiate a circuit and land without incident While the aircraft was crop spraying, the right wing struck a dead branch of a gum tree on the edge of the field. the pilot maintained control and returned to the airstrip. the pilot had misjudged clearance between the wing and the tree. Crop spraying was being carried out at last light. approach made over 60 ft trees. during round-out at spraying height, aircraft stalled and squashed heavily into crop. travelled 50 yds, then became airborne, but rapidly reduced airspeed influenced pilot to land in adjacent paddock. while approaching, aircraft stalled, landed heavily. fire in battery and destroyed aircraft. During a cross-wind landing on an aerial work airstrip the left wheel ran into a soft patch and loss of control occurred. the aircraft groundlooped to the left and came to rest on a reciprocal heading beyond the side of the strip.
Part Code Defective Oil pipes and 6 clamp
Total 9
76/49
ACC
MA
14/09/2003
CSM
South Island
Muffler
10
76/51
ACC
MA
6/10/2006
LDZ
Balclutha
Cylinder assembly
11
76/63
ACC
MA
19/10/1970
CQP
MARTON
76/75
ACC
MA
8/12/1970
CQT
BUNNYTHORPE
76/84
ACC
MA
1/11/1971
CQJ
KINLEITH
179
OCC No 77/17
Code ACC
Sev MA
Date Time UTC Reg 18/03/1972 CQX
Location OHINGAITI
Description During a spray run one wing collided with a piece of rusty water pipe protruding from the crop. in flight the obstruction was almost visible against a background of ripe barley. the farmer knew of the obstruction but had not considered it significant enough to warn the pilot. During a cross country ferry flight deteriorating weather necessitated a precautionary landing being made on a golf course. shortly after touchdown a previously unseen hummock caused the aircraft to be thrown 4050 ft into the air and in the subsequent ground impact the port undercarriage leg was torn off. At the completion of a topdressing run the pilot failed to maintain adequate terrain clearance and the aircraft collided with high tension power lines. The pilot landed his aircraft in a paddock too fast and too close to a tanker. he braked but wet grass made this ineffective and an attempted groundloop to avoid the tanker resulted in the aircraft's elevator and tailplane striking it. The pilot partially applied brakes on his first touchdown on the strip. a fresh tail wind was blowing. the tail rose and after skidding for 60 yards the aircraft overturned. The pilot touched down on an uphill-sloping strip. as the upper part of the strip came into view during the landing roll the pilot realised that he was off-line and heading towards a gully. he endeavoured to groundloop but was unable to prevent the aircraft from sliding down a bank. After completing a spray run over steep terrain the pilot pulled sharply into a climb near a lone pine tree. he encountered light turbulence and the left wing struck the tree.
Part Defective
Code 7
Total 4
77/49
ACC
MA
2/02/1973
CSM
PATEA
77/79
ACC
MA
14/10/1974
CQK
NR TE ANAU
77/103
ACC
MA
8/11/1974
CQY
WAITAHUNA
77/108
ACC
MA
8/05/1975
DPC
NR WAINUI
77/123
ACC
MA
8/12/1975
CQY
WAITAHUNA
78/3
ACC
MA
26/12/1975
DOY
CHEVIOT
10
180
OCC No 78/46
Code ACC
Sev MA
Date Time UTC Reg 4/03/1976 CSB
Location RANGITIKEI RVR
Description The pilot dived left to avoid a large flock of seagulls which rose directly in front of the aircraft, but then collided with unseen telephone lines strung from a high bluff. While landing on an exposed airstrip in unfavourable weather conditions, the pilot experienced difficulty in maintaining directional control. a wheel entered a washout on one side of the strip and the aircraft fell off the strip. After landing the brakes were ineffective on wet grass and the pilot yawed the aircraft sideways to increase effectiveness but one wheel ran over the side of the strip and the aircraft collided with a tree. When wind conditions became unsuitable for further topdressing the pilot decided to terminate operations from the strip and return to base. as the takeoff roll was commenced a cross-wind gust lifted the port wing bringing the starboard wingtip, stub wingtip and propeller into contact with the ground. thereafter the aircraft swung through 240 deg and struck a fence The strip being used sloped out of the pilot's view after the first 100 metres. he mistook the direction of takeoff and the aircraft sank into a hollow containing large stones. the left undercarriage collapsed and the aircraft slid to a stop. The aircraft undershot a selected touchdown point by approx 15 feet. contact with rough ground in the undershoot area resulted in the left under-carriage leg being torn from its mounting. After touchdown following a normal approach for a downwind/uphill landing the pilot applied brakes very firmly and the aircraft overturned.
Part Defective
Code 7
Total 11
78/145
ACC
MA
12/05/1976
CQV
NR WAITOMO
12
78/158
ACC
MA
13/06/1976
DOE
MATAKOHE
13
79/17
ACC
MA
22/07/1976
CQJ
MATAHIWI
14
79/39
ACC
MA
4/02/1977
CSE
AVON VALLEY
15
79/45
ACC
MA
17/03/1977
DPU
RANGIWAEA
16
79/125
ACC
MA
12/10/1977
DPX
WAITANGIRUA
17
181
OCC No 80/45
Code ACC
Sev MA
Date Time UTC Reg 6/01/1978 CSM
Location NR TOKOROA
Description On takeoff the aircraft ran into a cloud of pumice dust which it had created turning around on the strip. after abandoning the takeoff a groundloop was initiated to prevent the aircraft going over a steep drop off the end of the strip. Aerodrome closed due to flooding and an appropriate notam issued. when pilot landed on grass, he encountered a large pool of water which was hidden by long grass and the resultant drag flipped the aircraft on its back. the pilot was not aware of the closure which occurred after he departed earlier in the day. While the pilot was landing the aircraft with the sun in his eyes, he felt a jolt and heard a bang and immediately initiated a go around. the aircraft had hit a sheep which had wandered onto the strip. one undercarriage had been dislodged and when the aircraft landed back at base it dropped onto its wingtip. After touchdown in gusty conditions with moderate turbulence the aircraft became airborne again drifting sideways. an attempt to control the aircraft was unsuccessful and it was substantially damaged in the ensuing groundloop. The pilot misjudged the approach for a crosswind landing on an uphill landing strip made greasy by recent rain. he was unable to prevent the aircraft sliding into the loading area and colliding with the parked loading vehicle. no overshoot was practicable and the pilot's attempt to groundloop the aircraft was unsuccessful. The pilot was unable to maintain directional control of the aircraft when taking off in a strong gusty crosswind. he was committed to takeoff and the aircraft collided with a fence.
Part Defective
Code 7
Total 18
80/110
ACC
MA
13/11/1978
DJZ
TE KUITI AD
19
81/80
ACC
MA
26/02/1979
CSC
HOTEOE
20
82/28
ACC
MA
1/03/1979
CSM
WAIOURU AD
21
82/52
ACC
MA
11/10/1981
CQD
PUNGAREHU
22
82/122
ACC
MA
29/05/1984
DRZ
HINAKURA
23
182
OCC No 83/55
Code ACC
Sev MA
Date Time UTC Reg 26/11/1984 DPA
Location CHELTENHAM
Description A wheat crop on the side of the airstrip had grown since the strip was last used. on landing the spray boom struck the wheat and the aircraft groundlooped. The pilot vacated the cockpit quickly when a bee or a wasp started to bother him. he inadvertently knocked the throttle open and then fell off the wing as the aircraft rolled forward and collided with the fertiliser bin. On departure the pilot taxied the aircraft into a patch of ground fog. the windscreen frosted over and the aircraft's right mainwheel dropped into a drain beside the runway. On landing the aircraft's sprayboom snagged in a tall crop alongside a narrow airstrip and caused the aircraft to groundloop. Taxied into fuel pump ON T/O ROLL A/C VEERED TO RIGHT GETTING OUT OF CONTROL BECAUSE OF THE STEEP GRADIANT OF THE STRIP. DAMAGE TO A/C After startup, aircraft was being taxied down the side of the company's airstrip when the propellor struck a haybale, damaging the propellor. The pilot opened the throttle to maximum power for takeoff and shortly after, the propeller separated from the engine. the threaded shank of one propeller blade had failed just below the top of the ferrule which holds the blade. the fracture could not have been detected visually without dismantling the propeller.
Part Defective
Code 7
Total 24
84/31
ACC
MA
9/04/1985
DMD
NR EASTBOURNE
25
84/52
ACC
MA
18/05/1985
DOE
TE KUITI AD
26
84/114
ACC
MA
2/01/1987
DHX
STANWAY
27
85/35 85/36
ACC ACC
MA MA
8/05/1992 29/04/1994
DPA DPX
Taupo Ad KIMBOLTON
7 7
28 29
85/47
ACC
MA
7/09/2001
CSM
Kahatara
30
85/94
ACC
MA
5/11/1979
CXO
NR STRATFORD
183
OCC No 87/5
Code ACC
Sev MA
Date Time UTC Reg 23/02/1970 CQO
Location RANGITOTO
Description The aircraft failed to clear a ridge beyond the departure end of the strip. the pilot reported that the jettison would no operate. aircraft stalled, struck the face of a ridge, bounced and slewed into a fence. no defect was found when the hopper operating mechanism was subsequently examined by a civil aviation division aircraft surveyor. Just after taking off on 8th topdressing sortie since last refuelled, the aircraft disappeared from sight beyond end of strip, crashed and burned. pilot fatally injured. probable cause: sudden loss of lift arising from unexpected wind change encountered at a critical airspeed immediately after takeoff and which resulted in aircraft striking the ground. The aircraft sank after takeoff and collided lightly with a tree. the pilot returned to land at the strip but the aircraft stalled short of and below the threshold and the undercarriage was torn off at impact. Just after liftoff the aircraft sank and made brief but heavy contact with the ground. control was maintained and the aircraft was flown to base for repair. While taking off from a steep but soft airstrip the pilot realised that he would not become airborne and operated the jettison, but too late for it to be effective. the aircraft sank off the end of the airstrip, the undercarriage struck an earth bank, and the aircraft overturned On takeoff from a steep undulating strip the aircraft became prematurely airborne after striking a terrain hump. as flying speed had not been attained the aircraft sank heavily on to the tailwheel causing it to separate from the aircraft and extensively damage the rear fuselage
Part Defective
Code 9
Total 1
89/42
ACC
MA
25/02/1970
COP
TUTAENUI
89/66
ACC
MA
3/03/1971
CSL
TE KARAKA
89/86
ACC
MA
16/04/1971
CSC
MANDEVILLE
91/694
DEF
MA
27/08/1972
CQL
NR TAIHAPE
91/904
DEF
MA
28/11/1972
CSC
PUKEMAORI
184
OCC No 92/1121
Code ACC
Sev MA
Date Time UTC Reg 6/03/1973 DHX
Location AWARUA
Description During a downwind takeoff the pilot inadvertently raised the flaps instead of jettisoning the load and the aircraft failed to become airborne. the pilot had recently converted from another type in which he had flown 5000 hours and in which the hopper and flap levers were located in positions the reverse of those in the cessna a188. Due to hoar frost on the wings and a slight tailwind the aircraft sank after takeoff and collided with a boundary fence. The aircraft sank back on to the strip following premature liftoff with an inadvertent overload and collided with three fences before coming to rest. Due to power loss aircraft sank off end of strip and impacted with lower ground. full flap had been applied to lift weight off wheels early in takeoff. just refuelled, it seems likely that being suddenly deprived of ground effect as passed off end of strip in low-speed high-drag configuration, aircraft sank in semi-stalled condition and pilot interpreted it as power los. After liftoff on the 66th takeoff of the day a momentary power loss was experienced. after jettisoning the load the aircraft passed through two fences before becoming airborne. a water droplet or foreign particle in the fuel injector was considered the most likely cause of the power interruption
Part Defective
Code 9
Total 7
92/1325
ACC
MA
18/06/1973
CQV
NR RAETIHI
92/2320
DEF
MA
30/05/1974
CQK
LUMSDEN
92/2215
DEF
MA
9/07/1974
CQZ
ACTON RIVER VLY
10
92/2625
ACC
MA
11/03/1976
CQN
NR NGAROMA
11
185
OCC No
Code
Sev
Date Time UTC Reg
Location
Description
Part Defective
Code
Total
92/2655
ACC
MA
25/03/1976
DOE
TITOKI
As the tail was slow to rise during a takeoff the pilot attempted to dump the load but found the hopper lever jammed. while he was attempting to free the lever the aircraft veered off the normal takeoff path and over a hump. as it became airborne it collided with a fence at the end of the strip. The aircraft collided with level ground below the strip after takeoff causing the left undercarriage leg to fail. the pilot made an emergency landing at new plymouth airport. After a normal takeoff run the aircraft lost height off the end of the strip. the pilot was unable to avoid colliding with the terrain and the aircraft came to rest inverted. After aircraft airborne it began to sink. pilot attempted to jettison but this was ineffective. aircraft nosed down sufficiently for propeller to strike ground lightly and shatter pitch charge links which thus prevented the propeller from adopting any useful angle of attack. the pilot was unable to prevent aircraft colliding with a fence and eventually tracking into ditch.
12
92/4148
DEF
MA
8/06/1977
CQS
MANUTAHI
13
93/1250A
ACC
MA
22/08/1977
CQS
MIDHURST
14
93/3453
ACC
MA
6/09/1977
DPV
NR BALCLUTHA
15
93/3223
ACC
MA
13/03/1978
CQI
ARGYLE EAST
During the takeoff run the pilot elected to jettison the load. he was unable to obtain the 'full dump' setting because the inertia reel of his shoulder harness locked. he closed the throttle but was unable to avoid a collision with the fence.
16
186
OCC No 93/6084
Code DEF
Sev MI
Date Time UTC Reg 23/12/1982 DPP
Location KNAPDALE
Description At commencement of spraying operations it became apparent aircraft would not become airborne before reaching end of airstrip. pilot operated dump control and aircraft lifted off but struck some gates just beyond strip dislodging right wheel and spray pump assembly. during ensuing landing right undercarriage dug into ground and both u/c legs were torn out as aircraft groundlooped The aircraft was climbing towards a ridge en route to the sowing area when the pilot initiated a turn away from the terrain. however, the aircraft struck the face of the ridge during the turn. the pilot was fatally injured and the passenger was seriously injured in the postaccident fire. The aircraft became airborne but started to sink towards a fence just off the end of the airstrip. the pilot selected full jettison but the aircraft's right mainwheel struck a concrete fence post. After travelling about 100 m on its takeoff run the aircraft veered to the left despite the pilot's application of full right rudder and then right brake. the pilot jettisoned the 600 kg load of d.a.p. as the aircraft left the strip. the aircraft continued through a fence, across a road and into a second fence. Failed to get airborne, hit ditch Failed to get airborne, hit fence Failed to get airborne, hit fence Hit trees on takeoff Failed to become airborne, overran paddock Sink on takeoff, load jettisoned, but hit fence Power loss after takeoff, landed heavily
Part Defective
Code 9
Total 17
94/84
ACC
MA
6/06/1983
CSB
NR AWAKINO
18
94/759
ACC
MA
10/04/1985
EJL
NR HOKONUI
19
94/1243
ACC
CR
10/08/1989
DSA
MARTINBOROUGH
20
94/2639 94/4047 95/1003 95/3303 96/3571 97/3348 98/526
INC ACC ACC ACC DEF ACC ACC
MI CR CR CR MA MI MA
2/09/1992 6/09/1992 29/04/1993 18/07/1993 13/01/1994 3/03/1994 24/10/1994
FYJ EJK DHX CQX DPA CQY TJK
nr Otane Feilding Raetihi Havelock North Kairanga Strip Seaview, Seddon Akatore
9 9 9 9 9 9 9
21 22 23 24 25 26 27
187
OCC No 98/599
Code ACC
Sev CR
Date Time UTC Reg 7/03/1998 EMD
Location Pongaroa
Description During the final run of a topdressing operation the aircraft had turned downwind and was caught in sinking air. Performance was inadequate to clear terrain and the aircraft impacted at the top of a ridge. Aircraft destroyed, pilot sustained a minor injury . The aircraft took off with a load of liquid fish fertiliser and turned towards the treatment area near the Haupiri River gorge. One spray run had been completed and the aircraft commenced a right procedure turn. About three quarters of the way through the 180 degree turn, the aircraft struck the top of trees and crashed to the ground, inverted. According to the pilot, the weather conditions were favourable with nil wind, slight overcast and fair visibility. The aircraft failed to become airborne off a farm strip and slid down a bank and was destroyed. The pilot was not hurt. The aircraft failed to accelerate as expected so the pilot tried to jettison the load but this did not help. As a result the aircraft over-ran the strip coming to rest on a slope below the runway. It then caught fire and was burnt out. It was reported that the aircraft was hit by a tail wind gust during take off. This resulted in the plane hitting the ground and going through a fence. The aircraft then went over a 50 metre bank before coming to a rest on a creek bed.
Part Defective
Code 9
Total 28
01/2305
ACC
MA
13/03/1998
DPX
Haupiri V
29
01/3108
INC
MI
7/07/2001
CSD
Akaroa
30
01/3273
DEF
MI
1/09/2002
JCR
Clinton
31
01/4379
DEF
MA
4/09/2004
DHX
Gwavas Airsrtip
32
02/2572
ACC
CR
6/12/1993
ESL
MOSGIEL
"G" SWITCH 10
188
OCC No 03/3953
Code DEF
Sev MA
Date Time UTC Reg 7/04/1971 CQY
Location SILVER PEAK
Description During 31st takeoff a total power loss occurred necessitating forced landing in inhospitable terrain. in subsequent test, engine started normally and developed rated power. auxiliary fuel pump was reportedly not switched on when the power loss occurred and is probable that by-pass valve which showed evidence of sticking caused a restriction of fuel flow to engine-driven pump As the aircraft was returning from a topdressing sortie the engine lost power. the pilot was unable to rectify the fault and attempted to glide the aircraft to the strip. this proved impracticable and the aircraft was damaged after it touched down in a short sloping field. there was no fuel evident in the aircraft's tank after the accident. Fuel exhaustion The pilot suffered an incapacitating event at take off and was unable to maintain control of his aircraft.
Part Defective
Code 12
Total 1
04/2822
ACC
CR
29/01/1979
CSA
NR PONGAROA
12
04/3396 06/4047
ACC DEF
CR MI
21/04/1992 23/10/2004
DHX CSM
Apiti Omihi
12 16
3 1
189
OCC No 77/11
Code ACC
Sev MA
Date Time UTC Reg 23/01/1977 CVD
Location PUHOI
82/86
ACC
MA
12/09/1982 TRO
TAIC Description Reference The aircraft became overdue on a topdressing sortie. its 77-012 wreckage was found later in thick bush just over half a mile from the airstrip from which it had been operating. the sole occupant received fatal injuries. LOWRY PEAKS The aircraft was engaged in topdressing a steep hill country 82-086 RGE property when it failed to return from the third sortie. the burned out wreckage of the aircraft was subsequently located in a gully at the extremity of the area being sown. the pilot was fatally injured in the accident. DUPLICATE TAINGAIHE REFER TO OCC No 00/2616 On landing, the nosewheel assembly collapsed and the aircraft turned upside down. assembly collapse was attributed to fatigue failure of the nose leg hinge bolt. 2106
Class 0
Total 1
00/2540 70/32
NRO ACC
MA MA
5/08/2000 8/03/1970
CWM
0 2
3 1
72/83
ACC
MA
6/09/1972
CVB
KAWAKA
74/59
ACC
MA
6/05/1974
DMZ
PUKENUI
Before using a new airstrip for the first time the pilot flew 72-075 over it, noting that the surface appeared firm, dry,and clear of obstructions. after a normal landing the nosewheel ran into a soft area and folded rearward. the aircraft then overturned. 74-055 Aircraft carrying 15 cwt hopper load was beginning 7th takeoff from an agricultural airstrip. about 30ft beyond takeoff initiation point, nose wheel seen to collapse and aircraft, arrested by ground friction, slowly pitched forward, nosing over into an inverted attitude in which overturn truss collapsed. pilot trapped by head beneath aircraft, and died before extricated. The transverse tubular member of the engine mount which 75-123 supports the nose gear fractured at the weld clusters causing the nose gear to collapse. 84-090 The left undercarriage support pylon failed on takeoff. on landing the aircraft settled onto the stub wing.
75/126
ACC
MA
1/12/1975
DMZ
OMAKERE
84/86
ACC
MA
24/08/1984 TRN
NR TE PUKE
Annex K: Transavia PL-12 Airtruk Occurrences
190
OCC No 77/33
Code ACC
Sev MA
Date Time UTC Reg 18/02/1977 DVP
Location DUDERS POINT
Description The new 'tiara'-powered airtruk suffered sudden power loss in-flight and made a heavy forced landing. it is considered likely that the engine stopped through a 'rich cut' when the auxiliary fuel pump was accidentally switched on in flight. there was no information available to the pilot that this pump could not be used in-flight.
TAIC Reference 77-031
Class 6
Total 1
79/104
ACC
MA
2/09/1979
DMK
RAHOTU
98/2117
ACC
MA
4/08/1998
TRS
Masterton
79-102 The engine stopped soon after takeoff due to fuel exhaustion in the selected fuel tank. fuel flow could not be restored before the aircraft struck the ground. the fuel gauge in this tank over-read considerably. the gauge had recently been repaired but was not recalibrated on completion of the repair The aircraft suffered an engine failure after take-off, about 200 m from the end of the strip. The pilot managed to carry out a successful forced landing in a paddock ahead, but with minor damage to the aircraft when it struck the downwind fence. The en gine had given a burst of power again after the initial failure. An engineering investigation found that the flight was the pilot's last before he intended refuelling. Prior to take-off, the aeroplane had been sitting on sloping ground, allowing the fuel to cross-feed to the lower tank. The fuel outlet unported during take-off, causing the power loss. The pilot was committed to force-landing the aircraft and did not have time to select the electric boost pump on before touching down. 71-001
71/1
ACC
MA
2/01/1971
CVA
ARDMORE AD During circuit training involving a series of takeoffs and landings, the engine lost power during takeoff due to fuel starvation. realising that the safe endurance of the tank in use had been exceeded the pilot selected the other tank but was unable to effect a restart in time to avoid a forced landing.
191
OCC No 73/127
Code ACC
Sev MA
Date Time UTC Reg 24/10/1973 DMY
Location PERIA
TAIC Reference During refuelling operations some fuel was spilt on the stub 73-126 wing. at start-up a sheet of flame from the exhaust ignited the fuel. the fire extinguisher was not in its normal position on the loading vehicle and with no means of controlling the fire flames spread rapidly and consumed the aircraft. Description Sheep had been cleared from the strip but during the first takeoff a sheep crossing in front of the aircraft was struck. severe vibration followed and the pilot was unable to stop the aircraft on the sloping strip. the aircraft landed in a paddock below. While approaching a steep sloping airstrip, airspeed was allowed to decrease too much and a high sink rate developed. corrective action failed to arrest it and the aircraft landed very heavily. The aircraft landed heavily after application of full power had failed to arrest sink rate incurred after a severe downdraught was encountered during final approach. 75-050
Class 7
Total 2
75/52
ACC
MA
14/04/1975 DMK
OPARAU
75/112
ACC
MA
21/10/1975 DMK
NR MANGONUI
75-108
75/128
ACC
MA
4/12/1975
CJT
TINUI
75-139
76/139
ACC
MA
3/12/1976
DMK
PAPONGA
The very inexperienced topdressing pilot did not heed the 76-140 advice of experienced pilots that weather conditions at the airstrip would be unsuitable for topdressing operations. while landing on the strip severe downdraughts and turbulence caused the aircraft to land very heavily
78/65
ACC
MA
23/04/1978 DNA
78/76
ACC
MA
20/05/1978 DNA
WAIMATENUI Wet grass and a tailwind resulted in the pilot being unable 78-061 to stop the aircraft when landing after his first topdressing flight for the day. the aircraft ran into a ditch and tipped up onto its nose. HOUTO 78-076 Aircraft operating from a strip which had recently been resurfaced with topsoil by owner. area to be used compacted by a truck driving over it. 42 sorties operated normally off strip before a slight increase in tailwind persuaded pilot to land little closer to strip's threshold. after touchdown nosewheel entered an area of soft uncompacted soil and aircraft nosed over.
192
OCC No 83/58
Code ACC
Sev MA
Date Time UTC Reg 13/07/1983 CWX
TAIC Location Description Reference TANGITERORI 83-058 While descending from a reversal turn the aircraft struck A power conductors suspended in a long span across a valley. the conductors were broken by the impact and the top of one empennage separated from the aircraft. the pilot flew the aircraft back to the airstrip using the remaining empennage and landed without further incident. TANGITERORI The pilot initiated a left turn to draw up beside the loading 84-019 A vehicle. however the left brake lost effect when he applied full rudder and the aircraft collided with the loading vehicle. NR TEMUKA At the completion of a spraying run the left wing of the aircraft struck a disused electrical conductor which was attached to a nearby tree. The aircraft was engaged in spraying weedkiller on a farm near waimate. during the fourth sortie, at 0745 hours nzst, it collided with an electric power conductor. witnesses found the pilot dead near his aircraft, which was burning fiercely. the probable cause was damage to the aircraft control system sustained in a collision with a wire, which deprived the pilo of control of the aircraft. When visibility was reduced due to sun glare the pilot landed well into a short field. Dew on the grass reduced braking and the aircraft ran into a fence. One blade of a mccauley d2a34c58-bn propeller was reportedly shed when the pilot opened the throttle for takeoff. dsir report carried out. late reporting of this accident and unauthorised interference with the wreckage caused vital evidence to be lost and prevented positive determination of the cause of blade separation. 84-134
Class 7
Total 9
84/20
ACC
MA
14/02/1984 CJU
10
84/126
ACC
MA
26/12/1984 CJT
11
85/92
ACC
MA
19/10/1985 CJT
NR WAIMATE
85-092
12
87/79
ACC
MA
18/08/1987 TRS
LEVELS VALLEY
87-085
13
72/33
ACC
MA
2/03/1972
CWX
TE PUKE
72-033
193
OCC No 72/55
Code ACC
Sev MA
Date Time UTC Reg 25/05/1972 CVB
Location WAINUI
Description After full power was applied for takeoff a loud bang was heard followed by a loss of thrust. inspection revealed that one propeller blade had separated from the hub as a result of a fatigue fracture of the threaded portion of the blade root. the resulting imbalance caused the remaining blade and hub to separate from engine and damage engine mounts. The aircraft had proceeded about 40 metres along the strip on its takeoff when a propeller blade separated from the hub. the resultant imbalance tore the engine from its mounts and fractured the crankshaft, causing the hub and other blade to separate. the aircraft was brought to a stop half way down the strip. propeller-mccauley model d2a 34c 58n/90at-2 The last of 60 tons of lime which, during previous flights, had shown a tendency to hang up, was being sown over steep gullied country. during the last flight the aircraft started to sink and an attempt was made to jettison the load which failed to discharge. the pilot had no option but to stall his aircraft onto a ridge. The aircraft began to sink when approaching the sowing area. the pilot was unable to jettison the load of damp lime and the aircraft sank into a plantation of pine trees.
Class 8
Total 2
76/32
ACC
MA
18/02/1976 CVA
MATAHIWI
76-029
72/10
ACC
MA
16/01/1972 CWY
PUKENUI
72-008
72/100
ACC
MA
17/10/1972 CWT
TINUI
72-097
73/3
ACC
MA
3/01/1973
CTT
ARARIMU When the aircraft failed to attain flying speed the pilot attempted to jettison the load of lime he was carrying but was unable to do so in time to prevent collision with a tree and a fence. it is suspected that the aircraft was overloaded due to a hang-up of part of the previous load.
73-003
194
OCC No 73/82
Code ACC
Sev MA
Date Time UTC Reg 23/06/1973 CWN
Location NR WAINUI
Description Nearing the end of a steep climb over a ridge en route to the sowing area the aircraft encountered downdraughts and the airspeed decayed rapidly. jettison of the load of lime was initiated but more than half failed to discharge. the aircraft stalled and before recovery could be effected, collided with trees below the ridge line. The accident was caused by a stall uncorrected soon enough to prevent entry into a spin at a height which precluded recovery before the aircraft struck the ground.
Class 9
Total 4
74/84
ACC
MA
15/07/1974 DNB
NR TAHEKE
74-082
74/99
ACC
MA
25/08/1974 DMK
NR TOKOROA On 4th takeoff aircraft became very tail-heavy on rotation 74-098 AD and became airborne in a stalled attitude. pilot attempted to jettison load but unable to do so. aircraft failed to climb out of ground effect. after crossing a small, deep, ravine it impacted heavily on a bank on the far side. all-up weight of aircraft 900 lb above that permitted. RAKAU Following a partial power loss during takeoff a heavy forced 74-108 landing was made in a ploughed paddock as a result of which the nose wheel broke off and the aircraft overturned. partial power loss due to fuel contamination. Aircraft reloaded with lime and completed takeoff run without becoming safely airborne. in overrun area it cleared ground but despite an attempt to jettison the load struck a small rise immediately afterward sustaining damage to lower left wing which forced pilot to turn towards large tree. as aircraft hit branches, pilot closed throttle and a/d rested on adjacent public highway. The aircraft sank off the end of the airstrip and the left undercarriage was substantially damaged when it struck a knoll. the pilot flew to hastings and landed without incident. 76-142
74/102
ACC
MA
2/09/1974
CWW
76/145
ACC
MA
12/12/1976 CTT
NR CLEVEDON
77/51
ACC
MA
17/03/1977 DMZ
MOTERE STN
77-050
195
OCC No 78/96
Code ACC
Sev MA
Date Time UTC Reg 25/07/1978 DVN
Location TIROHANGA
79/97
ACC
MA
9/08/1979
DNA
00/2616
ACC
MA
4/08/2000
TRS
99/921 71/32
DEF ACC
MI MA
23/03/1999 TRS 14/03/1971 CVB
99/920
DEF
MI
23/03/1999 TRS
TAIC Description Reference While sowing a damp mixture of fertiliser, part of previous 78-096 load retained in aircraft's hopper. on next takeoff from level strip aircraft 500lbs overweight. load would not jettison and aircraft sank off the end of the strip, passed through a fence, and bounced over undulating ground before coming to rest DARGAVILLE Very wet and muddy conditions considerably increased the 79-096 AD empty aircraft's takeoff run. although it became airborne just before the end of the strip the spray booms caught in the tops of some ti tree pulling the aircraft down into the scrub. nr Masterton The aircraft was applying slurry fertiliser on a property north-east of Masterton. The airstrip was wet and soft at the threshold end so the pilot elected to carry light loads of around 400 kg. On the last flight, the aircraft took off into a 10-15 knot south-westerly wind, which was increasing with the arrival of a front. Just after lift-off, the aircraft sank back on to the strip about 30 m from the end, and the soft ground prevented further acceleration. Beyond the end of the strip was a ravine, and the aircraft struck the far side about 2 m below the lip. The pilot had commenced jettisoning the load as the aircraft sank back on to the ground, and the load was virtually gone by the time of final impact. MASTERTON ELT failed output terst TAHEKEROA The pilot was unable to open the hopper door in flight. on 71-029 return to the strip the aircraft stalled at round-out and landed heavily. MASTERTON Wing struts corroded.
Class 9
Total 10
11
12
10 11
1 1
14
196
OCC No 02/3571
Code DEF
Sev CR
Reg DOZ
Location Havelock
Description Significant Event. Pilot reported that the rear compartment door broke away. This door then wrapped around the a/c fin causing damage to rudder. The top mounting of the rudder dislodged and rudder collapsed on to starboard elevator. A safe precautionar y landing was made.
Part Defective Rear Compartment door catch
TAIC Ref Class
Total
1 74-025
74/28
ACC
MA
24/02/1974
CJY
03/2283
ACC
MA
6/08/2003
RJI
04/2682
DEF
MI
11/08/2004
DOZ
04/1931
ACC
MA
10/06/2004
ZAA
An insecurely fastened oil tank cap resulted in a complete loss of oil during an aerobatic sequence and in the subsequent emergency landing the cap became jammed in the undercarriage operating mechanism thus preventing the undercarriage from being locked down. Hamilton Ad The Operator reported that the aircraft was doing a touch and go on runway 08 when it lost power after becoming airborne. The aircraft collided with a boundary fence during the ensuing landing. Mosgiel It was reported that during a routine inspection a crack Compressor approximately two inches long was discovered in the Casing compressor casse, on the forward right hand side of the upper engine mount pad. Te Kowhai The pilot was performing a touch-and-go. After landing the Ad pilot applied full power, the tail lifted, but the aircraft drifted to the right and struck a hedge causing substantial damage. Sports n Recreation Corporation Certificate: #727.
Near DARFIELD
05/1369
ACC
MA
29/04/2005
RJI
07/3173
ACC
MI
2/09/2007
RZN
The pilot was ferrying the aircraft from Hamilton to Whangarei and diverted to Pukekohe East to refuel, On the approach to land the aircraft was low but the pilot's application of power was too late to avoid a collision with a bank at the approach end of the airstrip. Mangaweka As the Aircraft was taking off and passing over the brow in the airstrip the pilot had to take avoiding action to miss a sheep. The aircraft skidded and hit an embankment and was written off. The Pilot was not injured. Balclutha There was contact between aircraft empennage and loader truck. The aircraft received substantial damage.
Pukekohe
7 7
3 4
07/4776
INC
MI
2/12/2007
WLO
Annex L: Zlin Z-137T Occurrences
197
OCC No 08/996
Code ACC
Sev MI
Reg VIH
Location Roxburgh
Description
Part Defective
TAIC Ref Class PWilliams 7
Total
05/1427
ARC
MI
4/05/2005
RJI
A wind gust affected the aircraft on takeoff. The aircraft swung to the left and following corrective action swung to the right colliding with a bank. . New Zealand It is alleged that John Waterson of Super Air submitted a CAA 337 conformity certificate plus a new 2129 radio station form for ZK-RJI covering the installation of Agnav 2 GPS equipment (and a KY96A VHF). He quoted AC43-14 as the acceptable technical data . However AC43-14 states that a differential GPS installation is a major modification and these are excluded from coverage of AC43-14. John Waterson was spoken to by telephone who advised he would either take the equipment off or go to one of the local Part 146 Design Organisations to get the installation approved. Waimiha While the aircraft was parked on a farm strip with the brakes applied it weather cocked in the wind and the elevator was substantially damaged when it collided with a fence post. Super Air Ltd reported that the aircrafts L/E skin was found by the pilot to be distorted. The loader driver failed to latch the rear cargo door which subsequently departed from the aircraft during flight. L/E Skin
10
04/1090
INC
MI
28/03/2004
RJI
13 14
1 1
05/1019 05/4385
DEF INC
MI MI
18/03/2005 11/11/2005
VIH VIH
North Auckland Towai
15
Annex L: Zlin Z-137T Occurrences
198
Annex M Agricultural Aircraft Safety Review
Summary
This report details all the fin related occurrences and defects reported for the FU24950 series and Cresco aircraft. Section A covers the FU24 fin failures in detail. Section B covers the FU24 fin defects reported. Section C covers the Cresco 08-600 fin occurrences and defects. Summary of all failures, defects and occurrences: Report Ref. Reg. Aircraft
Piston (P) or Turbine (T)
Summary of Details
CAA ACU Comment
A1
ZK-CMK FU24A950
Corrosion caused separation of fin Unclear whether fin forward attachment or skin failure caused loss of fin Corrosion caused forward fitting to fail
Caused by corrosion
A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7
ZK-CZA ZK-BSM ZK-EGH ZK-BPY ZK-EGV ZK-EGO
FU24950M FU24950M FU24-950 FU24950M FU24-950 FU24-950
P P P P T P
Caused by corrosion
Corrosion initiated fatigue of the Fatigue, initiation caused by fitting corrosion Corrosion initiated fatigue of the Fatigue, initiation caused by fitting corrosion Corrosion initiated fatigue of the Fatigue, initiation caused by fitting corrosion Corrosion initiated fatigue of the Fatigue initiation caused by fitting below skin corrosion, obscured by a/c skin Fatigue failure of LE skin initiated by score marks LE skin failed Scratches and scoring around LE skin Cracks found on LE and central rib of fin Cause unknown Corrosion on LE skin found Cause unknown Found by AD. Same as scoring on ZK-EGO (A7) Not investigated, cause and extent unknown Bad corrosion but no cracks (telecon with a/c Chief
Page M 1
Fatigue due to poor practice in application of protective covering.
A8 B1 B2
ZK-DZG ZK-EGS ZK-DUJ
FU24-950 FU24-950 FU24-950
T P T
B3
ZK-EUH
FU24-954
17 March 2008
Engineer) B4 ZK-DUJ FU24-950 T Multiple cracks found on LE skin and internal ribs Cause unknown Internal ribs of fin found very broken and cracked Cause unknown Crack found on LE Caused by poor fitting of ribs causing high spots on LE skin Cracks found on LE skin from working rivets. Chafe marks from dorsal fin also evident Two cracks found in LE skin Large crack found on skin Fractured forward fitting. Fin held on by dorsal fin Fatigue suspected as cause of front fitting mount found broken off Front fitting found severely cracked Crack found on LE. Originally attributed to cable over-tension Crack found on LE Corrosion and fatigue suspected Note; same a/c as B2, different (replacement) fin Internal structure found due to inflight loss of tip cap 2nd rib down. Inititeiuon from poorly formed rib Cracks intited under fastener headss Small cracks emanating from bottom of fin free edge Upper rear fin area from rudder mount bracket Cause undetermined No obvious initiation point detected Found by AD On review, not believed to be cable over-tension. crack with unknown cause Not investigated
B5
ZK-JLU
FU24-950
B6
ZK-CML
FU24950M FU24-954
B7
ZK-EMT
B8 C1 C2 C3
ZK-EGI ZK-LTU ZK-LTT ZK-LTY
FU24-950 CRESCO CRESCO CRESCO
P T T T
C4 C5
ZK-LTH ZK-LTX
CRESCO CRESCO
T T
C6
ZK-EEL
CRESCO
Note: Crescos occurrences (C5 and C6) show some similarities to A8, ZK-DZG
17 March 2008
Page M 2
A. FU24 fin failure summary

The following is a summary of the 8 known instances where the fin of an FU24 aircraft underwent structural failure, (ceased to provide direction stability and control). A1. 8 May 1970, ZK-CMK FU24A-950M, Marybank
Occurrence
In flight separation of the fin occurred during a ferry flight. Aircraft entered a steep spiral dive to the left before some control could be regained and immediate emergency landing made during which the aircraft was substantially damaged. The fin had been deflected to the left and ended up restrained to the fuselage only by the pitot head pipes and the rudder. The RH rear spar had failed 4 inches above the attachment bolts, from an area of extensive corrosion that reduced its cross-section by 70%. The forward attachment had evidently failed too, and the fitting was noted as being corroded through 30% of its cross section, but it is unclear if the separation of the fins forward attachment was due to failure of the fitting or of the skin? Source CAA Occurrence 73/70 and TAIC report 73-067
A2.
17 November 1975, ZK-CZA FU24-950M, Tahora
Occurrence
In flight separation at the end of a sowing run pilot attempted to pull up but found elevator was jammed in a forward position. Attempted a forced landing, with only ailerons available to manoeuvre and engine power to control rate of descent. The aircraft was substantially damaged. Forward fitting had failed. The initial failure of the fitting resulted from a weakening of the structure due to corrosive ag chemical acting through discontinuities in the protective paint. Not clear if fatigue was present. Entire fin had twisted around the rear attachment (Spar) and then along with the rudder bent into an inverted V jamming the elevator and rudder. Source CAA Occurrence75/125 and TAIC 75-119
A3.
4 November 1976, ZK-BSM FU24-950M (Or 300HP?), Pirongia
Occurrence
On completion of a sowing run at 90mph (80kts) and 200 ft AGL the pilot commenced a medium rate turn. As the rudder was applied there was a loud bang, control was lost and the aircraft entered a steeply banked diving turn. After closing the throttle the pilot recovered to wings level at a very low altitude. The pilot kept the throttle closed and made a forced landing during which the aircraft went over a ridgeand was
17 March 2008 Page M 3
The forward fitting had failed. The fitting was severely corroded. Fatigue not specified in TAIC 76-121 but failed portions sent to DSIR for examination, which suggests there was some reason to examine the fitting closely. Fin remained with aircraft, lying on the left-hand stabilator. Apparently held in place by linen sealing tape along lower edge. Source CAA Occurrence 76/125, TAIC report 76-121 and interview with John Waterson of Superair.
Airworthiness Directives
16 Nov 1976
DCA/FU24/161
Airworthiness Directive for inspection of forward fin attachment fitting. Corrosion to be removed and protected or parts renewed as necessary Airworthiness Directive for modification of forward fin attachment, per SB ASB/FU/028 or ASB/FU/029.
11 Mar 1977
DCA/FU24/163
A4.
30 March 1982, ZK-EGH FU24-950, Maungakaramea
Occurrence
Fin forward fitting failed in cruising Flight. Aircraft experienced severe uncontrollable yaw in both directions. Pilot found he had no yaw and limited pitch control. Used engine power to regain some control and carried out an emergency landing. Rear spar remained attached although twisted through almost 180 deg. Spar caps were able to cope without fracture as the twist was distributed up length of spar. Fin inflated by airflow after the skin sheared off from rear spar. The essentially intact fin had rotated through 180 degrees. Leading edge structure remained intact. Resulting drag was so high that pilot was unsure of ability to maintain height with full power, and elected to land immediately. Failure occurred in the cruise with plenty of height available which he rapidly consumed while trying to regain control of the aircraft. Initial effect was extreme yaw (looking out the side window at the approaching terrain). Repeated rapid uncontrollable yaw reversals until fin took up its final position. Yaw produced violent roll. Some control was established using engine torque against roll/yaw. Airflow over the elevator was disturbed such that control became very heavy. Pilot doubted whether he would be able to flare but some control returned as airspeed decreased. Forward fitting failed due to fatigue from a heavily corroded surface. Final failure of the fitting was tensile overload. Source CAA Occurrence 82/34 and TAIC 83-025 and telecon with pilot Murray Hargreaves 28 Jan. 2007. Figures A4a through A4d supplied by Murray Hargreaves.
17 March 2008
Page M 4
A5.
16 February 1995, ZK-BPY FU24-950M, Ngatea
Occurrence
Fin forward fitting failed during a low altitude sowing run. Fin fell clear of the aircraft. Pilot attempted immediate landing but lost control of the aircraft as the bank angle increased towards the left. Pilot seriously injured as the forward fuselage and wing disintegrated. Fwd fitting fracture above fuselage skin but below attachment bolt hole. Fatigue initiated from very small corrosion pit (only just visible in SEM micrograph). Fatigue surface partially obscured by subsequent fretting. Source CAA Occurrence 95/317 Figures A5a through A5c from CAA occurrence file.
19 Sep 1995
DCA/FU24/161A Airworthiness Directive for inspection of forward fin attachment fitting. Inspection for cracks as well as corrosion emphasised. DCA/FU24/163A Airworthiness Directive for modification of forward fin attachment, per SB ASB/FU/028 or ASB/FU/029, or PACSB/FU/088.
29 Sep 1995
A6.
20 September 2001, ZK-EGV FU24-950, Dargaville
Occurrence
The pilot reported that the rudder pedal suddenly locked into a fully deflected position. He managed to land safely at Dargaville where he discovered that the whole tailfin had rotated through 180 (160?) degrees on its remaining bracket and was hanging off. Failure was due to a crack originating from a corrosion pit which was hidden from view when installed on aircraft. Originated below aircraft skin. Pilot Peter Beatty (now deceased ZK-DZG). Telecon with Peter Butcher, a fellow ag pilot who was on hand when the aircraft landed. He was not sure if any photos of the damage were taken, but confirmed it was the fwd fitting and that the fin rotated to at least 135 degrees. Fin was restrained by rear spar but flapped freely back and forth. Peter Butcher had his aircraft (ZK-EME) checked the next day and found suspected crack initiated from chafing lock wire. Discussions with PAC suggest that fatigue margin of original design may have been reduced by anodising, which was introduced to counter the corrosion problems that were experienced. Cad plated steel item is made to same dimensions so has higher static and fatigue strength margins, as well as good corrosion resistance. Existing DCA/FU24/163 directed that -1 (al) OR -3 (steel) fittings be installed. This AD cancelled and replaced by DCA/FU24/172 which directs that -3 fittings are to be installed and inspected at 12 month intervals. Source CAA Occurrence 01 3269 and Telecons with Mike Chubb, Peter Butcher and Murray Hargreaves.
No photographs available but describes as essentially similar to incidence 4, ZKEGH.

Airworthiness Directive
25 Oct 2001
DCA/FU24/172
Airworthiness Directive for replacement of forward attachment fitting and inspection of fin leading edge.
A7.
18 April 2002, ZK-EGO FU24-950, 6 SSE Masterton
Occurrence
Fatigue failure of the skin immediately aft of the forward attachment bulkhead. Fatigue initiated from score marks left in the skin during LE rubber installation unknown number of hours previously. Crack propagated up the left-hand side of the LE skin and approx 1 inch down the right-hand side. Fin fell sideways onto left hand stabilator, as well as rotating to the left, fracturing the right-hand rear spar cap then the web and finally the left-hand spar cap before falling from the aircraft. Rear spar shows evidence of bending left and forwards see figure 10. The breakup sequence bent the rudder into an inverted V which wedged in the stabilator restricting pitch control for at least some of the subsequent flight. Pilot was unable to manoeuvre the aircraft clear of a ridge and was killed in the post crash fire. Sources CAA Occurrence 02/1167, Accident report Figures A7a through A7h.
26 Apr 2002
DCA/FU24/173
Emergency Airworthiness Directive for inspection of forward fin structure. If any structure is found cracked, it must be repaired before further flight and the CAA notified.
A8. 22 November 2005, ZK-DZG FU24-950 Walter Turbine Conversion, Whangarei

Occurrence
Aircraft crashed in dense bush during a ferry flight in deteriorating weather. The pilot and crew member were killed and the aircraft destroyed. The fin was found amongst the wreckage but witness marks on the fuselage and stabilator indicated that it had fallen onto the left stabilator and heavily contacted the fuselage prior to the impact (in-flight). The Fwd fitting was intact and remained attached to the fuselage. The Forward bulkhead and several inches of LE skin remained attached. The fin had failed through the LE skin approximately 6 inches above the forward attachment. The rear attachment had also failed via fracture of the rear spar. The LE failure was characterised by both sudden tensile overload and a small section on the extreme
leading edge that exhibited a polished and/or fretted appearance. Metallurgical analysis of the extreme LE indicated fatigue cracking that was heavily obscured by subsequent damage (cf incident 5, ZK-BPY) . The rear spar failure was the result of sudden tensile overload. It appears to have fractured RH spar cap first, then the web followed by LH spar cap. Similar to ZK-EGO there are indications that the spar was twisted to the left and slightly forward, from comparison of the distortion on the spar caps and web, figure A7c. Source: CAA Occurrence 05/3727, Accident Report
31 May 2007 DCA/FU24/176A Airworthiness Directive for inspection and repair of fin focussing on fin leading edge. 28 Jun 2007 27 Sep 2007 DCA/FU24/176B The content of these Airworthiness Directives (B and C) were revised to clarify the intent of the DCA/FU24/176C above (A).
17 March 2008
Page M 7
Figure A4a: ZK-EGH, FU24-950, Maungakaramea
Figure A4b: ZK-EGH, Fin twisted almost 180 deg.

Figure A4c: ZK-EGH, Post emergency landing.
Figure A4d: ZK-EGH, Rear Spar to the left, fin leading edge to right.
Figure A5a: ZK-BPY, FU24-950M, Ngatea
Figure A5b: ZK-BPY, Fwd fitting fatigue through, section below bolt hole, not lug min x-section.
17 March 2008
Page M 10
Figure A5c: ZK-BPY, Note clean departure of Fin, found 500m from crash landing.
Figure A7a: ZK-EGO, FU24-950, Masterton
17 March 2008
Page M 11
Figure A7b: ZK-EGO, Fin fwd attachment fitting, fwd bulkhead and extreme LE skin attached to aircraft.
Figure A7c: ZK-EGO, Rear Spar looking aft, spar has twisted to port and slightly forward before fracturing.
17 March 2008
Page M 12
Figure A7d: ZK-EGO, Rudder and witness mark in port stabilator.
17 March 2008
Page M 13
Figure A7e: ZK-EGO, Witness mark on rear fuselage, rudder post pulled fwd and to port.
17 March 2008
Page M 14
Figure A7f: ZK-EGO, Rudder wedged in stabilator damage
Figure A7g: ZK-EGO, Note distortion on fin to fwd attachment. Left hand skin was already failed (fatigue from knife marks). The starboard lower section of skin has been pulled to starboard as it attempted to restrain the fin leading edge as it buckled to port. Compare the residual lean angle of the right hand skin with the deformation evident on the left hand side of the forward remnant (figures A9 & A10). This
suggests that the fin has started to buckle to port while still remaining partially attached to the fwd portion.
Figure A7h: ZK-EGO, Close up of Figure A7g.
17 March 2008
Page M 16
B. Table of FU24 fin defects

Key Occurrence no Work Request 02/1578 2/SAI/2184 03/1964 4/SAI/42 Code Severity Date Registration Location Description Model Part defective Part no
B1
DEF
MI
16/04/2002
EGS
Fielding
Investigation of fin IAW DCA/FU24/173 found scratches and scoring around skin. Several cracks were found in leading edge and central rib of the tail fin of a Walter powered Fletcher when it was removed for painting. Bad corrosion was found on the vertical fin leading edge skin, in the area of the front mount bulkhead, during the aircraft's first 100 hour inspection. Multiple cracks were found in the skin and internal ribs of the airframe. This is a Walter Fletcher. The internal ribs of the Walter Fletcher vertical stabiliser were found to be broken and cracked. A crack was found on the fin leading edge skin starboard side between the leading edge and middle rib doubler P/N 242337R. The crack was on the doubler centre line in a horizontal direction and about half an inch long. Whilst complying with DCA/FU24/ 176 cracks were found on the leading edge skin from working rivets. Chafe marks made by the dorsal fairing were also evident. It was reported that the aircraft was undergoing 4 yearly inspection when the leading edge fin was found to have crack in it.
NZ Aerospace FU24-950 NZ Aerospace FU24-950
Forward skin of Fin
242308-2
B2
DEF
MI
2/07/2003
DUJ
Masterton
Tail fin
B3
03/2967 Nil W/R
DEF
MI
26/09/2003
EUH
Wanganui
NZ Aerospace FU24-954
Corrosion
B4
03/3295 Nil W/R 06/556 6/SAI/1438
DEF
MI
13/11/2003
DUJ
Masterton
NZ Aerospace FU24-950 NZ Aerospace FU24-950
Multiple cracks
B5
DEF
MA
8/02/2006
JLU
Masterton
Internal Ribs
242340
B6
06/2830 7/SAI/239
DEF
MI
14/07/2006
CML
Hamilton
Fletcher FU24950M
Leading edge skin
242308 - 2
B7
06/3537 7/SAI/561
DEF
MI
7/09/2006
EMT
Palmerston North
Leading edge skin and ribs
B8
06/3543 7/SAI/565
DEF
MI
20/09/2006
EGI
Gore
Leading Edge Fin
242308-2
In addition to the in-flight failures above, the following defects have been reported for the FU24 vertical stabilisers.
17 March 2008
Page 17Error! No text of specified style in document.
Further details about the FU24 fin defects

B1. 16 April 2002, ZK-EGS FU24-950, Fielding CAA SIU database: As a result of finding, new LE skin is fitted. CAA WR 2/SAI/2148: The investigation has been completed as far as possible. No further CAA Action is anticipated. Ian Stobba 19 Jun 2002. B2. 2 July 2003, ZK-DUJ FU24-950, Masterton CAA SIU database: Cracks found in fin leading edge. CAA WR 4/SAI/42: Spoke to Lew Dayman of Air Services Ltd. He will take up with Byron Knight who initiated the defect report and hopefully submit information which will enable event to be closed. Discussed with Ian Stobba, agreed that in view of the time now elapsed, chances of actually receiving any further. The investigation has been completed as far as possible. No further CAA Action is anticipated. Mike Baker 20 Oct 2004. B3. 26 September 2003, ZK-EUH FU24-954, Wanganui CAA SIU database: The skin area was repaired. Form 005D submitted by Rob Hartnell of Wanganui Aero work. Nil W/R or log entries. B4. 13 November 2003, ZK-DUJ FU24-950, Masterton CAA SIU database: All cracked parts were replaced. Nil W/R or log entries. B5. 8 February 2006, ZK-JLU FU24-950, Masterton CAA SIU database: The vertical fin top fibreglass fairing was found missing while the aircraft was operating. A serviceable fairing was fitted that became loose not long after being fitted. An inspection of the fin top rib with the fairing removed showed the rib completely broken across the rear reveal. The fin was removed and a serviceable one fitted. The trailing edge skin was removed and it was found the second rib down was completely broken across the rear reveal and the third rib down was cracked across the rear where attached to the spar. The log books did not show any major work had been carried out on the vertical stabilizer since the Walter conversion on the 17th August 2000. There were no signs of working rivets on the exterior of the fin and there is no access to the interior structure apart from the top fairing. The aircraft was being maintained to Part 43 Appendix C and did not have any major inspection programme in place. CAA WR 6/SAI/1438 Figures B5a and B5b.
17 March 2008
B6. 14 July 2006, ZK-CML FU24-950M, Hamilton CAA SIU database: Investigation revealed the fin had been overhauled only 230 hours previously. During the overhaul new nose ribs had been fitted to a new leading edge skin. The poor fitting of several of these ribs into the leading edge skin with high spots caused the crack, figures B6a and B6b. Several other high spots on the leading edge skin were also apparent. CAA WR 7/SAI/239: SIU discussed defect with Super Air, viewed defective parts and associated work sheets. State changed to closed as investigation completed as far as possible. Ian Stobba 27 Sep 2006. B7. 7 September 2006, ZK-EMT FU24-954, Palmerston North CAA SIU database: An approved repair scheme was authorised by a design organisation for six months while a new type fin is being designed. The repairs included a new leading edge skin and ribs. CAA WR 7/SAI/561: Fletcher -Stallion with 'distressed' fin. Under inspection/repair at Fieldair, arrow indicate working rivets, on closer inspection several found to be cracked. Cracks emanating from under rivet head NOT from holes which is an indication of skin panting/buckling as opposed to tension loads which tend to form cracks from rivet holes. Also fretting where dorsal extension attaches. State changed from Assessment to Closed. The investigation has been completed as far as possible. No further CAA Action is anticipated. Ian Stobba 2 Oct 2006. From 005D: Failure of the two upper rib attachment rivets caused the skin to be unsupported, allowing flexing especially under side airloads causing the skin to start cracking. Rib p/N 242343 and 24320 and skin P/N 242308-2 replaced. See photographs (figures B7a through B7d), cracking at upper edge and from rivets attaching it to next panel. Most of the LE to rib rivets working, oval holes, extensive chafing from dorsal fin extension on LE. B8. 20 September 2006, ZK-EGI FU24-950, Gore CAA SIU database: While carrying out the airworthiness directive DCA/FU24/176, two cracks were discovered in the leading edge of the fin. The leading edge skin was replaced. See photos (figures B9a through B9c), cracks have initiated from free edge of skin above uppermost rivet attachment to the front bulkhead. CAA WR 7/SAI/565: State changed from Assessment to Closed. The investigation has been completed as far as possible. No further CAA Action is anticipated. Peter Kirker 30 Jun 2007.
17 March 2008
Figure B5a: ZK-JLU, FU24-950, Masterton
Figure B5b: ZK-JLU, FU24-950, Masterton
17 March 2008
Figure B6a: ZK-CML, FU24-950M, Hamilton. Fin LE crack.
17 March 2008
Figure B6b: ZK-CML. Crack in relation to base of fin.
17 March 2008
Figure B7a: ZK-EMT, FU24-954, Palmerston North
17 March 2008
Figure B7b: ZK-EMT, FU24-954, Palmerston North
Figure B7c: ZK-EMT, FU24-954, Palmerston North
Figure B7d: ZK-EMT, FU24-954, Palmerston North
17 March 2008
Figure B8a: ZK-EGI, FU24-950, Gore
17 March 2008
Figure B8b: ZK-EGI, FU24-950, Gore
17 March 2008
Figure B8c: ZK-EGI, FU24-950, Gore
17 March 2008
Key
C1
Occurrence no Work Request 00/1690 0/SAI/1903
Code
Severity
Date
Registration
Location
Description
Model
Part defective
Part no
DEF
MA
22/05/2000
LTU
NAPIER
C2
00/1769 0/SAI/1883
DEF
CR
26/05/2000
LTT
MATAMAT A
C3
04/1305 4/SAI/1706
DEF
MI
21/04/2004
LTY
Wanganui
The vertical fin skin had a 6 inch long cracked from adjacent the top of the rudder mount bracket. It is suspected excessive loads have been imposed on skin. Significant Event. During topdressing operation, loader driver noticed vertical fin movement during taxi up to loading area and previous take-off. Examination of area revealed fractured vertical stabiliser Forward fitting. Forward location only held by dorsal fin attachment screws most of which were ripped out. It was reported that during the 100 hour inspection the vertical fin front mount was found broken off. It was reported that whilst changing the fin mount from aluminium to steel, the original fitting was found cracked one third to half way across. During a scheduled inspection of a Cresco aircraft the fin leading edge skin was found to be cracked at the top of bulkhead P/N 242305-2 attachment. Fin leading edge skin found cracking from top of cut-out area for PN: 242305-2 bulkhead.
Pacific Aerospace Cresco 08-600
Skin Cracked
08320014
fitting - forward fin attach.
243017-2
Front Mount
243017-2
C4
04/1803 4/SAI/1949
DEF
MA
31/05/2004
LTH
Wanganui
Front Mount
243017-2
C5
05/2942 6/SAI/464
DEF
MA
24/08/2005
LTX
Napier
Fin Leading Edge
08-32001-4
C6
07/1266 7/SAI/1979
DEF
MI
2/04/2007
EEL
Taieri
Leading Edge Skin
242308-3
C. Table of Cresco 08-600 fin occurrences and defects
17 March 2008
(Last two Cresco occurrences were the ones that prompted DCA/Cresco/13 in December 2007, photos and 005 forms supplied to Ken Mathews at TAIC.)
17 March 2008
Further details about the Cresco 08-600 fin occurrences/defects

C1. 22 May 2000, ZK-LTU Cresco 08-600, Napier (00/1690) CAA SIU database: The manufacturer has been advised and repair scheme data obtained. CAA WR 0/SAI/1903: State changed from Assessment to Closed. Cracking of vertical fin is a long-standing problem with Cresco's. No further investigation at this point. PG 18 Jan 2001. No further details available (no hard copies, nothing in DMS). C2. 26 May 2000, ZK-LTT Cresco 08-600, Matamata (00/1769) CAA SIU database: No corrosion evident and lockwire NOT around fitting. The manufacturer was advised and the fitting forwarded for analysis. CAA WR 0/SAI/1883: State changed from Assessment to Closed. Manufacturer unable to determine cause of failure as failure surface too badly damaged. PG 16 Jan 2001. No further details in DMS. C3. 21 April 2004, ZK-LTY Cresco 08-600, Wanganui (04/1305) CAA SIU database: Fatigue is suspected (no corrosion or other stress raiser). The aircraft had 3,500 hours. One previous failure at 4,800 hours. PAC has an optional steel fitting which has been standard production since s/n 029. PAC has published a SB calling for reduced inspection intervals with replacement of any aluminium fittings with a steel fitting by 3,000 hours (or within 150 hours if that is already reached). The SB is the subject of AD DCA/CRESCO/7 (27 Apr 2004). CAA WR 4/SAI/1706: Discussion regarding the importance of getting an emergency AD from experience with the same Fletcher fitting. State changed from Assessment to Closed. Investigation completed. AD issued. PG 26 May 2004. No further details in DMS.
29 Apr 2004
DCA/CRESCO/7
Airworthiness Directive for inspection and replacement of fin forward attachment.
C4. 31 May 2004, ZK-LTH Cresco 08-600, Wanganui (04/1803) CAA SIU database: It is recommended that all aluminium fitting be removed. Note: CAA investigations show there are only three aircraft in New Zealand and two in Australia with the aluminium fitting. All these aircraft have more than 3,000 hours and are therefore subject to the inspection/replacement requirements of the ADs. (Australia has raised a similar AD.)
17 March 2008
CAA WR 4/SAI/1949: State changed from Assessment to Closed. The CAA investigation has been completed and no further action is required as all aircraft will have the steel fitting in accordance with the AD. PG 04 Jun 2004.
C5. 24 August 2005, ZK-LTX Cresco 08-600, Napier (05/2942) CAA SIU database: The fin leading edge skin was repaired with an approved repair scheme and the aircraft returned to service. An investigation found the possible cause may have been the cable deflector modification PAC/CR/0051 that was installed could have had the cable tension to high and therefore exerting a load on the fin. It was also found there does not appear to be any maintenance instructions supporting this modification. This matter is being taken up with the manufacturer. CAA WR 6/SAI/464: State changed from Assessment to Closed. The investigation is complete and all factors such as confirmed rule non-compliance, causal factors and corrective actions have been entered on the Data Base. Ian Stobba 04 Oct 2005. 005D Cause: Fatigue, Possible cause being Wire cutter cable adjusted too tight. 005D Action taken: Fin Repair C/Out IAW FC-55-009, Wire Cutter Cable adjusted, Tech Data requested from Manufacture. Figures C5a through C5e.
C6. 2 April 2007, ZK-EEL Cresco 08-600, Taieri (07/1266) CAA SIU database: Corrosion Fatigue. Leading edge skin replaced. Spoke with the submitter Dave Patrick. He said that this crack is not readily inspectable as it is in the dorsal fin area. We discussed how critical this was and he said if it was the Fletcher it would be. However it was not like the Fletcher as there is a different structural design. This is secondary structure where in the Fletcher is primary structure. CAA WR 7/SAI/1979: State changed from Assessment to Closed. The investigation has been completed as far as possible. No further CAA Action is anticipated. Steven Walker 20 Apr 2007. 005D Cause: Corrosion/fatigue. 005D Action taken: Leading edge skin replaced.
12 Dec 2007
DCA/CRESCO/13 Airworthiness Directive for inspection of fin leading edge.
Figures C6a and C6b.
17 March 2008
Figure C5a and C5b: ZK-LTX, Cresco 08-600, Napier
17 March 2008
Figures C5c, C5d and C5e: ZK-LTX, Cresco 08-600, Napier
17 March 2008
Figure C6a: ZK-EEL, Cresco 08-600, Taieri
Figure C6b: ZK-EEL, Cresco 08-600, Taieri
17 March 2008
Appendix N Agricultural Aircraft Safety Review
FU24 Vertical Fin Comparison

During the FU24 Fin Engineering review, the Agricultural Aircraft Safety Review and the compilation of Paper DW1165505-0, it was necessary and at times instructive to consider the design details of the FU24 vertical fin. This document summarises the FU24 fin design details and compares them with other light single engine aircraft. The FU24 fin is unusual in having a single forward attachment point but not unique. The Pacific Aerospace Cresco was developed from the FU24, and shares many components including the single fwd attachment point and the leading edge. The Cresco fin benefits from the addition of a dorsal fin, protecting the critical lower leading edge and providing a certain amount of back up structure, (although it is secured to the fuselage with blind rivets and to the fin with riv-nuts which are not normally used for structural loads). The Cresco also has a single sheet of aluminium running vertically up the fin attached to the first lap joint. By comparison to the FU24 it introduces a second structural member to the leading edge assembly, item 47 in figure 1 below.
Figure 1 Cresco Fin Illustrated Parts Catalogue
Page N1
Single Forward Attachment Designs The Alpha R2000 aircraft have a similar fin design to the FU24 with a single attachment point and unreinforced load bearing leading edge. Refer Figure 2. The R2000 is designed for private operations with a 120-160HP engine. The Zenith CH200 range of homebuilt aircraft uses a similar design. The designer of the Zenith series was Chris Heintz, used to work for Avions Pierre Robin and was involved in the design of what became the Alpha R2000. The Zeniths are designed to fly with 80120 HP.
Figure 2 Alpha Aviation Drawing
Figure 3 Alpha R2160
Page N2
The Thorp T-18 Homebuilt has a similar forward attachment point, as it was designed by John Thorpe who originally designed the Fletcher FU24. The Thorpe T-18 was designed around the 100 HP 0-200 but is commonly fitted with 160HP O-320. Figure 4 is an external view of T-18 Note the cranked wing and the fin which is similar in overall shape as well as well as internal structure to the FU24.
Figure 4 Thorpe T-18 Homebuilt
By comparison the Cherokee PA28 series, which John Thorpe also designed, retains the single forward attachment but the leading edge now has three structural components where the FU24 only has one, refer Figures 5,6 &7.
Figure 5 Piper PA28-180C (Cherokee Archer)
Page N3
Figure 6 Cherokee Fin Attachment Detail
Figure 7 Cherokee Fin Structure
Page N4
Conventional Fin Designs In comparison to the few aircraft mentioned above, the more conventional approach is to provide two forward attachment points and internal structure, in addition to the load bearing skin. The homebuilt Sonex is an example of this construction.
Figure 8 Sonex Homebuilt
Sonex Two seat homebuilt aircraft Engine: Aero-Vee 80HP (Volkswagon derivative)
Sonex fin internal structure, stressed metal skin to be attached. Forward attachment via two bolts in corners of triangular attachment plate. Forward spar consists of C section channel.
Figure 9 Sonex Fin Internal Structure
Page N5
The Cessna range of single engine aircraft all have very conventional fin designs. Cessna 152 Private /Training aircraft 1640 lbs MAUW Lycoming O-235, 115 HP Design Features Two forward attchments Forward and rear spars Forward spar has
Figure 10 C-152 Fin Structure
a part span doubler, intercostal ribs.
Cessna 182 Utility Aircraft MAUW 2600lbs (check) Engine Lycoming 0-540 250HP Design Features Two forward attachments
Page N6
Forward and rear spars
Cessna 188A Agwagon (and Cessna 180/185). Agricultural aircraft, MAUW 4000lbs (check)
Figure 11 C-182 Fin Structure
Engine Continetal O-520 240HP Design Features Forward spar. Two forward
Figure 12 C-A188 Fin structure
attachment points and additional attachment of dorsal extension.
Page N7
Cessna 208 Caravan Utility Aircraft MAUW: Engine P&W PT6A-34, 750SHP Design Features: Two forward attachment
points. Forward spar, Extra nose ribs.
Figure 13 Cessna 208 Caravan
Page N8
Summary The FU24 has an unusual fin design. It is attached to the aircraft in just three places and as such relies on the integrity of all three attachment load paths. Structurally it is analagous to a mast supported by three stays or a three legged stool. Both of these are perfectly strong stable structures but vulnerable to a failure of any single component. The detail design of the FU24 fin where the loads pass from one component to the next means that from a structural integrity point of view, failure of one component in the load path is as serious as any other. This underlies the concept of the fin as a system and was the rational behind the grouping of fin defects for the purposes of analysis in the Agricultural Aircraft Safety Review. Although the single forward attachment point has been used on the Cherokee and Cresco, their leading edge structures consists of more than one piece of material. Having an assembly of two or more pieces prevents a crack from growing and compromising the whole structure. In this way the Cresco (2 piece) and Cherokee (3 Piece) are less vulnerable than the FU24. The single forward attachment with single piece leading edge has been used on light aircraft of 100-200HP, but it is not a popular design solution. Most utility aircraft, including the Cessna single engine range, use a conventional fin design with two forward attachments and internal structure within the leading edge assembly. The fin design of the Cessna Agwagon A-188 is noteworthy as it is designed to operate in the agricultural role. The Cessan 208 Caravan is a turbine powered utility aircraft, with a similar engine and operating weight to the Cresco.
Page N9
Annex O to Agricultural Aircraft Safety Review
Acceptable Climb Performance

Introduction
The Agricultural Aircraft Safety review detailed how the requirement to meet a minimum angle of climb had been omitted from the overload provisions of Part 137. The previous regulation of agricultural operations had required the aircraft to be capable of achieving climb gradient of at least 6% at the weight and conditions under which it was to be operated. The FAA document CAM 8 used to require a minimum of 350 fpm or 8 xVs whichever was higher. To improve the safety of agricultural operations in New Zealand, the rules governing operation at weights greater than the aircrafts maximum certified take-off weight (MCTOW) need to ensure a certain performance margin is available. Some performance margin is necessary, not just for the obvious need to out climb terrain and obstacles, but also to permit the aircraft to manoeuvre. The following section explains the requirements for performance margin in relation to manoeuvrability and consider the special case of downhill take-offs. Both of these factors need to be considered in the selection of a minimum climb performance for agricultural operations. This section does not calculate what the minimum climb performance should be. That decision should be reached in consultation with experienced industry member and backed by flight testing. The following is intended to aid that process. Manoeuvrability To turn an aircraft or any other vehicle requires the application of a force at 90 degrees to its direction of motion acting, inwards towards the centre of the turn. The obvious example is a tennis ball on a string, where the string provides the inwards force to keep it travelling in a circle. Road vehicles rely on the front wheels to provide an inwards component of force when they are angled in the direction of the turn.
Direction of travel without string force
Figure :. Tennis ball and string in circular motion
Total Lift Lift Lift
W Figure 2: Aircraft in straight and level flight

1
An aircraft in straight and level flight is represented in Figure 2. The aircraft is flying away from the viewer. The lift generated by each wing (blue) combines to provide a total lift force that is equal in size and opposite in direction to the weight force. The aircraft continues straight ahead neither climbing nor descending. To make a balanced turn, aircraft (and birds), roll to angle their lift vector toward the direction of the turn. As shown in the figure 3 this provides an inwards component, and accelerates the aircraft in the intended turn direction. Without the inwards force it would continue straight ahead.
Total Lift
W Figure 3: Aircraft turning left As the total lift vector is tilted, the component acting upwards (red) is decreased. If this was not compensated for, the aircraft would start descending as the upwards component would no longer balance the weight due to gravity (W), which remains unchanged. To avoid sinking in the turn the pilot increases the aircrafts angle of attack slightly to increase the total lift vector, until the upwards component once again equals the aircraft weight. The increase in angle of attack produces an increase in drag so the engine power needs to be increased to prevent the speed reducing and decreasing the lift again. In gentle turns at light weight where the angle of bank is small and the turn duration is short, the loss of height and speed may be small enough to neglect. However, if flying only slightly above the stall speed, and/or close to the ground, they become important. The steeper than angle of bank, the more pitch, and power needs to be applied to maintain height. At a given speed, the aircrafts radius of turn is proportional to its angle of bank. Tight turns require steep bank angles, which require more power to perform without height loss. Therefore the rate at which an aircraft can perform a level turn is proportional to how much extra power is available from that required in straight and level flight, at the given speed. This is known as the excess power for that speed. At an extreme, an aircraft that was using full power just to maintain height at a speed just above stalling would not be able to turn at all, as without additional power to compensate for the tilted lift vector, it must sink or slow down in the turn. If already close to stalling it cannot keep flying if it slows down. The excess power available at a given speed is difficult to calculate. While the engine rated horsepower is known, and the thrust the propeller produces can be
calculated (thrust decreases with airspeed), the drag produced by the aircraft at a given weight and speed (hence angle of attack) is difficult to predict. However the amount of excess power also determines the aircrafts rate of climb. At a given airspeed, the rate of climb is proportional to the difference between the thrust available and the airframe drag produced at that speed. Rate of climb is relatively simple to measure and provides an indication of the aircrafts excess power. Therefore the attainable rate of climb also provides a measure of the aircrafts ability to manoeuvre around obstacles in the horizontal plane as well as its ability to climb over them. Safe agricultural operations require adequate climb performance and manoeuvrability, and hence a certain amount of excess power. The easiest way to measure the excess power is to measure the aircraft climb performance. Therefore the selection of a minimum climb performance acceptable for agricultural aircraft operations, needs to assess the rate of climb and the maximum bank angle (and turn radius) that is attainable at the selected weight. Downhill Take-offs Another factor that needs to be accounted for in NZ agricultural operations is the effect of downhill take-offs. Agricultural operations in New Zealand often take place on sloping airstrips, due to the scarcity of substantial areas of flat land. Take-offs are invariably made in the down-slope direction to take advantage of gravity to accelerate to flying speed. While the slope helps the aircraft to accelerate, it also means that immediately after take-off the aircraft is actually descending. The following is a means of calculating the initial rate of descent. Knots 60 65 70 75 80 Figure 4 Feet Per Second 101.2 109.7 118.1 126.6 135 km/hour 111 120 129 140 148
Vr Vd Q Vh Figure 5
The descent velocity in feet per second can be calculated using Descent Velocity = Sin Q x Vr where Q = slope in degree from horizontal Vr = Velocity at takeoff in feet per second Multiplying the result by 60 gives the more customary units of feet per minute (fpm).
Gradient 1:20 1:15 1:10 1:5 Grade % 5% 6.67% 10% 20% Slope (degrees) 2.86 3.81 5.71 11.31 ROC (fpm) V r 60 kts - 303 - 404 - 604 - 1191 ROC (fpm) V r 70 kts - 386 - 514 - 770 - 1518
Figure 6 The table in figure 6 shows that take-off even from a moderate 1 in 20 sloped airfield results in an initial descent velocity of over 300 fpm. At the upper end, steeper slopes and higher rotate speeds produce initial rates of descent of over 1000 fpm. Unfortunately the selection of a minimum acceptable rate of climb is not as simple as saying it should exceed the rate of descent attained immediately after takeoff. Consider an aircraft that has climb rate of 100 fpm at its best climb speed of 80 knots. If the aircraft has accelerated to best climb speed while descending at 500fpm, it can commence climbing at 100fpm, as long as it maintains 80 knots. To pull out of the descent and establish the climb the aircraft needs to pitch upwards. If the aircraft pitches up too rapidly, the speed will decrease below 80 knots and the rate of climb will decrease. While pitching up from the descent to the climb the aircraft travels along an arc. The radius of the arc is proportional to the rate at which the aircraft can pitch up without losing speed. The rate it can do this is proportional to the excess power at 80 knots. If the excess power is small, the radius will be large, and descent will continue for longer before the climb is established. Therefore ability to arrest the rate of descent is once again proportional to excess power. As described earlier, excess power is most easily quantified by measuring the rate of climb at a given aircraft weight.
Conclusion
Selection of an acceptable climb rate for agricultural operations beyond MCTOW should take into account the rate of descent that can develop during downhill takeoffs. In addition consideration should be given to the aircrafts ability to pull up from the descent after takeoff on anticipated slopes. Its ability to do this will be proportional to its excess power. This may be best established by test.
Figure 7: Cresco taking off downhill. Dave Wareham photo.
Figur 8: FU24 Downhill takeoff in South Island, Jim Nimmo photo.
Annex P to Agricultural Aircraft Safety Review
Landing Gear Considerations

Introduction
Chapter 4 Section 2 of the Agricultural Aircraft Safety Review considered the high rate of landing gear failures amongst New Zealand produced agricultural aircraft. A contributor to this failure rate is the practice of operating at the Part 137 overload weight which is approx 30% higher than the weight used for design and certification of the landing gear. Design of a reasonably reliable landing gear for NZ conditions requires some consideration of the loads likely to be encountered in service. Only if the service loads are correctly anticipated can the design and certification requirements be correctly specified. The obvious modification to the certification requirement would be to certify the landing gear for operation at the selected agricultural overload weight (i.e. MCTOW+30%). However there are two other factors unique to agricultural operations that this approach overlooks, uphill landings and the disposable load effect.
Uphill Landings
On landing uphill another calculation has to be performed. Normal undercarriage design loads are detailed in Federal Aviation Regulation 23.473. The full set of requirements is complex but the calculation starts with the requirement that the landing gear be capable of withstanding the loads generated by contacting the ground with a rate of descent equal to: Vd = 4.4(W/S)1/4 {FAR 23.473}
where W = Landing weight , S = wing area, (W/S is the wing loading in lbs/in2) For the FU24 at the Part 137 weight of 6367 lbs and a wing loading of 24lbs/sq in, this calculation produces a descent velocity of 1584 fpm. (15.5 knots) FAR 23.473 then states that the rate of descent need not exceed 10 fps which is equal to 600fpm. This then is the standard design condition for FAR 23 light aircraft. The landing gear should be strong enough to withstand the loads seen by the undercarriage if the pilot sets the aircraft up in a 600fppm glide, and flew all the way down without the usual round out and flare. Subsequent section of FAR 23 deal with calculating the resulting deceleration g. Long travel soft undercarriage can accept that rate of descent without imposing large loads on the airframe, while short travel undercarriage with firm springs will have to arrest the 600fpm descent in fewer inches of travel and produce a greater deceleration and thus loads into the undercarriage and supporting structure. All of this presumes a descent onto a level runway, with a rate of descent perpendicular to the runway. In NZ agricultural operations, landing s are routinely made up slope. The effect of an up slope is to increase the apparent rate of descent, from that shown on the aircraft vertical speed indicator (VSI).
Vt G s V ref
Vp
Vd
G = slope of the ground relative to horizontal. s = aircrafts glide slope, below horizontal Vref = Aircraft approach speed Vd = rate of descent indicated on aircraft VSI. Vt = aircraft approach speed tangential to the ground Vp = aircraft approach speed perpendicular to the ground.
Figure 1: Uphill landing When landing on a level runway, Angle G = zero and Vp = Vd which for design purposes can be taken as the 10fps/600 fpm from FAR 23.473. When the ground slopes up, the glideslope is effectively steepened to angle (s+G) and the speed perpendicular to the ground becomes Vp, which is larger than Vd the rate of descent shown on the aircrafts VSI. The new velocity perpendicular to the ground is : Vp = sin(G + s) x Vref The increment in apparent descent velocity perpendicular to the ground is: dVp = sin( G )x Vref For the FU 24 with a Vref of 55 kts, a range of runway slopes gives the following increases in apparent descent velocity, Slope Grade % Angle G Descent velocity increment (fps) V ref =55 knots 1:20 1:15 1:10 1:5 5.00 6.67 10.0 20.0 2.86 3.81 5.71 11.31 4.64 6.19 9.25 18.24
2
Figure 2: Descent Velocity Increments Recalling that the maximum rate of descent required by FAR 23.473 was 10 fps, even a relatively gentle 5% up slope increases the rate of descent by more than 40%. from that encountered on a level runway. In day to day operation on sloping strips experienced pilots would compensate and adjust the flare until they are landing almost parallel to the up slope with a slight rate of climb at touchdown. But most pilots operating FAR 23 aircraft also flare and achieve landings with a minimal rate of descent. The point of a certification standard is that is intentionally a worst case. Designing FAR 23 aircraft to withstand the loads of a 600 fpm descent, which they may only experience once in their lifetime, gives them sufficient static strength to withstand a long service life at the much lower everyday landing loads. Therefore, although most agricultural pilots will flare sufficiently to compensate for the slope, to provide NZ agricultural aircraft with the same confidence in their landing gear as regular FAR 23 aircraft they probably need to be certified to a load 40%-50% higher than the FAR 23.473 case.
Disposable Load Effect
As discussed in Chapter x, the choice of landing weight at which these calculation is s performed also becomes important for NZ agricultural operations, as FAR 23 usually assumes the landing weight is not less than 95% of the take-off weight. If that is true the 600fpm landing loads exceed anything likely to be encountered during taxiing or take-off. But if the take-off weight is 40% greater than the landing weight the protection provided by that assumption is no longer present. In that case FAR 23.473 paragraph g) states:
g) No inertia load factor used for design purposes may be less than 2.67, nor may the limit ground reaction load factor be less than 2.0 at design maximum weight, unless these lower values will not be exceeded in taxiing at speeds up to takeoff speed over terrain as rough as that expected in service.
This means that unless it can be shown otherwise, 1 the aircraft can be expected to experience acceleration of up to 2 G when encountering to bumps in the runway at speeds up to take-off speed. This requires that the landing gear be designed to withstand a force sufficient to accelerate the aircraft at take-off weight upwards at 2G. This needs to be assessed for NZ agricultural operations as, the 2G acceleration at Take-off weight may be more severe than the 600fpm landing at landing weight.
Conclusion
The effect of uphill landings on ground closure speeds and the effect of the marked difference in weights at takeoff and landing are two of the factors that need to be assessed during the engineering assessment of the aircrafts ability to operate at weights above its maximum certified takeoff weight. Failure to account for these factors will reduce the factor of safety of the landing gear from that which it was certified with.
Due perhaps to very compliant landing gear, or a limitation to paved surfaces.

3
Figure 3: FU24 performing an uphill landing, note dirt flying up at point of impact.

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Agricultural Aircraft Safety Review

Agricultural Aircraft Safety Review

Agricultural Aircraft Safety Review

Page 11 December 2008

Agricultural Aircraft Safety Review

Page 12 December 2008

Agricultural Aircraft Safety Review

Page 13 December 2008

Agricultural Aircraft Safety Review

Page 14 December 2008

Agricultural Aircraft Safety Review

Chapter 3 - Regulatory Basis of Part 137 and CAM 8

Agricultural Aircraft Safety Review

137.103 Maximum take-off weight

Agricultural Aircraft Safety Review

Page 17 December 2008

Agricultural Aircraft Safety Review

Standard and Restricted Certification An Analogy

7 FAR 23.49 c) 1, single engine aircraft

Page 18 December 2008

Agricultural Aircraft Safety Review

Page 19 December 2008

Agricultural Aircraft Safety Review

Page 20 December 2008

Agricultural Aircraft Safety Review

Page 21 December 2008

Agricultural Aircraft Safety Review

Page 22 December 2008

Agricultural Aircraft Safety Review

Certification of the FU24-950 Comparison of Regulatory Requirements

Page 23 December 2008

Agricultural Aircraft Safety Review

Page 24 December 2008

Agricultural Aircraft Safety Review

Summary of CAM 8 and Part 137

Page 25 December 2008

Agricultural Aircraft Safety Review

Page 26 December 2008

Agricultural Aircraft Safety Review

Chapter 4 CAA Safety Data Review

Section 1 - Collection Method

Page 27 December 2008