Brittle fracture - Stress States

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Metals and alloys generally have adequate gross ductility. However, under certain conditions of stress-state strain rate and temperature, brittle fracture can occur without a significant plastic flow prior to fracture. If the part contains a flaw or crack, and a load is applied, the stresses and strains at the crack tip are intensified. When these are increased to a critical value called fracture toughness, K.sub.IC), the crack propagates and the part fractures. Low values of K.sub.IC indicate ease of crack propagation. The value of K.sub.IC in certain carbon and alloy steels shows an abrupt change in a narrow temperature range which is called the ductile-brittle transition temperature. Fracture above this transition temperature is predominantly by movement of dislocations in slip planes and by microvoid coalescence. The Pearls-Nabarrow lattice friction stress increases with decreasing temperature, and, at temperatures below the ductile-brittle transition, K.sub.IC becomes very low and fracture occurs by cleavage. Consider the example of the brittle fracture of a steel storage tank used to store I million bushels of corn (see Figure 4). The tank collapsed without warning on a cold winter day when its wall split and was pushed outward by the flow of corn. The tank was 49 m in diameter, 15 m tall, and was constructed by welding 6 rings of steel plates. It had a 1.4-cm thick bottom and a 2.1 by 2.1 m access door that was reinforced by a 1.9-cm thick steel plate. Fracture occurred when the ambient temperature suddenly dropped to about - 23' C. Chevron markings on fracture surfaces all indicated that the crack began near a sharp rectangular corner of the reinforcing plate weld joint at the top of the access door. Laboratory investigations found that the steel plates used were in conformance with the ASTM A283 Grade C carbon steel requirement. They had 471-MPa tensile strength, 249-MPa yield strength, 34 percent elongation, and 75- to 78-RB hardness. The weldjoint was made by the

multipass fusion weld method and the weld metal exhibited little porosity, a columnar grain structure, and 24-RC hardness. Scanning electron fractography near the crack origin area showed a cleavage-type brittle fracture with flat grain facets and a river pattern typical of a steel fracture below the ductile-brittle transition temperatures (see Figure 5). Attempts were made to determine the ductile-brittle transition temperature of the steel using the Charpy V-notch impact test method, and to determine the fracture toughness K.sub.IC with the centercrack test method using specimens machined from the tank wall. At the fracture temperature of 23C, the impact energy for fracture measured 12 J with 0.1 percent lateral expansion. The fracture toughness K.sub.IC measured 59 MPa.m. The critical crack size was about 3.5 cm, which is close to the value that can be predicted by fracture mechanics analysis. Stress calculations indicated that the hydrostatic pressure stress at the fracture origin area for the full tank load of corn, based on Rankine's formula, was 128 MPa, and the vertical compressive stress due to steel weight was 0.97 MPa. Thus, the allowable design stress was about 129 MPa, or 3.6 times smaller than the fracture strength of steel. If we assume a temperature gradient of about 22o C due to the sudden drop in ambient temperature, the thermal stress that may develop on the tank wall would be 45 MPa. The square-cut reinforcing plate can cause an additional stress concentration, which was estimated as 2.0 by Roark's formulas. The total stress including these factors is still below the load-carrying capacity of steel. Fusion welding creates residual weld stress and when it is superimposed on the local applied stress, the total can reach the fracture stress of steel and initiate a crack. Once the crack was formed below the ductile-brittle transition temperature, it propagated rapidly and caused the catastrophic fracture of the storage tank. It should be pointed out that because of the interrelation of the different effects, the exact combination of stress, temperature, weld structure, and flaws that will cause brittle fracture in a given steel structure cannot be accurately calculated. Therefore, the general design practice is to select a steel with an appropriate ductile-brittle transition temperature for the application. This is common practice for the design of pressure vessels and should have been followed in the design of this steel storage tank for cold

climate use. The court found the engineering company responsible for the collapse of the storage tank and for damages. Hydrogen-induced Cracking Chemical attack and thermal effects can also cause brittle fractures in metals and metal alloys. These effects include hydrogen-induced cracking, stress-corrosion cracking, and cracking by structural change. Hydrogen embrittlement occurs when high strength steels and certain other alloys absorb excessive amounts of hydrogen in a variety of environments, such as in the presence of hydrocarbons or hydrogen sulfide, or during pickling in acids, plating, welding, and heat treating. If steels have a flaw, hydrogen tends to diffuse to the stress concentration region and can initiate cracking. The crack propagates in a brittle manner through grain boundaries, giving a "rock-candy"-type fracture appearance. A steel tank was fractured catastrophically in an oil refinery. The tank was 2.4 m in diameter, 18-m tall, and was constructed from 2.54cm thick steel plate, in accordance with the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, by welding six cylindrical rings together between two ellipsoidal ends. it was used to remove H.sub.2S from a propane/butane liquid mixture by the counterflow of an aqueous solution of monoethanol amine. The hydrocarbon liquid entered the tank near its bottom at 38' C and 1.4 MPa pressure, and the amine solution entered at the top and exited at the bottom. The H.sub.2S gas tended to collect in the lower part of the tank and produced hydrogen blisters in the tank wall. After five years in service, the second ring from the bottom was replaced by a new steel ring welded in place by the shielded metal arc process. Two years later, the tank developed a leak near the inlet valve and fractured catastrophically, causing an explosion and fire, and extensive damage. Field investigation indicated the fracture path followed the weld line of the replacement ring. When the fracture surfaces were cleaned with high pressure steam, it was noted that a black deposit extended from the inner surface of the wall for nearly 30 percent of the circumference. Chemical analysis showed the black deposit was rich in sulfur. Since it was formed prior to fracture, it delineated the crack that existed at the time of final

rupture. This pre-existing crack was as deep as 2.36 em when the leakage occurred. Laboratory investigations indicated that the steel used was ASTM A5]6 Grade 70 carbon steel with 540-MPa tensile strength, 304-MPa yield strength, and 29 percent elongation. Metallographic examination showed the pre-existing crack was in the heat-affected zone of the repair weld area and consisted of hard spots with 410 to 490 KHN.sub.500 (41 to 47 RC) hardness with martensitic structure. A typical scanning electron micrograph of the pre-existing crack surface exhibited rock-candy"-type brittle intergranular fracture generally associated with hydrogen-induced cracking. Operating pressure of 1.4 MPa in a steel tank 2.54-cm thick with a 2.4-m diameter produced an axial stress of about 34 MPa. When the tank wall thickness was reduced by a crack, the value of axial stress increased to close to the value of the breaking stress of steel. The crack propagated until it reached a critical size and the remaining thin, solid metal shell fractured, causing leakage. At the same time, the through-crack continued to grow. When it reached 80 cm, catastrophic crack propagation occurred. Fracture mechanics analysis based on Irwin's empirical relation indicated that the crack tip opening displacement (CTOD) was about 0.064 mm. Tests conducted by the National Bureau of Standards using notched ASTM A516 steel plate specimens yielded a CTOD measurement of about 0. 17 mm. Therefore, hydrogen embrittlement reduced the fracture resistance of the steel by more than half. It should be pointed out that special precautions are required in welding ASTM A516 carbon steel plates to avoid hydrogen embrittlement. AWS Di.1 Standards stipulate that low hydrogen-coated electrodes preheated to 22' C or higher must be used, and that these temperatures must be maintained when welding 1.9 cm or thicker steel plates. Neglecting these standard welding procedures appears to have been the primary cause for the hard spots in the weld joint which resulted in hydrogen-induced cracking of the steel tank. Stress-Corrosion Cracking

Stress-corrosion cracking (SCC) is the acceleration of cracking from the combined effects of stress and a corrosive environment. These stresses can include residual stress due to fabrication, or a combination of residual and operating stresses. Stress corrosion normally is initiated at several sites by localized pitting or intergranular attack at the metal surface. It continues slowly, and eventually a crack develops. The crack propagates either between granules (intergranularly) or across them (transgranularly), and when a critical size is reached the remaining solid metal ligament ruptures by mechanical overloading. Crack propagation often is difficult to see and detailed microscopic examination is necessary to confirm that the fracture was indeed the result of SCC. Many chemical, electrochemical, and mechanical mechanisms have been suggested to interpret the features of stress-corrosion behavior of metals. They include chemisorption of surface active species, as in liquid metal embrittlement, fracturing of surface oxide films, anodically active paths through dissolution, or formation of co-planar dislocation arrays. The fracture of a steel cylinder by SCC is shown in Figure 1. The cylinder was manufactured in accordance with Department of Transportation Specification 178.36 (OT-3A480). It was made of seamless steel to handle a 480-psi (33.6 kg/cm.sup.2) service pressure, and had 85-kg tare weight, 126-liter volume, 68-kg ammonia capacity, 38-cm outside diameter, and 5.58-mm wall thickness. It was used to supply anhydrous ammonia to a blueprint machine. One day it exploded, discharging toxic fumes and hurling pieces of steel some 10 meters across the room, causing property damage. Laboratory investigations indicated that the fracture occurred longitudinally with a fishmouth thick-lip fracture almost through the entire length. Tensile tests indicated 415-MPa tensile strength, 276-MPa yield strength, and 32 percent elongation. The cylinder was manufactured in 1938, was in good appearance, and was hydrostatically tested at five-year intervals. The latest test was two years prior to the accident at 63 kg/cm 2 , and showed no permanent deformation. The ammonia vapor pressure at room temperature is about 9 kg/cm 2, which can develop hoop stresses in the cylinder wall (30 MPa) considerably below the stress developed by the test pressure of 63 kg/cm.sup.2. It is clear that the cylinder wall thickness was reduced by internal cracks to cause catastrophic failure.

Visual examination of the chevron pattern indicated that the fracture began at the site of the maximum bulge in the cylinder wall (see Figure 2). The wall at the fracture site had a reduced thickness (of about 4.4 mm as compared to 5.58-mm normal thickness) resulting from a bulge and exhibited a flat surface. The inner diameter edge at the fracture site had a 1.0-mm deep layer with interference colors ranging from light yellow brown to blue, followed by a rust color zone almost to the outer diameter of about 10 cm in length. The inner diameter surface had longitudinal microcracks with a depth of 2.5 mm; these microcracks extended transgranularly (see Figure 3). Scanning electron micrographs of the fracture initiation site showed transgranular cleavage and radial microcracks. Fracture mechanics analysis showed that at hydrotest pressures of 209 MPa, the cylinder could resist cracks 2.3-mm deep without fracture, and could resist a critical through-crack size of 3.0 cm without crack extension. Assuming that the rust region of fracture of about 10 cm in length represents the critical crack size, the cylinder wall must have been reduced in thickness to a very thin value (about 0.4 mm) after hydrotest before catastrophic failure occurred. The ammonia used was pure-grade with 33 ppm water content. (The DOT requires that commercial grade ammonia cylinders contain 50 ppm or more of water.) Addition of 0.08 wt percent of water was found to inhibit SCC. It has been reported that carbon steels do not exhibit SCC in pure grade ammonia unless it is contaminated with oxygen. The formation of an oxygen-iron-ammonia film, along with fracturing by slip in the base metal, was necessary for crack propagation. The use of pure-grade, water-uninhibited liquid ammonia, failed to prevent air contamination when filling the cylinders, and infrequent and improper testing and inspection to detect microcracks were the contributing factors in the catastrophic fracture of the steel cylinder. In general, austenitic stainless steels exhibit excellent corrosion resistance to many environments and are widely used in the process industries. The chromium and nickel in steel provide an effective passive layer and reduce the corrosion rate. Certain environments that reduce the

breakdown of passivity can initiate pitting, where cracks start in a pit and propagate transgranularly. The low stacking fault energy favors the formation of co-planar dislocation arrays and tends to increase solute atom concentration at the crack tip, thus increasing the susceptibility of austenitic stainless steels to stress corrosion. Structural Change-induced Cracking There is a strong relationship between the microstructure of metals and alloys and the effect of environmental factors on crack propagation. Castiron underground pipes, for example, generally have a long service life. However, when such a pipe is located in mildly corrosive soils that are constantly moist or contain high calcium sulfate and chlorides, it is subject to graphitic corrosion. For example, a gray-iron underground water pipe 20 cm in diameter was fractured after 20 years in service, causing flooding (see Figure 6). Metallographic examination of the fractured section indicated the presence of type B graphite flakes in pearlite and ferrite matrix. Graphitic corrosion occurred, where the graphite in the pipe acted as a cathode and iron was selectively leached out onto the outer diameter surface of the pipe. The leaching process left a lacy porous residue that had the shape of the original pipe, but practically no strength. The effective wall thickness of the pipe was severely reduced, decreasing the pipe's ability to handle loads. As a result, a slight external bending force (added to the pressure of the water flowing through the pipe) was sufficient to cause a sudden brittle fracture to occur. This article is adapted from a paper presented at the ASME Winter Annual Meeting, San Francisco, Calif., Dec. 10-15, 1989.

A283 does not have adequate toughness at the temperature you mention. A temperature of -30F or -30C is not cryogenic, its just a low temperature.