RESTRICTED C AIR FORCE CODE NO 0001 The information given in this document is not to be communicated either directly or indirectly

to the press or to any person not authorized to receive it. This pamphlet is produced for internal circulation within SLAF and is issued by authority of the Director of Training.

INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) & COUNTER REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE (CRW)

COMPILED BY THE TRAINING WING OF SLAF STATION DIAYATALAWA ON MARCH 2010

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PART 1 INTERNAL SECURITY

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LAND OPERATIONS VOLUME III - COUNTERS REVOLUTIONARY OPERATIONS PART 2 - INTERNAL SECURITY CONTENTS Aim CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION SECTION 1. General Introduction Responsibility for Law and Order Legal status Principles on the use of force General Application Pattern of operations General Nature of incidents Types of operations Intelligence CHAPTER 2 PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES 4. Impact of military presence on the people Possible good effects Possible adverse affects Co-operation with civil authorities Command and control and joint organization Command and control Outline chain of command Joint organization Local security scheme Protection of military personal and dependants General Troops on duty Troops off duty Other precautions against MT ambush Action if ambushed Dependants 20 20 20 20 20 20 21 22 22 23 23 23 24 24 27 28 PAGE 09 09 09 09 10 10 10 11 11 11 16 16 08

2.

3.

5.

6.

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RESTRICTED 7. Protection of important persons and small convoys General Road escorts Other measures Briefing Guarding of vulnerable points General Selection of VP s Priority list and types of VP s Tasks of a key point guard Economy of man power Dispositions Orders Administration Maintenance of essential services Use of troops Command 28 28 28 30 30 30 30 30 31 31 31 32 32 33 33 33 34

8.

9.

CHAPTER 3 - SUPPRESSION OF UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLIES AND RIOTS 10. Introduction General Panning Military responsibilities The crowd Preliminary military action Arrival of military forces in an incident Crowd dispersal Layout of section Crowd dispersal drills General matters affection crowd dispersal Non-violent crowd dispersal Opening fire Crowd dispersal in a confined street Crowd dispersal in an open space Employment of troops on police duties General Military standards Action by troops employed in police role Training organization and drills Urban anti-terrorist operations General Probable background situation Difficulties peculiar to urban anti-terrorist operations Concept of operation Tactical methods 34 34 34 35 35 35 35 36 36 36 37 38 38 40 43 44 44 44 45 46 46 46 46 47 47 48 4 RESTRICTED

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CHAPTER 4 - CONTROL OF URBAN MOVEMENT 14. Introduction Aim Principles Planning Methods of control Road blocks General Types Principles Methods Stores Control points Aim Tasks Composition Layout Orders Method of operation Communications Stores Police assistance Domination from rooftops/hilltops General Tasks Composition of standing patrols Orders Reconnaissance and siting Method of operation during civil disorder Helicopters Urban patrols Aim Types Used of armoured vehicles Communications Police Curfews General Imposition Military duties Police duties Method of operation Command and control 50 50 50 51 51 52 52 52 52 53 55 56 56 56 56 56 57 57 58 58 58 58 58 58 59 59 59 60 60 60 60 60 62 62 62 63 63 63 64 64 64 65 5 RESTRICTED

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

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CHAPTER 5 - CORDON, SEARCH AND SNATCH OPERATIONS 20. General Introduction Command and control Tasks Difficulties and possible disadvantages Organization Cordon techniques General Approach Dispositions Battle procedure Action in cordon area Isolating an area from external telephone communications Search techniques Announcement to the public Search parties Searching of women Methods Cages Screening teams Escort troops Snatch operations Aim Composition of snatch parties Planning Method 66 66 66 66 67 67 68 68 68 71 71 72 73 74 74 74 74 74 75 76 76 76 76 76 76 77

21.

22.

23.

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ANNEXES Annex A The law and members of the armed forces B Detection and disposal of enemy booby traps and explosive devices C Communication D Specimen headings for a military local security scheme E Vehicle modifications F Safety precautions against accidental discharges G Suggested instructions on when to open fire H Platoon box formation for crowd dispersal I Platoon extended front formation for crowd dispersal J Standard company formation for crowd dispersal K Company formation for crowd dispersal in an open space-pivoting L The platoon acting in a police role- crowd dispersal formation M The platoon acting in a police role sequence if action and scale of Equipment. N Crowd disposal sequence of event and words of command O Specimen headings for incident reports P Riot and crowd disposal diary of events Q Use of riot control agent R Form to be completed by an officer who ordered fire to be opened S Procedure for searching vehicles T Control points, road blocks, gate check points, suggested scale of stores U Control points specimen headings for orders 78 84 85 88 90 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 107 108 109 111 112 114 117

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18

FIGURES Booby traps and explosive devices A terrorist hide An arms cache Vehicles fitted for IS operations Immediate action drill when ambushed Diagrammatic layout of a road escort Troops in IS box formation Troops facing a hostile crowd A police riot squad Troops in IS formation for police role Diagrammatic layout of a road block A kidnap vehicle used in Palestine A rooftop/hilltop standing patrol A foot patrol in an urban area A vehicle patrol in an urban area A cordon moving in to position A cordon in position Diagram of a cage layout for screening

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LAND OPERATIONS
VOLUME III - COUNTER REVOLUTIONARY OPERATIONS PART 2 - INTERNAL SECURITY AIM 1. The aim of part 2 is to give guidance on the tactics and techniques to be used by military forces when called upon by the civil authorities for supporting in dealing with. a. b. Scope 2. This part confines itself to internal security operations in urban areas. Is explained in part 1 paragraph 6, internal security operations against insurgents in rural areas are dealt with in part 3. However, when applying the tactics and techniques used in counter insurgency to an internal security situation, regard must be paid to the principle of minimum force described in this pamphlet. Civil disobedience, unlawful assemblies and riots Armed terrorist activities in urban areas

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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
SECTION 1 -

GENERAL

Introduction 3 In internal security operations the threat, whether it be riots, terrorism by individuals or by small sabotage and killer groups, could well occur in the context of a revolutionary war. On the other hand there will be cases when the incidents particularly civil disturbances are locally inspired and unconnected with a wider struggle. The degree of force which it is appropriate to use will depend very much on the political climate. In civil disturbances which do not savour of revolt or rebellion, armed force will be essentially in support of the civil power and the principle of minimum force should be applied most conscientiously. In the case of the more violent threats with serious political undertones, some latitude may be allowed to the commander to ensure that he can produce sufficient force to deal with the situation. Although still aiding the civil power there may, under these circumstances, be occasions when the police are placed under the direction of the military commander in a given area for a specific period of time. Responsibility for Law and Order 4. The primary responsibility for maintaining law and order, and for safeguarding essential services, rests with the civil authorities. In British dependencies overseas British military forces must be prepared to support the civil authorities in preserving or restoring peace. This type of assistance may also be called for by the governments of independent states with whom we are bound by some form of treaty, although experience has shown that this is not particularly likely unless violence reaches serious proportions. In independent territories it is more appropriate, when civil disturbances do not savour of rebellion, to use indigenous forces. There may also be a requirement for British forces to maintain law and order under the United Nations auspices, as part of United Nations force. Legal Status 5. When calling in the military the civil authorities must clearly define the nature of the unrest and the legal status under local law of the military forces; it is also essential that members of the British forces taking part are fully briefed beforehand on any differences between local and English law, which might affect the degree of military force permitted and their powers of arrest. In this pamphlet English law is used as the basic guide as the main principles to be considered are set out in Annex A. It must also be made absolutely clear who has authority to ask for military assistance.

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SECTION 2

- PRINCIPLES ON THE USE OF FORCE

General 6. In addition to those principles given in part I, Section 8, the following apply particularly use of force aid of the civil authorities on internal security duties. a. Justification. There must be justification at law of each separate act of force, and such an act should be continued longer than is necessary to achieve the immediate aim. Prevention. The only object is the use of force is to suppress actual disturbances. Force must never be applied with punitive intent nor as a reprisal. Minimum Force. A commander must be firm and never flinch from using sufficient force, but he must not use more force than is absolutely necessary to achieve the immediate military aim. The military commander is ultimately responsible for deciding the nature and extent of the force to be used, and he must always act in a spirit of humanity. Legal Obligations. Members of the armed forces must comply with the law and act calmly and impartially in doing so. Safeguarding Loyal Citizens. Care must be taken not to endanger harmless civilians. Maintenance of Public Confidence. Every effort must be made to win and foster public confidence and support, as by doing so this will depress the morale of the dissidents.

b.

c.

d. e. f.

g. Evidence. It is the responsibility of the commander on the spot to record accurate evidence of any incident involving a civil disturbance. Application 7. In applying these principles, it is important to recognize the distinction between civil disturbances which are not aimed at overthrowing the established government, and other incidents and acts of terrorism which savour of armed rebellion. 8. In circumstances which approach conditions of armed rebellion, there may be instances where rigid adherence to the principles of minimum force may result in unnecessary casualties and a disproportionate escalation in the degree of the force subsequently required. Under such circumstances may be desirable to use a degree of force which is apparently greater then immediately necessary in order to show firmness of purpose to dissident elements. The decision to adopt this course is a difficult one but commanders must be prepared to exercise the latitude indicated in paragraph 3 to prevent the deterioration of a situation, and unnecessary casualties. 10 RESTRICTED

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9. In addition, the principle of minimum force must not be confused with the number of troops deploy on the ground. A large concentration of troops deployed at the proper time may actually enable a commander either to use less force than he would otherwise have done or to avoid having to use it altogether. 10. It is impracticable to attempt to cater for every contingency, and to do so would tend to cramp initiative. When operating in aid of the civil authorities, commanders at all levels are likely to be confronted with unusual situations, in which they alone can make the decisions; they must therefore be trained and briefed so that they can be relied upon to act soundly and intelligently on their own responsibility.
SECTION 3

PATTERN OF OPERATIONS

General 11. Background Situation. The pattern of military operations will depend on the political situation and the reason for and nature of the disturbances. These may range from isolated incidents which have their origin in industrial or racial disputes and natural disasters, whose aftermath can lead to looting; to acts of terrorism which are part of a planned insurgency designed to overthrow the government. Whatever the precise circumstances, it is assumed in this part that the responsible government has already established the necessary joint machinery, in conjunction with the military, on the lines set out in part I. It will then be the aim of the military, acting in concert with the civil authorities, to restore or maintain order and the authority of the legal government. 12. Timing of Military Operations. If the incidents are of a minor nature, the military will hold themselves in readiness for any call for assistance from the civil authorities, which is only likely to be made if the police are unable to deal with the situation or have exhausted their resources. If the information available indicates that the disturbances are likely to be on a large scale or, if there is some sinister undertone savouring of rebellion, troops are likely to be called out at an early stage to supplement to police action by military force. A decision may even be taken for the military assume control for specific periods, with the police under their direction or in support. 13. Integration of Security Forces. Once the decision has been taken to call the military into the disturbed area, and particularly when it has been decided that the military must be used to break up unlawful assemblies and riots, the military forces and police must be considered as one security force operating jointly to a previously rehearsed deployment plan. Nature of Incidents 14. Disturbances. These include unlawful assemblies, strikes and picketing, civil disobedience, riots, arson and looting. 15. Terrorism in Urban Areas. This may manifest itself in any of the following forms.
a. Murder Attack by Killer Groups. High priory targets for the killer groups will be members of Special Branch, and the more impotent agents and informers on whom security forces rely for their covert information. Killer groups will also murder selected

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potential or actual political opponents, and local government or trade union officials to whom the local population may look for leadership. Less resolute terrorists may attack soft targets such as civilians in isolated houses, unwary and unarmed servicemen and unguarded VIPs. As efforts by the security forces to counter terrorism increase. Murder attacks will be preceded by lengthy surveillance. Careful planning and rehearsal, to ensure the getaway of the killers. In towns, the weapon may only be in the hands of the killer for a very short time and will probably be hidden near the site chosen for the murder.

b. Ambushers. The enemys main aim will often be to capture arms and ammunition, and only to inflict casualties coincidentally. Detailed paining and lengthy surveillance are likely to precede all ambushers and little will be left to chance, but it is unlikely that a resolute effort will be made to press home and advantage once the ambush has been sprung. A small incident may be manufactured to draw troops or police into an ambush. The characteristics of ambushes can be summarized as follows.

(1) They are laid in places where profitable targets are likely to appear. The site chosen will normally be a place where vehicles have to slow down, halt or close up, and where troops after dismounting have little room to manoeuvre. A typical place in a town would be a narrow street where there is a good line of withdrawal for the attackers. Ambushers in urban area are likely to be carried out by one or two persons only, ho strike and then quickly make their getaway.

(2) Weapon used may include pistols, rifle, automatic weapons or grenades. Vehicles, fallen trees and mines may be used to block a route, while grenades could be thrown from windows or roof tops, or from behind walls.

(3) The enemys aim is to achieve success by surprise. He is likely to withdraw quickly if confronted by immediate and resolute offensive action.

c. Incidence Involving Miners, Booby Traps and Bombs. Incidents may involve the use of pressure or electrically detonated mines, booby traps or bombs, as they lessen the risk on the attacker. Their detection and disposal is considered in annex B. In many cases ambushes may rely entirely on such devices without any fire from small arms (1) Pressure Miners. They will be buried under the surface and can be placed in position sometime before use and armed in a matter of minutes. They are ideal for trapping vehicles whose movements can be anticipated.

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RESTRICTED (2) Electrically Detonated Mines. These may be used in carefully sited position, attached to the branches of the trees hanging over the road or buried under road surfaces, in walls or in culverts. They will normally be detonated from an OP overlooking the road or by trip wires. (3) Booby Traps. The following are some examples of articles which have been used as booby traps, the list is not exhaustive and any attractive items might be used as booby traps and left lying about: Thermos flasks Air travel bags Cameras of all types Watches and pens Cigarette tins and packets OHMS envelops. BOOBY TRAPS AND EXPLOSIVE DEVICES FIG 1 a

Fig 1 b

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Fig1 c

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Fig 1 d

(4) Simulated Explosive Devices. May be articles as outlined in the previous sub paragraph but without any explosive charge. They have to be dealt with by qualified experts and consume much time and effort in their disposal. (5)Parcel Bombs. Bombs concealed in parcels have in the past been delivered to important officials and servicemen, often wrapped in, service stationery or discarded wrapping from ordinary parcels. Control of service stationery and the destruction of old parcel wrapping is one method of countering such tactics. (6)Explosives in Vehicle and Planted Containers. These may be used for attacks on important security force centres such as HQ s and officers living accommodation.
d. Sabotage. Attacks with bombs and explosive may be made against essential

services, the transport system. Unguarded public buildings, police stations and service Installations. Its not easy to prevent sabotage because of the difficulty of screening and carefully searching all casual labour.

e. Impersonation. The terrorist may disguise himself as a priest, women, police man

or solider, in order to deceive the security forces.

f.

Hides and Arms Caches. These may be located as follows;

(1) Hides. Hides for wanted terrorists may be found in houses, sheds or

outbuildings. Likely places are in large cupboards, wardrobes with false bottoms, clothes containers, attics, food bins, water tanks or underground tunnels. Where the entrance to hide is through the floor it will usually be covered by a large heavy piece of furniture. False walls may also be used, and trapdoors constructed beneath tiled floor in such a way that no hollow sound will result from tapping
(2) Arms Caches. The enemy will be short of arms and ammunition and

will take particularly care of them. The location of arms caches may be 15 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED known only to a small group. Arms may be hidden anywhere, possibly an oil drum built into a wall, or an earthenware jar covered with rubber and buried out of range of mine detectors, or even merely buried in the middle of a vegetable patch. Reserve weapons may be kept in less accessible hides on the outskirt of urban areas.

Types of operations

16. The tasks which will face the military forces operating under the above circumstances call for some special tactics and techniques, which are considered in this part under the following headings a. Chapter 2. Precautionary Measures. These are for the protecting of military personal and dependants, the guarding of important persons and vulnerable points and the maintenance of essential services. b. c. d. e. Chapter 3. Suppression of Unlawful Assemblies and Riots Chapter 4. Control of Urban Movement Chapter 5. Cordon, Search and Snatch Operations Chapter 6. Communications

17. More extensive operations beyond those listed above to deal with terrorism outside in urban areas and insurgency, are dealt with in Part 3

Intelligence

18. The importance of intelligence in internal security operations cannot be over estimated. Its the key to successful operations. The subject is dealt with in detail in Part 1, Chapter 5, and is therefore not repeated in this Part.

19, 20 Reserved

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TERRORST

HIDE

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CONCEALED Fig 2(a)

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REVEALED Fig 2 (b)

AN ARMS CACHE

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Fig 3 (b)

CHAPTER 2 PRECAUTIONARY
SECTION 4 - IMPACT

MEASURES

OF MILITARY PRESENCE ON THE PEOPLE

Possible Good Effects

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RESTRICTED 21. The arrival or presence of an efficient armed military force will often do much to restore confidence and peace in an area involved in civil disturbances, this will apply particularly if the troops are well disciplined, smartly turned out, and perform their duties impartially , with patience and politeness. Furthermore, the presence of a strong military force available to assist the civil authorities will undoubtedly help to raise the morale of the local police and armed forces. It will also enable police and military action thereafter to be joint. Possible Adverse Effect 22. There may however, be occasions when the premature and ostentatious display of British forces could antagonize local opinion, heighten tension, increase the likelihood of disturbances, and even lower police morale, this could apply particularly in an area where our treaty arrangements were in themselves a political issue. A commander must use his judgment, after taking advice from the civil authorities, as to whether an open display of force is likely to do harm or good. Co-Operation with Civil Authorities 23. Whatever the circumstance under which military assistance has been requested, it must be made abundantly clear to the local population that the British forces are operating in full co-operation with, and at the request of the civil authorities.
SECTION 5 - COMMAND

AND CONTROL, AND JOINT ORGANIZATION

Command and Control 24. The form of command and control to deal with an emergency will depend on the type of constitution that exists in the country, the extent of the emergency and the size and composition of the security forces. 25. Since every function of government is affected by an emergency, a special system for the control and direction of operations must be developed. The detailed application and the general principles of government action are fully covered in Part 1, Chapter 3, Section 8 and 9 and at annex D to Part 1. 26. The chain of command and control must be by joint civil/ military/ police committees at various levels, this ensure that: a. There is always complete interrogation of effort. b. The security forces are always acting in support of the civil authorities. c. Plans are agreed by joint decisions. Orders are then passed through service channels. Outline Chain of Command

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RESTRICTED 27. It is impossible to lay down a chain of command to meet all circumstance and in any case it is frequently difficult to achieved a nearly dove-tailing joint command organization. 28. A possible outline chain of command at the lower levels might be as follows, although additional members will be appointed to the committee dependent on the circumstances. REGIONAL OPERATION COMMITTEES

REGINAL GOVERNOR

BRIGADE COMMANDER

ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER POLICE

OF

DISTRICT OPERATION COMMITTEES GOVERNMENT BATTALION POLICE DISTRICT DISTRICT OFFICER COMMANDER DIVISIONAL COMMANDER

OR

COMPANY COMMANDER

OC POLICE STRATION

DIVISION

OR

Joint Organization 29. As stressed in Chapter 1 paragraph 13, the military forces and the police must be considered as one security force operating jointly to a previously rehearsed deployment plan. This can be achieved by the following precautionary measures. 22 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED a. Practicing the establishment of joint police/ military HQ. Although military HQ must be mobile it will normally for the military HQ during disturbances to move into the appropriate police HQ, where the civil and police communications exist and the joint intelligence organization can be integrated. The police have the local knowledge and experience and their advice should always be sought. b. Establishing and rehearsing the procedure for calling in the military to assist the police. c. Rehearsing drills for joint police/ military action at the scene of disturbances as described in chapter 3. d. Rehearsing joint police/ military action for control measures (chapter 4) and for cordon and search operations.(chapter 5) e. During internal security disturbances and insurgency the police force may be penetrated at lower levels by subversive organization and information must always be passed on a need to know basis. It may therefore be necessary for final details of actual operations involving low level police deployment to be passed to them as late as possible. Lack of mutual trust between the military and the police can be disastrous; however the current state and morale of the police force must be assessed. Local Security Scheme 31. Commanders overseas will be responsible for the production of local security schemes. Specimen headings are given in annex D and it is particularly important that states of readiness listed in paragraph 13a of annex D are clearly defined, together with action required at each stage.

SECTION 6

- PROTECTIONS OF MILITARY PERSONAL AND DEFENDENTS

General

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RESTRICTED 32. When it is possible that the enemy attack defendants and troops whether or not engaged on operations certain precautionary measures must be taken. Troops on Duty 33. Organized bodies of troops must be prepared to move tactically at all times. When travelling in vehicles, the packet system may have to be introduced and in that case vehicles should move in groups of not less than two, with sufficient troops on board to provide local protection. The commander of a vehicle group should not travel in the leading vehicle. Also: a. Care and planning in needed to control the movement of routine administrative vehicles, such as those taking officers and troops to and from their place of duty, post and ration vehicles and school childrens buses. To obviate ambush, precautions should include the use of escorts, alternative routes and staggered timings. b. If there is a danger of military personnel being attacked it may be necessary to ensure that all vehicles travelling outside secure areas carry one or more armed sentries, whilst at night a vehicle may have to be accompanied by an armed escort in a separate vehicle. such measures cannot be laid down arbitrarily but must be altered to suit the particular circumstances in the area of operations. 34. Organized bodies of troops and vehicles should always move in the form of an advance patrol, with a main body in the centre and a reserve/ strike group in the rear. Groups should be sufficiently close together to help each other., but not so close that an ambush can catch several groups at the same time. Each group must have its own sentries. 35. During movement through a possible danger area all ranks must be alert. An effective plan is to have two degrees of alertness, which can be described as scale 1 and 2; scale 1 should be ordered when a commander considers an attack is likely and every man must be ready for instant action; scale 2 may be ordered when moving through a less dangerous area, and when it is only necessary to have the commander and sentries fully alert for instant action. The different scales can be ordered verbally for marching troops, and by flags, radio or light signals for vehicle convoys.

36. When troops are travelling in vehicles all packs and stores should be stacked centrally and men must sit facing the sides and rear holding their weapons. Sentries should have smoke grenades immediately at hand to throw. To enable troops to debus quickly. a. Not more than 15 troops should be carried in the back of a 4 ton vehicle. b. Vehicle canopies should be removed. c. Tail boards should be down. 24 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED d. Wire mesh if fitted must be so constructed that men can debus from the rear or over the sides. Use of wire mesh depends on the role of the unit and usually only applies to operations in urban areas. Wire mesh can be a severe handicap in antiambush drills. e. Mesh if fitted must be angled so that bombs or grenades cannot be caught on top. 37. Details of vehicle modifications are given in Annex E and consideration must be given to use of sandbags and metal or plastic amour to protect troops in the vehicles. Troops off duty 38. Movement will often have to be restricted by placing certain clearly defined areas or establishments out of bounds at specified times. It may become necessary to impose a military curfew to restrict and control the movement of troops. Dependants and service sponsored civilians; also to guard places of recreation and to transport personnel to and from recreational areas in escorted vehicles. 39. If the threat is sufficiently serious arms may have to be carried by all troops outside barracks, but this measure has certain obvious disadvantages as well as providing a degree of provocation. Troops carrying arms should never move singly. Safety precautions to be taken against accidental discharges are given in Annex F. Other precautions against MT ambush 40. Armoured Vehicles. Although they are more vulnerable in build-up areas than in open country, the inclusion of armoured vehicles in convoys has three important effects on antiambush action: a. They act as a deferent to hostile action. b. They give good covering fire for a counter attack. c. They can support anyone ambushed, by driving into the ambush area and engaging the enemy at point blank range.

VEHICLES FITTED FOR IS OPERATIONS LANDROVER FITTED WITH WIRE MESH

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Fig 4(a) LANDROVER FITTED WITH WIRE CUTTER

Fig 4 (b) VEHICLE FITTED WITH WIRE MESH CARRYING TROOPS

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Fig 4 (c) LANDROVER FITTED WITH ANT-MINE PLANTING, ROLL BARS AND SAFETY HARNESS

Fig 4(d) 41. Precautions against Mines. Ambushes may be based on the mining of roads with either electrically detonated explosives or pressure mines. To reduce the risk in such circumstances, the following rules should be observed; a. Vehicle movement should be controlled and carried out at irregular times and intervals. b. Dust roads should be avoided if possible. 27 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED c. Vehicles should if possible be armoured, or escorted by armoured vehicles. d. In addition to the vehicle modifications given in annex E, sandbags should be placed on the vehicle floor. e. Mudguards may be removed from such vehicles as Ferrets, where they tend to trap the blast from a mine. Action if Ambushed 42. General. If an organized body of troops is deliberately ambushed in an urban area, the action to be taken should be governed by an immediate action drill, which has been practiced repeatedly and can be applied automatically. 43. Basic Rule. The basic rule is to avoid remaining in or entering the killing area of the ambush itself. 44. Immediate Action Drill. When troops in vehicles are caught and forced to stoop inside the danger area of an ambush, the immediate action drill will be as follows: a. Sentries through smoke grenades and engage the enemy, while the remainder debus and move to a rallying point in the direction ordered, followed finally by the sentries. b. Simultaneously the commander orders muster right or muster left to indicate the direction in which troops are to move at once. c. As soon as the troops have assembled, any wounded brought under cover and the commander has located the enemy, an immediate counter attack should be launched with the aim of cutting off the enemys retreat and destroying him. d. All troops must be trained to act according to the circumstances, but they must be briefed to avoid wild and indiscriminate firing. 45. Minor Ambushes and Sniping. On coactions, troops and vehicles may be subjected to a minor ambush in the form of long distance sniping. In such circumstances it is generally advisable to keep moving. Fire should be returned towards the general area of the sniper.

Dependents 46. The term dependents covers British service families and service sponsored civilians, all of whom may be terrorist targets. The following precautionary measures must be taken for the protection of dependants if the situation warrants it: a. The restriction of movement to certain areas at specified times for business, shopping, recreation, etc, and restrictions on large social gatherings. 28 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED Movement in pairs, avoiding any regular pattern of movement. c. The organization of a family warden system to protect dependants in their homes. This takes the form of armed vigilante patrols composed of offduty servicemen, supplemented by security force patrols if necessary. d. In a really grave situation, dependants may have to be concentrated in one or more security areas under guard, and their movement outside these areas prohibited. e. Establishment of family information centres where dependents can be briefed on the general situation and the latest security regulations. This will help to counter alarmist rumours. 47. Specific instructions on the protection and movement of dependence will be set out in local security schemes.
SECTION 7

b.

- PROTECTION OF IMPORTANT PERSONS AND SMALL CONVOYS

General 48. In many instances, and particularly in the case of VIP travel, the safest and quickest method will usually be by helicopters. When helicopters are used security measures must include the protection at, and the clearance of any mines/ booby traps from, terminal landing points. 49. The staff officer responsible for the arrangements for the movement of the VIP or small convoy must agree with the district security committees concerned the measures the committees are taking to protect the VIP or small convoy through their area. The points to be covered include the means of travel, the route, timings and the size of escort. 50. A regular pattern of movement must be avoided.

Road Escort 51. The Escort. A full escort is divided in to:

a. Advanced patrol b. Close protection group c. Reserved /strike group

52. Advanced Patrol. This should be made up of armoured cars and infantry mounted in armoured or soft vehicles. The task of the advanced patrol is to clear the route of any obstruction and give warning to the close protection group of any danger. It must travel sufficiently far ahead to enable small obstructions to be cleared without getting the close protection group involved.

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RESTRICTED The Close Protection Group. This should be composed of armoured cars, the convoy/ VIP car, and infantry in armoured or soft vehicles. This party should move at a steady speed, estimated to conform to the convoy/VIPs programme and well within the capability of the armoured vehicles. In certain circumstances it will be advisable for the VIP to travel in an armoured vehicle. If there is more than one VIP, additional vehicles for their use and additional mounted infantry may be required. A typical order of march is as follows: a. Armoured car b. Convoy/VIP car c. Armoured car containing the escort commander d. Mounted infantry
e. Armoured car

53.

DIAGRAMATIC LAYOUT OF ROAD ESCORT

54. The Reserve/ Strike Group. This should be composed of armoured cars to provide firepower, and mounted infantry; it must move sufficiently far behind the close protection group to allow freedom of action if the latter is ambushed. 55. Command and Control. The escort commander commands the escort from his position behind the convoy /VIP. Good radio communications throughout the column are therefore essential together with a link to the local commander in case the column requires help. 30 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED Other Measures 56. The following additional measures should be considered: a. If the VIP agrees, he should be encouraged to travel in a less conspicuous vehicle than an official flag car. b. In the event of attack, it is the duty of the close protection group to protect the convoy/VIP and to get them and their vehicles out of the danger area as quickly as possible. c. In some circumstances it may be advisable to establish rooftop/hilltop patrols on all or part of the route to be covered by convoy/VIP. d. Light aircraft and helicopters, in radio touch with the escort commander will in some circumstances provide valuable warning of danger ahead, and discourage ambushers. e. Secrecy about details of the move must be maintained for as long as possible. f. The immediate action drill to be taken in the event of a vehicle breakdown must be planned and rehearsed. Briefing 57. Before starting the move, the escort commander should brief the convoy or VIP on what action to take in the event of an incident. Command will be exercised by the escort commander. Whatever size of convoy, everyone in it must know what to do if an incident occurs.
SECTION 8 - GUARDING OF

VULNERABLE POINTS

58. Guards on vulnerable point (VPs) must be kept to the minimum. They are normally a police responsibility and commanders must strike a balance between the military need to retain mobile forces for offensive tasks and the civilian requirement for security. A satisfactory and sound solution will only be found by close co-operation and discussion with the police. A policeman should be present with any military guard. Selection of VPs 59. In order to free as many troops as possible for offensive task, the following action must be taken. a. All VPs must be reconnoitred and classified as key or otherwise. b. Military guards should only be provided for those classified as key points. c. Some VPs may only be classified as key for a limited period, eg a railway station during the unloading of security forces and their equipment. For this reason the classification of VPs should be frequently reviewed. E.g. a railway station during the unloading of security force and their equipment .For this reason the classification of VPs should be frequently reviewed. Priority list and Types of VPs

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RESTRICTED 60. A list of key points and other VPs should if possible be drawn up by the local government officer and military and police commanders before trouble breaks out: a. Key points may include: (1) Communications centres such as telephone and teleprinter exchanges and radio transmitters. (2) Joint HQs. These are normally located at a police station (3) Public utilities such as power stations, water pumping stations and Pipelines. Those bridges essential to the security forces. VIP houses and offices. Civilian stores of industrial explosives. Other VPs may include: Government Offices. Industrial concerns such as oil storage tanks, refineries. Jails Cantonments especially during racial or religious disturbances.

(4) (5) (6) b. (1) (2) (3) (4)

Task of a Key Point Guard 61. The task of a key point guard is to prevent damage, arson or looking and ensure the maintenance of essential services. The guard must remain until relieved at the key point and should not be called upon to answer requests for help elsewhere. Mobile patrols must be readily available to support key point guards, either in the defence of a key point or to deal with incidents reported by them. Economy of Manpower 62. Economy of manpower is essential, but adequate guards must be provided. Many key points have to be guarded mainly by providing sentries on the ground, but the use of rooftop sentries by day, if suitable vantage points exist, combined with a good alarm system will reduces the number of troops required. Detection devices of the TOBIALS or IRIS type are now available and may save manpower. Guard dogs can provide protection of large key points or area such as depots and installations, although a determined saboteur will not be deterred solely by a guard dog. 63. A key point guard should not normally be of less than a section but its strength will be determined by; a. The size of the key point b. The threat c. The distance from the nearest reserve. Dispositions 64. General Guardrooms. Living areas and sentry posts should be established where they cannot be rushed. Sandbags and barbed wire should be used to provide adequate protection against small arms, grenades and rocket launcher type weapons, and to create 32 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED an atmosphere of military alertness and strength. Dispersion of posts should be avoided, otherwise the relief of sentries and quick support in an emergency will be difficult 65. Daytime Guards. The minimum requirement will normally be: a. Sentry at the main entrance to support those checking the right of entry. b. Sentry in tower or on rooftop, and/or arm armed power(s), playing particular attention to the perimeter fence. Reserve that can be called out immediately.

c.

66. Night Guards. At night, isolated and patrolling sentries must be doubled. Patrolling should be done in an irregular pattern with one man covering the other. Sentries should report to the guardroom at timed intervals .Dogs may be of use. 67. Support of Key Point. Key point guards must be able to call for assistance by such means as radio, telephone or very lights. A degree of protection can be provided for secondary VPs by regular visits from mobile patrols. Commanders of such patrols must be given specific tasks to perfume and on return be correctly debriefed so that all information is recorded. Routes and timings must be changed constantly, otherwise they will become known to the enemy. Orders 68. Guard Commanders. Every key point guard commander must be given clear and explicit orders, which should be put in writing as soon as possible. They should include: a. Description of the key point. b. Task including: (1) Entrances, installation to be guarded and posts to be manned. (2) Number of sentries required at any one time. (3) Duration of sentries duties and degrees of standby for remainder. (4) Action to be taken if the key point is approached by an unauthorized person. (5) Action to be taken if the key point is in danger of damage, looting or Arson. c. Concise instructions on the circumstances in which fire may be opened. d. Liaison with police, including instructions regarding searching of vehicles and persons entering or leaving the key point. e. List of authorized employees or visitors, together with specimen passes. f. Availability of reinforcements g. Communication, and the times at which reports must be made by radio and telephone. h. Action on receipt of any code word. i. Safety precautions- charging of weapons. j. Security of weapons. k. Administration. 69. Sentries. Sentries written orders are to be read out by the guard commander or by the NCO in charge of reliefs, and should include the: a. Dress and equipment.

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RESTRICTED b. Scale of ammunition to be carried, charging of magazines, loading, position of safety catch \change lever. (3) Area and are of responsibility (4) Position of post on patrol route. (5) Checking of passes. Specimens of which should be issued. (6) Challenging and identification of authorized employees/ visitors, and instructions regarding searching persons and vehicles. The necessary commands in the local language must be known. (7) Action to be taken when approached by unauthorized persons. (8) Action when the key point is in danger of damage, looting or arson. (9) Orders on opening fire (10) Method of calling for assistance 70. Opening Fire. Suggested instructions on when to open fire are at Annex G. These must be adapted to meet local conditions and the circumstances Administration 71. Small detachments guarding key points must be correctly administered and visited frequently, otherwise morale and efficiency suffer.
SECTION 9

- MAINTENANCE OF ESSENTIAL SERVICES

72. The maintenance of essential services is one of the most obvious forms of effective government. The insurgent, particularly in urban areas, has the ability to disrupt the life of the community by intimidating the people into withdrawing their labour. This not only causes widespread administrative problems, but also brings the existing government in to disrepute. 73. To forestall such insurgent activity it will be necessary to prepare contingency plans at an early stage for the manning of essential services should a withdrawal of local civil labour occur. These contingency plans may include the provision of specialists from the UK. Use of Troops 74. Troops should not normally be employed to maintain essential services unless the local governor or his equivalent has specially authorized their employment on such duties, in order to: a. Protect the health of the community. b. Protect the local administration of the security forces. c. Maintain the commercial life of the community. d. Maintain a service for the community on humanitarian grounds. Commands

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RESTRICTED 75. Military forces employed on maintaining essential services are to be used solely as organized labour under their own commander, who will arrange with the civil authorities how the troops can best be employed. Troops may be withdrawn at any time if a prior military claim arises. In some circumstances it may be necessary to from combined civil/military committees to co-ordinate measures for maintaining public services such as ports, electricity, water, sewage, fuel, food, post and telephones. Troops employed on the maintenance of essential services may themselves need protection.

CHAPTER 3 - SUPPRESSION OF UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLIES AND RIOTS

SECTION 10

- INTRODUCTION

General 81. This Chapter explains the tactics and techniques which should be employed by military forces in the suppression of unlawful assemblies and riots. It also covers the use of troops in a police role. Instructions given in this Chapter are based on English law and if overseas may have to be adapted to meet the requirement of the local law. An aide memoire, Army Code No 70014 is in issue. Planning 82. If disturbances are expected, military intervention should be planned and rehearsed with the civil police. Outline plans should cover the following. a. An assessment of the different types of disturbances likely to develop, their probable locations and the strengths and action needed to control or suppress them. b. An assessment of what troops will be required for each locality and the earmarking of troops for each task. In some circumstance it may be necessary to plan to use troops in a police role. This is covered in detail in section 12 c. The arrangements for magistrates or representatives of the civil government (who may be police officers) to join the troops. d. Joint and discreet reconnaissance, if possible down to platoon/riot squad level. e. The channels through which requests for military help should be made. f. The Establishment of joint police/military operational HQs. g. An assessment of critical areas and centres of communication which must be securely held. h. The preparation of any special stores likely to be needed .e .g, public address equipment, warning banners, dinner wire and emergency lighting. i. The reception, accommodation and administration of troops and reinforcement. j. The rehearsal of procedures and the testing communication .In all areas where internal security operation are likely there should be specific military frequency allocations so that forces can use radios immediately on arrival k. Stockpiling of internal security equipment, control agents and maps for reinforcing units.

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RESTRICTED l. Maintenance of up-to-date briefs torahs to commences of reinforcing units on arrival. Military Responsibilities 83. Troops will normally be positioned at strategic points when disturbances are imminent, but it will be exceptional for them to be called to the actual scene of a disturbance unless a high level decision has already been taken to employ military forces for the dispersal of unlawful assemblies or riots. Once the troops have been called, it is still the military commanders responsibility to decide what action is necessary, and it will be his responsibility not to use more force than is necessary. Whether or not he takes action is likely to depend largely on the information and the advice of the civil police or authorities. He will be guided by these authorities unless he has good reasons for not doing so. 84. The military commander should not use force if: a. The civil authorities are still in control have not asked for help in the particular incident in question b. Other effective but less severe methods of dispersing the crowd will suffice The Crowd 85. Generally, the size of the crowd is no indication of its attitude. It may consist of nearly as many peaceful citizens and sightseers as unruly elements, and women and children may be present in large numbers. Troops should appreciate that a crowd which hither to has confined itself to shouting slogans and creating noise may, in a brief space, be joined by other more violent elements or may spontaneously turn to more violent methods. There have been occasions in the past when ringleaders have tried inducing troops to open fire on a crowd, to use the incident for propaganda purposes. Preliminary Military Action 86. Before trouble breaks out the military commander must decide, in conjunction with the police, whether and where his troops should be concentrated, where they should move to if disturbances occur, and whether or not they should be seen to be available. It will be desirable of course to dominate an area before trouble breaks out by the measures described in chapter 4. The commander must not allow his forces to be scattered, and he should keep a reserve under his own control. Military and police HQs must wherever possible be together and the two commanders at the appropriate level must always be in personal or radio contact with each other. There must also be good communications to any detachments. Arrival of Military Forces at an Incident 87. The decision to move troops openly or unobtrusively will depend on the cause and degree of the disturbance. When it is of a minor and local nature, and particularly when violence has not yet occurred, the appearance of troops may have a calming effect, but if the disturbance is more serious and widespread, it may be wise to move troops in unobtrusively. If a situation is serious and the police are losing or have lost control, troops must be moved in

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RESTRICTED by the most direct open route. Detailed reconnaissance should have been made of all likely routes, and police action planned to speed the movement of troops in urban areas. 88. It is essential that movement should be carried out in an orderly, decisive and deliberate manner because, when feeling is running high, this will have a steadying effect. Police and traffic escorts should be provided if available. Troops must move in formed bodies. Officers or experienced NCOs will command all small parties or detachments, particularly when AFVs are used. Neither men nor vehicles must be employed singly and sentries or lookouts must be posted in pairs. 89. Armed forces should not confront, nor be used to marshal the crowd until necessary, as this may cause provocation. Moreover the crowd may become accustomed to the presence of armed troops and be encouraged to think that stronger measures will not be used. On the other hand, to keep far away may make it difficult to use troops at the right moment, and their commanders may be out of touch with the situation. It is particularly important that AFVs should not make a premature appearance, which may rob a commander of the advantage he would gain later from the effect of their sudden intervention. 90. Troops should be ready to intervene the moment they arrive at the scene of the disturbance, so that the situation may not be allowed to deteriorate through unnecessary delay. They must therefore have a well rehearsed deployment drill. Commanders must lay down states of readiness for reserve in accordance with the situation.
SECTION 11 -

CROWD DISPERSAL

Layout of Section 91. This section describes particular steps which must be taken when dispersing a crowd in an urban area under the following headings a. b. c. d. e. General matters affecting most forms of crowd dispersal. Crowd dispersal by non violent persuasion. Opening fire. Crowd dispersal in an open space. Crowd dispersal in a confined street.

Crowed Dispersal Drills 92. The drills described in this section must not be followed rigidly on all occasions, as circumstances will vary according to the place, size and type of crowd and number of police present. Each occasion will require a special plan made jointly with the police. Crowd dispersal formations are shown in fig.7 and in annexes H to L. A sequence of events and words of command for crowd dispersal are given in annex N

General Matters Affecting Crowd dispersal 37 RESTRICTED

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93. Factors and Principles. The key factor in the military commanders plan will probably be to assess the direction in which to disperse the crowd. He will be influenced by the mood and intentions of the crowd, alternative dispersal routes, the location of other crowds in the area, the location of attractive targets, and the degree of urgency, particularly if another threat is likely to develop. The principles governing crowd dispersal are: a. Early warnings of the crowd assembly from police, rooftop standing patrols, helicopters and others sources. b. Speed of arrival once called for. c. Co-operation with the police. d. All-round protection to prevent rioters encircling security forces. e. Warnings. E.g. non-violent persuasion. f. Intelligent anticipation of the crowds intention, including. (1) Keeping factions apart. (2) Protecting attractive targets from the whim of the crowed. g. Intelligent handling of the crowd, which must be never bottled up but must be given time and room in which to disperse. h. Use of minimum forces. i. Subsequent domination of the area. 94. Command and Control. The terms military commander and police commander mean the senior military/police representative present at the riot. Although the senior police officer present will not normally be commanding the police riot squad, it is with him that the senior military commander should make joint plan. The physical command of troops must always be exercised by their own officers. 95. Use of Air Craft. Air craft, particularly helicopters, may be employed on the following tasks: a. Reconnaissance to give advance warnings of crowed assembly. b. Shadowing a crowd. c. Dominating a crowd by flying low overhead, thereby drowning cheer leaders and generally causing confusion among the crowd. These tactics may be sufficient to persuade the crowd to disperse. d. Dropping riot control agent on or near the crowd. e. Acting as an airborne command post or to relay radio massages between ground stations. f. Troop carrying. g. Voice air craft. 96. Records. Military action in support of the civil authorities is often a subject of inquiry. Therefore it is essential to be able to establish the facts, and a complete record must be kept of all events as they occur. Commanders at all levels must arrange for a diary to be kept in which is recorded such things as: a. Important events in a chronological order. b. Brief details of any orders received and issued, either in writing or orally c. Factual information, such as the names of civil representative or police officers with whom the commanders has consulted. d. Brief details of any requests, proposals, and advice given by the civil authorities. 38 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED e. Reasons for decisions, subsequent action taken and results.

97. Photographs. Photographs form a valuable record of the situation. A military photographer should be included in a riot platoon organization to photograph important events such as the activities of a crowd, the capture of offenders and the opening and cessation of fire. 98. Proforma. A proforma for use by a commander when giving evidence or when writing his report of an incident is at annex O and specimen format for use as a diary of events is also these. Non-violent Crowed Dispersal 99. If possible a commander should try to disperse a crowd by non-violent means before resorting to force, e.g. a. Verbal and visual persuasion using loud hailers, banners, bugles, and/or powerful public address equipment mounted in a vehicle or an air craft. A policeman or interpreter may be required to make announcements. b. The ostentatious assembly of a large concentration of armed troops who are alert and clearly ready for anything. c. Ringleaders, agitators and others should be photographed so that they can be identified later as disturbers of the peace. This may cause ringleaders to have second thoughts. d. In some circumstances water hosing from fire engines may be used to disperse crowds. If so, adequate traffic control arrangements are necessary to get the fire engines to the scene, and they must be protected while carrying out their task. e. Irrespective of previous police action, the military commander should always consider the use of riot control agent before sorting to opening fire. Annex Q gives a guide to the use of riot control agent. f. The steady advance of line of soldiers with fixed bayonets can have an unnerving effect on a crowd. This form of action must be taken only if the commander is quite certain in his own mind that there will be no danger of troops coming into close contact with the crowd. Otherwise it will inevitably lead to hand-tohand fighting, dispersion, loss of control and perhaps the use of more than minimum force by individual soldiers. Opening Fire 100. Responsibility and Training. Responsibility for deciding to open fire is solely that of the military commander on the spot. If possible, he should consult with any representatives of the civil authorities present before ordering fire to be opened, but he cannot ask them to take or share the responsibility for his action. In no circumstances will anyone but the commander himself order fire to be opened, and he will not do so unless he is absolutely satisfied that no other means at his dispersal would be effective. Every effort must be made to prevent troops from being overrun by a crowd: when this is about to happen. Opening fire is usually the only way of restoring the situation. 101. Sequence of Action. When the military commander decides that fire must be opened he will, as far as possible, take the following action: 39 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED a. Warn the crowd by all available means that effective fire will be opened unless the crowd disperses at once. This can be done by a call on a bugle, followed by the display of banners showing the necessary warning in the vernacular, and an announcement over a loud hailer, megaphone, or public address equipment. b. Give the order personally to the fire unit (platoon/section) commander concerned, indicating the target and the number of rounds to be fired. He will ensure that the number of rounds is the minimum to achieve the immediate aim. 102. Additional Points Connected with Opening Fire. The following should be noted: a. Troops may have to suffer much provocation and even casualties before a decision is made to open fire. b. Marksmen should be used to provide fire. Steps must be taken to conceal the identity of the firer so that reprisals cannot later be taken against him. A possible way is for a whole section to cock their weapons, apply their safety catches and come into the aim. A firer is then indicated but NEVER by their name, and ordered to fire. c. When used, fire must be effective. d. Fire will only be deliberately directed at persons who can be seen to be taking an active part in the disturbance. Aiming low may in many cases be an effective way of keeping casualties to a minimum but, where there is a tarmac road or other hard surface, it may be unwise as innocent people behind the crowd may be killed or injured by ricochets. e. The SLR is the best weapon to use against a crowd because its fire is easily controlled and can be directed accurately against individuals. Rapid fire from SLRs or bursts from automatic weapons must be used only in the gravest emergency and after single shots have failed. f. In a really serious riot the threat of fire from the machine gun of an armoured vehicle is a powerful deterrent to a hostile crowd, and will also be ideal for dealing with any terrorists supplementing the treat by sniping from buildings. An armoured vehicle used in this role must be provided with close infantry protection and must not open unless the treat justifies it. g. Ammunition must be strictly controlled and accounted for. This ensures that troops do not posses unofficial ammunition and prevents ammunition falling into the hands of terrorists. The control of ammunition is particularly important as it provides a check on the number of rounds expended and acts as a deterrent to careless handling or unauthorized firing by our own troops. 103. Action after Firing. The effect of fire must be judged by the reaction of the crowed and not by the number of casualties. As soon as it considered that the desired effect has been achieved, the following action will be taken: a. Firing must be stopped at once. Empty cartridge cases will be collected and counted. b. Immediate help must be given to any wounded. c. Any necessary steps must be taken to help to clear the area, but in so doing it is important that the exits are not blocked, and that no action involving violence is taken against the people who are trying to disperse. d. Any dead bodies must be collected and held until they can be handed over to the police. They must not be removed by relatives or friends.

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RESTRICTED e. Efforts must be made to arrest the ringleaders. Where possible this must be done by the police. f. Any person arrested by the military must be handed over to the police as soon as possible. However care must be taken to maintain the chain of evidence. See paragraph 29 and 30 of Annex A. g. Finally, the armed forces, with representatives of the civil authorities and police, must remain at the scene of the disturbance until it is clear that the situation has been restored. h. After an officer has ordered fire to be used he will as soon as possible render a written report to his superior officer. The proforma to be used is at Annex R. Crowd Dispersal in a Confined Street 104. Speed. Street crowd are almost invariably intent on looting, committing arson or threatening life and property. Quick arrival at the incident is therefore vital, for this purpose mobile reserves should be maintained in each unit area as well as each control point. . Information Required from the Police. When the senior police representative at the scene of the disturbance decides that he is unable to deal with the crowd, he will call for reinforcements. If the reinforcements are military, he must give the following information which should be based on an aide-memories common to police and military: a. The RV with the police near to the scene of the incident. b. The best route to the RV, to ensure arrival from the right direction without interference. c. The size of the crowd. d. The crowd intention and temper. e. Any relevant topographical details including lighting problems at night. f. The direction in which we wishes the crowd to disperse. . Calling for Military Reinforcement. The senior police officer present should personally call for reinforcement if his radio vehicle is with him at the scene of the disturbance. If the radio is some disturbance away, he may send a deputy briefed with the information listed in paragraph 105 above. In normal circumstance, police commander should meet military commander at the RV , but there may be occasions when his deputy will be sent. It is not possible, or indeed desirable, to be dogmatic about the action of the police commander as much will depend on his assessment of the situation. . Routes. To help the two commanders to meet, the police commander should if possible keep open the route from the RV to the scene of the incident. . Communication. In every situation where troops are called to aid the police, it is the military commanders responsibility to communicate with the police commander. . Reconnaissance and Plan. The RV should be well clear of the crowd, so that the two commanders can make their plan without interference. But the crowd and rioters must be visible from nearby. If the police commander cannot meet the 41 RESTRICTED

105

106

107 108 109

RESTRICTED military commander at the RV, the letter must act according to the circumstance. As follows: a. Make a plane with the police commander over a police radio at the RV. b. Base his plan on information given him by police deputy. c. Advance with his force to make physical contact with the police engaged. Fire must not be opened if there is any danger to policemen. 110. Role of Police. When the military commander takes over, the police are withdrawn into reserve, but a police representative must remain with the military commander. The police can then be used to: a. Follow up quickly with a baton charge after the troops have opened fire. This is effective only if the crowd shows signs of wavering. b. Cover the troops rear, by blocking side streets. c. Make arrests. Deployment. The following is the normal sequence of action: a. Approach. If the military force moves to the scene of the disturbance in transport, it should debus well clear of the crowd. Troops must debus quickly to a practised drill with all their equipment, and at once from up in the correct formation. If necessary, the force may then be given the order to load and fix bayonets. b. Transport. With the exception of one vehicle, transport should be left under guard well clear a small party including a policeman, which can move quickly to deal with specific diversions such as a splinter crowd setting fire to property, looting, or attacking an individual. This vehicle can also carry wire to block off side streets, entrances to buildings etc. And is useful for dominating the area afterwards. c. Action. After taking action as described in sub-para. A. above, the force should advance in formation and take action in one of the following ways, depending upon the action of the crowd; (1) If the Crowd is Advancing, or is likely to advance down the road, the force will if possible halt 60 to 70 metres from the crowd. The men on the flanks and in the rear ranks will then turn to face their arc of responsibility as shown in the diagram in Annex II. The force is thus covered from all directions and will be able to watch the ground, upper windows and rooftops on both side of the streets. If there is time the tape/wiremen will then double out and put the tape across the road up to 50 metres in front of the force, and return. If considered practicable wire may be stretched across the road instead of tape. The banner men facing the crowd will then hold up their banner, inscribed in the vernacular Anyone crossing this line is liable to be shot. Once the force is in position any police in contact with the crowd should withdraw behind the military. 42 RESTRICTED

111.

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The military commander should than take action, first employing the non-violent measures outlined in paragraph 99, before resorting to the opening of fire, should this prove necessary. TROOPS FACING A HOSTILE CROWD

Fig 8 (2). If the Crowd is Stationary. The initial action is the same as described above. Expect the tape need not be put down In front of the force. A banner inscribed disperse or we fire will be held up towards the crowd. If the crowd later decides to move towards the troops, the commander can order the tape to be put out and the banner described in (1) above displayed it is normal to have two banners with Disperse or we fire on the other in the local language 112. Handling of a Dispersing Crowd. Once a crowd has started to disperse, it may occasionally be necessary for troops to advance to keep it on the move in the right direction. Troops advancing and pushing a crowed before them should remember that the pace will be that of those furthest away. A crowd on the move in the right direction should not be hurried. Those able to see the troops will no doubt be going as fast as they can and not nearly as fast as they would wish. On no account should the crowd be hemmed in so that it is unable to disperse 113. Subsequent Domination of the Area. The following action will normally take place after a crowd has dispersed: a. Patrolling. An operation does not end with the dispersal of a crowd, which must not be given an opportunity to re-assemble. A joint plan must therefore be made by military and police for patrolling the area after dispersal of the crowd, and removing any barricades erected by the crowd. Only when military and police commanders are satisfied that the crowd is not re-assembling, or

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RESTRICTED that the police along can carry out the patrolling, Should the military force withdraw. Size of Patrol. If possible the military force should not be spilt when following up a crowd, but if the detachments are used they must be commanded by same one sufficiently senior to be authorized under local instruction to order fire to be opened. Control will be quickly lost if soldiers start chasing a crowd from side street and houses, the only exception to this being the use of a vehicle as described in paragraph 111b. Following up Action. The crowd should be followed up at a reasonable distance and the military force must remain poised ready to take over from the police again if necessary. When a crowd splits up into side streets all round protection is particularly important.

b.

c.

Crowed Dispersal in an Open Space 114. General. The dispersal of a crowd in an open space is often a more difficult operation than in a confined street because; a. b. The crowd is likely to larger and to build up more rapidly. It will be less easy to canalize the crowds movement, so a large force may be necessary to deal with it. c. It will be less easy to anticipate the direction in which the crowd is moving, and to take the necessary country measures d. The crowd will be more likely to envelop and encircle the security force opposing it e. It will be less easy to establish a clear cut demarcation line, across which the crowd cannot penetrate without knowingly incurring a heavy penalty. f. Riot control agent is less effective when used in open spaces 115. Adjustment to Tactics and Techniques. Due to the factors listed above, the following adjustments to confined street techniques should be considered when dispersing a crowd in an open space; a. Initial Action. Before taking dispersal action it is usually advisable to: (1) Decide where the crowd must not be allowed to go, and deploy accordingly. (2) Observe the crowd by all available means, to establish its objective and mood. (3) Give the crowd every opportunity to disperse of its own accord. b. Strength. Due to the necessity for all round protection, a force of at least company strength is likely to be used when dealing with a crowd in an open space. The use of armour with infantry protection should also be considered, as the threat of fire from an armoured vehicle is a powerful deterrent to a hostile crowd. c. Formations and Tactics. The basic platoon formation will again be the box formation as shown in Annex 11 and the company formation as show in Annex j. Considerable flexibility is however essential, and platoons must be trained to extend their front as indicated in Annex I. Particular care must be taken to prevent troops being surrounded by the crowd and it may be necessary to use prevent troops being surrounded by the crowd and it may be necessary to use several platoons acting 44 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED together, eg.To platoons remaining firm while the third pivots in an attempt to disperse the crowd in the required direction, as in Annex K. The importance of basing one flank of the company on secure ground like a fence or ditch, so that it cant be turned, must not be overlooked. Police riot squads can also be very effective in helping to cover the flank and rear of a company. d. Transport. Company transport must be left in a firm base clear of the disturbance, and should be protected by wire to save manpower.
SECTION 12

- EMPLOYMENTS OF TROOPS ON POLICE DUTIES

General 116. The likely organization of police force is described in part1 chapter 4. In certain circumstances, e.g. When the police are unreliable, under strength, or insufficient to deal with the scale of disturbances, the civil authorities may authorize troops to perform certain duties normally carried out by the police, such as crowd dispersal using batons and shields (see fig 10) and dismounted patrols. Troops may also be enrolled as special constables, where an authority exists for this. 117. Troops will not be used for these duties unless direct orders have been given by the local governor or his equivalent and the necessary legislation has been passed. 118. Normally troops should only be used in a police role as a last resort, and the use of mixed police and military parties in such a role as dispersing a riot, should be avoided if possible for the following reasons; a. The way in which orders are given to their men by military and police commanders differ b. Troop and police may use a different language. c. Drill may vary. Military Standards 119. When soldiers are used for duties which are normally carried out by the police, they will use police techniques but must retain the normal military standards of bearing, dress and discipline.

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A POLICE RIOT SQUAD

Fig 9 TROOPS IN IS FORMATION FOR POLICE ROLE

Fig 10 Action by Troops Employed in Police Role 120. Tasks. The tasks are to: a. Disperses unlawful assemblies and riots. b. Deter demonstrators from taking further action, c. Arrest law breakers, so that they can be brought before civil courts. 121. Main Force. On arrival at the scene of action, the force must deploy rapidly in accordance with a simple rehearsed drill, which will vary according to conditions. If it is necessary to detach part of the force to deal with trouble on a flank, a balanced sub- unit should be sent. It is inadvisable to detach a military baton section on its own, except as a blocking party. 122. Other Detachments. A small military party should be held in reserve to spot and arrest ringleaders at the appropriate moment. Riflemen, who are good shots, should be posted to 46 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED watch higher places such as roofs and windows to deal with snipers or bomb throwers. Rooftop patrols may be established to observe the area. 123. Transport. Sub-units of the riot force should be carried tactically, each in their own vehicles, which should if possible be ton ton trucks, as larger vehicles are difficult to manoeuvre in narrow streets. Vehicles should be left under guard well clear of the incident, once the riot force has debussed. Training, Organization and Drills 124. When it is likely that military forces may be used for police duties, training and rehearsal of all possible drills must be practised and carried out in close co operation with the police. The take-over by a military riot force from the police at the scene of an incident is a very difficult and delicate operation. Details of the organization, formation, sequence of action and equipment of a platoon acting in a police role are given in annexes L and M
SECTION 13 -

URBAN ANTI-TERRORIST OPERATIONS

General 125. The maintenance of low and order when the urban terrorist is prepared to use rifles, light automatic weapons and grenades against the security forces requires a different approach to the use of force, although the principle of minimum force still obtains. 126. Urban terrorism may occur during any phase of revolutionary warfare. Here it is considered however as an aspect of internal security. Probable Background Situation 127. A typical situation could include the following: a. The population will have been intimidated subjected to virulent propaganda and be under server political pressure b. A low should have been passed prohibiting the assembly of more than five persons, and therefore any crowd will be a deliberate defence of authority. c. The police and indigenous Para-military force are likely to be relatively ineffective and to be heavily infiltrated by agents, informers and sympathizers. d. The system of command and control differs little from less severe internal security situations. The civil authority should remain in overall control; in extreme situations however the military may be given control during specific operations of the police and may Para-military forces. e. The armed insurgents normally mount operations against the security forces by; (1) ordering crowds to assemble and then creating incidence to draw in the security forces when the security forces are in contact are grenades placed in the crowd throw grenades and snipers engage the deployed troops from rooftops. (2) Sniping at rooftop hilltop standing patrols and sentries. (3) Firing at helicopters and security force patrols in the urban area.

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RESTRICTED Difficulties Peculiar to Urban Anti-terrorist Operations 128. a. Identification. A terrorist in the town can be anyone. He wears no uniform and can merge easily in to the crowd. The only positive identification is to catch the terrorist, committing an act of terrorism, or in actual possession of offensive armaments such as grenades or fire arms. b. Cover. An urban terrorist has only to step into a shop, cinema or house to achieve perfect cover, not only from identification but also from the view of those seeking him. c. Security. Whenever any soldier is deployed anywhere in an urban area he has to be constantly inquisitive and alert to prevent exposing himself as a target and to provide security for those with him. Sentries, observers in OPs, foot and mobile patrols, even parked vehicles, can present targets for the armed insurgents. All soldiers in static posts must be covered by fire and the post itself should be protected with sandbags and have over head covers. All movement must be carried out with fire support available. d. Intelligence It is probable that the police and Special Branch will be ineffective. However military intelligence is integrated with whatever remains. It also becomes doubly important that the military make every effort to gain intelligence by good observation, constant patrolling and the quick passage of information. It is also essential that less overt methods are employed. e. Press. There are normally adequate hotels in the area and therefore reporters and photographers can get extremely quickly by car or foot to the scene of any incidents. They can be a liability because they are prepared to take great personal risks to scoop a story or picture. Concept of operations 129. Contain or Control. A decision must be made whether the urban terrorists are to be contained or controlled. On this will result the deployment and the use of minimum force. To contain is the more passive policy whilst to control will require more positive action. The aim of maintaining complete law and order can probably only be achieved by capturing or killing those insurgents engaging the security forces or those elements fighting each other, to the danger of the rest of the population. 130. Deployment. There are two methods of deployment in these conditions either for the troops to be based outside the periphery of the urban area and to operate from a secure and firm base or to establish sub unit and unit bases within the urban area. a. Bases outside the urban area. (1) (a) (b) (c) Advantages. Security of the base. Troops have better amenities and rest is more assured. Fewer sentries and guards are required.

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(2)

Disadvantages. (a) Reserves, if required, take longer to get to the scene of an incident. (b) Speed of reaction surfers. (c) Increased transport to ferry reliefs, meals and normal administrative traffic within the urban area, can create additional targets for insurgent activity.

b.

Bases in the Urban Area. (1) Advantages.

(a) Ensure speedy reaction and deployment of reserves. (b) Troops become more familiar with the layout of the urban area. (c) Domination can be achieved. (2) Disadvantages (a) Extra guards and sentries are required to provide security for the bases. (b) More troops are constantly exposed to danger and attack. (c) Administration over a long period becomes progressively more difficult. 131. Degree of Force. The principle of minimum force still applies but must be related to the aim. When the aim is to control the urban insurgents a greater degree of force will need to be used if causalities to the security forces are to be kept to the minimum. However the mounting of counter offensive action in an urban area, without inflicting large casualties on the civilian population, is a difficult operation. Tactical methods 132 Planning. The main requirements in any plan whether to contain or control an urban area in these conditions are good observation, sound communications and quick reaction. Rooftop/ hilltop standing patrols may prove essential to achieve these requirements. 133. Allocation of Area. Its normal to split the urban area in to unit and sub unit areas of responsibility. 134. Patrolling. Constant patrolling both by day and night, by vehicle and foot are essential if terrorist activity is to be curbed. 135. Reserves. These must be held by commanders at sub unit and unit level, they must be so positioned as to be able to deploy speedily. 136. Tactical Formations. The platoon box formation shown in Annex H is not suitable for use in this situation. It present too great a target, is ponderous, and prohibits quick retaliation with mutual fire support and cover. All movements must be carried out tactically so that at any movement, if troops are engaged with fire by the terrorist, protection and are able to rotate. 49 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 137. Additional Aspects. Aspects which need special emphasis in urban anti terrorist operations although little different from those necessary in less violent forms of internal security are; a. Sealing Off the Urban Area. Further arms and explosives must be prevented entering the area by sealing off likely routes by such means as; (1) (2) (3) Road blocks and control points. Waterborne patrols if there is access by river or sea. Constant patrolling and ambushing of foot paths or foot routs into the urban area b. Carriage of Arms. Consideration must be given to prohibiting the carriage of arms. In some parts of the world however this may cause resentment. In the Middle East a rifle can be the symbol of manhood. c. Prevention of Large Crowds Forming. Once a large crowd has been allowed to form it presents a major security problem. The crowd may have been order to form to draw the security forces into the area. Only by good observation and constant patrolling together with quick reaction by the security forces, can this be prevented. In fact surprise against the terrorist can be achieved by anticipating the assembly of a crowd as a result of intelligent observation. 131. Night Operations. The measures that have to be taken must depend on the particular situation. Some factors that should be coincided are; a. Curfews. Curfews stop all movement and inhibit terrorist activity. They require, however, the authority of the civil power, which may be unwilling to impose or prolong them, due to the disruption caused. The factors to be taken into consideration and the methods of imposing curfews are considered in Section 19. b. Lighting. The decision as to whether street lighting is to be turned off, depend on the situation. Town dwellers are usually afraid of the dark, but this must be balanced against the cover that darkness provides for evil doers. Conversely street lighting exposes security force patrols to added dangers at night. c. Patrolling. At night, patrolling should mainly be done on foot. Vehicle noise and light provide good targets and the Land rover in particular is easily identified by its head lamp configuration. 139. Helicopters. Apart from their normal functions helicopters are particularly useful in urban areas as command posts to direct the deployment of the security forces and to plot the movement of crowd; as re broadcast stations; for casualty evacuation and for the resupply of rooftop/ hilltop standing patrols. However they are vulnerable in these conditions and will normally have a minimum operating height imposed. They are unable to land indiscriminately in the urban area, and landing points must be selected that area secure that are secure and free from possible sniper fire.

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RESTRICTED 140. Individual Protection. Troops engaged on certain duties can at time wear armoured vest. Not only do these prevent serious chest injury, they also raise moral. 141 - 146 reserved

CHAPTER 4
CONTROL OF URBAN MOVEMENT SECTION 14 - INTRODUCTION Aim 147. In general terms, the aim of controlling the movement of vehicles and people in urban areas is to assist in the maintenance of low and order. The particular aims may be summarized as; a. To dominate an area or areas before trouble breaks out, as a deterrent to hostile action and to hinder the gathering of unlawful assemblies and riots. b. To prevent crowds that have already assembled being reinforced and to canalise their movement in to area chosen by the police. c. To deny contact between the people and terrorist groups. d. Apprehends wanted persons. e. To prevent the smuggling of arms, ammunition, food and medical supplies to terrorists. f. To increase public confidence in the local government, and encourage those who are willing to divulge information. g. To facilitate operations by the security forces. Principles 148. Imposition. The civil authorities are responsible for imposing collective measures of control in accordance with the locale low. The police/military commanders are responsible for enforcing these collective measures 149. Control of Measures. Prohibitions and restrictions are distasteful to the people and affect the life of the whole community. Unless such measures are closely controlled they may cause the collapse of such things as public utility services, postal facilities and food distribution, and may engender widespread discontent. The exact purpose and value of each new restriction should be carefully conceded before it is imposed; those responsible must: a. Appreciate the criticism which such measure may engender. b. Be sure that the advantages to be secured outweigh the objections. c. Satisfy themselves that the measure will be effective in producing the advantages claimed. d. Recognizes that, once imposed, a measure must be continued only until it produces the desired result or it is proved to have failed. e. Appreciate that measure which are infective may do untold damage. 150. Manner of Imposition. Control measures should be applied with firmness but not with harshness. It must be made clear to the population that the inconvenience and hardship is not being inflicted with punitive intent, but in order to root out bad elements and to provide the low abiding with security and protection.

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RESTRICTED 151. Lifting of Restrictions. Controls must not be continued for longer than is absolutely necessary. The lifting of controls in one area may well act as an incentive to the population in another area to drive out terrorists and trouble makers. 152. Co operation. Control measures must be planed and directed from a joint police/military HQ; full co operation with the police is essential at all levels, as is co ordination with heads of public services such as, medical, ambulance, fire, etc. Planning 153. The joint police/military plan for enforcing control measures should normally include; a. The division of large areas into the sub areas, if possible to coincide with police divisions, and the allocation of troops to sup area. b. The establishment of joint police/military HQs sub areas, and liaison with Special Branch of early warning. c. The positioning of central and local reserves. d. Establishing the channels through which requests for military help should be made. e. The sitting and controlling of ground surveillance radars, detection devices, searchlights and other aids. f. The planning and rehearsals of control measures, including the testing of communications and the allocation of police to accompany and assist the military. g. Arrangements to keep the public informed of the situation. h. The preparation of any special stores likely to be needed, eg. Photographs and descriptions of wanted persons and vehicles. I. The reception accommodation and maintenance and maintenance of troops. 154. The planning of control measures will invariably take place concurrently with the planning of the other types of operation considered in this pamphlet. Plan must be flexible so that military forces are always ready to switch wholly or partly from one type of the operation to another; the availability of the central and local reserves should help to meet this equipments. Methods of control 155 a. b. c. d. e. The methods of control are considered in succeeding sections; Section 15- Road Blocks Section 16- Control Points Section 17-Domination From Rooftop/Hilltop Section 18-Urban Patrols Section 19-Curfews
SECTION 15 - ROAD

BLOCKS

General 52 RESTRICTED

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156.

Road blocks may be established with one or all of the following aims in view; a. To maintain a continuous check one road movement. b. To apprehend wanted persons and couriers. c. To prevent the smuggling of arms, ammunition and supplies. d. To assist the local authorities in enforcing food control. Road blocks may be expanded into control points, which are described in Section16

157. Types 158.

Broadly, there are two types of road blocks; a. Deliberate. These may be placed on a main road and act as a useful deterrent to unlawful movement, but they are unlikely to produce spectacular results. b. Snap. These are used for spot checks, and their actual location is often related to some item of intelligence. Quick planning and execution is required. Initially they may achieve surprise and success, but once their position is generally known they become deliberate road block. This type of road block can be of a simple design based on two vehicles set diagonally across the road with a search area in between them. However, the principles and methods description below still apply. Principles When a road block has to be established, the following principles should be observed; a. Concealment. It should be sited tactically where it is difficult for a guilty person to turn back or reverse a vehicle without being noticed. Sharp bends or dips in the road provide good positions. b. Security. There must be sufficient troops to provide security throughout the duration of the road block, and particularly during the initial occupation. To make road block truly effective, sentries should be sited as back stops on the both sides and well clear of the search area, to watch appropriate traffic and prevent persons or vehicles from evading the block. The space available and the number of leading in to the site are relevant factors to be considered c. Construction. It is best established by placing two parallel lines of knife rests (Each with a gap) across the road, approximately 50 meters apart. The enclosure formed can then be used as a search area. d. Layout. The number of troops required will depend upon the number of roads to be covered and the expected volume of traffic. Wherever possible, there should always be a policeman and an interpreter at each military road block, particularly in the early stages of disturbances. If persons are to be searched, women searchers and special accommodation must be provided. The military commander should where possible be of the ranks of the sergeant or above. The search and administrative area should contain a cage, a male and female search area, and a vehicle waiting check and search area. e. Early Warning Devices. The provision, if available, of early warning devices, detection devices or radars to give warning of an approaching vehicle may be of value.

159.

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RESTRICTED f. Communications. It must be provided with external communications, preferable radio in addition to telephone, in order that revised instruction may be given, information about wanted persons passed quickly and incident at the road blocks reported. Internal communications within the large road block can speed reaction time. g. Administration. All troops may have to be self contained for administration. h. Diagrammatic Layout. A suggested layout for a road block is show at fig. 11 DIAGRAMMATIC LAYOUT OF ROAD BLOCK

Fig 11 Methods 160. General. All these manning a road block must know their jobs thoroughly, and act quickly and methodically. To prevent delay to all legitimate traffic, identification should be checked before searching starts; this avoids friction with civilians employed by government, etc. Politeness and consideration must be shown at all times and wanton damage to vehicle and property must be forbidden. Any suspects arrested area must be handed over to the police as soon as possible. 161. Searching Vehicles. The following procedures should be followed;

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RESTRICTED a. General. Each vehicle must be dealt with separately. Its generally, better to select a few vehicles for complete examination in a separate bay, Including stripping by mechanics, than to attempt to do so to all vehicles. Vehicles awaiting either a cursory or complete examination must be held under guard in a waiting area, with passengers confined to their vehicles. b. Number of Searchers. An armed sentry and one unarmed searcher should be used to search cars. Tow armed sentries and two unarmed searchers are required for large vehicles and buses. c. Conduct of Searches. Vehicle occupants must be made to get out and stand well clear. The owner or driver of the vehicles must watch the whole search. d. Frisking Passengers. The road block commander will arrange for all vehicle occupation to be frisked and checked while the vehicle search proceeds. Drivers will not be questioned about their identity or requested to produce documents until they have been frisked. Woman may not be frisked except by woman searched but their handbags, Parcels or shopping baskets must be searched. e. Completion of Search. When the search is completed the vehicle will be allow to proceed unless any suspicion remains that there is still something hidden. In such circumstances the vehicle and driver should be handed over to the police. In order to refute subsequent accusation of theft by solders, it may be necessary to get vehicle owners to sign an indemnity certificate stating that they have suffered no damage or loss during the search. f. Detailed Procedure for Searching Vehicle. More details of the procedure for searching cars, buses, goods vehicles and motor cycles are given in Annex S. The photograph at fig. 12 illustrates the need for inquisitiveness and thoroughness in vehicle searching. The vehicle shown was successfully used by terrorists in Palestine. 162. Searching Persons. The following procedure should be followed; a. Search must include under the arms, the stomach, inside the thighs and the crotch. b. Clothing should not be patted, as this might result in a small flat object like a knife being overlooked, but should be rolled between the fingers. c. Women will only be searched by a women searcher; particular attention should be paid to their hair. d. After a person has been searched, he will be asked to produce his identity card and, if applicable, his driving licence, or any other official document he might possess. These documents should be carefully checked against each other, and against any photographs or descriptions of wanted persons. e. Occupants of a vehicle should be requested to stand facing the vehicle with their hands resting of the roof or side of the vehicle as the case may be. The searcher should then quickly but thoroughly ran his hands over their bodies from head to foot.

A KIDNAP VEHICLE USED IN PALESTINE

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Fig 12 163. Identity Documents. The following points should be note when checking identity documents. a. Photograph. Compare the photograph on the card with the individual. When making such a comparison try to create condition under which the photograph was originally taken, e.g. If a photograph was taken hatless than ask the person being searched to remove his or her hat. Similarly a woman having had her photo taken two or three years ago with straight hair may now look very different after the permanent wave. A good tip is to place a finger across the photo to hide the hair and compare only the features. A check of age will also assist in making the comparison. b. Stamp. Careful examination of the stamp across the corner of the photo will show whether the original photograph has been removed and another substituted. The authenticity of the stamp itself should also be checked. c. Questioning. When questioning a person about the particulars of his or her identity documents, leading questioning should be avoided. Questions should be framed in a direct manner e.g. what is your name? where do you live? How old are you? d. Finger Print. Positive identification can only be made by experts; for this reason a mark indicating a thumb print must in the normal course of event be accepted. However, if for any reason suspicion has been aroused, a suspect can be held for further questioning and a finger print check can be carried out by the police. Stores 164. A suggested scale of story for a road block is given in Annex T
SECTION 16 CONTROL

POINTS 56

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RESTRICTED Aim 165. As soon as armed forces are called in to help the civil authorities, the fire step will normally be to establish control points throughout the populated area of a town or city, to control the movement of vehicles and pedestrians and to help maintain law and order. Crowds can be canalized into areas chosen by the police with control points established as stops. By intelligent planning, disturbances can be confined to unimportant areas where arrests can easily be affected. Tasks 166. The tasks of the control point area; a. To control all vehicles and pedestrian traffic so that large crowds cannot assemble, known offenders can be arrested and curfews can be enforced b. To dominate the area of responsibility around the control point. This includes maintaining law and order by locale patrolling with a view to preventing damage to property or injury to persons, and dispersing groups of people before they have time to assemble in to a crowd.

Composition 167. A control point should normally be manned by at least a platoon, but the minimum strength required will vary according to the number of roads to be controlled and the number of traffic lanes in each road. The minimum scale should be; a. Control Point HQ. Commander, signaller and runner b. Barrier Sentries. One NCO for each road or lane of traffic blocked and one sentry for each barrier c. Covering Party. Two men covering the barrier sentries d. Standing Patrol. Where possible two men in an OP or on a nearby roof top should watch adjacent building and roofs for bomb and acid throwers, and the whole area for approaching crowds e. Reliefs. Reliefs are required for all the above. Reliefs will also be required to carry out patrolling and crowd dispersal when necessary f. Civil Police. One civilian policeman, if available, for each lane of traffic. Interpreters and women searchers are also required

Layout 168. Barriers. Each road or traffics lane should have tow barriers, one at the beginning and one at the end of the control point. The barriers should be made of knife rests and dannert wire, and should cover the width of the road or traffics lane so that a vehicle has to do an S turn to pass. Red hurricane lamps should be hung on the end of knife rest nearest the centre of the road at night. STOP signs should be placed ahead of the all barriers, and must at night either be luminous or lit by hurricane lamps. 169. Control Point HQ .The HQ and covering party should be sited centrally where they can see and effectively control the barrier sentries. The HQ should be constructed of the sand 57 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED bags and other materials up to the least four feet from the ground give protection against missiles. If possible, the HQ should also be protected from sun and rain. A reserve of riot control agent should be held. 170. Standing Patrol. A control point is vulnerable to attack by a crowd which may suddenly appear near to it, or to acid and bomb throwing from roofs, or from tip-and-run attacks with bazookas and small arms. It must therefore be covered by a standing patrol, ideally on a nearby flat roofed building, armed with riot control agent and an automatic weapon. The latter should of course only be used if the threat justifies it. 171. Rest and Administrative Area. This should be as close as possible to the control point and should be reasonably secure and out of public view. The latter is important because in order to instil confidence in low abiding citizens and fear in to would be low breakers, it is essential that soldiers appear smart and alert whenever they are seen by the public. 172. Transport. Each control point, in a residential or relatively open area should have a suitable vehicle for use by patrols, and for moving troops quickly to deal with incidents. Orders 173. General. The commander should be issued with written orders, giving the layout of his control point, a list of stores and equipment required and details of his area of responsibility. Specimen headings for control point orders are giving at Annex U. Method of Operation 174. Control points should be operated in the following manner; a. The commander or his second in command must be present at all times. b. All vehicles and pedestrians will be channelled through the barriers, and checked in accordance with the current orders. Checking will be carried out within the barriers by the civil police if available, otherwise by barrier sentries or NCOs. c. The control point commander should ensure that the area around his control point is patrolled. The exact area of the responsibility will depend on the type of area and the men he has available. d. The commander must remember that the manning of his control point is his primary task, and if an incident, accurse in his area with which he cannot deal effectively without seriously depleting the strength of his control point, he must call for reinforcements. e. The control point commander must maintain a log of all important events and incidents. f. The control point commander in a densely populated area must carefully assess the effect of imposing a degree of control on both traffic and pedestrians. For instance during the rush hour period, however efficient the control point, a crowd of impatient civilians or a jam of cars and Lorries can quickly build up and precipitate the very situation that the control point commander is trying to avoid.

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RESTRICTED Communications 175. Whenever possible alternative means of communication should be provided. Communications are required from control point HQ to; a. Company or equivalent HQ or direct to unit HQ. b. Rest and administrative area. c. Standing patrol. Stores 176. A suggested scale of stores required for a control point is shown at Annex T.

Police Assistance 177. The closest liaison must be maintained between the control point commander and the senior policeman. Policemen at control points are employed: a. For checking and searching vehicles and persons. b. As interpreters. c. To make arrests when necessary. d. On the scale of one policeman for each lane of traffic, but if sufficient police are not available most of the duties will have to be carried out by the barrier sentries.
SECTION 17 - DOMINATON

FROM ROOFTOPS/HILLTOPS

General 178. Standing patrols or sentries on rooftops or hilltops are an important means of acquiring information and dominating trouble areas (see fig 13). They can be used in particular areas or, given suitable buildings, can cover the whole of a city. They can operate by day and by night depending on the situation. Tasks 179. The tasks of rooftop / hilltop patrols are; a. To obtain general information of civilian activity in the area, eg. Signs of intimidation, distribution of leaflet ect. b. To observe the movement or activities of terrorist, curfew breakers or crowds and to direct patrolling troops, police or helicopters to them. c. To give covering fire to vehicle or foot patrols if these are attacked. d. To assist in the dispersal of unlawful assemblies by observation and by using riot control agent. They will require the authority of the commander on the ground before using CS. ROOFTOP /HILTOP STANDING PATROLS

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Fig.13 Composition of Standing Patrols 180. Rooftop/hilltop standing patrols should consist of an officer or NCO, two to four soldiers and if possible a civil policemen. The patrols should be equipped with radio, air craft recognition panels, binoculars, riot control agent, town plan/map and aids to night vision. 181. The introduction of night observation devices and ground surveillance radars should greatly assist in detecting the movement of men and vehicles around the area being observed at night. Orders 182. The following must be known; a. The area to be covered. b. The locations and movements of our own troops and police patrols. c. The location of mobile reserves and control points d. The method of reporting and other action to be taken in the event of an incident.

Reconnaissance and Sitting 183. Reconnaissance should be carried out by the unit or sub unit commander providing the patrols, in conjunction with the police. Patrols should be sited within visual distance of each other or of a central control point. A rooftop/hilltop position is vulnerable to attack, particularly sniping. Buildings should therefore be chosen which cannot easily be burned down, and the position itself should be protected by sandbags. A reserve must be available to reinforce a rooftop/hilltop patrol quickly. Method of Operation during Civil Disorder 60 RESTRICTED

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184.

Roof top/hilltop standing patrols might be operated as follows: a. In the case of a building, the police men accompanying the patrol will obtain access to the roof. b. If an unlawful assembly is observed, the patrol commander should instruct it to disperse. If this fails, and provided he has the authority to take such action, he should attempt to disperse the assembly with riot control agent. If unable to do either he should: (1). Direct troops/ police on the ground to the scene, or (2). Radio or signal by flag to a patrolling helicopters and indicate the position of the crowd. The helicopters can then disperse the crowd with riot control agent, call up reserves or take any other action necessary.

185. Experience has proved that in the right circumstances well sited posts manned by an officer can spot crowds assembling and identify the ringleaders. This information can then be passed by radio to mobile patrols, who can arrive on the scene quickly and immediately, arrest those ringleaders, even if by this time they have withdrawn into the crowd. This apparent second sight can have a very salutary effect. Helicopters 186. If helicopters are available, they should patrol over the area where rooftop/ hilltop standing patrols are operation and should where possible be in radio communication with the patrols. 187 Reserved.
SECTION 18 -

URBAN PATROLS

Aim 188. In general, the aims of urban patrols should be to dominate the area, in which they are operating, maintain curfews when these have been imposed, and provide protection for dependants. Types 189. Foot patrols (see Fig 14). These should normally be of section strength and should patrol in open formation to avoid being ambushed. Their task is to dominate an area, to instil confidence in the civil community particularly during working hours, to carry out snap searches and to deal with minor incidents.

A FOOT PATROL IN AN URBAN AREA

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Fig 14 190. Vehicle Patrols (sec fig 15). Police/military patrols mounted in vehicles and equipped with radio are the quickest means of covering a wide area with a limited number of troops. Tasks include. a. Reconnaissance. b. Moving to the scene of an incident quickly and dealing with it. c. Reinforcing foot patrols. d. Supporting control points, rooftop, hilltop, standing patrols and road blocks e. Escort duties. f. Establishing a cordon rapidly in a cordon and search operation. g. Snap road blocks. 191. Helicopter patrols. Police/military helicopter patrols can be very effective in urban operation, but their vulnerability must be taken in to account. Main tasks are a. Reconnaissance, both visual and photography. b. The reporting of incidence quickly. c. The rapid reinforcement of foot and vehicle patrols in certain open areas and causality evacuation. d. To take action under certain circumstances against rioting crowds by dropping riot control agent. This must be co-ordinated with the commander on the ground. e. Supporting rooftop/hilltop patrols

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Fig 15 192. Clandestine Patrols. Coordinated with the overall patrol scheme, small clandestine patrols on foot can be effectively employed. Their activities should be based on the stealth, guile and doing the unexpected. By lying up concealed, moving through back alleys and over waste ground and garden walls, they will be able to impose sudden checks, intercept couriers and bomb carriers, and thus maintain a measure of initiative over the terrorists. War dogs can be used effectively with such patrols. Use of Armoured Vehicles 193. Armoured cars and scout cars have a deterrent effect on crowds and insurgents. They can be employed to support troops in other vehicles or foot. They can be used to shield infantry form a crowd which has opened fire, can help to illuminate darkened streets and dazzle snipers at night, and their excellent communication should prove invaluable. Armoured vehicles should not be used as patrols by themselves, but should always be supported by infantry. They are vulnerable in built up areas and their armament is not usually compatible with the principle of minimum force. The use of tracked vehicles, and particularly tanks, is generally inadvisable as their presence may cause public ill feeling. The same does not normally apply to armoured personnel carriers when used in their troop carrying role, nor to light AFVs such as the combat vehicle reconnaissance series. Communications 194. All patrols operating in urban areas should be in radio contact with their HQ. Where this is not possible due to shortage of equipment or bad reception, arrangements should be made for the patrol to report its HQ periodically, or in the event of an incidence, by some other menace, eg.By public telephone or by vehicle. Poor communications can usually be overcome by the use of properly sited VHF rebroadcast stations in a secure location. Police 195. Whenever possible patrols should be accompanied by policeman. He can act as an interpreter and a link between the military forces and the civil population. A policeman should always be present when any building is searched by troops, to prevent accusations of looting by soldiers. A building may be searched without a policeman only when troops are in hot pursuit of a suspected terrorist. Entry to certain buildings such as mosques may be forbidden to British force. The search of such buildings will have to be carried out by police or local military forces. 63 RESTRICTED

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SECTION 19 - CURFEWS

General 196. The following matters should be taken into consideration when planning a curfew; a. Its an effective measure for maintaining control, and is normally imposed for one all of the following reasons. (1) To prevent movement in a selected area while a searched or the investigation of an incident is carried out. (2) To prevent movement for a period of time following serious incidents. (3) To allow tempers to cool after riots. (4) To prevent the movement of terrorist between areas, and disrupt their comer routes. (5) To allow the security forces greater freedom of movement. b. It may be applied as a total measure over a large town, to a particular area, or to a particular part of the community. By varying its from and timing, the insurgent will be kept guessing and his plans may be disrupted. Security of planning is therefore important. c. It should not normally be imposed on punitive grounds, nor should it be applied to impress on the population the inconvenience and hardships which their behaviour warrants. d. To be effective, a curfew must be complete and there must be sufficient troops and police to enforce it. e. It requires careful timing especially in large towns. If timings are wrong the curfew will soon become unworkable. The following factors must therefore be considered; (1) The time that the inhabitants normally yet up, go to and return from work. (2) The timing that shops are normally opened and closed. (3) The time taken to implement the curfew, after the public announcement has been made. f. In general, the population will obey the curfew, but the shortage of food, boredom and a natural desire to go out may eventually cause the curfew to be broken and incidents will then result. Imposition 197. The likely sequence of events is as follows; a. The decision to impose a curfew is made by the civil authorities in consultation with the police and military commanders. b. Plans are made to cover timings, area, boundaries, troops required and administrative arrangement. c. A joint police and military curfew controlled HQ is established, or an existing joint HQ is nominated for the task.

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RESTRICTED d. Local representatives of the police and military make detailed plans, although overt reconnaissance of the area should be avoided. e. Cordon parties, road and static patrols move rapidly in to position. f. The curfew and subsequent control instruction are announced by the appropriate means, e.g., press, radio, siren and police announcements by loud hailer. Helicopters and light aircraft can also be used as voice aircraft to make public announcements. Military Duties 198. The military commander will provided troops for the following purposes; a. Cordons b. Road block if required. c. Static posts and mobile patrols to supplement the police. d. Administrative help required by the civil authorities to maintain essential and public services

Police Duties 199. The police are responsible for; a. Announcing the curfew to the general public. b. The issue of curfew passes. c. Carrying out normal police duties. d. Providing police patrols, to enforce the curfew in conjunction with the military. e. The disposal of all curfew breakers, including any that may be arrested by troops. Method of Operation 200. Area of Curfew. The area must be clearly defined. Where practicable in urban areas, care must be taken to ensure that both sides of the street on the perimeter are included in the area, eg. Houses outside the curfew area should not be overlooked by the perimeter. The curfew areas must if possible be planned and agreed with civil and police authorities beforehand. 201. Patrols. Mobile patrols and statistic posts may be required initially to establish the curfew. If on the other hand authority can be established quickly, or if the curfew is solely to prevent movement of cars and /or cycles, then the number of static posts can be reduced and the curfew maintained mainly by mobile patrols. In towns, statics posts on rooftops/hilltops are necessary in order to watch for any illegal movement between houses and to help covers street patrols. The employment of rooftop /hilltop standing patrols was considered in Section 17. 202. Electronic Aids. Troops may be assisted in enforcing the curfew at night by the use of night observation devices and ground surveillance radars.

Command and Control

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RESTRICTED 203. Control HQ. Normally, the existing joint police/military HQ will maintain and control the curfew throughout the whole period it is in force. The main function of the joint HQ is the co-ordination of any aspect affecting both the military and the police. 204. Control of Visiting Vehicles. When a curfew is imposed over a large area, a number of visiting vehicles will often be checked. A planned system of screening and clearing such traffic must be worked out with the civil police. It must be explained to drivers what restrictions are imposed on their movement within the curfew areas, and that no re-entry to the area will be permitted during the curfew. 205. Curfew Passes .This is a major problem for the civil administration and for the police, who will normally be responsible for the issue of passes. From the time that a curfew is imposed a number of person such as a doctors, nurses and essential workers must be free to move above. A system of passes which can be easily understood by troops, must be devised well in advance by the civil authorities. 206. Curfew Breakers. The action to be taken by troops against curfew breakers must be laid down. Offenders will normally be frisked handed over to the civil police, care being taken to log evidence, if a policeman is not present for production in court when the offender is committed to trail. Administration 207. The civil authorities are responsible for introducing measures to meet administrative difficulties which will arise if a curfew is imposed for a long period, but military help may be required in this respect. The administrative problems which could arise are: a. b. c. d. e. f. g. h. i. j. k. l. . 208-211 Reserved. Lack of water in houses. Shortage of food in shops. The need to purchase essential food daily. Essential food deliveries in areas with no shops. Clearance of refuse from house and streets. Fuel supplies for lighting, cooking and heating houses. Treatment of the sick and maternity cases. Care of animal. Care of corps. Lack of indoor sanitation. Local administration support for isolated police detachments not in police stations. Pavement sleepers

CHAPTER 5

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RESTRICTED CORDON, SEARCH AND SNATCH OPERATION

SECTION 20 - GENERAL

Introduction 212. Cordon and search is normally a joint police and military operation, which has as its aim the capture of wanted persons, arms, ammunition, supplies, explosive or documents. Everyone taking part in the search must be quite clear about the aim which will determine the methods used. 213. Cordon and search operation should be based on good intelligence and should be planned in detail. Everything possible mustve done to maintain secrecy and achieve surprise. Reconnaissance in uniform must be avoided and the plan should be simple and capable of rapid execution. Command and control 214. The size of the area, the relative strength of police and troops and an estimate of whether violent resistance may be encountered, will determine whether a search should be controlled by police or military. A search involving a company or more is best control by military, while it may be preferable for a smaller search to be controlled by the police. Where troops are confined to the cordon and all searching is done by the police, both forces will operate under their own command but a joint HQ will be established. Tasks 215. Searching. The actual searching will normally be carried out by the police with troops in support. 216. Military. The military forces are normally responsible for; a. Providing the cordon. b. Escorting the police searchers. c. Setting up cages. d. Detained suspected. e. Providing helicopter if required and available, to spot movement within cordon area. f. Providing technical assistance for searchers, eg mine detectors, dogs or small parties trained in use of explosive. Police. The police are normally responsible for ; a. Deciding on the area to be searched. b. Carrying out plain clothes reconnaissance. c. Provision of special Branch representatives to evaluate intelligence on the spot. d. Providing any guides required for the cordon troops. e. Warning the inhabitants of the search and curfew imposition, after the cordon is in position. f. Searching the area and arresting suspects. 67 RESTRICTED

217

RESTRICTED g. Screening suspects. h. Traffic control. Difficulties and Possible Disadvantage 218 The difficulties and disadvantages of a large scale cordon and search operation are; a. It is difficult to preserve security. b. It is expensive in man power. c. The search, if thorough and prolonged, may irritate the population and so win further support for the insurgent.

Organization 219 If sufficient troops and police are available, the force should be organized into; a. Inner Cordon Troops. These surround the area to be search to prevent anyone inside from getting out. In the large scale searches it may be necessary to deploy troops within the search area to divide the area into manageable section and to prevent movement between these sections. b. Outer Cordon Troops. If required, these are deployed some distance from the inner cordon, at road block and position covering routes leading to the area, to prevent any attack or interference from outside. c. Search Parties. These usually consist of the police with an escort of troops, who search houses and inhabitants in the selected area. d. Cage Troops. These erect and guard cage for holding person awaiting interrogation. e. Screening teams. These consist of police and informers who identify suspects and wanted person. f. Escort Troops. These escort wanted persons to a place of detention after interrogation. g. Reserve. A reserve of troops should be kept at all levels to deal with the unexpected. It may be necessary to use reserves to; Maintain rooftop/hilltop standing patrol. (2) Deal with any disturbances or unlawful assemblies which occur in cordon area. (3) Enforce a curfew. (4) Operate and protect public address equipment touring the district. (5) Reinforce the cordons and/ or pursue any persons making away from the search area. (6) Provide relief.

(1)

SECTION 21 - CORDON

TECHINIQUES

General 68 RESTRICTED

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220. Normally one cordon only is necessary to achieve the aim in a cordon and search operation. However as indicated in paragraph 219, it may on occasions be Necessary to deploy an outer cordon in the form of road blocks some distance from the inner cordon, to prevent interference with the latter and to prevent people joining the inhabitants of the area being searched 221. The outer cordon can move into position by helicopter, in vehicles or on foot, and can be assisted in its task by light aircraft and helicopters giving warning of any large scale movement towards the isolated area. The outer cordon could be found from an armoured unit. 222. The reminder of this Section is concerned with the development and operation of the inner cordon, referred to hereafter as the cordon (see Figs.16 and 17) Approach 223. General. The aim is to surround an area before the inhabitants realize what is happening. It is sometimes best to move into position direct in helicopters (e.g. on to rooftop) or in vehicles, while on other occasions it may be advisable to deplane or debus some distance away. The decision will depend on the available approaches and exits, and on the local situation. Normally, the quickest way is the best, the approach being by as many different routes as the maintenance of simplicity permits. 224. Timing. Exact time is the most important factor affecting the success of a cordon, and the most difficult to achieve. As far as is possible, the area must be surrounded simultaneously: if this does not happen and some troops are late, an alert suspect will be given an open exist through which he can escape. 225. Movement .The following points should be considered: a. Forward RV. When the approach is made in vehicles there should if possible be a forward RV, So that the commander can retain control for as long as possible. The forward RV is not a debussing point, and dispersal may take place later, but it ensures up to the last possible movement that the convoy remains under control, and that it is not split up by other traffic. The forward RV should be close to, but out of sight and sound of the target area. b. Traffic Control. Civil police will be required at the forward RV to control traffic, so that the convoy achieves a clear run to the target area. The following points should be noted: (1) Just before the convoy is due to move from the forward RV, traffic must be held up at the rear- the rear vehicle will normally be a police vehicle carrying traffic policeman.

(2) If a number of side roads lead into the route selected between the forward RV and the target area, they must be sealed off to prevent civilian 69 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED vehicles infiltrating into the convoy. A traffic police vehicle should travel immediately behind the leading company commanders vehicle. At each intersection police should drop off this vehicle and prevent traffic entering the convoy. These policemen are picked up by the police vehicle at the rear of the convoy. c. Routes. It is normally best to move to the forward RV by one route, as this is the simplest way in which to co-ordinate the simultaneous arrival of the whole convoy, from the forward RV to the objective sufficient routes should be used to ensure that the cordon is established simultaneously. The sub-unit with the furthest distance to travel should move first; Subsequent departures from the forward RV can be on a time basis. Vehicles should not, however, remain in the forward RV for more than two or three minutes, otherwise the advantage of surprise may be lost.

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RESTRICTED A CORDON IN POSITION

Fig 17 d. Security. Surprise will be lost if anyone connected with the operation arrives in the target area before the cordon is in position. Detectives, police searches, etc, should move at the rear of the military convoy, and this must be made clear during the joint planning. 71 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED Dispositions 226. General. A cordon established in darkness must be unbroken, with every man in sight of his neighbour. After daylight, a cordon can be thinned out and maintained by a chain of observation posts of one or two men, with gaps covered by patrols. Normally, it will be impossible to maintain a continuous cordon for any length of time, owing to the large number of troops require. If possible troops should use wire to help maintain their line, and under some circumstances it may be advisable to dig in and take advantage of natural cover. 227. Estimate of Troops Required. A cordon of 100 meters in a built up area will require nearly 30 men, or approximately one platoon. Men of company HQ may also be required to guard any captured suspect and company transport. The following may be used as a guide: a. Cordon facing inwards, 15 men per 100 meters. b. Facing outwards and watching opposite rooftops/windows, an additional five men per 100 meters. c. Facing inwards and watching rooftop/windows above the cordon, an additional five men per 100 meters. d. To cover any side roads or alleys leading into the area, an additional one or two men per 100 meters. e. Number may be reduced in an area with large modern buildings. 228. Sitting of Cordon. A cordon should not be on the inner kerb of the road, but as far back as possible to gain a field of view. If strengths permit, two man patrols should move behind the cordon in each sector to act as pursuit parties should anyone break through. 229. Thinning the Cordon. The cordon may have to remain in position for long periods. The length of time depending on the number of buildings, size of the area, the strength of the police available for searching and the destiny of the community. To thin out the cordon the following action should be taken: a. Once escape routes have been wired off, sentries should be sited tactically, on rooftops, etc if available. b. Sentries should be sited in pairs and in depth, and where possible should be in shade by day. They require, good all round observation to get warning of any attempt at break out. They should be found from one sub-unit where possible. c. When thinning out the cordon, sections should be removed complete; they can then be rested close at hand and from a tactical reserve (see Paragraph 237). Battle procedure 230. General. Practice and rehearsal of cordon technique is essential. A suggested from of battle procedure for a planned battalion operation is outlined in paragraphs 231-233. Whatever the size of the operation every man must know his task. As in all other similar operations, smartness and alertness, coupled with a determined attitude in every individual will go a long way to ensuring success.

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RESTRICTED 231. Maps and Enlargement. For the briefing the intelligence officer should produce an enlargement showing measurements and distances marked on each side of the perimeter, and a blackboard diagram of the area, plus air photographs if available. Company commanders, and later even platoon commanders, can study the blackboard diagram and air photographs while waiting for their orders. 232. Orders. Orders must include details about: a. Roads or open spaces forming the perimeter of the target. b. Location and time of RV for military /police commanders. This is quite separate from the forward RV and is normally at a police station. c. Assembly area for company main bodies, normally near to the police station where the briefing takes place. d. Routes to the assembly area and from the assembly area to the forward RV. e. Order of March. f. Time cordon to be in position. g. Orders for the apprehension of cordon breakers h. Search party organization and detailed. i. Company areas of responsibility on the perimeter. j. Battalion/company cages. k. Deception measures. Company and Platoon Commanders Orders. The following point should be a. After the battalion O group, company commanders will give out their orders to their platoon commanders who should by now have studied the diagram and air Photographs of the area. b. The platoon commanders then give their orders in the form of a briefing to the whole platoon including their drivers. Platoon commanders can enlarge their diagram on a blackboard, pavement, road, or canopy of a vehicle. c. Every soldier must understand the outline plan and his part in the operation before he embosses. There is no time, even for last minute orders, on arrival at the debussing points, not is it advisable to try to give them out en route. Action in cordon area 234. Debussing/ Deplaning and Development. As soon as troops leave the forward RV surprise is lost. Speed in identifying the target area and in deployment is therefore essential. To achieve this following sequence of action should take place: a. In the case of a vehicle approach, each company commander should travel about 30 meters in front of his column with a police guide if one is available. The company commander then has time to confirm the correct spot for all to debus, Or from which to direct his platoons to their debussing points in then sectors of the cordon. In the case of a helicopter approach the company commander should travel in the first helicopter. b. From now on crash action is required. Platoon commanders should quickly indicate the position of sections. Section commanders, without a pause, should lead their sections and double to the areas allotted. c. On arrival at section areas, troops fix bayonets and adopt the on guard position facing their individual areas of responsibility. The platoon commander 73 RESTRICTED

233. noted:

RESTRICTED will quickly confirm that the troops are deployed, and he or platoon sergeant will co-ordinate areas of observation. 235. Action after Deployment. The following is the full sequence of events, which may have to be varied for particular operations according to the circumstances: a. Checking the Cordon. The cordon commander must make an immediate, check of the area and personally ensure that the perimeter cordon is complete. Roads or alleys and open spaces which are likely escape routes should be sealed off with wire but must remain under observation by sentries. When the troops have been on guard for five minutes, the cordon commander may feel that the full physiological effect has been achieved, and a more relaxed but still alert position may be adopted. b. Instructions to the Public. Once the cordon is in position, the police should warn inhabitants that a curfew is in force, and tell them what to do if they wish to enter or leave the area. This is a police matter, but the military commander must tell the police where he wishes the cordon entry/ exit point to be sited. c. Challenging. If anyone in the cordon sees a suspect approaching he should shout on guard, all those in his sector come into this position and pass on the warning order verbally. d. Company cages. At this stage, company commanders should site their own temporary cages, where suspects can be held until escort can be spared to take them to the main cage for interrogation. 236. Communications. The various sectors of the cordon must be in radio contact with the controlling HQ. 237. Reserve and Rest Area. An area should be selected where reserves can rest. It should be outside the target area, but near enough for the reserve to be able be act quickly and immediately occupy alarm positions in the event of a break out or other disturbances likely to destruct the cordon. The sitting of these alarms positions in open housing estates is relatively simple, but in built-up areas it is much more difficult and they will be required much closer to the cordon. Isolating an Area from, External Telephone Communication 238. The enemy may make use of telephone circuits and remote exchanges for passing information. When a large area is to be searched the following actions may have to be taken with the concurrence of the local security communities. a. Telephone Exchanges. All manually operated exchanges in the area concerned should be occupied by troops with an interpreter. Operators should be instructed to inform subscribers who attempt to make calls that the service has been discontinued temporally. b. Telephone lines. All telephone lines in the areas concerned should be made ineffective. This can be done by royal signals technicians isolating the circuits at the exchange or at a distribution point. If this assistance is not available or where time does not permit, the wires can be short circuited and earthed at a point along the route, as described in Annex C paragraph 11. An obvious disconnection of lines in one area may be used as a cover plan for operations elsewhere.

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RESTRICTED c. Co-ordination. The time factor is important and the disconnection of lines should be synchronized with the occupation of exchanges. Security will prohibit any prior warning being given to civilian subscribers.
SECTION 22

- SEARCH TECHNIQUES

Announcements to the Public 239. As soon as the cordon is established the police will inform the community by loud hailer, or by other practicable means, that: a. b. The area is about to be searched. A house curfew is in force and that everyone must remain indoors.

Search parties 240. Each search party should consist of at least one policeman and a protective military escort. The escorts task is to guard the police searches and prevent anyone escaping. Ideally each search party should also include a trained woman searcher to search women and detect men disguised as women. Searching of women 241. In no circumstances must women be exempt from search, and if there is a shortage of women searchers all women must be concentrated in one place to make the best use of available searchers. If civilian women searchers are not available, selected dependants or members of the womens Service must be used. Methods 242. The police will normally carry out the search and give all the necessary orders to the civilians involved. However, if no police are available the following drill should be adopted. a. Vehicles. The procedure for searching vehicles is given in Chapter 4, paragraph 161 and Annex S. b. Persons. The drill for searching individuals is given in chapter 4, paragraph 162. c. Buildings. The following point should be noted: (1). All occupants should remain in their rooms while the rooms are been searched (see Annex A paragraph 30 d and c). Individuals should be personally searched first and then be present while their rooms are searched. Any discoveries and the subsequent action of the occupants should be carefully recorded for future evidences. (2). Buildings are best searched from top to bottom. Arms and ammunition may be hidden anywhere, particularly in such places as behind walls, under floors, in cattle stalls, down wells and amongst clothing. A description of hides and arms caches is given in Chapter 1 paragraph 15f. When carrying out a search imagination is needed, but effort must be made to avoid unnecessary damage. Main detectors are invaluable for arms detection.

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RESTRICTED (3). When a house has been search it must be marked accordingly. It may be necessary to get house owners to sign a certificate stating that they have no loss or damage during the search. (4) Pearson awaiting search must not be allowed to move into a building which has already been searched. This can be prevented by the inner cordon closing in to exclude from the isolated area the houses that have been searched. Cages 243. The military are responsible for erecting and guarding any cages required buildings may be used as part of the cage complex. If in the open, cages should be sited in the shade and on the ground free from stones. If no shade is available, tents should be erected for women and young children, and if the search is to be prolonged arrangements must be made for food and water. Adequate latrines must be provided for males and females and the latrines should be searched at the end of the operation. A suggested cage layout is shown in fig. 18. DIAGRAM OF A CAGE LAYOUT FOR SCREENING

Unscreened men

Unscreened women

Tent for screening team

Screened Men Screened Women Wanted Women

Wanted Men

NB: The cage staff should include a doctor and an interpreter. Children must not be regarded automatically as being innocent, since they may have been trained to be hostile by parents and teachers, if under 12 years of age they should be kept with the women. If suitable buildings which will provide the above facilities are available, they can be used.

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Screening Teams 244. The two types of searching are: a. Low Level. This is done at the cage in the search area and aims to climinate persons of good character and to pick out suspect for higher level screening at the central cage. This screening should be done by local police or representatives of Special Branch. b. High Level. This is done by police at the central cage. Their task is to interrogate all suspected persons picked out during the search and to decide who should be detained. Although this screening is the responsibility of the police, troops will have to escort suspected persons to the central cage and keep them under observation, while they wait their turn for interrogation. During this period it is important that the suspected persons are prevented from communicating with other persons or disposing of incriminating papers. The collection of document and issue of detention certificates for suspected persons are the tasks of the police. Escort Troops 245. Wanted persons must be evacuated as soon as possible after screening has been completed. Troops may be required to do this and if so escort parties with transport must be detailed in advance. Vehicles used to carry wanted persons should have a wired off compartment to make it impossible for them to jump out, and to segregate them from their guards.
SECTION 23

- SNATCH OPERATIONs

Aim 246. When accurate information is gained on a wanted individuals whereabouts, his capture should be carried out by an organized snatch party. Composition of snatch parties 247. Snatch parties consist of specially selected and trained groups with a high officer and NCO content. They should be trained in coup de main operations, and may require a special allocation of vehicles and other equipment, e.g. ladders, sledgehammers, etc. At least one officer or NCO should be able to speak the local language. Each major unit should train a number of these groups to ensure that at least one is available at all times. Planning 248. A snatch needs most careful planning and rehearsal to ensure that the approach is undetected. Several methods can be used to obtain surprise, such as the employment of civilian vehicles or helicopters. Detailed arrangements are required for follow-up action should the operation prove successful, and for the immediate interrogation and handling of the captured person. 77 RESTRICTED

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Method 249. Two parties should be organized for an operation. The first consists of a Special Branch representative to organize the subject, and a few selected soldiers to provide firepower and carry out the snatch. The other party forms a close cordon to prevent escape, and to make the area of the snatch secure from outside interference. A subsequent search of the area may also be necessary.

Annex A THE LAW AND MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES 78 RESTRICTED

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INTRODUCTION Aim 1. The aim of this Annex is to help a member of the armed forces to understand his responsibilities when he has to assist civil authorities. It explains in outline the basic principles of English law, knowledge of which will help a member of the armed forces to understand local law in overseas territories. Knowledge of Local Law 2. Overseas, a member of the armed forces may have rights and duties which differ from those which he has in England. He must be fully briefed on any difference between local and English law and the effect of these differences on such subjects as the legal procedure for dealing with unlawful assemblies and riots, the degree of force permitted and powers of arrest. Military commanders overseas will, with the assistance of the local authorities and the Army Legal Services, frame written instructions regarding the duties of military personnel when helping the civil authorities. Both service and civil authorities must know who has authority to ask for help from the armed forces. BASIC PRINCEPLES OF ENGLISH LAW Duties of Members of the Armed Forces as Citizens 3. A member of the armed forces has the same rights and duties as an ordinary citizen, when dealing with crime or helping the civil authorities. Responsibility of Civil Authorities 4. The primary responsibility for preserving and restoring law and order rests with the civil authorities who may call upon any citizen, including a member of the armed forces, to help them. Service Responsibilities 5. A member of the armed forces must: a. Respond to a request for help by the civil authorities b. Uses the minimum force necessary to achieve the immediate aim when enforcing law and order. 6. A commander who has been asked to help the civil authorities must do so, unless he knows of facts which make him consider that intervention by the armed force is necessary. Even if he has not been asked to help, it will be his duty to intervene if it is clear that such intervention is necessary to prevent disorder and the commission of offences. It follows, that if he does not know all the circumstances, he must arrange for forces to be moved close to the scene, but these forces should not take any action until order by him to do so. If there is time he should go, or send a representative, to find out what is happening, and if he considers that the civil authorities are mistaken in thinking that it is necessary for the armed forces to

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RESTRICTED intervene, he will be justified in refusing their request for help: indeed, it is his duty to refuse in such circumstances. 7. A request for help from the civil authorities to the military may be made orally or in writing. It is, however, desirable that such a request should be made in writing, as this will make it easier for a military commander subsequently to prove that the civil authorities asked for his help. A written request might take that the following form: To OC troops I have come to the conclusion that the civil authorities are unable to control the situation and that the assistance of the military has become necessary. I accordingly request such assistance. Place.. Date... Time Signature Appointment Use of Force- Commanders Responsibility 8. A commander, irrespective of his rank, is solely responsible for deciding what action the armed forces under his command are to take, e.g., what degree of force in any they are use in the circumstances. In making his appreciation and deciding upon his plan to help the civil authorities, he will be guided by the principles referred to in Chapter 1, Section 2. 9. The civil authorities are assumed to have no knowledge of weapons and their effects, and are not the best judges of the degree of force which the armed forces must use to achieve their immediate aim. 10. Commander must carefully consider whether to order his force to fire without a request from the civil authorities, and whether to refuse to fire if asked by them to do so. It is his judgment of the immediate circumstances which alone will determine whether fire should or should not be open. IF A COMMANDER ACTS WITHIN THE LAW, IN GOOD FAITH AND THE ACTION WHICH HE TAKES IS NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE HIS IMMEDIATE AIM, OR THERE ARE RESPONSIBLE GROUNDS FOR BELIEVING IT TO NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE THAT AIM, HE NEED NOT FEAR THE RESULT OF ANY INQUIRY INTO HIS CONDUCT. 11. Depending on the circumstances, the minimum force necessary to restore law and order can vary from the mere appearance of troops, to the use of all the force at a commanders disposal. 12. A commander must not exceed his duty in one instance, or at one place, because it is his personal opinion that his action will have a good effect in another instance or at another place. 13. Disorders and offences which are clearly not of a serious nature should never be suppressed or prevented by the use of fire-arms. Where, however, serious disorder of offences can be suppressed or prevented only by the extreme measure of resorting to the use 80 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED of fire-arms special are must be taken to restrict the use of such fire-arms to the minimum necessary to achieve the immediate aim. For example, if automatic weapons capable of firing single shots are being used and single shots only are necessary to restore law and order, the firing of bursts will not be justified. Where a commander decides that he has no alternative expect to resort to the use of fire-arms he must, where possible, give warning of this intention, since the warning may of itself prove sufficient to restore order and the use of firearms may then be avoided. Prevention of Crime 14. Any person may use such force as if responsible in the circumstance to prevent the commission of a crime. Only in the case of crimes of violence involving an immediate threat to life, such as murder or arson, could actually killing the wrongdoer be considered reasonable force and then only if there was no other way of preventing the wrongdoer carrying out his design. 15. Forces engaged in protective or defensive duties, e.g., a sentry, guard, piquet or patrol may if it is essential to do so use forces and even in the last restore lethal force, in the execution of their specific duty to protect or defend, in particular as follow: a. In preventive Action. To prevent. (1) Other bodies of the armed forces from being attacked. (2) The capture of or damage to buildings, vehicles, aircrafts or equipment in charge of the armed force. (3) Damage to or interference with VPs such as communication centres, railways and canals which they are protecting. b. In Self Defence. 16. In accordance with the general rule, however, no more force must be used than is necessary to achieve the immediate aim. Self Defence 17. A member of the armed forces, like an ordinary citizen, may use forces in self defence providing the makes every effort to avoid its use and in any event he must not use more force than is no other way of avoiding an immediate risk of losing his life or receiving serious bodiely injuries. A person who uses fire-arms in self defence must be prepared to justify his action strictly on the above basis. Unlawful Assembly 18. An unlawful assembly consists of three or more persons who are assembled together and intend to commit a crime by open force or to carry out a common purpose, whether lawful or unlawful, in such a way that firm and courageous persons near the assembly have responsible ground for thinking that a breach of the peace may result. The commission of act violence by one more of the assembly is not make the assembly unlawful. It will be unlawful, if its character and the circumstances are calculated to alarm a person of reasonable firmness and courage.

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RESTRICTED 19. An unlawful assembly may be dispersed although it has committed no act of violence. The civil authorities have power to command the person forming the assembly to go away, to arrest them if they do not go and to stop others form joining them. If the civil authorities are resisted they may use such force as will compel obedience, but it would be very unwise of them to use force which would harm or injure a person who was resisting, unless that person himself makes an attack inflicting or calculated to inflict grievous personal injury. Riot 20. A riot is a tumultuous disturbance of the peace by three or more persons who are assembled together without lawful authority and with the intention of mutually helping one another, by force if necessary, against anyone opposing them in caring out an enterprise of a privet nature, and who actually begin to carry out that enterprise in a violent and turbulent manner which terrifies other people. It is immaterial whether the act done is unlawful or not, but there must be an act. The doing of an act which is calculated to terrify people is punishable whether the act is lawful or not. When the aim of an assembly is lawful, the evidence that terror was caused must be stronger than would otherwise be the case. 21. Civil authorities are required by law to do all they can to suppress a riot. If a mob is committing, or is obviously about to commit some outrage calculated to endanger life or property, the authorities may at once use such force as is necessary to disperse the mob. Firearms, however, ought not to be employed against the rioters unless they are armed and in a position to inflict grievous injury or the person trying to disperse them, or are committing or are about to commit some outrage which can only be stopped by the use of fire-arms. 22. It will sometimes be impossible to arrest individuals without using fire-arms, but opening fire on a mob can be justified only by the need of self protection or because the forces at the disposal of the authorities are so small that some violent outrage such as burning a building, breaking open a prison or attacking a barracks, cant otherwise be prevented. 23. Details of the methods of suppressing unlawful assemblies and riots are given in chapter 3 Insurrection 24. An insurrection savours of high treason and consists of some enterprise of a general and public nature which is being carried out in defiance of the government of the country. 25. The existence of an armed insurrection or rebellion will justify the use of any degree of force necessary to suppress it. What is said in paragraph 21 above about the duty of suppressing riots applies still more strongly to insurrections or riots which border on rebellion. Fire-arms may be used as soon as the intention of the insurgents to carry out their purpose by force of arms is shown by open acts of violence, and it is apparent that the immediate use of fire-arms is essential. Application of Basic Principles

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RESTRICTED 26. The answer to the question, For what purpose has the mob come together? will help the civil authorities and a commander to decide what force, if any, is necessary to maintain law and order and when to use it. Some examples are given bellow. a. A mob assembles to remove an obstacle across a footpath which has been obstructed illegally or with doubtful legality. Their proceedings may be disorderly but their purpose may be legal. They will probably disperse after moving the obstacle, and normally it is better not to use force to disperse such a mob. Participants should however be identified in case they are later charged. b. A meeting or procession assembles in order to further a parliamentary reform or, someother political aim which involves neither the rebellion against established authority nor any intention to enforce its aims by violence. Excitement may prompts the meeting or procession to some outage, but, so long ago as it commits no act of violence, it should be interfered with as possible and no exhibition of force should be made until some violent crime has been or is about to be committed. c. Where a mob shows clearly that it intends to destroy a factory or other property of an unpopular owner, and arms itself with weapons to break down doors and shows a settled intention to carry out its aim, its intent is criminal and it should be warned of the danger it will incur if it attempts to carry out its aim. The necessary measures should be taken to prevent the mob carrying out its aim. These may include the arrest of ringleaders. If civil authorities are in danger of being overpowered, force should stand by but should not be committed unless there is an immediate need to protect life and property by armed force. Although it may be wise to have forces standing by within easy distance, and an actual display of armed force may, in certain circumstances, provoke a mob and do more harm than good. Armed forces (at any rate when uncounted) can in practice seldom intervene effectively without using firearms and running the risk of killing and wounding a number of innocent or comparatively innocent persons. However, a mob which declares openly that it proposes to attack the constituted authorities and which consists by wholly or partly of armed persons, or which attempts to size an arsenal for the purpose of getting arms, cannot be dealt with too quickly. References in the Manual of military law 27. The account of the law given in this chapter is sufficient for all practical purposes. However, all officers should read the following extracts from the manual of military law, 1965: a. Part II; Section V-Employment of troops in Aid of the civil power. b. Part I (11th Edition) Chapter VI. Para II (Responsibility for the use of force) Para 13 (Arrest) Para 16 (Self defence) Para 17 (Prevention of crime) c. Part I (11th Edition) Chapter I Paras 9-12 (Martial Law and Emergency Legislation) STATE OF EMERGENCY

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RESTRICTED Legislation 28. When an emergency arises which cannot be dealt with by the civil authorities under the ordinary law, even with the aid of the armed forces, emergency legislation may be passed or brought in to force giving the authorities special powers. Restrictions are permitted which, in the absence of such legislation, would be considered unjustified infringements on the liberty of the individual, and punishment for offences is often increased. For example, the death penalty may be imposed for carrying arms. Such legislation is introduced for limited purposes and is subject to review. Examples of increased powers which may be conferred to the civil authorities are as followed. a. b. c. d. To impose a curfew. To search without a warrant. To detain a person without trial. To declare and special and prohibited areas. EVIDENCE General 29. The investigation and prosecution of offences is a police responsibility. Commanders can however, help by ensuring that the chain of evidence is maintained in any action involving the military. Adequate evidence against offenders must be correctly presented. The following are examples of the types of evidence required by police; a. Dead Bodies. It is not sufficient merely to deliver the dead body merely to the police they must be told of the circumstances of death including time, place and cause, and given means of identification (if possible) and names of independent witnesses. b. Prisoners. When handing over prisoners, statements must indicate where they were arrested, the reason for their arrest and give the full circumstances surrounding the case. The evidence of the person actually making the arrest is vital and he must be able subsequently to identify the accused. If possible therefore a photograph should be taken of the captor and his prisoner which will support any evidence which may be given later in court. Independent witnesses to the activities of the accused should be obtained where possible. c. Use of Dye. This is a useful method of identification when making large scale arrests. Considerable preparation is involved in the use of these different dyes. Records must be made of their composition. Samples lodged with the government chemist and records kept off to whom they were issued and where and when they are used. This is essential to rebut the defence that discoloration was caused by any other means. d. Conduct of Searches. Although a search is preliminary a police responsibility, there may be occasions when soldiers conduct one. In such a case, householders should be present and occupants should be in their rooms when the search is carried out. If the objects which are being looked for are found, it is necessary to establish 84 RESTRICTED

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RESTRICTED beyond reasonable doubt that the occupant was aware that the articles were there, and that there had been no possibility of other persons putting them there in his or her absence. When conducting a search, therefore, the reason for it should always be made known to the occupant and his or her reply recorded. If he or she denies the presence of persons or things subsequently found, this may help to establish his or her guilty knowledge. e. Identification of Exhibits. A chain of identification must be maintained for exhibits required as evidence at a trial. The best example is a weapon found during a search or raid, and the chain of identification should be as follows. (1) The actual finder should hand in the weapon to the receiving station, care being taken not to erase fingerprints. (2) The weapon should then be labelled and signed for both by the finder and the receiver. (3) The receiving station, which is normally organized by the police, must then hand over the weapon direct to the police investigation officer. (4) In the subsequent proceedings, the finder must be able to identify the exhibit, state exactly where he found it and in what circumstances, and also identify the person to whom he handed it over. Annex B DETECTION AND DISPOSAL OF ENEMY BOOBY TRAPS AND EXPLOSIVES DEVICES (See Chapter I Section 3) Clearance 1. In internal security operations, booby traps or explosives devises may often be used to hinder the security forces, or to endanger the general community. 2. When such devices are discovered, they must be reported immediately to unit or formation HQ and to the police. 3. Clearance must be by the fastest means, with the objects of allowing operations to proceed with the minimum delay. If the immediate operational situation may it necessary these devices should be cleared, but only by qualified personnel, eg, infantry assault pioneers or engineers. 4. In cases where the presence of a device is not impeding operations, it is desirable that clearance should be carried out by RAOC ammunitions technicians, in order to; a. Obtain information on how the device is operated, with a view to disseminating this information to all security forces engaged on operations. b. Obtain evidence of construction of the device, which may later be required to support police prosecutions. 5. If numbers of devices discovered, even though there are not impeding operations, it may be necessary for clearance to be carried out by qualified personnel of any arm or service. A decision on this matter must be taken by the local commander at the time. Capabilities 85 RESTRICTED

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6. In deciding who should carry out clearance and disarming of devices, commanders should bear in mind the capabilities of the various arms and services which are summarized below; a. Royal engineers and infantry assault pioneers are trained in the clearance and disarming of mines and booby traps, and in the use of explosives. b. RAOC ammunition technical officers and ammunition technicians experts in all matters concerning ammunition and explosives, including disarm and dismantling of explosives devices. c. All arms are responsible for maintaining in each unit, detachments trained in the detection and clearance of booby traps, for the immediate protection of the unit. d. In the Royal navy specialists will normally b found in the larger ships which are competent to deal with the clearance of explosives devices. The assault engineer troop in a Royal Marine Commando is trained in clearance and disarming of mines and booby traps, and in the use of explosives. e. The RAF employ specialist terms for bomb disposal both in the UK and overseas. Co-operation 7. All military forces must co-operate closely with the police, local authorities and intelligence services. The speedy dissemination of information will reduce the risk of death or injury when similar booby traps or devices are subsequently discovered. In prolonged operations a joint cell may be necessary in joint police/military HQ to co-ordinate action and disseminate information speedily. Annex C COMMUNICATIONS (Sec Chapter I Section 3) General 1. A joint communication system is required so that formations, units and the police in keep in touch. Operational communications must be duplicated by using radio and line whenever possible. 2. In certain overseas dependencies the army has installed civilian pattern VHF radios in static locations and in vehicles specifically for disaster and/or internal security operations. These radios provide an alternative means to existing line communications and are often interoperable with those of the civilian police. Where military and police radios are not interoperable it will usually be necessary for the army to station liaison detachments with the police, or to loan equipment for the police to operate on a joint net. Liaison 3. Close liaison between the military, police and civil authorities must be maintained in all levels. The Royal Navy and Royal Air Force may require assistance from the army in the

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RESTRICTED provision of communications. An efficient system of passing signal traffic between army and police radio station is essential, eg, a joint message form must be used. 4. The senior signal officer must liaise with the senior telecommunication official, and special branch advice must be obtained, concerning the reliability of civil employees before the latter are consulted on internal security matters. A joint civil/military communications community may be necessary. 5. Is the civil postal service is slow, uncertain or insecure, the army should offer its own facilities for the carriage of important civil documents. Means of Communication 6. Radio. a. When radios that are interoperable with those of the police have not been installed for internal security operations, an increased scale of military sets may be required together with an adequate reserve of operators, radios and spares. b. Commanders should be aware of the limitations of VHF radio when in built up areas. It may be necessary to deploy rebroadcast stations at high points so that communications may be maintained to all areas. These rebroadcast sites may need a guard and special resupply arrangements. c. When a joint military/police net is working, a mutually acceptable procedure must be agreed. d. It should be remembered that the police will not normally have access to codes, whereas the army may find SLIDEX essential when dealing with plans for future operations. Line. The following points must be noted; a. Linemen will seldom be available in sufficient numbers to supply their own protection. Escorts are essential, particularly for repair parties working in remote areas and liable to ambush. b. An alternative means of communications, normally radio, must be immediately available and must therefore either be tested regularly, say hourly, or remain on continuous listening watch. c. Royal signal officers should familiarize themselves with the exchange and telephone system in readiness for any withdrawal of civil labour. 8. Dispatch Riders. These should not normally be used as they are easily ambushed. When used they must operate in pairs and be mounted in vehicles not on motor cycles. Regular routes and timings must be avoided. The use of helicopters and light aircraft for SDS will often be the only acceptable method. Maximum use must be made of all visitors and liaison officers to lighten the burden on SDS. 9. Maintenance of Equipment. The increased use of radio will heavily load the repair and maintenance facilities and reinforcements may be necessary. Mobile generating sets should be duplicated at every site and regularly maintained. Main rectifiers should, where possible, be issued to all units, but a generator will always be required as an alternative any civil main power source. 87 RESTRICTED

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RESTRICTED Ground/Air Communication 10. There is specific need for formations and units, down to platoon or even section level and on occasions, police to be able to communicate with any aircraft supporting ground forces in internal security operations in urban areas. There will also be occasions when one aircraft may be used either as an airborne command post or to rely messages from one ground station to another, or to act temporary as a radio rebroadcast station. It is therefore important for the senior signal officer to bear in mind the radio fit of all aircraft likely to be used in support of internal security operations. Security 11. The following aspects of security are important; a. Rules for voice procedure must be strictly adhered to all times. On authorized voice codes and appointment titles must be used. Past experience has shown that internal security operations the enemy is fully capable of monitoring voice radio nets; in fact he would be stupid not to do so. b. Telephone systems with radio relay back-up, and with channels allotted to Teleprompters, offer some security, provided exchanges are inaccessible to saboteurs. Ciphers provide a high degree of security if the delay is acceptable. c. The senior signal officer should be informed when clandestine methods, such as the tapping of telephones, are required to obtain information about the enemy. d. The method of isolating an area from external telephone communication is described in chapter 5, in connection with cordon and search operations. The wrap method of disconnecting overhead telephone lines is as illustrated. THE WRAP METHOD OF DISCONNECTING OVERHEAD TELEPHONE LINES (See paragraph 238) 1. A wrap

2.

Application of wrap

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3.

Lines wrapped

Civilian Radio 12. The senior signal officer must ensure that civilian radio transmissions do not interfere with the security forces radio nets. 13. The main transmitting station of the local radio service will always be a vulnerable point, and it may be necessary for a Royal Signal officer, covertly, to familiarize himself with the equipment in readiness for any withdrawal of civil labour. Annex D SPECIMEN HEADINGS FOR A MILITARY LOCAL SECURITY SCHEME (See Chapter 2 Section 5) Note: The headings given below are a guide to be adapted to meet the local situation. Situation 1. Political Situation. An outline summary from intelligence reports and news papers

2. Areas Likely to be effected by Disturbances. An up-to-date appreciation of the situation in catch area 3. Civil Administration and Police. a. Outline organization of civil administration and police at appropriate level. b. Brief details of civilian and police emergency plans. c. Civil official authorized to call on the military for assistance. Ordinances Relating to Internal Disturbances.

4.

5. Security Zones. Sub-division of area of responsibility into zones, to concide, if possible with civil/police sub-divisions.

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RESTRICTED Mission 6. (For example To maintain law and order in)

Execution 7. 8. General Outline. Including outline dispositions Military Forces. a. Grouping. b. Tasks. c. Reserves. Local Military Forces. (May be included in paragraph 8) Naval Forces. Air Forces. Civil Police

9. 10. 11. 12. 13.

Co-ordination a. States of Readiness. Action to be taken at each stage to be defined under; (1) Preparatory The types and number of stages will depend on (2) Precautionary the local situation (3) Emergency b. Use of Force. Including use of riot control agents c. Vulnerable Points. (1) List of civilian and military VPS (2) List of key points which must be guarded. (3) Responsibility of the civil/police/military for guarding key points. (4) Reconnaissance. d. Movement between Zones. e. Curfew Passes. f. Announcement to the Public. g. Precautionary Measures for Service Families, Dependents and MOD Civilians. This may be included in sub-para above. h. Preparation of local security schemes. Service Support 14. 15. 16. Supplies. Including details of reserves to be held by units and sub-units POL. Including details of reserves to be carried by vehicles. Water.

17. Transport. Including plans or requisitioning transport should such a measure become necessary.

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RESTRICTED 18. Accommodation. a. Plans for accommodating service family in an emergency. b. Plans for accommodating troops on protected operations away from their barracks. Medical. a. Military. b. Civilian. Reinforcements. Plans for reception and accommodation

19.

20.

Command and Signal 21. Signal. a. Detailed signal instruction, as an annex, to cover radio, line and civilian communication, call signs, security codes, SDS, etc. b. Duplication of civilian/military lines of communication by the military.

22. Code Words and Nick Names. Comprehensive list to indicate each state of readiness, varying degrees of tension, place names, etc Annex E VEHICLE MODIFICATIONS (See Chapter 2 and 3) A. Vehicles 1. Wire Bound Poles. Wooden poles 12 to 20 feet long, at least 6 inches in diameter and wound copiously with barbered wire can be mounted on the front of light tracked or wheeled A. vehicles for the clearing of large crowds in open spaces. Vehicles should be used in echelon, but where this is impracticable the sides and rear of the vehicle can be protected by barbered wire or by electrification. 2. Bullet Proof Skirt or Wheeled A. Vehicles. Wheeled A. vehicles can be fitted with a bullet-proof skirt at the rear to protect troops sheltering behind them from a crowd which has opened fire. The skirt prevents ricochets from the metalled surface of the road. 3. Electrified Vehicles. Wheeled A. vehicles can be electrified as a described in paragraphs 9 to 12 below, and metal dozer bars similarly electrified can be fitted to the front and rear of the vehicle. B. Vehicles 4. Mine Plates. Where mined are liable to be encountered, B. vehicles may be fitted with mine plates kits. The principle is to design is to afford protection to the crew rather than to the vehicle. When such kits are fitted, a reduction in the effective pay load may have to be accepted (See Fig. 4 (d) )

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RESTRICTED 5. Internal Security Kits. These consist of sturdy wire-mesh guards and can be fitted to B. vehicles. They are intended to give protection to passengers and crew form the missiles, bombs and grenades (See Figs. 4a and 4c) 6. Wire Cutters. This consists of the long angle iron picket mounted vertically on the front of the vehicle. IT is design to cut wires stretched across the road (See fig. 4b) 7. Details. Detailed information of the above aids may be obtained through DS technical channels. Use of Fire Fighting Equipment 8. Use can be made of fire pumps and tenders for crows dispersal, and certain fire extinguishers can be converted for spraying dye or irritant fluids. ELECTRIFICATION OF WHEELED A. VEHICLES Method 9. The frame work of pushing bar of a vehicle, with a 24-volt DC LT system, is charged to high voltage above ground potential, thus giving a strong electric shock to any person standing on the ground and on in contact with the vehicle or bar. The current must be limited to a safe value, so that it will neither prove fatal, nor cause serious or permanent injury. ELECTRIFICATION OF WHEELED A. VEHICLES WIRING DIAGRAM

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RESTRICTED Description 10. The modification consists of a centurion booster coil, wire carthing chain, and a 2-pint water can with tap and rubber tubing. The booster coil is mounted by means of a bracket next to the switch. The existing cable harness clips are used to carry the high tension lead and tubing to the rear of the vehicle, where they are passed through the rear drain hole in the hull. The high tension lead and earting chains are insulated from vehicle at this point. A switch can be left permanently on is required. The wiring diagram is shown opposite. Operation 11. To obtain a good electrical shock in the summer on the dry stony ground, the following procedure should be adopted. a. b. Open the water tap for approximately 15 seconds. Switch on.

12. An even greater effect can be produced, if the small amount of the paint on the vehicle is scarped off at any point at which person is likely to grasp the vehicle or pushing bar. The force of the shock will be much reduced if a crowd is pressing round the vehicle. The device is not therefore, suitable for crowd control vehicles. It should be used to deter the individual for climbing on to a vehicle. The Prodder 13. An alternative device is to carry the HT output to a radio aerial fitted with an insulated handle. The vehicle commander can prod anyone impeding his progress, particularly people lying down in his path.

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RESTRICTED Annex F SAFETY PRECAUTIONS AGAINST ACCIDENTAL DISCHARGES (See Chapter 2 Section 6) 1. It is the duty of every officer and NCO to ensure that unnecessary waste of life does not occur through the accidental discharge of weapons: safe handling of weapons is an important part of training, and a matter which requires constant attention when troops are engaged on internal security operations. The following safety stages, applicable to all men engaged on such operations such who are armed with SLRs, GPMGs and SMGs, are set out as a guide. Stage I Action a. Breech empty working parts forward b. Safety catch applied (Not applicable to GPMG). c. Full ,magazine in pouch/pocket As for stage I but full magazine on weapon. a. Action cooked. b. Safety catch applied. c. Full magazine on weapon. As for stage III but safety catch off. Where Applicable In unit lines or in an area where incidents are unlikely to occur

II

III

IV

Travelling in vehicles in an area where incidents are likely to occur. (Nominated sentries should adopt Stage III) On entering an area on foot where incidents are likely to occur. This stage also applies to nominated vehicle sentries. When preparing to engage the enemy.

2. Weapons must be cleared before men return to unit lines, and then inspected by the officer or NCO. Weapons are normally returned to armouries when troops are in camp, but there may be occasions when all troops, or a proportion of troops on immediate standby, are required to be armed at all times. 3. Many accidents, occur when reverting form stage III to II and from II to I, ie., when embossing, travelling, or debussing or return from an operation in transport. It is important that as a drill, weapons are cleared and inspected by an officer or NCO before embussing. If it is necessary then to change to stage II or III this must be done as a drill from stage I, when embussed.

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RESTRICTED Annex G SUGGESTED INSTRUCTIONS ON WHEN TO OPEN FIRE (See Chapter 2 Section 8) 1. Individual Responsibility. a. As an individual under direct orders of a military superior you are to act on the orders of that military superior. b. As an individual not under the direct orders of a military superior, or if you have others under command, you are to act on the principle of Minimum force. It is always your duty to assess the situation facing you and to decide what degree of force is necessary. If having done this carefully and honestly, you decide that there is no alternative but to open fire, and then do so, you will be doing your duty and acting lawfully, whatever the consequences. When You Are to Fire. a. It is your duty to shoot if it is the only way to: (1) Defend yourself, your comrades, families, police and all peaceable Persons against serious attack (2) Protect against serious damage all government property, eg, buildings, installations, vehicles and equipment. (3) Disperse a riotous mob that you honestly believe will cause serious injury to persons and property if not forcibly prevented. (4) Arrest persons committing acts of violence, or whom you honestly believe to have done so, or are about to do so, to prevent their escape. b. When you are attacked with arms or explosives. c. When acting as a sentry or escort, the persons, vehicles, equipment or place you are guarding or escorting are attacked with arms or explosives. 3. When You are Not to Fire. a. When you are under orders of a military superior, who is present, until you are told to do so. b. It is obvious that you can achieve your object by any other means. How to Fire. a. Always fire and aimed shot. b. Aim at the centre of the main part of the body exposed. c. Never fire warning shots over peoples head. How to Challenge. (Clear orders should be included on how to challenge, in accordance with the local situation.)

2.

4.

5.

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RESTRICTED Annex H PLATOON BOX FORMATION FOR CROWD DISPERSAL (See Chapter 3 Section II)

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RESTRICTED Annex I PLATOON EXTENDED FRONT FROMATION FOR CROWD DISPERSAL (See Chapter 3 Section II)

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Annex J STANDARD COMPANY FORMATION FOR CROWD DISPERSAL (See Chapter 3 Section II)

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RESTRICTED Annex K COMPANY FOMATION FOR CROWD DISPERSAL (See Chapter 3 Section II)

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Annex L THE PLATOON ACTING IN A POLICE ROLE CROWD DISPERSAL FORMATION (See Chapter 3 Section 12)

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RESTRICTED Annex M THE PLATOON ACTING IN A POLICE ROLE SEQUENCE OF ACTION AND SCALE OF EQUIPMENT (See Chapter 3 Section 12) Sequence of Action 1. 2. Debus well clear of incident. Halt, facing mob or rioters, out of stoning range. 3. Leading baton section charges target at the double, using batons and shieldS to maximum advantage, until ordered to withdraw. Batons must be tied to the wrist and shields secured to the forearm. Batons should be used with a lateral crossing movement aimed at the arms and not the head. 4. The number of sections Committed initially will vary with the situation. Baton and shield work is very tiring and a reserve is therefore advisable whatever the situation. 5. Baton charges can be co-ordinated with the use of riot control agent, details of which is given in annex Q 6. An assault from an unexpected direction (from a flank or the rear) will offer be most effective. 7. The command group should keep careful watch on rooftops, and the rioters themselves, in case fire-arms are used. Rooftop patrols should be established. 8. Fire should only be opened as a last resort, when repeated baton charges and the use of riot control agent have failed to disperse the crowd. Equipment Carried on the Man 9. Equipment carried on the man should be kept to a minimum and should be as light as possible, to ensure speed of approach and the free use of batons and shields. Equipment traps are easy hand holds for rioters. 10. The following is suggested as a guide. a. Baton Section and Platoon Sergeant (each man) (1) Baton and shield. (2) Respirator or goggles, or both. (3) Belt. (4) Riot control agent grenade. (5) In certain circumstances, and armoured vest. b. Command Group. Each man equipped as shown in the legend of Annex L. Arms must be secured to the man to prevent seizure.

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Other Equipment 11. Dye sprayers can be fitted to vehicles and project spray up to approximately 15 meters. Their aim is to mark leaders for subsequent identification. The stain lasts for approximately 24 hours. 12. Water hosing from hydrants and fire tenders may also be employed for crowd dispersal if the equipment is available. Annex N CROWD DISPERSAL SEQUENCE OF EVENTS AND WORDS OF COMMAND (See chapter 3 section 11) 1. A possible sequence of events for crowd dispersal by a military given as a guide. a. Non Violent Methods (1) Verbal and visual persuasion, using loud hailers, bugles, banners, and / or powerful public address equipment mounted in a vehicle or aircraft. (2) The ostentatious display of a concentration of armed troops, who are alert and clearly ready for anything. (3) Photographing ringleaders, agitators and others, so that they can be identified later as disturbers of the peace. This can have an unnerving effect and may cause ringleaders to have second thoughts. (4) The use of riot control agent by troops and/ or helicopter. force is

(5) The steady advance of a line of soldiers with fixed bayonets. Providing That there is no danger off the troops coming in to close contact with the crowd. (6) The ostentatious display of an armoured vehicle with machine gun Mounted ready for action. This may prove a powerful deterrent to a Hostile crowd, but the armoured vehicle must be provided with infantry Protection. b. (1) Opening Fire AfterFailure of Non Violent Method Warn the crowd by all available means that effective fire will be opened unless the crowd disperses at once. This can be done by a call on a bugle followed by the display of banners showing the necessary warning 102 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED in the vernacular , and an announcement over a loud speaker, megaphone or public address equipment. (2) The commander of the force personally orders the fire unit commander Concerned(platoon or section commander) to open fire, indicating the target and the number of rounds to be fired, which must be the minimum to achieve the immediate aim. (3) The fire unit commander gives the fire order to a marksman or marksmen. The best weapon to use is the rifle firing single shots. c. 2. Action after Firing. As described chapter 3 paragraphs 103

A summary of words of command for crowd dispersal is as follows. a. Platoon In Military Role remarks Platoon approaches crowd from behind Cover and halt out of stoning range (60 To 70 meters) Men detailed to watch rooftops/treetops and other likely threats turn and face their tasks. Cameraman starts taking Photographs. Diarist records the sequence of Events and timings. Banner displayed ordering crowd to disperse Or fire may be opened. (To be supplemented By a verbal warning in the bernacular by a police officer or interpreter over a Loud hailer) 3Gs on the bugle to attract the attention of the crowd to banner/verbal warning Not more than one section fits respirators at a time

Command (1) Platoon halt

(2) Observers outward Turn.

(3) Banner men display Banner.

(4) Bugler sound off

(5) platoon will fit Respirators by sections No 1 section move No 2 section move etc. (6) Rear section prepare To use Tear smoke

Each man in rear section withdraws a grenade, holding his rifle vertically at the point of balance in the other hand.

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RESTRICTED (7) Rear section double march (8) Prepare to throw Rear section doubles through leading section And halts about 40 meters from crowd. Each man slings his rifle and withdraws Safety pin from grenade. Each man throws his grenade to land in Front of the crowd. (8) And (9) are repeated, until platoon commander estimates that the action is effective. Sections double back to its normal march position When the situation allows, respirators are Removed by sections.

(9) Throw

(10) Section retire - double

(11) Platoon will remove respirators by section. No 1 section_ respirators off No 2 section_ respirators off Etc (12 prepare to cover wiremen/ Tape men.

If tear smoke is not effective and crowd refuses to disperse.

(13) Wiremen/ tape men forward

Wire or tape placed between platoon and crowd covered by leading section. Banner now shows definite intention to open fire without warning.

(14) As for (3) and (4) (15) NB (16)

Omit (5) to (11) if use of tear smoke is not appropriate. Omit (12) and (13) if the situation is not favourable for positioning wire. Omit (14) and (15) if commander judges the situation requires action. Placing wire/ tape may well precede the use of tear smoke if Crowd is advancing.

Front section (or number.. Section) prepare to fire

Front section kneels

(17)

At bearded man in purple suit waving an axe, aim

Whole front section aims 104 RESTRICTED

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(18)

No rifleman, fire

Repeat as required until effect is achieved. Rifleman from rear section move out to cover recovery of corpse (s) Stretcher party pick up casualty and his weapon if any. Move to cover before rendering medical assistance.

(19) Covering party, forward

(20) Carrying party, forward

(21) Dairyman, recover Evidence

Concurrent with (19) and (20) above empties collected. Casualties photographed,etc.

Platoon will then stand firm, advance or withdraw using normal words of command according to the situation. b. Police Acting in a Police Role Command (1) Platoon halt, observes Outward turn Remarks On arrival of area of crowd. Marksman armed with rifles cover baton section and any rooftops overlooking area. Diarist/ cameraman record evidence. Banner displayed ordering crowd to disperse or CS may be used, but does Not include reference to opening of Fire. A verbal warning given. 3 Gs of bugle to attract attention of Crowd to banner/verbal warning. Not more than one section fitting Respirators at one time. (CS smoke used only if appropriate.) Each men in No 2 section Withdraws a grenade, holding baton 105 RESTRICTED

(2) Banner men - display Banner

(3) Bugler - sound off (4) platoon will fit respirators By section. No. 1 section, move No. 2 section, move etc (5) No .2 section prepare to Use Tear smoke.

RESTRICTED In the shield hand. (6). No 2 section - double march No 2 section doubles through leading Section and halts about 40 meters From the crowd. Each man withdraws safety pin from The grenade. Each man throws his grenade to land In front of the crowd. (7) and (8) Are repeated until commander estimates That action is effective. Omit (4) to (10) if use of tear smoke is not appropriate. Alternatively , no 1 section kneels and No 2 section throws over their heads.

(7) Prepare to throw. (8) Throw

Platoon acting in a Police Role Command (9) Section retire - double March Platoon will remove respirators By sections. No 1 section respirators Off. No 2 section respirators Off etc. No 1 section prepare to Charge. Charge remarks Section double back to its normal position When situation allows, respirators are Removed by section

(10)

(11) (12)

If crowd refuse to disperse No 1 section close with crowd, Remainder of platoon advances To about 20 yards behind No 1 section. Given over loud hailer so that No 1 section is aware of relief 2 Section relieves 1 section by doubling forward and engaging crowd 1 section disengages and double back to join platoon. 106 RESTRICTED

(13)

No 2 section prepare to Charge No 2 Section Charge

(14)

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(15) (16) (17)

Repeat with three sections as required No.section, prepare to Secure prisoner(s) move

Relive section at least every 2 to 3 Minutes. Addressed to a section not in a action. Person(s) to be detained indicated By platoon commander. Section Moves through section in contact. If it is necessary to break off the Action with crowd still in being. Section in contact disengages together On word from section commander. This avoids any soldiers being held By the crowd.

(18) (19)

Prepare to break Break

(20) * Recovery of casualties/ evidence as in sub paragraph 2a (19) (21) above. If repeated baton charges and tear smoke fail to disperse the crowd, fire may have to be opened using the same sequence of orders as in sub paragraph 2a. This action should be undertaken by a reserve platoon suitably armed and equipped.

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RESTRICTED Annex O SPECIMEN HEADINGS FOR INCIDENT REPORTS (See chapters 2 and 3) PART 1 Questionnaire (To be passed by signal, when urgent, using letters shown Below, for each item.) A. Date/ time B. Place (grid reference) C. Type of incident D. Were mines employed if so, what type? E. Were the security forces on foot or in vehicles? If on foot, what type? of patrol? F. How were the security forces armed? G. If in vehicles, was journey operational or administrative? H. How many vehicles and what types? I. J. How were they moving? (Eg spacing, speed etc) Approximate damage to vehicles

K. Were security forces fired on? If so, what was the type and volume of Enemy fire? L. Did security forces open fire? If so how many rounds by calibre?

M. Enemy casualties or number captured? N. O. P. PART 11 PART 111 PART 1V Security forces casualties, by natures. Was follow up action taken? If so, with what result? What use was made of riot control agent? Brief Description of Incident (Include brief description of site, if Ambushed) Sketch Map Conclusions and Recommendations

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RESTRICTED Annex P RIOT AND CROWD DISPERSAL DIARY OF EVENTS (See chapter 3 section 11) Serial Date Time Persons involved (Including names of civil/ police officers etc.) Event (Including brief details of orders ,requests or advice received) Action Time of Initials taken action and (Including completion reasons for decisions, orders issued and results) (e) (f) (g)

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

NOTE. In difficult circumstances such as darkness or when the speed of events is such that a written record cannot be maintained, a portable tape recorder may be used. However the evidence should be reduced to writing as soon as possible owing to the risk of inadvertent erasure. It is essential that the operator of the tape recorder be properly trained in its use.

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RESTRICTED Annex Q USE OF RIOT CONTROL AGENT (See chapter 3 and 4) General 1. The possible use of riot control agents should always be concedered before a decision is taken to open a fire on rioters. This is in accordance with the principle of minimum force and to minimize the possibility of causing casualties to innocent bystanders. 2. If riot control agents are to be employed it is important that all troops and police have properly fitted and tested respirators and have been trained in their use. (NBC Defence Training, Volume 1 Pamphlet 3 Code no 70273). Only Pellets Irritant Smoke Respirator Testing may be used in a CS chamber to test respirators. 3. The stranded riot control agent in use in the British Army is the chemical ORTHOCHLOROBENZYLIDENEMALONONITRILE known as CS 4. CS is immediately effective against unprotected persons. It results in watering and irritation of the eyes and causes the recipient to cough and vomit. Only a very determined man will stay in a CS concentration; most will get out as quickly as possible. The effects pass off in about five to ten minutes in clean air. CS smoke can be dangerous if used against anyone in a confined, unventilated space from which escape is difficult or impossible. CS Ammunition 5. Cartridge 1 1/2 inch Anti riot Irritant a. This cartridge is only fired from the pistol agent 1and half inch no .4 mark 1 b. The cartridge has a range of approximately 70 meters, its most effective range is about 50 meters. A group of 12 to 18 cartridges should be fired at a high angle to avoid risk of the cartridges injuring people, and to achieve a good concentration. c. The cartridge emits CS smoke for about 10 to 15 seconds. d. Practice is required in the use of the pistol and a training scale of cartridges is authorized annually for this purpose. 6. Grenade, Hand Anti Riot Irritant LAAL a. The grenade is similar to the 83 smoke grenades. It can be thrown about 35 meters. The grenade omits CS smoke for about 25 to 45 seconds. c. A scale of grenades is authorized annually for internal security training. d. Grenade should normally be carried by:

b.

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RESTRICTED (1) Platoons sergeants, section commanders and all riflemen in platoons employed at control points or on crowd dispersal. (2) All members of rooftop standing patrols. (3) All members of mobile patrols. Decision to Use CS 7. The commander on the spot is the only person in a position to decide whether the use of CS will produce the necessary effect. Before deciding he should conceder the following factors. a. The size, disposition and temper of the crowd. b. Whether he has time to use CS before the actions of the crowd endanger persons or property which must be protected. c. The downwind hazards. CS may drift considerable distance beyond the incident area. Possible creating an unacceptable hazard to innocent, eg motor traffic. d. The ground CS is more effective when used in narrow streets rather than in open spaces. But care must be taken to check that there are sufficient exits, in case the crowd stampede in panic. Note also the danger mentioned in paragraph 4 above. e. Whether the reduction of visibility caused by the use CS smoke will be acceptable to the security forces. Suggested Drill for Using CS 7. The following is a suggested drill for a platoon carrying out crowd dispersal: a. A warning is given by banner and/ or loud hailer, to the crowd to disperse or CS may be used. b. The rear section of the platoon must be detailed to use CS. c. The platoon commander must give the warning order Tear smoke, and if he considers it necessary, he must order his platoon to fit respirators, a section at a time, the remainder staying on guard. The use of a hand held loud hailer greatly assists the issuing of orders in respirators. d. On the order prepare to use tear smoke, each man of the rear section withdraws a grenade with his throwing hand , holding his rifle vertically at the point of the balance in the other hand. e. On the order section double march, the rear section doubles through the leading section and halts about 40 meters from the crowd. ( If in a police role formation and closer to the crowd, No 1 section kneels and No 2 section throws.) f. On the order prepare to throw each man slings his rifle and withdraws the safety pin from the grenade. g. On the order throw each man throws his grenade to land in front of the crowd. The section then doubles back to its normal position. a. As soon as the situation allows the platoon commander must order respirators to be removed.

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RESTRICTED 9. The drill can be modified when using the 1 and half inch cartrige.

10. If a small concentration of CS is likely to have the desired effect. Then the required number of individuals should be nominated to throw/ fire, and the orders adjusted accordingly, if the number of CS cartridges/ grenades used should be recorded and empty cases collected in the same way as ball ammunition. Annex R FORM TO BE COMPLETED BY AN OFFICER WHO ORDERED FIRE TO BE OPENED (See chapter 3 Section 11) PART I Form to be completed by an officer who ordered fire to be opened during a civil disturbance. a. At (place) on .(date) at hrs(time) had occasion to open fire to maintain law and order. I

b. Brief description of events leading to the opening fire. c. A civil/ police officer was/ was not present. d. The civil police officer agreed/ disagreed with decision to open fire (with brief summary of reasons if he disagreed) e. The calibre and number of rounds fired was .. f. The details of casualties to my force were . g. The details of casualties to the enemy were h. The arrangements for dealing with casualties were. (Signed) (Date) PART II Unit/ Area Commanders remarks.

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RESTRICTED Annex S PROCEDURE FOR SERCHING VEHICLES (See chapter 4 Section 14 and 15) Cars 1. The car should first be checked against the wanted car list. Cars should then be systematically searched from front to rear. Examples of possible hiding places are as follows. a. Sun visors b. Dashboard pockets or cubby holes c. Behind dashboard (wires leading from instruments may conceal a small weapon or document) d. Under drivers seat e. Between drivers and passengers seats. Back of drivers seat. (i.e. between back of seats and bottom of back rest.) f. Door pockets g. Underneath moveable mats h. Back seats i. Rear window panel shelf j. Luggage boot k. Under bonnet and spare wheel compartment l. Spare wheel m. All loose baggage and parcels n. Particular care must be paid to any apparently innocent articles such as umbrellas or newspapers, which may be used for concealment Buses 2. When searching buses note must be taken of the places where people are sitting before they leave the vehicle. Proof of ownership of articles found will otherwise he impossible. The search procedure is the same as for cars. Goods Vehicles 3. a. The procedure is similar to that for cars with the following additions.

Wooden Body Construction.Owing to the wooden body construction of some lorries, it is very simple to make effective places of concealment by the addition of enclosed panels, False bottoms, or the boarding up of spaces between the batons supporting the floor. The sides of Lorries may be prepared in a similar manner. The best method of searching such cases is close examinations from all angles and careful measurement. b. Twin Rear Wheels. The space between, twin rear wheels should be examines carefully.

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RESTRICTED c. Wooden Blocks (Chocks). Some goods vehicles particularly those of a heavy class, carry wheel chocks which are placed under the rear wheels of the vehicle to help the breaks, should the vehicle have to stop on a steep gradient. Through regular use they become dirty, worn and greasy, and are generally thrown in the rear of the vehicle or carried in the drivers cab. Such block can be hollowed out to become good places of concealment, and should therefore be examined carefully. d. Gunny Sacks. All gunny sacks should be lifted and searched. A common subterfuge is the concealment of articles under a help of gunny sacks in an apparently unlade goods vehicles. e. Drivers Cab. particular attention should be given to the search of the drivers cab and the drivers mate. Motor cycles 4. Motor cycles are comparatively easy to search, but attention should be paid to the following. a. b. c. d. e. Bicycles 5. a. Handlebars and rubber grips b. Bells, and bicycle pumps c. Lamps, dynamos, etc, including the back of reflector glasses d. The saddle e. All tubular framework, particularly open ends and joints. f. Mudguards and crankcase g. Saddle and tool bag. Petrol Tank. This may have a false division Tool Box or Case. Open, remove all tools and examine Rubber Handle Grips-Controls. Examine Foot Rest-Supports. Examine foot rest and machine support General. Lamps, mudguards, and all hollow or tubular frameworks should be examined. A search should also be made under the saddle.

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RESTRICTED Annex T CONTROL POINTS ROAD BLOCKS, GATE CHECK POINTS SUGGESTED SCALE OF STORIES (See chapter 4 section 14 and 15) Item Knife rests Control point As required Road block As required Gate check Remarks point As required For barriers depending on width of roads. If available Combs to HQ and within the control point/road block

Portable record Radio/field telephones

tape

1 As required As required As required

Night surveillance equipment Dennett wire Wiring gloves Wiring cutters

As required

As required

As

required

As required 1 pair barrier

As required

As

required

each 1 pair each 1 pair each each 2 2 2 1

1 pair 1 pair

1 pair barrier Stop signs 1 pair barrier Stop sins 1 pair (luminous) barrier Hurricane lamps Mechanics tool kits

1 each barrier plus 4 1

1 1 For dismantling suspect vehicles. If available lamps electric are better and quicker to set up 115

Hurricane lamps, red

2 each barrier

2 each barrier

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RESTRICTED Some to be adapted by the Addition of red Plastic covers for use as traffic wands.

Hand torches

Warning barriers Tracing tape Megaphone Bugle or rattle Whistles

1 1 roll 1 1 8 2 1 2 1 Includes one for each sentry. The light batteries and small generator fit into a quarter ton vehicle

Searchlight 1

Chalk As required Sand bags As required 6 for defence Plus 6 for captured documents ammunition etc. As required As required 2 Shovels 6 Tents 1 Stretchers 1 116 RESTRICTED 2 roll 6 As required As required

Labels Wire netting

As required

RESTRICTED Medical haversack Bicarbonate of Soda Stationery box 1 Tables 2 Chairs As required Jerricans 4 and gallons 1 can Kerosene 3 cans water Handcuffs 2 pairs Probes 3 foot 3 Prodder 4 foot 3 Tape measures 3 Latrine buckets 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 For determine hidden compartment 1 1 1 can Kerosene 1 can Water 2 pairs 1 can Kerosene 1 can water 2 pairs 1 1 1 1

1 2lb 2lb

For treatment of battery acid burns. Including SOP's. Lists of wanted persons and vehicles, etc.

Waste bins 2 Scales 1 Thumbprint pads 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 For weighing suspicious parcels

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RESTRICTED Annex U CONTROL POINTS SPECIMEN HEADINGS FOR ORDERS (See chapter 4 section 15) ORDERS FOR CONTROL POINT NUMBER.. Ref: map. 1. Situation (To include details of troops of franks, important bullrings, features within patrol limits, terrorist information, wanted persons and vehicles) 2. a. Mission. You are to Control all/ a proportion of vehicles and pedestrians passing through the control point. b. your patrol limits(see sketch) by preventing and by dispersing unlawful assemblies. 3. Execution a. Layout (sketch should be attached showing full details) b. Duties. The following are to be maintained permanently 1. 2. 3. 4. One sentry for barrier One NCO per entry barrier Two riflemen at control point HQ covering all barriers Two man standing patrol in the observation post covering the control point. Maintain law and order within damage to property or persons

c. Use of Riot Control Agent. Instructions on allocation and use d. Opening of Fire. Fire is not to be opened except in self defence. e. Patrol (1) (2) Limit of patrolling. (To be shown on sketch) A patrol of not less than one section is to be sent out on foot or in vehicles, and must be prepared to prevent minor incidents.

f. Control of Vehicles and Pedestrians 1. All vehicles and pedestrians are to be slowed down and directed through the control point. 2. If vehicles are to be checked , they are to be searched inside the barrier by civil policeman if available, otherwise by the barrier sentries and NCOs.

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g. Allocation Duties

Police

1) 2)

(a) Checking and searching vehicles and persons (b) Acting as interpreter (c) Making arrests when necessary (3) Administration. You are responsible for feeding and looking after police allotted to you.

h.

Lights (1) All NCOs and sentries on duty at night are to carry torches (2) The following lights are to be put in position at night.

(a) Hurricane lamps at each police stop sign. (b) A red hurricane lamp at the end of the each knife rest near the middle of the road. i. Turnout. The turnout and bearing of the soldiers on duty is of the utmost importance. You are to ensure that all soldiers outside the rest and administrative area are correctly and smartly dressed and move about in a soldierly manner. 4. Service Support a. Rest and administrative area (location) b. Stores (a suggested list of stores is given in annex) c. Transport (location and use of vehicles) d. Water point e. Washing facilities f. Cooking facilities g. Latrines h. Medical (evacuation of casualties) 5. Command and Signal a. Control point HQ (location and composition) b. Company HQ ( location) c. Communications (1) To company (2) To rest and administrative area (3) To standing patrol (4) To flanking units

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PART 2 - PRINCEPLES AND GENARAL ASPECTS

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LAND OPERATIONS
VOLUMES III - COUNTER REVOLUTIONARY OPERATIONS PREFACE Political power comes out of the barrel of a gun. Mao tse Tung 1938 If you wish for peace, subversive forms of war. understand war, particularly the guerrilla and

B.H Liddell hart 1961 1. Between the end of world war 11 and 1 st January 1969, Britains forces have had to undertake a wide variety of military commitments and only in Europe, after the formation of NATO, has there been real stability. Fifty three of these commitments have been operations of the counter revolutionary type with only Korea and the short Cuez campaign falling outside this category. 2. As far as can be foreseen, Britain will continue to have the following military commitments outside Europe. a. The internal security and external defence of British dependencies overseas. b. The support of commonwealth or friendly independent states. When this help is specifically asked for in compliance with treaty obligations. This support may be required to resist an internal or an external threat or a mixture of both. c. Provision of a military contribution to a united nations force.

Pattern of Revolutionary war 3. a. The communist have evolved a technique of revolutionary warfare which relies mainly on popular support for its success. this technique has proved successful when it has been correctly used. The principles on which it is based have been described by the communist leaders and the pattern is therefore all to study. It is therefore understandably attractive to nationalist leaders who aspire to promote revolution in their own countries. They may not be avowed communists and may not follow communist doctrine exactly, but the invitation to imitate successful revolutionary method is tempting. For this reason much of this volume has been set against a communist threat.

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RESTRICTED b. A diagrammatic illustration of the warfare is at annex A. South Vietnam 4. The doctrine set out in this volume is designed to cover the broadest range of possible counter revolutionary operations. The tactics differ in many ways from those adopted by the united states in south Vietnam, where the largest counter revolutionary war in the world is now in progress. The problems that confront the united states in south Vietnam, however have special characteristics: a. South Vietnam is completely independent and the United States does not exercise the authority of a colonial power. b. The communists have had total control over some parts of south Vietnam for about 25 years and their structure has never been dismantled. It is not, therefore, a question of re-establishing the legitimate government in these areas but of building, imposing and maintaining a new administration. c. The Viet Cong have safe sanctuaries in all non-bearing countries which are imposable to seal off. They thus have guaranteed sources of supply and reinforcement and uninterrupted training facilities. d. There is no joint HQ no director of operations has been appointed. There is no effective civil service throughout the provinces and the police are little more than the traffic branch. The police are unable to provide either security for the individual or worthwhile intelligence. There is no scope therefore to implement our fundamental concept of the working of the triumvirate, civil, military, and police as a joint and integrated organization from highest to the lowest level of policy making, planning and administration. Contents of Volume 5. Part 1 Part 2 Part 3 Counter Revolutionary operations are covered in volume III as under. Principles, general aspects and definitions Internal security Counter insurgence pattern of revolutionary

6. To avoid repetition and because of the inter relationship between internal security and counter insurgence operations, details of the following which may apply in all phases of counter revolutionary operations have been included in part 1. a. The treat and insurgent b. Intelligence c. Civil affairs d. Psychological operations e. Training aspects f. Air support g. Politic relations 122 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED Definitions 7. The Opposition. The terms guerrilla, revolutionary, terrorist, dissident and rioter are used on occasions to indicate differences in the opposition. When it has not been necessary to indicate specific differences, however insurgent has been used to cover all the roles implied by the forgoing terms. It also embraces such additional terms as saboteur, enemy, insurrectionist or rebel when applicable. 8. Definitions used throughout the three parts of this Volumes are at pages 3 to 6.

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LAND OPERATIONS
VOLUME III - COUNTER REVOLUTIONARY OPERATIONS PART 1-PRINCIPLES AND GENERAL ASPECTS AGREED STANDARD TERMS AND DEFINITIONS The definitions below are placed at the beginning of this pamphlet so that the reader will be in no doubt as to their meaning in the text. The agreed joint service definitions have been taken from the joint Service Glossary (JSP 110) and are shown in quotes.
1.

2. Base Area. The area, virtually free from guerrilla interference that has a defensive perimeter, and supported. It will normally be based on a port and/or strategic transport terminal airfield. In some circumstances a tactical transport (medium range) (Tac T (MR)) airfield may have to be used initially, but it should be developed as soon as possible. 3. Civil Disturbances. Group acts of violence and disorder prejudicial to public law and order. These will necessitate police and possibly military intervention. 4. Cold War. The continuing world-wide struggle in peace time between communism and the free world waged by all means short of international armed conflict. Certain non-aligned countries also wage all type of cold war to foster their own militant ideological or nationalistic aims; in many cases these are countries which have accepted, at least temporally, communist aid and support. Cold war covers propaganda, subversion, economic sanctions, civil wars, military confrontations, revolts and rebellions inspired by a basic ideological conflict. 5. Controlled Area. An area not entirely free from the enemy, in which conditions permit the civil administration and police, to work effectively in co-operation with military forces. Although insurgent infiltration in to the controlled area is possible, the civil administration supported by military forces is capable of limiting insurgent activity, thereby separating the insurgents from the local population. 6. Counter Insurgency. Those military, para-military, political, economic, psychological and sociological activities undertaken by a government, independently or with the assistance of friendly nations, to prevent or defeat subversive insurgency, and restore the authority of the central government. 7. Counter Intelligence. That phase of intelligence activity devoted to destroying the effectiveness of inimical foreign intelligence activities and to the protection of information against espionage of individuals against subversion, and of installations and material against sabotage. 8. Guerrilla Warfare. Military or para-military operations conducted in enemy held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces. Guerrilla warfare will be the main preoccupation of security forces in counter insurgency. 9. Insurgency. A form of rebellion in which a dissident faction that has the support or acquiescence of a substantial part of the population instigates the commission of 124 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED widespread acts of civil disobedience, sabotage and terrorism, and wages guerrilla warfare in order to overthrow a government. A state of insurgency implies that the insurgents have control of sizeable areas of the country and that it will almost inevitably be a part of a revolutionary war on the communist pattern. 10. Internal Security. Any military role which involves primarily the maintenance and restoration of law and order, and essential services in the face of civil disturbances, and disobedience, using minimum force. It covers action dealing with minor civil disorders with no political undertones as well as riots savouring of revolt and even the early stages of rebellion. 11. Limited War. International armed conflict, short of general war. It may be limited geographically, by the scale of forces or by the weapons employed but will be conducted overtly by formations of regular troops. 12. Psychological Operations. The planned use of propaganda or other means, in support of our military action or presence, designed to influence to our advantage the opinions, emotions, attitudes and behaviour of enemy, neutral or friendly groups. 13. Sabotage. An act excluding a normal military operation, or an omission calculated to course physical damage in the interests of a foreign power or subversive organization. 14. Security Forces. All indigenous and allied police, military and paramilitary forces used by a government to maintain law and order. 15. Subversion. Action taken to undermine the military, economic, psychological, morale or political strength of a nation and the loyalty of the subjects. 16. Terrorism. A resert to violence by a dissident faction in order to intimidate and coerce people for political ends. This may manifest itself in sabotage and assassination by individuals or small groups, or in the form of ambushes or attacks on civilians or police by large bodies of terrorists. It can take place in either urban or rural areas.

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RESTRICTED ADDITIONAL TERMS USED 17. Battalion/Company Bases. Temporary bases set up when establishing or expanding controlled areas. Such bases may be located alongside civil/police HQ, near defended villages or in the countryside. Defence arrangements must allow for a large proportion of the force to be out of the base on offensive operations. 18. Civil Disobedience. Active or passive resistance of the population to the authority or policies of a government, by such means as unlawful strikes 19. Clandestine Operations. Activities sponsored or conducted by government departments or agencies in such a way as to maintain secrecy by concealment or stealth, i.e., concealed but not disguised. 20. Communist Revolutionary War. The process, which includes the use of political, economic and military measures that militant communists, working mainly within the country, employ to waken and overthrow a non-communist government. Its military measures include sabotage, terrorism and insurgency with the accopaniment of gurrilla warfare. In its most intense from the fighting will take on the characteristics of limited war, but with the complication of having no front or rear and having guerrilla activity in all areas. The communist concept has three merging phases-Passive, Active and Counter Offensive. Four different degrees of activity/intensity are recognized in this volume but to refer to them numerically causes confusion with our allies and in relation to the three communist phases. They have therefore been referred to as preparatory, active resistance, insurgency and open offensive phases. In effect the communists second phase is split by us into two; and finally the communists third phase and our fourth phase are identical. A diagrammatic illustration of these phases is at Annex A. 21. Community Relations. The use of military forces on projects contributing to economic and social development useful to the local population at all levels, in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health and others. It serves to improve the standing of the military forces and the administration with the population. It is known as The Battle for Hearts and Minds. 22. Counter Revolutionary Operations. A generic term to describe the operations which British Forces may have to undertake, when maintaining and restoring law and order in support of an established government, in order to counter the threats in an internal security or revolutionary war setting. These threats include civil disturbances, terrorism and organized insurgency, irrespective of whether these are nationalist, communist or racially inspired or directed from within or outside the threatened territory concerned. 23. Covert Operations. Operations which are so planned and executed as to conceal the identity of, or permit plausible denial by the sponsor. They differ from clandestine operations in that emphasis is placed on concealment of the identity of the sponsor rather than on concealment of the operation; i.e. disguised but not concealed. 24. Defended Villages. Villages in controlled areas which have been organized for defence with a view to, giving the inhabitants security from insurgent action, preventing subversive elements, assisting the insurgents and encouraging the provision of information. Initially, defended villages may have to be manned by military forces but in the long term the 126 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED aim must be to train and organize home guards so that they and the police are able to take over the static defence from military forces. 25. Forward Operational Base. An area providing a semi-permanent firm base from which offensive action against the insurgents can be developed. It should be established at a seat of local government as a formation base, usually at brigade level, and will normally have a Tac T (MR) airfield, Tac T (SR) air field capable of quick development. 26. Guerrilla. A combat participant in guerrilla warfare. When used in the context of communist revolutionary war the word describes the communist village militia, to differentiate it from the regional and regular soldier of the insurgent forces. Guerrillas will invariably have a measure of support from the populace. 27. Insurgent. The terms guerrilla, revolutionary, terrorist, dissident and rioter are used on occasions to indicate differences in the opposition. When it has not been necessary to indicate specific differences, however, insurgent has been used to cover all the roles implied by the foregoing terms. It has also been taken to include such additional terms as saboteur, enemy, insurrectionist or rebel when applicable. 28. Insurrection (Revolt) and Rebellion. When subjects revolt, they openly express their dissatisfaction with the established government or its policies. When such an expression is armed and organized it becomes a rebellion. When a rebellion has a large measure of support and aims to overthrow the government a state of insurgency exists. 29. Operations in Depth. Operations designed to locate, disrupt and destroy hard core insurgents outside controlled areas, with a view to relieving insurgent pressure on the later and thereby giving pacification operations a better chance of success. Operations in depth may be launched from temporary bases established in the area of operations, or they may take the form of in and out operations launched direct from a main or forward operational base. 30. Pacification Operations. Military operations designed to clear and hold an area of immediate insurgent influence and re-establish civil control. Military forces will continue to provide security until para-military and police forces can accept responsibility. 31. Para-military Forces. Forces or groups which are distinct from the regular armed forces of any country but resemble them in organization and training and in the missions they undertake. 32. Patrol Bases. Temporary bases to provide a comparatively secure area in which patrols can rest and recuperate, and from which patrol activities can be launched. 33. Prohibited Area. The definition will vary as it depends upon the terms of the enactment or regulation etc which creates such an area. Generally it is automatically an offense to enter or be in a prohibited area and security forces are given power over and above the general law in relation to using force to repel or apprehend anyone in the area.

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LAND OPERATIONS
VOLUME III - COUNTER REVALUTIONARY OPERATIONS CONTENTS Preface to Volume III PART 1-PRINCIPLES AND GENERAL ASPECTS Definitions CHAPTER 1-INTRODUCTION Aim Section
1. Likely Military Tasks General Types of Operations Characteristics of British Intervention Operations under United Nations Auspices 133 133 133 134 135

Page 120

123

133

CHAPTER 2-THE THREAT

2. Types of Unrest General Categories 136 136 136

3. Revolutionary War Aim Methods Significance Pre-requisites for Success

138 138 138 138 139

4. Communist Pattern of Revolutionary War General

140 140

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Communist aim Protracted Warfare Co-ordination of Political and Military Action Phases of Revolutionary War Preparatory Phase Active Resistance Phase Insurgency Phase Open Offensive Phase Summary 140 140 141 141 141 142 143 144 144

5. The Revolutionary Soldier General Village and urban Cells Village guerrillas Regional Soldiers Regular Soldiers Commanders

145 145 145 145 146 146 148

6. Insurgent Command and Staff Organizations Intelligence and Propaganda Administration and the Formation of an insurgent Firm base

148 148 149

7. Tactics of Revolutionary War General Sabotage Terrorism Guerrilla Tactics

150 150 150 150 151

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CHAPTER 3-PRINCIPLES FOR THE CONDUCT OF COUNTER OF REVOLUTIONARY OPERATIONS

8. General Principles of Government Action Aim Principles National Plan Co-ordinated Government Action Public Opinion and Popular Support Security Intelligence Strong and Popular Security Forces Summary

156 156 156 156 157 157 158 158 159

9. Organization for Co-ordinated Civil and Military Actions General Principles Political Aspects Joint Tasks High Command Control of Operations

159 159 160 160 161 161

CHAPTER 4 THE SECURITY FORCES

10. Police and Local Armed forces 163 Police Forces Regular Police Local Military Forces 163 164 165

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11. The Roles of Arms 165 165 166 167 168 169

Infantry Armour Artillery Engineers Signals

12.

Naval Support

172

13.

Air Support

173 173 174 174 175 175 176 177 177 178

General Helicopters Limitations Command and Control Air Transport and Logistic Support Offensive Air Operations Air Reconnaissance and observation Assistance by Aircraft in Command and Control Special Tasks

CHAPTER 5-INTELLIGENCE

14.

Introduction

179

15.

Intelligence Functions

180

16. Principles

180

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17. Organization 181 181 182 184 184 185 185 185 185 186

General Composition of the Military Intelligence Organizations Integration with other Intelligence Organizations Dependent Territories Foreign Countries Intelligence Committees Special Branch or Equivalent Joint intelligence Centres Military Intelligence Officers and Military Intelligence Liaison Officers

18. Planning 186 Action in the United Kingdom Pre-emergency Action in the area of Operations Provision of interpreters 186 187 187

19.

Research And Liaison, Communications and Security

187

20. Operational Intelligence 188 Sources of Information 189

21.

Counter Intelligence

190 190 190 191 191

Tasks Principles Protective Security Civil Security 22. Conclusion 192

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CHAPTER 6-MILITARY OPERTIONS

23.

The Pattern of Security Operations

193 193 193 193 194

General Background Operating Principles Types of Operation

24. The Pattern of Counter Insurgency Operations 194 Establishment of a Base Securing and Enlargement of Controlled Areas Operations in Depth Border Protection 194 195 195 195

25.

The Training Requirement

196 196 196 199 199 199

General Common Aspects Internal Security Training in a Police Role Counter insurgency

CHAPTER 7-ADMINISTRATION
26. Special factors affecting Administration 200 27. Main Factors in logistic planning 200

CHAPTER 8-CIVIL AFFAIRS

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28. Objectives, Functions, Principles and Responsibility 202 202 203 203 204 205

Introduction Objectives Functions Principles Responsibility for Civil Affairs

29. The Protection and Control of the People 205 General Resettlement Protection Food Control and Denial Public Information Summary 30. Community Relations 205 205 206 206 207 208 208 208 209 209 210 210

Purpose Principles Command and Control Projects Individual Actions

CHAPTER 9-PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

31. Definitions and Aims 211

32. Conduct of Psyops 211 General Tasks Pre-requisite for Psyops Methods and Resources Available 211 211 213 213

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Jamming 215

33. Command and Control 215 Overall Direction Co-ordination Responsibility of Military Psyops Staff and Units 215 215 216

CHAPTER 10-UNITED NATIONS OPERATIONS .

34. Introduction and Aim 217 217 217 Introduction Aim

35. Deployment of a UN Force 217 Decision to Deploy a UN Force Composition of the Force Appointment of a Commander Commanders Directive Relationship between Military and Political Staffs Control and Support of the Force 217 217 218 218 219 219

36. Peacekeeping at Contingent/Unit Level 219 Contingent/Unit Commanders Directive Tasks Zones and Boundaries Use of Force Loyalty Rights Element of Success 219 220 220 221 221 221 221

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Training Conclusions 222 222

ANNEXES Annex A B C D E F A Synopsis of Some past Counter Insurgency Operations Typical Organization of a Regional Insurgent Battalion Chain of Command of Security Forces and civil Administration Financial Aspects Resettlement Types and Use of Dogs FIGURES
1. Diagrammatic Layout of Typical Defences of a Fortified Village

223 234 235 236 238 240

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LAND OPERATIONS
VOLUME III-COUNTER REVOLUTIONARY OPERATIONS PART 1-PRINCIPLES AND GENERAL ASPECTS CHAPTER 1-INTRODUCTION AIM The aim of this Pamphlet is to give general guidance on the conduct of counter revolutionary operations, whether they are concerned with civil disturbances, terrorism or insurgency in the pattern of revolutionary war. It examines the methods most likely to be used by the instigators of disorders, revolts and insurgency, be they nationalist or communist inspired or based within or outside the territory concerned, and it sets out the general principles on which the security forces, working in close consert with the appropriate civil power, should base their operations.
1.

SECTION 1

- LIKELY MILITARY TASKS

General 2. As indicated in the Preface to this Pamphlet, Britains overseas commitments since World War 11 have been primarily concerned with operations of the counter revolutionary type. 3. A synopsis of some past counter revolutionary operations is given in annex B

Types of operations

4. As a result of our commitments British forces may be faced with having to carry out one, or any combination of three main types of operations; a. Internal Security. Covers any military role which involves primarily the maintenance and restoration, using minimum force, of law and order and essential services in the face of civil disturbances and disobedience.

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RESTRICTED This could include; (1) Dealing with civil disturbances resulting from labour disputes, racial and religious antagonism and tension or social unrest. (2) Dealing with riots and civil disobedience, with or without the political undertones which savour of revolt or even rebellion. (3) Countering terrorism by individuals and small groups in the form of sabotage and assassinations, particularly in urban areas. (4) Peace keeping under United Nations auspices involving any of the above operations, or more commonly the keeping apart of two belligerent or hostile factions. b. Counter Insurgency. This will be in areas where we are directly responsible for law and order or where we have been asked for help. Insurgency is a more serious state of affairs, for it implies that a rebellion has the support of or acquiescence of a substantial part of the population has achieved physical control over parts of the country, and that guerrilla warfare is being waged in order to set up an alternative administration. Insurgency will almost inevitably be part of a revolutionary war in the communist pattern. Counter insurgency therefore covers the full range of measures which must be taken by the government and security forces to defeat the insurgents and restore government authority. This could include; (1) (2) Countering attacks and ambushes by formed bodies of terrorists on communications, installations, and isolated police and military posts. There are more likely to occur in rural areas. Countering guerrilla warfare.

c. Limited War. This will be against well equipped units committed by one country against another in overt aggression, covertly to reinforce insurgents, or in a combination of both. In these conditions limited war will have the added complication of guerrilla warfare continuing at the same time. 5. This more serious operations will of course contain elements of the less serious ones. For example, although civil disturbances and riots could be of no special political significance, they could also be a prelude to, or part of a more serious threat such as a rebellion; while a rebellion, with its accompaniment of terrorism perhaps aided from outside the threatened country, could be part of a revolutionary war on the communist pattern, and be a prelude to or even part of a more intense phase of such a war. Insurgency will almost inevitably be part of a revolutionary war pattern. The degree of force necessary and justified in dealing with an incident will therefore to some extent depend on the context in which that incident occurs. 6. Between internal security and counter insurgency operations there is the anti-terrorist category of operations. Terrorism, when it is manifested by sabotage and assassination by individuals or small groups, may represent an advanced stage of a locally inspired and controlled rebellion, or could be part of the first phase of revolutionary war. When it has somewhat escalated and formed bodies of terrorists are carrying out ambushes and attacks on 138 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED civilians and police, which is more likely in rural areas, it must inevitably be looked at in a revolutionary context. Measures against urban terrorism will be considered under the heading of internal security, while those in rural areas which impinge on controlled area operations will be covered under counter insurgency. 7. In their extreme from counter revolutionary operations may have many of the characteristics of limited war, from which they may differ only because they are directed against an essentially internal threat.

Characteristics of British Intervention 8. It is particularly important in counter revolutionary operations for our strategic reserve forces to arrive quickly and act effectively, immediately after arrival, since the normal pattern of events is such that outside assistance is rarely for by other governments until the situation in the threatened country has become serious. Indeed British forces may not be called in by a friendly administration until at least a state of insurgency exists. 9. The arrival of British and Allied forces should have the following beneficial effects; a. The standing of the indigenous government should be improved within and outside its own country. b. The morale of the police, local armed forces and government organizations should improve. Where morale is excessively law, local forces may have to be relieved so that they can be reorganized and regain their confidence. c. Those sections of the local population not yet subverted may be prevented from acquiescent acceptance of the insurgents. 10. Against this it must be recognized that with the arrival of foreign troops the dissident factions will try to pursue their terrorism and insurgency with even greater determination and fanaticism, and they will exploit any local or external misgivings at foreign intervention to the greatest degree possible. This may make them a more popular movement. 11. The aim of British forces in the first instance must be to prevent further escalation of the conflict. Thereafter they must act offensively against the whole structure of the insurgent movement, in full co-operation with the civilian authorities and in such a way as to create the conditions in which the confidence of the people is restored and effective civil government becomes possible. 12. British forces will have to meet the additional problems of climate, terrain, hazards, to health, difficulties of language and the taboos and customs of indigenous peoples. No two tasks will be similar. 13. The Law and Members of the Armed Forces. British Forces will operate under the law of the country concerned. In British dependencies and Commonwealth territories this will be based on English law. In other countries there may be considerable variations which must be fully understood by our troops. The legal aspects are particularly relevant to the handilng of civil disturbances and riots and are covered in Part 2. It is the duty of the commander to

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RESTRICTED clarify and get agreement upon the standing of his troops under the local ordnance or current law. Operations under United Nations Auspices 14. Operations with international backing under United Nations auspices are for the time being, likely to be confined to a strictly peace keeping role designed to restore order and national cohesion. The examples of the Congo in 1960-64 and Cyprus in 1964 best illustrates this role. The special problems involved in United Nations operations are covered in Chapter 10. 15-19 Reserved. CHAPTER 2-THE THREAT
SECTION 2 - TYPES

OF UNREST

General 20. Each pattern of unrest is generally based upon at least one of the following main issues which provoke severe discontent; a. Nationalism b. Communism c. Racial or tribal rivalry d. Religious differences e. Maladministration and corruption of government f. Famine and poverty g. Lack of agricultural, educational and social planning h. Eviction of foreign troops and bases 21. These issues are the obvious and exploitable. The mass of the population of emerging nations is generally poorly educated and indifferent to problems outside its daily environment. The individual does not always realize the main reason for his misery or poverty is thus easy prey for a well trained unrest will normally fail one of the categories of unrest outlined below. Categories 22. Non-political Civil Disturbances. In many cases unrest will take the form of provocation of the population to demonstrations against authority. Some of these demonstrations could be purely regional and come as spontaneous outbursts of dissatisfaction among the people against the local administration and government. Such disturbances would not savour of rebellion but would merely be attempts to rouse the government to improve social conditions. If properly handled and if steps are taken to remove the dissatisfaction these outbursts present like danger. If, on the other hand, they are brutally and unintelligently suppressed and nothing is done to remove the causes of the unrest the ground may be prepared for further trouble and a section of the community may have been permanently alienated against the administration.No one should imagine that winning back the population will be easy if there are dissident and subversive elements at work. Propaganda and the spreading of lies or half-truths will be ceaseless and true social progress will be 140 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED misrepresented and even actively resisted in order to retain popular dissatisfaction. Firmness, combined with humanity, a readiness to work with responsible elements for social progress and a virile and intelligent government information service are required. 23. Internal Revolt and Rebellion. A continuing pattern of civil unrest and disturbances will throw up its own leaders and organizers. Amongst them may be men of goodwill who are primarily concerned in removing the causes of unrest, but there will be others who are agitators with long them political objectives and with no intention of being appeased. Failure to pick out and do business at an early stage with popular and militant bodies who are at the same time responsible and truly representative will only escalate the disturbances into a revolt and ultimately into a rebellion involving terrorism. This stage could well be reached without any control or assistance from external agencies although the communists will always be ready to profit from, and if possible to guide, any revolt which is working to their advantage. 24. Mutiny by the Armed or Security Forces. a. Mutinies can be caused by subversive political influences or by the failure of the authorities to introduce long overdue improvements, or both. The armed services or police can also become the private force of a particular individual. b. In many cases mutiny can be prevented by; (1) Penetrating the mutineers organization (2) Introducing reforms which eradicate the cause of grievance. (3) Arresting ringleaders and bringing the proposed mutiny into the open c. If it is feared that a mutiny may take place the strictest control must be placed on the issue of arms and ammunition. When necessary, stocks of arms and ammunition should be removed and/or guarded by troops whose loyalty is unquestioned. The location of all armouries and ammunition compounds must be accurately known. d. When a mutiny has taken place it must be suppressed in the shortest possible time in order to prevent it spreading like a contagious disease throughout the other elements of the force. Whilst the need for the minimum use of force must be appreciated a short, sharp action to suppress the mutiny is better than a long drawn out one, since the latter tends to enhance the status and strength of the mutineers and their determination to continue resistance. e. There must be no parleying with mutineers unless the lives of hostages are at stake. f. Once the mutineers have been overwhelmed, the various categories of mutineers should be quickly segregated and their custody entrusted to loyal elements as soon as possible. 25. Civil War. The distinction between a rebellion and civil war is difficult to define, being to a certain extent the involvement of the population in hostilities. The former is organized armed resistance to establish government, and the latter a conflict which splits a country into warring factions. We are unlikely to become involved in a civil war between rival supporters of political or religious beliefs except possibly as part of a Commonwealth or United Nations Force responsible for restoring law and order.

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26. Confrontation.This is a form of warfare in which raids and infiltration occur across another countrys frontier without any declaration of war. It will be part of a broader design by one country to bring about the downfall of its neighbour and in this context it may be closely linked with subversion, terrorism and even insurgency in rear areas. If it is conducted on any scale the campaign is likely to have some of the characteristics of counter insurgency and, although with more restrictions than usual, some of limited war. Terrorism and guerrilla activity may be less intense than in a revolutionary war which has originated inside the threatened country. In both confrontation and in an externally controlled rebellion on the revolutionary war pattern there will be internal and external threat. British forces may be involved in this conflict, either to help protect an ally or as part of a United Nations force to stand between the adversaries and maintain the sanctity of a frontier. 27. Externally Controlled Rebellion. Any type of unrest can be, and often is, aided from outside, but one that is specifically sponsored and almost totally organized external agencies who wish to overthrow a government of a different political complexion to their own, is in a different category. These agencies will seek to establish in its place an alternative government favourable to them and which will, in effect, allow them to control the policy of the country concerned. When this happens action is likely to develop along the lines of revolutionary war on the communist pattern. 28-29 Reserved
SECTION 3-REVOLUTIONARY

WAR

Aim 31. The aim of all revolutionary wars will be to overthrow a government by the use of political and economic, as well as military measures. Although this pamphlet naturally concentrates on the military side, it must be appreciated that the pattern with which he have to deal will always include political economic and sociological aspects, which may be more important and absorb more of the enemys effort than the military aspect. All four activities should be conducted in harmony as part of a co-ordinated and carefully controlled plan.

Methods 31. The basic methods of revolutionary warfare can be analyzed in its two components which take place concurrently. They are; a. Destructive. Attacking the established order and its supporters b. Constructive. Building up the will to fight, the means of fighting and the alternative government structure and organization Destructive methods include; a. Anti-government propaganda and demoralization. b. Subversion and penetration of the security forces, government departments and agencies and established trade unions.

32.

Significance 142 RESTRICTED

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36. Although revolutionary war was originally a communist term and it is the communists who have thought the most about, and most clearly demonstrated, the process and methods of including a state of insurgency, they are not alone in using this technique. Similar methods have been and are likely to be increasingly used by leaders of all those who have shown their readiness to aid dissidence in order to hamper British and Western interests. The leaders of these movements may be inspired by a variety of motives but they will all rely on gaining, by fair means or foul, the fullest measure of popular support. They have, therefore, tended to copy communist methods which have proved successful elsewhere and have often adopted the term revolutionary war to describe their own particular struggle. 37. Those newly emerging and under-developed states with weak and untried administrations and with unreliable and poorly trained military forces are most easily overcome such warfare. Indeed they may not be able to ward off such threats to their existence without the political, economic and in the most serious cases, military assistance from Western Allies. Revolutionary war therefore poses the most serious challenge to peace today, which is why it is used as the main background to this pamphlet. Pre-requisites for Success 38. General. Any revolutionary movement, however small and localized, must satisfy certain basic requirements if it is to be successful and achieve its aim. The following pre-requisites apply particular to insurgency in the context of a revolutionary war but also in some degree to any local revolt or rebellion. 39. Popular Support. The revolutionary movement must aim at gaining the support of the population. This, with the aid of strong propaganda, will probably come easily if based on real grievances and weak government. The most general causes were given in paragraph 20; such causes will be used to fuse the population into a revolutionary movement. The civilian population must provide food, shelter, clothing, medical care, informants and recruits. If this support should not be forthcoming voluntarily it will be compelled by terror. 40. Strong Leadership. A revolution must be organized and controlled by a leader who is not only highly trained but a fanatic for his cause. He must be brave, tough, politically astute, cold blooded and utterly ruthless in imposing discipline and obedience on his followers. 41. Intelligence. Good intelligence is fundamental to the survival and successful growth of a revolutionary movement. A widespread and efficient intelligence organization must be established by the revolutionaries amongst the civilian population, government agencies, police and armed forces, providing them with the essential details for their strategic and tactical planning and for their propaganda and security. 42. Terrain. Favourable terrain in remote areas of under-developed countries, such as jungle, bush, swamps and mountains, which hampers the deployment of regular troops, is important. It also provides adequate cover from air and ground observation. In these areas, firm bases for guerrilla warfare are formed, and if near to friendly communist countries small airfields are constructed for supply and liaison. These bases then become, refuge, administrative and production areas. Where the frontier actually marches with that of a communist or sympathetic neighbour every attempt will be made by the insurgents to control 143 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED this frontier area so that the neighbour may be used for resupply, reinforcement and refuge should the insurgents be hard pressed. In better developed countries, especially those with large urban and industrial areas, the towns also provide favourable cover for terrorists and insurgents because here they can merge easily with the population. 43. Outside Support. All revolutionary movements today receive some outside support. The chief forms of aids are training facilities, cadres to stiffen the hardcore of the movement, funds, communications, equipment and military supplies, continuous propaganda originating from outside to support the movement inside the country, and covert assistance from embassies and legations. In the insurgency phase of a revolutionary war additional troops from other countries friendly to the insurgents may be committed. Without such outside assistance, and a safe haven in which insurgents can train, organize and equip, insurgency would rarely succeed. 44. Time. Time in which to develop a revolutionary organization is essential. Many years may be needed to reach the stage where a guerrilla force can be formed in to a regular force capable of destroying the administration and assuming control of the country. 45-49 Reserved.
SECTION 4-COMMUNIST

PATTERN OF REVOLUTIONARY WAR

General 50. The leaders of any revolutionary movement tend to copy the communist pattern. It is most important therefore for readers to remember that in many places where the word communist appears in this Section it could equally well be nationalist or revolutionary and the communist technique has merely been used as an example. 51. This Section describes in general terms how communist revolutionary warfare is organized and the pattern it follows, but communist leaders are flexible and opportunist in the methods they employ. They may use a variety of methods concurrently to achieve their aims. Communist Aim 52. The acknowledged communist aim is to establish government sympathetic to the communist cause in all countries of the world. They see this being achieved mainly through a three- stage process of political evolution: national liberation; socialism; communism. All means are employed to achieve this aim. Subversion, the staging of coups detaches and the exploitation of United Fronts are the primary means employed to overthrow weak or inexperienced governments. The support of local wars of various kinds does not conflict with the communist theory of peaceful co-existence which in communist terminology is defined as intense political, ideological and economic struggle. The need and justification for various types of armed struggle is accepted, provided that general war is avoided. Thus the communists frequently support indigenous independence movements with arms, instructors, and if necessary, fighting troops. The instigation of a state of insurgency and the staging of a revaluation are undertaken only when the circumstances seen to warrant them and other methods have failed or seem unlikely to succeed.

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RESTRICTED Protracted warfare 53. The communist recognize that at the beginning of a revolutionary war the balance of forces is likely to be in favour of the government they intend to overthrow. The process of changing this balance may be long and difficult. They expect no great success until the support of the people has been effectively won. They stress this fact by preparing their cadres for a protracted war, thus forestalling any disillusionment that may occur later among their forces.

Co-ordination of Political and Military Action 54. Revolutionary warfare is waged by the use of carefully co-ordinated political, economic, psychological and military measures. Military action is expected to succeed only when it is supported by the people. Mao Tse-tung has illustrated the relationship that should exist between the troops and the people by saying that insurgents must be able to move among the people as naturally as fish in water. To achieve this state of affairs the communists put forward local political objectives to appeal to the aspirations and exploit the grievances of the people. Thus they gain their sympathy. co-operation and active support. Military action is proceed and accompanied by effective political measures which include the use of propaganda and economic pressures designed to mobilize popular support and direct it against the government. Thus revolutionary war is planned as an armed struggle of the people under the closely co-ordinated direction of the local communist party. Phases of Revolutionary War 55. An analysis of the patterns of communist revolutionary wars shows that they normally have four phases, despite the much publicized three phases used by Mao Tse-tung. It can be seen, however, that these dovetail with the communist concept and provided they are known by the description of the phase and not by numerical sequence, confusion is avoided. There is no doubt that there are in fact four degrees of intensity in the full development, although the phases merge as parts of a continuous struggle. A diagrammatic pattern is at annex A. Preparatory Phase 56. During the preparatory phase the local communist party is organized and prepared for the struggle. Communists, who have been trained for their tasks either locally or in communist countries, set about establishing themselves in particular sections of the community. They may or may not belong to the country that is to be attacked. Some of them endeavour to infiltrate in to schools, youth organizations, trade unions, the press and government bodies, including the police and the armed forces, where they may later bring their influence to bear. Others establish themselves in the villages and aim to become accepted as normal worthy people. All attempt to build up good reputations and make themselves well informed about local affairs, politics, personalities and grievances. They report the information they acquire to their communist superiors. Camps may be set up in the remotest areas if this is safer or easier than preparing and establishing the organization from the urban arrears. All training however will be clandestine.

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RESTRICTED 57. When they are established these communists are given the task of forming cells of dissidents who are prepared to work for the revolutionary cause. Members of these cells are indoctrinated and trained for the coming struggle. They will collect taxes, liquidate informers and generally provide the strong arm to back up the methods of coercion and persuasion. As the organization expands, particular efforts are made to recruit from the professional classes. Doctors, barristers, politicians and other prominent citizens can by their influence encourage other dissidents to join the movement. They can also embarrass the government when eventually it is faced with the political problems of their arrest and their detention. Prominent people are used as front men or cheer leaders, while the party organizers remain anonymous. Other suitable dissidents are recruited as potential guerrillas and saboteurs. All these dissidents are not necessarily communists; some are dupes who are just hostile to the government and may thus be useful. The revolutionary movement at this stage may not be openly communist; it may for instance; be operating under the guise of a United Front of parties or factions that are dissatisfied with the government. 58. Political and military intelligence sections are now established within the party or expanded, and the effective working of the whole organization is overhauled. Special attention is given to intelligence work and a widespread network of informers is established. All supporters of the movement are expected to report on a wide variety of subjects irrespective of their particular tasks. 59. At this stage propaganda and psychological warfare have mainly peaceful aims and are directed towards winning the co-operation of the local people. Local grievances are aired and exploited and, if the revolutionary movement is now openly identified with communism, an effort is made to show how much better affairs are managed in neighbouring communist countries. To this end leaflets as well as medicines, radio sets and other attractive goods that have been produced in these countries may be distributed. These are especially welcome in remote and backward areas. 60. Summary. The intentions during this phase are to set up an efficient party organization, infiltrate communists in to key positions, recruit and train active workers, and gain support for the revolutionary movement to that it acquires momentum. Most of the action taken is covert. It is impossible to lay down a time scale but this preparation may take years. At this stage forces will only be used for the protection of camps and to intimidate and coerce the population, thus building up a cadre of those actively supporting the struggle or at least tacitly accepting it. It is when violence expands from these limited aims and is directed at the government and national instructions that the revolutionary war moves into the active resistance phase. Active Resistance Phase 61. When the party organization has been sufficiently prepared and the time seems to be propitious active resistance to the governments is encouraged and steps are taken to increase popular support for their revolutionary movement. This may still not be openly identified with communism. Cells in the party organization are expanded and further supporters are recruited. Some times by coersion. Coersion and terrorism are increasingly used against two main groups of people and for two main reasons. The first group is the local population from amongst whom ordinary people are murdered, either because they fail to provide material support in the form of food or money, or because they fail to respond with enthusiasm to the 146 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED rebel cause. Such murders are frequently done as a warning, pour encourager les autras. The second group includes everyone in a position of authority in the local government. These may range from village headmen to government officials, administrators, police and servicemen. The object of murdering people in this category is to disrupt the power of authority to resist the revolutionary movement and to remove effective opposition leadership. Other prime targets are special branch officers and agents. The use of propaganda and psychological warfare is intensified and made more militant with the aim of discrediting the government. A climate is dissidence civil disobedience and possibly industrials unrest engendered. Acts of sabotage begin to take place and guerrilla bands may start to operate in those areas where sufficient popular support has been gained. Factories and workshops for the manufacturer and repair of weapons are set up in safe areas if they exist, otherwise clandestinely. 62. This phase is characterized by acts of terrorism. As the phase progresses so the insurgents take on more ambitious targets. Small military parties are ambushed, isolated police posts attacked and military stores raided to capture arms and explosives. In following Maos dictum fight only when victory is certain; run away when it is not the terrorists will only attacked an ill prepared or weak force. In the early stages terrorist will operate largely by night hiding by day and melting away in the face of superior forces. Only as their successes increase and their confidence grows will such attacks take place in daylight or near to centres of military strength. The main intentions are to increase the amount of popular support for the movement, to eliminate or neutralize all opposition, to embarrass and discredit the government and to test, prepare further and train the party organization for the next phase. Insurgency Phase 63. As the revolutionary movement gains strength its military activity increases. Guerrilla warfare becomes more widespread. As the insurgents gain funds and capture arms and explosives so their hold and influence grow over the local population. It is when such a hold ensures the safe tenure of their bases and freedom to move in daylight over a wide surrounding area that a state of insurgency exist. Bases are fully established in inaccessible and relatively safe areas where recruits can be trained; regular revolutionary fighting units are formed and trained for their role during the open offensive phase. It is how that the insurgents most need foreign support in the procurement of weapons, equipments and advisers. If they are fortunate enough to have a sanctuary in a neighbouring country this will be invaluable to them for raising equipping and training new units. 64. At this stage steps are taken to enlarge the areas dominated by the guerrillas. Efforts are made to win support in areas adjacent to those they already control and these are gradually incorporated in whole districts that are then controlled by the insurgents. The process of expansion may be protracted and is carefully controlled. Usually in a mainly agricultural country no attempt is made to bring the larger cities and towns fall more easily when their supporting rural areas have been dominated. As each area under effective control by the guerrillas expands a revolutionary administration is set up. If by now the revolution is openly supported or identified with communism, the districts that are controlled may be declared liberated areas for propaganda purposes. The revolutionary government may also be recognized by other communists countries. 65. Military action in this phase is concentrated on attacking government security forces, especially small detachments such as police posts and miner military units in outlying areas. 147 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED The supply lines of the government forces are harassed and acts of sabotage are aimed at damaging communications and generally impairing the economy of the country. Attempts may also be made to sabotage military installation base areas. The military aim is now to extend harass and weaken the government forces and to deny them access to the areas controlled by the guerrillas. 66. Political action is continued in the form of intense propagandas, coercion, blackmail and terrorism which are used to win further popular support to neutralize opposition among the people and to undermine the moral of the governments forces and supporters. 67. The aim of the insurgents throughout this phase are to gain further popular support, to enlarge the areas under their control, to discredit the government, dishearten its supporters, weaken its forces and to demonstrate that the revolutionary movement is capable of providing an alternative and better government. The essence of insurgency is that the insurgents, not the local government, effectively control specific areas. Open offensive phase 68. The final phase starts when it is apparent that the balance has definitely swung in favour of the revolutionary forces. When this stage is reached the revolutionary movements assumes the form of a peoples war against the government. Large areas of the country are by now dominated and administered by the insurgents, Guerrilla war begin to be supplemented by mobile war in which large regular fighting units and even formations of divisional size operate against the government forces from communist controlled areas of the country. Some of these units may well have substantial artillery support. The struggle becomes a form of limited war which retains many of the characteristics of guerrilla operations. 69. Regular mobile warfare is normally only undertaken when adequate supplies of heavy equipment are obtainable and a sanctuary exists for the training of regular forces. The need of the insurgents for greatly increased supplies and for secure supply lines is crucial at this stage. They will require increased numbers of advisers to improve the quality of their forces and volunteers from other communist countries will be most welcome. 70. The communists only embark on this final stage of revolutionary war after very careful deliberation. The need for it will never arise if subversion and the results of previous activities have led to the overthrow of the government. When it is launched however the aim is to depose the government after the defeat of its military forces. If the result of this phase is not conclusive, the communists will aim to consolidate their gains by political manoeuvres and prepare for further expansion at a later date. Summary 71. The pattern of communist revolutionary war has been described in phases but the whole process is continuous, is managed with great flexibility and may be very protracted. The phases merge can be altered to suite the circumstances and may even be reversed. At all stages the primary aim is to win popular support and show that the revolutionary war is a peoples war of liberation against an unpopular and ineffective government. 72 79 Reserved

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SECTION 5 -THE

REVOLUTIONARY SOLDIER

General 80. If the revolutionary war is fought on the communist pattern there are likely to be various types and grades of insurgent soldier. An insurgent soldier will normally be; a. Used to the privations associated with a low standard of living. b. Able to carry heavy loads over long distances on foot. c. Able to exist for many weeks away from his base on merge rations. d. Trained in stealth and cunning. Aided by his native resourcefulness and local knowledge he is a skilful and adaptable opponent. e. Adept at the use of ground. Village and urban cells 81. Village cells normally consist of three to six people. In larger towns there will be many such cells. These cells then recruit further members and multiply. Village cells organize the local population in a support rule. From these cells suitable recruits are obtained for guerrilla service.

Village guerrillas 82. Suitable recruits are formed into village guerrillas whom operate from or close to their home village often in conjunction with regional and regular soldiers. By day the guerrilla works at his job but at night or in emergencies he is available for assignment by his superiors. The insurgents like to have five to ten guerrillas of this type in each village. In villages under insurgent control there may be a full squad of 10 to 16 or even a platoon of three or four such squads. A village section is likely to have a few anti-vehicle mines and some grenades. It will probably own rifle stolen from local police stations and small military posts and patrols. Its main armament will therefore be a variety of firearms in addition to knives, machetes, spears and other hand weapons. 83. As the result of intensive indoctrination by the hard core cadre some of the villagers will undoubtedly be volunteers for this role but records show that many young men are dragooned into service as guerrillas. Some are kidnapped, others are threatened and others joint to prevent their families being harmed. In a village where there are few secrets, the identity of the guerrillas is probably known to most of the inhabitants, but fear of brutal reprisals ensures security. The guerrilla is therefore not readily identifiable by government forces. He conceals his activities until such time as there are sufficient converts to allow him to proclaim publicly his allegiance to the cause. 149 RESTRICTED

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84. The guerrilla does not receive much formal military training and takes part in military action only in emergencies or when specifically required to play a supporting role to regional or regular troop activities. Such military training as he has is devoted to the use of camouflage or concealment, weapon handling, elementary tactics and a study of the government forces and their tactics. He is taught how to set simple ambushes, dig defence works, site hides and dig man-traps. Seventy per cent of his training time, however is taken up with political indoctrination which is through. He is taught to obey unquestioningly even when the tasks given are repugnant to him. The chief value to the insurgents of village guerrillas is that they provide an effective intelligence organization for passing on all available information concerning the movements of government forces; they are, in fact, the eyes and ears of the revolutionary movement within the village communities. They also provide a labour force for the carriage and storage of food and equipment thus playing a part in the very flexible logistic system. 85. For a variety of reasons many individuals may advance up the scale of revolutionary soldiery, but will continue to serve in the ranks of the guerrillas indefinitely. Others who are young and unmarried and whose absence from the area can be explained or who demonstrate a degree of political understanding and efficiency will send to selected areas to become regional soldiers. Regional soldiers 86. These are organized into companies or even battalions and are better armed and equipped than village guerrillas, usually with good quality small arms and light mortars captured or stolen from the security forces. They are not normally used before the insurgency phase has been reached. A typical organization for an insurgent regional battalion is shown at annex C. 87. A regional soldier devotes about half his time to his time to his military activities and the other half of his normal civilian occupation. He may be away for several days at a time on specific training or operational activities. He will already have received some military training before joining and will have been successfully subjected to intensive indoctrination. Nevertheless, half his training time is still devoted to political study. A regional unit serves in the province of its origin with, ideally, squads coming from the same village and companies from one or more districts. Concentration is effected from squad to platoon to company. Dispersal is on similar lines unless unforeseen pressure forces individuals to scatter. 88. In most instances the regional is clad in his normal working clothes and carries his ammunition in a rough canvas bag or bandolier over the shoulder. About one half of a regional unit is armed with modern fire arms. Those who are unarmed attain armed status by rescuing arms from killed or wounded comrades or by capture. The security forces provide the main source of weapons. It therefore follows that the standard of equipment of a regional unit is in direct proportion to its success in battle. Arms so obtained are often passed to other regional or regular units if required. When in his village the regional soldier hides his weapon and lives the life of a peaceful villager. 89. Regional soldiers must concentrate and disperse quickly in order to carry out their tasks. They often cover long distance by night across the grain of the country. In this phase of his training the regional soldier is introduced to the hardness and severity of guerrilla 150 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED warfare which he will also find in increasing measure if he graduates through skill and leadership qualities to become a regular soldier. Regular soldiers 90. After a district has been thoroughly indoctrinated and brought under insurgent influence. Regional soldiers will be concentrated to form regular units. These are likely to be armed, trained, organized and equipped along conventional communist bloc lines. They are the main forces of the insurgent movement and are reserved for the destruction of inferior government forces anywhere in the country; and particularly for the main task of mounting the open offensive phase. These forces will normally be created only when they can be supplied and maintained by a friendly population. When possible the manpower and logistic requirements will be augmented from an adjacent and sympathetic country. The manpower assistance from outside will include trained leaders, technicians and in some cases, complete units and formations. Such forces can then be expected to have heavy support weapons and artillery support with even air support not totally discounted. 91. When a regional soldier becomes a regular soldier he leaves his own village and moves to an area, perhaps a village base where all the men are soldiers. Alternatively his subunit may be based in a jungle, bush, and mountain or swamp area with other sub-units. 92. In a village base he will live in a reasonably safe environment where he receives ample and timely warning from outlying regional units and guerrillas of government forces penetrating in his direction. He will eat and live in comparative comfort and the hardship of war will only be faced when his unit moves out against enemy targets. Then he will be compelled to live on what he carries and will moves as quickly as possible, carrying substantial weights for long distances. 93. Regular soldiers in the other type of base have a more rigorous existence. They must always be on their guard against penetration by government security forces. Their bases must be carefully concealed from ground and air observation and this may necessitate frequent moves. Because these bases are normally sited some distance from habitation, rations are often meagre. The bases are carefully sited for ease of defence and to facilitate a quick getaway. Security within the base is considered most important. Sentries cover all obvious approaches and bamboo spikes, camouflaged pits and other booby trap devices are used in the plan of defence. 94. Life for the regular soldier is a very full one. He has long hours of military instruction but over a quarter of his training time is still devoted to political indoctrination. The regular soldier is armed with a good weapon of communist bloc or western origin and over and above the normal small arms; a regular unit may have; 728 a. b. c. d. e. f. Light and heavy machine guns. Light mortars. Medium mortars. Recoilless rifles. Anti vehicle and anti personnel mines. Rocket launchers.

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RESTRICTED 95. The regular soldier will have a proper uniform and may wear a western or communists bloc type web belt with water bottle and carry a haversack and ammunition pouches. His rations and ammunitions are usually carried in two stout canvas bags slung from each shoulder. He will wear some form of military headgear and rough leather shoes or rubber sandals and will carry a blanket, a sharp machete and a length of plastic material for protection against the rain to complete his personal equipment. On arrival in a regular unit the regional soldier is exposed to formal and intensive discipline under trained cadre staffs. 96. In the regular insurgent forces infantry is considered the decisive combat arm and all soldiers receive intensive basic infantry training. Weapon training is conducted carefully and methodically to ensure that all soldiers are capable of handling with skill the various types of weapons available. Great emphasis is placed on camouflage and concealment. Considerable time is taken in studying terrain and cross country navigation and long marches are undertaken to test navigation and stamina. After basic infantry training some riflemen specialize on heavier weapons-machine guns, recoilless rifles and mortars. Insurgent forces develop great skill in the use of these weapons, particularly mortars. Political studies continue and the favourite communist device self criticism is widely used. Many of the soldiers are illiterate but from their ranks will come the non-commissioned officers and platoon or company level commanders who require varying of literacy; some time is therefore also devoted to giving the soldiers a general education. 97. The period of graduation for an insurgent soldier from the guerrilla fighter to the rank of the regular units is filled with action and experience. During this period he has gained much military knowledge. Has experienced combat and learned to adapt him self to military life. The process of advancing through this system may take several years. The final effect of his training is to produce an experienced well trained, dedicated and enthusiastic soldier. Commanders 98. The opportunity and scope for training company and platoon commanders is obviously restricted. Insurgent commanders are devoted to the cause and will lead by example. The state of their tactical training will probably not be as good relatively as the individual skill of the insurgent. They command ruthlessly and have few scruples about using brutal methods to achieve their aim. 99. Reserved
SECTION 6 -

INSURGENT COMMAND AND STAFF ORGANIZATION

100. A military insurgency organization will divide the country into military regions; these will often follow the governmental military region boundaries. Regions will be divided into district and again into regiment, battalion, and company etc. areas with HQ. Regional HQ often doubles the function of regional and district HQ. Regular and regional forces are commanded only through military command channels, but village guerrillas usually come under the control of the local political HQ. They may however come under regional or regular units for specific operations. At every level there is co-ordination between military and political staffs. Intelligence and propaganda

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RESTRICTED 101. Insurgent intelligence agencies permeate all walks of life. They not only collect and disseminate intelligence but also direct small operations against individuals, installations, etc. These agencies are normally grouped under the following headings; a. Party and political intelligence. b. Secret intelligence. c. Security service. d. Military intelligence. e. Military propaganda service. 102. Of the above military intelligence and the military propaganda service affects us most directly. 103. Military intelligence. Sub-units are found in all insurgent units at all levels. Village guerrillas and cells are the main sources of information. 104. Military propaganda service. Its aims are to encourage desertion and organize treachery within the government and security forces and it works in very close co-operation with party and political intelligence. One of its main functions is to provoke its contacts into acts of treason against the government. The insurgent propaganda organization includes the dissemination of information, the establishment of information centres in houses , shops or cafes along routes used by government forces, telephone cells to government posts and passing letters from deserters to their former comrades. Administration and the Formation of an Insurgent Firm Base 105. The logistic support of guerrilla and regional insurgents is depended on bases. When regular units are formed they normally function with an administrative tail, drawing upon guerrilla bases if required. 106. The population is regarded as the vital element in supporting the insurgent force during the organization and functioning of bases. All adults under 45 are organized to help in some way. 107. Generally there are two main areas which lead themselves to the establishment of firm bases firstly there are the mountainous, bush, wooded, jungle or swamp areas in remote districts where by virtue of the terrain it is difficult for government forces to penetrate. It is in this type of area that the first bases may be established during the preparatory and active resistance phases. Secondly, there are the populated rural areas where the people have all accepted indoctrination and the insurgents are in full political and administrative control. In a reasonably populated area the establishment of a firm base follows a set pattern; a. A propaganda campaign is mounted among the civil population and individuals are selected as nuclei for the necessary organization. This propaganda is accompanied when necessary by terrorism. b. Deports of all natures are established to provide logistic support. They consist of a multitude of small caches which are spread over a large area and are therefore difficult to locate. c. When the area is politically ripe with depots established and rations assured the guerrilla forces take over. Only then does major insurgency start.

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RESTRICTED 108. At this stage revolutionary reforms may be introduced by the insurgents in any area they control in order to obtain the full support of the population. A common method is the redistribution of land holdings combined with the elimination of hostile elements, e.g. the previous land owners. 109. The appropriate insurgent district committee draws up plans for the defence of the firm base ensuring co-ordination of efforts between guerrilla and regional forces. Villagers are listed and the tasks for their guerrillas lay down. Some are ordered to form forfeit centres, some to undertake liaison between governments controlled and liberated areas, others to watch the security forces and report on their movements. 110. When the firm bases are ready, regional units are formed have to use the bases to extend the scope of operations. With the establishment of firm bases troops can move about swiftly, without the encumbrance of supply trains and secure in the knowledge that the popular organizations within their area of operations will have stockpiled supplies ahead of them. The bases will also be stocked, as far as possible, to serve the regular forces in the open offensive phase. 111 119 Reserved
SECTION 7

- TACTICS OF REVOLUTIONARY WAR

General 120. On the military side insurgent operations in revolutionary war are waged initially by sabotage and terrorism, which in the preparatory phase are on a small scale but increase in scope and intensity in successive phases. They may develop into guerrilla operation and even ultimately into limited war. Sabotage 121. Active. Sabotage activities are usually carefully co-ordinated with tactical operations at regional HQ. Agents or urban terrorist gangs carry out special missions in the cities and factories while in the rural areas sabotage cadres supervise trained village guerrillas. The primary mission of the saboteurs is to disrupt government communications, increase general confusion and to tie down as many government troops as possible in the static defence of communication and installations. The main targets are therefore bridges roads , railways, telephone lines, military supply dumps, sewers power lines water supplies and transport , but targets whose destructions might cause mass unemployment and thereby lose of the people are carefully avoided. 122. Passive. Passive sabotage in key government industries and communication centre will be organized through political front organizations, with the object of promoting economic disorder and interrupting or blocking the movement of government supplies and troops. Such operations include strikes and working to rule, deliberate errors in dispatching supplies, contrived accidents, absenteeism and sabotage of machinery by neglect. Terrorism

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RESTRICTED 123. Terrorism is one of the principal weapons of revolutionaries, who believe that to be fully effective it must be absolute. It is used to demoralize those who are loyal to the government to extort support from those who are politically uncommitted and as a means of maintaining discipline and enforcing obedience among individual revolutionary soldiers. For example it is made clear that even through a man has been forcibly drafted into the revolutionary movement his defection on patrol is punishable by death. Should a defector reach an area free from insurgent control he knows that retribution will be exacted from his family. 124. Terrorist operations in government held territory are carried out by guerrilla bands or special assassination squads against individuals or whole groups of people. The targets of assassination squad are those people to whom the ordinary inhabitants of the country will look for leadership and example; they will therefore include the persons families and property of influential citizens such as politicians professionals men and industrial commercial and union leaders. The terrorism may be taking the form of beatings, kidnappings, blackmail, mutilation, assassination arson or bombing. Threats of terrorism are used to force individuals to obey rebel instructions and terrorists will often use government police or military vehicles and uniforms during such operations to discredit the government and deceive the public. 125. In insurgent held areas mass terrorism may be directed against sections of the population who because of race class, origins wealth or employment, are judged to be progovernment. Revolutionary leaders will involve the local inhabitants in their acts of terrorism and thus compel them to associate themselves with the uprising. For example, villagers will often be required to murder landlords under the guise of carrying out death sentences imposed by so-called peoples courts. Guerrilla Tactics 126. Guerrilla warfare is the most militant manifestation of the insurgency phase. Mao Tse-tung has written a great deal about the subject and is generally accepted as being a leading authority on guerrilla warfare as well as being the architect of the broader concept of revolutionary war. Mao Tse-tung accepts as the basis for guerrilla warfare that war will be protracted, that control of the countryside is essential and that widespread intelligence network must be established. Against this background he has laid down certain guide lines which should govern all guerrilla tactics. Although these were drawn up with Asia in mind, they and the communist guerrilla tactics which spring from them could apply equally or with only minor modifications, to other area. These guide lines, from which emanate the tactical trends described in later paragraphs, are; a. b. c. d. e. f. g. Act with speed and maintain mobility Always seek to deceive and surprise. Make an uproar in the east and strike in the west Be as cautious as a virgin and as quick as a rabbit If the enemy withdraws, pursue. If the enemy advances, withdraw. When the enemy halts, trouble him. Particularly by night attacks, to prevent him resting and to unnerve him. h. When the enemy seeks to avoid battle, attack. i. Divide and destroy the enemy; dont hold places and cities 155 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED j. In attack ten against one. k. Fight only when victory is certain; run away when it is not. 127. Mobility. Because insurgent force is generally numerically inferior and lack sophisticated logistic backing they avoid positional warfare and fight what Mao Tse- Tung calls mobile warfare. This implies an ability to move large forces quickly on foot carrying, if necessary support weapons with them. Rapid foot movement across difficult country and the ability to concentrate quickly on arrival in a new area is the insurgents greatest asset distance of up to 50 miles can be achieved in 24 hours. Such movement calls for careful preparation and reconnaissance, and co-ordination of support from local guerrillas on route. Dispersion after an operation has to be similarly organized. 128. Deception. This is achieved by;

a. False intelligence Deliberately planted on government forces by apparent sympathizers, returning prisoners or deserters with pre arranged stories, treacherous guides or decoys. b. Fake surrenders - A complete guerrilla unit may apparently defect and join the government forces. Their aim is to obtain equipment and training prior to redefection at a critical stage. c. Exploitation of treachery - Penetrating government security forces with a view to obtaining weapons and carrying out subversion and acts treason. 129. Surprise. This can be achieved by; a. Calculated deception. b. Diversionary action. c. Attacks in areas which have previously been quiet. d. Attacks at long distances away from known guerrilla bases. e. Speed of approach marches. f. Skilful use of ground in attack and defence. g. Merging with the local population.

130. Camouflage and Concealment. Insurgent attach great importance to camouflage and concealment. Harsh discipline is imposed during training and in the course of operations to achieve a high standard of personal and equipment camouflage. Camouflage and concealment during movement is paramount, all soldiers changing or rearranging their personal camouflage frequently in order to blend with the local surrounding at all times. Great in gauntly is also shown in concealing arms caches, stores and hiding places in general. Material caches or hides are very difficult to locate. Hides for personnel are usually spacious, with ventilators and drainage sumps and contain blankets, clothes, water and food. The pattern of construction is usually a narrow tunnel leading to one or two rooms, the following a zigzag course and petitioned by bulkheads to deflect any blast from explosives. Some favourite entrance positions are;
a. Through a night soil pit. b. Under an animal stall. c. In a clump of dense bush. d. Through a siphon entrance in a river, canal or stream bank.

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131. Ambushes. The ambush is the widely used guerrilla tactic because it makes the fullest use of surprise and allows a smaller force to engage a larger one effectively. Ambushes are often sited in broken ground where camouflage and concealment is easy but they may also be sited in open clear ground where there is good observation over long stretches of road. In the later case the ambush positions are completely dug in and concealed and the ambushes rise from the ground to spring the ambush. Because of the apparent unlikelihood of an ambush inflate open country the ambushers often achieve complete surprise. Insurgent will frequently stage an incident deliberately in order to lure the security forces into an ambush. There are two main types; a. Hit and run ambush. This designed to impose delay, to inflict casualties and to cause the diversion of security forces to route protection. It is a common task for village guerrillas and the strength of the ambushes may be as little as two or three men and the target a small patrol of one or two vehicles. This type of ambush may take place in any phase of revolutionary war. It is frequently employed in covering a guerrilla withdrawal. b. Annihilation ambush. This is a larger affair in which even a large force of up to a battalion may be isolate and destroyed. In this type of ambush the convoy is first effectively stopped by an element of up to company strength with the help of demolitions. The centre of the convoy is then assaulted by the main assault force. If cover is scarce the force will halt in position up to 800- 1,200 meters away and will move up once the ambush has been sprung under the cover of propositioned supporting weapons. Once the convoy has been engaged the rear stop will close the ambush and intercept any reinforcements. 132. Infiltration. Guerrilla tactics make extensive use of infiltration, because the ground and the nature of operations often permit even large forces to live undetected inside government dominated territory. 133. Sparrow tactics. In the active resistance and subsequent phases village guerrillas and regional troops split into small groups along roads frequented by security forces in order to; a. Snipe at all who venture outside fortified posts. b. Cause delays and so restrict movement. 134. Attack. A deliberate attack against a prepared position is generally only undertaken after meticulous preparation and when sufficient superiority has been achieved. Provided the full sequence has been followed insurgent commanders will have been taught to make detailed arrangements under such headings as; a. Preparation, including reconnaissance and dumping. b. Breaching. c. Fire support. d. Assault plan. e. Complementary guerrilla attacks elsewhere. f. Withdrawal plan. g. Recovery of casualties and weapons. 157 RESTRICTED

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135. Defence. Guerrillas will be on the defensive because they are not yet strong enough to go over to the offensive, to lure the enemy into an area where he can be destroyed, or to defend a vital base area. Whatever the reason their concept of defence will always be aggressive and if possible only temporary. It will often be based on a complex of defended or fortified villages to which the whole population is committed. These will be dealt with more fully in part 3- counter insurgency, but framework for defence can be summarized as follows; a. Observation villages. There are located in areas controlled by the government. Along lines of communication or on the fringes of guerrilla infested zones. They are organized into intelligence cells to which all other villagers report all movement of government forces. Observation villages avoid all action likely to bring reprisals. b. Passive villages. The majority of the villages around an insurgent base area have duties similar to those of an observation village, but features such as watch towers, cleared fields of fire and isolate sniping serve to confuse the enemy as to whether these villages are real centre of resistance. Searchers may encounter booby traps and mines within these villages. DIAGRAMMATIC LAYOUT OF TYPICAL DEFENCES OF A FORTIFIED VILLAGE

C.

Fortified Villages. The usual characteristics of fortified villages are; (1). Approaches are cleared. Surrounding country may be flooded and roads leading into the village are narrowed to less than the width required by motor transport. (2). A thick belt of belt of obstacles is constructed round the perimeter of the village; within which are inter communicating fire position.

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RESTRICTED (3). The interior of the village is divided up in to active and passive areas the latter consist of obstacles and heavily minded and booby trapped areas designed to lead attacking troops into ambushes in the active area. (4). Numerous tunnels are constructed to link active areas to each other to the central strong point from which counter attacks will be launched, and to various hides , rest rooms and supply and arms stores. Tunnels will also lead to emergency exsist and to other neighbouring hamlets to allow escape in the face of a hard passed attack. (5). the defence of the village will be based on three echelons: (a) First line- using terrain outside village. (b) Second line on the perimeter of the village. (c) Third line- using dominant features and strong point within the village. d. Additional points on Defence.

(1). Before a security forces attack on a fortified village is due the guerrillas normally evacuate the population to a safe refuge or conceal them underground. (2). The defence is designed to delay the security force assault until nightfall, when they must choose between continuing under extremely unfavourable conditions halting in an exposed position or withdrawing until the next day which may give the defenders a chance to slip away through their escape tunnels. (3). Where the defenders are faced with a large scale clearing operation which they have little hope of resisting successfully , they will try to break out of the area of encirclement leaving small elements behind to continue resistance and barras the enemy. The guerrillas who have escaped may then move round the flank and rear of the attacker and seek to rag the initiative by surprise attacks and ambushes. 136. Mines and booby traps. Guerrillas make considerable use of mines and booby traps. The types used are anti-tank mines, improvised mines from shells and areas bombs, numerous booby traps using grenades and shells and man-traps with spikes in them. The skill and cunning with which mines, and particularly booby traps, can be set by insurgents is of a very high order. To attempt to give guidance in a few sentences would be worthless. All security forces must be well trained to deal with these hazards and must consider them in all types of operation. 137. Anti tank Tactics. Some methods are to: a. Destroy road surfaces. b. Place remote-controlled mines in the roadway with the fire in a nearby ditch c. Mine tank tracks. d. Throw smoke grenades, followed by grenades on cords designed to wrap around the guns. e. Mine crossroads and other turning places. f. Hold a strong force near an obstacle to destroy the tank when it slows down. g. Use light and medium anti-tank weapons.

138. Air Defence. Insurgents that have been located or are operating overtly will use small arms aggressively against helicopters and low flying air craft. If unallocated they are trained not to fire.

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139-149 Reserved

CHAPTER 3 - PRINCIPLES FOR THE CONDUCT OF COUNTER REVOLUTIONARY OPERATIONS

SECTION 8

- GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT ACTION

Aim 150. The aim of counter revolutionary operations is totally to destroy the revolutionary movement. This is not purely a matter of soldier killing insurgeants, but has far wider political and social aspects. initially counter revolutionary operations must check the progression of revolt , rebellion and insurgency then it must force the insurgents back to an earlier phase in their activities ; next it must destroy the revolutionary movement ; finally and concurrently with order measures , it must rectify any political and social wrongs. There are innumerable facets to this subject, and this Chapter deals both with the part which has to be played by a government and the local civil authorities and also with the organization required for co-ordinate civil and military action. Principles 151. National plan. Counter revolutionary operations can never be prosecuted successfully unless and until a national policy which mobilizes the full national potential, can be established for its conduct. The outstanding lesson from past revolutionary wars is that no single programme-political, military, psychological, social or economic-is sufficient by itself to counter a determined revolutionary movement. 152. Good Government. Any permanent solution must be based on the provision of good government by an administration that is aware of and in sympathy with the aspirations of the mass of the people. The importance of this is highlighted by the fact that all measures taken to provide good government will be viciously and continuously attacked by the revolutionaries. 153. Popular support. Since revolutionary operations aim to win or coerce the support of the people, a government can successfully counter them only by ensuring that it regains this support. This is likely to be a long and difficult struggle fought; against the strong appeal which communist and national propaganda is likely to have, and against the fear resulting from terrorism. Unless popular support is regained, however purely military actions 160 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED will fail to have any permanent effect. The whole national plan must therefore be directed to winning this support. National plan 154. A national plan will involve co-ordinated government action and should include; a. The passing of emergency regulations to facilitate the conduct of a national campaign. b. Various political, social and economic measures designed to gain popular support and counter or surpass anything offered by the insurgents. c. The setting up of an effective organization for joint civil and military control at all levels; this is covered in the next section. d. The forming up an effective integrated and nation-wide intelligence organization, without which military operations will never be successful. e. The strengthening of indigenous police and armed forces so that their loyalty is beyond question and their work effectively. This is often easier said than done. f. Control measures designed to isolate the insurgents from popular support; this is covered in Section 29. Co-ordinated Government action 155. The legal government must be firmly established and be seen to govern. This is not always the case, and weak central government is frequently a contributory factor to the uprising. Outside military forces may well have to bolster up the central government but it must always be made apparent that is the government who run the country and not the outside military power. Measures taken must be issued in the name of the government and all joint committees headed by a national official. 156. It is the governments duty to formulate its political aims and make them known to everyone. Without a clearly stated policy, effective co-ordinated action is unlikely. 157. It is difficult to determine, in abstract, what social and economic measures are necessary to achieve these aims, but a government will probably have to make some attempt at some or all of the following; a. Removal of whatever social, political or economic grievances are tending to justify the rebel cause, particularly an inequitable system of land tenure. b. Political reform to franchise the population, giving freedom of political expression. c. The establishment of sound, incorrupt central and regional government, with every department, acting in accordance with government policy and in consultation with other departments. d. Respect and support for local religions and minorities. e. An education system which is open to all. f. Mounding of public opinion in support of the national programme. g. An amnesty plan for the rehabilitation of surrendered insurgents. h. Ensuring impartial, humane and honest administration of justice. i. Food distribution of control, both to relieve starvation and to prevent food from reaching the insurgents.

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RESTRICTED j. Rehabilitation measures designed to help those who have lost homes or work due to the insurgency. k. Keeping the population informed. Public Opinion and Popular Support 158. The government must keep its finger on the pulse of public opinion in urban and rural areas. Only by doing so can the government know and assess the views and grievances of the population and the improvements needed to counteract them. 159. Public Relations. While it is gathering information the government must also keep the people informed of its policies and the action it is taking in their interest. For these purpose it should maintain properly staffed information on which public opinion can be formed. Psychological operations should be mounted to improve the moral of the people in government controlled areas and undermine the confidence of those in areas under insurgent control. (Considered in detail in Chapter 9) 160. The press. The government should permit a free press to exist, as far as this is possible. While it obviously cannot allow publication of subversive propaganda and must apply safeguards to meet the needs of security, it should be aware of the danger of stiffing criticism and suppressing honest opposition to its policies. Action to muzzle the press almost invariably rebound on the government, and any proposed restrictions on press activities must be carefully considered. The press, properly handled is potentially one of the governments strongest weapons. Within the country it is a vehicle for passing information between the government and the people. A favourable attitude by representatives of the foreign press will result in the sympathy and support from other countries. 161. Radio and Television. The value of the radio telecast for publicity and propagandas is so great that the free provision of a receiving set for each village community is a most desirable target. The frequency range must be carefully selected, however, to avoid the set being use to listen to counter propaganda broadcasts, The reception of television broadcasts is at present confined to the most populated areas, and the equipment for reception is expensive; but when it can be provided, and particularly among a largely liberate population, it is a most effective means of persuasion. 162. Justice. In any society a frequent cause of discontent is the maladministration of justice. To maintain support for the government, the courts must regularly and impartially dispense justice and be seen to do so. Offenders must be caught and brought to triad quickly, evidence produced against them, witness protected from coercion and judgment given and enforced fairly. The various agencies responsible for these tasks must be strong enough to carry them out. The dispensation of justice in a faire and human the government can show the people that it takes a close interest in looking after their legitimate interests. Such evident concern in the peoples welfare is a prime factor in wining popular support. Security Intelligence 163. As well as an effective public relations organization the government must also have an efficient centralized intelligence organization that will provide it with timely intelligence on all matters affecting the security of the at state. This should provide intelligence reports 162 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED about people, their activities, their affiliations, and the aims and actions of the leaders of the leaders of discontented groups. Such a service is vital if timely and effective measures are to be taken to redress grievance and to restore public order and confidence, should disturbance and rioting take place or be likely. One of the main targets of this organization must be the operation of the insurgent organization by the police special branch. To be effective Special Branch must be allocated adequate funds by the governments may be reluctant to provide sufficient money, but-past experience has shown that Special Branch cannot be expended or built up rapidly to meet an emergency. Strong and Popular security Forces 164. Good security intelligence will, however, be ineffective unless the government has adequate and efficient forces for maintaining public order. An efficient, loyal police force with the sympathy and support of the people is the first requirement. Where a state of insurgency has arisen the loyalty of the police force may be doubtful. Its resources will certainly be stretched, and its moral and the regard in which it is held by the people may have suffered. Where this has happened the leadership must be stiffened and morale improved. Until this is done the police will be unable to discharge their duties effectively and the armed forces are not equipped for police tasks. This is undesirable as the armed forces are not equipped for police tasks. This is undesirable as the armed forces in duties. It shows the need, however, for the training of the armed forces in all types of counter insurgency roles. The police forces must take over their own duties as soon as possible and the armed forces released for military tasks. 165. The police and local military forces should represent the people as whole. Ideally they should be recruited from all section of the people and not only one race or class. They must be neither partisan nor oppressive in their behaviour but should make a determined effort to maintain good relations with the public. While much can be done by parades and demonstrations by assistance to local welfare activities and by helping in times of national disaster, it will be on their behaviour in the discharge of their duties and in their day-to day contact with the people and their ability to protect them that success of failure will rest. Summary 166. The only effective and permanent counter to a revolutionary movement is good government which alone will gain and maintain the support. The government must coordination all the various activities so that they are purposefully directed towards aim of clearly stated and widely publicized policy which is in the best interest of the people. The security forces and civil administration must be strong enough for their task which they must fulfil humanely and efficiently. While military operations are an essential ingredient of the national plan. It is vital to keep them in proper perspective in relation to the national plan as a whole. 167-169. Reserved
SECTION 9 - ORGANIZATION

FOR CO-ORDINATED CIVIL AND MILITARY ACTION

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170. It was made clear in the previous section that the ability to co-ordination the action of all the civil and military forces of the government in the national plan is the principal ingredient of success in counter revolutionary operations. The organization required to achieve this will be influenced by the constitution of the country, the personalities of the leaders, the size and effectiveness of the security force, the degree of insurgency, the structure of local government and many other factors. Every country and situation is different and no stranded organization can be suitable for all situations. The organization finally adopted must however ensure:
a. Joint direction of operations consultation and far as security allows, joint planning at all level. b. The collection of information and the production of intelligence on which sound operational decisions can be taken. c. The security of bases public utilities and installation against attack by terrorist and gorillas. d. Effective action by mobile armed forces in depth. e. The safety of loyal people within the ever expanding controlled areas. f. The rapid introduction into controlled areas of measures to reduce grievance and of good government in general in order to speed the process of pacification.

Political Aspects 171. Although British forces called in to assist the local government, will have little opportunity for the purely civil sphere, all soldiers must understand the problem, be aware of national political and ensure that all military are co-ordination with and complementary aims. A military commander must support the policies of the national government and demonstrate clearly to the civilian population particularly at the lowest levels, that his action and those of the units under his command stem from that policy. Joint Tasks 172. The insurgents must be isolated physically and psychologically from their civilian support. To do this, joint action need to be taken in certain fields and may include:
a. Control of the population, by registration and by establishing zones in which movement and residence are restricted, and by curfews, food control and search operations designed to trap insurgents living among the civil population b. Resettlement operations to separate insurgents from the population. c. Establishment of village self-defence or home guard units to free regular forces from guard duties. d. Activities which provide military assistance to the national economy and social programmers and thereby win the support and co-operation of the population for the work of the security forces. e. Psychological operations within the framework of the national political program to gain the support of the civil population and to depress the morale of the insurgents.

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A defensive stitude in these matters is as useless politically as it is military. Insurgents are not harmless because they appear inactive, and their pressure on the civil population is often greatest during an apparently quiet phase. The political attack as well as the military must be pressed with vigour and should be aimed at the basic weaknesses of an insurgent movement, many of whose members may be selfish, ambitious, who are maladjusted to normal society. Frequently their leaders will have rival ambitions. The movement may contain mutually suspicious ethnic groups and it may be possible to persuade the weaker ones that their interest are not been considered by their leaders. There may also be ideological differences between extremists and moderates. Finally there are the weaknesses inherent in a situation in which as well as the constant danger of betrayal there are difficulties brought about, by bad living conditions and relatively poor military equipment and facilities. All these factors can be successfully exploited by military psychological operations in co-ordination with political action. These aspects are covered in fuller detail in Chapters 8 and 9.
173.

High Command

174. National Defence Council. A council is needed at the highest level to decide the policy for the conduct of the campaign to pacify the country and remove the causes of revolt. The title of this council will vary; so will its composition. The latter will depend on the form of government and the characters of its leaders. To be effective, the council should have as its chairman, the head of the government and its permanent membership should include his deputy and some of the more important ministers. The chiefs of the armed forced and police, a director of operations and other persons may be co-operated of where necessary to discuss particular subjects. These temporary members of the council should advice, but not participate in the taking of decisions.

175. The Director of Operations. The appropriate ministers should take the executive action necessary to implement the decisions of the national defence council concerning civil departments. It is desirable to appoint one director of operations to ensure that the military action take by all the security forces is co-ordinated and effective. He should be responsible to the head of the government for the co-ordination and direction of all the security forces, both military and civil which have been allotted for counter insurgency operations. He exercises his authority by issuing instructions toregional operations and executive committees. He is normally an officer of the armed forces but could be a senior police officer. He will have a small Staff to assist him in planning operation and issuing suitable instructions. It must be recognized, however that for political reasons the head of government may not always be prepared to delegate such authority to one individual, and the authority of a council may have to suffice. 176. War Council or National Operations Committee. The director of operations, if appointed, will be the chairman of a council or committee which is the executive instrument for implementing the military policy. Its members should include the heads of the military services and police. The chief of intelligence services, the director of psychological operations and such civil administrative officers as are needed. Where British forces are 165 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED committed in a foreign or Commonwealth country the ambassador, high commissioner or special representative (possibly the theatre commander-in-chief), of the British Government should be a member of the national operations committee. The task of the committee will include: a. The submission of intelligence and other military assessments to the national defence council. These will provide the basis for the formulation of the governments defence policy and decisions. b. The issue of orders given effect to the decisions of the national defence council in the military sphere. c. The co-ordination, control and development of the security forces in operations.

Control of Operation 177. Subordinate Committees. For day to day control, integrated coordination committees must be formed at the regional/province/district level. These committees regional/province /district level these committees may be known by a variety of names-local operational committee, war executive council, operations command and so on. In this pamphlet the title of operations committee will be used. The chairman of committee should be the senior officer of the local civil government, for example at provincial level a provincial govrenor, thus demonstrating that military operations are in support of the government. Its members must include the local military and police commanders, representatives of the intelligence organization and if necessary some selected civilian experts such as the head of PWD, forestry officers and the local health officer. If British force are involved the commanding officers of ouw own formation/units would be included on this committees at the appropriate level. 178. Joint Secretariats. In an emergency a considerable extra secretarial load will fall upon the staffs of government, the military and the police at all levels. If the committees are to function smoothly arrangements must be the made for the distribution of agendas and briefing papers, the taking and issue of minutes and the issuing of orders or decisions that emanate from the committees. In addition there are usually daily reports to be made to higher authority and the press must be dealt with by press release or the calling of press conferences. There is also the vital need for security in the reproduction and distribution of papers which requires the maintenance of Registers for classified correspondence. Plans must be made to establish adequate joint secretariats at the appropriate levels, otherwise the implementation of decision taken by the various committees will be slow and almost certainly insecure. 179. Military Responsibilities. In the preparatory phase of a revolutionary the military role is predominantly one of support. Whatever the degree of insurgency however, the limits of the military commanders authority must be carefully preserved. Where the civil administration has collapsed or where none has existed in the past, it may be necessary for the military of the military to the set anted operate the organization required for both the conduct of operations commander will need an appointed political adviser. It is certain that under the circumstances the revolutionary will Endeavour to such an organization. It is therefore important that no one, even a civilian of high standing should be accepted at their face value. Nevertheless, civilian should be brought in to the local operation committee as early as practicable to advise problems affecting the local population.

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RESTRICTED 180. Operations. The local operation committee is a planning and cooperating agencyit has no command responsibility once an operation starts. When operations are in progress, committees meet as frequently as necessary. They consider new information and the progress of operation and decide the function an operation room is established where possible. Control by committee means that the military commander will be expected to consult his civilians and police counterparts before ordering a major change in plans; only to his extent is his command over his own forces limited. Members must be prepared to make some compromise when there is a difference of opinion. The committee structure ensures that; a. There is always complete integration of effort. b. The security force is always acting in support of the civil authorities and the national plan. c. Plans are agreed by joint decision. Orders are then passed through service channels. 181. Chan of Command. A possible chain of command showing the control of security forces and civil administration is set out in diagrammatic form in annex D. 182. Location of Headquarters. The siting of a local operation committee is usually determined by the position of civil and police communication and the intelligence organization. The operations room should be at the police or civil administrative HQ. It is, therefore always best to locate the military unit HQ as close as operational convenience will permit to the local committee. If it is apart it must at all time is linked by secured communications. 183. Communications. In counter insurgency operations the communication problems are increased because of the many agencies with whom the commander must deal and the special need for security. The problems are examined in detail in chapter 4. 184. Intelligence, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations. Because of the importance of these subjects on military operations, they are considered separately in Chapters 5, 8 and 9. 185. Summary. Control of military operations is ideally exercised in three ways. a. As ordered by the director of operations to local operation committees lower leaves; b. As director by these lower level operation committees; and c. As ordered by local commander, within their immediate areas of responsibility, in accordance with the joint policy issued by the local operations comities.

186. It is of paramount importance that a clear and known chain of command should be established and that the actual command of the military forces involved remain in military channels .this is particularly important during the preparatory or active resistance phases, when unreasonable demands by civil authorities could result in the dissipation of military resources. 187. The degree of command of control that a British commander can expect over indigenous regular and Para-military forces will vary. Nevertheless it must be precisely stated and never be less than operational control over indigenous military and Para-military forces located in the area for which he bears operational responsibility. 188-190 Reserved. 167 RESTRICTED

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CHAPTER 4 - THE SECURITY FORCES

SECTION 10-POLICE

AND LOCAL ARMED FORCES

Police Forces 191. In British Colonies and Commonwealth countries the pattern of police of police organization follows the British Colonial police system. There are some variations but the details given below will generally apply. 192. The police force is usually a federal or national organization commanded by an inspector general or commissioner of police, responsible to the Ministry of Interior. The force will be split up into contingents, each commanded by a chief police officer. In a federation these contingents will normally belong to each component state. When a country or state is administratively split into districts the police will also be divided in to police districts, each with its own officer commanding police district (OCPD). 193. Tasks. The tasks of the police force are: a. Maintenance of law and order. b. Prevention of Crime and apprehension of offenders. c. Protection of life and property. d. Maintenance of an efficient Special Branch, which is the intelligence department of the and as such is the police instrument for the collation and assessment of any information which may affect the security of the country. e. Control of population. f. Destruction of the insurgent cell structure in town and village communists. g. Para-military duties necessitated by any state insurgency.

194. Where the police undertake para-military duties during a state of insurgency these operations must be closely co-ordinated with the military forces. This is usually done at district level. 195.
I.

Organization. The police are divided in to:

Temporary and volunteer police, the main groups of which are; (1) Special constabulary. (2) Temporary staff (female searches etc) (3) Police volunteer reserve (for use in an emergency)

a. Regular Police.

Regular Police 196. The regular police are permanent career policemen, and are divided into; a. Uniform Branch. This includes the policeman on patrol, traffic police, a police field force or special iot police, and marine police. b. Criminal Investigation Department (CID). This is organized, and trained to carry out criminal investigation duties in urban and rural areas.

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RESTRICTED c. Special Branch. Its main duties are; This is the intelligence department of the police force.

(1) To collect, process and assess information of subversive and potentially subversive political organizations and connected personalities from all available sources. (2) To plan, conduct and advise upon counter subversive and counter espionage operations. (3) To ensure that all security intelligence deriving from travel control measures is received, evaluated and acted upon (4) Top advice the government where appropriate, through security and intelligence committees, on matters relating to protective security and the use of security intelligence. (5) To investigate the background and activities of all foreigners entering the country. (6) To assist the CID in the investigation of any criminal offence having a political or subversive complexion. (7) To work in close touch with all government authorities and to keep in touch with public opinion on matters which are to cause general discontent among racial, political sections of the public, dissatisfaction with central or local government or individuals officials. 197. A Police Field Force. This is a para-military formation equipped and trained to operate in any area of the country on & platoon and company basis, in the same way as the army units. It also provides additional trained riot units. It does not usually have heavy support weapons but its vehicles are generally equipped with some form of armoured protection. 198. Marine Police. These deal with the problems of water guards, harbour protection and immigration. In some countries they carry out customs and excise duties. Special Constabulary 199. Where found, they are usually raised and deployed in the more developed areas of the country as area security units and special police squads. Their role is offensive patrolling against insurgents, enforcement of food denial measures and the static defence of vital public utility instillations against sabotage. Other forms of Police Organization 200. Some countries employ the system of a national gendarmerie. This implies a force which is more closely controlled at national level, and does not permit autonomous discretion and command at district or state level. In such a force it is usual to have major police units, armed and equipped on full military lines and with heavy infantry support weapons. These carry out full counter insurgency roles. Local Military Forces 201. In British Colonies and Commonwealth countries any local military forces will probably, like the police, be organized, trained and equipped and British lines. In other 169 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED territories this will depend on the nationality of any military advisers and on the orientation of the countrys trade and foreign policy. In many cases this will mean forces organized on United States lines. The part which local forces can play in counter revolutionary operations will depend on their efficiency and reliability. These in turn will depend among other things on the quality of any advisers or military missions and the length of time that these have had to organize and supervise training. An early assessment must be made of the quality and moral of the local forces.
SECTION 11-THE

ROLES OF ARMS

Infantry 202. Principle Tasks. The versatility and mobility of infantry make it the predomination arm in this form of warfare. Its tasks vary from duties in aid of the civil authorities in quelling urban unrest; to limited war against organized and well equipped regular troops (see also section 25). A battalion is prepared to fight with a good deal less than the normal support expected in conventional warfare. It is fully air transportable, able to operate for long period in difficult types of country and in bad climate conditions, carrying is immediate needs and relying on air resupply. It can be independent of motor transport and capable of lengthy operations under the most adverse condition, an infantry battalion can and will be required to carry out any role envisaged in counter revolutionary operations without alteration to its establishment. The only equipment which is not part of its scale is that required for anti-riot duties in the police role and this is available as a special issue should it is required. 203. Support Weapons Platoons. The roles of the mortar and anti-tank platoons vary, because of the need to use minimum force when on internal security operations and the restrictions sometimes imposed by distance and terrain on their employment in country insurgency operations. Dependent on the threat they may be trained addition as: a. Rifle platoons. b. Sustain fire machine gun platoon. c. Reconnaissance platoon. d. Combat tracker teams. e. Dog handlers. Armour 204. Armour can assist greatly in counter insurgency situations. Its mere presence will have a favourable effect on the morale of the local friendly population, and a correspondingly adverse effect on the insurgents. There may well be problems of transportation to the battle area and once there the use of armour may be restricted by the going and nature of the country. However, the dividends which the skilful use of armour will pay are worth the effort. 205. Use of armour. a. It has been found in the past that the areas in which counter insurgency operations take place favour the employment of light armoured vehicles, wheeled and tracked, rather than heavy AFVs. The armoured reconnaissance regiment will be mainly used, because it is more suitable for the tasks for which armour is required. The value of tanks in certain circumstances should however not be overlooked, and the problems of transportation, maintenance 170 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED and supply should not be allowed to over-influence any decision against their employment. b. The principle tasks of armour are listed in Paragraph 206 below. These cover many internal security tasks, including some in urban areas: armour becomes an increasingly important and effective element of the security forces to counter armed insurgency when operations escalate to this level. c. Rather than give fragmented guidance on the uses of armour throughout Parts 2 and 3 of this Volume, a single chapter (Part 3-Counter Insurgency, Chapter 7) is devoted to this subject, covering all aspects of counter revolutionary operations including internal security in urban areas. 206. Principle Tasks of Armour

a. Armoured Reconnaissance Units. The firepower, protection, mobility and flexibility of these units make them ideal for tasks in support not only of military forces but also of the police and local civilian authorities. Each regiment has six helicopters on establishment. On some occasions reconnaissance units may be required to carry out tasks more usually performed by tanks in limited or general war. It must be remembered, however, that they have no tanks and cannot perform such tanks against an enemy equipped with sophisticated anti-tank weapons. Examples of the tasks which are suitable for reconnaissance units whenever the terrain allow are: (1) Direct and indirect fire using main armament or machine guns. (2) Offensive operations against insurgents, including the reduction of strong points by fire. (3) Convoy protections for the movement of troops and supplies through dangerous areas and escorts for VIPs. (4) Evacuation of casualties under fire. (5) Manning a stop line. (6) Reconnaissance and confidence patrols (7) Snap road blocks. (8) Cordons generally employed in the outer cordon. (9) Route reconnaissance and the checking of critical points for sabotage (e.g. bridges) (10) Supplementing radio communication networks. (11) Support of infantry in riot situation and operations against urban guerrillas. b. Armoured Units. It is obviously more difficult to employ tanks in these circumstances but their value should not be underestimated. Even on a narrow front the shock action produced by their firepower, protection and mobility can be decisive. The tasks they can perform are: (1) Providing fire support. (2) Offensive operations against enemy units, including close support of infantry and the reduction of enemy strong point. (3) Relief of isolated outposts and in some close cases portioned convoys where the danger of an annihilation ambush exists. (4) Acting as a deterrent or protection force in capital cities or operational bases.

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Artillery 207. Lack of roads, inaccessible gun areas, lack of security and the threat of ambush all highlight the need for a light airport able gun and highly mobile fire units able to provide continuous fire support and observation in all areas ,Whenever such degree of force is necessary and justified .in addition ,the need for range and for counter mortar and possibly counter battery retaliation in the insurgency phase make medium guns, even if only a few ,invaluable ,and mortar locating equipment essential .In certain circumstances and mortar locating equipment may also be needed .If air and naval weapons are employed there may be a requirement for a fire support coordination centre .the burden placed upon a commanding officer of an affiliated field regiment may be conceder ably increased and the normal fire control inning may have to augmented to meet the additional work load. 208. Organization and Equipment .Artillery in counter insurgency operations must be flexible. The field regiment must be able to: a. Deploy by independent barreriers, or even down to single guns for special tasks. b. Concentrate the fire of a regiment at every opportunity, to take full advantage of range and weight of fire. c. Move by, (1) Road (2) Tac T (MR) and Tac T (SR) aircraft and support helicopters. (3) Inland water transport or assault craft. (4) Track, pack transport or for abort distances, by being manhandled d. Be maintained by air e. Provide its own gun area defence, though any position of less than regimental strength cannot with stand concentrated attack. 209 a. b. c. OP d. e. f. g. h. Principal Tasks for Artillery. Defensive fire in support of operational bases or controlled areas. Counter battery fire on insurgent artillery and mortar. Support of mobile operations patrol and ambushes .This will require normal artillery parties Destruction of located enemy hides, bunkers, and fortified village. Air defence when applicable. Harassing of enemy petrol bases supply and courier routes. Provision of artillery operational intelligence. Provision of advice at all levels on all types of fire support.

Engineers 210. General. Counter Revolutions Operations increase the call upon engineer since they normally take place in under developed areas .Engineer units must be able to fight as infantry and provide their own protection .The engineer task falls in to three categories. a. Combat Engineering. Engineer assistance and support to other arms in the combat zone. b. Logistics Engineering. Engineer work in the base area, L of C or forward operational Bases. c. Aid to the Civil Community. Engineer work for the benefit of the local population.

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RESTRICTED 211. Combat Engineering. The following Engineer work is likely to be required in the combat zone. The priority of task will vary with the theatre and the type of operations: a. b. c. d. e. f. g. h. Construction and maintenance of roads and tracks. This may require additional Engineer unites and plant. Construction and maintains of forward airstrips, STOL\VTOL strips and helicopter landing point. Wetter supply, which may have a high priority in an underdevelopment country. Clearing mines and body traps. These are amongst the insurgents main weapons in counter Revolutionary war and the most difficult to counter. Field defiance, including bankers, battle shelters, clearing fields of fire and the fortification of buildings inurbane areas. Demolitions, especially of insurgent positions and fortified villages. Constriction of obstacle including minefields. River and obstacle crossings

212. Logistic Engineering .This consists of developing essential facilities in the base are and the forward operational bases, and will include some of all of the following task: a. The construction, improvement and maintenance of airfields, including associated buildings and other facilities. b. Camp construction including water, sewage, drainage, electricity supply and possibility air conditioning. c. Provision of facilities for handing and storing bulk petroleum and aviation fuels. d. The construction, improvement and maintenance of road and tracks and if necessary railways. e. The construction improvement and maintenance of port facilities where these are required. 213. Aid to the Civil Community. Engineer effort will sometimes have to be diverted from combat and logistic tasks in order to assist in gaining the goodwill of the local population. The sorts of tasks envisaged are;
a. b. c. d. e. Construction of repair of roads and bridges to isolated communities. The drilling of wells improve local water supply. Irrigation and flood control. The construction of community buildings such as schools. Maintenance of essential services in the event of strikes, riots, sabotage or natural disasters.

214. Organization. In all such operations the basic engineer unit will remain the field squadron. But the engineer units organic to any formation are likely tobe sufficient to enable much work to be undertaken outside the combat zone. Apart from minor tasks, if logistic engineering is required extra field squadrons, field squadrons, field squadrons (airfield), engineer specialist teams and an engineer command organization, and RCT general transport and tipper units will have to be added to the order of battle. It will also be necessary to employ local habour, possibly in large numbers. 173 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 215. Engineer Support Organizartion. Engineer work cannot be carried out without plant and other special equipment. Their supply will depend partly on the methods of transport to the area, and partly on the availability of such equipment and materials from local resources. Where a force is entirely dependent on such items being brought from the United Kingdom or some other distant base a substantial propotion of the available air or sea freight space will have to be allocated to them. Signals 216. The high degree of mobility and the need to control widely dispersed forces in counter revolutionary operations demand good communications. These often have to be provided under conditions of bad interferences, extermes of climate and diffficult country. The scale of communication equipment may be inadequate; ingenuity and improvisation will often therefore reap great benefits. 217. In under-developed areas where vehicle movement is impossible formationnand unit radio nets must be able to operate on a manportable basis. These sets are at present of low power and their perfomances will often only be marginal. Mobile forces, especially patrols, must halt when necessary to allow time for antennas to be erected at the best ppossible sites.

218. Principal Tasks. These are:

a. Provision of communications down to unit level using VHF where possible and HF as a back up. Line should also be provided in static situation and where distances permit. Radio relay between formations should be provied. b. Provision of cipher and message carrying facilities (SDS). c. Assistance in training regimental signallers if this is needed. d. Press communications, when other facilities do not exist. e. Controlling all aspects of communications security, including electronic warfare.

219.

Main Requirements and Facilities.

a. HF. In order to achieve reliable communications over the distances involved and to reduce the problems of bad siting, radio interference and high noise levels on HF radio, it will often be necessary to use handspeed morse. Radio operators, down to sub-unit level, must be proficient in this skill. b. VHF. Where VHF communication is practicable operational control of the signal plan must bbe centralized at the highest tactical level to ensure satisfactory results. By carefully grouping and siting sets on high ground where they can be protected it should be possible to form a VHF network that will provide reliable communication. c. Radio Relay. There is some organic radio capability down to and including brigade. Because of its large traffic capacity and reliability radio relay is invaluable for connecting geographically seperated but operationally independent areas. The ranges required and the

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nature of the intervening terrain may, however, dictate the need for relay stations. If such stations are required the problems of their protection and maitenence may render the system impracticable but the great benefits of a radio relay system must be fully taken into account before the possibility is discarded. In extreme cases it may be necessary to use light aircraft to operate rebroadcast on a schedule basis. d. Line. Although radio is the primary means of communication, a telephone system should, if stores are availabe, always be installed where practicable. Unless the physical security of the line is assuared it must be reguarded as an unclassified means and appropriate security measures employed. Its use will normally be restricted to within the forward operational bases. The use of cable should be carefully controlled and must be concealed if used outside a completely secure area, as the enemy can use it as a guide to HQ, observation posts, gun areas, etc. As it is only a secondary meant of communication it would usually be wrong to risk casulaties to maintain it. e. Civil Telephone System. The area of operations may include some civil telephone facilities; these may amount to a local service in main centers with a limited trunk facility between centers. Such a syatem may be used wholly or in part for military purposes provided it is at all times reguarded as an unclassified means. The normal problem of security will be aggravated by the relay on local civilian operation and thechnicians for the operationa of the syatem. f. Liasion. Army radio nets should be linked with police radio nets where appropriate and joint working practised. It may be necessary to exchange equipment or liasion detachment if the types of radio are incompatible. Radioes should be supplemented by other means, such as an air despatch service. Close friendly relations between the Army and civil telecommunications staffs are essential. If the civil postal service is slow, uncertain or insecure the use of SDS for the carriage of important civil documents should be offered. g. Messagge carrying Agencies. There is alimit to the traffic handling capacity of electronis means. This is especially true of classified messages which must be encipheredand deciphered. Maximum use must be made of message carrying agencies to avoid overloading radio nets. A great weight of traffic can be moved but the security achieved is, of course, only as good as the safety of the carrier. In a counter insurgency situation liasion officers and desapatch riders moving in the ground will be a security risk except in completely secure areas; full use must therefore be made of air despatch, whether by RAF or Army aviation. Both scheduled and unscheduled flights should be used to clear routine process. The use of British civil commercial aircraft for delivery of packages by hand of pilot can prove a bonus. h. Communications Security. Even an unsophisticated enemy will be capable of, and will attempt, exploiting out radio and line by listening in and entering a system with a view to passing deceptive messages. Users and operators must be prepaired to minimize the threat by the correct use of communication security procedures, authentication drills and codes. i. Air Support Communications. The importance of prompt close air support and therefore the need for efficiency air support communications are contained in the Manual of Joint Warfare, Volune V, Ottensive Aupport Operations (JSP 5)

Army Aviation

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RESTRICTED 220. Three main factors will lead to a much wider employment of army aviators in counter revolutionary operations. These are:
a. The virtual absence of any enemy air threat and the greatly reduced threat from heavy calibre ground weapons. b. The nature of the terrain and the lack of surface communications. c. Difficulties of ground mobility due to harassment of comunication systems.

221.

The tasks of army aviation are considered furthur in Section 13.

Specilized Units 222. Special units have an impportant part in counter revolutionary warfare. These may include RM commandos, parachute troops, SAS and locally raised forces, which may be used in support of the force or complementary to it. 223. Parachute Troops. Parachute infantry supported by parachute artillery and engineers may be particulary valuable for the following roles:
a. Offensive airborne action against enemy positions in depth. Such operations may well be made in co-operation with other units approaching the objective area on foot, by water or helicopter. Consideration must always be given to extraction of the force once the task has been completed. b. Seizing and holding forward operational bases. Parachute troopa, including parachute engineers, may be necessary to seize suitable areas and start construction of an airstip at the earliest possible moment.

224. Parachutting into Trees. Many under-developed countries have areas of tall jungle. The technique of parachuting into tall trees needs special training. This applies to any parachiting unit and to tracking or any specilized emergency teams, eg medical etc. 225. SAS. SAS squadrons are particularly suited trained and equipped for counter revolutionary operations. Small parties may be infiltrated or dropped by parachute, including free fall, to avoid a long approach through enemy dominated areas, inorder to carry out any of the following tasks:
a. Collection of information on the location and movement of insurgent forces. b. The ambush and harassment of insurgents. c. Infiltration of sabotage, assassination and demolition parties in to insurgent held areas. d. Boarder surveillane. e. Limited community relations. f. Liaisin with, an organization, trainig and control of, friendly gurilla forces operating against the common enemy.

226. Hovercraft. Hovercrafts operate successfully in coastal waters, rivers, estuaries and swamp type terrain. They are suitable for; 176 RESTRICTED

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a. Patrolling rivers and coasts. b. Quick tactical deployment and reinforcement of small parties of troops, particulary at night. c. Routine surface logistic support.

227. War Dogs. When properly trained and handled dogs can save lives on operations and reduce numbers employed on statis guards. The main types of dogs are:
a. Infantry Patrol. Trained to give silent warning of the presence of insurgents either on reconnaissance patrols, fighting patrols ar ambushes. b. Trackers. Trained to follow human ground scent. c. Guard. Trained to detect intruders and to attack and hold them when ordered to do so. d. Mine. Trained to locate burried mines, tripped wires and booby traps. They can detect nonmetallic mines over looked by electronic devices.

228 229 Reserved

SECTION 12 -

NAVAL SUPPORT

230. General. In any area of operations which is accessible from the sea support can be provided by naval forces. This may consist of air support from strike carriers, gufire support from cruisers, destroyers or frigates, and operational and logistic support from amphibious shipping. The latter is divided into three main types of ship: landing platform helicopter [LPH] [commando ship], landing platform dock [LPD] [assault ship] and landing ship logistic [LSL] [logistic ship]. The main characteristic of these ships are: a. LPH. These are converted fixed wing air craft carriers which carry a squadron of [Wessex v] helicopters [18 aircraft plus four in reserve]. The embarked force is normally a Royal Marine Commando group, including a light battery, giving a total strength of 800 men. Under austere conditions this can be increased to 1650 men for periods of normally up to 14 days, depending on climate, weather and space available after equipment and aircraft have been stowed. The helicopters can lift a company group in one wave to a radius of 75 miles. Once ashore the group can be supported direct from the ship up to the radius of 75 miles by a combination of helicopters and vehicles. The radius of action can be increased by establishing ashore refuelling points for the helicopters. In addition to holicopters the LPH carries four landing craft vehicle and personnel [LCVP] which can be used for ship to shore movement of men, 105 mm pack howitzers, vehicles (1/4 ton only) and stores. The ship can support a unit group ashore with all commodities for a period of up to 42 days depending on the intensity of operations. b. LPD. The LPD has two main roles : (1) To provide the joint HQ for an amphibious group commander and a brigade commander in an amphibious operation. 177 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED (2) To carry a military lift of personnel, heavy vehicles and stores for an amphibious operation. The ship can carry 325 embarked troops for a long period or 650 for up to 7days; within these figures considerable flexibility can be achieved. The ship can also carry either 20 Centurion or 16 Chieftain Tanks and 43 x 3-ton equivalent or 83 x 3-ton equivalents with no tanks. 50 tons of stores may be carried in addition. This can be increased to 2000 tons of stores if no vehicles are carried. The ship has no helicopters of its own but can operate two from her flight deck simultaneously. Four landing craft mechanized [LCM] and four LCVP are carried for the ship-to-shore movements of tanks. Vehicle and stores. Unlike the LPH the LPD is not designed to provide logistic support on a day-to-day basis to the embarked troops once ashore. c. LSL. This is designed to carry personnel, helicopters, vehicles and tanks in the follow up role. The ship is capable of beaching to unload her cargo or may use ferries or pontoons as a causeway. The ship is fitted with bow and stern ramps and a helicopter platform. It can carry 16 tanks and 34 x 3-ton equivalents plus 4 x ton vehicles or up to 60 x 3-ton equivalents without tanks. The ship can carry 534 embarked troops for a short period or 340 for long periods. The ships capacity for bulk stores is 490 tons including 300 tons of water which can be increased at the expense of the vehicle lift. 231 Reserved
SECTION 13-

AIR SUPPORT

General 232. The roles of RN, Army and RAF air support are invariable complementary although in conventional operations there is some degree of geographical separation of activity; i.e. offensive air support and reconnaissance beyond the forward edge of the battlefield area [ FEBA], and transport support and helicopter operation behind the FEBA. In counter revolutionary operations there is no FEBA and this geographical separation tends to disappear. The nature of the campaign enhances the operational value of air transport support and reconnaissance, particularly by helicopter and light aircraft, while offensive air support operations may have limited scope. The division of tasks between the services is likely to be based upon the variations of scope, distance involved, response times and aircraft availability. 233. The air support roles considered in this section apply equally to aircraft of the three services but employment of army aviation aircraft has the following advantages / limitations: a. They are an integral part of the ground forces, normally based with and commanded by the formation HQ. They have the ability to provide detachments to units as required and therefore are more readily available. b. They have radio communication on army networks. c. There pilots are soldiers, conversant with the needs and problems of the ground troops. d. The aircraft have smaller lift capacity. 178 RESTRICTED

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234. The very nature of the operations, the terrain and difficulties of communications will all call for the maximum use of air support. Although there may be a threat of an intervention by a neighbouring country, the insurgents themselves are unlikely to have aircraft, so that the government forces should have absolute air superiority. This will greatly extend the use which can be made of air effort. Helicopters 235. The helicopter in particular has an essential and prime contribution to make in all phases of counter revolutionary operations. Its advent has completely changed the method of operation of the security forces and has greatly increased their chances of quick success. Indeed in certain parts of the world it will play an indispensable role in operations. It enables relatimely small numbers of troops to dominate a very wide area and immeasurably increases their flexibility. Counter revolutionary operations are some of the few operations in which helicopters may, fairly consistently, be over flying territory which may hold an enemy random threat. It may be advisable to consider fitting amour to helicopters to reduce vulnerability. The possible protection achieved has to be balanced against the reduction in payload. Limitations 236. Insurgents quickly learn to conceal themselves from aircraft and to retaliate with small arms fire. They may also seek protection by mingling with the civil population. As a result reconnaissance is made difficult, and frequently deliberate attacks would result in grave repercussions. Aircraft flying low and slow may become vulnerable almost anywhere in the area. 237. Terrain may make air operations more hazardous and the climate may restrict visibility. Temperature and altitude affect the performance of all aircraft, particularly helicopters. 238. The probable difficulties of finding suitable air strips will place a premium on VTOL aircraft. Manoeuvrability, the ability to carry heavy loads, the rugged construction and simplicity of maintenance are the particularly desirable characteristics of aircraft in this type of operation.

Command and Control 239. The Manual of Joint Warfare, Volume III, Air Transport Operations, Chapter 3 and Volume V. Offensive Support Operations Chapter 2, give the established organization for command control of RN and RAF aircraft in joint operations. In the context of counter revolutionary operations the director of operation can be equated with the joint force commander. 240. Command and control of army aviation will be as for any other operation, except that there may be a greater centralization of control of effort. The intermingling of aircraft from all three services operating in much the same areas and on broadly similar tasks will 179 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED emphasize the importance of close liaison. When operational control of RN and RAF aircraft is delegated to brigade or unit level it may be more satisfactory to establish a central tasking centre for all aircraft in support whether RN, Army or RAF. Air Transport and Logistic Support 241. Strategic transport (ST) and Tac T (MR) aircraft enable a force and its equipment to be moved rapidly into or near the area where it is to be deployed. Subsequently Tac T (SR), fixed wing aircraft and support helicopters as well as aircraft of RN and Army, may be used for the maintenance and further forward movements of units and supplies. 242. The use of air support within a theatre provides troops with increased tactical mobility and thus allows a commander greater flexibility in the use of his forces. Operations may include; a.Airborne Operations. These enable a combat force and its logistics support to move by air direct into an area of operations, by fixed wing aircraft, helicopters or parachute. b. Tactical Troop Lift. This will be primarily a task for helicopters. Direct redevelopment and the movement of reserves will usually be carried out with support helicopters. The smaller lift such as the quick insertion of cut-off parties, road blocks, check points, roof top standing patrols, snatch parties etc may be undertaken by support helicopters or those of army aviation; depending on scope, availability and the tactical situation. c. Air Logistic Support. This is the logistic support by air of forces deployed in an area of operations. It includes air supply, the movement of personnel, evacuation of casualties and prisoners, and the back loading of equipment. It enables ground forces to operate in remote or inaccessible areas and reduces the need for a vulnerable land line of supply which has to be guarded. Troops are able to move with lighter scales of equipment and can be used with greater flexibility since their movements are not so restricted by logistic limitations. The rapid evacuation of casualties, especially from remote or inaccessible places, greatly improves their chances of survival, reduces manpower wastage and raises the morale of the forces on the ground. Apart from its purely military advantage, air logistic support is of great value to the civil administration and it can be used it meet urgent needs of the civil population in isolated districts. Aircrafts should also be made available whenever possible for the evacuation of civilian casualties. Army aircraft have a very limited lift but there may be tactical situations in which their use is preferable. Offensive Air Operations 243. Because of the nature of counter insurgency operation the opportunity for offensive air action with heavy weapons against insurgents is likely to be very limited, except in prohibited areas. The aim must always be to regain the support of the people and use of very destructive lethal weapons must therefore be closely control. 244. Aircraft need to be armed mainly with anti-personnel weapons for use against groups of enemy whose positions are known but invisible. Machine guns and small fragmentation bombs are likely to be used more frequently than heavy high explosive bombs. Rockets 180 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED projectiles and guided missiles may also be used against targets that demand greater accuracy and hitting power. Heavy bombs will be required against bunkers, tunnel and well dug positions. The use of napalm should be considered for strikes against massed vehicles, bunkers or forfeited positions, but political clearance for the use of this weapon must be obtained. 245. The principal types of operations will be:

a. Interdiction Attacks. These may be against insurgent supply routes and reinforcement areas. They disrupt insurgent communications and harass guerrilla bands, forcing them to move into areas where the insurgents can be effectively engaged by ground troops. This form of attack is not an efficient or economical of killing insurgents although it may adversely affect their moral. Haphazard attacks should never be authorized and great care must always be taken to avoid inflicting casualties on civilians even though they may have given support to the insurgents. b. Close Air Support. Air strikes on parties of insurgents which are on the move are seldom fully successful because of the difficulties of directing aircraft onto fleeting targets. Aircraft on alert with an airborne FAC shorten the response time. When insurgents are in camps or fortified villages that have been accurately located, however, air strikes can be most effective. In pre-planned operations there is a need for accurate target indication but the importance of achieving surprise may rule this out. Air proscription missions may be used to attack insurgents in prohibited areas. Armed helicopters may on occasion be the only intimate air support available, particularly immediately before and after an airborne assault. c. Support with Non-lethal weapons. Tear gas and irritant smoke may be used to disperse hostile assemblies. This is likely to be a task for army aviation since it will invariably be required in the closed co-operation with ground forces. See also part 2 chapter 3.

Air Reconnaissance and Observation 246. Air reconnaissance and observation will provide an invaluable source of information. Reconnaissance may be photographic or visual. 247. Photographic Reconnaissance. This is normally undertaken by aircraft provided especially for this role. In the early stages of a campaign a large proportion of the available effort may have to be employed on aerial survey missions to provide topographical intelligence. Night photography may disclose the activity which security forces operations have forced the insurgents to perform after dark. Local and more limited photographic

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RESTRICTED reconnaissance may frequently be undertaken with light aircraft and helicopters. The use of a telescopic lens may enable individuals in mobs or assemblies to be identified. 248. Visual Observation and Reconnaissance. This will primarily be undertaken by army aircraft, since army pilots are specially trained for this role. In jungle type country the abundance of cover may mean that only sustained observation over a fairly extensive area is likely to detect any ground activity; in this case a light fixed wing aircraft, comparatively slow and with long endurance, may prove more suitable than a helicopter. Likely observation and reconnaissance tanks in counter revolutionary operations are: a. Familiarizing commanders [military, police or the civil authorities] with their areas. b. Reconnaissance and planning for the specific operations. c. Area reconnaissance to give advance warning of crowed assembly. d. Shadowing crowds. e. Part of a convoy or VIP escort. f. Searches g. Verifications of reports from other sources, h. Airborne FAC and direction of artillery and mortar fire into targets invisible from the ground. i. Location and re-establishment of contact either visual or by radio with friendly ground forces that have lost communication with the main force. j. Aircraft operating in the above roles, if armed, may also be able to engage opportunity targets which might otherwise escape. 249. Radar Scans. Radar reconnaissance is achieved by photographing the returning echoes from transmitted radar pulses. The resolution of radar pictures is inferior to photographs. Radar reconnaissance techniques are still developing and improvements can be expected. 250. Infra-red Photography. Infra-red is the greatest development in sensor equipment; it records heat emission in the form of a photograph and is effective both by day and night. However it is affected by weather; thick cloud or rain reduce the heat emissions. Assistance by Aircraft in Command and Control 251. The degree of dispersion involved and the difficulties of communication make aircraft an invaluable asset. Some of the ways in which aircraft are likely to be employed are: a. As temporary airborne command posts and rovers. b. Assisting with radio communication: either as rebroadcast stations or for relaying messages particularly between isolated ground troops such as rooftop standing patrols and hilltop OPs. Such employment is, however, extremely expensive in aircraft effort and should be avoided if possible. c. As a rapid and secure form of movements for VIPs, military/police commanders, government officials and liaison officers. This allows them to dispense with escort, avoid ambushes and keep in close touch with developments. The use of service aircraft by government officials to visit distant areas may be of the utmost importance. They may by their presence and influence rally support for the government. Such visits undoubtedly lead to improvements in the civil administration,

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RESTRICTED and can thus have a decisive influence on the progress of the pacification campaign. They demonstrate the interest of the government in the peoples welfare. d. In traffic and crowd control. Special Tasks 252. There will always be innumerable special tasks for which aircraft are required. Some of these are described below. 253. Voice Aircraft. Suitable aircraft and helicopters can be fitted with public address equipment. Arrangement must be made to equip aircraft as soon as the need for the role is appreciated. They can: a. Broadcast over a wide area, either as part of psychological operations, or for public announcements, e.g. imposition of a curfew or instructions to idle bystanders. Such broadcasts may follow the dropping of leaflets. b. Dominate a crowd by flying overhead and broadcasting instruction to the crowd to disperse, thereby drowning cheer leader. c. Broadcast government propaganda or music over a specific area to drown antigovernment propaganda being put out from amplifiers in the streets. 254. Additional Roles. The following are further possible tasks: a. Defoliation of jungle to improve ground visibility and to expose insurgent camps or routes. b. Crop destruction in prohibited areas by chemical spraying. c. Leaflet dropping

255 260 Reserved

CHAPTER-5 INTELLIGENCE
SECTION 14

- INTRODUCTION

261. Intelligence is the key to success in counter revolutionary operations; it saves time and also saves lives because accurate, reliable information and good intelligence make it possible for effective action to be taken by the minimum number of troops in the shortest possible time. But intelligence takes time, and much depends on building up mutual confidence between the security forces and the local population. Timely information from local sources may be lead to successful operation which will increase public confidence and 183 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED so bring more information and further success. It is probable that in the early stages of an insurgency the only source of local information available to the security forces will the special branch, or its equivalent if one exists, and the tasks of the security forces will be the special Branch, or its equivalent if one exist, and the task of the security forces will always be made easier in those countries in which an efficient Special Branch is maintained as part of the normal police force. 262. In conventional war the intelligence required by a commander in order to plan operations is acquired by the normal methods of surveillance. Information may not be easy to obtain but at least the commander knows who his enemy is. From the intelligent point of view one of the essential differences between conventional war and counter revolutionary operations is that the enemy is merged with and is part of the population in the area of operations. In planning internal security and counter interagency operations, therefore, one of the primary tasks of the security forces is identification of the insurgent and the causes of unrest. 263. Whilst it is an axiom that the provision of accurate, up to date and timely intelligence is the pre-requisite of successful operations, the pre-requisite of successful intelligence activities in counter revolutionary operations understand. This understanding must cover every aspect of the operations. It must apply to the language, the topographical, political, ethnological and economic background; it must itself be the basis for the evaluation of all information, and the foundation upon which intelligence officers build the intelligence organization. It cannot be acquired overnight. 264. A major factor which must influence all intelligence activities is the use made of terror by the insurgents. Intimidation of the local population is an essential part of the insurgents security measures which, supplemented by elaborate systems of cells and cutouts, aim to conceal identities, intentions and methods. Local inhabitants, the most importance source of information, will not co-operate with the security forces until they are convinced that the insurgents are being defeated and that they themselves can be protected if they provide information. To win and retain the co-operation, goodwill and confidence of local inhabitants must be a major operational objective. In conventional war it is possible to fight for information; in counter revolutionary operations the security forces must create an environment in which local inhabitants feel that it is in their best interests to provide and volunteer information. This is a long process.

SECTION 15

INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS

265. If intelligence is to be of value to a commander it must reach him in time for him to make use of it; this truism applies particularly to the need for background knowledge of a potential area of operations before the political situation has deteriorated into an emergency. When he is in the area of operations the commander will require intelligence on which to base his operations, and at the same time he will wish deny information to the enemy. Thus in the planning and conduct of counter revolutionary operations the intelligence organization has three separate but closely related and continuous tasks:

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RESTRICTED a. Basic Intelligence. To provide background intelligence on potential areas of operations. b. Current Intelligence. To provide the intelligence on which operations can be based. c. Counter Intelligence. To counter enemy activities to obtained information and their attempts to carry out subversion and sabotage. 266. First Requirement. The collection of information is a long process which cannot be accelerated; all available intelligence relating to potential areas of operations must therefore be collected long before an emergency has arisen. Furthermore, this intelligence must be constantly revised and kept up to date so that when it is required it is both accurate and opportune. This continuous pre-emergency process can be described as the first requirement of the intelligence function. 267. Second Requirement. The second requirement of the intelligence function is the setting up in the area of operations of an intelligence organization whose responsibilities are: a. b. c. To provide the intelligence required by the commander, including a comprehensive order of battle of insurgents and their supporters, thus making complete eradication and rehabilitation possible. To expand, revise and keep up to date all basic intelligence. Counter intelligence activities.
SECTION 16 - PRICIPLES

268. Although the basic aim of a rebellion or revolutionary war-the overthrow of the government by armed force is always the same no two situations are ever like. Past experience of an apparently similar situation may in fact be a disadvantage. The setting up of an intelligent organization will always be greatly influenced by local condition which will, to a large extend, dictate the structure of the organization at the methods by which it will operate. Successful functioning of the organization depends on the application of certain principles. It may be difficult, perhaps impossible to apply all these principles but they should nevertheless constitute the aims of the intelligence organization. These principals are:
a. The need for a single centralized, integrated intelligence organization.

b. Careful pre-emergency collection of intelligence, planning and training particularly language training. c. Continuous research into all aspects of the threat so that patterns and trends can be clearly understood and foreseen. d. Effective liaison between the military operation staff and the civil administration to ensure that proper account is taken of the interests and requirements of the intelligence organization and effective use made of all intelligence obtained. e. Good communication. f. Security. 269. It must be appreciated that the future counter revolutionary operations in foreign countries may present British forces with an entirely new situation in which a force may have entered at the request of an independent country in order to assist in quelling what, by then, may have become a state of insurgency. The force commander will not necessarily be in charge of operation and the ability of the intelligence staff to apply the above principals will

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RESTRICTED depend on many different factors. In particular, the establishment of a single, integrated intelligence organization will depend on; a. The effectiveness of the indigenous intelligence organizations in particularly the police force and its special branch, or equivalent. b. Their willingness to co-operate with British forces. c. The need to protect the interests and maintain the security of British forces in the area of operations.
SECTION 17

ORGANIZATION

General 270. The affairs of any government should be conducted to encourage the maintenance of law and order, for which the government is ultimately responsible. It follows that a government is responsible for maintaining some organization for obtaining security and intelligence information affecting the well- being of the country. The government must make arrangements for: a. Ensuring that an efficient organization exists for the collection, collation, interpretation and dissemination of all categories of intelligence from all sources within the country and for maintaining liaison with outside sources. b. Defining generally from time to time the current intelligence, requirement and determining priorities connected with it for the guidance of the special branch in setting the targets. c. Providing the local defence or security committee with intelligence on which to based defence planning and formulate measures for any expansion of the intelligence organization which may be necessary in an emergency. d. Keeping under review the threats to security within the country and in the light of these also keeping under review protective security measures [physical security of key points from sabotage, security of secret information and protection of personnel from subversion]. 271. In times of emergency more detailed information of a totally new type will be required, and it should all be directed into a single channel, with collation at all levels, leading to an intelligence HQ which is responsible for producing the composite intelligence picture to cover the whole country. The intelligence organization should therefore incorporate the intelligence elements of the civil government and security forces, both British and indigenous, which are operating in the country. 272. There are, however, considerable differences between depended territories in which a British force may be called upon to operate against insurgents, and a foreign country to which a British force has been invited under treaty. Composition of the Military Intelligence Organization 273. If the force deployed to the aid of a dependent or foreign country is of about brigade strength it may have to function independently or with supporting naval and air forces; furthermore, it may have a joint two-star force HQ superimposed on it. In these 186 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED circumstances the normal intelligence establishment for a brigade is quite inadequate, for it is based on the assumption that a brigade is part of a force provided with sufficient intelligence facilities and support to supplement the intelligence element in formations as and when the need arises. Where no such support exist special provision of intelligence staff and personnel must be made. 274. It is impossible to lay down any firm establishment for such an organization. There are, however, certain basic requirements, and if a commander is to get the intelligence he needs, particularly at the beginning of an operation, it is essential that an intelligence organization which meets these basic requirements be established as early as possible in the area of operations. There will inevitably be adjustments in the light of experience as the campaign proceeds. Intelligence specialists are held in intelligence and security groups in command and overseas theatres, whence they can be allotted to formations to augment the existing intelligence element. 275. The senior intelligence officer in the command where the force is being mounted is responsible for advising on the requirement in terms of specialist personnel. When making his assessment the following intelligence functions should be taken onto account: a. Operational Intelligence. b. Counter Intelligence c. Command and Administration d. Interrogation e. Photo interpretation f. Field intelligence officers [FIO] 276. The accepted increment of personnel required by an intelligence and security group when an additional brigade joins the command can be used as a very rough guide to the minimum scale which an independent brigade may need, but any force deployed is also likely to require additional intelligence sub-units. Thus the assessment of intelligence support falls under two headings: a. Intelligence staff for the brigade or force HQ. b. Intelligence sub-units and personnel for attachment to the brigade or joint force HQ. 277. Intelligence Staff. Any list is only a guide and could be far below an obvious requirement in a given set of circumstances but two vehicles and the following minimum scale of personnel are required: a. b. c. d. e. 278. One captain or subaltern and one staff sergeant as interrogators. Two sergeants, one corporal as operators intelligence and security. One photo Interpreter One photographer[RAOC] One clerk [RAOC] who is tactical sketcher.

Intelligence Sub- units and personnel. Some or all of the following may be required; a. Operational Intelligence. The joint intelligence centre at joint force HQ cannot be manned without a staff of at least four. 187 RESTRICTED

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b. Counter intelligence. A minimum of three NCOs with, one vehicle, possibly locally requisitioned will be required. c. Command and Administration. A command and administrative element should consist of a minimum of two officers and three soldiers; responsibilities will include advising staff on counter intelligence matters. d. Interrogation Centre. A minimum of seven specialists are needed for the centre and they will require administrative support in the form the cooks, guards,etc which may have to be found by other units in the force. e. Photo Interpretation Detachment. A minimum of one officer and two soldiers, with one vehicle are needed to form the army element in a joint air reconnaissance intelligence centre. f. Field Intelligence Officers. The number of FIOs will depend on the local situation. 279. The choice of intelligence sub-units and decisions on the number of additional intelligence personnel must depend on the nature and size of the intelligence problem in the area of operations. In making any assessment the following should be born in mind; a. An intelligence organization will normally have to operate continuously, 24 hours a day, and therefore proper manpower provision must be made. b. The gathering of information, particularly in a foreign country, is a long process and success is dependent on creating a climate of confidence among the local inhabitants. Efficiency helps to build confidence and an efficient intelligence organization, planned and complete from the start, is far more likely to achieve results than one supplemented at intervals by ad hoc improvisation to meet situations after they have arisen.

Integration with Other Intelligence Organization 280. In the same way that every internal security task is different, so is every situation envolving co-operation between allied intelligence organizations in the area of operations and local civilian intelligence organizations, if they exist. Co-operation will always be affected by; a. Local personalities. b. Loyalties of indigenous security forces which may be influence by the local situation. c. National pride, and individual jealousy or fear. d. The need to protect sources of information. e. The general efficiency and effectiveness of the local intelligence organization. f. The security of our own intelligence organization. 188 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED g. The need to know principle. 281. Complete co-operation will seldom be achieved, but failure to reach reasonably high level of mutual trust in the passing and exchange of information will added to the problems confronting intelligence officers. 282. It is impossible to formulate rules relating to anything unpredictable as human behaviour but if there is to be any understanding between the British intelligence organization, those of allies in the area and the local civilian organization, the following principles should where possible be observed; a. All intelligence organizations should be grouped under one director of intelligence and subordinated to him. b. All intelligence organizations should be represented on each intelligence committee at national, regional, provincial, district etc. level. C. Naval, Army and Air intelligence officers should serve in the joint intelligence centre of joint force HQ or the joint HQ of the security forces. d. Bearing in mind the need to know principal, particularly in the dissemination of security intelligence, the exchange of information should be as unrestricted as possible. e. Every attempt should be made to establish friendly relation between intelligence officers of the security forces at all levels in the intelligence organization. 283. Successful integration must be based on representation at all committee levels and loyalty to one mutually approved director of intelligence. The success of the intelligence organization is liable to be proportionate to the degree of integration attained. Dependent Territories 284. In dependent territories, with their structure of police force and special branch, there need be little difficulty in establishing an integrated intelligence organization under a director of intelligence. In these territories a national intelligence committee should be set up at central government level and should consist of a senior officer of the administration as chairman with members from the administration, police, special branch and the armed forces, both indigenous and British. This pattern of membership should be repeated on the intelligence committees at the lower levels. Foreign Countries 285. In foreign countries it is possible that very close integration of this kind will not be achieved. Although a national intelligence committee may be set up it may not be possible or desirable for the British force to be represented on it. Good liaison and the setting up of joint intelligence committees at all levels are essential, however, to make the best use of all intelligence services; and all British controlled sources at least must be grouped under one man to ensure proper guidance and co-ordination. Intelligence Committees

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RESTRICTED 286. Membership and the choice of chairman for these joint committees will depend on local circumstances and the relative strengths of British, allied and indigenous forces in the area, but they must include representative of: a. The civil administration. b. The uniformed police. c. The police special branch or its equivalent. d. Senior intelligence officers from indigenous, allied and British forces. 287. The functions of an intelligence committee are: a. To advise the government, or its next higher HQ, on all aspects of intelligence in the area for which it is responsible. b. To provide the intelligence on which operational planning can be based and protective measures adopted. c. To allocate tasks, targets and priorities to the intelligence organization. d. To liaise with parallel and subordinate committees where they exist. e. To establish common procedures, particularly in relation to the disposal of surrendered or captured enemy personal, captured documents and equipment, etc.

288. Intelligence committees should not have any executive command over the intelligence organization in the detailed direction of its activities; this should act only on the orders of the director of intelligence or the senior intelligence officer at the lower levels. Special Branch or Equivalent 289. Ideally an intelligence organization should be based on whatever civilian intelligence organization may exist in the area of operation, for example, the police special branch or its equivalent. If, however, there is no special branch or equivalent or it has ceased to be effective, the military intelligence services must absorb what is left of the civilian elements and gradually build up an integrated, joint intelligence organization under a director of intelligence. Joint Intelligence Centres 290. To achieve effective co-ordination of the various intelligence staffs a joint intelligence centre, adjacent to the joint operations centre, must be established. This joint intelligence centre must contain the following sections: a. Research. To cover all aspects of insurgent activity under such headings as: (1) Historical Intelligence. (2) Organization and order of battle (3) Leaders and prominent personalities (4) Weapons (5) Techniques, methods of operating, etc. b. Operational Intelligence. To be responsible for the collection of information through the control of all sources and agencies, its processing and dissemination as intelligence, in time to be of use. c. Counter Intelligence. This is covered in detail in section 21

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RESTRICTED Military Intelligence Officers and Military Intelligence Liaison Officers 291. As soon as there are signs that an emergency may develop in an area, immediate action should be taken to reinforce the police intelligence services in the threatened country. Every counter insurgency situation demands the closed liaison between civil and military intelligence services and this cannot be achieved unless proper preparations are made for it. These include: a. Reinforcement of the special branch or its equivalent. b. Close liaison between civil and military intelligence services. This can be achieved by providing specially trained military intelligence officers [MIOs], military intelligence liaison officers [MILOs] and field intelligence officers. [FIOs] 292. The main role of an MIO is to work in the HQ of the special branch or its equivalent, under the direction of its head. Although they may be given normal special branch duties, their tasks are to: a. Plan and provision for the military intelligence assistance which will be needed in an emergency. b. Assist in the development of a joint civil/ military intelligence organization. c. Collate the intelligence required for the planning of military operation. 293. MILOs are attached to formations for employment on intelligence liaison duties in theatres and commands. They form the reserve from which MIOs may be appointed and from which the MIOs in the intelligence organization in an area of operations may be reinforced. FIOs duties are explained in paragraph 308. 294. The planning required for counter insurgency operation falls under two main headings: a. Action in the United Kingdom. b. Pre-emergency action in the potential area of operations. Action in the United Kingdom 295. Action in the United Kingdom is limited to maintain a pool of trained MIO, MILOs and FIOs available for deployment and the collection of all available intelligence on the area of operations, so that formations and units likely to form the British force will know the following before they leave: a. All topographical and climatic details. b. Basic intelligence of the origin, history and background of the situation. c. Up-to-date intelligence on the current situation. d. Details of the administration of the territory, with particularly references to the organization and deployment of intelligence and security forces. Pre-emergency Action in the Area of Operation 296. It is most desirable, though not always possible, that a MIO be attached to the Special Branch or its equivalent before the situation has developed into an emergency in any country 191 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED where the threat suggests the poibility of an appeal for assistance to the United Kingdom. This will enable the country concerned to prepare for the expansion of its intelligence resources and to begin establishing a joint intelligence organization. Much valuable time can be saved if a MIO is in a position to give the British force commander an up-to-date briefing as soon as he arrives. Provision of Interpreters 297. One of the greater problems facing a British force in an area of operations is the early provision of linguists; there will always be a need for linguists trained interrogation. Local interpreters constitute a major security risk, so they should be used with caution and closely supervised. In addition to the specialists required for the intelligence function listed in Para 275, specialists with the ability to speak the local language may be required for: a. Interrogation b. Document translation c. Counter intelligence d. Censorship e. Travel control
SECTION 19 -

RESEARCH AND LIASION, COMMUNICATION AND SECURITY

298. Research. Insurgents attract converts to their cause by exploiting local grievances to the detriment of the central government or local authority. These grievances may differ from village to village and they constitute the levers with which the insurgents hope to unseat the government. The need to discover what these levers are is obvious. Insurgency cannot be quelled solely by military action, which is directed at containing the operation of the insurgents until government reforms can be removed grievances and thus gain popular support for the government. There is therefore a need a continuous research into the causes of unrest and all these aspects of the threat so that the patterns and trends can be understood and foreseen. The needs for research also extend to the study of insurgence tactics and methods because changes in any apparent pattern may indicate changes of plan which will affect the course of future operations: all basic intelligence must be constantly reviewed and brought up to date.

299. Liaison. In addition to the complete integration of all intelligence services good liaison is of extreme importance; but in the initial stages of an emergency it may be difficult to achieve. Conscious of failure, the local intelligence service may well resent the assistance for which the government has asked. It will be one of the main tasks of MIOs and MILOs to overcome any antipathy or resentment that may be felt by local security forces. The successful conduct of counter revolutionary operations depends entirely on the liaison between G [intelligence], G [operations], other services which constitute the British force, and the local government and security forces. 300. Communications. In counter revolutionary operations, where apparently trivial events and negative information may be of great significance, the volume of signal traffic is likely to 192 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED be large. Much of the information must be rapidly disseminated and reaction to it must be swift. Communications must therefore be efficient, secure the portable, and the standards of signal security must be high. 301. Security. The normal problems of security are made more acute by the difficulty of distinguishing between friend and insurgent. All security measures must be rigidly enforced, particularly within the intelligence organization which will be the primary target of hostile intelligence services. It must be assumed that by the time British forces arrive in the area of operations their will have been extensive penetration of government services, including the police Special Branch or its equivalent. It must also be assumed that the revolutionary organization is able to listen to insecure voice radio nets. Our forces must therefore be trained to; a. Plan, provide and use alternative channels of communication. b. Maintain the highest standards of communications security. c. Demand authentication from any suspicious sounding station.
SECTION 20 - OPERATIONAL

INTELLIGENCE

302. Tasks. Operational intelligence entails the provision of intelligence on the terrain and on the insurgent movement in its military and civil aspects. Success in counter revolutionary operations does not depend on military action alone and therefore in addition to topography, climate, insurgent order of battle, insurgent leaders, intentions, tactics and methods, there must be information on; a. Economics b. Historical background c. Political, sociological and psychological matters. 303. Insurgents devote much time and effort to concealing the structure of their organization and its leaders. This is largely because terrorism and insurgency are set in motion by a small but highly trained group, and the few leaders must be safeguarded if the revolution is to succeed. The capture of any leader can mean serious disruption of the insurgent organization and a consequent adverse effect on their capabilities and morale. The intelligence organization of the security forces should therefore concentrate on identifying and locating the insurgent leaders.

Sources of Information 304. Provided that the government concerned has not delayed its appeal for assistance until the local security services have ceased to be effective, the following sources and agencies, although possibly penetrated and therefore a security risk, should be available to the intelligence organization. 305. Local inhabitants. In areas more or less controled by insurgents, and where their weapons of fear, intimidation and blackmail are in use, it is unlikely that much information will be obtained. But every soldier must understand the importance, and the operational necessity of winning and retaining the hearts and minds of the local people. Much of the 193 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED intelligence from this source is usually obtained through the local police supplemented by the work of FIOs. 306. Local Police and Armed Forces. These have the advantage of coming from amongs: the people, but the need to protect their sources of information from terrorism may result in their reluctance to co-operate with the intelligence organization. 307. Border Scouts. These are locally raised troops who are usually recruited as auxiliary policemen but armed and trained by the security forces. They are tribesmen and after training, are sent back to their local tribal area to report on any irregular activity or movement of personnel. 308. Field Intelligence Officers. FIOs can either be serving officers, intelligence corps NCOs or locally recruited officers with an intimate knowledge of the area of operations and the local language. Their role is to live with the people and collect information from any source available to them. 309. SAS. This is an important intelligence collection agency whose role was outline in chapter 4. Paragraph 225 310. Agents and Informers. Good agents and informers, controlled by trained handlers, can be among the best sources of information, but failure to control and co-ordinate them, and the growth of private networks, will lead to compromise, false information and double agents. 311. Surrendered and Captured Insurgents. It is important that at the outset of counter revolutionary operations a policy on the treatment of captured and surrendered insurgents is agreed with the civil government. They must be questioned by trained interrogators at the earliest opportunity; but immediate tactical questioning in the field, before the initial shock of capture has worn off, may yield goods results. A soldier able to speak a few words of the local language may obtain tactical information which leads to the discovery of insurgent camps, supply dumps, etc. It is possible that some governments may wish to make political capital from them even to the extent of trial and execution on charges of treason. This can be disastrous for two reasons: a. Insurgents will be defeated by loss of popular support for their cause and not by military action alone. Retribution enacted on those who surrender or are captured will only stiffen resistance to the government and create more dissidents. b. They are an extremely valueble sources of information and it is possible that with the right type of treatment and free education they can be turned back and used against the insurgents. 312. Captured Documents. They may be unintelligible to troops who capture them, documents are valueble sources of information to intelligence staffs; documents found on a suspect can be extremely useful to an interrogator. Insurgent prisnors and deze, their camps and captured positions must be searched and any documents found must be reserved, labelled with the circumstances of capture, identified with individuals where possible and handed over as quickly as possible to the intelligence oorganization. The insurgents communications depend on the use of dead letter boxes it discovered they may contain important document and may provide an opportunity to capture a leading figure when he comes to collect or despatch his orders.

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RESTRICTED 313. Air Reconnaissance. In the initial stages of deployment the air may be the only reliable source of information to British Forces. In addition to abtain specific information it can be a vulnerable means of confirming information received from other sources, not only by visual or photographic reconnaissance, but by the use of air borne surveillance devices. 314. Patrols. The proper briefing and de-briefing of patrols is essential and troops must be trained in cheerfl observation and recording of important information about insurgent camps, food dumps, tracks, mines, explosives and insurgent tactics. 315. Observation Posts. Well sited observation posts, by day and night can provide useful information on movement or the absence of it. 316. Survellience and Listening Aids. These can be used to assist ground and air reconnaissance; particularly each sensitive devices which detect camp fires through foliage, image intensifires and infra-red devices for night survellience, short range radar and remote listening devices. 317. Captured Equipment. This can be of great value to technical intelligence staffs, and should be marked and identified in the same way as insurgent documents.
SECTION 21 - COUNTER

INTELLIGENCE

Tasks 318. The greatest problem confronting the security organization is that of identifying the insurgent. The staff will be concerned with the measures that must be taken to prevent espionage, sabotage and subversion, and with the methods of obtaining intelligence on organizations which pose these military installations will include insurgent agents on long and short term reconnaissance tasks. Principles 319. There are five main principles which must be observed: a. Current military security instructions must be applied sensibly. b. The activities of all counter intelligence agencies must be directed and controlled by a central authority. c. Commanders at all levels must appreciate the importance of counter intelligence activities. d. The distribution of information must be carefully controlled on a need toknow basis. e. Communications security must be enforced. Protective security 320. Protective security is concerned with; a. Orders, instructions and plans to ensure the safety and security of documents, equipment, installations and personnel.

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RESTRICTED b. Advice to commanders on physical security measures such as guards, fences and systems for controlling access. c. Investigation of subversive acts or incidents affecting our forces. 321. Protective security falls under three main headings; a. Security of information defence against espionage, including the security of operations. b. security of materialdefence against espionage and sabotage. c. security of personneldefence and protection against compromise and subversion.

322. Security of Information. All commanders are responsible for implementing security controls in their own units and making sure that all ranks are aware of the consequences of careless talk. It should never be assumed that a local inhabitant cannot understand English. Insurgents value documents more than mere verbal reports on then and current military security instruction must therefore be understood and obeyed. Local contractors and employers in the area of operations are vulnerable to insurgent pressure; and to the insurgents they can be valuable sources of such information as unit ration strengths, operational roles, future moves, etc. security risks of this sort can be reduced by careful vetting, adopting cover plans for moves and other activities, and by the training and indoctrinationn of all ranks in enforcing security measures. 323. Security of Material. Protection of equipment against espionage must be regarded as complementary to the protection of documents, for it is usually easier to gain access to equipment than to the documents concerning it. The targets of a saboteur are key installations, equipment and buildings, and his weapons are explosive and fire. Protection against sabotage is achieved by a combination of physical security, good orders and control of access normally by a pass system which denies entry to all except screened personnel. Insurgents are always in need of medical supplies, explosive, weapons and ammunition, and these must be safeguarded. The weapons and ammunition of casualties, both man and equipment such as AFVs and air crafts, must be recovered immediately: even empty cases may be valuable to the enemy. 324. Security personnel. Protective measures can never be relaxed in an operational area. Propaganda is the main medium of subversion and its object is to destroy the will to resist the insurgents. Deliberate atrocities against our troops will have the aim of encouraging the troops to react violently against the local population, thereby destroying the goodwill and confidence which are essential. Insurgent propaganda is insidious, and suitable counter measures are: a. Education: explaining the true facts behind the insurgency and why the country has asked for assistance. b. Explanation of the methods and techniques the insurgent will use to achieve subversion. c. The prevention of rumours by keeping troops as fully informed as possible. d. Good discipline and leadership. e. Good welfare amenities. Civil Security

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RESTRICTED 325. Civil security is concerned with controls imposed on the civilian population with the object of identifying hostile elements within the population, highlighting the hostile intelligence attack and those working for insurgent intelligence. The measures are aimed at preventing the movement of insurgent agents and their information, the traffic of weapons, and at nullifying the activities of the insurgent intelligence services. 326. The supervision of these controls is a civil responsibility but the assistance of the counter intelligence staff may be required for: a. Background investigations and the vetting of persons whose loyalty is questionable. b. Indoctrination of personnel in all aspects of security. c. Control of civilian movement. d. Unannounced searches and raids on clandestine meeting places. e. Censorship.
SECTION 22

- CONCLUTION

327. Intelligence is the key to successful operation: with good intelligence the battle will be won, without it the security forces are fighting always in the dark and much of their effort will be fruitless or wasted. Furthermore, where there is a lack of information more troops than are in fact necessary have to be employed. Accurate and timely information usually results in operational success which creates confidence among the local population and lead to further information and success provided always that sources of information are properly protected. The collection of information and its conversation into intelligence require an efficient intelligence organization which exploits all available sources to the full with a detailed, systematic and economical collection plan. The successful functioning of this organization depends largely upon; a. Knowledge of the area of operation and the local language. b. The collection of all available intelligence before the emergency begins. c. the forming of close ties with the country concerned to make full use of all its sources of intelligence. d. The setting up of a single, integrated and centralized intelligence organization, probably based on the local Special Branch or any similar civilian intelligence organization, if one exists which operates through committees at all levels parallel with the civil administration. e. The acquisition of intelligence by all arm and services, using all available means and technical aids. f. Efficient, secure and portable communications. 328-330 Reserved. CHAPTER 6---MILITARY OPERATIONS
SECTION 23 - THE

PATTERN OF INTERNAL SECUITY OPERATION

General 331. British forces are most likely to undertake internal security operations either in a British dependency where civil disturbances need not necessarily savour of rebellion, or in a 197 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED foreign country which is in the throes of a revolutionary war and has appealed for military assistance. In the latter instance civil disturbances may represent only one of the many types of unrest. Before long term political, economic and social measures can be taken to solve the problems, military action may be necessary to control or contain the situation. 332. The patterns of internal security operations greatly depend on the political situation and the nature and cause of the disturbances. Background 333. The disturbances may have their origin in industrial or racial disputes or be a phase of revolutionary war in a calculated campaign to overthrow the government. 334. The nature of the disturbances may take one, or a combination of the following forms and can escalate in intensity; a. Unlawful assemblies, strikers and picketing, civil disobedience, riots, arson and looting. b. Terrorism in urban areas, with murder groups selecting individual high priority targets such as government officers and officials or spreading terror by attacking selected civilians. c. Sabotage of essential services, transport syatems, police stations, and government installations. d. The placing of mines, booby traps and bombs to terrorize the public and to create additional chaos. e. Urban terrorist operations where the insurgents are prepared to contest the security forces in urban areas with rifles, light automatic weapons and grenades. Operating Principles 335. Civil Authority. The military will always be in support of the civil authority except in extreme cases of urban anti-terrorist operations. 336. Minimum Force. The principle of the use of minimum force must be applied. This must not be confused with the number of troops deployed on the ground. A large concentration of troops deployed at a critical time may actually enable a commander either to use less force than he otherwise would have done or avoid having to use it altogether. 337. Co-operation. The military must co-operate at every level, in every sphere and at every step with the civil authorities. The police and military must work together as a single team. Types of Operation 338. In between internal security and counter insurgency operations there can be antiurban terrorist operations. These can result from an escalation of aggression by the insurgents in urban area or may represent an advanced stage of revolutionary war in urban or rural areas. When formed bodies of terrorists are carrying out ambushes and attacks on police and military posts it must be looked on in the insurgency context of a revolutionary war. Such Attack is more likely to take place in rural areas. Anti-terrorist operations in urban areas are considered under internal security in part 2 in order to avoid overlap: those in rural areas,

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RESTRICTED which impinge on controlled area operations, are considered under counter insurgency in part 3.
SECTION 24 - THE

PATTERN OF COUNTER INSURGENCY OPERATIONS

339. Whatever the precise circumstances of the insurgency it is assumed that the government is still in control of at least part of the country. If this were not the case, the conflict would largely have the characteristics of a limited war until such time as a measure of control could be achieved. The control of the rest of the country would then be systematically regained in stages on the lines of the following paragraphs. Establishment of a Base 340. The first requirement is for the armed forces to establish a secure base or bases from which aggressive operations against the insurgents can be mounted. Until this has been done the purely military tasks involved in seeking out and destroying the insurgents cannot be successfully achieved. These bases fall in to two categories: a. Base areas. There may be a requirement for more than one of these bases. They should be developed around a port and - or terminal strategic transport (ST) airfield, and have the all facilities and installations needed to support a prolonged campaign. At the same time each of them must be concentrated in to a comparatively small area which can be protected from interference by saboteurs and ground forces. They are unlikely to be attacked from the air, but may be targets for subversion and shelling or mortaring. b. Forward Operational Bases. These should be developed around Tac T (MR) and Tac T (SR) airfields/airstrips, and at least one may have to be established in each province. If neither type of airfield is available the base may have to start as an air head. Development is then necessary and the criteria are that projected pacification operations and operations in depth must be within convenient helicopter turn round of a forward operational base. These bases will clearly be more vulnerable than a main base, but they must be made impregnable, with properly dug in posts with over head cover. They should be capable of being held by one third of the garrison thus leaving two thirds of the garrison available for offensive operations.

Securing an Enlargement of Controlled Areas 341. Ones a secure base has been established operations can be undertaken to secure controlled areas within which the authority of the national government can be maintained. Initially these may be carried out from the base itself but as it becomes necessary and possible to deploy greater strength and so operate further afield, forward operational bases must be seized and areas cleared systematically outwards from these.

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RESTRICTED 342. The operations to secure and enlarge a government controlled area, launched from a forward operational base, are known as pacification operations. And area adjacent to the base or existing controlled area should be selected. And this should be progressively dominated by regular forces carrying out clearing operations, cordons and searches, patrols and ambushes. The security forces must be prepared to destroy at once any guerrilla force or base identified by the operations. As each group of villages is cleared of insurgents, the covert insurgent organization destroyed and a framework of protection provided against further interference by insurgents; the police local home guards and civil authorities should move in to reestablished orderly government: once this has been done satisfactorily the security forces should move on to the next selected area. When police are not available or are unreliable, local force may have to be used in the police role. All this is a very slow process. The system does however have the great merit of ensuring that a progressively grater part of the nation is feed from insurgent influence, and once freed, remains so. Operations in Depth 343. Because of the slowness of the operations to establish controlled at the insurgents are liable to have considerable freedom of action elsewhere. If sufficient troops are therefore available, seties of offensive actions, signed to locate and destroy insurgents in adjoining provinces and regiments should be mounted simultaneously. This is done to isolate the insuring from outside assistance, and thus prevent interference with the pacification operations, and also to ensure that the process of recapturing control over the whole country is not unduly protracted. This is also the quickest way of reducing the hard core insurgent: although the areas covered in these operations will, of course, invariably need clearing subsequently. 344. Such operations will not aim to clear areas but rather, by deep penetration raids, to capture or kill guerrilla leaders, harass their movements and communications, destroy their food supplies and depress their morale. The stronger the hole of the insurgents the more emphasis will have to be placed on these offensive operations in depth in order to give the pacification operations a chace of success. Border Protection 345. As part of the campaign to win control over an increasing area of the country and deny outside help to the insurgents it may be necessary to establish some form of control over a land frontier with a foreign power. It may be satisfactory to carry this out with locally recruited frontier guards, particularly if the area is very inaccessible. On the other hand the threat may be too great for this and it may be better to use these frontier guards as guides and for providing information and early warning, and to move in regular formations prepared to undertake full scale operations with many of the characteristics of limited war. SECTION 25 - THE TRAINING REQUIREMENT General 346. To carry out the roles and tasks given in section 11, all ranks require their normal skills brought to the highest pitch. They also require a thorough training in matters which are common to all arms. The requirements set out in the following sections although applying in every respect to infantry are not confined to that arm; they apply to every officer and every 200 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED soldier regardless of arm for there are no rears of safe areas. Counter revolutionary warfare in all its phases and forms demands a higher standard of leadership than any other form of warfare. It is essential to train junior leaders of all arms to make sound decisions and to act on their own. 347. The two training aspects of the greatest importance in counter revolutionary warfare are the need for supreme physical fitness and the ability to kill at fleeing targets at short range. Common Aspects 348. Briefing. A considerable amount of training time must be devoted giving all ranks initially briefings and, subsequently, to keeping them up to on the following subjects; a. The background to the emergency. b. The political situation. c. The legal status of British forces in the theatre of operations, including limitations on the use of force. d. The pattern of operations that can be expected including the organization of local police and military forces. e. Topography f. Insurgent habits and tactics. A sound knowledge of the insurgent including his minor tactics, subterfuges, hiding places, use of mines etc, is essential. g. The tribal, religious backgrounds and customs of the people of the country. h. An understanding of the necessity for treating defectors and surrendered insurgents jeniently to enhance the good faith of the government in the eyes of both the local population and the insurgents. 349. Fitness and Endurance. A very high standard of physical fitness is required to overcome any adverse climatic conditions and, when allied with mental toughness, to enable fatigued, wounded or injured soldiers to carry on. All soldeirs must be capable of sustained physical effort over long periods in circumstances which present both psychological and physical obstacles. 350. Skill at Arms. This invariably decides the outcome of any engagement in counter revolutionary operations, and the following points must be emphasized: a. The ability to hit, instinctively and immediately, fleeting targets at short range and in poor visibility is vital. This skill calls for special type of marksmanship and constant practice. b. Shooting practice should be carried out at every available opportunity on whatever form of range is available. Firing on battle ranges from cramped positions and at night is particularly important. c. Safety precautions against accidental discharge. The recommended drills are given in part 2 Annex F. 351. Field craft. A soldier must be capable of living in and making use of the local conditions however arduous and primitive they may be. This presupposes a thorough knowledge of patrolling, navigation, ambush, search and tracking techniques, which can only be obtained by the sound training of junior leaders and the stressing of field craft skills at both section and platoon or equivalent level. These skills must be supplemented by contact

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RESTRICTED drills which will cultivate instinctive offensive reactions to counter ambushes and other tactical emergencies. 352. Night Operations. Insurgents make constant use of night operations and the cover of darkness. All training programmes must lay great stress on night training. 353. Medical. Unless health training is sound, casualties from disease are likely to be far greater than those due to enemy action. The majority of discases are preventable or avoidable and sound training in the following will greatly reduce wastage; a. Health and hygiene discipline. Orders dealing with health and hygiene measures must be comprehensive, realistic and enforced. b. First Aid. All ranks must understand basic first aid. In many tactical situations, particularly when small group are operating away from their units, medical orderlies will not be immediately available. Knowledge of first aid may make the difference between life and death. The manual carriage of sick and wounded should be understood and practiced by all ranks. 354. Communications. Internal security and counter insurgency operations place heavy demands on signallers at all levels and reserves must be trained. The normal training syllabus for voice and telegraph operators will be adequate but special emphasis must be placed upon; a. b. c. d. 355. Antenna sitting, especially for VHF communications. Antenna design for both HF and VHF radios. Sitting, maintenance and resupply of rebroadcast stations. Telegraph operating on HF radios at night under conditions of heavy interference and fading.

Specialist Training. The following aspects require particular attention: a. Intelligence Training. (1) Training of unit intelligence officers and sub-unit intelligence NCOs in intelligence techniques and methods applicable to the theatre of operations, including the role of the local special branch. (2) Training of the individual solider in accurate observation and reporting. (3) Training of officers and NCOs in immediate tactical questioning following the capture of an insurgent. (4) Training of patrols in intelligence gathering tasks, with particular reference to protracted day and night operations over difficult country. (5) Training of all ranks in the art of deception and general security measures.

b. Language courses for selected officers and soldiers, particularly those covered by sub paragraph a. (1) above c. Training some officers and soldiers from all sub units in the detection and disposal of mine, booby traps and explosive devices. d. Signals exercises, including communication with aircraft and helicopters. e. Organization and functioning of combined operations rooms at unit and subunit level. 202 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED f. Training of diarists and photographers down to platoon or equivalent level. g. Use of riot control agent, as described in Annex Q of Part 2 h. Tracker dog handler training. i. Use of soliders as porters for the carriage of heavy equipment such as guns, mortars and some heavy radio stations. 356. Air Mobility. Because of the emphasis placed on air support in the tactical concept, training on the following must take places. a. Emplaning procedure. Every unit must have officer who have attended unit emplaning officer courses as well as a cadre of other ranks who have qualified on aircraft loading and lashing courses. b. Emplaning and deplaning drills for utility and support helicopters and STOL aircrafts for tactical movement by air generally. This task will fall to unit emplaning officers who, with other qualified personnel, must be pass on to all ranks their skills in air documentation and the loading and lashing of equipment. The RAF will, whenever possible, permit loading and unloading drills to be practiced on aircraft. This should be arranged at unit level with the appropriate RAF unit. Besides making every effort to exploit this facility, full use must be made of mock-ups within the unit. c. Air supply procedures including the clearing and making of dropping and landing zones. d. All aspects of offensive air support, including air support at night. e. Battle procedure and techniques for airmobile operations at night. f. Night troop lifting. 357. Forward Air Controllers (FAC). Air strikes will normally be controlled by a primary FAC who is an Army or an RAF officer established for the purpose. Some artillery FOOs and helicopter pilots are also trained as FACs. Other officers and NCOs may be trained as air contact officers (ACO). 358. Pioneer Tasks. Engineer troops will often be committed on priority tasks such as the development of forward operational bases and the opening up of main routes. Other arms should therefore be trained to carry out simple engineering tasks for themselves. These tasks will include field defence, improvised rafting, waterman ship, makeshift tracks and roads, elementary water supply, mine warfare, the use of explosive in felling trees for construction of helicopter landing points, dropping zones and field defences, and in the destruction of enemy defences, tunnel systems etc. 359. Watermanship. Special emphasis should be given to improvised river crossing including rafting and personal flotation. All ranks must be able to swim. 360. Security. Until all ranks are imbued with the highest standard of security the simplest operation can be hazardous. Security of weapons is also of paramount importance. 361. Behaviour. The need for irreproachable behaviour must be stressed during training. This is essential, as every deviation from the strictest standards of behaviour will be used for hostile propaganda. Soldiers must be trained to show firmness combined with humanity, decency and impartiality the importance of high standard of bearing, turn out and discipline must also be emphasized. Internal security

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RESTRICTED 362. The following tactics and techniques must be practiced and rehearsed thoroughly. They should be regarded as a means to an end, to be applied intelligently and with tactical sense to a given situation. They are all considered in part 2 of this Volume: a. Precautions against ambush. b. Guarding VIPs and small convoys c. Guarding VPs d. Crowd dispersal formations and techniques. e. Road blocks. f. Control points and troops/hilltop patrols. g. Urban patrols. (Patrols and ambushes in rural areas are covered in part 3 and also in infantry Training volume 4 the Infantry Platoon in Battle) (Army code no 9923) h. Cordon, search and snatch operations. Training in a Police Role 363. The training of a unit or part of a unit to act in a police role, using batons, shields and riot control agent, but without arms, would require some warning and the issue of the necessary equipment. This subject is also covered in part 2. Counter Insurgency 364. The many important training requirements for counter insurgency operations should be apparent from a study of the appropriate chapters and parts of this volume. However the two most important individual requirements are supreme physical fitness and the ability to shoot to kill under any conditions. 365. The following tactics and techniques require special training and are considered in Part 3 of the Volume: a. Patrolling and Ambushing b. Cordon and Search c. Search and Clear d. Immediate Action Drills e. Fix and Destroy Operations (1) Attacking insurgent camps or positions (2) Attacking a Fortified Village 366-370 Reserved

CHAPTER 7 ADMINISTRATION
SECTION 26 - SPECIAL

FACTORS AFFECTING ADMINISTRATION

371. The problems and accepted methods of administering British forces in underdeveloped countries with various types of terrain are set out in Administration in the Field 1966 chapter 111. (Army cord No 70182). The purpose of this Chapter is to emphasize those administrative problems that assume particular importance in country revolutionary 204 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED operations (both in interanl security and counter incurgency).The arise because of the special conditions under which this type of operation is normally conducted, whatever may be the terrain or climate of the operational area. 372. The main factor affecting administration in these operations are: a. The insurgents are the indigenous people: certain areas of the country may actually be insurgent-held territory and the whole country may be vulnerable to attack by guerrillas, terrorists and saboteurs. This vulnerability of the land line of supply makes it important that the maximum use should be made of air transport. b. The nature of military operationseg that they take place over a wide area, and as a result of information which suddenly comes to hand demands that the administration of the security forces is highly flexible. There will be a constant need to improvise new systems of supply and maintenance. c. There is a need for the closest co-operation with the local people and the government agencies in all administrative matters of common concern. There will in fact be frequent requests for assistance by the civil government, e.g.for the accommodation and feeding of refugees. These must be sympathetically considered and help given whenever possible. d. There is a need to make the maximum use of local resources, host nation or allied facilities, e.g. labour, accommodation, transport and fresh food: not only the economize in the amount of logistic support that must be important but also to help to identify loyal supporters of the governments with the campaign against the insurgents. e. There is a need for economy in all forms of administration, transport so that the size of the administrative tail does not limit the number of troops which are available for operations in the field. f. If the force that is helping the government to quell the revolt or rebellion is a multi-national one, there will be the additional problems of co-ordinating the different administrative systems. The responsibility for this co-ordination should be vested in one nation.
SECTION 27 - MAIN

FACTORS IN LOGISTIC PLANNING

373. Forward Planning. The need for early and through logistic planning cannot be over emphasized. Logistic planning for a military force entering a country for counter revolutionary operations particularly counter insurgency is bound to be complex. Negotiations for co-operation with the local government agencies and possibly with other national forces will have to be conducted. It is there for important that logistic staff should be among the first to arrive in the theatre of operations. 374. Security. In a country where the insurgent cannot easily be identified and where agents may be everywhere, the need for strict security measures in all logistic installations cannot be over emphasized. Installations must be suitably sited and effectively guarded using their own resources for local protection; their staffs must be discreet; and the movement of equipment and supplys must not be aloe to indicate the nature and the area of active operations. When operations are undertaken by a purely British force, no indigenous persons should, as a rule, be trusted with knowledge of the aim scope, and the logistic needs of the operations. 375. Training of Logistic Personnel. All soldiers of logistic units are vulnerable to attack because there are no safe rear areas in this type of warfare. They must therefore be suitably 205 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED armed and trained in the use of their personnel weapons and capable of their units defence, and be responsible for their own security. 376. Air Maintenance. As the maintenance system should be based mainly on the use of air transport, there must be the closest co-operation between the logistic and air force staffs. The use of air transport gives great flexibility and speed to the system of supply. The advantages this confers must be fully exploited. The size of reserve holdings can then be reduced, even though they may have to be more widely distributed. The number of installations on the ground can also be reduced, thereby effecting economies in staff, guards and transport. Troops on the ground can be supplied by air and therefore can be more lightly laden and armed, and can undertake longer operations. A flexible system of air maintenance by efficient and alert logistic staffs will do much to give increased mobility and effectiveness to the troops on the ground. 377. Air Strips - Landing Points. Air dropping is most effective where air strips - landing points are not available or unusable. It is however uneconomical compared with air landing, owing to the air dropping equipment and crews required. There will therefore be an early requirement for forward air strips and helicopter landing sites. If the operation is dependent on air supply, it is important that forward operational bases should be sited to include existing airfields or sites where air fields can be developed. 378. Communications. The provision of good communications is essential to the working of an efficient logistic organization. Reliable communications enable plans to be more flexible and contribute to reducing the need for large reserve stocks. These communications require as high a degree of security as the operational network. 379. Medical. The rigorous conditions in which operations are conducted against insurgents enhance the need for good medical arrangements. Troops entering the theatre of operations should be given time to become acclimatized and adjusted to the local conditions. Strict medical discipline must be enforced. Prophylactic medicines must be regularly taken and hygiene must be of a high standard. Casualty evacuation although often by air may be difficult to task at once and therefore a good knowledge of first aid by all ranks is particularly important. Army medical teams may find themselves overwhelmed by the medical needs of the local population, but their ability to compete with all the demands that are made on their resources will contribute important psychological advantages to our forces. 380. Morale. With the uncertain conditions in a country that is in the throes of a rebellion there may be a tendency for a loss of moral. The progress of operations may appear to be slow, success may sometimes, be in doubt and the elects of the insurgents activates may be exaggerated. Rumours are easily spread but take time to disprove, and troops will be operating in small parties for long periods under trying conditions. It is therefore important to counter any tendency toward lowered morale by providing reliable information services, a full days work for all troops well organized leave centres or at least rest and relaxation facilities in safe areas, and a frequent mail service from home. 381. Local Resources. To save valuable air and sea lift capacity and at the same time to help the economy of the country the maximum possible use should be made of reliable locality enlisted labour and indigenous resources of all kinds. An organization to control these resources should be set up as early as possible and careful screening of any local labour used is necessary. 206 RESTRICTED

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382. Military Assistance to the Civil Power. As a counter revolutionary campaign is a combined civil and military affair, there must be close co-operation between the military administrative services and civilian government agencies. Military staffs must always be willing to assist with civilian schernes and with the measures to improve conditions in the country. Help should be given mainly in the form of advice, the loan of equipment and decision of expert supervision. This subject is considered further in Section... 383. Financial Aspects. The commander of a force dispatched the civil power of either a British dependency or of a friendly nation, ensures that the financing of the operation is properly according to on certain financial aspects are at annex E. 384-390 Reserved.

CHAPTER 8 - CIVIL AFFAIRS

SECTION 28 -

OBJECTIVES FUNCTIONS, PRICIPLES AND RESPONSIBILITY

Introduction 391. Civil-affairs are concerned with the relationship between our armed forces, the civil authorities and the people, with particular reference to areas where the armed forces are conducting operations. This relationship will depend upon government policy and will vary from liasion with and advice an assistance to the local civil government to the exercise of complete legislative, executive and judicial power by the armed forces, ie. Military government.The civil affairs policy for each area of operations should be established at government level. 392. In conventional military operations, civil affairs is in a supporting role. In counter insurgency, however, because of the importance of isolating the insurgents from the people, civil affairs, like psychological operations, assume greatly increased significance. 393. The conduct of civil affairs will vary depending on the extent to which integrated local operations committees have control and direction of the counter insurgency effort and the effectiveness of the civil administration generally. Where civil government and its agencies are efficient the armed force should seek to avoid interference in governmental matters. On the other hand, if the civil administration has collapsed or is near collapse, the appropriate military commander may have to assume complete responsibility for administration of the area with the ultimate aim of creating the conditions whereby effective civil administration can be re-established. Objectives 394. The desirable Objective for civil affairs/military government authorities operating in a given situation should be: a. Support for Military Operations. Vigorous action may be required to maintain public order and to prevent unrest which could prejudice military operations. Local 207 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED resources e.g. transport a/craft, timber, plant, etc can often be employed to support military operations and should be properly purchased through civil agencies. b. Meeting International Obligations. Regardless of the circumstances under which British forces are employed overseas, international law imposes on the military commander certain obligations concerning the welfare of the civil population. The British Government, by its membership of the united nations, its committed to an exemplary discharge of its responsibilities, and this obligations extend to all its reprehensive, including its armed forces. c. Support of Implementation of National Policies. The nature, extent and objectives of British civil affairs/operations in any country will depend on British national policy. A military commander must carry out this policy with the advice and assistance from a representative of his government. If he is not given enough guidence he must ask for it. d. Transfer of Responsibility from Military to a Civil Agency. When military control is re-established in any area civil affairs/military government functions should be restored to civil authorities as quickly as the situation will permit. The transfer will require foresight and careful advanced planning. Functions 395. For the purpose of organization and training, civil affairs/military government functions may be grouped under the following categories; a. Government Functions (1)Legal (2)Public safety (3) Public welfare (4)Public health (5) Public finance (6) Public education (7) Labour b. Economic Functions (1)Economic policy (2)Commerce and industry (3)Food and agriculture (4)Price control and rationing (5)Property control (6)Civilian supply c. Public Facilities Functions (1)Public utilities (2)Public communication (3)Public transportation d. Special Functions (1)Civil information (2)Resettlement of population (3)Arts, movements and archives Principles 208 RESTRICTED

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396. In the absence of specific political guidance, the following general principles will be used for planning civil affairs/ military government operations;
a. Humanity. The principle of humanity prohibits the use of a greater degree of force than is actually necessary for the purpose of the war. War is not an excuse for ignoring established humanitarian principles.

b. Benefit of the Governed. Subject to the requirements of the military situation, the principals of governing of the benefit of the governed should be observed.

c. Reciprocal Responsibilities. In the event of occupying enemy territory a commander has the right within the limited set by international law; to demand and enforce such obedience from the inhabitants of an occupied area as may be necessary for the accomplishment of his mission and the proper administration of the area. In return for such obedience the inhabitants have a right to freedom from unnecessary interference with their individual liberty and property rights. d. Command Responsibility. Responsibility and authority for the conduct of civil affairs/military governments operations are vested in the senior military commander who is gilded by directives from higher authority, by national policies, applicable agreements and by international law.

e. Continuity of Policy. Continuity and consistency in policy are essential to the success of civil affairs/military government operations. It is therefore fundamental that ever-all policy should be developed at governmental level and transmitted through normal command channels.

f.

Inclusion of Civil Affairs/Military Government Aspects in Plans and Orders. It is essential that military directives, plans and orders contain guidance to ensure that civil affirms /military governments matters are fully covered.

Responsibility for Civil Affairs 397. Civil affairs is a command responsibility and a commander is responsible for the conduct of civil affairs activities and operations of responsibility. 398. Although on the staff side civil affairs is a G (Operation) it is exercised with the advice and assistance of both A and activities of the former branch predominating. For this reason implementation of civil affairs policy within a task force will normally be affected to 209 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED the A staff. The senior civil affairs officer must have the right of direct access to the commander of the force or unit be is supporting. 399. Ideally and for any long period of time, civil affairs functions should be carried out by officers who have been given special training for the task. If no specialist officers are provided a commander must improvise and officer, who speak the language, have sound local knowledge organizing ability and a commonsense approach, should be able to tackle directly or indirectly most of the governmental functions for a short emergency period. Provided officers are available who can advice on the economic side. Public utilities can be handled by engineer, transportation and signal specialists from within the army. 400-404 Reserved.
SECTION 29 - THE

PROTECTION AND CONTROL OF THE PEOPLE

General 405. In counter insurgency operations the control of the civilian population will become one of the main concerns of a commander. This constitutes a definite civil affairs mission. And a commander must use his staff and units in the normal manner to discharge this responsibility. 406. The insurgents must gain control of and support from the civilian population, if their effort is to be successful. Conversely this must be resisted by the government side if the forces of law and order are not to encounter an ever increasing barrier of both active and passive resistance. In the battle for the hearts and mines of the peaople, a most important factor is the ability of the government to protect the people against the threats and assaults of the insurgents. Fear and self-interest will dominate the action of the people who will not rally to the government until they are convinced that their lives, families and property will be will protected. 407. As early as possible the people must be encouraged to play a full part in protecting themselves by obeying the emergency regulations, by giving information about the insurgents and by forming self defence units. Eventually the people will have to assume virtually complete responsibility for their own protection. Resettlements 408. Concentration of Outlying Communities. Isolated groups of people such as those living on farms and in outlying villages are particularly vulnerable to attack, and may have to be resettled in larger communities where they can be more easily protected. This concentration of families will reduce the number of police and guard units required for protective duties. If not concentrated it may be necessary to restrict their movements and to issue travel permits. 409. Regrouping of Plantation and Industrial Labour. Labour employed on plantations and the in large Industrial concerns should be re-housed in labour lines where they too can be

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RESTRICTED controlled and protected. Not only will the labour be safer, but the ability to control it will reduce absenteeism and enable production to be maintained. 410. Defended Villages. Rural communities must be concentrated into villages which can be defended against enemy attack. Only in exceptional circumstances should resettlement be undertaken before the area concerned is controlled and security can be guaranteed. The main requirements for establishing a defended village or certain a defended resettlement are at Annex F. Protection 411. Three types of military forces, other than regular forces and the police may be required to ensure the protection of the people; a. Home Guards. These are recruited form with in the defended village and should be sufficiently well armed with light weapons to resist an insurgent raid. They must have a suitable organization, be trained in the controlled use of their weapons and have a roster of duties. This training will have to be given by a special unit or cadre of instructors. Some articles of military uniform will help to raise their moral. They must be visited frequently by the security forces and it will probably be necessary to leave a permanent instructor behind even when the control area has been expanded. b. Regional Units. There are civil guards or militia units who are liable for service within their own province or district. Their role is to reinforce threatened villagers and operate against insurgents in their own areas. They must be well armed and disciplined if they are to oppose the enemy successfully. Both the regional units and village home guards should be valuable sources of military information. c. Frontier Guards. These may for a time be used as military units in an early warning role. But at a later stage are likely to form a branch of the para-military forces. Naval or coast guards may be necessary for the defiance of the coast, coastal waters and harbours. All types of frontier guards are best recruited locally. 412. The presence and quality of all these forces will indicate the intention and ability of the government to protect the people and to win their confidence and support. Until they are able to do so they must be supplemented by indigenous regular or allied forces, but it is obviously undesirable for regular units to be dispersed into small group for static defence tasks. At the earliest opportunity static tasks should be handed over to the locally raised forces to allow the regular to be employed in a mobile role. Food Control and Denial 413. Requirement Revolutionary forces are normally dependent upon local food supplies. When the country is in a state of insurgency, the population is largely sympathetic to the insurgents who thus have little difficulty in obtaining sufficient supplies. In order to deny supplies to the insurgents, it is essential to register the people and impose a system of food rationing. This will necessitate an organization to check the production, important and distribution of all items of food. This organization must ensure that the populations receive sufficient food, but that there are no surplus supplies which can be passed to the insurgents. Control of the whole organization must be strict, as abuses and unfair distribution of food can quickly alienate any support for the government. 211 RESTRICTED

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414. Steps must be taken in the villagers to safeguard crops and livestock. These may include the control of harvesting, and the collection of crops and livestock into protected communal stores or livestock yards. Where villagers have been evacuated or declared prohibited areas steps may have to be taken to destroy crops already planted, but not yet harvested and to deny insurgents use of the fields for growing their own crops. In prohibited areas, this can be done by chemical spraying from the air. 415. Methods. A combination of restrictions will force the insurgent to expose himself to search for suppliers, thus giving the security forces more chance of bringing him to battle. It will also force the insurgent to divert manpower to undertake his own food cultivation. The methods of controlling the distribution of food and denying it to the insurgents can be summarized as follows: a. b. c. d. e. f. g. Crop growing restrictions. Supervision over and the guarding of standing crops and stock. Control over harvesting and food storage Purchase of harvest and re-issue of national foodstuffs. Imposition of food rationing and the closing of trading centres. Centralized cooking in extreme cases. Imposition of gate checks, road blocks and curfews.

416. Control. The civil authorities are responsible for the control of food supplies and will usually appoint a special government official for this propose. Food control requires careful planning, training and co-ordination. If imposed wrongly it will cause unnecessary hardship, create hostility towards the government and possibly international controversy. 417. Enforcement. Allied forces may be ask to help the police undertake house searches for supplies of surpluses food which, if found should be purchased compulsorily and removed. They may be requested to help control movement of supplies and also locate and destroy any suspected insurgent food cultivation. Spot check may also be necessary to ensure the effectiveness of gate cheacks.etc. Public Information 418. Many of the control measures taken will be unpopular. They may interfere serious with the ability of some of the people to earn their living or continue their accustomed way of life. Moreover the insurgents will make strenuous effects to nullify the effect of government action especially by means of propaganda designed to discourage compliance with unpopular regulations. 419. A carefully planned public information campaign must therefore be conducted if full co-operation is to be gained. The reasons for the measures taken must be fully explained and the people made to realize that the measures are not punitive, that the sole aim is to deny food and other suppliers to the insurgents and that the real culprits are the insurgents themselves who make these unpopular measures necessary. Recalcitrant individuals or groups must be shown to be assisting the insurgents.

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RESTRICTED Summary 420. The people must be protected before they will give their support to the government. Initially, the power and action of the armed forces, supplemented by administrative action, will encourage a sense of security. Eventually, however the people themselves must provide their own protection and the effects of all government agencies the administration, police, armed services and information services must be directed to this end. The government must ensure that the people are informed of the steps being taken for their protection, the reasons for these steps and the benefits that will result from their co-operation in the campaign against the insurgents. All measures must be carried out as humanely as possible, and with scrupulous fairness.
SECTION 30

- COMMUNITY RELATIONS

Purpose 426. The purpose of a community relations programme is to use the resources of the armed forces for constructive civilian activities. Such as assisting in health, welfare, and public works projects, improving living conditions, alleviating suffering, and improving the economic position of the country. In addition, the program aims to gain the support respect, and accumulative goodwill of the people for the armed forces and to emphasize the concept of freedom and importance of the individual. In the past this has proved an effective way of reducing the threat of subversion, particularly in under developed rural areas; and in this respect it forms part of psychological operations dealt with later. 427. The community relations programme can encompass everything from a soldier imparting his particular skills or knowledge to a civilian in order to help solve a problem to improve conditions, to the organization and functioning of a complete army unit in opening up and developing in remote areas. Military aids will be equally appreciated in highly developed areas if there has been a disaster or sound administration has been disrupted. 428. Contribution of military resources and services can often meet the needs of a community in ways far beyond the capabilities of the community itself, or of its higher civilian authorities, since military forces often passes better resources of man power, material communications and organization. By improving the social and economic states of a country, military forces are able to reduce sources of civilian discontent, strengthen the countrys own war effort and add materially to politically stability. At the same time care must be exercised not to impair the military effectiveness of the units participating in these projects and to ensure the military assistance does not duplicate, but is complimentary to, the activities of other agencies. Principals 429. Experience has shown that community relations should be based on the following principals: a. A project originated by the local people and then adopted by a military unit is much more desirable, and has a must greater chance of success than one conceived elsewhere. 213 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED b. A project must have a fairly short completion time or have phases that provide frequent opportunities to evaluate its effectiveness. c. Results should be visible to a wide public. They should also lend themselves to publicity. d. Result should clearly demonstrate to the public the benefits which spring from an association with the military authorities and civil government. Credit for results should be attributed to both the local military and the local civil administration. Command and Control 430. The direction, specific guidance and control of community relations, is the responsibility of military commanders at all levels. The initiative and imagination of subordinate leaders should be exploited and encouraged. The fact that such action is offen the result of the natural impulse of men to help others less fortunate should be recognized and fostered. The guidance provides to subordinate commanders should indicate the type of project whichthey can undertake on their own initiative, and the type which requires dditional funds, which must therefore be approved by higher HQ. 431. Although spontaneous actions and initiative at a low level should be encouraged, most projects will first have to be cleared with the responsible civil authorities, either through local operations committees or thought civil affairs liaison contact with the appropriate government department such clearance is necessary to avoid friction caused by cutting across departmental policies and responsibilities and to maintain a proper sense of priorities. 432. With, indigenous or tribal people who live primitive lives in rural and inaccessible areas. It is most important to gain their trust and confidence. The ways to achieve these are by: a. Speaking their language b. Respecting their customs and religion c. Sending small specially trained SAS-type patrols to live and work amongst them, to protect them and share their danger to get to know them and gain their confidence d. Giving them feeling of security by day and night through the presence of patrols and by Constance visits from the civil administration police and army. e. Proving that the security forces are superior jungle fighters to the insurgents and at the same time proving the deeds that they can be as constructive to the civil community as they are destructive to the insurgents. f. Improving the efficiency of their agriculture; providing experts and arranging dominations g. Improving their communications and their trading facilities h. Improving their water supply i. Providing them with medical clinics and a flying doctors service. 214 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED j. Establishing schools but carefully supervised lest they become breeding grounds of subversion Projects 433. Requests for military assistance are likely to range from invitations to construct roads involving considerable engineering effort, to modern task such as local clinics conducted by company medical orderlies. The needs, customes, beliefs and aspirations of the people vary from areas to areas and these must be determined before major projects are planed, and before it can be decided how best to use the skills and resources available. Some excellent results have been obtained by a unit or sub unit adopting a specific village or group of villagers in its area. This community improves the prospect of building up confidence among the local population and establishing friendships. If sections or platoons are then made responsible for specific houses or families and visit them at regular intervals it also permits the passage of information from the local population to the British forces without the insurgents being able to pin point the source. Individual Actions 434. Each soldier should be imbued with winning the battle for the hearts and maids of the people so that, in addition to the general community relations programme, he conducts his own personal programme. This may include simple acts of kindness such as: a. Helping a fisherman to mend his net or boat. b. Exercising courtesy on the road and giving lifts where permitted. c. Assisting a local farmer with a bogged or damaged cart. d. Kindness to children and old people. e. Displaying respect for places of worship and assisting religious leaders. Eg. monks 435. Community relations in any action which make the solider a friend of the people as well as their protector, and each individual solider must try to demonstrate a close identification with the people. This does not imply however that he must not be strict in enforcing regulation; not that he must ever cease to be alert and ready for action. Good discipline a soldierly bearing an efficient performance and correct behaviour with a touch of humanity; will be the best weapons in the battle for, hearts and minds 436. Community relation projects, no matter how impressive, cannot overcome the harm of bad behaviour by individuals or groups. Drunkenness, brawling, interference with local woman, pilfering from vegetable gardens and any souvenir hunting are all highly undesirable and must not be tolerated. 437. Religious building should not be entered if it can possibly be avoided. Failure to pay a fair price for goods, reckless driving, thoughtlessness or deliberate discourtesy, may well be the act which will make the people angry enough to refuse to co-operate or to withhold vital information. This in turn could prevent the successful accomplishment of an operation.

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CHAPTER 9-PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

SECTION 31 - DEFINITIONS

AND AIMS

446. General. Psychological operations (psyops) will be covered in detail in supplement no 3 JSPI, which will supersede staff officers guide to psychological operations (WO Code No 7229). This chapter aims to underline the importance of and the necessity for such operations in the conduct of counter revolutionary operations. 447. Definition. Psyops are the planned use of propaganda or other means, in support of our military action or presence designed to influence to our advantage the opinions, emotions, attitudes and behaviour of ememy, neutral and friendly groups. 448. Aims. Psyops has two distinct aims: a. Gaining the confidence and co-operation of the civil population so as to assist military operations by isolating the insurgents from civil support and ensuring a steady flow of information b. Lowering the moral of the insurgents and thereby encouraging surrender and defection.

SECTION 32

- CONDUCT OF PSYOPS

General 449. Psyops have an essential contribution to make in counter revolutionary operations. In simple cases of civil disturbance brought about by agitation and propaganda. A counter balance may be provided by an efficient information service pursuing a sound constructive and positive programme in support of government actions. In an insurgency situation however there is a need for much more offensive type of programme which, while supporting the government aim, will also act as a destructive weapon against insurgents. The success of such a programme is linked with the success of a conventional counter insurgent operation. Although psyops can exploit success, it cannot justify failure. Tasks 450. In order to achieve the two aims set out above, psyops effort should be directed at the specific tasks set out below. 451. Consolidation tasks. These include: a. Encouraging loyal elements to remain loyal and to denounce insurgents. If information is scarce, or not forthcoming it may be encouraged by the governments institution of rewards, which should be publicized by all available means.

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RESTRICTED b. Persuading the uncommitted to support the government, as being the best way of serving their own interest. This is done by publicizing military success, insurgent losses and government measures for the improvement of the peoples well-being and, the removal of causes of past dissatisfaction. c. Assisting in creating and maintaining a favourable attitude towards the presence of British forces. Constructive community relations by our own forces are an important element in this. Good behaviour, discipline, a correct and helpful attitude to civil population, and goodwill gestures, eg. Providing food and medical facilitiesand taking part in supporting fixtures, all contibute. d. Demonstrating the strength, efficiency and unity of purpose of military and civil security forces, so as to breed confidence in the governments ability to provide security from terrorism. Eg: without conflicting with operational needs patrolling should be carried out by joint military and police patrols in areas where the local population can see them. e. Explaining the necessity for irksome restrictions such as curfews and searches and for any delays in fulfilling government plans brought on by the emergency; stressing that all this will disappear when the insurgents are eliminated. f. Countering or, better still, forestalling insurgent propaganda from both internal and external sources. g. Ensuring that commanders foster a sympathetic attitude on the part of the troops towards the government and the indigenous people by programmes designed: ()1 To explain to the troops the reasons for their involvement in the situation. ()2 To familiarize the troops with the political, religious and historical influences and the outlook, customs, habits and attitudes of the indigenous people. h. Explaining to the troops the psychological implications of tactical counter insurgency measures which affect the local population. A cordon and search operation may net five adherents but if it is conducted in such a way as to create 500 new communist sympathizers it cannot be classified as a long term success. 452. Anti-insurgent Task. These include a. Stripping up dissensions between the leaders and the rank and file eg. By exploiting any weakness and eccentricities of the leader and playing up any perpetration of harsh or unfair treatment. b. Stressing shortage or inferior of food, weapons and medical facilities.

c. Stressing insurgent losses, as against the strength and successes of the security forces. d. Drawing attention to lack of outside aid and the increasing lack of sympathy and assistance from the local population 217 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED e. Having lowered moral by the above means, encouraging surrender, by publicizing its advantages, eg. Good treatment, leniency, rehabilitation in civil life, etc according to the governments policy on matters. Also publicizing the methods of surrendering in safety, eg. Use of safe conduct passes or leaflets. 108 Explaining the necessity for lenient treatment of defectors and surrendered personnel as a means of enhancing the good faith of the government in the eyes of both the local population and the insurgents.

f.

Pre-requisite for psyops 453. To be successful propaganda must be: a. Based upon truth b. In conformity with government policy; no promise, threats or statements should be made which diverge from political directives. c. Based on accurate knowledge of the target. d. Carefully planned on a joint military /civil basis. e. Designed to exploit insurgent weaknesses. f. Put over by the best media available. g. Attributable to the government rather than to the military sources, because it is the former who will ultimately be left in sole control. h. Based on a positive approach which will allow the creation of trust and confidence in which insurgents can surrender without fear of maltreatment from the security forces.

Methods and Resources Available 454. Propaganda can be applied by any of the following methods: a. The Written Word. Leaflets, posters, pictures, pamphlets, safe conduct passes, books, special publications and the press. b. The Spoken Word. Radio broadcast, ground loud speakers, voice aircraft, surrendered personnel teams discussion groups, public address systems, rumours, films, television. c. Good Deeds. Well planned community relations, which being part of civil affairs have already been described in detail in the previous chapter. 455. The method selected will vary according to the country, target and resources available. No matters what method is selected, insurgent propaganda should be ndver repeated in order to deny it. 456. Military Resources. There may include: a. Psyops staff. This is a very small staff belonging to the senior military HQ. It is responsible to the military commander for the conduct of psyops. b. Psyops Unit. This is a small unit equipped with loud with speaker equipment, cinema projection and tape recording. The precise establishment

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RESTRICTED will vary according to the situation. But should include locally provided translators, artists and cartoonists. The unit is capable of; (1) Conducting propaganda activities among the population by film shows, recorded broadcasts and direct appeals. means of

(2) Producing direct appeals in the vernacular for the air or ground broadcasts to specified insurgent groups. Such apparels must be based on timely intelligence. (3) Preparation and distribution of leaflets to the local population insurgents. It should be noted that the unit has no organic printing capability. or

c. Voice Aircraft. Aircraft can be equipped to broadcast short massage, live or on tape. Such aircraft are useful in reaching remote or inaccessible areas. They can be directed at insurgents or the civil population. Some contingency tapes may be required to save reacting time. d. Printing Units. Where possible leaflets and news sheets should be locally produced. There will probably also be a requirement for one or two small military printing presses to supplement, or if necessary replace, locally printing facilities. The leaflets can then be air dropped or ground distributed. 457. Local Civil Resources a. Radio (and TV if it exsists). These are ideal for psyops, in that they can reach more people more quickly from one source than any other media. Radio propaganda can be put over in speeches by leading personalities, news commentaries, interviews and even in such things as drama, musical or religious programmes. b. Newspapers and Other Publications. These should give accurate and encouraging news and counter any insurgent propaganda. c. Face to Face Persuasion. Visits to towns and villages by government officials. d. Rumours. These can be spread by local agent giving, for example, misleading and sometimes, confusing reports of the deployment and intentions of our own forces. Rumours can also be introduced to undermine the confidence of insurgents in their leadership. Rumours however can be dangerous as they can easily become distorted and cause results more far reaching than anticipated or desired. They should therefore be introduced with caution and local advice should be obtained whenever possible. e. Local Translators, Interpreters, Announcers, Artists and Printers. These can be used for the production and dissemination of propaganda, provide they have no personal axe to grind. In the case of expatriates, long residence may not imply expert knowledge. f. Local Experts. These can be indigenous or expatriate, but whichever they are their experience and ideas may be of value and can be used.

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RESTRICTED g. Films. These are particularly useful in under developed countries where a film show is always sure of a large attentive audience. h. Drama Troupe. The travelling troupe presents a live play which brings out the lies and deception practised by the insurgents. Inclusion of local topics and personnel with civilian speeches can make a great impact. Jamming 458. Hostile radio propaganda must if possible be forestalled or countered. Suppression by jamming, although, perhaps the most effective method, is technically difficult and expensive in money and manpower. Even more important, it involves a difficult and high level political decision since it may be result in retaliatory measures elsewhere. Unless plans are made beforehand for the provision of technical personnel and equipment ,there is likely to be a delay of several months between the time of a decision to jam and effective working.

SECTION 33

- COMMAND AND CONTROL

Overall Direction 459. In counter revolutionary operations the responsibility for psyops will always rest with the government of the threatened country. Where British help is called in from outside psyops must be planned and executed jointly but will remain the responsibility of the indigenous governmen. Overall direction of all propaganda agencies, including military psyops, is best places in the hands of a senior civil official either indigenous or expatriate, ideally with expert knowledge of the subject and of the country. He will be a member of the national intelligence committee. British psyops experts both civil and military will advice and assist. Co-ordination 460. In view of the governments overall responsibility, military psyops will tend to be pointless unless they are co-ordinated with the following agencies: a. Intelligence staffs and organizations, which provide much of the information for planning psyops. b. Public relations (PR), although care must be taken to avoid any overt connection between psyops and PR, so that the credibility of PR is not compromised. c. Civil, political and information authorities. d. Police Special Branch. e. Interrogation units, which be provided with a list of current psyops interests. 461. Co-ordination is achieved at government and lower levels by the committee system. The above agencies should all be represented, together with a psyops staff officer and any local experts co-opted as required psyops committees are normally sub-committees of the main operations committed. The main function of the psyops staff officer is to represent his 220 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED commanders views and requirements and to ensure that propaganda action takes account of military operational plans. For this reason he must be fully in the operational picture. Responsibilities of Military Psyops Staff and Units 462. Althuogh working under overall civil direction, the first loyalty of the military psyops staff is to the military commander, who will initially receive his guidance on psyops from the political adviser to the force commander. Subsequently the co-ordination of psyops at every level which has already been stressed will ensure that military psyops, civilian propaganda and government policy are complementary. 463. Psyops Staff. Military psyops are a general staff (operations) responsibility. Specially trained staff official will be provided at force HQ as required. As well as advising the force commander and his formation and unit commanders on psyops, they will have the task of controlling the tactically psyops units. They are also responsible for ensuring that psyops units received relevant and timely intelligence upon which to base their operations. 464. Tactical Psyops Units. These will be placed in support of the force or formation when the need arises. These units will be manned by serviceman with the addition of civilian specialist as required. The units will be self-contained for transport and specialized equipment, but are generally attached to a formation HQ for administration. Their organization will be based on: a. HQ. Consisting of an officer in command and a small staff whose function is the preparation of propaganda based on political direction and intelligence received from the psyops staff. The commander will be responsible for establishing liaison with the forward troops in the area of a projected psychological operation, and also the leaflet printing and disseminating agencies. b. Field Section. There may be one or more sections. Each section will be capable of operating independently for the dissemination of propaganda through the media of loud speakers and leaflets. 465 470 Reserved

CHAPTER 10 - UNITED NATIONS OPERATIONSSECTION 221 RESTRICTED

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SECTION 34

- INTRODUCTION AND AIM

Introduction 471. Since World War II the United Nations (UN), in accordance with its charter has undertaken many types of military activities: a. Limited war on a large scale-Korea. b. Major internal security operations-Congo. c. Interposition-Cyprus d. Observer groups-Kashmir 472. In general, the purpose has not been to coerce any state but rather to assist in preserving international peace while a political settlement was sought through negotiation or other means. 473. Although the balance of opinion in the UN is against the participating of forces of any permanent member of the security council in peace keeping operations, Britain has already taken part in UN operations in Korea and Cyprus and there could well be other occasions in the future. Aim 474. Clearly the guidance in this volume on counter revolutionary operations in general will apply equally to many of the situations in which British troops could find themselves as part of a UN force, but there are important difference and difficulties of which all ranks should be aware. This chapter therefore outlines the sequence of events leading up to the dispatch of a UN force and draws attention to some of the problems involved thereafter in operations of lesser scale than limited war.
SECTION 35

- DEPLOYMENT OF A UN FORCE

Decision to Deploy a UN Force 475. Once of the functions of the Security Council is to determine the existence of a threat to peace and to recommended what action should be taken. Under the 1950 Uniting for Peace revolution the General Assembly is also empowered to authorize military action in an emergency when action by the Security Council has been blocked by the use of a vito.

Composition of the Force

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RESTRICTED 476. Once a Security Council of General Assembly decision has been taken it is the responsibility of the Security-General, assisted by his permanent staff to daw up on two fundamental documents; a. The mandate. This establishes the role, the size of the force and the form of the operation. It must be agreed by the Security Council and is consequently a compromise and heavyly weight with political expediency. b. The Status of Forces Agreement. This is concerned with the rights and privileges of all UN personnel while on duty in the host country. It is negotiated between the UN secretary and the host country. Appointment of a Commander 477. The choice of a commander is equally hedged about with difficulties. His military task will be greatly complicated by political consideration and he will have far less freedom of action than a national military commander. His failures will be abundantly clear to the world but his success will often pass unnoticed. 478. He will normally be a serviceman from a neutral country, and in the eyes of the committed countries, he will often be considered military inexperienced. A widely experienced solider, on the other hand, might be labelled as a warmonger by those who are opposed to the operation. 479. The commander must be made available by his own country, which although it continues to pay him, does not continue to employ him, and he is no longer answerable to his own government. He may be the sole UN authority in the theatre but he is more likely to work in parallel with a representative of the Secretary General who will handle the political affairs. 480. One of the commanders heaviest burdens will be dealing with the world press, which will undoubtedly have reached the scene of operation before the commander himself. His own communication with New York, are likely to be inferior to those of the press at any rate at the start of operations, and it has been a frequent occurrence in the past that inaccurate reports have gained wide currency in New York, simply because they arrived before the more reliable despatches from the UN commander. 481. UN commanders are frequently maligned by military men who judge them by direct military standard; the task of the UN force commander is seldom, if ever, directly comparable to that of a normal military commander; the differences are clearly brought out by a comparison of military and UN directives. Commanders Directive 482 It is normal for the military directive to require positive action such as to attack, seize or destroy. A UN commanders directive is more often negative; so to deploy your that further fighting will not occur, to prevent by the appearance of your force future clashes from talking place or perhaps using only the minimum force necessary to disarm the rebels in... Furthermore in many UN operations there is no enemy such. 483. The task to be carried out is normally qualified by severe limitations over the areas in which the force may operate the circumstances, in which forces may be used, the legal rights 223 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED of the force in the country concerned and the action that the commander may or may not take on his own responsibility. It is now common practice for the UN commander to have a political advicer at his right hand throughout all operations, who will judge the acceptability of any military order that the commander may plan to issue and will received him of a host of political problems. 484. In the event, the directive is likely to be 10 or 20 pagers of closely typed, but often loosely worded, instructions attempting to cover every possible eventually but invariable failing to cover the actual problem that occurs. Relationship between Military and Political Staffs 485. The political and military staffs of a peace keeping force must be located in the same place and be physically adjacent to each other if differences in their policies are to be avoided. The correct relationship is a prerequisite for the success of an operation and must be clearly understood by all concerned. It is similar to the relationship between the service in adjoin service operation. There will be many occasions when the political staff must take the lead with the military adjusting their actions accordingly; on other occasions it will be necessary for political action to be carefully related to the military capabilities and requirements. Control and Support of the Force 486. Governments contributing force to UN operations must be prepared to give up control of their own units. This is normally accepted in principle at the outset of an operation, but is quickly forgotten when a unit is ordered to carry out a task which may in some way be opposed to the wishes of its own government. 487. The language problem in the command and control of any UN force presents many difficulties, but equally serious, through less obvious, are the inevitable difference in staff procedures, standing operating procedures, establishments, organizations , terminology, discplinary regulations and strands of training. Despite many attempts, no realistic progress has been made towards finding any common doctrine in these matters. 488. Added to these problems are the immense difficulties of the administration of the force. These are caused by such things as differences in equipment, weapons, ammunitions, radioes, rations and final control: and these problems have to be faced and overcome, so far as is possible, early in the operation, almost certainly under the most trying conditions.

SECTION 36

- PEACE KEEPING AT CONTINGENT/UNIT LEVEL 224 RESTRICTED

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Contingent/Unit Commanders Directive 489. As soon as possible after a decision has been taken to deploy a UN force, a directive must be issued to commanders at all levels. Subjects to be covered in this directive might include: a. Appointment. The commanders authority for his appointment as a UN commander. b. Task. Include areas of responsibility c. Composition of force. d. Status of Force. Particularly the relationship with the government of the country in which the forces is to operate. e. Introduction and Directive. From whom they may be accepted. f. Reporting. To whom and when. g. Method of Operation and Deployment of Forces. h. Relationship with Local Forces.

i. Use of Force. Including opening fire, use of anti-riot agents and power of seach and arrest. j. Regulation Affecting UN Troops When Off Duty. k. Liaison with UN Mediating Mission. l. Relations with the Press. m. Location of Headquarters. Tasks 490. The tasks of any UN commander depend entirely on his mandate and will vary with the situation on the ground and the circumstance of the intervention. But in principle, the commander should consider himself a mediator rather than an arbitrator, particularly when dealing with politically sophisticated parties. That is to say, he should reach a decision after hearing both sides and secure the agreement of both disputing parties to a course of action. Once this has been achieved the commander can then impose that decision, if necessary, by the use of force, provided he has the authority for this course of action. 491. It follows that the success or failure of peace keeping in any areas is directly related to the effectiveness of the liaison between the local UN commander and the disputing parties. Therefore a commander need a through knowledge of the local political situation, and where possible, intimate contact with local leaders. If this is done it will often be possible, either by inference or observation to gather early warning of any major developments. 225 RESTRICTED

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Zones and Boundaries 492. It will be normal for each contingent or sub unit to be given its own areas of responsibility. Where possible these areas should fit existing civil divisions or districts although, on occasions they may have to be adjusted to coincide with the areas dominated by the opposing local leader. Use of Force 493. The policy on the use of force should be laid down clearly in the directive to all commanders and will normally be restricted to the defence by the UN force of its own soliders and with the prior concurrence of all sides, to protect agreements freely negotiated between disputing parties. 494. Whether operating in a rural or an urban area a quick reaction intervention force will be essential. This may consist of a proportion of armoured vehicles and be conspicuously and heavily armed. This force will be bound by the principles of applying minimum force but its appearance, in certain circumstances, is likely to have marked deterrent effect. Loyalty 495. Although a unit component of a force is clearly no longer technically under command and therefore immediately answerable to its own government, in effect there is a channel of appeal for a national contingent commander through his ambassador. He might need to use this if he was ordered to undertake an operation entirely contrary to his national policy. 496. The United Nations is not an intelligence gathering agency, and so the nation external sources of intelligence are not available to a UN force. National contingent, while participating specific UN tasks, may have access to intelligence that might have been requested or desired by its own government. It is clearly that this contingents loyalty during this operation is to the UN. Rights 497. The right of members of UN contingents vary in each country. They will depend on what local agreements have been accepted by all sides and on the character and personality of the solider. As an example soldiers on UN duties may not have the legal right of search, arrest or even entry. It is essential that the legal status of the members of the contingent is fully understood. Element of Success 498. Unlike most normal military operations, the military characteristics of drive and urgency are by no means the ones most likely to achieve the aim of a UN peace keeping operation. On the contrary, the converse of these qualities is often required and the lessons of previous UN operations show that the following which are by no means the ones most apparent in a well trained military force, essential per requesting of success: a. The need for resting in the face provocation, for endless patience and tact. 226 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED b. The intervention force must be impressive and this includes, of course a high stranded of discipline and turnout. c. All rank be update and fully briefed on the political as well as military situation. d. There must be a full understanding at all levels of what the UN is trying to do. a. The force must get to know the people and understand their problems. They must consciously aim at achieving a reputation for being sympathetic and unbiased towards all sectors of the community. b. Constant surveillance is required but at the same time the acquisition of information must not prejudice the good will of the local population. c. Clear UN SOPS must be issued which are known to all ranks, particularly on the subject of opening fire or using riot control agents. Training 499. As every UN force will operate under different mandates it is impossible to specify what constitutes the full training requirements for potential components. There are at least two general long term skills which require special attention if they are to be achieved. 500. Political Understanding. The need for a better political Understanding than the average officer achieves is important, if the political and military parts of the force are to work to maximum efficiency and if the officer is to act with real understanding of the problem. 501. Languages. A knowledge of at least one other language will be of the greatest value and assistance to anyone involved in UN operations. Conclusions 502. A UN peace keeping force will not prove fully effective unless its military action is harmonized with parallel political action. In the absence of concurrent political activities, the purely military action of a UN force will inevitable prove negative and cannot be expected to solve the problems which called the force into being. 503. However, an operation undertaken in the name of the UN cannot afford to fail. Although the difficulties involved in introducing a mixed force into an overseas theatre at short notice, with virtually no preliminary planning, under a commander with very little freedom of action appear formidable, they can be overcome as has been shown by the past successful actions of UN forces.

503.However an operation undertake in the name of the Un cannot afford to fail. 227 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED Although the difficulties involved in introducing a mixed force into an overseas theatre at very short notice, with virtually no preli Annex A

A SYNOPSIS OF SOME PAST ANTI-TERRORIST AND COUNTER INSURGENCY OPERATIONS

General 1. The purpose of this annex is to describe some of the most important recent insurrections and to emphasize thereby how much they have varied in origin and character. 2. While the origins and character of insurrections vary, the military and political methods to which insurgent resort show a remarkable similarity. The insurrections can be divided into two categories as under: Anti-Terrorist Palestine 1945-48 Malaya 1948-59(Later year) Cyprus 1955-59 Kenya 1952-55 Counter Insurgency Malaya 1948-59(Early year) Indo-China 1946-54 Algeria 1954-62

3. A description has also been included of the Cuba Insurrection 1956-59.although military activity was minimal. PALESTINE 1945-1948 PALESTINE: A League of Nations Mandated Territory under British Administration: Capital: Jerusalem: Area: 10,429 square miles: Terrain favourable to guerrillas: None: Climate: Mediterranean: Population (1948): Jews 614,000: Arabs 1,090,000: other: 225,000. 4. The Circumstances of the Palestine crisis are unique in their character and complexity. Palestine, a formal Turkish province, bad fallen conquest in 1918 to Britain, to who is administration was subsequently entrusted under Mandate. Its term bound Britain to transfer power when the time was ripe to the native peoples. Those of the neighbouring mandated states had all achieved self-government before 1945 and the Palestinians would doubtless have done so too had they remained as overwhelmingly Arab as at the moment of British conquest. 5. Between 1920 and 1939, Britain had fostered in Palestine the establishment of a Jewish national home in fulfilment of its pledge of 1917 to World Zionist Organization by the Balfour Declaration. The arrival of these numerous, dedicated and energetic strangers transformed the character of the country and deeply disturbed its Arab inhabitants. The communal violence which resulted convinced the British that its pledges under the Mandate and the Ralf our Declaration were irreconcilable and by 1939 they were offering the 228 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED communities partition. It proved anathema to both: to the Arabs because it would set the seal on Jewish expropriation: to the Jews because the terms included a sharp reduction of immigration quotas. The onset of World War II temporarily eased the situation, since it brought the Jews into close co-operation with the British and immigration to a stop at source. At the end of the war the Jews demanded unrestricted immigration, for which Hitlers atrocities had made a morally overwhelming case, while the growingly united Arab world was determined to bold Britain to its Mandate promises. The British, who had always had strong strategic reasons for retaining Palestine, settled for a policy of maintaining the status quo until a formula acceptable to all parties could be found: pending that unlikely outcome, immigration would be held to a trickle. The Jews therefore decided on violence. 6. There were three armed Jewish organization: Haganah, the official Zionist force, while Britain tacitly condoned, Irgun Zvei Leumi (IZL): and the Stern Gang. Haganahs role had always been one of communal defence: IZL, though aggressive, acted only against Arabs, the Stern Gang terrorized Arabs, collaborationists Jews and British alike. The three forces settled their differences to co-ordinate an isolated act of violence on 31st October 1945 as a warning to the British. The resultant sabotage served only to harden Britains attitude and attract reinforcements strong enough to inhibit violence for some months. In mid1946, however, IZL and the Scientists resumed their attacks against British persons as well as property. Their objects, in which Haganah undoubtedly acquiesced, was to render Britains position untenable, force her withdrawal and so clear the decks for a fight to the finish with the Arabs. 7. Since both illegal group was strong enough and the Haganah was unwilling to wage guerrilla warfare, the British Army was not called and to perform more than internal security duties. These were hindered both by Jewish silence, for even the moderates either would not or dared not inform, and by the presence of the world press, alert for the merest rumour of British brutality. It was however the activities of the Haganah rather than the terrorist which fed the propaganda machine, since it concentrated its efforts on the organization of illegal immigration and the arming of the communal settlements (Kibbutzim). Because both immigration and the kibbutzim were largely financed by influential American Jewish community interference with either brought protest, besides involving the British Army in distressing scenes at the ports of the countryside. 8. The military operations failed to maintain peace and by the end of 1947 no solution had been found but since Russia and America each had her own reasons for wishing to see a Jewish state (now the Zionists decided objective) and since the British Government had grown as heartily sick as the Army of bearing the worlds abuse, it then declared its intention of abandoning the Mandate. British troops were concentrated into racially mixed areas and all withdrawn by 15th may 1948. In the preceding six months the Haganah had put the Jewish inhabited areas into a state of defence, but in the following six was to extend them by conquest into the modern state of Israel. MALAYA 1948-1959 MALAYA: A federation of Malay Principalities under British rule: Capital: Kuala Lumpur: Area: 50,600 square miles: Climate: tropical: Terrain favourable to 229 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED guerrillas: primary forest covering 70 per cent. Of land area: population (1947):2,400,000 Malays: 530,000 Indians: 1,900,000 Chinese (Singapore excluded). 9. The Malayan insurrection was an attempt by the Malayan Chinese of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), an ideological minority within a racial minority, to overthrow the British colonial government through Maoist guerrilla methods. It was decisively defeated and the social and political life of the Federation transformed in the process. 10. The conditions which allowed an armed communist conspiracy to take root in Malaya were created by the Japanese, who in 1942 overran the country and destroyed the British administration. For the rest of the war Malaya was insulted from military event, so that Britains only means to subvert the Japanese occupation lay through its liaison with the Malayan Peoples Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA). This was an organization chiefly recruited among the Chinese and under communist control. It was plentifully supplied with arms but took good care not to wield them too provocatively against the Japanese. Consequently it escaped serious reprisals and was largely intact when the British returned in 1945 after the Japanese collapse. They were generous in praise of its efforts but quick to repossess its weapon and disband it. 11. The country was rapidly restored to settled colonial rule. In 1948, however, following the adoption of a policy of armed uprising by the Asian communist parties at the Calcutta Youth Conference, a well prepared programmed of violence and subversion was unleashed in the Malayan countryside. It was based on Maoist principles and implemented by a resurgent MPAJA, now calling itself the Malayan Peoples Liberation Army (MPLA). 12. The resort to violence was a confession by the Malayan communist party of its failure to win popular support by political means. This in turn was due firstly of its largely Chinese character which denied it appeal to the Malays, and secondly, to the generally high level of prosperity among the Malayan Chinese. The MPLA had, therefore, to turn for recruits, supplies and intelligence to the one genuine underprivileged group in the country, the 600,000 Chinese rural squatters. They were peculiarly vulnerable to terrorism and extortion, since there settlements were on the jungle fringe. 13. The MPLAs initial aim, as Maoist doctrine dictated, was to secure a liberated area. But their armed strength, never than 8,000 and widely distributed, was insufficient to achieve it and they were quickly driven back on a strategy of ambush, sabotage and subversion. The security forces: 10 later 20 battalions of commonwealth infantry: 10,000 (later 50,000) Malayan police and eventually perhaps 40,000 local home guards, at first tried to contain and defeat them by static defence and jungle patrols. This strategy prevented the MPLA from improving its position but did not reduce its numbers of effectiveness. In 1951, however, the newly appointed Director of Operations, General Briggs, instituted a plan to resettle the Chinese squatters in 500 new villages. There were fenced and guarded but so appointed with schools, clinics and employment outlets that there effort was to be one of positive reconciliation. At the same time plans were expedited to bring Malaya to self-government. The combined effect of appropriate and well-timed political, economic and administrative reforms with widespread military operations undertaken by a large number of troops eventually defeated the insurgent and won the support of people. The Briggs plan, though 230 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED long in fulfilment, was a brilliant conception and let to the only clear-cut success vet achieved in country revolutionary operations. Its important preconditions, however, were the MPLAs lack of foreign aid, secure sanctuary, and firm internal base or expectation of support from the non-Chinese majority. CYPRUS 1955-1959 CYPRUS: A Mediterranean island, under British colonial rule: Capital: Nicosia: Area: 3,572 square miles: Climate: Mediterranean: Terrain favourable to guerrillas: Troops Mountains: Population (1955): 571,000 (77 per cent Greek, 18 per cent Turk). 14. Turkey surrendered sovereignty of Cyprus to Britain in 1878. The Greek speaking element of the population had strong ties with Greece and had always wished to be free of foreign rule and be part of Greece (Enosis). In 1931, there was a sudden upsurge of enosis activity, the construction was suspended and the Greek Mediterranean of the Orthodox Church, the traditional political leader, was exiled. Until 1948 no more was heard of enosis, but in that year an attempt to revive constitutional government uncovered a remarkable depth of enosis feeling on which plans for reform foundered. Thus encouraged, the newly elected Archbishop Makarios II re-opened the campaign for reunion. Openly he worked for the support of Greece and of international anti-colonial opinion through the political organization EOKA. Covertly he planned to raise a guerrilla force under a retired Greek army officer, Colonel Grivas, who he had invited to return to his native island. 15. Had Britain been able at this stage to count on the continued use of other east Mediterranean bases, it is possible that she might have yielded to enosis pressure. Turkey as yet showed little concern for the Turkish Cypriot minority and was anxious, as wartime neutral, to keep on terms with Britain and as a NATO neighbour, to improve her chronically poor relations with Greece. But for the Britain, with Palestine gone and the Canal Zone threatened, Cyprus had assumed an increased strategic significance. She was forced therefore to set her face against enosis and so commit herself to a bitter guerrilla war, whose outbreak may be dated from January 1955. 16. Grivas never deployed more than 300 guerrillas, but with an inaccessible base in the central Troodos range and supporters, willing or constrained, in every form in most villages, he was able to tie down a force of ten battalions for three years. After a concerted drive in mid-1956, the Army virtually put a stop to guerrilla activity but Grivas swiftly switched to terrorism in urban areas, equally if note more difficult to combat. In any case neither he nor Makarios, by now in exile, had ever planned to win territory or battle in so small an island. Their object, like that of the Jews in Palestine, was to make the British position untenable and this they eventually achieved. 17. The louder the Greeks appealed for world recognition, the more inevitably did they internationalize the conflict, Turkeys protective concern for its own minoritys future increased, and she and Greece were brought to the brink of war. Eventually it was they and Britain who combined to settle the politics of the island. Cyprus was declared independent, 231 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED under a mixed administration, and Britain was granted sovereign right over her chief military bases. INDO-CHINA 1946-1954 INDO-CHINA: A union of Asian States, bordered by China, Burma and Thailand, under French rule: French administrative centre: Saigon: Area: 287,000 square miles: Terrain favourable to guerrillas: mountain and primary forest: Population (1946): 28,000,000 (21,000,000 Vietnamese) 18. The Vietminhs struggle with the French in Indo-China is a study of communist revolutionary warfare in its classic form, culminating in a remarkable victory.

19. Indo-China, consisting of the protected Kingdom of Laos and Cambodia, the protectorates of Tonkin (North Vietnam) and Annam (South Vietnam) and the Colony of Cochin-China (the extreme south of Vietnam) had come under French rule in progressive stages during the last half of the 19th Century. The Vietnamese who, as an ethnic group, occupying a fraction of Vietnam proper but are culturally and numerically dominant, have a long history of resistance to foreign, particularly Chinese, imperialism. Nevertheless they at first acquiesced in French rule. But between the world wars, partly because of French heavyhandedness and partly because of the effort of the world slump, there was a resurgence of nationalists feeling. The party to profit most from of its was the Indo-Chinese Communist party, which was directed from abroad by a number of Moscow trained, but French educated, Vietnamese, of whom the most important was Ho Chi Minh. 20. Ho Chi Minh, who had left Vietnam in 1910, was not return until the end of World War II during which the Japanese removed control of the country from the Vichy French administration. He had by this time united the various nationalist parties into a front, henceforth known as the Vietminh, which had passed itself off to the Allies as an AntiJapanese resistance movement and been supplied with arms and advisers by the Allies. When Japan surrounded in August 1945, they did so in Vietnam to the Vietminh, which declared Vietnamese independence. 21. There was little that the new French Government, lacking any Far Eastern base, could do in 1945 to reverse this faith accompli. Its face was saved by the Allies, who were concerned to regularize the circumstances of the Japanese surrender and accordingly dispatched a nationalist Chinese Army to the north and a British-Indian force to the south, as forces of occupation. The Americans meanwhile were urging the French to come to terms with Ho, whom they saw as a simple nationalist, and this French were not wholly unwilling to do. Negotiations, however, broke down, a French expeditionary corps was dispatched, the south reoccupied without difficulty and the northern towns seized by force. Ho and hi general Giap, withdrew hastily and set up a base in the remote mountains on the Chinese border.

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RESTRICTED 22. Until 1949, the French held Vietnam down without much bloodshed, through the Vietminh steady extended their parallel political network. The Vietminh was too Vietnamese to appeal to the Cambodians, Laotians or the numerous hill tribes, had never sunk deep roots in the south, and was anathema to the northern Catholics. The only scene of serious fighting was along the Chinese border road where the French garrisons came under constant attack from the Vietminh base in their rear 23. The turning point in the insurrection came with the arrival of the victorious Chinese Red Army on the frontier in October 1949. It brought Giap arms and advisers and in late 1950 he extinguished the French border garrisons in a series of skilfully co-ordinate strokes. When the French abandoned the whole of the frontier and withdrew inside the Red River Delta Giap, a student of Mao, judge the moment right for the counter offensive. The situation was now transformed, however, by the arrival of an inspired French commander, General de Lattre de Tassigny, who quickly formed what troops he could free from static guard into mobile group and decisively defeated Giap at the edge of the delta. Giap withdrew to the northern redoubts and resume guerrilla activities. 24. De Lattres success proved transitory since the delta victories had not broken the Vietminhs power. It main force, which now numbered about 80,000 against 160,000 French, was still intact and with Chinese aid continued to grow. The provincial and village guerrillas, under centre control, were still free to extend their grip on the countryside, most of which they controlled at night and much by day, French air effort being miniscule. 25. As apolitical counter move to the French had by now conferred independence on Vietnam but so obviously retained real power themselves that independence did little to enthuse the Vietnamese townspeople and probably passed unnoticed by the peasantry. Military, the French sought to repeat the successes of 1951, which did convinced them that the Vietminh could be beaten if brought to battle. Since Giap was determined to evade it the new policy of deep penetration by the French into Vietminh areas never encountered the enemy in group sizeable enough to bring a decision, while steadily bleeding their Army by ambush and harassment. 26. By 1953 the French staff had grown weary of its operations against a phantom enemy. Two episodes now implanted in its mind the outlines of a disastrous alternative to its current strategy. These were the sieges of a Na San and Lai Chau where the French had learned that it was possible to sustain garrisons by air supply far beyond the secure area. They believed that Na San in particular had impeded a Vietminh invasion of Laos and as signs grew of a second attempt the French eyes were drawn towards Dien Bien Phu a village in the largest on the Vietnam-Laos border and on the obvious invasion route. 27. Dien Bien Phu lay 200 miles from the Red River delta base and was eventually to be garrisoned by 12 battalions which the French airlift just sufficed to supply. It was seized in November 1953 and was ready by March 1954. Giap, meanwhile, had done his own logistic calculations and judge that he could win the battle offered. He had marshalled his own forces. Including quantities of field and anti-aircraft which the French had refused to believe he could position. On 14th March he opened the attack with a devastating bombardment, putting 233 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED the airstrip cut of action and by 8th May had, at terrible cost, overrun the French position. He had throughout the battle kept up widespread diversionary operations, so preventing the rest of the expeditionary corps from intervening. The French losses at Dien Bien Phu amounted to only 4 per cent of the whole force but were sufficiently dramatic to bring a costly war, now immensely unpopular in France, to an end. The Geneva Conference partitioned the country at the 17th parallel, a line which roughly delineated the respective areas of military control. 28. The Vietminh had successfully fought the war through from the lowest to the highest level of operations laid down in Maoist doctrine, and had successfully overcome two serious setbacks. It was indeed their flexibility and their willingness to make an ally of time that made them so formidable in the field. ALGERIA 1954-1962 ALGERIA: A province of France in North Africa: Area: 850,000 square miles (7\8 desert): Capital: Algiers: Climate: Mediterranean: Terrain favourable to guerrillas: the Atlas Mountains: population (1954): 1,000,000 Europeans, 9,500,000 Arabs. 29. The object of the Arab (Muslim) uprising in Algeria was to end French rule. Its leaders were socialist in outlook but it was nationalist, not ideological, in character. It was to develop rapidly into limited war involving half a million French troops and to have far reaching political effects of which the most important was the downfall of the Fourth republic. 30. Algeria though in theory a province of France, was in fact a French Colony. The white settlers (Colons), who were full French citizens, voted in national elections and had a strong say in local government, forming privileged class, while the Muslims, who were merely French subjects, lacked power and owned little property. Since however they were not a unified people, nationalism was slow to take root among them. Its growth was further delayed by the appeal that assimilation had for their national leaders, a French educated middle class. It was only when this middle class came to recognize after 1945 that the European Algerians had no intention of sharing let alone yielding power that it turned to the fielding nationalist party. 31. These parties were numerous and at odds, chiefly over the issue of violence. By 1954, however, they had thrown up a group of leaders who agreed that violence alone would suffice to make nationalists of the Muslim majority and had organized the nucleus of a guerrilla force. On the night of 1st November 1954 about 3,000 attacked French post and installations throughout Algeria. This was planned as the first stage of a Maoist revolutionary war, which was well known in theory to the leaders and in practice to many of their followers, veterans of Indo-China. Yet although by 1958 the Army of national Liberation (ALN) numbered perhaps 40,000 regulars within the country and thousands more in the neighbouring State of Morocco and Tunisia (to which France had hastily granted independence in 1956) it was never able to carry operations to the offensive phase and had by 1960 relinquished the effort. 32. The reasons for this were, firstly, that although the weight of world disapproval was successfully invoked by the Muslim government in exile against France, it was more than outweighed by the bitter resistance of the while Algerians to any moderation of the military effort. Indeed between 1956 and 1958 France was virtually ruled and the French Army commanded by the colons. Secondly, the ALN was careless and impatient. Because of 234 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED difficulties in communication between their mountain bases, the leaders transferred their headquarters to the towns, where they often succumbed to French sweeps. They were also over-anxious to move from the lower to the higher stages of revolutionary warfare and were badly cough out in so doing-Thirdly, the French Army proved a skilful and ruthless anti-guerrilla force. Many of its officers had fought in IndoChina and welcomed the chance to apply techniques learned there to a situation not yet beyond redemption. The countryside was divided into squares and garrisoned as a beginning. The regiment to break the electrical fence along the Tunisian frontier which ended in total defeat. Meanwhile the cites had been cleared of ALN cadres in a series of ruthless cordon operations, of which the most important was the so-called Battle of Algiers in 1958. In addition, the Army instituted a programmed of urban and rural development, of a hearts and minds nature, to win Muslim sympathizers away from the rebels. Imaginative in concept, it was however of much less effect than the military measures in bringing resistance to a halt. 33. If the wars outcome was nevertheless the grant of independence to Algeria, this was because the colons nominee, General de Gaulle, decided that a military victory could not be made to last. Having brought both them and his dissident soldiers to heel, he concluded agreements with the National Liberation Force at Evian in 1962. The mass of the colons chose to immigrate to France.

KENYA 1952-1955 KENYA: A British East African Colony: Capital: Nairobi: Area: 224,000 square miles: Terrain favourable to guerrillas: Abadare and Mount Kenya Ranges: population (1952): Africans, 5,561,000: Asians 154,000: Europeans, 40,700. 34. The Kenya rebellion was neither ideological nor strictly nationalist in character or aims: it could be perhaps most simply described as tribal and anti-European respectively. It was carried on by only one of Kenyas many tribes, the Kikuyu, though they found some support among their Bmudu and Meru neighbours, but together they numbered less than one quarter of the colonys population and occupied only one sixteenth of its territory. The movement which fomented and controlled the rebellion, Mau Mau, was primitive in structure, its programmed nave and its military ability low. It succeeded nevertheless in imposing its authority on almost all the Kikuyu and disrupting the life of the Colony for three years. 35. It is probably true to say that driving force of the Mau Mau movement was tribal land grievance but this does not explain the extraordinary from which the expression of that grievance took. The Mau Mau bound the Kikuyu to its will by the administration of obscene oaths, in a deliberate perversion of sacred tribal ritual, and inflicted barbaric cruelties on those who resisted. Had the Kikuyu been a notably backward people, these features of their rebellion would seem less important. In fact they were noted for their adaptability to European ways, ready conversion to Christianity and avidity for European education. The Mau Mau leadership seems however to have deliberately rejected European methods in organizing the rebellion because they judged the tribal past to have a strong hold on the Kikuyu mind than the European future-even though it was to a European future that the Kikuyu looked. 235 RESTRICTED

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36. When Europeans first made contact with the Kikuyu 70 years ago, they were occupying the lowland zone below the Aberdare and Mount Kenya Ranges. This was declared a tribal reserve and while settlement was confined to the uninhabited Highland. But in time population growth forced many Kikuyu off the reserve and onto while employment in the Highlands and the cities. Many took with them the nation that their exile was due to the Europeans theft of their land and extremist leaders were to exploit it with profit. But it was not by any means a majority viewpoint and in the late 1940s its protagonists seem to have tired of the attempt to spread it by persuasion. Their own political organizations were failing to win members and were disregarded by the government, which was under strong settle influence. The extremists therefore channelled their real energies into the organization of Mau Mau.

37. The rise of Mau Mau did not pass unnoticed and as a result of the spread of illegal oath taking, violence and disaffection, the government declared a state of emergency in 1952. Mau Maus strength however had been underestimated and the declaration provoked a general outbreak which the government was not equipped to contain. Some of the violence was directed against the more isolated European settlers, but most against loyal Kikuyu and so effectively that almost the whole tribe eventually took some form of oath. But by 1953 there were 10,000 soldiers and 21,000 police opposing them. The government plan had been reorganized on a joint military\civilian basis, as in Malaya, and measures were afoot to: a. Protect the villages. b. Register all Kikuyu. c. Clear Nairobi of Mau Mau organization. d. Harvest intelligence. e. Drive the gangs into the forests of the Aberdare Mountains. 38. Mau Mau brutality and sacrilege had sickened many Kikuyu and once assured of protection they co-operated increasingly with the government: eventually many were to be entrusted with arms as village home guards. As in Malaya, much resettlement was done, improving security and bettering rural standards of life. These measures achieved their object. Once the gangs had been driven into the forests they were hunted down by normal military methods. The gangs had no access to foreign aid and were denied the usual anti-colonial endorsement because of their barbarities. Their numbers, 12,000 at their peak had been reduced to 500 by September 1956. The emergency was not declared over until 1960 but the measures taken to prosecute in had so hastened the Colonys readiness for self-government that independence was to be granted within three years. CUBA 1956-1959 CUBA: A Caribbean Island Republic, 130 miles South of Florida: Area: 44,000 square miles, 746 miles long and an average of 62 miles wide: capital: Havana: Climate: sub-tropical: Terrain favourable to guerrillas: the Sierra Maestre range: population (1953): 5,800,000 (3\4 white, 1\4 coloured): per capital income $331 a year average.

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RESTRICTED 39. The overthrow of the Batista regime in Cuba came as a result of a protected insurrection, fomented and directed by professional revolutionaries who disclosed their Marxist beliefs only when established in power. It is this twist which distinguished Castros from the many rebellion which preceded it in the islands history. 40. Cuba is the most recently independent major Latin American State. Slavery was not abolished in the island until 1886 and Spanish colonial government not overthrown until 1898, this desire year of revolt. When independence came it was because of American intervention and the islands proximity and economic importance to the United States. These factors together with its peoples inability to achieve stable government, have ensured continuous American involvement in Cuba ever since. 41. There are no brief explanations for the political instability of Cuba, apart from those which apply to all countries without experience of self-government. Early attempts at democracy, on the American modal, foundered in fraud and faction: the dictatorships which followed were largely unacceptable to the educated classes, and to the intellectuals, of whom Castro was one, in particular. Yet Batista, whom Castro planned to overthrow, was not wholly a tyrant. An ex-sergeant, he had overthrow a worse dictator in 1933 in the name of decent government and had genuinely sought to foster future democracy. It was only when free elections in 1944 returned an opponent that Batistas aims become solely selfish. And even after his second coup, in 1952, he enjoyed much popular support and showed indulgence to those, like Castro, who attempt counter coups. After 1955 however, when the islands onecrop economy took one of its chronic downturn he met growing opposition. Castro, I voluntary exile, decided to profit by it and December 1956 landed from Mexico with 80 companions, including the late Che Guevara, and made his way to the remote Sierra maestre to raise the standard of revolt. 42. Batista chose to ignore so insignificant a group. Militarily Castro was to achieve littlethrough his practice or returning prisoners unharmed to their units was an original psychological gambit. But his presence encouraged a campaign of subversion in the towns. For which Cuban towns were always ripe, which only stimulated further aggression and outraged American where traditional support for a democratic Cuba had temporally overcome equally traditional desires for a safe Cuba. Washington accordingly cut off its military supplies to Batista. Castro had by now made a united front with the opposition parties (excluding the communists) and after a single large scale but largely bloodless engagement in December 1958, drove Batista into exile. At the beginning of the month, Castros troops had numbered only 803; it was the scent of success which swelled their ranks. In almost every respect, therefore, his carefully concealed and personal politics been the exception, Castros revolution belongs more properly to the traditional of 19 th Century Spanish America than to that of Mao Tse Tung Summary 43. It should be clear that any attempt to generalize about the origins and character of insurrection is difficult and would be dangerous. For, if war is the continuation of state policy by other means; and political opposition, however need not entail a violent assault on government, as the example of numerous successful democracies goes to prove. Violence is to be expected only:

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RESTRICTED a. Against those regimes which allow opposition groups no other means to make their protest felt- e.g. dictatorships, oligarchies, repressive colonial governments, etc. b. From those opposition groups whose aims are so unpopular or so subversion that only by violence can they hope to achieve power. 44. Similarities in Insurgent Methods. A close of the methods used by the insurgents shows that there is much similarity in the techniques used. The following features of the revolutionary technique are common to nearly all the insurgent plans. a. The published political aim of each revolution was designed to take advantage of local popular grievances and aspirations. These were exploited by rebel propaganda to gain mass support from a large section of the people. b. The revolutionary leaders attempted to involve the local population in antigovernment acts so as to ensure their active support. c. The possible opposition of minority groups and uncommitted people was reduced by correction, intimidation, threats and acts of terrorism. d. Terrorism and sabotage were extensively used to embarrass the government and remove opponents. e. Even through in some instances there was much rebel activity in the large towns, in general the revolution was nurtured in the rural areas, from which guerrilla bands were raised and operated. The rural population was persuaded or intimidated into providing intelligence and administrative support for those insurgents. f. To provide an intelligence network, rebel sympathized infiltrated into the trade unions, various community groups and the government service. The postal and telephone systems were invariably tapped. g. Teachers with rebel sympathies were introduced into schools and youth organizations. They spread revolutionary doctrines and procured recruits. h. Guerrillas were used to disrupt government communications of all kinds. They operate over wide areas in order to disperse the governments forces. i. Efforts were always made to enlist foreign moral and material support. The degree of support obtained very largely influenced the outcome of the struggle in each instance 45. It is important to understand that the outbreak of insurrection, however deep the groundswell of disaffection, is never spontaneous. Indeed the difference between insurrection and mere civil disorder is that the former is planned, organized and led from the start. Any insurrection therefore must have its roots in conspiracy, by definition the works initially of a close knit gang and it is at this conspiratorial stage of development that it is most easily checked, either by measures of political concession or by counter subversive action. 46. The British, in Malaya particularly, very successfully, combined a liberalization of colonial policies with effective counter subversive measures; the French in Indo-china for examples, however, there is an important difference. It is that while in Malaya the communists had to conspire under the nose of a firmly established government, in Indo-China no effective government existed, at least at the conspiratorial stage. The communists therefore enjoyed almost perfect freedom to complete all the important preliminaries of insurrection.

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Annex B TYPICAL ORGANIZATION OF A REGIONAL INSURGENT BATTALION Bn HG Coy (1) (2) P1 P1 (25-30) 2.6*7.62mm 2-4*82mm P1 2-4*57mm Squad (8-10) Squad Squad 60mm mor 90mm RL or 75mm recoilless rifle or 57mm recoilless rifle Coy (2) Coy (1) Wpns Coy

P1

P1

Wpns P1 (2) Mor P1

Recoilless Rifle

MMG

Notes: (1) There could be from two to five coys in a bn. Coys frequently up indep. (2) Only formed if manpower anti wpns permit. Not found in all coys or bns. (3) Figures in brackets denote approx strs. Bn strs vary from 250-700.

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Annex C CHAIN OF COMMAND OF SECURITY FORCES AND CIVIL ADMINISTRATION CABINET DEPARTMENTS AND MINISRTIES OF GOVERNMENT NATIONAL DEFFENCE COUNSIL (1) NATIONAL OPERATIONAL COMMITTEE .Lic son.. REGIONAL OPERATIONS COMMETTEE (3) GOVERNMENT .Lic son. DISTRICT OPERATIONAL COMMITTEE (4) Notes: (1) Lays down government policy for the counter insurgency campaign: Chairman: Head of State. Member: Civilian Ministers 240 RESTRICTED DISTRICT ADMINISTRATION FEGIONAL REGIONAL GOVERNMENT

RESTRICTED (2) Implements the military policy laid down by the National Defence council. Chairman: Director of Operations Members: Chief of the security forces and civilian departmental heads as required. (3) Co-ordination and plans at regional level. Chairman: regional governor or head administrator. Members : Local military and police commanders and civilian experts as required (4) As for Note 3 but at district level.

Annex D FINANCIAL ASPECTS General 1. Operations are often mounted at short notice and it may be some time before the financial aspects are considered in detail. This delay can lead to difficulties in seeing that money voted for use by the Army Department is properly used and accounted for. It is not feasible to provide detailed financial instructions covering all aspects of unit deployment overseas but this Annex provides some guidance. 2. The underlying principle is that Parliament votes money to the Ministry of Defence for the defence interests of the United Kingdom: any expenditure incurred on tasks not directly related to this purpose should not be charged to Defence Votes. Financial Considerations 3. On any operation, for which sufficient warning has been given to allow detailed plans to be prepared the financial arrangements required to protect Defence Votes should have been settled before the force departs and should be known to the commander. For example, the mounting of a United Nations peace keeping force or obtaining intergovernmental agreement for British troops to assist in internal security operations is an independent country can often be a time-consuming process, during which the financial arrangements will normally be settled if they have not, in fact, been arranged in advance.

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RESTRICTED 4. On other operations, the unit may be moved at short notice and the financial detailed will be settled after the start of the operation. 5. In either case the commander will usually have access only to Army funds through his imprested account, which he can spend in accordance with his delegated powers. To ensure financial property, Arms Department money spent on purposes other than the defence of the United Kingdom will have to recovered at a later than date from the appropriate government department, overseas government or some other source. Accounting Procedure 6. It is important that locally incurred extra costs for any operation should be cleared identification in the impress account so that they can identify for recovery. Extra cost items are basically those items of expenditure which would not have been incurred at the peacetime duty station. The following are examples of expenditure which is likely to be incurred but will have to be recovered later: a. Payment for local civilian labour-or overtime pays to existing staff. b. Cost of consumable stores and supplies over and above those needed for normal peacetime maintenance: these items would include locally purchased rations and POL. c. Cost of repair or replacement of stores, vehicles or equipment lost or damaged in the operation. 7. In addition, operations of this nature may require the issue of stores and equipment to a civil authority, the cost of these items would normally be recovered later and of is therefore important that adequate records are kept of all such issues. 8. These items of local extra cost do not provide the total extra costs of the operation for recovery purpose. The costs of movement and re-supply may give rise to extra costs; individual entitlement to local overseas allowance is also an extra cost for a United Kingdombased unit. These and other similar items would normally be identified for recovery either by commands or by the Ministry of Defence and need not, therefore, present problems for the commander. 9. Since financial guidance to cover all types of operations cannot be laid down in advance it is clearly important that any commander who is likely to take part in an overseas operation should consult his command financial adviser to get detailed instructions about the records which will be required for recovery purposes. Miscellaneous Expenditure 10. A special fund already exists to cover expenditure on community relations or hearts and minds projects. An application should be made as necessary, although an increased allocation to the fund may have to be sought. 11. To allow the rapid provision of emergency assistance in natural disasters overseas immediate expenditure up to 10,000 can be authorized by the appropriate political department, normally acting on the advice of the British Representative in the affected area. This authority only applies to those units stationed outside the United Kingdom, since more 242 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED comprehensive financial arrangements will be made for overseas assistance provided from the United Kingdom. Annex E RESETTLEMENT Requirements 1. Resettlement will require the prior agreement of the civil authorities at the appropriate local operations committee and, so long as the civil administration of effective, it should be executed by them supported were necessary by the police and the armed forces. The key to success is detailed advance planning. Complete surveys will be required of the number of houses needed and the number of people moved. Great care is necessary in the selection if sites. 2. The following factors must be taken into consideration: a. Adequate water must be available. Wells may have to be dug in advance. b. There must be reasonable access to the sites by road or water. c. Sites must be convenient to the future work area. No person should have to go more than three or four miles to his fields or to work. If he does, he must be allotted alternative plots of land nearer to the resettlement area. d. As resettlement is costly, it should only be undertaken when absolutely necessary for the defence of the population. If possible sites should be chosen which reduce to the minimum the amount of construction work needed. e. Sites must be capable of defence. For this reason, very isolated sites should be avoided. Defence of Defended Village 3. Each new defended village must have a defensible perimeter, fortifications, and a sound means of communicating with the local police, an urgent call is an-emergency on Paramilitary unit, and an organized and armed body of village home guards. Every member of the village should be registered, photographed or fingerprinted and given identity cards. Village community leaders must known at all times who have deserted to the insurgents, who are unaccountably absent from their homes, and who are newcomers to the village. Site Preparation and Development 4. Sites for defended village should be fully prepared in advance. Town planning principles should be followed. As a guide and check list, the following points are relevant: a. A normal house with small garden requires about 300 square meters. b. Space in needed for internal roads and for a perimeter road inside the defence. No house should be built within grenade throwing range of the perimeter. c. Space will be required in the centre of the village for shops, a church or temple, a medical clinic, a community centre, possibly a bus stop, a school and an open site for a recreation ground which can also be used as a helicopter landing point.

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RESTRICTED d. A defence control post should be established at the most convenient and tactical point in the centre of the village. It may include a watch tower and a generating set for perimeter lighting. A limited number of street lights should also be connected to this generator. e. The defence control post will require communication to district or the next senior HQ. f. Perimeter defence should be constructed around the whole area with barbed wire, trenches, and other obstacles: sufficient posts should be dug to ensure all round defence. g. Fields of fire should be cleared for at least 50 meters outside the perimeter fence. h. The number of entry points through the perimeter fence should be strictly limited to one to possibly two. Barbed wire gates should be closed and well secured at night. Movement 5. The movement of people to the prepared site must be planned carefully and executed with speed and efficiency. The appropriate military commander, through his civil affairs officer, should ensure that attention is paid to the following points-providing assistance where necessary to make good any civilian deficiencies: a. Preparation. All householders who are to be moved will be allocated in advance to a house site in the new area. Military earthmoving equipment may be required to level building sites and to assist in the drainage and preparation of areas for cultivation. b. Transport. Vehicles are needed to move, free of cost, families, domestic animals, essential household possessions and all building materials which can be salvaged from their existing house. They must be ready to move on an appointed day and will require at least 24 hours warning if this is to be achieves. If longer notice than this is given, the insurgents may be in a position to prevent or hinder the resettlement. c. Compensation. Those moved will have lost their homes and crops. Ideally resettlement should whenever possible, await the harvest. Even so, some cash compensation must be given to families until they can again become self supporting. d. Food. Arrangements should be made for all families to be fed free at the new site for three days or longer if necessary. Food may be provided in lieu of compensation until crops are harvested in the new area. e. Shops. These must be opened rapidly so that normal essential supplies are available from the outset. f. Medical. The sick must be cared for. Medical assistance is needed on arrival at the new area and for training local orderlies. The Red Cross may be able to help. g. Construction. Building materials, particularly roofing, should be ready on the site at the time of the move. Although locals, given the materials can probably construct their own homes, they will require help in constructing defences. h. Training. Training in village administration, local defence, etc, should begin at once to ensure that the restricted area ceases to be a liability to the armed forces as soon as possible.

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RESTRICTED i. Sponsorship. Resettled families will often be without their men folk who will either be with the security forces or perhaps unwillingly with the insurgents. Resettlement is greatly facilitated if a soldier is made personally responsible for one or more families. He will quickly identify himself with them, take care of their children and old people, help safeguard their possessions, and see that they get their fair share of food building materials, etc. this develops a bond of mutual sympathy between the soldiers and the settlers, which pays big dividends. j. Civil Administration. It may be necessary for a civil administrative officer to join and remain with the village until the hierarchies are properly established. k. Elected Representative. As soon as possible the resettled families should choose or elect one of themselves to be their representative. This person will then join any security or joint planning committee in the area and become the channel by which the government pass or collect information.

Annex F TYPES AND USE OF DOGS General 1. It is possible to train dogs to perform task which save manpower and time and which increase the effectiveness of a search or follow-up. there are guard dogs and security dogs and also several types of dog with other specialist skills which can be used to detect people or inanimate objects. A proper understanding of the capabilities and limitations of each type is essential if full value is to be got from them. 2. The performance of a dog depends largely on the ability of its handler. Because units in an operational area will generally have to produce many of the handlers from their own resources, the attention which is given to the selection and training of these men will be directly reflected in the subsequent usefulness of the dogs. 3. Only guard and security dogs are normally kept under training in any number. Therefore the need to use other types of dog must be foreseen early in a campaign so as to allow time for their acquisition and for the months of training needed before they become operational. 4. For dogs to be effective arrangements must be made for them to reach a suspect area before the scent gets cold or the ground disturbed. because of this and also because there will seldom be enough dogs with specialist skills, they should generally be held in some central place. 245 RESTRICTED

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5. Dogs can be distracted by pepper, poisoned meat, a bitch on heat used as a decoy or by physical attack. With an alert handler these tactics are seldom effective and a well trained dog even on his own should not be influenced by them. 6. Guard Dogs. These are trained to detect, attack and hold an intruder and can also be used to help guard arrested people. They therefore require close control and should not be used where there is constant movement of people in the guarded area. 7. Security Dogs. These are trained to detect an intruder and hold him at bay but not attack him. They can be worked loose.

Specialist Dogs Used to Detect People 8 Infantry Patrol Dogs (IP Dogs). IP dogs are trained to pick up the air scent or sound of person and point in that direction they are therefore valuable as sentries for giving warning of hidden people such as those in an ambush, an occupied terrorist camp or resting place, or those hiding from an identity card check. They cannot of course differentiate between own troops, enemy and civilians. 9 Tracker Dogs. These are trained to work off a ground scent. It is therefore important that they should be on the spot quickly, before the scent has drifted away or been dissipated by a hot sun. Troops must be educated to avoid the area before the tracker dog arrives. Provided there has not been too much disturbance of scent, tracker dogs can be used in built up areas, eg to follow up a wanted man in the early morning when he is known to be somewhere within a cordon. 10 Casualty finding dogs. These are trained to find people, eg in the ruins of a bombed building or on a DZ. Specialist Dogs Used to Detect Inanimate Objects 11 Arms/Explosives dogs. These are taught to detect arms or the more normal explosive being used by the terrorist in a particular theatre. They can search open or confined areas, for example road sides, vehicles or buildings. They are speedy and reliable method of checking an area. Much of their value of negative: that is, if they show no interest, there are unlikely to be any weapons or explosives in the search area. These dogs need frequent rests if a lengthy search is being carried out. 12 Mine Detection Dogs. These dogs can be used to search likely mined areas either before or after an incident has taken place. They can also be used to carry out routine checks on road banks and verges. 13 Drug Detection Dogs. These are trained to detect particular drugs. They have very little value in CRW operations. Detailed Advice

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RESTRICTED 14 Detailed advice on the use and deployment of dogs can be obtained from the RAVC representative in an area through MOD (AVR) Combat Tracker Teams 15 The use of dogs in combat tracker is covered I Part 3-counter insurgency, Annex A.

Annex SURVEILLANCE, TARGET ACQUISTION AND NIGHT OBSERVATION EQUIPMENT (Part 1 Section 228) Introduction

1. Surveillance, target acquisition and observation (STANO) equipment assists the security forces in the acquisition of information, in the acquisition and engagement of targets and in helping the soldier to move and fight with more confidence at night. All the devices are in effect an extension of the sight and bearing of the soldier and they should be used to supplement and not replace these basic faculties. A list of current devices, their characteristics and limitations is at appendix 1 to this Annex. Principles of use 2 . Vulnerability to Detection. Active systems such as infra-red or radar can be detected if suitable equipment is available to the insurgents. On the other hand, passive system such as image intensification devices cannot be detected even when in use. Tasking. Orders should be specific on areas of surveillance responsibility, the targets to be observed, and what action is to be taken 247 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED against them. Operators can then give their full concentration to the essential tasks. 4 `Selection of the Appropriate Device. Commanders should decide, which are the appropriate devices to use in a given situation. This will depend upon the aim of the operation and the target to be acquired. For example radar can give warning of movement but will not identify the enemy, while vision devices such as image in testifiers can help to identify both men and vehicles. Use of Complementary Devices. Narrow fields of view, short ranges and specific sensing techniques inherent in many STANO devices unit their capability when used on their own. The distinctive features of different STANO devices should therefore be used in concert to complement each other and thus effectively to cover the characteristics of all likely targets. For example: the range of image intensifiers can be increased by using indirect white or infra-red light; and thermal pointers will reduce the time an operator needs to search an area. The Human Factor. Long periods of observation and viewing through vision devices are tiring, and some devices have unpleasant through harmless side effects. Operators should therefore be changed at intervals and adequate ret and relief is essential. In most cases more than one man is required in order to man long-range equipment for lengthy periods Level of Planning and Coordination. The use of STANO equipments should always be planned at the highest possible level compatible with tactical requirements; this will enable the most economical use to be made of the STANO devices and the men needed to operate them. For example, where there are a number of VPs one surveillance plan should if possible be made of to cover them all; and surveillance for a company cordon operation should be planned at company level. Reliable and Secure Communications. Observers need to pass information quickly, and therefore reliable communications are essential. The classification of the information will influence the means chosen to pass it. The ability of a relatively unskilled enemy to intercept military radio nets should be underestimated. Training. Good training both in the use of the equipment and in observation techniques, is essential for the successful operation of STANO equipment. Security. The loss of STANO equipment must be regarded as seriously as the loss of arms. Commanders should take precautions to prevent the loss of such equipment when sitting exposed OPs. However, by the very nature of the equipment and the task, it must at time be left in isolated positions where it will be difficult to safeguard.

10

Planning

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RESTRICTED 11 devices; a) b) c) d) e) f) g) h) i) j) The nature of the insurgent movement. The aim of the operation. The type of target. The type of information required. The effect of the terrain. Improvement of operating conditions, eg turning street light on or off. Any legal or political constraints on the use of the devices. Communications. Security. Logistic implications-power supplies, etc. The following should be borne in mind when planning the use of STANO

Appendix 1 To Annex G Equipment (a) 1. (b)

OPTICAL DEVICES

Characteristics and Limitations

Employment

a. Binoculars No 2

(c) (d) All optical devices are passive and have a limited capability in poor light. (1)General issue, but outdated (a)OP work. (see e below). (b)General surveillance. (2)Magnification x6. (3)Reasonable performance except in twilight and poor light. (4)Relatively heavy.

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RESTRICTED b. Binoculars No 5 (1)Issued to Armd Regts and (a)OPs work. Arty OPs, but outdated (see e (b) General surveillance. below) (2)Magnification x7 (3)Poor twilight and poor light. (1)Replacement for a and b (a)General surveillance above. duties in all 3 services. (2)Magnification x7-straight through optics. (3)Good twilight performance. (4)Weight 2 Ibs.

c. GP binoculars

d. Binocular (1)Used in army helicopters (a)Enables steady Stabilizer (2)Fits any binocular with an observation of target area open centre post. from helicopter. (b)General recce and surveillance. e. Telescopes scout (1)Issued for use by snipers for (a)Snipers-for observation. regiment- snipers observation of distant target (b)OP work-long range telescope areas. tasks (2)Magnification x20, narrow field of vision. (3)Requires steadying, but enables observer to pick out detail at long range in day light f Telescopes (1)Snipers telescopic sight. (a)Used for target Straight Sighting Fits on L42 rifle. engagement particularly in LIAI (2)Magnification x3. Field of the anti-sniper role view 142 mils. Single point graticule. Fixed focus. (3) Requires skilled marksman. g. Trilux (1)Large aperture back sight (a)Target engagement, but with illuminated foresight no surveillance capability. (2)Enables riflemen to fire with greater accuracy at night. unit (1)Issue to all riflemen where (a)target engagement. trilux they carry no other night vision (b)limited observation device on the rifle. duties. (2)Illuminated aiming mark within sight (3)Enables firer to engage targets at twice the range possible with unaided eye at night. 250 RESTRICTED

h. Sight infantry (SUIT)

RESTRICTED (4)High weight (13oz).magnification x4. Field of view 135 miles. (5)May be fitted to SLR GPMG, CARL GUSTAV and AR 15mile. (6)Simple to operate. (7)No loss of dark adaptation i. Periscope Battery Command No 1 Mk1 (donkeys ears) (1)A binocular periscope (a)OP work. which enables an observer to (b)Surveillance. remain behind cover whilst observing. (2)Magnification x10. (3)Can be spilt to use as 2 monocular periscopes. (4)Heavy. Old and therefore often poor optics. (5)When ears are horizontal stereoscopic viewing possible at long ranges.

j. Periscopes (local (1)Can be made from wood (a) In OPs which are manufacture) and glass. overlooked. (2)Either panoramic or narrow field of view. 2.
IMAGE INTENSI-FIERS (11)

a. General (1)Efficiency depends on See equipments below characteristics ambient light level. Some back ground light must exist to work at all. Too bright a light can cause a whiteout and damage to the intensifier. (2)Automatic brightness control (ABC) incorporated in later models reduces white out problems. (3)Passive. (4)Fog, smoke, rain, etc, degrade performance. (5)Lengthy surveillance may cause unpleasant side effects but no permanent damage 15 minutes is about a maximum for a continuous look may cause headaches, loss of dark adaption and loss of orientation. 251 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED (6)Ambient light level may be improved by white light (e.g. flats, torches, searchlights beamed at clouds) or by using infra red illuminators. (7)All devices simple to use. (8)Future larger devices may have binocular presentation which would reduce eye strain but cause total loss of dark adaptation. (9)Will look into dark areas from well-lit areas. b. individual (1)Smallest j1 sight in service. weapon sight (IWS) (2)Later models incorporate ABC. (3)Men can be seen at 300 m in starlight. Field of view 180 mils. Magnification x3.75. Internal battery 6.75v. (4)Can be fitted to SLR, LMG, GPMG, CARL, GUSTAV and AR15, also sniper rifle if brackets provided. (5)Weight 6.5 lbs. therefore requires support for long periods of observation. (6) Zeroing is a serious problem when an IWS has to be shared. (a)Target engagement at night (b)OP work. (c)Ambush. (d)Night foot and vehicle patrolling (used at the halt only) (e)Boat patrols. (f)Road block (g)Control points. (h)Not all men in a tactical group should be equipped eyes and ears important to ensure all round coverage (e.g. 4 man patrol 2 x IES 2 x sight unit infantry triplex )

c. Crew weapon (CSWS)

(1)Mounted on CONBAT served WOMBAT. sight (2)Field of view 115 mils, weight approx 15 lbs. 64cm x18 cm in size. Power supply internal battery lasting 16 hours. (3)Tank recognition at 700m in starlight. (4)No tripod issued at present but with suitable support excellent for surveillance task in IS (5)Human factors pronounced. (see 2a(5)).

(a)OP work. (b)Target engagement where use of CONBAT, WOMBAT justified only. (c)Surveillance of approaches to installations, tactical bases, cordon areas. (d)Road blocks. (e)Control points.

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RESTRICTED d. RPISS 32 (twiggy) (interim UK Night observation deviceNOD) (1)Tripod mounted (a)As above less (b). 11surveillance. (b)Boat patrols. (2)Field of view 135 mils. Magnification x5 weight 22.25lbs. Power internal battery 6.75v disposable. (3)Range 600m against men in starlight. (4)Cannot be used as weapon sight. (5)Human factors pronounced(see 2a(5)) (6)Head and shoulders may be exposed when using the equipment. (1)American equipment to fill (a)As in (d) above. gap before introduction of UK NOD. Tripod mounted. (2)Field of view 157 mils. Magnification x7. weight 34lbs, less tripod. Battery 6.75v.29x8.3. (3)Range and characteristics comparable to twiggy. (a)Movement at night. (b)Vehicle patrolling. (c)Escort duties. (d)Operations in rural areas.

e. US NOD

f. Vehicle sight and (1)CVR/T will be equipped driving aids with good passive driving nibs and commanders/gunners sights. (2)Protection of the optics of such sights in urban unrest will be important.

THERMAL IMAGING

The only thermal imaging equipment currently in service in the British army is IRLS and thermal pointer. (a)Used in conjunction (1)Relies on temperature with image intensifiers. difference between (b)Reduce searching time background and men or and fatigue with vehicle targets. surveillance devices. (2)Detection capability only. (3)Range against men 300 m in all conditions, vehicles 700 m. 253 RESTRICTED

a. Thermal pointer

RESTRICTED (4)Very narrow field of view. (5)Weight 3.75lbs. (6)Has an audio alarm. b.IRLS 4
INFRA RED

See under 9b and 9c (1)going out of service with army but equipments still exist for verity of weapons from small arms up to tank. (2)active: can be detected if opposition is equipped with IR detectors or image intensifiers. (3)high power supply requirement. (4)ranges depend on power of searchlight. (5)passive viewers required common user binoculars. (6)enhances performance of image intensifier.

WHITE LIGHT FLARES

a. Trip flares

(1)These are initiated when an intruder inadvertently disturbs a tightly stretched wire and sets off a flare. (2)Length of wire 60 ft max. Weight 1 1/2lbs approx. (3)Candlepower 12,000, burning time 60 secs. (4)Need for careful sitting so that light falls on target area; reflectors help. (5)False alarms can be avoided by siting where only a hostile target could trigger the flare (6)Remote detonation possible. (7)Smoke may render target invisible. (8)Damp may affect the flare. (9)The bright light will effect 11 devices which should therefore keep it out of their field of view. (1) Hand held rocket flare, range 320 in. (2) Disposable launcher weighs lbs with flare. RESTRICTED

(a)Early warning for protection of static installation. (b)Illumination of targets for engagement by small arms. (c)Ambush.

b. Schermuly

(a)illumination for target engagement (b)illumination for other purpose including use by 254

RESTRICTED (3)Candle power 80000. patrols, Illuminated area sentries 300mdiameter, burning time 30 secs. (4)May give away position of fire. ambushes and

c. Light Mortar2 (1)Para illuminating flare (a)OP work. Flare range of bomb 300 m. (b)Operations generally (2)Weight 1.5lbs outside built-up areas. (3)Candle power 150,000, illuminates 225 m diameter, burns for 28 secs. (4)Flares move quickly across sky in any wind and resulting shadows may be confusing. (5)Sound of mortar may cause target to freeze. d. Light Mortar 51 Replacement for 2* mortar mm Flare with similar characteristics and limitations, except: (1)Burns for 40 secs. (2)Candlepower e. Mortar 81mm flare. CARL GUSTAV Flare, artillery flares. Not suitable for IS

WHITE LIGHTSEARCHILIGHTS

a. General (1)A great variety of characteristics equipments which either illuminate targets directly or raise ambient light levels. (2) High power consumption for bright lights. (3)When used reveals position of source. (4)When used with IR filter much less likely to be detected, but range and beam width is restricted. 255 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED (5)May lead to loss of dark adaptation. (6)Use carefully (indirectly) with 11 devices.

(1)Small. b. Vehicle mounted (2)Low power. searchlights land (3)2-300m range. rover IS vehicle c. AFV searchlight (1)High power consumption. (2)Range 1500m. (3)IR capability

(a)Searching for targets (b)Vehicle patrols.

d. movement light (1)Trailer mounted. (a)Indirect lighting. searchlight (2)Requires associated generator. e. night sun (1)Searchlight attached to army helicopters, which can be used to flood an area or spot a selected target, when helicopter is moving or in the hover. (2)In flood mode movement of vehicles can be detected and searches of roads, rivers, railways undertaken from 1000-1500ft above ground. (3)Once a target is detected light switch to spot giving approx 300ft diameter light on the ground. Men and vehicle can then be seen clearly from approx 1500ft (4)Helicopters need warning to fit device and arrange night LS facilities: the additional weight may restrict the availability of night landing sites for this purpose. (5)Navigational assistance from the ground, usually by radio, may be needed: this requires some practice. (a)Recce. (b)Searches. (c)Cordon and search operations. (d)Illumination aid for ground troops including urban incidents when street lights are out of order.

RADAR-GROUND SURVEILLANCE

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RESTRICTED a. General (1)Active, this is not a serious characteristics disadvantage in IS. (2)All weather day and night capability against moving targets. (3)Audio signal can classify type of target eg man, vehicle, etc, but cannot identify friend or foe. b. Radar GS No 14 (1)Vehicle mounted, but can Mk 1 (ZB 298) be removed by crew and man packed for short distances. (2)Mechanical scan limited to 4 x 90 mils beam widths either side of centre of arc and of 1000 range bracket. (3)Detectors moving men up to 3000m and vehicles up to 6000m. (4)Weight 100lbs approx. (5)Land rover mast mounts available (limited issue). (6)Up to 4 skilled operators per set required. (7)Audio and visual displays. (a)General surveillance within the limits of the width and depth of (2) in column (c). (b)Ambush. (c)Cut off group. (d)early warning of movement on specific approaches. (e)Surveillance over rivers and lakes, ect. (f)Useful in areas where movement is controlled.

c. Infantry company (1)Small simple reader. (a) As in (b) above reader (2)Field of view 80mils horizontal 100 mils vertical. (3)Range 700m against men. (4)Weight 25lbs approx max. (5)Operators will have to be trained to recognize targets. (6)Audio and visual displays. RADAR-WEAPON Cymbeline could be used to LOCATING locate targets on the ground, though it would require careful sitting and a skill full operator. Its use in IS situations would be unusual.

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RESTRICTED 9
PHOTOGRAPHY

a. General (1)Provide high resolution characteristics pictures useful for planning purposes. (2)Can be still or cine. Ground and air to ground or vertical. (3)Comparative photography reveals changes and thus discloses activity. (4)Night capability with flash, IRLS and SLAR. b. Aerial (1)High-level, high-definition, vertical and oblique daylight photography RAF photography. (2)Expensive infirm, processing and interpretation effort. (3)Night capability with IRLS.SLAR and flash photography. (a)Detailed planning, Eg patrols. (b)Updating map information. (c)IRLS useful in close and wooded country. (d)SLAR identifies movement patterns and has a mapping capability. (e)Observation of inaccessible areas. (a)Town maps. Comparative photography, recording security incidents planning and recce. (b)Border surveillance. (c)Used with false colour can penetrate camouflage. (d)Night and poor visibility surveillance. (e)Update map and recce information. (a)Record security incident. (b)Record security suspects. (c)Record finds as a result of search operations, etc. (d)Analysis of security incidents. (e)Briefing of patrols.

c. photography aviation

Arial (1)Hand held F 95 camera army takes still, high definition photography. (2)Hand held civilian type cameras with telephoto lenses. (3)IRLS sensor type 201. Passive photographic sensor with fast processing. (4) Zeiss-krbs. A high resolution sensor with fast processing. (1)Wide variety of cameras available including IR cameras for night work. Correct camera must be selected for task. (2)Soldiers require some simple instruction to operate still cameras. Cine operators require training.

d. Ground photography

10

REMGTE DEVICES

SENSOR

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RESTRICTED a. General (1)Equipment capable of characteristics maintaining surveillance over dead ground. (2)Require careful siting and are most effective when used where movement of any description must be hostile or illegal. (3)Usually used in a defensive or protective role. (4)Recognition capability, except TV, very limited. (5)Can save manpower for sentries. b.IRIS (1)Equipment consists of 4 x IR fences connected by cables. Detects men or vehicles breaking active IR beams. Weight 24lbs without cable. (2)High false alarm rate unless carefully emplaced. (3)No recognition capability. (4)Inflexible because of connecting cable. (5)Sensors need careful alignment. (6)Best used in conjunction with other devices, eg TOSIS. (7)Danger of theft of sensors. (a)Defence ofVPs, static installations ect. (b)Ambush. (c)Defence of isolated patrol positions. (d)Early warning for other devices. (e)Prisoner cages-escape routes. (f)Surveillance of dead ground

c. TOBIAS (1)Equipment consists of (a) As in (b) above but seismic detector with 4 with a better surveillance geophones connected by cable. capability. Detects men up to 150m and vehicles up to 500m. (2)Can distinguish men, vehicles and animals. (3)Weight 19 lbs without cable. (4)Inflexible because of connecting cable. (5)Emplacement time lengthy. (6)Trained operators required for good results. 259 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED (7) Danger of theft of sensors. d.TV (1) Expensive; no standard issue equipment. (2)Gives instant recognition of target but requires continuous watch of monitors. (3)Source of high power is required. (4)Artificial lighting is required at night. (5)LLTV eliminates need for bright lights at night. (6)TV cameramen need training (7)TV with a video tape recorder enables a permanent record to be made and also provides instant playback of pictures without the need for film processing. (8)TV and LLTV can be fitted to army aviation planes for day and night use. (a)Assisting in guarding of static installations VPs ect where there is adequate lighting

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PART 3 COUNTER INSURGENCY

LAND OPERATIONS
VOLUME III - COUNTER REVOLUTIONARY OPERATIONS PART 3 COUNTER INSURGENCY CONTENTS Aim PAGE 259

CHAPTER 1- INTRODUCTION 261 RESTRICTED

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SECTION

1 .General The setting 2. The basis for counter insurgency action 3. Insurgent threat General Insurgent strategy 4. Ingredients of success for counter insurgency

259 259 260 261 261 261 262

CHAPTER 2-PATTERN OF OPERATIONS 5. The tactical concept Basic tactical concept Tactical requirements Methods of operating 6. Defensive Aspects Aim General considerations Defence of forward operational bases Tasks and responsibilities 7. Offensive aspects Aim General considerations Approaching the objective Withdrawal 8. Surprise and deception planning 9. Operations following the collapse of local security force 263 263 265 267 268 268 268 269 269 269 269 269 271 273 274 275

CHAPTER 3-PACIFICATION OF CONTROLLED AREAS 10. Introduction 11. Forward operational bases General requirements Occupation . Defence and sequence of build-up 12. Establishing controlled areas General Securing a new controlled area Consolidation of a new controlled area Defended villages Battalion and company bases Patrols and ambushes Mobile reserve Control measures Records 13. Expansion of controlled areas 14. Cordon and search 15. Search and clear General Sweep method . 275 276 276 277 277 281 281 281 283 283 284 285 285 286 286 287 288 289 289 290 262 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED Fan patrol method 290

CHAPTER 4- PATROLS AND AMBUSHES 16. Patrols General Infantry patrols Execution of patrol tasks Immediate support Organization Patrol bases Armoured patrols 17. Ambushes General Types . 291 291 291 292 292 293 293 294 294 294 295

CHAPTER 5- OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN DEPTH 18. Introduction . 19. Fix and destroy operations attacking camps or positions 20. Fix and destroy operations attacking a fortified village Setting The problem Outline plan Preparatory phase Breaching phase Clearing/searching phase Withdrawal phase 21. Special operations Border protection SAS squadrons Waterborne operations 296 297 302 302 302 304 304 305 306 308 308 308 308 309

CHAPTER 6-BPROTECTION OF MOVEMENT 22. Introduction 23. Protection of road convoys General considerations Precautionary measures Convoy composition Possible sequence of action Immediate action if ambushed Command and control Summary 24. Picketing Setting General considerations 310 310 311 311 312 314 315 316 316 316 317 316 263 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED Method of picketing Use of other forces operating in the area 25 protection of rally movement General Command and control of individual trains Communications Precautionary methods Follow-up tactics against small insurgent group FIGURES 1 .Diagrammatic illustration of terminology 2. Assault and ambush 3. Assault and block 4. Contracting cordon 5. Encirclement and attack 6. Fortified village 7. Clearing a fortified village 8. Protaction of convoy from point A to point B PAGE 23 39 40 41 42 44 47 56 317 317 317 317 318 318 318 319

LAND OPERATIONS
VOLUME III COUNTER REVOLUTIONARYOPERATIONS PART 3 COUNTER INSURGENCY AIM The aim of part 3 is to give guidance on the tactics and techniques to be used by security forces when dealing with armed insurgency. CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
SECTION 1-GENERAL

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1. Before considering the specific doctrine on counter insurgency the reader should have provided Part I of Volume III Principles and General Aspects which covers the doctrine applicable to both internal security and counter insurgency operations. 2. Counter insurgency is the full range of measures military, Para military, political, economic, psychological and sociological which are undertaken by a government, independently or with the assistance of friendly nations, to prevent of defeat subversive insurgency and restore the authority of the central government. The operations considered in this part are set against the background of revolutionary warfare in its various phases. 3. Terrorism by formed bodies or guerrillas, an activity which is an integral part of insurgency, is also covered in this pamphlet. 4. When British forces are committed they will probably operate under the political direction of one of the following: a. The government of a dependent territory. b. The national government of the country which has asked for it. c. The United Nations Organization. 5. It is essential that the legal standing of British troops are carrying out counter insurgency operations is clearly defined in a directive issued to the British force commander. This should set out the rights and duties of members of the British forces. Such instructions must be drawn after consultation with the local government and the Army Legal Services, and if necessary after further reference to the British Government. The Setting 6. When outside assistance is required by a national government the tendency is for the request for assistance to be delayed in the hope that the situation will improve and that assistance will not in the end be necessary. It is therefore likely that the revolution may even have reached the insurgency stage before British forces are called in. The latter they arrive the more difficult will be their task. 7. On arrival the commander will normally find that he is required to: a. Provide for the security of his own base. b. Guard key installations. c. Control the population, perhaps by curfew, check points, patrols, etc. d. Provide protection for movement of all kinds. e. Take offensive action against insurgents in areas adjacent to his base. f. Take offensive action against insurgents in depth.

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RESTRICTED g. Maintain a reserve to meet minor contingencies throughout his area and also to react to any larger force such as an insurgent field army from either within or outside the country concerned. h. Support the national economic and commercial life. 8. A list of priorities must therefore be established. It is most important that a reverse should not be inflicted on the British forces soon after their arrival, not least because of the serious effect it would have on civilian morale. 9. The desire to do everything at once with the minimum resources must be balanced against the risk of defeat. The problem for the security force commander will be to decide what proportion of his resources he can afford to allot to the various tasks confronting him. He must decide his priority tasks and allocate his forces accordingly, although as operations he will need to revise his priorities. 10. All ranks must understand the political background. Often purely military aims become subservient to political requirements. 11. The outstanding lesson from recent revolutionary wars is that no single programmepolitical, social, psychological, economic or military-will in itself succeeds. It is a combination of all these elements together with a joint government/ police/ military approach to the problem, which will counter the efforts of the insurgents, and restore lawful authority.
SECTION 2 THE

BASIS FOR COUNTER INSURGENCY ACTION

12. A revolutionary war starts if a rebellious minority plans to overthrow the legal government. It can only thrive if the movement in the end gains popular support. It will only succeed if the government and security forces fail to take effective and timely measures. 13. The leaven of revolutionary war is discontent, and whilst the purely military operations required to kill or capture the insurgents may well succeed, it is not until the sources of that discontent are removed or rectified that a revolutionary war can be brought to a successful conclusion. 14. Thus counter measures are certain to fail unless there exists a working harmony between the government, indigenous security forces and any friendly forces that come from outside to assist. 15. The aim of our forces is therefore to re-establish stable civil government, which at local level means the normal civil/police system. Unless the police system has already collapsed it is likely to provide the main source of intelligence required both for local and general operations by the security forces. It may happen that the police in their anti-crime role are still efficient but that their intelligence collecting agencies have been penetrated by insurgent sympathizers. Every effort must be made to build up the stability, reliability and effectiveness of the police especially their intelligence collecting role. The major task is the re-establishment of a cohesive system of local government rather than the defeat of an enemy.

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RESTRICTED 16. Individual operations must be not only directed to clearing away insurgents to allow the normal civil machinery to operate, but carefully co-ordinate to ensure that the results of military action are fully exploited. In this respect the armed forces must be prepared to give positive help on the civil front to fill any acumen that may have been created.
SECTION 3 INSURGENT

THREAT

General 17. The general points in the make-up of an insurgent were considered in Part 1 and this section gives some additional aspects related to the insurgency and open offensive phases of revolutionary warfare. 18. The insurgent is usually careless of death. He has no mental doubts, is little troubled by humanitarian sentiments, and is not moved by slaughter and mutilation. His upbringing and standard of living make him well fitted to hardship. He requires little sustenance and comfort, and can look after himself. The insurgent has a keen practiced eye for country and has the ability to move across it, at speed, on his feet. He is capable of being trained to use modern and complicated weapons to good effect. Insurgent Strategy 19. Characteristics, The fundamental characteristics of all insurgent planning are normally that; a. The campaign will last for many years. b. The aim is to gain civilian support and to dominate the population area by area. c. The overall plan will normally be based on three phases: 1) The penetration of government and civil organizations. 2) Intimidation and disruption by terrorism. 3) Guerrilla warfare. 20. Tactics, Insurgent tactics are based on, a. Flexible, imaginative and unorthodox operations, relying above all on surprise. b. Offensive action, even when temporarily on the defensive. c. A high degree of foot mobility. d. An emphasis of night operations. e. Detailed preparation before any attack, superior strength and favourable conditions being assured. f. Frequent use of ambush.

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RESTRICTED g. Extensive use of booby traps, mines, improvised obstacles, pits, panjis, caltraps, zerebas and field works using locally available material, bunkers, weapon pits with overhead cover, and tunnel systems. h. Well constructed and defended fortified villages, which usually combine artificial with natural obstacles. 21. The pre-requisites for successful insurgent operations generally are: a. Popular Support. The movement must gain the support of the civil population because the insurgents depend on the civilians for food, shelter, medical care, informants and recruits. If the government is weak and there are real grievances among the people, skillful propaganda can exploit these to win such support. If support is not forthcoming voluntarily, the insurgents are likely to coerce the population by terrorism and other drastic measures.
b. Strong Leadership. The effective leader must not only be highly trained but a

fanatic about his cause. He must be brave, tough, politically astute, cold blooded and ruthless.
c. Good Intelligence. Good intelligence is fundamental for the survival of

insurgency. An efficient organization must be established amongst the civil population, the government and the security forces, for only thus will the insurgents obtain the necessary details for planning propaganda and security.
d. Suitable Terrain. Bases must be established to provide refuge, administrative,

training and production areas. It is likely that these will be in remote areas such as jungle, bush, swamp or mountains which hamper the full potential of regular troops and provide good cover from air and ground observation. In contrast, comparable cover is provided by densely populated areas which the insurgents may use initially.
e. Outside Support. Revolutionary movements normally require outside support

in the form of training facilities, funds, equipment, and military supplies. In the insurgency phase troops from other countries friendly to the insurgents may be committed.

SECTION 4 INGREDIENTS

OF SUCCESS FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY

22. General. This section emphasizes those factors which have a special application to counter insurgency. 23. Joint Control. The conduct of counter insurgency operations should be a joint operation and the overall direction should be by joint civil/military operations committees. The military must never lose sight of the paramount importance of a close understanding and co-operation with their civilian counterparts. Although military and political aims often clash, 268 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED military commanders at all levels must appreciate the necessity at times of subordinating purely military aims to other considerations so that political ends can be achieved. 24. Hearts and Minds. Unless the trust, confidence and respect of the people are won by the government and the security forces the chance of success is greatly reduced. If the people support the government and the security forces the insurgents become isolated and cut off from their supplies, shelter and intelligence. 25. Intelligence. Successful counter insurgency operations depend upon an efficient integrated intelligence organization, planned and controlled on a national basis. Good intelligence is the key to successful operations and is considered in detail in Volume III, Part I, Chapter 5. Very little of value will be achieved without timely and accurate intelligence, and commanders will often have to plan special operations and take considerable risks to obtain valuable intelligence. Before undertaking military operations against insurgents the district in which they are operating should be thoroughly studied and a dossier prepared by the police intelligence service. 26. Security of bases. It is fundamental to the success of counter insurgency operations that all bases are secure, whether it be a major port, installation, air field, police post or patrol base. All members of the security forces, whatever their tasks, must be trained to take an effective and active part in the defence of installations. 27. Planned Pattern of Operations. Counter insurgency operations must be planned on the basis of systematically regaining control of the country, by the establishment and constant expansion of controlled areas. In many cases a revolutionary movement may deploy a considerable field army in addition to its guerrilla forces. This situation creates problems for the security forces; if they disperse to deal with the guerrillas they become vulnerable to attack and defeat in detail by the insurgent field army, if they concentrate against the field army they may lose control of the countryside. 28. Seizing and Holding the Initiative. A clear cut political policy and offensive action by the security forces are essential for seizing and holding the initiative. Security forces must be imbued with an aggressive spirit. Every effort must be made to dominate any area in which the security forces are operating 29. Speed, Mobility and Flexibility. Security forces must be equipped, trained and accustomed to operate for long periods under the same conditions as the insurgents, while full use must be made of air support to provide additional mobility, speed of action, reconnaissance capability and a flexible administrative system. 30. Surprise and Security. The strictest security in planning is essential if surprise is to be achieved. Loss of surprise probably means an unsuccessful operation and at least a temporary loss of initiative. 31 40 Reserved.

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CHAPTER 2 PATTERN OF OPERATIONS

SECTION 5 THE

TACTICAL CONCEPT

Basic Tactical Concept 41. General. As outlined in Volume III, Part I, Section 24, the basic tactical concept in counter insurgency operations is to regain control systematically of all areas of a country. The methods outlined below, which are enlarged upon in succeeding chapters, are employed to achieve that aim. 42. Use of a Base Area. A base area should initially be secured which is compact, easily defended, virtually free from insurgent interference and based on a port and or strategies transport terminal airfield, with all the facilities required to support a campaign. In some circumstances, a tactical transport medium range (Tac T(MR) airfield may have to be used initially, but it should be developed to strategic transport specifications as soon as possible. 43. Composition of the Force. The size of British forces committed to any counter insurgency operation will vary; depending on the size there may be a joint force HQ at two star level or above. The main tactical formation, however, will be the brigade. A brigade or brigades will be given a tactical area of responsibility (TAOR) which may be sub-divided into battalion TAORs. It is unlikely that any brigade could operate successfully without air support. 44. Command. The brigade commander is in overall command of his TAOR, and non organic helicopters allotted for the tactical support of his operational control. To advice on air problems, the brigade air support officer (BASO) will usually be established at brigade HQ. The BASO will act as the air commanders representative and when required as forward air commander. 45. Pacification Operations. The subsequent deployment, outside the base area described in greater detail in Chapter 3, should be based upon the following outline:
a. Establishment of a Forward Operational Base. Bases should be set up with the aim of regaining control of insurgent dominant areas; these are normally established at brigade level and if possible located at or adjacent to a seat of local government. They should be close to a Tac T (MR) air strip.

b. TAOR. The TAOR of a brigade should be clearly defined and if possible coincide with a civil district or province. Initially all operations tend to emanate from the base area or forward operational base but, depending on the size of the TAOR, they may ultimately

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require the establishment of battalion or company bases in order to expand the controlled are or to reach the area for operations in depth.

c. Expansion of Controlled Areas. As soon as the consolidation by the security

forces and the civil administration of a controlled area is well under way regular military forces should be launched to undertake operations designed to expand out from the area initially selected. This phase should not be undertaken until it is clear the area selected for expansion can in its turn be effectively secured, governed and protected by the civilian administration, supported by the security forces

d. Battalion/Company Bases. Such bases if needed may be located alongside

civil/police HQs, near defended villages, or in the open countryside. Defence arrangements should allow for a large proportion of the force to be out of the base on offensive operations.

e. Close Co-operation with the Civil Administration. The civil administration,

which may require reconstruction, will probably need assistance from military forces to develop the controlled areas. Maximum use should be made of local Para-military forces for this purpose. 46. Offensive Operations in Depth. While pacification operations are in progress long range penetration operations should be launched to locate, disrupt and destroy hard core insurgents and their bases outside cleared areas. This aspect is considered in Chapter 5. 47. Border Protection. As part of the campaign to win control over an increasing area of the country and to deny outside help to the insurgents it may be necessary to establish some form of control over a land frontier with a foreign power, Depending upon the nature of the threat, border protection may be carried out by locally recruited frontier guards, or it may be necessary to deploy regular forces with the locally recruited frontier guards providing information and early warning. Should the threat be really strong it may be necessary to deploy a high proportion of all the security forces available in a counter penetration role or even, in suitable terrain, to establish a physical obstacle such as wire and minefields supported by surveillance devices and covered by fire. 48. Conclusion. The overall aim of counter insurgency operations is to bring the whole of a country under control by systematically expanding controlled areas. The aim of operations in depth is to locate, disrupt and destroy hard core insurgents outside controlled areas, thereby giving pacification operations a better chance of success. Operations in depth will normally take place concurrently with pacification operations, and it is essential that a proper balance is struck in the allocation of forces between the two types of operations. If too great a proportion of the available force is devoted to operations in depth, the controlled areas may be penetrated and disrupted by the insurgents. Conversely the insurgents must not be allowed 271 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED a free hand on remote areas, from which they can launch offensive operations against controlled areas. Although operations in depth are the quickest way of reducing the hard core insurgents, areas covered in such operations will invariably need clearing again as the controlled areas are ultimately expanded. Tactical requirements 49. Ground Forces. If success is to be achieved, it is essential that sufficient infantry, together with armoury, artillery and other supporting arms, are deployed on the ground. The infantry must be highly trained, acclimatized and masters of the complex modern techniques of electronic aids, air mobility, weapons, communications and fire support as well as being first class in foot mobility over the terrain concerned. This may require many special skills and operational techniques, as for example in jungle or mountainous areas, and considerable additional training must be required to develop both aspects. The infantrymen must be highly trained specialist if he is to outfight the insurgent. 50. Air Support. The general aspects of air support are considered in Volume III, Part I, Section 13. Although air power in itself does not guarantee success in counter insurgency operations the tactical concept replies primarily on it for strategic and tactical movement, heavy fir support and logistic support, with particular emphasis on the use of helicopters in the reconnaissance, armed and support roles. Counter insurgency operations are therefore essentially a joint army/air operation, demanding the closest co-operation between commanders and staffs at every level. Adequate air support is so important because; a. By means of air logistic support it enables troops on the ground to move lightly equipped and unencumbered by heavy equipment, reserves of ammunition or supplies. b. It provides mobility in the form of rapid means of deployment, reinforcement and withdrawal, and limits the insurgents ability to interfere with operations. c. Its flexibility allows surprise to be exploited to the full. d. It is invaluable for control and reconnaissance. e. It is the best, the quickest, and in some cases the only method of evacuating casualties. 51. Naval Support. In any area of operations accessible from the sea, such as coastal areas, and terrain where the main means of communication is by inland waterway, support can be provided by naval forces. The types of support and the characteristics of the ships which can provide this support are considered in Volume III, P art 1, Section 12. 52. Co-ordination between the Services. When a brigade is operating as part of a joint service, as will be the case in a forward operational base, the co-ordination of all forms of air and fire support and the control of the low-level air space will be undertaken by the Fire Support Co-operation Centre (FSCC) and the Brigade Air Support Operations Centre (BASOC)

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RESTRICTED 53. Offensive Action. The tactical concept is essentially offensive from the beginning. The commander must however, bear in mind the protected nature of operations, the great boost to morale of success and the corresponding danger of failure. He must avoid acting on too great a scale prematurely and he must ensure that his initial offensive operations are within the capability of the forces he has available. 54. Training. Success in counter insurgency operations is only possible if troops are highly trained, supremely fit and sufficiently tough, cunning and skilful to outfight the insurgents on their own ground. While full use must be made of a technical superiority in fire power, mobility and equipment, all troops must nevertheless be trained to such a pitch that they are full confident that man for man they are better fighters than insurgents. Training is considered in detail in Vol: III, Part I, Section 25. The 2 most important training requirements are supreme physical fitness and the ability to shoot accurately at fleeting targets at short range. 55. Use of Local Armed Forces. It must be accepted that co-operation of any sort with local inhabitants will always constitute a security risk. However, bearing this in mind, the maximum use should be made of loyal military and Para-military local forces, the latter being organized as the campaign develops. Effective use of local forces is dependent on a close understanding of local commanders, their motives, customs, habits, religious attitudes and superstitions, as well as on the standard of training and morale of the men themselves. It may be possible to use them as guides within British Units. Local forces can be invaluable for the following: a. Providing topographical information and guides. b. Gaining information. c. Providing local knowledge of the habits and methods of the insurgents. d. Taking over the defence of controlled areas. e. Watching and protecting borders. f. Providing liaison officers to British units. Methods of Operating 56. The main methods of operating in counter insurgency are normally by:
a. Patrols. This subject is considered more fully in Chapter 4. The main aims of

patrolling, in either pacification operations or during operations in depth, are: 1) Reconnaissance; to locate and report insurgent movement. The method employed is normally to discover if certain routes have been used recently by the insurgents and, if they have, to follow up tracks and report on the insurgents movements. 2) Harassing; in the form of small scale offensive operations against insurgents as and when encountered. In particular, the raiding of small bases, arms dumps, food sources, and the 273 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED disruption of movement by ambushing will force the insurgents on to the defensive. 3) The provision of security and early warning in both the offensive and defensive roles. This may include the securing of helicopter landing zones and artillery positions for subsequent operations. Ambushes. Successful ambushes by security forces are likely to disrupt and demoralize the insurgents to a greater extent than any other type of operations. Ambushing is the favourite tactic employed by the insurgents themselves, and they usually suffer a severe drop in morale when they find that they are being beaten at their own game. The basis for a successful ambush is good intelligence, training and self-discipline. Ambushes offer more scope than any other type of operation for inflicting casualties on the insurgents, and may be carried out by fighting patrols, standing patrols or as separate operations by forces of up to battalion strength. Ambush techniques, which are described in Chapter 4, are employed extensively in pacification operations, and can also be used to good effect during operations in depth outside controlled areas.
b.

. Cordon and Search. This is an operation to isolate, and search systematically, an area in which it is suspected that small parties of insurgents. Wanted persons, arms, ammunition, explosives, food, equipment or documents may be concealed. This type of operation is most likely to occur during pacification operations and is therefore considered in Chapter 3, Section 14
c.

Search and Clear. This is an operation conducted in an area where it is suspected that the insurgents may be locating, possibly in some strength. The aim of the operation is to locate insurgent elements and installations with the object of destroying them or driving them out of the area. When positive information is available, a fix and destroy operation is preferable, as it is easier to co-ordinate and offers a better chance of success. As search and clear techniques are employed extensively during pacification operations they are described in Chapter 3, Section
d.

Fix and destroy. This is an operation based on specific intelligence, with the aim of contacting and destroying enemy units, HQs or other installations. Attacks on enemy camps or fortified villages are typical examples. The techniques to be employed are considered in Chapter 5, although the same techniques may often be employed during pacification operations.
e.

Counter Penetration. This is the deployment of the security forces in the defence of a border shared with a country assisting the insurgents. Counter penetration operations to meet such a threat are based mainly on patrol and ambush activities.
f.

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RESTRICTED Special Operations. These are conducted when special circumstances exist. Specially trained forces in relatively small numbers, such as SAS squadrons, are often suitable for such tasks, which may include border surveillance and the organization and leadership of friendly irregulars or tribesmen. This subject is covered in Chapter 5, Section 21.
g.

SECTION 6 DEFENSIVE

ASPECTS

Aim

57. Insurgents will invariably attempt to infiltrate as deeply as possible into government held territory to collect information, dominate the civilian population and interfere with the communications, supplies and movements of the government forces. The aims of defensive operations in counter insurgency must therefore be to: a. Ensure the security of all base areas. b. Secure forward operational bases from which offensive operations can be conducted. c. Secure controlled areas against guerrilla interferences. d. Secure the lines of communication within the controlled areas. e. Prevent reinforcement or assistance from outside getting through to the insurgents. f. Maintain the economic life of the country. General Considerations 58. Mobile and Positional Defence. The concept of defence is a combination of mobile and positional defence. This means that what is necessarily static, be it an administrative installation or a friendly village, and is put in the best state of positional defence possible, thus freeing regular forces and their supporting arms for mobile aggressive action. 59. Reserves. Reserves must be maintained at short notice at every level of command and must at all times be prepared to react rapidly to any unexpected insurgent activity. 60. The Threat. In counter insurgency there is no front line or safe rear area and all units must be trained as fighting units. Administrative installations can best be protected by 275 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED offensive patrolling designed to dominate the area, and to forestall insurgent activity against forward operational bases. All arms and services in forward operational bases must be prepared to contribute to this patrol programmed. Reliance on passive security measures will only result in ever increasing commitments. Defence of Forward Operational Bases 61. Forward operational bases are considered in detail in Chapter 3, Section 11. Because it will not always be possible to site forward operational bases on easily defensible ground, it may be necessary to move them to a more secure area in the event of a dangerously strong insurgent build-up. This factor should be taken into account during planning. Tasks and responsibilities 62. The following is a guide to defensive tasks and responsibilities.
a. Defence of Base Area and Forward Operational Bases. This is primarily the

responsibility of regular military forces. Local Para-military and military forces of proven loyalty can be employed to assist the regular forces when the threat has decreased.
b. Security of Controlled Areas. This is normally the responsibility of the

established government and local Para-military forces, supported by the regular military forces acting in a mobile role.
c. Operations in Depth. Operations in depth will normally be undertaken by

regular military forces. There will be few occasions when such forces take up a positional defensive attitude in such operations. Security must be bases on mobility combined with bold offensive action. This subject is considered further in Chapter 5. 63. Whatever the nature of the defensive requirement, operations must be aggressive both by day and night. This can be achieved by mobility, ambushes, patrols and a high standard of training and individual morale.

SECTION 7 OFFENSIVE

ASPECTS

Aim 64. The aims of defensive counter insurgency ops are to destroy the insurgents and to gain the support of the people for the government. General Considerations

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RESTRICTED 65. Basis for Success. The aims can be achieved by operations designed to keep the insurgents on the move, disrupt their organization, threaten their security, cut off their supplies, weaken them physically, deny them the political support upon which they depend and so throw them on the defensive. Above all it will be necessary to separate the insurgents from their civilian supporters, who must be won over from the side of the insurgents to the side of the legal government. As has been repeatedly stressed, this latter aim can be achieved only by the combined effort of the military forces and government agencies working together to a common national plan; nevertheless, successful military operations against the insurgents will have a marked effect on the attitude of the civilian population. 66. Intelligence. Offensive operations will not be successful unless they are based on reliable information and sound intelligence. A highly efficient integrated civil/military intelligence organization in therefore of paramount importance-this subject is considered in Volume III, Part I, Section20. Outside controlled areas are above sources of information can be supplemented by long range patrolling by SAS specially trained clandestine forces and by regular forces. 67. Surprise. When operating amongst a population who may be sympathetic to the insurgents the ability of the security forces to achieve surprise is surely limited. For this reason special measures are necessary to ensure the attainment of surprise. This matter is dealt with in more detail in Section 8. 68. Mobility. Tactical mobility is all important and is achieved mainly by the use of air transport, in particular helicopters. The advantages so obtained are listed in Para: 50. Too many wheeled vehicles inhibit mobility, and troops must not relay on road movement. They must be trained to move across all types of terrain on foot at speed, taking full advantage of re-supply by air and thus being able to move lightly equipped. In certain areas use can be made of coastal or river craft and hovercraft. Inland waterborne movement, however, is always susceptible to ambush. The maintenance of tactical mobility will be one of the priority tasks for engineer units who are likely to be used in the construction and maintenance of airfields, forward air strips, VTOL sites and the opening of land routes. 69. Mobile Reserves. The retention of a highly mobile reserve in the hands of a commander, at any level, is particularly important because it will enable him to react immediately to changing circumstances, and thus maintain the initiative and security of his force. At battalion or higher level such a reserve will normally be air transported. Likely tasks for a mobile reserve are: a. To maintain the momentum of an attack by dealing with unexpected opposition. b. To establish an ambush on the insurgents lines of escape. c. To pursue or mop-up. d. To thicken up a cordon at any threatened point. e. To counter attack if the main body is ambushed, or to help to extricate it. f. To reinforce the forward operational base.

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RESTRICTED 70. Support Helicopters. The advantages of holding support helicopters in forward operational bases are that it reduces the reaction time and thus increases the offensive capability of the units supported. The main disadvantages are the loss of flexibility in the use of helicopters and the risk of their loss or damage from enemy ground action. When support helicopters form an essential part of an immediate tactical part, operational control will be delegated to the ground force commander and tactical control will be exercised by a qualified aviator. 71. Supporting Fire. The following points need consideration: a. No operations should e undertaken without fire support. Although considerable reliance is placed on air support, the maximum use must also be made of infantry support weapons, armour and artillery within the limitations imposed by the amount of air-lift available. b. It may be necessary to establish forward mortar and or artillery gun positions with their own local infantry protection to support operations in depth. In many instances the only way to do this will be to air-lift the equipment into position. Where helicopters or suitable landing sites are not available, mortars and guns may have to be moved using either vehicles or animal support, or manhandling by troops, possibly assisted by local porters. These methods may prejudice surprise and security. c. Air support, including FGA and or armed helicopters, should be on call to support the establishment of the gun or mortar positions, and be available for the subsequent offensive operations. d. The advantages gained from preparation fire by FGA, armed helicopters, support weapons and armour are the neutralization of the insurgent positions and the reduced risk to our helicopters. The disadvantage may be the loss of surprise. Approaching the Objective 72. General. One of the main problems associated with mounting offensive operations against insurgents is to introduce a force into the area of operations without giving away the commanders intention. This can usually be overcome by a description plan and by using one of the following: a. Parachute troops for limited task. b. Helicopters. c. An indirect land approach by day and night. d. Water transport. 73. Parachute Troops. Although parachute troops can be used for limited tasks or in combination with a land or helicopter approach, the most effective means of achieving tactical mobility and surprise will normally be by the use of helicopters. 74. Helicopters. The following factors on the use of helicopters should be considered: 278 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED a. They are vulnerable to small arms fire particularly at landing sites. When an enemy threat exists at landing site, the landing site must be secured before helicopters land. This may be achieved by preliminary patrolling by infantry, SAS or local forces. If physical clearance of the landing sites by ground forces is not possible or is undesirable because surprise may be lost, support by air (FGA or armed helicopters) or by guns and mortars must be provided to deal with any enemy attempting to interfere with the landing.

b. The vulnerability of helicopters any effect the choice of their approach route and flying height. c. They can operate at night providing that the landing sites are prepared, marked and defended by ground forces.

d. Their use may prejudice surprise in subsequent operations. Any previous reconnaissance and securing of landing sites may also prejudice surprise.

e. An effective initial assault must be made simultaneously at each landing site, otherwise the enemies will disperse, or the landing element will be vulnerable to insurgent counter attack.

f. In large scale operations where a simultaneous landing at each site is not possible the initial landings must provide a sufficiently strong force to contain the enemy. Subsequent landings must follow quickly. Suitable landing sites of sufficient size for several helicopters to land simultaneously must be available and alternative landing sites or roping areas selected and reconnoitred to give flexibility to the plan.

g. When a unit is given responsibility for an area, the Commander should prepare a large number of landing points and sites for likely future operations and must ensure that these sites are visited by patrols at irregular intervals.

h. Helicopter-borne operations should be supported by all available fire support. This includes FGS aircraft, armed helicopters, artillery and mortars. Some mortars or light artillery should be included in the early waves of the assaulting force.

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RESTRICTED 75. Indirect Land Approach. The following must be considered when deciding on a land approach: a. An approach by indirect routes is normally necessary in order to avoid the insurgents protective screen of passive or fortified villages, or chance encounters with locals sympathetic to the insurgents.

b. The assault forces may move on converging axes to the point of concentration for the allotted task, and after completing the mission return to their base by different routes from those previously taken, in order to avoid enemy ambushes. As an example, a battalion might split down into companies or platoons each moving along different routes, provided plans are made to avoid defeat in detail and clashes between each other.

c. Local guides, in addition to reconnaissance elements or SAS, may prove invaluable if their reliability and loyalty can be guaranteed. d. A night approach is desirable, but if through thick jungle, it is normally essential for success to have: 1) A broad, clearly defined track, such as a game track or forest boundary, to follow. The danger of ambush or loss of surprise in using such an obvious approach must be weighed against the possible advantages. 2) Reconnaissance elements or guides who have intimate knowledge of the route. 3) Night aids. 4) A high standard of training in movement by night. 76. Water Transport. There may be occasions when a waterborne approach is the best, if not the only, method of approach. Waterborne operations may range from a platoon or company size force using small local river craft, to a large battalion or brigade force supported by a river assault group, including various types of landing ship, hovercraft and landing craft. This subject is considered in Chapter 5, Section 21. Withdrawal 77. After an offensive action the assault force withdrawing must expect to be ambushed, as insurgents are particularly quick to react in such circumstances. Furthermore, at this stage of an operation the assault force will be at its most venerable, when men are tired and casualties may have been suffered. The following measures should be taken to achieve an orderly withdrawal: 280 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED a. The plans for withdrawal must be made as an integral part of the overall plan for the operation. b. After the assault there must be prompt reorganization, and no subsequent lingering on the objective once prisoners have been rounded up and enemy equipment collected or destroyed c. The best method of withdrawal is by helicopter, but the unit routes to the landing zone and the landing zone itself must be secured. Air support cover is normally essential for a helicopter withdrawal and armed helicopters can best provide this. d. In general, withdrawal routes should be different to those used for the approach. e. A mobile reserve must be maintained.

SECTION 8 SURPRISE

AND DECEPTION PLANNING

78. Surprise. Some of the methods that can be employed to achieve surprise in counter insurgency operations, in addition to the deception methods listed in the next paragraph are: a. Speed in planning, mounting and execution.

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RESTRICTED b. Restricting information on a need to know basis to achieve good security during the planning stage. c. Segregation of security forces from civilians. d. Control of the civilian population by such measures as curfews. e. Avoiding obvious changes in daily routine or in dispositions before an operation. f. Making use of bad weather, difficult terrain or the hours of darkness. g. Making full use of superior mobility through the use of air transport, hovercraft, river and sea going craft. h. Devising unusual and unexpected tactics. Operations should not repeat themselves, nor should they present a stereotyped pattern which the insurgents can anticipate. 79. Deception. Deception measures, which must form an integral part of all operational and administrative plans, fall roughly into two categories:
a. Cover Plans. Tactical and administrative cover plans subtly exposed to

insurgent intelligence may disguise the purpose of preparations and movement. Some examples are: 1) Feeding incorrect information to known insurgent informers, although this must be done with the utmost care. 2) Planning potations in conjunction with local forces known to have been penetrated by the insurgent intelligence organization. Skilfully handled this can deceive the insurgents without the local forces realizing they are being used. The operation needs to be carefully handled and its possible benefits must be balanced against building up confidence with local forces. 3) Deceptive and uncoordinated movement by several scattered units, followed by a co-ordinated attack on the main objective. 4) Propaganda leaflet-dropping in one area, followed by offensive operations in another. 5) Obvious air reconnaissance, air strikers or helicopter movement over one area, followed by offensive operations in another area.

b. Ruses. Ruses based on the idea of appearing to offer an attractive target which

is actually a trap area from a deception that can be employed by insurgents and security forces. All successful ruses require ingenuity, cunning and imagination. A few examples are as follows: 282 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 1) A defined post is apparently evacuated to the extent that it is left vulnerable to a raid, while the evacuated forces return under cover of darkness to take up ambush positions on the approaches. 2) A small apparently isolated patrol invites attack while a large force waits in ambush to engage the attackers. 3) The use of vehicles which appear to be attractive targets, but which are actually protected by armour, or have troops concealed within the vehicles. An airborne reserve on call may be required.
SECTION 9 - OPERATIONS

FOLLOWING THE COLLAPSE OF LOCAL SECURITY FORCES

80. General. The partial or total collapse of local security forces may not permit the immediate or continued implementation of the concept of joint counter insurgency operations, as set out earlier in this chapter. The action to be taken by outside friendly forces that are operating in support of the legal government under such circumstances is set out below. 81. Partial Collapse. It is possible that before the arrival of the force, or even after its arrival, insurgent action has resulted in the demoralization of the Police and local military forces, which may be in danger of disintegration. In such circumstances the intervening forces army have to adopt a purely military role while urgent steps are taken to regroup and revitalize the police and local military forces. As soon as this has been achieved the basic concept of joint operations should be commenced or resumed, as complete success cannot be ensured without the full support of all the agencies of the country concerned. 82. Complete Collapse. If the local security forces have completely disintegrated before the arrival of the force there may be no secure base available for operations in the country concerned. In this event, military operations will have to be undertaken to establish a base area and forward operational bases from which to develop counter insurgency operations according to the concept. The type of military operation undertaken will depend on the availability of resources and the location and terrain of the country concerned. 83 90 Reserved.

CHAPTER 3- PACIFICATION OF CONTROLLED AREAS

SECTION 10 FORWARD

OPERATIONAL BASES

91. A controlled area is an area, not entirely free of the enemy, in which conditions permit the civil administration and police to work effectively in co-operation with the military forces. Although insurgent infiltration into the controlled area is possible, the civil administration supported by the security forces is capable of limiting the insurgents 283 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED activities, thereby isolating them from the local population. Major insurgent activity in controlled areas can only be undertaken by them at the risk of the destruction of their forces. 92. Initially controlled areas will be established in and expanded outwards from the base area. When such operations can no longer be easily supported by Tac T (SR) aircraft from the base area, it will become necessary to establish forward operational bases further afield, where a part of the helicopter force may be based. Forward operational bases will be sited with a view to securing and expanding further controlled areas, and mounting offensive operations in depth. 93. The remainder of this Chapter deals with mechanics of occupying and defending a forward operational base followed by the establishment, defence and expansion of controlled areas, including the operational techniques to be employed.
SECTION 11 FORWARD

OPERATIONAL BASES

General Requirements 94. A forward operational base may be defined as an area providing a firm base from which aggressive action against the insurgents can be developed. Its establishment will be undertaken as a joint operation conducted according to the principles and procedures given in the Manual of Joint Warfare, which includes volumes on Concept, Planning and Control, Joint Tactical Communications, Air Transport Support, Amphibious Operations, Offensive Air Support and Air Defence. 95. The doctrine covered in the Manual of Joint Warfare is not repeated here. The purpose of this Section is to emphasize counter insurgency aspects. 96. The normal requirements and characteristics of a forward operational base are: a. It should be formation base, usually at brigade level, establishment at a seat of local government. If this is not possible easy access to the centre of local administration is essential. b. It should be located in an area from which operations can be successfully developed throughout the formation TAOR. Projected pacification operations and operations in depth must be within convenient helicopter range. c. It must contain a suitable airfield site. In some circumstances a Tac T (SR) airfield may have to suffice initially, but it must be capable of quick development for use by Tac T (MR) aircraft for which it may be necessary to bring in or to airdrop large quantities of engineer plant or store. d. The immediate vicinity of the base should be at least temporarily free from insurgent interference. e. It should be easily defensible. If it is surrounded by natural obstacles so much to the better; if not, the ground of tactical significance that lies outside the immediate perimeter should be controlled. 284 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED f. The area of the base must be large enough to accommodate the logistic units and dumps necessary to support the force being deployed, but as small as possible to facilitate its defence. g. The base should be accessible by road or tracked vehicles and heavy plant can be brought in, probably by a once-only road convoy. This requirement is not always possible to achieve, and more extensive use of air transport may have to be made for bringing in vehicles and plant. In any case a secure landline of communications will probably be impossible, and would only be used if the strongest precautions had been taken. Occupation 97. The occupation of a forward operational base may be entirely peaceful, but if it has to be achieved in the face of some opposition, careful consideration must be given to the method of approach. If a combined air and land approach is employed, it is important to plan the correct balance and to co-ordinate the timing of the arrival of the two forces. As an example, it may be necessary for the airfield site to be secured initially by parachute troops, followed by a rapid build-up of air landed forces with some moving by road. Whatever the precise circumstances, the following factors and possible eventualities must be considered: a. There can be no question of seizing a forward operational base in the face of a strong opposition-this would be an operation of a different nature and would in any case be contrary to the tactical concept. Whether or not parachute troops are employed, the close defence of the airfield should be established as soon as possible. b. There must be a rapid build-up and a considerable show of strength. Engineers should be brought in early to clear the area of mines and booby traps and to start the reconnaissance of Tac T (SR) or (MR) strips. c. It is likely that insurgents sabotage stay-behind and reconnaissance parties will begin to operate against the base within a short space of time. d. In planning the build-up, careful consideration must be given to possible threats. Infantry supported by armour and or artillery are likely to be the first requirements, but if there is an air threat some priority may have to be given to develop the airstrips rapidly. e. Both the air and land approach operations will need to be carefully planned and executed. f. It is possible that civil demonstrations against the appearance of foreign troop may take place during the occupation of the base.

Defence and Sequence of Build-up 285 RESTRICTED

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98. General. The measures outlined below envisage defence against insurgent sabotage, raids or attacks of up to battalion strength, supported by mortars. The defence commitment of the base will be reduced as the surrounding countryside is cleared of insurgents and as the controlled area is enlarged by pacification operations. When planning the defence full use must be made of any available RN/Army/RAF and administrative units. Every man capable of bearing arms must be incorporated into the defence organization, and must be fit and trained for combat duties, including patrolling within the base. 99. All-round Defence. Every unit or staff of an administrative installation must be given a sector to defend with arcs of fire, weapon pits, obstacles and patrol area. Installations must be protected from sabotage and insurgent attacks, special attention being given to items particularly attractive to the insurgent. The maximum use must be made of guard dogs, together with improvised devices such as caltrops. All main and isolated positions must be organized for all-round defence; guard posts and detachments in isolated positions covering approaches to the base must be dug in, with overhead cover, be protected by wire, mines and improvised obstacles and have reserves of ammunition, supplies and water. A duplicated system of communication between all posts in the base must be established. The use of booby traps can be a two-edged weapon. In a hot humid climate it is essential that early warning devices are checked regularly to ensure they are in working order and the danger of our own troops initiating booby traps during these checks must be appreciated. 100. Command. If the brigade commander assumes personal command of the forward operational base, he and his staff tend to become immersed in detail and are unable to pay as much attention as they should to operations in depth. Someone else is needed to command the base area, as every component of the brigade or its echelons will be there and the coordination of the defence and detailed command is a large task. To nominate an infantry battalion HQ gives the wrong priority to offensive operations and reduces the fighting strength of the brigade. The same almost applies to the support regiment HQ, although not to the same extent, as the HQ battery commander will be in the FSCC at brigade HQ and they will therefore have someone at the centre of communications. There is little doubt that a deputy brigade commander would provide the best solution, but he is not on the establishment; and so a specific commander and HQ for the control of the forward operational base must be nominated by the brigade commander dependent on particular circumstances and personalities. 101. Sequence of Build-up. The build-up of the base may take weeks depending on the distances involved and the resources available. The sequence for land forces might be: a. An air assault by parachute troops and an infantry battalion group. b. The assumption of overall control of defence by the assault battalion group. c. A brigade key plan which directs the deployment of units and installations to selected areas. d. Reception arrangements by the assault battalion group for the follow-up echelons arriving by air. e. Offensive patrolling by the assault battalion in areas close to the base. 286 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED f. The handover of sectors of the perimeter to follow-up battalion groups. g. Frequent clearance searches of the base area and adjacent country by units. h. The reception of a one-time road convoy. i. Follow-up battalions patrol in their TAORs offensively. j. The opening up of an air strip. k. The assault battalion group may still be primarily concerned with the defence of the base and the provision of the counter attack force. l. The establishment of a limited initial controlled area. m. The expansion of the controlled area. n. The introduction of local military and Para-military forces to assist in the defence of the base, in the patrolling of the controlled area and the establishment of defended villages, etc. o. Operations in depth start concurrently with the establishment of the controlled areas. p. The progressive reduction of the number of infantry required to ensure the security of the base. Initially this will be high, but as soon as the domination of the immediate surrounding area is successful the numbers can be reduced. 102. Defence Problem. The ideal defensive plan should ensure that no insurgent small arms, rockets or mortar fire can damage anything in the base. This will seldom, if ever, be practicable because of the size of the problem. For example if it is assumed that the forward operational base covers an area of approximately 2000meters by 2000 meters, has one side totally protected by the sea and the insurgents only have mortars with ranges of up to 6000 m, this still leaves an area of approximately 100 km map squares from which insurgent mortars could be fired and achieve a hit on a part of the base. This illustrates the size of the area around the base that must be converted into a controlled area as quickly as possible. Insurgent rockets may present an additional problem. They have considerably longer ranges than mortars, but due to their inaccuracy they are mainly a harassing threat. Every effort must be made to prevent insurgent small arms from being able to engage aircraft approaching and leaving the airhead or airstrip. 103. Patrolling. While the area of the base itself should be patrolled by any units located in the base the infantry battalions should be used for offensive patrolling in the TAOR in the following ways: a. In general, offensive patrolling should extend from the perimeter of the base out to the limit of the range of enemy mortars and rockets. This patrolling must of course be tied in with or be part of the controlled area patrol programmed, as described in Section 12. A comprehensive and detailed random patrol plan will be needed and maximum use must be made of listening devices, detectors and surveillance equipment. 287 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED b. Patrols must operate within the range of artillery support and be adopt at laying ambushes. 104. Security Measures. In addition to normal security precautions the following require special consideration in connection with the defence of the base: a. The declaring of prohibited and restricted areas for b. Under some circumstances it may be necessary to stop all movement, except patrolling within the base after dark. c. Local jab our, which always constitutes a major security risk, must either be carefully screened and supervised or escorted. d. The timings and methods of patrolling, changing guards and detachments, and other routine matters must be varied. e. Guards and patrols might be supported by tracker and guard dogs. f. Depending upon the nature of the threat, full use must be made of all forms of illumination, including floodlighting, searchlights if available, and illumination provided by mortars, artillery or aircraft. g. The provision of earthwork protection for vulnerable equipment and stores. 105. Reserves. In addition to the mobile reserve, which is held ready for use within the controlled area as a whole, a small central reserve for the defence of the forward operational base is essential. Tasks for this reserve must be planned and rehearsed and must include a well co-ordinated fire plan. The infantry reserve might use helicopters or APCs. Helicopters are particularly valuable if there is a requirement to get behind the insurgents and cut off their withdrawal. There is a danger of helicopter landing sites being ambushed by the insurgents though this can be reduced by a short period of prophylactic fire from artillery or armed helicopters immediately before a site is used. 106. Armour. Tanks and armoured cars provide valuable fire support whilst the base is being established: their presence alone often acts as a deterrent. Thereafter, they are likely to be required for both defensive and offensive tasks. 107. Artillery and mortar. The defence of a forward operational base will depend very much on fire support; all artillery and mortars (including RAF mortars) in the base will be coordinated through the senior artillery officer, to ensure that the best use is made of the fire power available. There will usually be an urgent requirement to fly in, or to move in by road, artillery, mortars, and locating equipment if the insurgents have mortars. The following points should be borne in mind. a. Artillery will be invaluable for breaking up insurgent concentrations and for counter battery fire. In addition to air portable field artillery some medium guns will be useful to provide extra weight of shell. b. When close support defensive fire is required on or near the perimeter of the forward operational base it will be provided by a combination of field artillery (firing over open sights when necessary), infantry mortars and offensive air support. c. If the size of the base is small. It may be necessary to establish some fire support sub-units at a distance from the base. 108. Air defence. In counter insurgency operations the enemy is unlikely to have any air power, but the possibility of sneak air attacks, perhaps from a neighbouring country which is backing the insurgents, has to be considered.

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RESTRICTED 109. Engineers. Engineer considerations are likely to be critical both for the selection of the forward operational base, and for the timing of the operation, particularly the opening of the Tac T (MR) airhead. Engineer task in the base may include: a. The construction and maintenance of the Tac T(MR) airhead together with the necessary bulk fuel installation, maintenance facilities and protective defences. b. The forward Tac T(SR) airstrip. c. VTOL sites d. The improvement of port or beach exit facilities. e. Combat engineer support 110. Controls of Air Space. In the initial stages, apart from insurgent action, hazard to lowflying aircraft in the forward operational base arise from collision and from friendly artillery and mortar fire. Because of the nature of the insurgent threat and the fact that at least initially the forward operational base must expect attack from any direction, the close co-ordination and control of weapons and aircraft is most important. This is done by the Fire Support Coordination centre (FSCC) and the Brigade Air Support Operations Centre (BASOC) at Brigade HQ. Further details of these and other co-ordination agencies are contained in Manual of Joint Warfare, Volume I (JSP1).

SECTION 12

ESTABLISHING CONTROLLED AREAS

General 111. The methods employed to establish and expand and controlled areas are known as pacification operations, which are launched from the base area and forward operational bases. A diagram illustrating the method is at Fig 1. Regular military forces are usually employed in the early stages of such operations, local Para- military forces being moved in to considerate, and eventually to take over, the areas which have been cleared; regular forces are thus freed for further offensive operations designed to continue the expansion process. It will, however, be a great asset if the Para-military forces with their local knowledge are competent to carry out or assist with the initial operations. 112. Although some insurgents will undoubtedly penetrate into and through controlled areas their opportunities for doing so in strength and for achieving surprise will lesson progressively as the civilian population is won over to the governments side. The defence commitment for forward operational bases will be reduced as the surrounding countryside is cleared and secured under government control, thereby freeing more troops for offensive operations. Securing a New Controlled Area 113. The first task is to seek out and eliminate insurgent opposition in area selected as a new controlled area. This is achieved by the establishment of a forward operational base, or by extending the base area using the oil slick method(see Fig 1). Operations will entail patrolling. Cordon and search, search and clear, and possible fix and destroy operations. At this stage all those identified as, or suspected of being, insurgents or active sympathizers will be screened and if necessary removed from the area. 289 RESTRICTED

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DIAGRAMMATIC ILLUSTRATION OF TERMINOLOGY

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Consolidation of a New Controlled Area

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RESTRICTED 114. As soon as the situation permits, and usually concurrently with securing the area, the security forces will take steps to re-establish the authority of the legal civil administration by the following means: a. The organization of defended villages. b. The establishment, where necessary, of temporary battalion and company bases. c. Active patrolling and ambushing, to prevent outside interference and re-infiltration by insurgents. d. The maintenance of a strong mobile reserve. This reserve is quite distinct from the small central reserve which is held ready for the defence of the forward operational base. The mobile reserve for the controlled area must be sited to give the maximum confidence to the local population, in addition to being poised ready to counter insurgent infiltration. e. The implementation of control measures.

f. Building up a sound intelligence network within the controlled area, followed by offensive action based on good intelligence. g. The extension of the land and air communications network to allow the swift deployment of security forces. h. Psychological operations designed to win over the people and to destroy the insurgents morale, as explained in Volume III, Part I, Chapter 9. i. The re-establishment of the civil administration and police to maintain law and order and essential services in towns and villages throughout the controlled area. If there are insufficient police for these task small detachments of local Para-military forces may have to be used in their place. j. The garrisoning of cleared areas, preferably with local Para-military forces, which should also carry out mopping-up operations when the insurgent movement has been broken up. k. Conducting operations to expand the controlled area which will have the effect of relieving insurgent pressure on the initial controlled area. Defended Villages 115. The purpose of organizing defended villages is to: a. Ensure control of the population. b. Give inhabitant security from terrorist action c. Prevent subversive elements assisting the insurgents with supplies. d. Permit the security forces greater freedom at action. e. Encourage the provision of information.

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RESTRICTED 116. Initially, defended villages may have to be manned by military forces, but in the long term the aim must be to train and organize village guards so that they and the police are able to take over. The network of defended villages in a controlled area must be supported by patrols, mobile reserves, artillery and air support. 117. The following requirement must be met to ensure the success of a network of defended villages within a controlled area: a. The villages must be fortified by every means possible, including perimeter wire, fire trenches with overhead cover, communication trenches, tunnels, village strong points, good field of fire, mines and booby traps. b. There must be a foolproof system of communication between defended villages on the one hand and mobile reserves on the other, including telephone, radio, coloured rockets, verey lights, sirens, alids lamps, and locally improvised methods such as drum flares. c. Villages must be grouped together and placed under an overall commander d. Defended villages must be having a local intelligence system for early warning of any insurgent approach. e. Regular military forces must assist the local authorities in training village home guards to undertake the following tasks in the defence of their villages: (1) Lay light patrolling of the area immediately surrounding the village. (2) Checking people entering and leaving the village. (3) Assistance to the police in enforcing control measures. (4) Night patrols within the village perimeter. (5) The laying of night ambushes in conjunction with the police, in the vicinity of the village. (6) The manning of the defences and calling for illumination, defensive fire or air support. f. Within the network of defended villages it may be possible to organize some villages as strong points occupied by a company or more of local para-military or regular military forces, and supplement the mobile reserve by patrolling between defended villages and by laying ambushes.

Battalion and Company Bases

118. Battalion and company bases may be set up temporarily in controlled areas to provide spring-boards from which to launch offensive operations. In some circumstances they may provide protection for villages and then act as a focal point for the gathering of intelligence. 293 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED Whenever a battalion or company base is established, more troops are committed to static defence.

119. Temporary bases should be moved from time to time, company bases more frequently than battalion. The moves are necessary to deny the insurgents the time to make detailed observations and plans for raiding the bases. Such bases may be located alongside civil/police HQs near defended villages, or in the countryside; their establishment throughout a controlled area will enable troops to feed, rest and recuperate between operations, without imposing an undue strain on helicopter resources.

120. The best defence will result from aggressive action outside the base. Defensive preparedness within the battalion or company temporary base is essential, however, and should provide for; a. Defences to be effective not only when the whole force is in base when a large proportion are out on operations. Which will normally be the situation. For example, the defence of two-company side base will have to be completely effective when only 1 -2 platoons remain in the base. b. The ability to withstand attack by an insurgent battalion group supported by mortars, until the arrival of reserves.
c. All round defence, with particular attention paid to field works, field of fire and defensive device including mines, surveillance and night detection devices. d. Sleeping accommodation to be protected by overhead cover, or at least by thick blast walls. e. Sleeping accommodation to be within easy reach of fighting trenches, the latter manned at all times by sentries armed with fixed line GPMGs and the normal range of illuminations. f. g. All trenches to be linked by telephone to a central command post. Substantial artillery and mortar support.

Patrols and ambushes

121. The security of controlled area can best be maintained by a well coordinated patrol and ambush programme covering the areas between defended villages. There can be no question of establishing a perimeter type defence for the whole of the controlled area. Patrols and ambushes will normally be carried out by both regular and local Para-military force, as decided by local operations committees; this subjects is dealt with in more detail in chapter 4,but the main alms of patrols in controlled areas are:

a.

Reconnaissance. 294 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED b. c. d. Ambushing. Harassing. Protection.

Mobile reserve

122. The mobile reserve for a controlled area will consist either of regular military or local Para-military forces. The task of the mobile reserve is to destroy any large insurgent concentrations in the controlled area by fix and destroy operations, by ambushes based on information or by counter attacks on insurgents who are assaulting defended villages or the forward operational base. The following points concern the mobile reserve;

123. a As a guide, two companies of infantry with armour, artillery and engineer support might be nominated as the mobile reserve for a brigade controlled area. The infantry element will whenever possible use helicopters or APCs for mobility, though there may be occasions when they have to move on foot or use river craft. Whatever method is used, the aim must always be speed of action conditioned by anti-ambush precautions.

b. The mobile reserve may operate independently, or it may be placed under command of the unit in whose area it is being deployed. Operations undertaken by the mobile reserve, however, must be coordinated with the activities of other forces operating in the controlled area.
c. Likely operations for the mobile reserve must be planned as for a counter attack force. To be effective the mobile reserve must have a quick reaction time.

d. Artillery support must be available for the mobile reserve. The ideal is that all defended villages, and all sectors of a controlled area should be within range of some artillery. This may involve the deployments of some artillery outside the forward operational base, in which case arrangements must be made for its protection. e. In suitable country armours and APCs will be invaluable, either operating independently or in support of an infantry battalion. In such cases engineers may be required to open up routes and to search for and clear mines. f. Armed helicopters may be particularly effective in providing close fire support in areas inaccessible to AFVS and to supplement the available artillery fire support. g. The mobile reserve should be sited where it gives them maximum confidence to the local population. This consideration may involve locating the mobile reserve away from the forward operational base. Control measures 295 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 124. Measures with in a controlled area are designed to protect the people and bring them under government control thereby making it easier to: a. Redress their grievances. b. Improve their standard of living. c. Act as a deterrent to insurgent action, particularly the subversion of the people. d. Encourage the provision of information by the people. e. Conduct operations by the security forces. 124. The decision to impose control measures will be taken by the local operations committee, who must weigh carefully the possible advantages and disadvantages of measures which may be unpopular. The reasons for imposing control measures must be explained to the local population, and such measures must not be continued unless they are producing the desired results. 125. The methods to be employed by the police and military when imposing collective control measures are set out in volume III, part 2, chapter 4. Some examples are: a. The banning of illegal political rallies b. Censorship c. The registration of all civilians d. Frequent and irregular inspection of identity cards, permits, and passes e. Control of food, crops, arms, ammunition, explosives, drugs and medicines. f. Restrictions on civilian movement. g. Curfews at specific times over specific areas by the establishment of prohibited and restricted areas.

Records 126. Records in all controlled areas must be included: a. Incident maps and reports b. Patrol maps and reports c. Route and topographical maps d. Air photograph libraries

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RESTRICTED e. A file for each village. This should contain information on personalities and local habits; details of incidents, covered approaches, observation posts from which the village can be watched, defensive fire tasks, agreed signals and any other relevant information. f. Intelligence reports and summaries from higher formations, including lists and photographs of local persons.

SECTION 13 -

EXPANSION OF CONTROLLED AREAS

127. General. Once the consolidation of the initial controlled areas, as described in the previous section, is well under way, regular military forces should be launched from the forward operational base to undertake operations designed to expand the area initially selected. This phase must not be undertaken until it is clear that the area selected for expansion can be effectively secured and governed by the civilian administration, supported by the security forces. Successful insurgent attacks against inadequately defended villages in poorly controlled areas will have an adverse effect on morale and will expose loyal citizen to reprisals. This could well jeopardize future counter insurgency operations. 128. Method. An area adjacent to the initial controlled area will be selected and should be progressively dominated by military forces carrying out offensive operations, eg. Patrols, ambushes, cordon and search, search and clear, and fix and destroy operations. As each group of village is cleared, the civil authorities and police should move in. defended villages should be organized and the whole process described in the previous section should be applied to the newly cleared area. In such operations the following required special attention: a. Boundaries between units must be clearly defined, and should where possible follow local administrative boundaries. Every possible precaution must be taken to avoid clashes between the security forces operating in adjacent areas. b. Insurgent locations, particularly in the .. Of the controlled area, will be constantly changing it is essential that information reserved is acted upon immediately. Mobile reserves must therefore be available. 129. Continuing process. As each new area is properly secured and the civilian administration established the security forces should move on to the next selected area. When police are not available or unreliable, local Para-military forces may have to be used in a police role. Although this system is slow, it does ensure that the countryside is progressively brought under control and freed from insurgent influence and, once freed, remain so.
SECTION 14

CORDON AND SEARCH

130. General. With the exception of the variation covered in this section, cordon and search techniques in a counter insurgency setting are similar to those employed in urban areas on internal security operations. The latter subject has been covered in Volume III, part 2, chapter 5, which must be read in conjunction with this section. Cordon and search techniques are used frequently in pacification operations, and have therefore been included in this

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RESTRICTED chapter, but there may be occasions when the same techniques can be applied during operations in depth. 131. Aim and Setting. In counter insurgency operations the aim of a cordon and search remains the same as in the internal security role that is the capture of wanted persons, weapons, ammunition, supplies, equipment, explosives and documents. The setting however is likely to be rural and the area to be searched is likely to be larger than in urban areas. There is also likely to be a greater threat of armed resistance. 132. Tasks. In counter insurgency operations the respective tasks of a military and police are likely to be as same as for internal security cordon and search operations, except that regular forces and local Para-military forces may have to take on some of the tasks which would normally fall to the police in urban areas, due to the limited strength of most rural police forces. 133. Cordon Techniques. The main variations in counter insurgency cordon techniques are: a. As the area to be cordoned will usually be larger than in urban areas, and as the countryside is likely to afford good escape routes to wanted persons, stronger mobile reserves will be required. Furthermore there is likely to be a greater threat of armed resistant. Overall a larger force will be required. b. The main difficulty will still be to get the cordon into position without alerting wouldbe escapers. As soon as the cordon is in position or at dawn if a night approach has been made by the cordon, the search parties are moved in by helicopter. c. In a rural sitting it will normally be impossible for the cordon to cover every inch of the ground with troops. For this reason sections and half sections should bested to cover likely escape routes, possibly with a further breakdown to two-man posts if the situation warrants it. Helicopters can b used for the control, observation and reinforcement of the cordon area. d. The mobile reserves should include armour. 133. Search Techniques. The main differences in search techniques in counter insurgency as opposed to internal security operations are:

a. A stronger escort for search parties will be necessary due to the increased threat of armed resistance. b. The area must be cleared of enemy or potential enemy before the search commences, and must be held secure until completion of the operation. c. Where the houses to be searched are spread over a wide area, the plan will have to cater for a systematic search with the cordon closing in on cleared areas. d. Wanted persons and material are likely to be hidden with great ingenuity in elaborate tunnelling systems. Mines, booby traps, caltrops, etc are also likely to be used extensively by insurgents in rural areas.

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SECTION 15 SEARCH AND

CLEAR.

General 135. Aim. The aim of a search and clear operation is to search an area thoroughly with a view to locating and eliminating insurgent activity within that area. 136. A search and clear operation is launched in an area where it is suspected that the insurgents may be located, possibly in some strength, or where there may be hidden caches of weapons, food or other supplies. This type of operation is used frequently when expanding controlled areas and is different from a cordon and search operation in that it normally takes place in the countryside without involving the detailed search of villagers and the subsequent screening of the inhabitants in depth. Such operations require a large number of troops to achieve any success and this disadvantage must be weighed against the likely effectiveness of the operation. 137. Search and Clear operations normally fall in to one of the following categories:

a. A sweep through an area towards a line of stops. b. The splitting through an area into a number of sectors. Each sector is then allotted to a sub-unit which searches by means of fan or other suitable patrols combined with ambushes and stops. 132. The following matters require consideration when planning a search and clear operation: a. b. c. There must be sufficient troops for the task/ a common error is to try to clear an area too large for the force available. Infantry are normally employed for search and clear operations. Armoured sub-units can be very effective as stops or as a mobile reserve. Secrecy in planning and the achievement of surprise are essential to success. It is best to enter the area to be searched from several directories, to avoid the use of tracks and to vary the methods of movement, so that the insurgents are not able to anticipate the pattern of an operation. Clear orders and good communications are essential in order to retain control. Sufficient time must be allowed to ensure a thorough search of the ground. In this connection the rate of advance in a sweep operation needs careful consideration. To avoid clashes between our own troops and accidental casualties, clear interunit boundaries based on obvious features must be established. Rules of engagement across these boundaries must be laid down and recognition signals must be known by every soldier taking part. Recognition plans should be varied from one operation to another. Mobile reserves, which should include infantry in helicopters, or APCs and armour should be available to give support in the vent of the insurgents 299 RESTRICTED

d. e.

f.

g.

RESTRICTED offering organized resistance, or to pursue and destroy insurgents who break through the stop line. If the ground does not permit the use of APCs the reserve must be organized so that it can deploy in tracker /combat groups. Sweep Method 139 Stop Parties stop lines will normally be established on three sides of the area to be searched, on unmistakable features. Stop parties should be organized in small groups armed with a high proportion of automatic weapons. They should be sited in concealed positions within visual distance of each other, with the intervening areas covered by fire. Any stray civilians encountered by the stop parties on route to their positions, or while in their positions, should be silently detained until the conclusion of the operation in order to avoid giving away the position of the stop lines. When the clearing party reaches a stop line, the stops should give a previously agreed recognition signal and stand up. 140. Clearing Parties. The clearing force will normally consist of sub units searching as they advance on parallel axes, the distance between sub units depending on the ground. The clearing force should not consist of an evenly spaced line of individuals but rather of a line of sub units, each thoroughly searching the area within its boundaries as it advances. 141 Command and Control. Commanders down to section level must know the location of other troops on their flanks, front and rear, so that fleeting targets can be engaged immediately without endangering friendly forces. The advance of the clearing force will normally be controlled by bounds, on which each clearing party should stop for the minimum time required to reform, report and redeploy and on no account should troops be allowed to treat this pause as a rest or halt. Commanders must be given freedom of manoeuvre within their boundaries, so that they can concentrate their force or part of it to carry out particular tasks. Some ground may be open and will require relatively few searchers, while close country, copses, cultivation or dwellings may require a very thorough search. Helicopters as airborne command posts or for general observation are of great value to a commander for controlling such an operation, as long as they do not prejudice surprise. Fan Patrol Method 142. General. The fan patrol method is normally employed when searching an area for small parties of insurgents, caches of weapons, food or other supplies. It is one method of locating the enemy when expanding a controlled area. 143. Organization and Control. A fan patrol search and clear operation is normally carried out by infantry. For example, in a battalion operation in jungle the area to be searched would be sub- divided into adjacent company areas. These would then be systematically searched by each company taking on a definable area using fan patrols, with ambushes and stops on the fringes. There are many variations to this type of operation, depending on the nature of the ground, the time available, the forces available and the insurgent threat. 144-150 Reserved. CHAPTER 4 PATROLS AND AMBUSHES
SECTION 16 -

PATROLS 300

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General 151. The aim of this chapter is to highlight those aspects of patrolling and ambushing which apply particularly to counter insurgency operations. A detailed description of techniques is contained in volume V, part 2 jungle*, and in infantry training volume IV (WO Code No9624). A careful study of insurgent tactics and habit must always be made and techniques adjusted accordingly. 152. Patrolling and Ambushing are, to a great extent, linked in counter insurgency operations. Together they represent the surest means of maintaining the initiative, disrupting the insurgent organization, gaining information about the insurgents, and achieving security by offensive tactics. The end product of a patrol is very often an ambush. 153. Aims. Patrolling is one of the most important techniques in counter insurgency operations, and is employed extensively during pacification operations and operations in depth with following aims. a. To gain information about the insurgents both positive and negative. b. To gain topographical information c. To harass and disrupt the insurgent camps. fortified village HQs, and supply dumps, so that they can be destroyed either by the patrol if it is strong enough to deal with the situation, or by a larger fix and destroy operation mounted as a result of information gained by the patrol. d. To provide security Infantry Patrols 154. Terminology once a patrols aim has been defined the patrol can be classified as being one of the following types: a. Fighting b. Standing c. Reconnaissance 155. Fighting patrols. Fighting patrols vary in strength from a section to a company, and on occasions a larger force may be used. In general, the aim of fighting patrols is to harass the insurgents by carrying out small scale offensive operations. Typical tasks for fighting patrols are: a. To dominate an area, by harassing all enemy movement in that area. b. To lay an ambush or a series of ambushes. c. To establish a temporary patrol base, from which to launch a reconnaissance patrol. d. To locate and attack insurgent bases, arms dumps and food source 301 RESTRICTED

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156. Standing Patrols. These are small static patrols, normally. Up to section strength, sited on likely insurgent approach routes, tasked to impose delay usually by ambush and / or giving early warning of infiltration. Standing patrols should not be confused with listening posts sited by sub- units to provide close security for their own localities. 157. Reconnaissance Patrols. The aim of a reconnaissance patrol is to find and report insurgent movement and locations. The method employed is normally to discover if certain routes have been used recently by the insurgents, and if they have, to follow up tracks and report the insurgents movements, the following points should be noted about reconnaissance patrols in the counter insurgency role: a. They may vary in strength from two or three men even up to a platoon b. c. They must move silently and with stealth, avoiding existing tracks whenever possible They should avoid contact, and never lose sight of their main aim, which is to locate and report insurgent movement and location.

Execution of Patrol Tasks 158. The following points apply to all types of patrols: They must be given latitude as to their time of return to base, so that they are able to follow up signs of insurgent movement if necessary. They must be prepared to stay on patrol for many days at a time. a. A reliable communication drill must be arranged so that signallers do not give away the presence of patrols by their effort to open radio communications b. Clear, specific tasks must be given to all patrol leaders, together with all available information on topography of insurgents friendly forces and civilians. Immediate Support 159. Patrols should operate within range of artillery and/ or mortar fire support. Several targets should be allowed and registered on the patrol route so that support can be obtained easily and quickly with often only small corrections by patrol commanders. Patrol leaders must be equipped with efficient radio communications, and must be trained in artillery target indication procedures. Patrol commanders must know how to call for air support, and they should be equipped with indication equipment such as coloured smoke, marker balloons or homing beacons to pinpoint their position to aircraft. 160. Helicopter borne reserves or parachute troops can in some circumstances be held ready to assault insurgent camps, etc, which have been located by patrols, or to go to the aid of patrols who have encountered insurgents in superior strength. Organization

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RESTRICTED 161. In addition to standard procedures the following matters require special attention in the organization of patrolling in counter insurgency operations: a. An efficient organization for the clearance of patrol tasks is essential. This prevents clashes occurring between security forces and casualties being in9flicted on innocent civilians. Clearance will normally be obtained through the joint operations committee who may have declared prohibited areas to facilitate patrol activities by the security forces. b. Patrolling boundaries between units and sub units must be clearly defined; whenever possible natural features should be used. c. The activities of supporting arms, and in particular harassing or prophylactic fire, must be co-ordinated with patrol programmer. Patrol Bases 162. In counter insurgency operations patrols must be prepared to stay away from their permanent base for many days at a time. For this reason temporary patrol bases may be established with the object of providing a comparatively secure area in which patrols can rest, and from which lightly equipped reconnaissance patrols can be launched. Patrol bases may also be used as support areas when laying ambushes. Defence arrangements for patrol bases will not be as comprehensive as those for company/ battalion bases described in chapter 3, section 12, but will rely secrecy and the observance of the following guiding rules for their security: Whenever possible the approach march should be made by night, and the use of established tracks should be avoided at all times. a. The approach march should avoid contact with local inhabitants: if necessary any locals encountered by patrols in remote areas may be detained as a temporary measure. b. Bases should be sited away from obvious sites, and should not normally remain in the same place for more than one night. c. Fires lit by day should be smokeless. d. Not more than one track should lead into a patrol base, and this track must be well camouflaged and guarded. e. The occupation of the bases must be achieved as quickly and as quietly as possible. f. There must be an efficient early warning system, including the use of carefully sited listening posts. g. Before setting up base, the immediate vicinity should be cleared by patrols to ensure that there are no insurgents in the area. Armoured Patrols 163. In additional to the predominantly foot patrols already described there is usually a task for mounted patrols, whose main function is the disruption of the enemy organization. 303 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED Armoured cars are well suited to this task, which includes active deep patrolling to harass and disorganize the enemy, to show the flag and to link physically with outposts and other scattered static patrols and bases. Armoured patrols are also able to prove routes by ensuring that they are not mined or obstructed, to spring ambushes and to glean information, both positive and negative.
SECTION 17

AMBUSHES

Generals 164. Successful ambushes by security forces engaged on counter insurgency operations are likely to disrupt and demoralize the insurgents to a greater extent than any other type of operation. The detailed techniques for laying and springing ambushes, for command and control, and for withdrawal after the action, are covered in Volume V, Part 2 and in Infantry Training Volume IV (WO Code No 9624). The aim of this Section is to emphasize certain aspects which require special attention in the counter insurgency role. As insurgents rarely offer themselves as targets in open country, this Section deals with ambush techniques in close country. 165. Special Requirements. In addition to the normal essential ingredients of a successful ambush the followings are particularly important in the counter insurgency role: a. Good intelligence of insurgent movement and knowledge of the ground. b. Careful selection of the ambush team. Where possible the team should be made up of men chosen for their marksmanship or other qualities; it may require high officer/NCO content. c. Detailed and clear order must be given on when to spring the ambush and the action to be taken during and after the ambush. This should be accompanied by as much rehearsal as possible. d. Surprise. Insurgents usually develop excellent powers of observation, hearing and sense of smell. Surprise can only be achieved by a careful approach to the ambush site, good concealment and a complete absence of movement and noise once in position. e. Many ambushes are liable to be of long duration and require a high standard of battle discipline by the ambush party. A long-term ambush requires a concealed rest in administrative area within easy reach of the ambush sit; the procedure for reliefs also needs special attention. f. Accurate shooting from all positions, kneeling, standing, sitting, lying and from behind the cover. 166. If the ambush is set at night the following points should be considered in addition: a. The sitting of night ambush may be simplified as concealment is easier in the dark.

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RESTRICTED b. The killing ground must be adequately illuminated. c. Weapons should fire on fixed lines or have their arcs of fire fixed by means of sticks, to avoid troops firing at each other. d. When possible, the position should be occupied before last night. e. Men and groups should be sited closer than by day, to make control easier. f. The ambush party must remain absolutely still. All movement can then be assumed to be that of the insurgents. No movement from outside to contact an established ambush must ever take place. 167. Strength of Force and Support Areas. The size of an ambush force should be no larger than is required to deal with the expected insurgents. The smaller the force, the easier it is to control, conceal and extricate after contact. The effectiveness of a small force may be increased by additional automatic weapons. In counter insurgency operations it frequently necessary to deploy supporting troops in firm bases through which the ambush party can fall back once the ambush has been sprung. This is particularly important if strong insurgent reaction to the ambush is likely. 168. Supporting Fire. A deliberate ambush should be supported by mortar and artillery fire. Special sites may have to be cleared to enable helicopters to fly in guns and mortars. FOOs and MFCs must be located with the ambush force, or a short distance away, to direct fire on to insurgent escape routes, insurgent counter action, or against insurgent mortars which may intervene once the ambush has been sprung. Types 169. Deliberate. A deliberate ambush is one planned and executed as a separate operation. This may take the form of a linear ambush with the killing area concentrated along a track, river or clearing; or it may comprise an area ambush, with a number of small linear ambushes places to cover all the approaches into an ambush area, and also to catch insurgents dispersing after a contact. Although anticipated killing areas will normally be covered by small groups of up to ten men, with a mobile reserve held ready to intervene after the ambush has been sprung, the overall size of the ambush force may vary from a platoon to a battalion. A deliberate ambush will normally be supported by mortar and artillery fire. 170. Immediate. An immediate ambush is set with a minimum of planning to anticipate imminent insurgent action, or as a defensive tactic by a patrol. The degree of success of such an ambush will depend upon the initiative of the commander concerned, prior rehearsals of immediate action drills, and the standard of training of the troops. 171. Remote Control. A remote control ambush entails the laying of remote controlled anti-personnel mines at the ambush site, together with a system, perhaps using seismic detectors, for giving warning of the arrival of the insurgents in the ambush area. The ambush force is located a short distance from the site awaiting the insurgents arrival and ready to set off the anti-personnel mines by remote control. Once this has occurred, the ambush force moves quickly either into previously reconnoitred fire positions or to assault the insurgents caught in the ambush. The exact sequence of this latter phase will depend on the ground and 305 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED other factors, but whatever the circumstances rehearsal on a similar site is desirable. A remote control ambush may be employed if one or more of the following conditions apply: a. It is not possible to conceal an ambush force of sufficient strength in close proximity to the ambush site. b. It is anticipated that the insurgents will clear their line of advance with foot patrols. c. It is anticipated that the insurgents will advance well strung out to prevent the involvement of their main body. d. There are insufficient troops to cover the required frontage by a conventional ambush along the insurgent line of advance. e. In a deliberate ambush if it is desired to extend the killing area beyond the scope of the force, cover the flanks or cover likely insurgent withdrawal routes. 172 180 Reserved. CHAPER 5- OFFENXIVE OPERATIONS IN DEPTH
SECTION 18

INTRODUCTION

181.

General. The aim of operations in depth is to locate, disrupt and destroy insurgents outside the controlled areas, which a view to relieving insurgent pressure on the latter and thereby giving pacification operations a better chance of success. Operation in depth will, therefore, normally take place concurrently with pacification operations, and as previously stressed it is essential that a proper balance is struck in the allocation of forces for forces for the two types of operations. In this connection it will be important to bear in mind the overall aim of counter by systematically expanding controlled areas. Tactical Considerations. Although operations in depth are the quickest way of reducing the hard core insurgents, areas covered by such operations will invariable need clearing again later, when the controlled areas are finally expanded to cover the whole country. During operations in depth, ground is seldom of any tactical importance and a position should rarely be attacked simply to gain ground. Operations in depth are of the locate, strike, withdraw variety and usually rely on air power for tactical mobility. Deployment. When operating in depth, introduction of forces to an area must be achieved in such a way that surprise and security of movement are ensured. The method of movement will depend on the size of the size of the force, the distance to be covered, the nature of the intervening ground and the insurgent threat. Troops operation on foot should be lightly equipped. Resupply. To ensure that the force is able to operate lightly equipped, resupply will usually be by helicopter, air drop or by air landing stores if an airstrip is available. In some circumstance supplies can be dumped at selected points to 306 RESTRICTED

182.

183.

184.

RESTRICTED timed programme. The planning of resupply to avoid interfering with offensive operations and to avoid loss of surprise needs careful consideration 185. Extrication. The best method of extrication is usually by helicopter with code air support available. Plans to extricate the force must be an integral part of the overall plan. All troops must be briefed on the action to be taken should they become split up, or temporarily lost. Pattern of Operation in Depth. The per requisites for operations in depth are that they should be mounted in areas which are within convenient helicopter radiuses of action of the base area or forward operational bases, and that air and/or artillery support is available. The conduct of operations in depth will normally be on the following lines; a. The selection of area which is thought to contain a hard core insurgent organization. Such an area may be adjacent to a controlled area, or it may be in more remote region. b. The establishment of temporary operational based on pinpoint information. Fixed and destroy techniques are described in section 19 and 20. c. Active patrolling and ambushing disrupt insurgent movement, and to locate camps, fortified villages and supply bases. d. Fix and destroy operations based on intelligence gained from patrolling, air reconnaissance and other sources. Security .forces operating in depth may be considerably weaker than the total insurgent strength in the area. Consequently there is little value in taking up a positional defence, even if the operation is to last for a long period, with the aim of holding ground or inviting attack. Given sufficient time the insurgents would be able to concentrate a stronger force and over turn such a position. Security must be based on mobility, surprise, balance and superior fire power. Fire power should normally include offensive air support on call, artillery support from secure areas and as soon as possible close support artillery and mortar fire from the force itself. Special Operations. The term operation in depth also covers special operations such as deep penetrations by SAS patrols, the organization and leadership of friendly tribesmen, border operation and deep penetration by water borne force. Some notes on special operation are given in section 21.
SECTION 19 -

186.

187.

188.

FIX AND DISTROY OPERATIONS ATTACKING INSURGENT CAMPS OR POSITIONS

189.

General. The fix and destroy techniques described in this section are likely to be employed frequently during operations in depth, but the same techniques may often be used during pacification operations to establish or expand controlled areas. this section describes various encircling methods for attacking insurgent camps or positions, but there may be situations where an insurgent position has been accurately pinpointed, possible by air reconnaissance, and when an immediate air strike will offer the best chance of success.

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RESTRICTED 190. Encirclement. if an insurgent force is locate in a camp or position, any plan to assault it, other than by an immediate air strike, will normally involve some form of encirclement, as insurgents are adept at quick dispersion in small groups when attacked. If complete encirclement has been achieved, which is rare in close country, the insurgents will normally aim at breaking out through the cordon, and mobile reserve is always necessary to meet this eventuality. Close Fire Support. Air armed helicopter and / or artillery and mortar close fire support should be employed when assaulting insurgent camps or positions. in close country the use of air power to support ground forces is dependent upon an accurate location of the insurgent positions, backed up by some form of reliable target indication such as marker balloons from which a bearing and distance to the position can be given. If the ground is suitable armour may also be employed to give fire support or to act as a mobile reserve. Attack Techniques. The figures that follow illustrate various forms of encirclement attack which may be applied to situations where an insurgent force has been accurately located. There are of course many other variations, and commanders must devise and practice methods which are best suited to local conditions and the number of insurgents expected.

191.

192.

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RESTRICTED 193. Execution. In general normal battle procedure applies to attacks on insurgent camps and positions. However. the following require special attention : a. The approach march by all tactical group must be made without being seen by the insurgents. b. If any operation is taking place in jungle a night approach is normally impracticable, unless troops have and intimate knowledge of the area. c. All ranks must be fully briefed on details of the plane in order to avoid accidents occurring between the assaulting encircling forces d. Good communications are essential between the attacking force and supporting arms. Commanders down to platoon level must be capable of calling for the directing artillery fire.
SECTION 20 FIX

AND DESTROY OPPERATIONS ATTACKING A FORTIFIDE VILLAGE

Setting 194. This section describe the method of attacking and village is under the complete domination of the insurgents, and in which most of the villages are armed and will fight to defend themselves or enable to their comrades to escape. A description of a fortified village was given in volume III, part I, section 7 and fig 6 shows typical examples 195 During offensive operations in depth it will be necessary to attack fortified villages in order to disrupt the insurgent organization by killing or capturing the insurgent and destroying hidden dumps of arms and ammunitions and supplies. Operations of this nature should be considered as raids and should be undertaken when the chance of success high. The permanent occupations of avillages not normally contemplated, and assault force must be extricated as soon as possible after the aim has been achieved.

The Problem
196. The difficulties of assaulting a fortified village deep in hostile territory ,with its approaches covered by swamp or jungle ,defended by booby traps and possibly stout palisades. 197. The destruction of a fortified village by air bombardment is not always feasible, because of the depth and strength of underground fortifications. Furthermore, the theatre policy may preclude the use of massive air support against fortified villages, because of the danger of causalities to innocent civilians, women & children. 198. A. formal set piece attack is not, therefore, the complete solution for an attack on a fortified village, although elements of such an attack may be included. Stealth, the achievement of surprise, and the use of novel tactics and devises are essential to the success of the overall plane.

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RESTRICTED Outline Plan 199. The method of attacking a fortified arrears will usually essential combination of pardon, assault and search. They are normally four phases as follows. a. Preparatory Phase .This covers the planning stage the gathering of information, the approach of forces. b. Breaching phase. This covers period from the time that the attack is launched until the assault forces are within the village perimeter. it is described latter under the following heading 1. Type of defenders 2. Methods of crossing obstacles 3. Assault formations c. village. d. Clearing / searching phase. This covers the clearing and searching of the

Withdrawal Phase This is not completing till forces return to the base or position from which it originally set out together with persons and captured equipment, documents, etc. The timing of this phase is very important, the main problem being to complete the withdrawal before nightfall. Preparatory Phase 200. Intelligence. The success of an attack against a fortified village depends largely on the accuracy and amount of information available about the village defences. This information may be obtained from agents, patrols, local troops, captured insurgents , air photographs , and air reconnaissance. It will effect to make planes, warning systems, and their tasks. 201. Approach.

a. It is important that only those who need to know are told of impending operations against the fortified village. Rehearsals may take place without the troops knowing the location of the objective. Final orders should be given at the last moment and, once issued, the troops should be restricted in their moments to avoid any leakage of information. b. There may be occasions when a direct and simultaneous positioning of the cordon con be effected by the use of helicopters, followed quickly by the assault force also possibly in helicopters. If a land approach is made, the route should avoid populated areas and the use of tracks. 202. Establishment of cordon and positioning of assault troops .The following points must be considered: a. The Cordon. The establishment of the cordon must be carefully planned and executed. Whenever possible sufficient troops should be made available to make the cordon completely effective. If sufficient troops are not available stops and ambushes will have 314 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED to be placed on likely insurgent withdrawal routs although this method is unlikely to be fully effective. Full use must be made natural obstacles, and patrols should operate outside the cordon to deal with enemy who have slipped through, possibly by the use of tunnels. Artillery concentrations, air strikes (including armed helicopters) and amour can be used to supplement the cordon when there are insufficient troops. After the cordon is firmly established, it may in some circumstances be desirable, on humanitarian grounds, to give uncommitted villagers the opportunity to evacuate to a designated assembly point outside the village; this could be announced using public address equipment or voice aircraft, but such a measure would of course give the insurgents a good opportunity to prepare for the coming assault. b. Assault Troops. Whatever means are used to move the assault troops in to the area the assault must not start until the cordon troops are positioning. If the cordon troops have approached on foot, it may still possible to move the assault troops by helicopter as soon as the cordon is established. Breaching Phase 203. Types of defence. The obstacles used by the defenders will be simple yet effective. In the worst case they will include one or more panji fences as well as pits, caltraps, zarebas, trip wires, booby traps and mines, and full use will also be made of natural obstacles, Obstacles will invariably be covered by fire. The fire trenches manned by the insurgent will normally be well considered. Often resembling ant heaps, and they will be difficult to destroy. Tunnels may link fire positions so that the defenders can quickly reinforce or evacuate positioning at will. Obstacles must also be expected inside the village., with the aim of forcing the attacks in to the chosen killing ground. 204. Methods of Crossing Obstacles. The two principal ways of crossing obstacles when attacking defended village are: a. Where a panji or zareba fence or fences have to be breached ,some or all of the following methods can be employed. 1. Air stickers or armed helicopters using rockets, bombs and missiles 2. Artillery & mortars 3. Smoke to screen the attack 4. Armoured vehicles 5. Bangalore torpedoes and shaped or pole charges, including those improvised from local material such as bamboo. 6. Anti-tank weapons b. Alternatively a small party using machetes to cut their way though ,or lengths of timber to force their way though ,may be employed .These should only be attempted in conjunction witch strong covering fire. 205. Assault Formations. The initial break-in wall normally be on a narrow front to limited objectives, as illustrated in fig.7. At this stage the aim is to clear the gap through the perimeter obstacles, and to secure the insurgent position covering this gap. The initial break-in must be supported by all available means of supporting fire and the breaching may be carried out by terms of infantry assault pioneers with engineer support. Armoured vehicles will be invaluable in assisting the establishment of an initial bridgehead inside the village defences. As a rough guide, it is suggested that a battalion carrying out such an 315 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED assault would do so on a one company front, and it may well be advisable for company assault to be on a one platoon front. the

Clearing / searching Phase 206. Objectives. These must be limited company, so that adequate troops and fire power are available to roll up the village defences progressively from the area of the breaker end in to the far end of the village. Unless each objective is systematically and thoroughly cleared, causalities may be caused by insurgents who have remained concealed behind the attacking troops. 207. Timings. Providing that there are adequate hours of daylight available the clearing/searching operation should not be hurried .Adequate time must be given to sub-

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RESTRICTED unit commanders clear each area thoroughly .Normally the best time to launch the assault will be as near as possible to first light. 208. Clearing Buildings. Ones insurgent fire has been encountered all buildings should be treated as insurgent occupied until the clearing operations has been completed. Possible weapons for clearing buildings are HE grenades ,automatic weapons or CS. Should a commander decide to use CS .he must be aware of the dangers of employing it in a small confined space from witch escape may be difficult or impossible , Particularly if that space has little or no ventilation. 209. Clearing Tunnels. The entrance to tunnels are very hard to find ,and are usually concealed behind false walls ,under cesspits or cooking fires ,etc .Once the entrance has been found a command decision must be made whether the tunnel system is to be searched before destruction .Normally tunnels provide a great deal of information ,storage destruction .However ,in the absence of adequate natural or forced (by air compressor) ventilation ,the penetration of underground workings by CS or smoke is unlikely to be fully effectively .Subsequent exploration should be only undertaken b(by air compressor) ventilation ,the penetration of underground workings by CS or smoke is unlikely to be fully effectively .Subsequent exploration should be only undertaken by masked ,Protected personnel .The service respirator gives no protection against the presence of carbon monoxide ,which may accumulate naturally in underground working. If it is decided to clear and search the tunnels made of conventional explosives . If it is decided to clear and search the tunnels with infantry and/or engineer terms , the following method should be employed. a. No 1- Probes all round for booby traps and subsidiary- tunnels b. No 2- Supports No 1,remains in visual contract with him and navigates c. No 3- Supports No 2, maintains contact with a surface controller. d. No- Lays telephone line and check atmosphere e. A surface control must be established (platoon or section HQ) to plot the path of the tunnel on surface, based on bearings and distances provided by the search team .The surface control should also stand by to provide support or a small rescue team. 210. Searching and Screening A systematic search of the buildings and surrounds must take place with the object of capturing the concealed insurgents, discovering arms dumping , supplies, local printing matching ,leaflets and other insurgent propaganda. Every searcher must be covered by the fire of another man. Duals takes place. For this purpose villages must be moved out of their houses in to the open where they can be kept under observation. 211. Surrounding Areas While the village search is in progress a sea of the adjacent area, scrub, fields, ponds and canals outside the defences ,must take place. A though knowledge of various types of hides ,together with a close inspection for entrance or breathing holes ,assisted by sounding ,probing ,dogs and mine detectors, will be required.

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Withdrawal Place 212. Ingenuity in extricating the forces , together with prisoners ,captured equipment ,documents etc ,will be necessary if the withdrawal is to be achieved in daylight and if ambush is to be avoided .it may be possible to the force using helicopters or APCs .If helicopters are used ,suitable landing zones are routs them must be secured. helicopters are ideal for the withdrawal phase, and should normally be retained for this purpose whenevr possible. 213 If withdrawal is make across country, either in vehicles or on foot. Different routes from those used should be chosen. An appropriation will also have to be made as to whatever withdrawal in small parties on a variety of routs is preferable to the moment of whole force on one route. SPECIEL OPPERETION

SECTION 21

Border Protection 215. In order to win control over an increasing area of a country and to deny outside help to the insurgents it may be necessary to establish some form of control over a land frontier with the foreign powe. In low intensity operations, border protection may be carried out by locally recruited frontier guards. It may be necessary however, to deploy regular forces with the locally recruited guards being use for obtaining information and early warning. In circumstances of grater intensity, a physical obstacle such as wire and minefields, supported by surveillance devices and covered by fire, might be required. In close country defoliants may be needed to clear fields of view and fire. SAS Squadrons 216. SAS squadrons are particularly suited, trained and equipped for deep penetration operations. Somali parties may be infiltrated or dropped by parachute in to remote areas thereby avoiding a long approach through insurgent dominated country. The tasks which SAS squadrons may carry out are follows. a. The collection of intelligence on the locations and movement of insurgent forces. b. The ambushing and harassing of insurgent. c. Infiltration of sabotage, assassination and demolition parties in to insurgent-held arrears.

d. The organization, training and leadership of friendly, guerrilla forces operating against the insurgent Border surveillance .This may be achieved by watching likely infiltration routs , and setting up a good liaison with local village ,aborigines or friendly tribesmen. e. Giving limited community relations assistanc. e.g,helping villages with medical attention or locale projection. 318 RESTRICTED

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Water -Borne Operations 217. General. Counter insurgency operations may take place in coastal arrears, flooded delta arrears, or in countries where the main means of communication is by river. In addition to water man ship training involving the use of stranded army equipment for tactical and logistic support. Operations may vary from a small force using local boats to a large force support by a river assault group or groups. Naval forces including carrier born RM commando are of cause invaluable in coastal waters in the counter insurgency role, but their detailed operational techniques do not come within the scope of this pamphlet, although navel / commando elements may well form part of the river patrols and river assault groups. Some aspects on river patrols and river assault groups, for which there are no standard organizations, follow. 218. River Patrols. Navel and other forces may be organized in small in depended units as river patrols, using various types of patrols, using various types of patrol boats including locally commandeered craft .The task of such patrols is to harass and intercept insurgent forces moving or withdrawing in boats. Such patrols must be backed up by helicopter borne reserves ready to give immediate support. 219. River Assault Groups, River assault groups may have to be formed to transport and support forces operating in depth. Such groups will normally include a variety of craft , including LCT, LCM,LCVP and hovercraft ,together with locally commandeered boats . The tasks which might fall to a river assault group: a. Transporting forces operating in depth. b. Providing fire support from craft ships at sea .However, the control and coordination of the fire support available can present a different problem to a river assault group, and to achieve the best effect it may be necessary to make additional arrangement. a. Acting as river patrols. c. Predicting logistic support. 220. Limitation. Large scale water borne operations on river way tend to be uneconomical, cumbersome and inflexible. Waterborne forces operating up reveres are very vulnerable to ambush, particularly during prolonged operations which involve the constant use of rivers as a supply line-in such circumstances insurgent will resort to the mining of rivers in addition to ambushes. 221. Summary. Although there are disadvantages and limitations to waterborne operations. They are sometimes unavailable. Past experience has shown that in circumstances river assault groups can be successfully employed for limited periods in transporting and supporting force operation in depth ,while the tactical use of small boats by relativity small forces has provide indispensable in certain types of terrain . There is no standard organization for river assault groups, river patrols, etc,and their composition depends upon the availability of navel ,army and local craft. 220-230 Reserved. 319 RESTRICTED

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CHAPTER 6- PROTECTION OF MOVEMENT

SECTION 22

- INTRODUCTION

231. Aim The aim of this chapter is to give guidance on the techniques to be employed, in counter insurgency operation, for the protection of road and drill movement. 232. Connected Subjects. The following connected subjects are not included in this chapter, as they have been dealt with elsewhere: a. b. c. d. Protection of military personnel and dependants (volume III, part 2,Chapter 2) Guarding important persons are small convoys (volume III, part 2, chapter 2) Air movement security ( volume II, part 3, Tactical Air Mobility) Other forms of tactical movement which are an integral part of counter insurgency tactics, and have been covered in previous Chapters of this part.

233. Classification of Areas and roads. In counter insurgency the national deface council will normally instruct operations committees to classify areas and roads according to the degree of threat, as following: a. Black .Insurgent activity frequent and server ,therefore movement must be strictly controlled and must take place in tactical groups with full precautionary measures .It may be necessary to sub divide this category in to sectors subject to particularly heavy or special types of insurgent activity. b. White. Insurgent activity infrequent and not severe. And therefore movement by military forces and civilians will not be so stringently controlled as in black areas Nevertheless, military forces will normally move in tactical groupings. c. Unrestricted , No insurgent activity 234. Avoidance unnecessary Risks. All forms of movement in counter insurgency operations involve some degree of risk, and vehicle movement by road. Convoy is probably the most vulnerable and dangerous method. Security forces must avoid becoming road bound. However, a shortage of aircraft, bad weather or other circumstance may make the use of unavailable. In any case, and particularly writhing controlled areas, it is highly undesirable that the road network should be virtually denied to the security forces . For this reason all troops engaged on counter insurgency operation must be thoroughly trained in the techniques and method to be employed for the protection of road convoys.
SECTION 23 - PROTECTION

OF ROAD CONVOYS

235. Aim. This section covers the techniques to be employed for the protection of large roads convoys in areas where the insurgents can be expected to mount both hit and run and annihilation ambushes, as described in volume III, part I, section 7 .The technique described in this section must be adapted to meet local circumstances, and must be varied to avoid presenting a stereotyped pattern which the insurgents can anticipate.

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General Considerations 236. Danger Ambush A long column of vehicles , even if it is composed of fighting troops with an armoured escort , is one of the most vulnerable targets insurgency operations ,and potentially one of the most rewarding for the insurgents to ambush . Insurgents normally have highly developed ambush techniques. Unless effective anti-ambush measures are employed, military forces are liable to suffer heavy casualties in road ambushes, particularly when insurgents make extensive use of mines. 237. The Basis for successful counter measures. The only effective way of discouraging ambushes is to convince the insurgent that any ambush will inevitably result in a quick, efficient and successful counter stroke .This can best be achieved by the following techniques. a. Precautionary measures designed to forestall ambushes, or to minimize their effect. b. Tactical grouping within convoys , and the prevention of adequate artillery ,air support .Convoys will normally consist of well spaced out groups, with some amour in each group ,and will usually move by bounds from one firm base to another .They should also contain an engineer element in case mines. Road blocks or craters are encountered. c. The immediate availability of a mobile reserve to intervene with the heaviest possible fire support, as soon as an ambush is sprung. In this connection air support is all important, and the reserve will frequently be helicopter borne. Precautionary Measures 238. Secrecy and Deception. Secretary in the planning stage is essential particularly in relation the date, duration and route of a convoy the implementation of certain preliminary measures described below will have to be weighed against the need for secrecy. In some circumstances it may be possible to mislead the insurgents as to the route to be taken by convoy, by means of stepping up preliminary activities on other routes. 239. Intelligence. Every effort must be made to gain intelligence about insurgent movement astride the route to be taken by convoy. 240. Clearance Of Likely Ambush Sites Whenever possible, and particularly within controlled areas ,the verges of roads should be cleared of undergrowth to a distance of approximately 100 meters on each sides of roads .This unable amour in a convoy to use it fire power to better effect ,and may prevent the insurgent from taking up concealed positions immediately overlooking the road clearance of undergrowth may be undertaken by local labour, mechanical equipment ,chemical spraying or frame throwers. When time and resources permit likely ambush areas should be searched on foot and engineers should search the route ahead of convoys for concealed command detonated mines. 241. Offensive Operations and Patrolling. One of the most effective means of preventing ambushes is for military forces to dogmatic an area by offensive operations including intensive patrolling, both in the vicinity of the road at likely ambush positions and in depth. Counter ambushes never bridges, embankments, cuttings and other likely ambush positions, will have a deterrent effect on the insurgents. 321 RESTRICTED

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242. Control of Vehicle Movement. All vehicle movement must be strictly controlled and kept to the minimum in black areas .Night convoys are particularly vulnerable and should be avoided. 243. Use of Locale Forces. Local Para military forces and village guards can assist in route protection by patrolling and giving information about the insurgent. Their use in this role of course depend upon their loyalty and reliability, and specific information about convoy intentions should only be divulged, if at all, at the last possible moment. 244. Air and Artillery. Full use must be made of irregular air reconnaissance of all routes likely to be used by convoys. On occasions the convoy commander may be able to control his column effectively, if he is airborne in a helicopter. Convoy should be normally be escort by a helicopter carrying by an air bone FAC with close support aircraft on call ,and artillery observer with direct and call on guns in range of the convoys may be also be escorted by armed helicopters or close support aircraft . 245. Mobile Reserve A mobile reserve ,external to the convoy ,must be available to intervenes immediately should be ambushed .Such a reserve will normally consist of helicopter bone infantry on immediate standby .Detailed planning intervention by the mobile service ,with full scale air and artillery support ,must be carried out in advance ,including the marrying up the infantry and helicopters .If the risk of ambush is very great ,or if information suggest that an ambush is imminent ,the mobile reserve may be kept airborne for limited period. And alternative means of moving the mobile service must also be planned in case bad weather prevents air movements. 246. Communications Good radio communications are essential between all groups within the mobile server, supporting artillery and aircraft and other security force operating on or astride route. Light signals and colours smoke grenade should also be used and arrange code, for passing information and for indicating target to the airborne FAC and artillery observer. 247. Picketing In some circumstances it may be advisable to secure a route in advisable to secure a route in advisable to secure a route in advance of a convoy by means of picking .This type of operations is dealt with section 24. 248. Protection of Individual Vehicles. Troop-carrying vehicles, and in any case the leading vehicles. Of each group, must be protected against mines by sandbags and armour planting if available Convoy Composition 249. Definition of term

The following terms are used in connection with convoys a. Escort. The force detailed to provide protection. It is commanded by the escort commander

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RESTRICTED b. Vehicle Column. A column of vehicle which is to be escorted .It is commanded by the column commander c. Convoy .The vehicle column plus escort .The overall commander is the convoy commander 251. Strength of Escort. The strength and composition of escort will of course depend upon the size of vehicle column and the forces available in the theatre. In counter insurgency operations, the ideal is a mixed escort composing amour and infantry, with air and artillery support. The armoured reconnaissance regiment is well Suited for providing the armoured element and escort, although in some circumstances tanks can be invaluable, particularly with the advanced parole .Engineers should be included in the convoy, to make minor repairs to bridges and roads, and to detect and remove mines and obstacles .Whenever available. The infantry element in the escort should be carried in APC s. As an example, the strength of an escort for a column of up to six vehicles may be and armoured reconnaissance troop while for a large convoy, two troops or a squadron of the armoured reconnaissance regiment with two companies of infantry might be employed. 252. Organization of Escort. The following is an example of an escort, based on a squadron of the armoured reconnaissance regiment a. Advance Parole. A point troop with a support section, together with infantry and congeners in APC s. These move well ahead of the convoy and locate trouble before the remainders of the column meet it. b. Close protection. The squadron HQ plus troop or troops supported by infantry in APCs and artillery .These provide immediate close protection to the vehicle column. The sub-devotion of the column in to small tactical groups, each with amour and infantry will normally be necessary. c. Reserve / Strike Group. Troop or troops with the remainder of the support troop, together with infantry in APCs, and artillery .Their task is to provide a reserve to come to the aid of the close protection group. d. Helicopter Support Wherever possible helicopter support from the armoured reconnections regiment air squadron should be provided to give overhead cover and assist in command and control. e. Grouping .As a rough guide, and within the organization given above, the aim should be for the amour to be interspersed, so that there is some amour in each group. The convoy should be divided in two groups to between five to ten vehicles, each with their nominated commander. The interval between groups should be satisfied to minimize the number of vehicles caught in anyone ambush , e.g. five minute intervals between groups. The distance between vehicles very according to the visibility and speed of the convoy for a fast moving convoy it may be as little as 20 meters, to avoid loss of Mont role.

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Possible Sequence of Action 253. The following procedure which is illustrated in fig,8 ,provides the best security when miring through a break area a. Stage 1. Secure first firm better near the convoy starting point and deploy artillery .Continues airborne FAC and artillery observation over the route and assemble the mobile. Armed helicopters may also be server deployed. b. Stage 2. Secure second firm base with infantry moved by helicopter or on foot .this should be followed by moving some artillery to the second firm base, either by helicopter, or by road with amour and infantry protection. c. Stage 3. By now artillery will be in positions ready to fire from broth bases. And the mobile reserve will be on standby in the first firm base .The convoy should now move in the tactical grouping privacy described with the point troop moving well ahead by bounds , the airborne FAC and artillery observer overhead ,and possibly supported by armed helicopters . d. Stage 4. Assuming that the convoy has reached the second firm base artillery should move there from the first firm base, either by air or by road with the protective force which was originally established at the first firm base. The mobile reserve would also move to the second firm base, before the whole procedure is repaired over the next 10 15 kilometres.

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PROTECTION OF CONVOY FROM POIT A TO POINT B

Immediate Action If Ambush 254. The insurgents may allow the advance patrol to pass the site of the ambush and then block the road before attacking the main convoy. Whatever the precise circumstances, the following is the basis for counter action by the ambushed force, a procedure which requires training and rehearsal to ensure speed of execution: a. The portion of the convoy under direct attack employs the following immediate action drills, in order to hold the insurgents, and for their own protection: 325 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED Vehicles attempt to move out of the killing zone before halting, or if this is not possible or applicable they halt where they are. Vehicles should not move on to the road verge as the latter will probably be mined. (2) Nominated individuals in each vehicle engage the enemy with fire, and fire or throw smoke grenades to cover debussing by the reminder to a position of cover. Covering parties follow once remainder have debussed. (3) Armoured vehicles manoeuvre into position from which they can engage the enemy. The escorting infantry debus and attack the enemy the enemy in the in immediate vicinity of the ambush under cover of fire from the armoured vehicles. b. Concurrently with the above, artillery and air support is called for by radio. c. The reserve/ strike group move forward to counter attack or outflank the insurgents. d. The mobile reserve (preferable helicopter borne) is called in to assault the insurgents positions or to block their escape route, in conjunction with the reserve/ strike group. Command and Control 254. It is always possible that the convoy or group commander, unless he is airborne, may be killed or wounded in the early stages of an ambush, or he may not be in a position to see what is happening and to take the necessary counter measures. In order to ensure that there is always a nominated commander on the spot, whatever the situation, it is essential that group and vehicle commanders understand their responsibilities for organizing a counter attack, and for calling for supporting fire and air support. This must be clearly laid down in convoy orders and stressed at the briefing before the convoy moves off. Summary 255 In counter insurgency operations road movement should be kept to a minimum particularly in black areas. Air transport may be limited, however, and there will in any case be occasions when road movement is available-especially in controlled areas. The counter ambush measures described above must therefore be carefully planned, practiced and rehearsed by all troops. It must be made clear to the insurgents that any road ambushes will result in swift, devastating retaliation by the security forces. (1)

Setting 256 Picketing techniques in mountainous country will be conveyed in volume V, part 1-Mountainous Country*. The aim of this Section is to give guidance on picketing techniques in close country in a insurgency role, as distinct from normal picketing procedures in mountainous country.

General Considerations 257. Picketing expensive in man power and time, and should only be employed when there is a very server threat of insurgent ambush ,if armed helicopters are not available or unable to 326 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED fly ,or if lack of observation precludes their use .The aim will then be to secure a road of tack by means of picking for a limited period ,To allow the safe passage of convoy .If possible picket should be moved in to position and recovered by helicopter .If this is not feasible a picketing force must be organized .It comprises an advanced guard to clear the axis by bounds ahead of the picketing force main body and a rear guard for rear protection and for calling in pickets on completion of the task, when the convoy has passed. Such a force could either move on foot or in vehicles, and should in any case be supported by armoured vehicles, except in the special circumstances described in paragraph 262. Method of Picketing 257 Distance Between Pickets. The initial task of a picketing force will be to ensure that there is no ,major insurgent ambush in position .therefore the distance between pickets will be governed by the requirement for the intervening ground be covered by fire. The distance of pickets from the axis of advance depend on the nature of the ground, and on the time available for establishing the pickets: the pickets should be sited to prevent direct fire from insurgent small arms and hand healed anti tank weapons being brought to bear on the convoy. Size of Pickets. Pickets will vary in size depending on the threat ,visibility and type of country .They should not normally be less than section in strength and will probably average half a platoon Establishment and Withdrawal of Pickets. Pickets must be supported in to and out positions by small arms fire and mortars, by artillery and by armoured vehicles. Planed light signals, in addition to radio communications are means of ordering pickets withdraw.

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259

Use of Other Forces Operating in the Area 262. If military forces are already operating possibly at some depth, astride the route to be taken by a convoy, they may be used secure the route by means of picketing. In this case when operating in close country like jungle, they would approach the route to be secured on foot arcos country and established the pickets normally without armoured support.
SECTION 27 PROTECTION

OF RAIL MOVEMENT

General 263. Aim. The primary aim of protecting rail movement is to get the train throughout to its destination. A second but complementary aim is to defend the train passengers and crew against insurgent action. 264. Standing Operating Procedures. SOP s for the protection of rail movement must be published in each theatre of operations

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RESTRICTED 265. Sector Control Method of Operation. On a single track railway ,or when one way traffic is in operation ,the line should be divided in to sector and no trainer be permitted to enter a sector until it has been cleared by the preceding train .This allows a. A train to reserve out of sector in order to disengage from an insurgent ambush b. Reinforcement to be sent by rail from either direction to assist ambushed train Command and Control of Individual Trains 266. So long as a train remains in motion control of the train rests with the train crew .Insurgent can of course be engage by security forces on the train while it is in motion 267. If insurgent action result in a train becomes immobile the train escort commander must assume command of the situation .The aim will then be to defend the train passenger and crew. Commanders and deputy commanders must be nominated before the commencement of a journey and their identity must be known to all passengers and crew .Some troops must be positioned in broth the front and rear carriages of the train in order to kept commanders in touch with the situation by radio. Communications 268. Radio communication must be available to call for assistance, in addition to the communications required within the train if military or police foeces have been deployed, to protect the railway line their communications must be netted in within the train radioes. Planned light signals can also be employed to suppliment radio communications. Precautionery Measures 269. Armoured Trains. Armoured trains may be useful for patrolling sections of railway lines where insurgent activity is expected. Armoured trains should operate tactically under orders of the local military commander, and should be crewed either by specially selected railway employees or by military technicians. The operation of armoured trains must be conducted in the light of the tactical situation and in coordination with the movement of other trains. 270. Pilot Trains. Locomotives should be presided by two or more pilot trains which normally consist of locomative fitted with anti-mine devices and protected by sand bags, rocks or scrap material. The aim of pilot trains is to prove the line ahead of a train for mines, obstructions and sabotage to the line. Pilot trains should be fitted with radio communication and should have a small escort. 271. Close Protection Trains. When an escort is provided to a train the bulk of the escort will normally be located in an armoured carriage, with specially designed mountings for machine guns, mortars and rocket launchers. Alternatively an unarmoured carriage can be prepared for defence by piling sand bags on the floor and at the sides, and by improvising weapon mountings. Armoured carriages must not be placed next to wagons containing gasoline, ammunition or other inflammable material. Lookouts must

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RESTRICTED be posted to watch the whole length of the train for insurgents who may try to board the train and uncouple coinages. 272. Prophylactic Fire. When trains are passing through uninhabited areas which are subjected to insurgent ambush it is sometimes possible to authorise prophylactic fire on to likely ambush sites such as defiles or heavily overgrown areas adjacent to the line. Automatic weapons may be used for this purpose, but fire must be carefully controlled by the escort commander. Following up Tactics Against Small Insergent Group 273. When small groups of insurgent make a habit of sniping at trains, particularly during the hours of darkness the following counter measures can be taken. a. Following up forces consisting of infantry and tracker dogs in positioned on train. b. As soon as the insurgents open fire the spot marked ,eg by flour or dye ,etc While the train continues on its journey .at a planed distance from the .While the follow up force return to the point whole where the firing took place to pursue insurgents.

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