Conflict dynamics, rebel defection and rebel group fragmentation: evidence from Burma, 1930-2009.

Joakim Kreutz Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University Joakim.kreutz @pcr.uu.se

This is work in progress I am grateful for comments and suggestions. Please contact the author for latest version before citing or quoting.

Paper presented at the Midwest Political Science Association 69th Annual National Conference, Chicago, March 31-April 3 2011

Many recent studies have emphasized that the rebel side often consist of multiple actors, and that this challenges our understanding of the why and how civil wars are fought. However, these studies have largely ignored a major factor that influences the behaviour of rebel organizations: conflict dynamics. To date, no existing study has investigated the effect of conflict dynamics on the likelihood that members of rebel groups defect, in effect becoming a pro-government militia, or fragment, form a competing rebel movement. I argue that during times of government offensives and government offers of concessions, the collective action problem becomes acute for rebel organizations as existing members or possible recruits re-evaluates their decision to participate in rebellion. I test this argument using unique annual data collected on more than 100 rebel movments in Burma 1930-2009 and find that my argument is supported: the risk of rebel defection increases both during government offensives and offers of concessions, while rebel fragmentation only becomes more likely when rebels are subjected to government attacks.

Introduction Violence in Iraq decreased substantively following the surge of US troops in 2007, leading to the subsequent adoption of similar strategy in Afghanistan (IBC 2008). However, the reduced violence could also be attributed to numerous other factors that coincided with the surge, such as the completion of ethnic cleansing in Baghdad (De Young 2007), the ending of US forces patrolling in cities (Cordesman 2010), and internal disagreements among Iraqi insurgents (Parker 2007). The possible effect of internecine tension among rebels is particularly interesting, as both counterinsurgency texts and manuals on rebellion press the importance of encouraging/preventing defection and infiltration of the dissident group (Mao 2000, US Army 2007). After decades of assuming that civil wars always are dyadic in nature, scholarship has recently identified that conflicts with multiple rebel factions are longer in duration (Cunningham 2006), more violent (Bloom 2005), and produces different settlement patterns and risk for recurrence than conflicts with a single insurgent group (Nilsson 2008). Yet, we have very limited knowledge about what why, when and how members of rebel groups choose to splinter off, to defect to the government, or to join forces with other insurgents. Recent studies have started to address the topic of rebel organization empirically, both as an independent and a dependent variable. However, results have so far been largely inconclusive and seem overly influenced by local specifics. A group having external backers have, for example, been found to contribute to increased splits in the Philippines (Cline 2000) but been a unifying factor in Mozambique (Weinstein 2007). I argue that this heterogeneity in the findings can stem from two sources. First, scholars have underspecified the scope of proposed theoretical arguments and thereby excluded important nuances in the empirical material. Studies have empirically focused either on rebel group fragmentation, into multiple different rebel groups, or defection, when rebel members join the government side, even though the theoretical arguments have not distinguished between these two phenomena. The practical implications of whether rebel members fragment or defect are however potentially enormous, both with regards to the challenges of ending the conflict and rebuilding society. After fragmentation, there will be increased competition between rebel groups making it harder to settle the conflict as well as more possible spoilers willing to resume fighting at a later stage. Defection, on the other hand, depletes remaining rebels of manpower, strategically important information, and legitimacy as such action also indicates to the rebel constituents that there is an alternative way to address grievances without the costs of armed strife. In this paper, I introduce a new line of inquiry into the topic of when and to what end armed groups reorganize. I argue that when governments launch offensives or offers concessions, the collective action dilemma for rebel organizations becomes acute, as rebel rank-and-file will reconsider their decision to participate in rebellion When faced with government offensives, rebel soldiers will have incentives both to defect to the government and to break off from the existing organization and form new, smaller, independent forces. This contrast with situations when the government offer some form of concession or amnesty to rebels, as the rank-and-file then will have incentives to defect to the government but not for leaving their existing organization. I test and find support for
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these arguments on a new annul dataset over more than 100 armed organizations in Burma from 1930 to 2009, controlling for multiple factors identified in the literature on rebel fragmentation or defection. During times of government offensives, there is at least 360% increase in the probability of rebel group fragmentation, and 141% increase in the likelihood of defection. However, the effect on defection is even greater, at least 800% increase, when government offer concessions without the simultaneous increased risk for rebel fragmentation. The paper continued with a short overview of the rapidly expanding research field concerned with rebel organization literature and existing arguments regarding fragmentation and defection. I then present my theoretical argument which provides four testable hypotheses. In the next section, I present the data collected on Burmese rebel movements 1930-2009 and a brief narrative of the armed conflicts in Burma during this time period. After presenting the research design, my analysis follows. The final section concludes and offers some implications of these findings.

Existing explanations of rebel fragmentation and defection Most scholarship on civil war has focused on the occurrence, onset, and, to a lesser extent, termination of internal strife without putting much emphasis on the variable nature of rebel organizations. Indeed, many studies that have taken into account the possibility that armed groups can split into factions have focused on subsets of actors, for example terrorists (Bueno de Mesquita 2005), separatists (Cunningham et al. 2010, Kalyvas 2008), or signatories to peace agreements (Kydd and Walter 2002). However, the explanations offered for why and when rebel groups experiences such splits can largely be put into three approaches as summarized by Cunningham (2006); different policy preferences, leadership disputes, or internal disagreement over which strategy to pursue in the conflict. First, literature focusing on policy preferences has primarily focused on the aims of the rebel movements, or the type of grievances that underlie the conflict breaking out in the first place. It has been suggested that rebel movement that are formed on strong community bands will share the same goals in the conflict and be less likely to fragment. In theory, group belonging can emanate from any type of joint social basis, whether ideological, ethnic, or other, scholarship on rebel movements has primarily focused on the ties that bind ethnic groups. Whether such connections are intrinsically conducive for group belonging or used instrumentally by individual agents to recruit fighters can be debated, but both approaches predict that ethnically mobilized groups will result in more committed rebels (Gates 2002, Sambanis 2001, Staniland 2010b, Weinstein 2007). A different but similar dynamic from conflicts along ethnic boundaries is how this creates, or at least reinforces, ethnic divisions. Even in countries where ethnic coexistence was largely frictionless before the conflict begun; these relations will strain by the social mobilization during conflict. Because ethnicity is ascriptive in nature, it will be more difficult for the government to co-opt factions within a rebellious ethnic group but easier to actively target all members of said ethnicity (Eck 2009). This will, in turn, provide further opportunities for the rebel movement to secure a dominant political
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position within their respective ethnic constituency (Zahar 1999). Moving out from the ethnospecific literature, some research suggests that rebel groups can create ideological convergence among its members during the conflict through for example indoctrination or the establishment of ruling institutions on controlled territory (Eck 2010, Johnston 2008, Korf 2009, Olson 2000). The second approach is concerned with how the competition for leadership in a group can lead to splits is more connected with research emphasizing the role of resources available for the rebel group. If the rebels have access to easily lootable resources, or foreign backers, it is more likely to attract opportunistic members who are less disciplined and less committed to the rebel cause (Johnston 2010, Weinstein 2007). In addition to increased difficulty of commanders to regulate the behavior of such troops, rivalry over the distribution of spoils increases the risk that groups fragment into separate factions (Ballentine and Nitzschke 2003, Gates 2002). An extension of the argument is that while lootable resources provide local commanders with incentives to branch off and set up their own organization, they should be less willing to defect to the government. A profitmaximizing local commander that receives payoffs from local economic resources should be unwilling to cede any of this income for affiliation with any other actors in the conflict (Christia 2008). In the third and final approach to rebel splintering, it is argued that disagreement over strategy can lead to a split between moderates and extremists, especially in times of ongoing negotiations. According to the logic of DeNardo (1985), movements contain members who have different preferences on both the goals and tactics for achieving them. As an organization grows, the intraorganizational diversity is likely to become increasingly prevalent as discontent will spread in the event of a failure to make what is considered sufficient headway towards fulfilling the original goals of the movement. In existing research, such intra-organizational competition is generally depicted as being between extremists and moderates, and particularly prevalent during peace negotiations (Bueno de Mesquita 2005, Kydd and Walter 2002). An extension of the argument, however, has suggested that factions of a movement may even choose to defect to the opposition following disagreements over organizational behavior against both the opponent and civilian constituents (Chai 1993, Gates 2002, Staniland 2010a).

Theory: How conflict dynamics revigorates the collective action problem Whereas existing research on rebel fragmentation has focused on structural factors and intra-rebel tension, I argue that it is necessary to explore the effect of conflict dynamics. In particular, it is imperative to focus on what effect conflict dynamics have on rebel rank-and-file in the form of midlevel commanders and foot soldiers; after all, it is those individuals that decide to defect or set up a competing rebel group. In order to do that, it is necessary to consider that the collective action problem for a rebel group is not only important at the formation and mobilization of the organization, but continues to be relevant throughout its existence.

A common starting point for studies on rebel group organization is the fundamental issue of why individuals choose to participate in rebellion. Whereas this issue has been addressed by several strands of research, most literature on rebel participation departs from the dilemma of collective action, which builds on the idea that peoples prime motivation is not group solidarity but individual utility-maximization (Olson 1965). Since rebel groups pursue goals that if they succeed will be available for all members of society, it is more rational for individuals to abstain from participation and thereby avoid the private costs of rebellion. This dilemma is argued to be particularly pertinent for rebellion since the risks of armed conflicts are potentially enormous and the collective benefits are highly uncertain and distributed in the future (Lichbach 1998). The rationalist solution to the free-rider problem is selective incentives, which are private gains distributed only to those individuals that participate (Olson 1965, Popkin 1979). What is less commonly noted is that a rebel organization is constantly faced with this collective action dilemma. During conflict, troops constantly needs to be reinforced to cover for attrition and combat losses while recruitment is arguably even more crucial in successful campaigns as the rebels will need to increase troop levels to undertake more ambitious offensives. As the conflict wears on, rebels can institutionalize recruitment in order to handle this problem (Eck 2010), intraorganizational socialization can prevent attrition (e.g. Florez-Morris 2010, McLauchlin and Pearlman 2009), and the ability to provide protection from violence can function as a sufficient private gains for noncombatants to join the rebel group (Kalyvas 2006, Kalyvas and Kocher 2007). However, insights that rebels can become better at mitigating the collective action problem does not suggest that it does not still exist. In fact, actions of the government actor in intrastate conflicts are generally aimed at exploiting rebels ability to recruit, thus ensuring a constant reminder of the collective action problem. Armed conflict dynamics can be observed on two different levels; the armed interaction between the parties, and possible offers of concessions between the parties. In order to relate these terms to the empirical scope of this paper; government military offensives or government offers of concessions. It can be expected that both of these events will provide different types of incentives and costs for the rebel leadership and the rank-and-file of mid-level commanders and foot soldiers. Focusing here on the rank-and-file, a government military offensive increases the cost of participation while an offered concession can provide some of the public good for which the struggle once commenced. Below, I outline how these two factors can provide testable predictions regarding the probability that rank-and-file choose to defect to the government or fragment into multiple rebel groups.

During times of government offensives, the rebel rank-and-file will reconsider their decision to participate in rebellion and re-evaluate their options. Studies on government repression have suggested that since the violence raises the costs of active participation, individuals will be

encouraged to leave the organization (Tullock 1971).1 Whereas this logically makes recruiting more difficult and provides incentives for members to defect to the group, it will also increase the risk of rebel group fragmentation. Unless the rebel organization is able to provide security for its members during the government assault, different units will have incentives to from independent armed forces to better utilize local knowledge and guerrilla tactics. In addition to increasing the costs of participation, government offensives will also exacerbate existing splits within the movement. Those members that are discontent with the present situation will be more likely to defect and join the government side (Kenny 2010, McLauchlin and Pearlman 2010, Olson-Loundsbury and Cook 2009). This will provide them with more security as the government is shown to be the stronger actor (Kavlyas 2008), while this also gives them increased opportunities to peacefully pursue their particular goals (Findley and Rudloff 2009).

H1: Government offensives increase the probability of rebel group defection. H2: Government offensives increase the probability of rebel group fragmentation.

The other move by a government that is likely to make the collective violence problem acute for a rebel group is when government concessions are offered towards the rank-and-file. By offering some of the public good that originally incited the conflict, rank-and-file members may not be willing to no longer endure the costs of participation and choose to defect to the government side. Indeed, the temporal dimension of the collective action problem suggest that war-weary rebels who had expected a shorter campaign may be tempted to renounce armed struggle even if only offered an opportunity to return to civilian life without repercussions for their rebellious past. At the same time, the offer of government concessions is also a signal that membership in the rebel organization has been successful. The offer may therefore improve the morale among the rank-andfile rebels, who may also expect an improved offer in the future providing their continued loyalty to the rebel cause. H1: Government offers of concessions increases the probability of rebel group defection. H2: Government offers of concessions decreases the probability of rebel group fragmentation.

An alternative argument is that repression unifies the target community and increases its resilience, but this is generally if a particular ethnic group is being repressed (Peterson 2002, Regan and Norton 2005).
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Data on Non-State Armed Groups in Burma A limitation in previous empirical work on reorganization of armed factions consists of the difficulty of obtaining sufficiently high-quality data. Since no global cross-national dataset is detailed enough to fully explore these issues, existing studies have been forced to focus on subsets such as only splits that lead to violent interaction between groups (Fjelde and Nilsson 2010, 2011) or resume violence with the state (Kreutz 2010).2 At the same time, existing case study research has provided important insights into how rebel organization but has primarily focused only on cases where the rebels have been successful. Detailed empirical accounts about the different approaches to organization employed by rebel groups in Afghanistan (Sinno 2008), Colombia (Ortiz 2002), Ireland and Burma (Kenny 2010), Mozambique, Peru and Uganda (Weinstein 2007), etc. have only focused on longrunning insurgents. To fully explore the effect of, for example, ethnicity on rebel organization, it must be possible to compare long-running ethnic insurgents with failed ethic or non-ethnic movements. To address this crucial component, the empirical information in this paper is based on a longitudal analysis of all identified non-state armed groups in Burma 1930-2009. Burma is a suitable case for this type of exercise for three reasons. First, there has been a wide variety of armed groups active in Burma during this time period, and this has included both ethnically mobilized and ideologically specific actors. The dynamics of the different conflicts in the country has also mirrored much of the global developments of the 20th Century, including anti-colonial movements, intense fighting during the Second World War, both direct and indirect links to the Cold War, and the recent attempt to impose top-down development as a means to pacify opposition. Second, the geography of the country as well as the nature of the regime has situated the country as a partially developed, partially weak state. The regime has neither been strong enough to suppress groups from forming nor so weak that such groups have been able to expand unopposed. Third, government policies towards non-state armed movements have been largely consistent throughout the period. The British, the Japanese, the democratically elected, and the military junta regimes have all been willing to make alliances with non-state armed actors but not offered any outright political concessions. Thus, since independence, defecting rebels have only been offered nominal rewards rather than any wide reaching political reform. An armed group is defined as an actor that either (a) has a stated ambition to challenge the regime militarily, or (b) has a de facto organized militia. Thus, pro-government militias are included provided they are controlled by actors that are outside of the government. For example, the socalled KKY pro-government forces that were established in the 1950s by local strongmen are included in the data, but not the USDA militia of 1993-2010 as this was under the direct patronage of members in government (NDD 2006). The information for this dataset is collected using a multitude of sources, including monographs, region-specific periodicals and extracts from archives, internal rebel group documents and
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Cunningham, Bakke and Seymour (2010) focus on a random sample from a subset of self-determination movements.

interviews. At present, the project has identified 103 different armed groups which that exist for a total of 1,456 group-years; 1,180 with the armed group in opposition to the government and 276 as a pro-government actor. For the analysis in this paper, pro-government militia years are excluded since the topic concerns rebel responses to government incentives.

Overview of conflicts in Burma, 1930-2009 Political mobilization in the then-northeast corner of British India only started in earnest during the 1930s. This decade began with the last attempt connected to the old traditional Burmese monarchy to resist the colonial power. The Saya San Rebellion in 1930-1931 was of such magnitude that the British were forced to deploy more than 8000 troops in order to suppress the widespread uprising (Steinberg 1982). In response to decade-old demands from in particular students and parts of the Buddhist clergy, Burma became officially separated from India in 1937 and limited self-rule was implemented (Charney 2009). As part of this process, existing regional committees of Indian proindependence organizations became increasingly disconnected from the main bodies and more concerned with Burmese politics. That said, Rangoon was an important base for the Indian Independence League (Azad Hind) in the early 1940s. At the same time, however, disapproval of the significant Indian business community helped radicalize Burmese-nationalists who drew inspiration from both communism and the Japanese-promoted brand of right-wing Asian nationalism. Even though these years witnessed little activity in the form of outright rebellions, the nationalists created uniformed cadre organizations that freely demonstrated their strength in parades along the streets of Rangoon. During the Second World War, many Burmese nationalists initially supported the Japanese takeover of the country in 1942. The British retreated westwards into India but guerrilla warfare continued against the Japanese, both by former British Army units and, importantly, by new militias that were organized and supported by allied agents that parachuted in behind enemy lines. These were primarily recruited among ethnic minorities in hill areas. These processes led to the establishment of several substantial Burmese fighting forces. The Burman-nationalist organization of Aung San counted 100,000 members by 1946, while the allies helped set up an ethnic Karen army of 12,000 troops and a Kachin irregular force that numbered 11,000 men. When it became clear that the Japanese occupiers were unwilling to transfer power to the Burmese, the nationalists offered their services to the allies. Thus, the British counteroffensive in 1945 managed to quickly defeat the Japanese but left them in control of a territory filled with armed groups who all expected rewards for their contribution to the war effort. As discussions about the transition to independence begun, these diverging interests led to an intense political competition within and between different groups. Muslim groups wanted a separate independence or to be part of neighboring East Pakistan, the ethnic Karen and Kachin wanted their own states, the traditional Samwba rulers of the Shan states wanted to protect their authority (while ethnic Pa-O in the same areas wanted it removed), while the Burmese nationalists fragmented over disagreement over nuances in leftist ideology. The Burmese

civil war basically started in 1946 even though the country only became officially independent on 4 January 1948. The government managed to survive the first few tumultuous years of independence mainly because of its ability to convince rebel units to defect and join the government side. As rebel groups retreated into forested and mountainous areas, a new source of instability arrived in the form of Kuomintang (KMT) remnants that settled in northern Burma after having been defeated in the Chinese civil war. These forces would remain influential for the development of northeastern Burma for decades because of their level of organization, access to US support, and involvement in the drug trade and local anti-government movements. In response to the KMT invasion, the government initiated a program that allowed local strongmen to form largely autonomous progovernment militias that soon also became competitors in the trafficking of contraband. During the late 1950s and the early 1960s, increasingly Buddhist-nationalistic political rhetoric in Rangoon, a series of failed peace initiatives, and a military takeover led to the launch of a new wave of insurrections. However, increased Chinese support for the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) in the 1970s made it possible for this group to expand its territorial control and incorporate many local groups into its organization. This situation remained largely unchanged despite a reduction of Chinese support to the Burmese groups in the 1980s. By 1989, however, there was a dramatic change in scenery. Lower level commanders rebelled against the CPB leadership and forced the dissolution of the organization (Lintner 1990). In its place, they established several local groups that entered negotiations with the government about ceasefires and a temporary autonomy. This made it possible for the government to eventually redeploy troops against rebel groups near the Thai border which forced the remaining groups to withdraw from their main military bases and rely on guerrilla tactics. In recent years, the main developments have consisted of government attempts to force the groups with ceasefires to incorporate into the state administrative structure as border guard forces. Some groups rejected this policy and have announced that they are prepared to resume warfare to protect their current de facto autonomy.

Research Design Dependent variables This study disaggregates splinters within rebel organization as being either a defection or a fragmentation. Since these two phenomena can occur at the same time and repeatedly, they are used in separate models rather than as different outcomes of the same variable. I define defection as occurring when a unit of a non-state armed opposition organization splinters off to form, or join, a pro-government militia or renounce violence altogether. That the defectors prior to this event were an existing organized unit is important here, since this does not capture situations of normal individual attrition from rebel groups.
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Rebel fragmentation is defined as occurring when a part of a non-state armed opposition organization splinters off to form another non-state armed organization that remains opposed to the government. This new group may formally announce a new name for its activities or continue to use the old moniker. A final clarification. This study is concerned with the phenomena of defection and fragmentation, and does not include situations when the entire rebel entity surrenders to the government or renounces fighting.3 Thus, at least some unit of the previous organization will have to declare an ambition to continue armed struggle for such situations to be captured by the data.

Independent Variables The main explanatory variables used in this study are the presence of government offensives or government offers of concessions. Government offensives in Burma have throughout the time period been accompanied by large-scale repression against the civilian population, and have focused on specified territorial regions rather than singled out a particular rebel group. Thus, the variable is coded as an indication on whether there were large-scale government offensives during the year in the territory of rebel group camps or activity. As mentioned above, the government side has rarely made any offers of substantial political concessions to the opposition forces at any point of the conflict history. However, there have been some instances when the government has reached out towards the rank-and-file members of armed opposition groups through amnesties, or when units have been offered economic opportunities in return for forming a pro-government force. This variable includes both group-specific incentives and country-wide amnesty offers as indicator of government concessions.

Control variables One consequence of investigating rebel group behavior over time in a single case study is that several of the control variables commonly used in civil war studies become obsolete, such as gdp per capita, regime type, or population. In a country like Burma, there is still much variation regarding the goals, resources available, and organizational ability of rebel groups which has changed over time. First, I include a variable indicating whether the rebels were pursuing ethnic goals ranging from increased minority rights to autonomy or secession.4 Second, I also control for potential sub-national local specifics that can influence rebel group defection and fragmentation. To control for the presences of lootable resources, I include a variable that indicate whether the rebels have bases in an

There are no incidences of peace agreements signed in Burma. Alternatively, I included a variable indicating if the rebel groups were communists (not reported). This had no statistically significant effect on the likelihood of defection or fragmentation and did not change any other findings substantively.
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area where drugs or gemstones are available.5 Separately, I include a variable indicating whether the armed opposition group received funds, arms, or other material from external backers during the year. Third, as a means of indicate the organizational ability of the rebel group, I sought for information on rebel troop size. As it is difficult to ascertain variation over time for this information, the variable included is a rough estimate identifying large rebel organizations.6 This is defined as organizations with around 5,000 troops or more. Finally, I include a set of variables to control for the effect of duration and previous history on rebel group behavior. First, I include a variable that indicates the longevity of the rebel group and is a count of the number of years since its formation. Second, another variable control for countryspecific changes over time and is a count of years that has passed within the time period for this study (1930=1, 1931=2, etc.) Both of these variables are log-transformed. Third, and finally, I include measures indicating whether the group has a history of defection or fragmentation since, for example, defection could be a more likely prospect for rank-and-file if former comrades in arms previously has defected. The variable is constructed as a decay measure that indicates 1/n with n being the number of years since last defection or fragmentation. Groups without previous defection/fragmentation are given the value 0.

Statistical technique Even though two dependent variables are investigated in the empirical investigation, they are both a dichotomous variable indicating whether a group experiences defection/fragmentation in a specified year. However, the observations of violence are only a small fraction of the observations of peace. King and Zeng (2001) show that in such situations, a normal logit model systematically underestimates the probability of rare events and reports biased estimates. To correct for this bias, we employ the Rare Events Logit (RElogit) procedure developed by King and Zeng (2001).

Findings Table I report the results for Hypotheses 1 and 2 of the Rare Events Logit model. Models 1-6 focuses on the dependent variable of rebel group defection, while models 7-12 investigate the risk of fragmentation. The first model is a simple bivariate regression, while additional controls are added in subsequent investigations. Model 2 includes the basic set of controls.

An additional specification expands the resources variable to also include groups that control trade routes for drugs or gemstones (not reported). The results are similar as those reported. 6 Existing theory has also only focused on how large organizations may be different, with arguments that these will include less committed members (DeNardo 1985), are harder to monitor for leaders (Gates 2002), but more able to provide security for their members due to improved battlefield performance (Bapat and Bond 2009).
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[Table I about here]

Bivariate regressions show that when rebel defection is regressed on ongoing government offensives that there is a positive and significant relationship. Post-estimation analysis shows that the probability of rebel defection increases from 0.5% in years without government offensives to 3.6% when such offensives occur, an increase of over 600%. Models 2-5 are multivariate models that include all of the basic controls and different additional control variables, and again the government offensive variable is positive and significant. The inclusion of the additional control variables of ethnic goals, access to lootable resources, external backing, and the size of the rebel organization not affect this finding, and the significance level of the regime transition variable remains at least at the .05 level. The probability of rebel defection in years without government offensives are undertaken ranges from 0.24% to 0.48%, when holding the other variables at their means. This probability increases to 1.4% to 3.2% in years with government offensives; thus, the probability of rebel defection increases by a range of 360% (Model 5) to 900% (Model 4) depending on whether the group was faced with a government offensive, strongly supporting Hypothesis 1. Turning next to the hypothesis 2 which predicted that rebel fragmentation would also be more likely during government offensives. Post-estimation analysis of the bivariate relationship in model 7 reveal that the probability of fragmentation increases from 1.6% to 4.4% in years when a group is targeted by a government offensive; a 200% increase. When controlling for ethnic goals, resources, and external support, the relationship between government offensives and rebel fragmentation remains statistically significant, with an increased probability ranging from 141% (model 9) to 181% (model 10). However, when controlling for the size of the rebel group, the statistical significance of the relationship decreases to 0.06 (model 11) or 0.07 (model 12). The direction of the sign remains positive, and the relationship is still within commonly accepted statistical significance levels, indicating support for Hypothesis 2. The direction of the signs on the control variables is largely as expected, though they are not all statistically significant. The main exception is defection history which is positive and significant at the 0.01 level. This indicates that the decision to leave a rebel organization and set up or join a progovernment militia is influenced by having seen other former comrades in arms having made this transition. In particular, this can help alleviate concerns about government reneging on rewards for such an action as well as give an indicator about the risk of retribution from remaining rebels after such a defection.

In Table II, I report the results for Hypotheses 3 and 4. The setup is identical as in the previous table, but the main explanatory variable is the presence of government offers of concessions instead of offensives. Models 13-18 focuses on the dependent variable of rebel group defection, while models 19-24 investigate the risk of fragmentation.
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[Table II about here]

The bivariate relationship between rebel defection and government-offered concessions is positive and consistently statistically significant at the .01 level. Post-estimation analysis shows that the probability of rebel defection increases from 0.43% in years without government offers of concessions to 3.7% if such offers are tables; an increase of 825%. When controlling for other factors in models 14-18, the effect remains substantial. The probability of rebel defection in years without government offers of concessions ranges from 0.28% to 0.43% when holding other variables at their means. In times of government offers, this probability increases to between 3.4% to 4.1; a change of between 800% (model 15) to 1,033% (model 17). What makes this finding even more noticeable is that the study focuses on Burma, where regimes have been reluctant to offer any substantial concessions to the opposition, and has repeatedly reneged on previous offers. Thus, this should be seen as a least likely case for rebel rank-and-file to trust government offers of rewards for defecting when these are given. In conclusion, table II indicate that hypothesis 3 is strongly supported.7 Hypothesis 4 predicted that rebel fragmentation would be less likely during periods of government offers of concessions. Models 19-24 in table II report the results from the empirical analysis of this factor. Surprisingly, the coefficient show that the rebel fragmentation is actually more likely to occur during times of government offers of concessions, but the effect is not statistically significant. This indicates the potential that offers of concessions influence rebel rank-and-file in more complex ways than specified in this paper. For some members, such offers can serve as a morale boost for continued membership in the organization, while it can also create or exacerbate internal disagreements over how to respond to this offer. Thus, as argued by for example Olson-Lounsbery and Cook (2009), some parts of the organization may want to reject the offer while others may see it as a window of opportunity to further expand the possible gains from negotiations. This non-finding can still be seen as partially support for hypothesis 4 in the sense that such offer does not increase the risk of fragmentation when the government offers concessions. The control variables in model 2 are again rarely statistically significant. The main exception is that large groups are more likely to experience defection during times of government offers of concessions, which is in line with expectations that such groups include some less committed members (DeNardo 1985). A history of defection also increases the risk for new defectors, while defection during times of government offers of concessions was more likely in the beginning of the time period studies covered by this investigation. This may be influenced by the specifics of the case as the Burmese government has more actively promoted defection among all existing rebel groups during the last two decades, while earlier offers of concessions largely consisted of short-term
When both government offensives and government offers of concessions are included in the same models (not reported), the effect of both decreases but remains highly statistically significant. Still, the effect of concessions remains more substantial than for offensives. When interacted, the effect is positive and statistically significant for defection, and positive but not statistically significant for fragmentation (not reported).
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sweeping offers of amnesty for insurgents. It could, however, also indicate that more recent rebels are more suspicious of government offers because of the government reputation of previously reneging on agreed provisions.

Conclusion This paper propositioned that conflict dynamics should be taken into consideration in studies on rebel group reorganization. I argue that when the government initiates large-scale offensives or offer concessions that appeal to rank-and-file insurgents, the collective action dilemma becomes acute for rebel organizations. According to this logic, government offensives are predicted to create incentives for rebel groups to both defect to the government side and to fragment into multiple rebel groups. It is further argued that the offer of concessions also will provide incentives for rebel rank-and-file to defect but not to establish new rebel organizations. My analysis using data on rebel armed opposition organizations 1930-2009 find support for these predictions, even when controlling for several other factors that existing literature suggest may influence the likelihood that rebel groups experience defection or fragmentation. Although conclusions from a single-case study like this can be sensitive to country specifics, the finding that government offers of concessions has a greater effect on the probability of defection than government offensives is notable. The regime in Burma has consistently been reluctant to offer any long-reaching concessions related to the goals of different insurgents and has also a history of reneging on previous offers. It could thus be suggested that Burma should be seen as a least likely case for such an effect on concessions, further strengthening the relevance of the findings. Further implications of these findings are outlined below. Theoretically, this study has identified the collective action problem as relevant for a rebel group not only during the mobilization phase, but throughout the conflict. Rebel recruitment and mobilization does not only occur at the onset of fighting, but is crucial for a movements ability to maintain a fighting force in the face of attrition as well as increase the troop size in order to expand rebel controlled territory. However, conflict dynamics influences not only a rebel groups need for recruitment but also to what extent they are able to recruit. Recruitment, or even being able to maintain current troops, will be more difficult when faced with government offensives since this increases individuals costs of participation. However, the difficulties for rebels to maintain troops are even greater when government offers concessions, since this provide rebels with three potential benefits; potential access to public goods which led them to mobilize at the onset of conflict, an opportunity to withdraw from the costs of conflict, and the chance to avoid repercussions for having rebelled in the first place. Empirically, this study contributes to the growing literature on disaggregated studies on civil war behavior and rebel organization. In contrast with many such studies that implicitly or openly assume that the character and behavior of rebel organizations is path dependent, the findings here emphasize the importance of capturing changes over time and conflict dynamics in the analysis.
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Thus, it is imperative that studies continues to disaggregate conflict processes and learn more about the details related to mobilization, participation, and defection in rebel groups. Although it isnt picked up by the data analyzed in this paper, conversations with former Burmese rebels have revealed that individuals can shift from being active rebels, defect to the government, become noncombatants, or join different rebel groups several times in areas where multiple armed actors exist over time. This suggest two possible implications for future research; first, that changes over time should be addressed both theoretically and empirically, and second, that decision making among rank-and-file in rebel groups should be considered as well as that of the leadership. Finally, the findings of this study can also have policy implications. Governments faced with an insurgency, and international actors concerned with the outbreak of civil war, will want to end the conflict with as little cost, however defined, as possible. Whether the fighting ended or not is not addressed in this study, but the findings here provides some information about the effects of two different government strategies. The most preferred option for the government is to defeat the insurgency but victories in civil wars are becoming increasingly rare as most conflicts either are settled by a compromise or peter out because the rebel side is not willing or able to continue with armed activity (Kreutz 2010). This suggest that governments should try to encourage rebel defection in order to weaken the rebel movement, provide useful intelligence, and decrease the popular legitimacy of the rebel cause, as a means of ending the ongoing conflict. What the government should want to avoid is promoting rebel fragmentation, as it has been found that conflicts with multiple rebel groups are more difficult to settle, more violent, and of longer duration. Against this background, the findings of this paper suggest that the strategy with the greatest likelihood of ending conflict is to offer concessions. Whereas government offensives does increase the likelihood that rebel rank-and-file defects, the effect of this is smaller than following concessions. At the same time, government offensives also increases the risk of the unwanted rebel fragmentation, something that offers of concessions does not.

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Table I. Rebel group defection and fragmentation during government offensives 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DV defect defect defect defect defect defect fragment Government offensives 2.129 1.885 1.837 1.992 1.586 1.604 1.065 (3.31)** (2.99)** (2.78)** (3.11)** (2.28)* (2.30)* (2.75)** Ethnic goals 0.755 0.203 (1.33) (0.29) Lootable resources 0.060 0.008 (0.12) (0.01) External support -0.928 -1.346 (0.88) (1.29) Large rebel group 0.925 1.214 (1.64) (1.91) Group duration 0.280 0.261 0.372 0.090 0.206 (0.73) (0.72) (0.95) (0.27) (0.60) Time -0.199 0.200 -0.031 0.630 0.249 (0.33) (0.26) (0.05) (0.74) (0.37) Defection history 2.043 2.124 2.076 2.124 2.065 (2.84)** (2.98)** (2.90)** (2.72)** (2.64)** Fragmentation history Constant -5.421 -5.759 (9.38)** (2.15)* Observations 1180 1148 Robust z statistics in parantheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% -6.727 (2.07)* 1175 -6.074 (2.28)* 1179 -8.090 (2.21)* 1152 -6.884 (2.28)* 1120 -4.149 (14.28)** 1180

8 fragment 1.032 (2.57)* 0.435 (0.96)

9 fragment 0.906 (2.07)*

10 fragment 1.056 (2.49)*

11 fragment 0.901 (1.89)

0.480 (1.14) -0.196 (0.30) 0.269 (0.53) 0.165 (0.64) -0.329 (0.73)

0.172 (0.67) -0.312 (0.84)

0.199 (0.76) -0.312 (0.73)

0.196 (0.78) -0.259 (0.73)

12 fragment 0.891 (1.83) 0.296 (0.50) 0.389 (0.83) -0.355 (0.45) 0.301 (0.54) 0.214 (0.75) -0.490 (0.89)

0.380 (0.32) -3.577 (2.94)** 1148

0.366 (0.30) -3.519 (2.56)* 1175

0.398 (0.33) -3.538 (2.86)** 1179

0.392 (0.33) -3.186 (2.01)* 1152

0.257 (0.21) -2.974 (1.82) 1120

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Table II. Rebel group defection and fragmentation during government offers of concessions 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 DV defect defect defect defect defect defect fragment fragment fragment fragment fragment fragment Government concessions 2.202 2.404 2.392 2.379 2.516 2.373 0.421 0.545 0.494 0.529 0.578 0.557 (3.42)** (3.79)** (3.56)** (3.58)** (4.06)** (3.84)** (1.08) (1.24) (1.12) (1.22) (1.33) (1.26) Ethnic goals 0.208 0.102 0.240 0.163 (0.35) (0.14) (0.54) (0.29) Lootable resources 0.296 0.042 0.629 0.448 (0.58) (0.07) (1.60) (1.00) External support -0.002 -0.956 0.302 -0.204 (0.00) (0.80) (0.49) (0.27) Large rebel group 1.602 1.769 0.638 0.626 (2.90)** (3.11)** (1.40) (1.29) Group duration 0.428 0.469 0.477 0.275 0.294 0.233 0.270 0.246 0.226 0.246 (1.17) (1.29) (1.28) (0.76) (0.84) (0.95) (1.09) (1.01) (0.89) (0.92) Time -1.243 -1.300 -1.276 -1.000 -1.009 -0.515 -0.597 -0.516 -0.642 -0.726 (4.38)** (4.82)** (4.45)** (2.80)** (2.79)** (1.63) (1.66) (1.63) (1.51) (1.43) Defection history 2.186 2.304 2.298 2.021 2.014 (3.04)** (3.31)** (3.24)** (2.18)* (2.29)* Fragmentation history 0.664 0.602 0.710 0.606 0.483 (0.58) (0.52) (0.62) (0.51) (0.39) Constant -5.443 -1.963 -1.868 -1.838 -2.932 -2.778 -3.829 -2.552 -2.458 -2.462 -2.025 -1.973 (9.42)** (1.67) (1.66) (1.74) (1.85) (1.99)* (15.64)** (2.58)** (2.31)* (2.57)* (1.45) (1.34) Observations 1180 1148 1175 1179 1152 1120 1180 1148 1175 1179 1152 1120 Robust z statistics in parantheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

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