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Adam Smith
STS.002, Fall 2004
Paper II
“[This study] forces the mind to arrive at pure truth by the exercise of pure
thought.”
Plato’s words have rhetorical appeal. He offers the reader a path to pure truth –
which nobody would object to achieving. A more detailed analysis of the statement,
though, leads the reader to several questions. After all, what is “pure truth?” In this
paper, we will discuss some of the ambiguities in Plato’s Allegory of the Cave and
evaluate a modern historian’s attempt to clarify it. We will argue that Plato likely
intended to communicate the following: reasoning based on observation will yield faulty
results, and inversely, reasoning based only on thought will result in truths. In support of
our argument, we will first highlight the ambiguities in Plato’s writing and arrive at the
statements above as best fit solutions to the ambiguities. Next, we will describe how
David Lindberg2 confirms our interpretation, but does not clearly define “imperfection.”
We will conclude with an interpretation that attempts to resolve the remaining ambiguity
story describes beings chained to the wall of a cave. The beings can only see the
1
See, Plato, “The Allegory of the Cave,” in Science & Culture in the Western Tradition, edited by
John G. Burke (Scottsdale, Arizona: Gorsuch Scarisbrick, 1987), pp. 7-9.
2
David C. Lindberg, The Beginnings of Western Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1992).
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shadows of the real objects behind them. Since these beings cannot see anything other
than projections on the cave wall, they are led to believe that the projections are reality.
Socrates describes two causal paths to Glaucon. One path, depicted in Figure 1a, results
the cave. The other path, the one Plato endorses, advises that something closer to reality
can be achieved through a more abstract style of thinking. We will now discuss each path
Figure 1. The two main claims in Plato’s argument. In (a), reliance on empirical observations
yield undesirable results. In contrast, the progression in (b) depicts the achievement of glamorous
ends through some notion of “pure thought.”
The progression in Figure 1a begins with the use of observation when reasoning
about the nature of the world or cosmos. Perhaps the clearest component of Plato’s work
is his notion of observation, or the human senses. Plato hypothesizes that reliance on the
senses results in inaccurate conclusions. It is easy to see the dynamic being played out in
Plato’s allegory; the chained beings’ observations are inherently limited, and thus a
reliance on such observations results in inaccurate conclusions (i.e., that the shadows are
real). Plato does not show that human observation is similarly unrepresentative of reality
this exercise is left to the reader, and thus Plato’s allegory is mildly ambiguous.
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The second causal link, offered to the reader as a recourse for the failure of
observation, is more ambiguous. The simplest way to decipher the argument without the
aid of other sources is to assume that everything Plato says in the second causal link is
the inverse of its equivalent in the first causal link. That is, rather than leading to
falsehood, the exclusive use of reasoning leads to truth. We will call this argument the
inversion hypothesis. Let us begin by discussing the possible meaning of the first bubble
in Figure 1b. “Pure thought” is similar to the term exclusive use of reasoning--from our
inversion hypothesis above. However, by “pure thought” did Plato mean exercising
thought alone, or was he referring to a specific type of thinking? Such ambiguity could
potentially be resolved by a historian who could translate Plato’s original manuscript with
an eye to the meaning of “pure.” Without that recourse, however, we turn to Bowen,3
who said that “Inference or Reasoning is the act of Pure Thought whereby one Judgment
is derived from another, or from two others.” This definition corroborates the inversion
hypothesis, that “pure thought” means exclusive use of thought (i.e., absent of
observations or axioms). To bolster this conjecture, perhaps other items in the causal
For example, if the astute reader can understand the meaning of “the real nature of
number,” then that understanding can be used to infer the meaning of other phrases used
in its place throughout the work. Unfortunately, the meaning of “the real nature of
number” is not clear. Numbers are arbitrary objects defined by a set of mathematical
axioms; therefore they do not have a nature. A more abstract line of reasoning about
Plato’s intentions might conclude that the author intended to mean logical inference,
3
See Francis Bowen, A Treatise on Logic, (Cambridge, Mass.: Sever and Francis, 1864), vi. pp.
148; as quoted in the Oxford English Dictionary
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similar to our conclusion about the meaning of “pure thought.” This discussion is still
weak, though. Unfortunately, the other phrases are not clear either; they leave much
room for interpretation. Thus, the best interpretation is the inversion hypothesis.
Now we will consider the second bubble, which follows from the first in Plato’s
allegory. These phrases (e.g., “Form of Goodness”) are the most unclear of those made in
Plato’s work. “Pure truth” (interpreted here to mean ideas which are completely true)
seems to be the most definitive description of the author’s intended meaning. Our
definition seems to fit well with the inversion hypothesis. However, it is not clear that
loose interpretations of the other items in the bubble can equate to our interpretation, i.e.
truth. When Plato says that the result is the “cause of [..] right and good,” we would have
to agree that truth is the cause of right and good. However, it is not obvious that truth is
the “parent of intelligence.” Indeed, it might be more accurate to state that intelligence is
the parent (i.e. cause) of truth. Unfortunately, once again there is not an interpretation of
Plato’s exposition that seems to be a better fit than the inversion hypothesis.
We will now evaluate the ambiguities of the causal link between the cause and
effect in Figure 1b. That is, if we assume that the inversion hypothesis is correct, does it
follow that exclusive use of thought leads to truth? This case is only somewhat clear in
the allegory. The caveat is that it might not be possible for the chained beings to induce
correct ideas about reality, since they might not have enough information available inside
the cave. For example, if there are no shadows of ducks in the cave, it would be
impossible to reason about the ideal form of a duck. Therefore we must say that
reasoning is only the best way to discover reality from inside the cave. This hole in
Plato’s reasoning grows when he tries to apply the allegory to humans on Earth, saying
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“The ascent to see the things [outside of the cave] you may take as standing for the
upward journey of the soul into the region of the intelligible.”4 As before, explaining the
causal link is left as an exercise to the reader, and is thus a mild ambiguity.
To summarize our ambiguity analysis of Plato’s work thus far, we created a best
guess interpretation of the author’s main points. Our interpretation is that reasoning
based on observation results in false conclusions, while reasoning based on thought alone
(i.e. pure thought) results in true conclusions. The first clause to the interpretation is
fairly clear from the original work, but the second clause is induced using our inversion
intentions.
With this in mind, we turn to the treatment of the allegory given by a modern
historian, David Lindberg, in his The Beginnings of Western Science.5 As we shall see,
Lindberg confirms the inversion hypothesis. According to Lindberg, “The senses are
chains that tie us down; the route to knowledge is through philosophical reflection.”6
Philosophical reflection is absent of empirically driven experiments, and is thus the same
as exclusive use of thought. Therefore, our attempt to interpret Plato’s ideas, based solely
on the original work, was correct. That is, Plato was indeed supposing that reasoning
based on observation leads to falsehood, and reasoning based only on thought will lead to
truth. From this, we can deduce the meanings of any of the previously ambiguous
phrases in Figure 1.
the causal links (i.e. the “Why?” questions in Figure 1). Fortunately, these ambiguities
4
Plato, “Allegory,” pp. 8
5
Lindberg, Beginnings, pp. 35-39
6
Lindberg, Beginnings, pp. 37-38
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are resolved by Lindberg’s general treatment of Plato’s works, including the world of
forms. Lindberg relates Plato’s idea by describing two worlds. The first is the world of
forms, which contains ideal images of objects. The second world is the real world, in
which instantiations of these forms are less perfect in some way. The two worlds map
directly to the allegory; the shadows on the wall are imperfect renditions of the objects
outside the cave. Since Plato believes the theory of the world of forms to be true in the
real world as well (i.e. on Earth, outside of the allegory), it serves as a level of indirection
to map between the allegory and the real world. This logical connection is illustrated in
Figure 2, below. This explanation, unfortunately, creates one more ambiguity. In the
world of the allegory, the images on the wall are imperfect because they come from
Figure 2. Resolving ambiguities concerning the truth of the causal links in the real world, outside
of the allegory
“In a passage in one of his dialogues, the Republic, Plato reflected on the
relationship between the actual tables constructed by a carpenter and the idea or
are alike down to the smallest detail, and limitations in the material (a knot here, a
warped board there) insure that none will fully measure up to the ideal.”8
7
Lindberg, Beginnings, pp. 36
8
Lindberg, Beginnings, pp. 35-36
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In Plato’s carpenter example, wood is less perfect than its ideal form because it might
have a knot or be warped. Furthermore, a table that a carpenter builds might not be true
to its blueprints. These are all illustrations of the same general idea; they are all examples
of imperfection. It is still not clear to the reader of both Plato and Lindberg, however,
because it is too hot, it might be just right for me. There does not seem to be a universal
formula. This is the single ambiguity that remains from a reading of both authors.
work. I agree with Lindberg’s discussion on the points that it covers. Lindberg confirms
the hypothesis drawn from the original work, and expands on it using strictly factual
information about Plato’s world of forms theory. On the issue of the final remaining
The first possible explanation of the remaining ambiguity is that, under a modern
commonalities of an object across a large random sample pool of that object. For
example, the carpenter’s wood will not always have knots, and therefore the ideal wood
also does not. Now, each individual item in the sample probably differs from the ideal
The second explanation supposes that something is imperfect if it differs from its
maker’s intentions. This definition works well for the table example; if a carpenter’s
output differs from the blueprints, then it must be imperfect. It does not work so well for
the wood case; if there is an actual creator of wood, then it must be nature (or some other
similar being), and we cannot be sure that nature does not intend for wood to have knots.
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Between the two hypotheses given above for the definition of imperfection, I
prefer the first. It does not require a maker, which makes it applicable to more cases. It
also avoids the measurement of intent, which could be hard to quantify even if we knew
the maker. It does not seem clear what Plato exactly meant; he took the definition of his
ideal forms to be axiomatic, almost provided by an intuition of what would be the best
possibility.
Plato’s Allegory of the Cave.9 Using the inversion hypothesis, we generated a guess at
Plato’s intended meanings based only on his original work. A modern historian’s
exposition related to Plato’s work confirmed our inversion hypothesis and cleared up the
justification for the causal links from Figure 1. One point of ambiguity remained, for
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Plato. 1987. “The Allegory of the Cave.” In Science & Culture in the Western Tradition,
ed. John G. Burke. Scottsdale, Arizona: Gorsuch Scarisbrick.
Francis Bowen, A Treatise on Logic (Cambridge, Mass.: Sever and Francis, 1864).
9
Plato, “Allegory”