3.

Francisco Tatad, e. al. v. Sec Jesus Garcia and Edsa LRT Corp., Ltd.

Chester Cabalza recommends his visitors to please read the original & full text of the case cited. Xie xie! GR NO. 114222 April 6, 1995 Francisco Tatad, John Osmena and Rodolfo Biazon, petitioners, vs. Hon. Jesus Garcia, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Transportation & Communications, and EDSA LRT CORPORATION, LTD., respondents. Facts: This is a petition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to prohibit respondents from further implementing the Revised and Restated Agreement to Build, Lease and Transfer a Light Rail Transit System for EDSA and the Supplemental Agreement to the same project. Petitioners Francisco Tatad, John Osmena and Rodolfo Biazon are members of the Philippine Senate and are suing in their capacities as Senators and as taxpayers. Respondent Jesus Garcia was then Secretary of the DOTC, while private respondent EDSA LRT CORPORATION, Ltd. is a private corporation organized under the laws of Hongkong. In 1989, DOTC planned to construct a light railway transit line along EDSA, which shall traverse the cities of Pasay, Quezon, Mandaluyong and Makati. The objective is to provide a mass transit system along EDSA and to alleviate the congestion in the metropolis. On March 15, 1990, then DOTC Secretary Oscar Orbos, acting upon a proposal to construct the EDSA LRT III on a Build-OperateTransfer (BOT) basis, had invited Elijahu Levin from the Eli Levin Enterprises, Inc to send a technical team to discuss the project with the DOTC. On July 9, 1990, RA No. 6957 referred to as the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) was signed by then President Corazon Aquino. The said Act provides for two schemes for the financing, construction and operation of government projects through private initiative and investment: BOT or Build-Transfer (BT). In accordance with the provisions of RA 6957 and to set the EDSA LRT III project underway, the Prequalification Bids and Awards Committee and the Technical Committee were formed. The prequalification criteria totalling 100% are as follows: a.) Legal aspects 10%; b.) Management/Organizational capability 30%; c.) Financial capability- 30%; and d.) Technical capability 30%. Of the 5 applicants, only the EDSA LRT Consortium met the requirements of garnering at least 21 points per criteria, except for Legal aspects, and obtaining an over-all passing mark of at least 82 points. The Legal aspects referred to provided that the BOT/BT contractor-applicant meet the requirements specified in the Constitution and other pertinent laws. Subsequently, Sec. Orbos was appointed Executive Secretary to the President of the Philippines and was replaced by Nicomedes Prado. The latter recommended the award of the EDSA LRT III project to the sole complying bidder, the EDSA LRT Consortium, and requested for authority to negotiate with the said firm for the contract pursuant to the BOT Law. Authority was granted to proceed with the negotiations. The EDSA LRT Consortium submitted its proposal to DOTC. Finding the proposal to be in compliance with the bid requirements, DOTC and EDSA LRT Corporation, Ltd., in substitution of the EDSA LRT Consortium, entered into an An Agreement to Build, Lease and Transfer a Light Rail Transit System for EDSA under the terms of the BOT Law. Secretary Prado, thereafter, requested presidential approval of the contract. Exec. Sec. Franklin Drilon, who replaced Sec. Orbos, informed Sec. Prado that the President could not grant the requested approval for failure to comply with the requirements of the BOT Law. In view whereof, Sec. Drilon, the DOTC and private respondent re-negotiated the agreement. On April 22, 1992, the parties entered into a Revised and Restated Agreement to Build, Lease and Transfer and Light Rail Transit System for EDSA. On May 6, 1992, DOTC, represented by Sec. Jesus Garcia, Sec. Prado and private respondent entered into a Supplemental Agreement to the April Revised Agreement so as to clarify their respective rights and responsibilities. The two agreements were approved by President Fidel Ramos. According to the agreements, the EDSA LRT III will use light rail vehicles from the Czech and Slovak Federal Republics and will have a maximum carrying capacity of 450,000 passengers a day. The system will have its own power facility. It will also have 13 passenger stations and one depot in 16-hectare government property at North Avenue. Private respondents shall undertake and finance the entire project required for a complete operational light rail transit system. Target completion date is approximately 3 years from the implementation date of the contract. Upon full and partial completion and viability thereof, private respondent shall deliver the use and possession of the completed portion to DOTC which shall operate the same. DOTC shall pay private respondent rentals on aj monthly basis through an Irrevocable Letter of Credit. The rentals shall be determined

by an independent and internationally accredited inspection firm to be appointed by the parties. As agreed upon, private respondents capital shall be recovered from the rentals to be paid by the DOTC which, in turn, shall come from the earnings of the EDSA LRT III. After 25 years and DOTC shall have completed payment of the rentals, ownership of the project shall be transferred to the latter for a consideration of only US $1.00. In their petition, petitioners argued that the agreement of April 22, 1992, as amended by the Supplemental Agreement of May 6, 1993, in so far as it grants EDSA LRT COPORTATION, LTD., a foreign corporation, the ownership of EDSA LRT III, a public utility, violates the constitution, and hence, is unconstitutional. They contend that the EDSA LRT III is a public utility, and the ownership and operation thereof is limited by the Constitution to Filipino citizens and domestic corporations, not foreign corporations like private respondent. Issue: Whether or not the EDSA LRT III assumes all the obligations and liabilities of a common carrier. Held: What private respondent owns are the rail tracks, rolling stocks like the coaches, rail stations, terminals and the power plant, not a public utility. While a franchise is needed to operate these facilities to serve the public, they do not by themselves constitute a public utility. What constitutes a public utility is not their ownership but their use to serve the public. Section 11 of Article XII of the Constitution provides: No franchise, certificate or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, nor shall such franchise, certificate or authorization be exclusive character or for a longer period than 50 years. The right to operate a public utility may exist independently and separately from the ownership of the facilities thereof. One can own said facilities without operating them as a public utility, or conversely, one may operate a public utility without owning the facilities used to serve the public. The devotion of property to serve the public may be done by the owner or by the person in control thereof who may not necessarily be the owner thereof. While private respondent is the owner of the facilities necessary to operate the EDSA LRT III, it admits that it is not enfranchised to operate a public utility. In view of this incapacity, private respondent and DOTC agreed that on completion date, private respondent will immediately deliver possession of the LRT system by of lease for 25 years, during which period DOTC shall operate the same as a common carrier and private respondent shall provide technical maintenance and repair services to DOTC. Since DOTC shall operate the EDSA LRT III, it shall assume all the obligations and liabilities of a common carrier. For this purpose, DOTC shall indemnify and hold harmless private respondent from any losses, damages, injuries or death which may be claimed in the operation or implementation of the system, except losses, damages, injury or death due to defects in the EDSA LRT III on account of the defective condition of equipment or facilities or the defective maintenance of such equipment facilities. Wherefore, the petition is DISMISSED.

Francisco Tatad et al vs Secretary of Energy

on November 15, 2010

Equal Protection Oil Deregulation Law

Considering that oil is not endemic to this country, history shows that the government has always been finding ways to alleviate the oil industry. The government created laws accommodate these innovations in the oil industry. One such law is the Downstream Oil Deregulation Act of 1996 or RA 8180. This law allows that any person or entity may import or purchase any quantity of crude oil and petroleum products from a foreign or domestic source, lease or own and operate refineries and other downstream oil facilities and market such crude oil or use the same for his own requirement, subject only to monitoring by the Department of Energy. Tatad assails the constitutionality of the law. He claims, among others, that the imposition of different tariff rates on imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum products violates the equal protection clause. Tatad contends that the 3%-7% tariff differential unduly favors the three existing oil refineries and discriminates against prospective investors in the downstream oil industry who do not have their own refineries and will have to source refined petroleum products from abroad.3% is to be taxed on unrefined crude products and 7% on refined crude products.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8180 is constitutional. HELD: The SC declared the unconstitutionality of RA 8180 because it violated Sec 19 of Art 12 of the Constitution. It violated that provision because it only strengthens oligopoly which is contrary to free competition. It cannot be denied that our downstream oil industry is operated and controlled by an oligopoly, a foreign oligopoly at that. Petron, Shell and Caltex stand as the only major league players in the oil market. All other players belong to the lilliputian league. As the dominant players, Petron, Shell and Caltex boast of existing refineries of various capacities. The tariff differential of 4% therefore works to their immense benefit. Yet, this is only one edge of the tariff differential. The other edge cuts and cuts deep in the heart of their competitors. It erects a high barrier to the entry of new players. New players that intend to equalize the market power of Petron, Shell and Caltex by building refineries of their own will have to spend billions of pesos. Those who will not build refineries but compete with them will suffer the huge disadvantage of increasing their product cost by 4%. They will be competing on an uneven field. The argument that the 4% tariff differential is desirable because it will induce prospective players to invest in refineries puts the cart before the horse. The first need is to attract new players and they cannot be attracted by burdening them with heavy disincentives. Without new players belonging to the league of Petron, Shell and Caltex, competition in our downstream oil industry is an idle dream. RA 8180 is unconstitutional on the ground inter alia that it discriminated against the new players insofar as it placed them at a competitive disadvantage vis--vis the established oil companies by requiring them to meet certain conditions already being observed by the latter.

1. G.R. No. L-36142: Josue Javellana vs Executive Secretary

Political Question Validity of the 1973 Constitution Restriction to Judicial Power

In 1973, Marcos ordered the immediate implementation of the new 1973 Constitution. Javellana, a Filipino and a registered voter sought to enjoin the Exec Sec and other cabinet secretaries from implementing the said constitution. Javellana averred that the said constitution is void because the same was initiated by the president. He argued that the President is w/o power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed constitution. Further, the election held to ratify such constitution is not a free election there being intimidation and fraud. ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must give due course to the petition. HELD: The SC ruled that they cannot rule upon the case at bar. Majority of the SC justices expressed the view that they were concluded by the ascertainment made by the president of the Philippines, in the exercise of his political prerogatives. Further, there being no competent evidence to show such fraud and intimidation during the election, it is to be assumed that the people had acquiesced in or accepted the 1973 Constitution. The question of the validity of the 1973 Constitution is a political question which was left to the people in their sovereign capacity to answer. Their ratification of the same had shown such acquiescence.

2. Summary: Francisco vs. House of Representatives (GR 160261, 10 November 2003)

Francisco vs. House of Representatives(GR 160261, 10 November 2003) En Banc, Carpio Morales (J): 1 concurs, 3 wrote separate concurring opinions to which 4 concur, 2 wrote concurringand dissenting separate opinions to which 2 concur. Facts: On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, superceeding the previous House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11thCongress. On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient inform," but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for being insufficient in substance. Four months and three weeks since the filing of the first complaint or on 23 October 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the

alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. The second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of Representatives. Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year." Issue: Whether the power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings. Held: The Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution. The "moderating power" to "determine the proper allocation of powers" of the different branches of government and "to direct the course of government along constitutional channels" is inherent in all courts as a necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable." As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, judicial review is indeed an integral component of the delicate system of checks and balances which, together with the corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of government and insures that its vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves. The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution. The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality. There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of the House of Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of Representatives without limitation, our Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases, provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official. The people expressed their will when they instituted the above-mentioned safeguards in the Constitution. This shows that the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or "judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review. There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review over congressional action. Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.

Francisco vs. House of Representatives G.R. No. 160261

FACTS: Within a period of 1 year, 2 impeachment proceedings were filed against Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario Davide. The justiciable controversy in this case was the constitutionality of the subsequent filing of a second complaint to controvert the rules of impeachment provided for by law. ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives is constitutional, and whether the resolution thereof is a political question h; as resulted in a political crisis. HELD: Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representatives are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution. REASONING: In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever mindful of the essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people. At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and

balances which has been carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three branches must be given effect without destroying their indispensable co-equality. There exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution. The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a proposal reached the floor proposing that "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary to initiate impeachment proceedings," this was met by a proposal to delete the line on the ground that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of a complaint does. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least onethird of the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period. The Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly political questions. Because it is not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial dominance over the other two great branches of the government.

4. Case Digest on Integrated Bar Of The Philippines v. Zamora G.R. NO. 141284 (August 15, 2000)
November 10, 2010

FACTS: The petitioner argues that the order of the President for the Philippine National Police and the Philippine Marines to carry out joint visibility patrols to prevent and restrain crime, violated the principle of supremacy of civilian authority over the military and the civilian character of the police force. HELD: The participation of the Philippine Marines constitutes a permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The civilian character of the police force is also not affected by this participation. The members of the PNP are the ones in charge of the operations. They are the ones who will direct and supervise the deployment of the Philippine Marines. FACTS: The petitioner argues that the order of the President for the Philippine National Police and the Philippine Marines to carry out joint visibility patrols to prevent and restrain crime, violated the prohibition on the appointment of the members of the Armed Forces who are in active service to civilian positions. HELD: The SC held that there was actually no appointment of the members of the Armed Forces to civilian positions. The members of the Philippine Marines were not integrated as members of the PNP. The participation of the Chief of Staff in civilian law enforcement does not mean that he was appointed to a civilian post, since the head of the PNP is the one actually vested with authority in these operations.

G.R. No. 141284 (August 15, 2000) FACTS: In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metropolitan Manila, the President ordered the PNP and the Phil. Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for crime prevention and suppression. The IBP questioned validity of the order invoking its responsibility to uphold the rule of law. HELD: The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by the whole citizenry. The IBP has failed to show any specific injury it has suffered or may suffer by virtue of the questioned order. The presumed possible injury is highly speculative.

G.R. No. 941284 (August 15, 2000) FACTS: In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metropolitan Manila, the President ordered the PNP and the Phil. Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for crime prevention and suppression. IBP questioned validity of the order on the ground that there is no factual basis for President to exercise his power to call out the Armed Forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence. HELD: The IBP failed to support its assertion that the President acted without factual basis. The President has determined the necessity and factual basis for calling the armed forces. He asserted that violent crimes like bank and store robberies, holdups,

kidnappings and carnappings continue to occur. The court can take judicial notice of the recent bombing perpetrated by lawless elements in public places.

5. DYCAICO VS. SSS

FACTS: Bonifacio became a member of SSS in 1980 and named Elena and their 8 children as his beneficiaries. At that time, Bonifacio and Elena lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. He retired in 1989 and began receiving his SSS pension. He married Elena on January 1997 and he died on June 19997. Elena filed for survivors pension but said application was denied on the ground that they were married after Bonifacios retirement. According to the SSC, it has consistently ruled that entitlement to the survivors pension in ones capacity as primary beneficiary is premised on the legitimacy of relationship with and dependency for support upon the deceased SSS member during his lifetime. Section 12-B(d) of RA 8282 provides that the primary beneficiaries who are entitled to survivors pension are those who qualify as such as of the date of retirement of the deceased member. HELD: The proviso infringes the due process clause. In a pension plan where employee participation is mandatory, employees have contractual or vested rights in the pension where the pension is part of the terms of employment. Where the employee retires and meets the eligibility requirements, he acquires a vested right to benefits that is protected by the due process clause and retirees enjoy a protected property interest whenever they acquire a right to immediate payment under pre-existing law. The mandatory contributions to the SSS under RA 8282 form part of the employees compensation. The proviso as of the date of his retirement runs afoul of the due process clause as it outrightly deprives the surviving spouses whose respective marriages to the retired SSS members were contracted after the latters retirement of their survivors benefits. There is outright confiscation of benefits due such surviving spouses without giving them an opportunity to be heard. By this outright disqualification, the proviso qualifying the term primary beneficiaries for the purpose of entitlement to survivors pension has created the presumption that marriages contracted after the retirement date of SSS members were entered into for the purpose of securing the benefits under RA 8282.This presumption, moreover, is conclusive because the said surviving spouses are not afforded any opportunity to disprove the presence of the illicit purpose. The proviso, as it creates this conclusive presumption, is unconstitutional because it presumes a fact which is not necessarily or universally true. Standards of due process require that the petitioner be allowed to present evidence to prove that her marriage to Bonifacio was contracted in good faith and as his bona fide spouse she is entitled to the survivors pension accruing upon his death. Hence, the proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section 12-B(d)which deprives the petitioner and those similarly situated dependent spouses of retired SSS members this opportunity to be heard must be struck down.

6. In re: Cunanan, 94 Phil. 534 (1954)

Fast facts: The case at bar deals with an RA that, when effected, result in the passage and admittance to the practice of law of peoplewho have previously flunked the bar exams. The enactment of the RA will result in the admittance of additional 1,094candidates. RA 972An Act to Fix the Passing Marks for Bar Examinations from 1946 up to and including 1955. Those who deemed to have passed by virtue of the RA shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as member of the Philippine Bar. OBJECTIVE: To admit to the bar those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation. Issue: (WON)RA 972 is constitutional. Requirement of legal profession. The public interest demands of legal profession adequate preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as legal problem evolved by the times become more difficult. An adequate legal preparations one of the vital requisites for the practice of law that should be developed constantly and maintained firmly. To the legal profession is entrusted the protection of property, life, honor, and civil liberties. Admission to the practice of law. The

admission, suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession their supervision have been indisputably a judicial function and responsibility. Role of Congress may repeal, alter, and supplement the rules promulgated by the Court, but the authority and responsibility over the admission, suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement of attorneys at law and their supervision remain vested in the SC. Discussion of the issue: The law is contrary to public interest because it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who confessedly had inadequate preparation for the practice of the profession. To approve officially of those inadequately prepared individual to dedicate themselves to such a delicate mission is to create a serious social danger. In decreeing that bar candidates who obtained in the bar exams of 1946 to 1952, a general average of 70%...be admitted in mass to the practice of law, the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment revoking those promulgated by the Court during the aforecited year affecting the bar candidates concerned. Although the Court can certainly revoke these judgments, it is no less certain that only the Court, and not the legislative (by virtue of RA) or executive (EO) department may do so. Otherwise, it will be a usurpation of functions. Resolution: The RA is partly unconstitutional and constitutional, the latter being caused by lack of unanimity amongthe presiding justices. Notes in class A law enacted in 1953 (It revoked the judgments the SC has made before as regards the lawyers theyhave admitted), applied retroactively will in effect give the Congress the power that should have beenvested solely in the judiciary: violates separation of powers.

7. Case Digest on Bayan v. Zamora (Visiting Forces Agreement) G.R. NO. 138570 (October 10. 2000)
November 10, 2010

The Visiting Forces Agreement, for which Senate concurrence was sought and received on May 27, 1999, is the subject of a number of Constitutional challenges. Issue 1: Do the Petitioners have legal standing as concerned citizens, taxpayers, or legislators to question the constitutionality of the VFA? Petitioners Bayan Muna, etc. have no standing. A party bringing a suit challenging the Constitutionality of a law must show not only that the law is invalid, but that he has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. Petitioners have failed to show that they are in any danger of direct injury as a result of the VFA. As taxpayers, they have failed to establish that the VFA involves the exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending powers. A taxpayers suit refers to a case where the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. Before he can invoke the power of judicial review, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the public. Clearly, inasmuch as no public funds raised by taxation are involved in this case, and in the absence of any allegation by petitioners that public funds are being misspent or illegally expended, petitioners, as taxpayers, have no legal standing to assail the legality of the VFA. Similarly, the petitioner-legislators (Tanada, Arroyo, etc.) do not possess the requisite locus standi to sue. In the absence of a clear showing of any direct injury to their person or to the institution to which they belong, they cannot sue. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) is also stripped of standing in these cases. The IBP lacks the legal capacity to bring this suit in the absence of a board resolution from its Board of Governors authorizing its National President to commence the present action. Notwithstanding, in view of the paramount importance and the constitutional significance of the issues raised, the Court may brush aside the procedural barrier and takes cognizance of the petitions. Issue 2: Is the VFA governed by section 21, Art. VII, or section 25, Art. XVIII of the Constitution? Section 25, Art XVIII, not section 21, Art. VII, applies, as the VFA involves the presence of foreign military troops in the Philippines. The Constitution contains two provisions requiring the concurrence of the Senate on treaties or international agreements. Section 21, Article VII reads: [n]o treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate. Section 25, Article XVIII, provides:[a]fter the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the

Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State. Section 21, Article VII deals with treaties or international agreements in general, in which case, the concurrence of at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the Members of the Senate is required to make the treaty valid and binding to the Philippines. This provision lays down the general rule on treaties. All treaties, regardless of subject matter, coverage, or particular designation or appellation, requires the concurrence of the Senate to be valid and effective. In contrast, Section 25, Article XVIII is a special provision that applies to treaties which involve the presence of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in the Philippines. Under this provision, the concurrence of the Senate is only one of the requisites to render compliance with the constitutional requirements and to consider the agreement binding on the Philippines. Sec 25 further requires that foreign military bases, troops, or facilities may be allowed in the Philippines only by virtue of a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum held for that purpose if so required by Congress, and recognized as such by the other contracting state. On the whole, the VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of US troops visiting the Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits of military personnel, and further defines the rights of the US and RP government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, import and export of equipment, materials and supplies. Undoubtedly, Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military bases, troops, or facilities, should apply in the instant case. To a certain extent, however, the provisions of Section 21, Article VII will find applicability with regard to determining the number of votes required to obtain the valid concurrence of the Senate. It is specious to argue that Section 25, Article XVIII is inapplicable to mere transient agreements for the reason that there is no permanent placing of structure for the establishment of a military base. The Constitution makes no distinction between transient and permanent. We find nothing in Section 25, Article XVIII that requires foreign troops or facilities to be stationed or placed permanently in the Philippines. When no distinction is made by law; the Court should not distinguish. We do not subscribe to the argument that Section 25, Article XVIII is not controlling since no foreign military bases, but merely foreign troops and facilities, are involved in the VFA. The proscription covers foreign military bases, troops, or facilities. Stated differently, this prohibition is not limited to the entry of troops and facilities without any foreign bases being established. The clause does not refer to foreign military bases, troops, or facilities collectively but treats them as separate and independent subjects, such that three different situations are contemplated a military treaty the subject of which could be either (a) foreign bases, (b) foreign troops, or (c) foreign facilities any of the three standing alone places it under the coverage of Section 25, Article XVIII. Issue 3: Was Sec 25 Art XVIIIs requisites satisfied to make the VFA effective? Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently met: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by Congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state. There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA. The concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the Constitution, as there were at least 16 Senators that concurred. As to condition (c), the Court held that the phrase recognized as a treaty means that the other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To require the US to submit the VFA to the US Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord strict meaning to the phrase. Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. Its language should be understood in the sense they have in common use. The records reveal that the US Government, through Ambassador Hubbard, has stated that the US has fully committed to living up to the terms of the VFA. For as long as the US accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself further to comply with its treaty obligations, there is indeed compliance with the mandate of the Constitution. Worth stressing too, is that the ratification by the President of the VFA, and the concurrence of the Senate, should be taken as a clear and unequivocal expression of our nations consent to be bound by said treaty, with the concomitant duty to uphold the obligations and responsibilities embodied thereunder. Ratification is generally held to be an executive act, undertaken by the head of the state, through which the formal acceptance of the treaty is proclaimed. A State may provide in its domestic legislation the process of ratification of a treaty. In our jurisdiction, the power to ratify is vested in the President and not, as commonly believed, in the legislature. The role of the Senate is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. With the ratification of the VFA it now becomes obligatory and incumbent on our part, under principles of international law (pacta sunt servanda), to be bound by the terms of the agreement. Thus, no less than Section 2, Article II declares that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations. G.R. No. 138570 (Oct. 10, 2000) FACTS: Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) was entered into by the Philippines and United States to regulate conditions of presence of US military personnels in the Philippines. The Senate concurred with the VFA. Petitioners who are taxpayers and members of Congress questioned its validity.

HELD: Petitioners failed to show that they have sustained or are in danger of sustaining any direct injury as a result of the enforcement of VFA. As taxpayers, they failed to show how the VFA will involve the exercise of Congress of its taxing or spending powers. Members of Congress standing cannot be upheld absent a clear showing of any direct injury to their person or to the institution to which they belong. Further, IBP has no standing.

Case Digest on Bayan v. Zamora G.R. No. 138570, Oct. 10, 2000
November 10, 2010

It is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. As long as the VFA possesses the elements of an agreement under international law, the said agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty. A treaty, as defined by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, is an international instrument concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments, and whatever its particular designation. There are many other terms used for a treaty or international agreement, some of which are: act, protocol, agreement, compromis d arbitrage, concordat, convention, declaration, exchange of notes, pact, statute, charter and modus vivendi. All writers, from Hugo Grotius onward, have pointed out that the names or titles of international agreements included under the general term treaty have little or no legal significance. Article 2(2) of the Vienna Convention provides that the provisions of paragraph 1 regarding the use of terms in the present Convention are without prejudice to the use of those terms, or to the meanings which may be given to them in the internal law of the State. Thus, in international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements in their binding effect upon states concerned, as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained within their powers. International law continues to make no distinction between treaties and executive agreements: they are equally binding obligations upon nations. In our jurisdiction, we have recognized the binding effect of executive agreements even without the concurrence of the Senate or Congress. In Commissioner of Customs vs. Eastern Sea Trading, we said:. . . the right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of subsequent Congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage. From the earliest days of our history we have entered into executive agreements covering such subjects as commercial and consular relations, most-favored-nation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal and navigation arrangements and the settlement of claims. The validity of these has never been seriously questioned by our courts.

8. Philippine Constitution Association vs Enriquez (235 SCRA 506)

on November 13, 2011

Political Law Veto Power Part of the Legislative Process This is a consolidation of cases which sought to question the veto authority of the president involving the General Appropriations Act of 1994. This case also involves the power of Congress as far as the pork barrel fund is concerned. Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) questions the countrywide development fund. PHILCONSA said that Congress can only allocate funds but they cannot specify the items as to which those funds would be applied for since that is already the function of the executive. In another case, after the vetoing by the president of some provisions of the GAA of 1994, neither house of congress took steps to override the veto. Instead, Senators Taada and Romulo sought the issuance of the writs of prohibition and mandamus against the same respondents in G.R. No. 113766. In this petition, petitioners contest the constitutionality of: (1) the veto on four special provisions added to items in the GAA of 1994 for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH); and (2) the conditions imposed by the President in the implementation of certain appropriations for the CAFGUs, the DPWH, and the National Housing Authority (NHA). ISSUE: Whether or not the Presidents veto is valid. HELD: In the PHILCONSA petition, the SC ruled that Congress acted within its power. In the Taada petitions the SC dismissed the other petitions and granted the others.

Veto on special provisions

The president did his veto with certain conditions and compliant to the ruling in Gonzales vs Macaraig. The president particularly vetoed the debt reduction scheme in the GAA of 1994 commenting that the scheme is already taken cared of by other legislation and may be more properly addressed by revising the debt policy. He, however did not delete the P86,323,438,000.00 appropriation therefor. Taada et al averred that the president cannot validly veto that provision w/o vetoing the amount allotted therefor. The veto of the president herein is sustained for the vetoed provision is considered inappropriate; in fact the Sc found that such provision if not vetoed would in effect repeal the Foreign Borrowing Act making the legislation as a log-rolling legislation. Veto of provisions for revolving funds of SUCs The appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUCs), the President vetoed special provisions which authorize the use of income and the creation, operation and maintenance of revolving funds was likewise vetoed. The reason for the veto is that there were already funds allotted for the same in the National expenditure Program. Taada et al claimed this as unconstitutional. The SC ruled that the veto is valid for it is in compliant to the One Fund Policy it avoided double funding and redundancy. Veto of provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance The President vetoed this provision on the basis that it may result to a breach of contractual obligations. The funds if allotted may result to abandonment of some existing contracts. The SC ruled that this Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision which can be the subject of a veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other hand, it specifies how the said item shall be expended 70% by administrative and 30% by contract. The 1987 Constitution allows the addition by Congress of special provisions, conditions to items in an expenditure bill, which cannot be vetoed separately from the items to which they relate so long as they are appropriate in the budgetary sense. The veto herein is then not valid. Veto of provision on prior approval of Congress for purchase of military equipment As reason for the veto, the President stated that the said condition and prohibition violate the Constitutional mandate of non-impairment of contractual obligations, and if allowed, shall effectively alter the original intent of the AFP Modernization Fund to cover all military equipment deemed necessary to modernize the AFP. The SC affirmed the veto. Any provision blocking an administrative action in implementing a law or requiring legislative approval of executive acts must be incorporated in a separate and substantive bill. Therefore, being inappropriate provisions. Veto of provision on use of savings to augment AFP pension funds According to the President, the grant of retirement and separation benefits should be covered by direct appropriations specifically approved for the purpose pursuant to Section 29(1) of Article VI of the Constitution. Moreover, he stated that the authority to use savings is lodged in the officials enumerated in Section 25(5) of Article VI of the Constitution. The SC retained the veto per reasons provided by the president. Condition on the deactivation of the CAFGUs Congress appropriated compensation for the CAFGUs including the payment of separation benefits. The President declared in his Veto Message that the implementation of this Special Provision to the item on the CAFGUs shall be subject to prior Presidential approval pursuant to P.D. No. 1597 and R.A. No. 6758. The SC ruled to retain the veto per reasons provided by the president. Further, if this provision is allowed the it would only lead to the repeal of said existing laws. Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, etc

In his veto message: The said condition is consistent with the Constitutional injunction prescribed under Section 8, Article IX-B of the Constitutional which states that no elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation unless specifically authorized by law. I am, therefore, confident that the heads of the said offices shall maintain fidelity to the law and faithfully adhere to the well-established principle on compensation standardization. Taada et al claim that the conditions imposed by the President violated the independence and fiscal autonomy of the Supreme court, the Ombudsman, the COA and the CHR. The SC sustained the veto: In the first place, the conditions questioned by petitioners were placed in the GAB by Congress itself, not by the President. The Veto Message merely highlighted the Constitutional mandate that additional or indirect compensation can only be given pursuant to law. In the second place, such statements are mere reminders that the disbursements of appropriations must be made in accordance with law. Such statements may, at worse, be treated as superfluities.

9.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

G.R. No. L-5279

October 31, 1955

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES, ETC., petitioner, vs. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION and the BOARD OF TEXTBOOKS, respondents. Manuel C. Briones, Vicente G. Sinco, Manuel V. Gallego and Enrique M. Fernando for petitioner. Office of the Solicitor General Pompeyo Diaz and Assistant Solicitor General Francisco Carreon for respondents. BENGZON, J.: The petitioning colleges and universities request that Act No. 2706 as amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180 be declared unconstitutional, because: A. They deprive owners of schools and colleges as well as teachers and parents of liberty and property without due process of law; B. They deprive parents of their natural rights and duty to rear their children for civic efficiency; and C. Their provisions conferring on the Secretary of Education unlimited power and discretion to prescribe rules and standards constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power. A printed memorandum explaining their position in extenso is attached to the record. The Government's legal representative submitted a mimeographed memorandum contending that, (1) the matter constitutes no justiciable controversy exhibiting unavoidable necessity of deciding the constitutional questions; (2) petitioners are in estoppel to challenge the validity of the said acts; and (3) the Acts are constitutionally valid. Petitioners submitted a lengthy reply to the above arguments. Act No. 2706 approved in 1917 is entitled, "An Act making the inspection and recognition of private schools and colleges obligatory for the Secretary of Public Instruction." Under its provisions, the Department of Education has, for the past 37 years, supervised and regulated all private schools in this country apparently without audible protest, nay, with the general acquiescence of the general public and the parties concerned. It should be understandable, then, that this Court should be doubly reluctant to consider petitioner's demand for avoidance of the law aforesaid, specially where, as respondents assert, petitioners suffered no wrongnor allege anyfrom the enforcement of the criticized statute. It must be evident to any one that the power to declare a legislative enactment void is one which the judge, conscious of the fallability of the human judgment, will shrink from exercising in any case where he can conscientiously and with due regard to duty and official oath decline the responsibility. (Cooley Constitutional Limitations, 8th Ed., Vol. I, p. 332.) When a law has been long treated as constitutional and important rights have become dependent thereon, the Court may refuse to consider an attack on its validity. (C. J. S. 16, p. 204.)

As a general rule, the constitutionality of a statute will be passed on only if, and to the extent that, it is directly and necessarily involved in a justiciable controversy and is essential to the protection of the rights of the parties concerned. (16 C. J. S., p. 207.) In support of their first proposition petitioners contend that the right of a citizen to own and operate a school is guaranteed by the Constitution, and any law requiring previous governmental approval or permit before such person could exercise said right, amounts to censorship of previous restraint, a practice abhorent to our system of law and government. Petitioners obviously refer to section 3 of Act No. 2706 as amended which provides that before a private school may be opened to the public it must first obtain a permit from the Secretary of Education. The Solicitor General on the other hand points out that none of the petitioners has cause to present this issue, because all of them have permits to operate and are actually operating by virtue of their permits.1 And they do not assert that the respondent Secretary of Education has threatened to revoke their permits. They have suffered no wrong under the terms of lawand, naturally need no relief in the form they now seek to obtain. It is an established principle that to entitle a private individual immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury as the result of that action and it is not sufficient that he has merely a general to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of executive or legislative action he must show that he has sustained or is interest common to all members of the public. (Ex parte Levitt, 302 U. S. 633 82 L. Ed. 493.) Courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a law upon the complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation. (Tyler vs. Judges, 179 U. S. 405; Hendrick vs. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610; Coffman vs.Breeze Corp., 323 U. S. 316-325.) The power of courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only when the interests of litigant require the use of that judicial authority for their protection against actual interference, a hypothetical threat being insufficient. (United Public Works vs. Mitchell, 330 U .S. 75; 91 L. Ed. 754.) Bona fide suit.Judicial power is limited to the decision of actual cases and controversies. The authority to pass on the validity of statutes is incidental to the decision of such cases where conflicting claims under the Constitution and under a legislative act assailed as contrary to the Constitution are raised. It is legitimate only in the last resort, and as necessity in the determination of real, earnest, and vital controversy between litigants. (Taada and Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines, p. 1138.) Mere apprehension that the Secretary of Education might under the law withdraw the permit of one of petitioners does not constitute a justiciable controversy. (Cf. Com. ex rel Watkins vs. Winchester Waterworks (Ky.) 197 S. W. 2d. 771.) And action, like this, is brought for a positive purpose, nay, to obtain actual and positive relief. (Salonga vs.Warner Barnes, L-2245, January, 1951.) Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest therein, however intellectually solid the problem may be. This is specially true where the issues "reach constitutional dimensions, for then there comes into play regard for the court's duty to avoid decision of constitutional issues unless avoidance becomes evasion." (Rice vs. Sioux City, U. S. Sup. Ct. Adv. Rep., May 23, 1995, Law Ed., Vol. 99, p. 511.) The above notwithstanding, in view of the several decisions of the United States Supreme Court quoted by petitioners, apparently outlawing censorship of the kind objected to by them, we have decided to look into the matter, lest they may allege we refuse to act even in the face of clear violation of fundamental personal rights of liberty and property. Petitioners complain that before opening a school the owner must secure a permit from the Secretary of Education. Such requirement was not originally included in Act No. 2706. It was introduced by Commonwealth Act No. 180 approved in 1936. Why? In March 1924 the Philippine Legislature approved Act No. 3162 creating a Board of Educational Survey to make a study and survey of education in the Philippines and of all educational institutions, facilities and agencies thereof. A Board chairmaned by Dr. Paul Munroe, Columbia University, assisted by a staff of carefully selected technical members performed the task, made a five-month thorough and impartial examination of the local educational system, and submitted a report with recommendations, printed as a book of 671 pages. The following paragraphs are taken from such report: PRIVATE-ADVENTURE SCHOOLS There is no law or regulation in the Philippine Islands today to prevent a person, however disqualified by ignorance, greed, or even immoral character, from opening a school to teach the young. It it true that in order to post over the door "Recognized by the Government," a private adventure school must first be inspected by the proper Government official, but a refusal to grant such recognition does not by any means result in such a school ceasing to exist. As a matter of fact, there are more such unrecognized private schools than of the recognized variety. How many, no one knows, as the Division of Private Schools keeps records only of the recognized type. Conclusion.An unprejudiced consideration of the fact presented under the caption Private Adventure Schools leads but to one conclusion, viz.: the great majority of them from primary grade to university are

money-making devices for the profit of those who organize and administer them. The people whose children and youth attend them are not getting what they pay for. It is obvious that the system constitutes a great evil. That it should be permitted to exist with almost no supervision is indefensible. The suggestion has been made with the reference to the private institutions of university grade that some board of control be organized under legislative control to supervise their administration. The Commission believes that the recommendations it offers at the end of this chapter are more likely to bring about the needed reforms. Recommendations.The Commission recommends that legislation be enacted to prohibit the opening of any school by an individual or organization without the permission of the Secretary of Public Instruction. That before granting such permission the Secretary assure himself that such school measures up to proper standards in the following respects, and that the continued existence of the school be dependent upon its continuing to conform to these conditions: (1) The location and construction of the buildings, the lighting and ventilation of the rooms, the nature of the lavatories, closets, water supply, school furniture and apparatus, and methods of cleaning shall be such as to insure hygienic conditions for both pupils and teachers. (2) The library and laboratory facilities shall be adequate to the needs of instruction in the subjects taught. (3) The classes shall not show an excessive number of pupils per teacher. The Commission recommends 40 as a maximum. (4) The teachers shall meet qualifications equal to those of teachers in the public schools of the same grade. xxx xxx xxx

In view of these findings and recommendations, can there be any doubt that the Government in the exercise of its police power to correct "a great evil" could validly establish the "previous permit" system objected to by petitioners? This is what differentiates our law from the other statutes declared invalid in other jurisdictions. And if any doubt still exists, recourse may now be had to the provision of our Constitution that "All educational institutions shall be under the supervision and subject to regulation by the State." (Art. XIV, sec. 5.) The power to regulate establishments or business occupations implies the power to require a permit or license. (53 C. J. S. 4.) What goes for the "previous permit" naturally goes for the power to revoke such permit on account of violation of rules or regulations of the Department. II. This brings us to the petitioners' third proposition that the questioned statutes "conferring on the Secretary of Education unlimited power and discretion to prescribe rules and standards constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power." This attack is specifically aimed at section 1 of Act No. 2706 which, as amended, provides: It shall be the duty of the Secretary of Public Instruction to maintain a general standard of efficiency in all private schools and colleges of the Philippines so that the same shall furnish adequate instruction to the public, in accordance with the class and grade of instruction given in them, and for this purpose said Secretary or his duly authorized representative shall have authority to advise, inspect, and regulate said schools and colleges in order to determine the efficiency of instruction given in the same, "Nowhere in this Act" petitioners argue "can one find any description, either general or specific, of what constitutes a 'general standard of efficiency.' Nowhere in this Act is there any indication of any basis or condition to ascertain what is 'adequate instruction to the public.' Nowhere in this Act is there any statement of conditions, acts, or factors, which the Secretary of Education must take into account to determine the 'efficiency of instruction.'" The attack on this score is also extended to section 6 which provides: The Department of Education shall from time to time prepare and publish in pamphlet form the minimum standards required of primary, intermediate, and high schools, and colleges granting the degrees of Bachelor of Arts, Bachelor of Science, or any other academic degree. It shall also from time to time prepare and publish in pamphlet form the minimum standards required of law, medical, dental, pharmaceutical, engineering, agricultural and other medical or vocational schools or colleges giving instruction of a technical, vocational or professional character. Petitioners reason out, "this section leaves everything to the uncontrolled discretion of the Secretary of Education or his department. The Secretary of Education is given the power to fix the standard. In plain language, the statute turns over to the Secretary of Education the exclusive authority of the legislature to formulate standard. . . .." It is quite clear the two sections empower and require the Secretary of Education to prescribe rules fixing minimum standards of adequate and efficient instruction to be observed by all such private schools and colleges as may be permitted to operate. The petitioners contend that as the legislature has not fixed the standards, "the provision is extremely vague, indefinite and uncertain"and for that reason constitutionality objectionable. The best answer is that despite such alleged vagueness the Secretary of Education has fixed standards to ensure adequate and

efficient instruction, as shown by the memoranda fixing or revising curricula, the school calendars, entrance and final examinations, admission and accreditation of students etc.; and the system of private education has, in general, been satisfactorily in operation for 37 years. Which only shows that the Legislature did and could, validly rely upon the educational experience and training of those in charge of the Department of Education to ascertain and formulate minimum requirements of adequate instruction as the basis of government recognition of any private school. At any rate, petitioners do not show how these standards have injured any of them or interfered with their operation. Wherefore, no reason exists for them to assail the validity of the power nor the exercise of the power by the Secretary of Education. True, the petitioners assert that, the Secretary has issued rules and regulations "whimsical and capricious" and that such discretionary power has produced arrogant inspectors who "bully heads and teachers of private schools." Nevertheless, their remedy is to challenge those regulations specifically, and/or to ring those inspectors to book, in proper administrative or judicial proceedingsnot to invalidate the law. For it needs no argument, to show that abuse by the officials entrusted with the execution of a statute does not per se demonstrate the unconstitutionality of such statute. Anyway, we find the defendants' position to be sufficiently sustained by the decision in Alegra vs. Collector of Customs, 53 Phil., 394 upon holding the statute that authorized the Director of Agriculture to "designate standards for the commercial grades of abaca, maguey and sisal" against vigorous attacks on the ground of invalid delegation of legislative power. Indeed "adequate and efficient instruction" should be considered sufficient, in the same way as "public welfare" "necessary in the interest of law and order" "public interest" and "justice and equity and substantial merits of the case" have been held sufficient as legislative standards justifying delegation of authority to regulate. (See Taada and Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines, p. 793, citing Philippine cases.) On this phase of the litigation we conclude that there has been no undue delegation of legislative power. In this connection, and to support their position that the law and the Secretary of Education have transcended the governmental power of supervision and regulation, the petitioners appended a list of circulars and memoranda issued by the said Department. However they failed to indicate which of such official documents was constitutionally objectionable for being "capricious," or pain "nuisance"; and it is one of our decisional practices that unless a constitutional point is specifically raised, insisted upon and adequately argued, the court will not consider it. (Santiago vs. Far Eastern, 73 Phil., 408.) We are told that such list will give an idea of how the statute has placed in the hands of the Secretary of Education complete control of the various activities of private schools, and why the statute should be struck down as unconstitutional. It is clear in our opinion that the statute does not in express terms give the Secretary completecontrol. It gives him powers to inspect private schools, to regulate their activities, to give them official permits to operate under certain conditions, and to revoke such permits for cause. This does not amount to complete control. If any of such Department circulars or memoranda issued by the Secretary go beyond the bounds of regulation and seeks to establish complete control, it would surely be invalid. Conceivably some of them are of this nature, but besides not having before us the text of such circulars, the petitioners have omitted to specify. In any event with the recent approval of Republic Act No. 1124 creating the National Board of Education, opportunity for administrative correction of the supposed anomalies or encroachments is amply afforded herein petitioners. A more expeditious and perhaps more technically competent forum exists, wherein to discuss the necessity, convenience or relevancy of the measures criticized by them. (See also Republic Act No. 176.) If however the statutes in question actually give the Secretary control over private schools, the question arises whether the power of supervision and regulation granted to the State by section 5 Article XIV was meant to include control of private educational institutions. It is enough to point out that local educators and writers think the Constitution provides for control of Education by the State. (See Tolentino, Government of the Philippine Constitution, Vol. II, p. 615; Benitez, Philippine Social Life and Progress, p. 335.) The Constitution (it) "provides for state control of all educational institutions" even as it enumerates certain fundamental objectives of all education to wit, the development of moral character, personal discipline, civic conscience and vocational efficiency, and instruction in the duties of citizenship. (Malcolm & Laurel, Philippine Constitutional Law, 1936.) The Solicitor General cities many authorities to show that the power to regulate means power to control, and quotes from the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention to prove that State control of private education was intended by the organic law. It is significant to note that the Constitution grants power to supervise and to regulate. Which may mean greater power than mere regulation. III. Another grievance of petitionersprobably the most significantis the assessment of 1 per cent levied on gross receipts of all private schools for additional Government expenses in connection with their supervision and regulation. The statute is section 11-A of Act No. 2706 as amended by Republic Act No. 74 which reads as follows: SEC. 11-A. The total annual expense of the Office of Private Education shall be met by the regular amount appropriated in the annual Appropriation Act: Provided, however, That for additional expenses in the

supervision and regulation of private schools, colleges and universities and in the purchase of textbook to be sold to student of said schools, colleges and universities and President of the Philippines may authorize the Secretary of Instruction to levy an equitable assessment from each private educational institution equivalent to one percent of the total amount accruing from tuition and other fees: . . . and non-payment of the assessment herein provided by any private school, college or university shall be sufficient cause for the cancellation by the Secretary of Instruction of the permit for recognition granted to it. Petitioners maintain that this is a tax on the exercise of a constitutional rightthe right to open a school, the liberty to teach etc. They claim this is unconstitutional, in the same way that taxes on the privilege of selling religious literature or of publishing a newspaperboth constitutional privilegeshave been held, in the United States, to be invalid as taxes on the exercise of a constitutional right. The Solicitor General on the other hand argues that insofar as petitioners' action attempts to restrain the further collection of the assessment, courts have no jurisdiction to restrain the collection of taxes by injunction, and in so far as they seek to recover fees already paid the suit, it is one against the State without its consent. Anyway he concludes, the action involving "the legality of any tax impost or assessment" falls within the original jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance. There are good grounds in support of Government's position. If this levy of 1 per cent is truly a mere feeand not a taxto finance the cost of the Department's duty and power to regulate and supervise private schools, the exaction may be upheld; but such point involves investigation and examination of relevant data, which should best be carried out in the lower courts. If on the other hand it is a tax, petitioners' issue would still be within the original jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance. The last grievance of petitioners relates to the validity of Republic Act No. 139 which in its section 1 provides: The textbooks to be used in the private schools recognized or authorized by the government shall be submitted to the Board (Board of Textbooks) which shall have the power to prohibit the use of any of said textbooks which it may find to be against the law or to offend the dignity and honor of the government and people of the Philippines, or which it may find to be against the general policies of the government, or which it may deem pedagogically unsuitable. This power of the Board, petitioners aver, is censorship in "its baldest form". They cite two U. S. cases (Miss. and Minnesota) outlawing statutes that impose previous restraints upon publication of newspapers, or curtail the right of individuals to disseminate teachings critical of government institutions or policies. Herein lies another important issue submitted in the cause. The question is really whether the law may be enacted in the exercise of the State's constitutional power (Art. XIV, sec. 5) to supervise and regulate private schools. If that power amounts to control of private schools, as some think it is, maybe the law is valid. In this connection we do not share the belief that section 5 has added new power to what the State inherently possesses by virtue of the police power. An express power is necessarily more extensive than a mere implied power. For instance, if there is conflict between an express individual right and the express power to control private education it cannot off-hand be said that the latter must yield to the formerconflict of two express powers. But if the power to control education is merely implied from the police power, it is feasible to uphold the express individual right, as was probably the situation in the two decisions brought to our attention, of Mississippi and Minnesota, states where constitutional control of private schools is not expressly produced. However, as herein previously noted, no justiciable controversy has been presented to us. We are not informed that the Board on Textbooks has prohibited this or that text, or that the petitioners refused or intend to refuse to submit some textbooks, and are in danger of losing substantial privileges or rights for so refusing. The average lawyer who reads the above quoted section of Republic Act 139 will fail to perceive anything objectionable. Why should not the State prohibit the use of textbooks that are illegal, or offensive to the Filipinos or adverse to governmental policies or educationally improper? What's the power of regulation and supervision for? But those trained to the investigation of constitutional issues are likely to apprehend the danger to civil liberties, of possible educational dictatorship or thought control, as petitioners' counsel foresee with obvious alarm. Much depends, however, upon the execution and implementation of the statute. Not that constitutionality depends necessarily upon the law's effects. But if the Board on Textbooks in its actuations strictly adheres to the letter of the section and wisely steers a middle course between the Scylla of "dictatorship" and the Charybdis of "thought control", no cause for complaint will arise and no occasion for judicial review will develop. Anyway, and again, petitioners now have a more expeditious remedy thru an administrative appeal to the National Board of Education created by Republic Act 1124. Of course it is necessary to assure herein petitioners, that when and if, the dangers they apprehend materialize and judicial intervention is suitably invoked, after all administrative remedies are exhausted, the courts will not shrink from their duty to delimit constitutional boundaries and protect individual liberties. IV. For all the foregoing considerations, reserving to the petitioners the right to institute in the proper court, and at the proper time, such actions as may call for decision of the issue herein presented by them, this petition for prohibition will be denied. So ordered. Paras, C. J., Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., and Jugo, JJ., concur.

Footnotes Court will not pass upon the validity of statute at the instance of one who has availed itself of its benefits. (Fahey vs. Mallonee, 322 U. S. 245; 91 L. Ed. 2030; Phil. Scrappers Inc. vs. Auditor-General, 96 Phil., 449.)
1 2

Cf. Montenegro vs. Castaeda, 48 Off. Gaz (8) 3392.

It should be observed that petitioners may not assert complete liberty to teach, in their schools, as or what they please; because the Constitution says "All schools shall aim to develop moral character, personal discipline, civil conscience and vocational efficiency and to teach the duties of citizenship." (Art. XIV, Sec. 5.) Would petitioners assert that pursuant to their civil liberties under the Bill of Rights they may refuse to teach in their schools the duties of citizenship or that they may authorize the broadcast therein of immoral doctrines?
3

G.R. No. L-5279: Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities vs Secretary of Education
Civic Efficiency

The petitioning colleges and universities request that Act No. 2706 as amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180 be declared unconstitutional, because: A.) They deprive owners of schools and colleges as well as teachers and parents of liberty and property without due process of law; B.) They deprive parents of their natural right and duty to rear their children for civic efficiency; and C.) Their provisions conferring on the Secretary of Education unlimited power and discretion to prescribe rules and standards constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power. Petitioners complain that before opening a school the owner must secure a permit from the Secretary of Education. Petitioners reason out, "this section leaves everything to the uncontrolled discretion of the Secretary of Education or his department. The Secretary of Education is given the power to fix the standard. In plain language, the statute turns over to the Secretary of Education the exclusive authority of the legislature to formulate standard . . ." Also, the textbooks to be used in the private schools recognized or authorized by the government shall be submitted to the Board (Board of Textbooks) which shall have the power to prohibit the use of any of said textbooks which it may find to be against the law or to offend the dignity and honor of the government and people of the Philippines, or which it may find to be against the general policies of the government, or which it may deem pedagogically unsuitable. HELD: Petitioners do not show how these standards have injured any of them or interfered with their operation. Wherefore, no reason exists for them to assail neither the validity of the power nor the exercise of the power by the Secretary of Education. No justiciable controversy has been presented to us. We are not informed that the Board on Textbooks has prohibited this or that text, or that the petitioners refused or intend to refuse to submit some textbooks, and are in danger of losing substantial privileges or rights for so refusing.

10. LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES vs. AQUINO (G.R. No. 73748 - May 22, 1986)
FACTS: 1. On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and Vice President Laurel were taking power. 2.On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino government assumption of power by stating that the "new government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines."

ISSUE: Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.

HELD: Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics where only the people are the judge. The Court further held that: 1.The people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of the entire country; 2.It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government; and 3.The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government.