Professional Documents
Culture Documents
The past several years have witnessed a growing awareness among American
managers of the central importance to competitive success in first rate competence in the
work of production. At the top of many corporate agendas now rests the determination to
boost productivity, product quality, and new product innovation. This is all to the good.
What managers still lack, however, is a powerful descriptive framework for understanding
how their manufacturing organizations are contributing to the overall strategic goals, as
In most of these companies, the bulk of the labor force and assets are tied to the
manufacturing function. The attitudes, expectations, and traditions that have developed
over time in and around that function will be difficult to change. Companies cannot atone
for years of neglect simply by throwing large chunks of investment dollars at the problem.
In practice, of course, the challenge for managers in far more complex than is
suggested by the simple dichotomy between “weakness” and “strength”. There is no single
end that every manufacturing function must serve and serve well. There are, instead,
several generic kinds of roles the function can play in a company. These roles can be
Longer-term manufacturing
developments and trends are
addressed systematically.
Figure 4 Pursue a manufacturing base Efforts are made to anticipate the
potential of new manufacturing
competitive advantage: practices and technologies.
any company in any industry, the key is not to get stuck with a single simple notion of its
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source of advantage. The best competitors, the most successful ones, know how to keep
Today, time is on the cutting edge. The ways leading companies manage time—in
represent the most powerful sources of competitive advantage. Though certain Western
companies are pursuing these advantages, Japanese experience and practice provide the
most instructive examples—not because they are necessarily unique but because they best
illustrate the evolutionary stages through with leading companies have advanced.
In the period following World War II, Japanese companies used their low labor
costs to gain entry into various industries. As wage rates rose and technology became
more significant, the Japanese shifted first to scale-based strategies and then focused
move to flexible factories, as leading Japanese companies sought both low cost and great
variety in the market. Cutting-edge Japanese companies today are capitalizing on time as a
critical source of competitive advantage: shortening the planing loop in the product
development cycle and trimming process time in the factory—managing time the way most
even innovation. Managing time has enabled to Japanese companies not only to reduce
their costs but also to offer broad product lines, cover more market segments, and upgrade
Surprisingly, a clear definition of learning has proved to be elusive over the years.
Organizational theorists have studied learning for a long time; the accompanying
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quotations suggest that there is still considerable disagreement (see figure 2 “Definitions of
unfolds over time and link it with knowledge acquisition and improved performance. But
Organizational learning means the process of improving actions through knowledge and
understanding. C.Marlene Fiol and Marjorie A. Lyles, “Organizational Learning”
Academy of Management Review, October 1985.
An entity learns if, through its processing of information, the range of its potential
behaviors is changed. George P. Huber, “Organizational Learning: The Contributing
Processes and the Literatures,” Organization Science, February 1991.
Organizations are seen as learning by encoding inferences from history into routines
that guide behavior. Barbara Levitt and James G. March, “Organizational Learning,”
American Review of Sociology, Vol. 14, 1988.
How can we discern among this cacophony of voices yet build on earlier insights?
transferring knowledge, and at modifying its behavior to reflect new knowledge and
relationships), knowledge sharing (the dissemination to others of what has been acquired
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by some), and knowledge utilization (integration of the learning so that it is assimilated,
broadly available, and can be generalized to new situations) (DiBella, Nevis, Gould, 1996).
Those companies which seek to undertake organizational learning will surely gain
competitive advantage over those who don’t. Improved capabilities and core competencies
are built. Some simple steps, such as proper documenting, will prevent mistakes from
being made twice. A company will not grow to its full potential unless organizational
learning is taking place. Without organizational learning, companies will not be able to
expansion. In order to enter into a new product or technological field, firms need
technological capabilities to design or use the new technology, they also need
manufacturing and customer knowledge to produce and market the technology. Lacking
these capabilities makes it difficult to adopt new technologies. On the other hand, if firms
are able to apply existing capabilities to new technological fields, they are more likely to
take this advantage and expand into new fields (Chen, 1996).
On the other hand, if firms are unable to use existing capabilities in new
technological fields, they will have to pay high switching costs to adopt the technologies.
For these firms, organizational inertia can create difficulties in adopting new technologies.
Group Technology
and achieve efficiencies by grouping like problems. In most cases, a prerequisite for the
in a library catalog are classified and coded in such a way that one can find all the books
written by a particular author, covering a certain topic, or sharing the same title.
Similarities between parts, captures in the group technology code, can in like
example a manufacturer can drastically reduce the time and effort spent deciding how a
recurring problems or tasks. By improving productivity is this way, group technology adds
Competition for competence is not product versus product, or even business versus
competencies like electronic imaging and printing and fine optics, Cannon competes with a
broad array of “competence competitors,” including Toshiba, Kodak, Nikon, and Hewlett-
Packard. Wal-Mart competes with Kmart and Sears in developing world-class logistics.
Glaxo competes with Merck to develop new drug-discovery competencies. There are
competition.
unit within the corporation. Core competencies are also longer lasting than any individual
product or service. While the constituent skills that go into Sony’s miniaturization
competence have changed markedly since the company first licensed the transistor from
Bell Labs, and while the range of products where Sony exploits that competence has grown
and changed, miniaturization has been at the heart or Sony’s competitiveness for decades.
the specific technologies that have contributed to the competence, and many of the
products or services, winning or losing the battle for competence leadership can have a
much greater impact than the success or failure of a single product. If Motorola lost its
Third, because the investment, risk-taking, and time frame required to achieve core
competence leadership often exceeds the resources and patients of a single business unit,
some competencies will not be built in the absence of direct corporate support. Senior
sustain investment in core competencies that will secure the firm’s position in the markets
Core competencies are the collective learning in the organization, especially how to
theoretical knowledge to put a radio on a chip does not in itself assure a company the skill
to produce a miniature radio no bigger than a business card. The bring off this feat, Casio
and ultrathin precision casting—the same skills it applies in its miniature card calculators,
If core competence is about harmonizing streams of technology, it’s also about the
technologists, engineers, and marketers have a shared understanding of customer needs and
allowed it to participate in world markets 24 hours a day. Its competence in systems has
provided the company the means to differentiate itself from many service financial service
component, it also involves the governance process inside the organization (the quality of
relationships across functions, across business units), and collective learning across levels
Consider a company that is not blessed with much technology. It qualifies for not
more than, say, 200 units, using the formula from above. However this firm has fostered
organizational learning. Let us give it 100 units for governance and 500 for collective
creation of a learning environment at all levels in the organization will remain under-
The diversified corporation is like a large tree. The trunk and major limbs are the
core products, the smaller branches are the business units; the leaves, flowers, and fruit are
the end products. The root system that provides nourishment, sustenance, and the stability
is the core competence. You can miss the strength of a competitor by looking only at their
end products, in the same way you can miss the strength of a tree by only looking at it’s
Core Product 2
Core Product 1
diverse businesses as calculators, miniature TV sets, monitors for laptop computers, and
automotive dashboards—Which is why Casio’s entry into the hand-held TV market was
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predictable. Second, a core competence should make a significant contribution to the
production skills. A rival might acquire some of the technologies that compromise the core
competence, but it will find to duplicate the more or less comprehensive pattern of internal
coordination and learning. JVC’s decision in the early 1960’s to pursue the development
of videotape competence passed the three tests outlined here. RCA’s decision in the late
1970’s to develop a stylus-based video turntable system did not (Prahalad and Hamel,
1990).
transcend a single business? Does it cover a range of businesses, both current and new? 3.
It is hard for competitors to imitate? It is hard for someone to visit Matsushita or Sony and
come back with an outline why they are good at manufacturing or miniaturization,
learning in an organization.
The difference between technology and competence is that technology can stand-
alone (e.g., design of very large scale integration). Competence, on the other hand, is
getting consistently high yields in VLSI. This transcends design capabilities. The process
of converting good designs into high yields requires that multiple levels (e.g., shop floor
to product develop engineers) and multiple functions (e.g., application engineers and
manufacturing groups) work very closely. A lot of understanding and learning is tacit.
And the recognition that competence represents tacit as well as explicit learning and the
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cumulative knowledge base involving a large number of people is critical to understanding
core competence. Technical capabilities, as stand alone skills, are not the key to
(Prahalad, 1993).
price/performance attributes of current products. But the survivors of the first wave of
global competition, Western and Japanese alike, are all converging on similar and
formidable standards for product cost and quality—minimum hurdles for continued
competition, but less and less important as sources of differential advantage. In the long
run, competitiveness derives from the ability to build, at a lower cost and more speedily
than competitors, the core competencies that spawn unanticipated products. The real
technologies and production skills into competencies that empower individual businesses
Senior executives who claim that they cannot build core competencies either
because they feel the autonomy of business units is sacrosanct or because their feet are
held to the quarterly budget fire should think again. The problem in most Western
companies is not that their senior executives are any less capable than those in Japan or
adherence to a concept of the corporation that unnecessarily limits the ability of the
individual businesses to fully exploit the deep reservoir of technical capability that many
Consider the color television business, for example. In order to succeed, firms
must have access to core products such as picture tubes, signal-processing I.C.’s, tuners,
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and line output transformers. If we disaggregate businesses at the core product level—be it
TV’s, VCR’s, camcorders, or laptop computers—we find very few Western firms that
differently. For example, we can explain why Matsushita and JVC won the battle for
VCR’s. Their combined market share through licensing was 80%, and core products for
decks was 85%. Eighty-five percent of the world’s requirements for decks were made by
creating collective intelligence and accomplishing the tasks on the group’s agenda.
is not sufficient unto itself. If the group cannot convert collective intelligence into
organizational action it can easily become a bonded support group rather than a high
an making decisions with the group intelligence, surpassing the sum of the IQ of the
individual members.
structures that sustain memory and learning in the organization over time. Examples
include the compensation system, the career development process, style of leadership,
methods of distribution of power and governance, and even physical structure of the site.
Both visible and invisible structures, systems, and forces affect a group’s ability to
(Http://www.vision.nest.com/cbw/creating.html.).
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Company
Management Competency
In 1968, business owners had been very strong on hierarchies and on reporting. They
believed on clear lines of command. They thought that employees should be like officers
in the army, communicating only with their immediate superiors and immediate inferiors.
And like soldiers, they considered it the height of disloyalty for an employee to raise an
issue with someone higher up if he was dissatisfied with the response of his immediate
Visionaries before their time, Intel’s management saw that in a fast moving industry
where speed of response to change was all-important, and where information had to flow
as swiftly as possible if the company was to make the right decisions, this approach did not
make sense. Instead, they wanted to encourage anyone who had a good idea to speak up,
anyone who had a question to ask it. Staff meetings were to be open to anyone who
though they could contribute something by attending; no manager, no matter how senior,
should refuse a request for help or information from another employee (Jackson, 1997).
Second Sourcing
Early in its history, Intel was consolidating, price pressures were increasing, and
experts were beginning to say that it was now too late to start a broad based semiconductor
manufacturing company. So the financial climate was too risky to consider developing
Their solution was to become a second source. There were two ways to become a
second source. The formal way was to sign a licensing agreement with the company that
invented the product, paying an up-front fee and royalty. In return you got a set of masks
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containing the master layouts of the circuits. Sometimes, if you were lucky, some
engineering visits to help you get the line working properly so that the process would
The informal way was to buy a few sample parts from a distributor as soon as the
part came out, rush them back to the lab, pop the top, and take blow-ups of the circuits
inside. You then assigned a team of people to take traces on a part, carrying out a kind of
electrical audit to try to deduce from the signals going in and out what is happening inside.
This was slower and more difficult than the official second sourcing, but cheaper. And
although it was frowned on, the law of the trademarks and patents, secrets, and copyrights
was murky enough to make it possible without actually breaking the law (Jackson, 1997).
With profits of $2.3 billion in 1993, Intel was the most profitable semiconductor
company. But Intel’s profits are not an entirely accurate barometer of the company’s
competencies. Buried in Intel’s profits are two significant endowments. First are its
intellectual property rights. The is no doubt that Intel is an innovative firm and produces
elegant and parsimonious microprocessor designs. On the other hand, if there were as few
legal barriers to copying a semiconductor design as there are to copying a retail concept,
much of Intel’s profits would be shared with competitor capable of reverse engineering and
patent legislation and enforced though the courts are, in essence, a tax levied on every Intel
customer. A second endowment is Intel’s installed base. The fact that Intel’s X86 chip
became the standard in the PC world owes much to the enormous distribution power of
IBM. IBM made the X86 architecture the de facto standard. The installed base of the X86
microprocessors has given Intel a substantial advantage in migrating customers from 286
two endowments disappeared. How, for example, would the competition between Intel’s
Pentium chip and the Power-PC chip of IBM, Motorolla, and Apple turn out if no
substantially reduced. In fact, intellectual property rights are being treatend around the
world and at some point, as microprocessor technology changes, it will be impossible for
Intel to continue to extrapolate on past chip designs or to count on its installed base for
forward momentum. A new phase of competition will eventually open up where the only
advantage that Intel will be able to count on will be its own design, manufacturing, and
endowments, but its competencies. Managers must be able to distinguish between the two
The selection process Noyce and Moore, Intel founders, used in assembling their
team was simple. The pair asked everyone they respected particularly in the electronic
engineering departments of universities, for names of the brightest research scientists they
knew. Noyce or Moore would make contact with a phone call, and the candidate would be
invited over for a chat—either at Noyce’s house or at some modest local restaurant like the
International House of Pancakes. They would chat over lunch or breakfast, the candidate
siting on one plastic banquette, The Intel founders sitting opposite on the other, and then
Noyce and Moore would make their decision. In addition to being a brilliant engineer, you
had to pass two tests to get a job at Intel. You had to be willing to come to work for Bob
and Gordon for no more than your current salary with your existing employer—and some
times, if they though you were over paid, for 10 percent less. In return, you’d be promised
stock options, which you would have to trust would be adequate compensation for the pay
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raise forgone. Also you had to be willing to take a demotion. If Intel was going to grow as
fast as its founders hoped, its first round of hires would soon be responsible for running
much larger teams of people. In the meantime, they would have to spend a few months
doing work that was more junior than the job they had come from (Jackson, 1997).
Building competencies starts with assembling the best possible teams that a
company can acquire. The knowledge that these employees bring is critical to building
opportunity to rise to new heights. But it may just as likely signal the
change but they are more than technological change. They can be
caused by competitors but are more than competition. They are full-
Andy Grove, Intel
CEO
scale changes in the way business is conducted, so that simply
adopting new technology or fighting the as you used to may be insufficient. They build up
force so insidiously that you may have a hard time even putting a finger on what has
changed, yet you know that something has. Let’s not mince words: A strategic inflection
can be deadly when unattended to. Companies that begin a decline as a result of its
But strategic inflection points do not always lead to disaster. When the way
business is being conducted changes, it creates opportunities for players who are adept at
operating in the new way. This can apply to newcomers or incumbents, for whom a
strategic inflection point may mean an opportunity for a new period of growth.
Intel'sIntel’s
newnew333Mhz
333Mhz Pentium II
Pentium II
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You can be the subject of a strategic inflection point but you can also be the cause
of one. Intel has been both. In the mid-eighties, the Japanese memory producers brought
upon us an inflection point so overwhelming that it forced us out of memory chips and into
the relatively new field of microprocessors. The microprocessor business that we have
dedicated ourselves to has since gone on to cause the mother of all inflection points for
other companies, bringing very difficult times to the classical mainframe computer
companies. Having both being affected by inflection points and having caused them, I can
safely say that the former is tougher. I’ve grown up in a technological industry. Most of
my experiences are rooted there. I think in technological concepts and metaphors, and a
lot of my examples in this book come what I know. But strategic inflection points, by
often brought about by the workings of technology, are not restricted to technological
industries.”
(Andy Grove from his book “Only the Paranoid Survive”, 1996).
Strategic Alliances
The NEC Corp. constituted a “C&C” Committee of top managers to oversee the
development of core products and core competencies. NEC put in place coordination
groups and committees that cut across the interest of individual businesses. Consistent
with its strategic architecture, NEC shifted enormous resources to strengthen its position in
internal resources, NEC was able to accumulate a broad array of core competencies.
evolution. Top management determined that computing would evolve from large
ISDN. As things evolved further, NEC reasoned, the computing, component, and
them, and that there would be enormous opportunities for any company that had built the
most important “core product.” It entered into a myriad strategic alliances—over 100 as of
its most noted relationship was with Honeywell and Bull. Almost all the collaborative
the rationale for these alliances and the goal for internalizing partner skills. NEC’s director
of research summed up its competence acquisition during the 1970’s and 1980’s this way:
“From an investment standpoint, it was much quicker and cheaper to use foreign
technology. There wasn’t need for us to develop new ideas.” (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990).
Resource Leverage
A high aspiration level (compared to the resources available) leads to the need for
resource leverage. The issues for managers is: How do you create the capacity in a large
pattern of likely industry evolution), identifying core competencies and core products.
configurations to create new market opportunities is at least the heart of the process of
Management Must See the Company as Anything Other Than a Collection of Discrete
Businesses
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There are major companies that have had the potential to build core competencies
but have failed to do so because top management was unable to conceive of the company
as anything other than a collection of discrete businesses. GE sold much of its consumer
maintain its competitiveness in this sector. That was undoubtedly so, but it is ironic that it
sold several key businesses to competitors who were already competence leaders—Black
& Decker in small electrical motors, and Thomson, which was eager to build its
competence in microelectronics and had learned from the Japanese that a position in
Management trapped in the strategic business unit mind-set almost inevitably finds
its individual business dependant on external sources for critical components, such as
motors or compressors. But these are not just components. They are core products that
contribute to the competitiveness of a wide range of end products. They are physical
organization—all people, at all levels, in all functions, and in all geographies. It involves
developing a shared mindset and shared goals, and developing strategies for acquiring
competency. Senior managers must focus on such questions as: How do we stretch the
How can top managers establish an aspiration level (strategic intent) for the
organization? Motivation for change results from an aspiration that all employees can
identify with and feel committed to. Aspirations must by definition exceed the current
resources of the company. Therefore, by design, strategic intent must cause a “misfit”
between aspirations and current resources and current approaches to using resources. The
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aspiration must focus the energies of the organization toward innovation (changing the
rules of the game) in the way the firm competes (Prahalad, 1993).
corresponding business units. Research has shown that there is something beyond
understanding business units and customers. We to start with a strategic intent, create a
strategic architecture, understand core competencies and products, such there is a logic for
business, both current and new, and that leverage is based on continuous reconfiguration of
these competencies.
To realize both the stretch and the leverage that this set of ideas promotes, we need
to develop a set of values and beliefs that are consistent with this orientation to profitable
growth. What is the unit of analysis for resource allocation? How do we manage inter-
capability or cycle time? And then, how do we think about administrative processes such
as budgeting or planning?
The next challenge for senior management is: How do you connect individual
inside the company, where everybody understands what the shared aspirations are and how
the various businesses interlink with each other, and logic for nesting individual products
and new initiatives? That is the next round of challenge (Prahalad, 1993).
embrace our dying process. We cannot avoid these transitions as we mature—and neither
can a community. If the organizational community avoids the pain of growth, it stops the
learning process. But if it consciously embraces the three learning challenges, it finds
can be temporarily grafted onto and old worldview, which rejects a spiritual
sense of life, seeks answers in linear causality, and fragment system problems
into systems for easier comprehension. But such a transplant will not “take”
permanently. Community living is a system, and the organization will see that
core competence requires day-in and day-out practice of discipline and mastery,
so that the community and individuals within it cannot help but move toward
find itself called to the responsibilities of the larger society. This final
developmental stage is really just a starting place for another level of growth.
acts interdependently. Each level, while a whole system in itself, is also a part
and simultaneous part of the learning organization. The self and the
that its survival is linked to that of the larger society. If the organization has
achieved a level of maturity and has integrated the prior two stages, it can take
Summary
competitive advantage: shortening the planing loop in the product development cycle and
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trimming process time in the factory—managing time the way most companies manage
Organizational learning means the process of improving actions through knowledge and
understanding. George P. Huber, “Organizational Learning: The Contributing Processes
and the Literatures,” Organization Science, February 1991.
Those companies which seek to undertake organizational learning will surely gain
competitive advantage over those who don’t. Improved capabilities and core competencies
are built. A company will not grow to its full potential unless organizational learning is
taking place. Without organizational learning, companies will not be able to compete and
thus will disappear.
expansion. In order to enter into a new product or technological field, firms need
Group Technology
Competition for competence is not product versus product, or even business versus
business. First, core competencies are not product-specific. Core competencies are also
Core competencies are the collective learning in the organization, especially how to
technology component, it also involves the governance process inside the organization (the
quality of relationships across functions, across business units), and collective learning
across levels and functions) inside the company. We may conceptualize competence as
The diversified corporation is like a large tree. The trunk and the major limbs are the core
products, the smaller branches are the business units; the leaves, flowers, and fruit are the
end products.
At least three tests can be applied to identify core competencies in a company. First, a core
competence should make a significant contribution to the perceived benefits of the end
consists primarily of the systems and structures that sustain memory and learning in the
Management Competency
Early in the creation of the Intel Corporation, Intel’s upper management saw that in
a fast moving industry speed of response to change was all-important, and adopted liberal
management procedures much earlier before they were popular in other industries
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Change—Strategic Inflection Points
A strategic inflection point is a time in the life of a company when its fundamentals
are about to change. That change can mean an opportunity to rise to new heights, or may
be just as likely to be the beginning of the end. Intel over came this problem in the 80’s
while being outsold by a Japanese market of memory chips, they began manufacturing
Strategic Alliances
The NEC Corp. constituted a “C&C” Committee of top managers to oversee the
development of core products and core competencies. NEC top management determined
that semiconductors would be the company’s most important “core product.” By using
Resource Leverage
strategic architecture (a way to capture the pattern of likely industry evolution), core
The role of top management is essentially one of energizing the whole organization
—all the people, at all levels, in all functions, and in all geographies. It involves a
corresponding business units. If the organizational community avoids the pain of growth,
learning organization will constantly cycle through the stages of pseudo-community, chaos,
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