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Contingency Analysis For Eastern Regional Grid of INDIA

P.Pentayya, P.Mukhopadhyay, S.Banerjee, M.K.Thakur
Abstract-The Eastern Regional Load Despatch Center has been successful in implementing the Real-Time Network Analysis (RTNET) sub-system of Energy Management System (EMS) for contingency analysis after proper tuning of State Estimator (SE) to ensure that the SE output is suitable for use in real time grid operation. Power System simulator Engine (PSS/E) is also being used for detailed off line studies for operation planning, contingency analysis and computation of Available Transfer Capability (ATC), Total Transfer Capability (TTC) etc. The paper describes in detail the event that led to sever depletion of transmission network in Eastern Regional Grid leading to noncompliance of (N-1) security criteria in certain corridors. With onset of monsoon , a conflict arose between economic operation of system and secure operation of system, thus requiring contingency plans. Detailed on-line and off-line studies have been carried out to workout the contingency plans. The paper discusses a case study of application of on-line and off-line tools.

I. INTRODUCTION The Indian power system is operating as two asynchronous grid viz. NEW grid comprising Northern (NR), Eastern(ER), Western (WR) and North Eastern (NER) region in synchronous mode and the Southern grid. The NEW grid has an installed capacity of 116348 MW and is presently meeting peak demand around of 99000 MW. The Southern grid is having installed capacity of 44220 MW and Meeting peak demand around of 30000 MW. The formation of NEW grid that immensely helped all the four regions synchronously connected, through sharing of scarce generation resources, diversity of peak demands, improvement in hydro thermal mix and increase of system stiffness (1800-2000MW per Hz) and increased economy exchanges among all the regions. The Eastern Regional Grid comprises the states of West Bengal, Orissa, Bihar, Jharkhand and Sikkim. The installed capacity of Eastern region is 23119 MW (including Talcher STPS Stg-II) and peak demand met is of the order of 13000 MW. The energy consumption is around 260 MU per day and daily net export from Eastern region is around 40 MU. Eastern Regional Load Despatch Center [ERLDC] has been designated by Electricity Act 2003, as the apex body in grid operation to ensure secure and economic operation of the Eastern Regional power system. As such the EHV grid is operating under the supervision and control of ERLDC on round the clock basis.

Tala Transmission system has been built primarily to evacuate power from Tala (Bhutan) HPS to Northern Region of India. The beneficiaries of Tala (1020MW) in the Northern Region are the states of UP, Delhi, Punjab, Haryana, Rajasthan and Jammu & Kashmir. During monsoon around 1700-2000 MW power needs to be evacuated from Hydro stations viz. Tala,( Bhutan) , Chukha(Bhutan), Teesta and surplus of Hydro generation of NER. Essentially this entire hydro power is being pooled at Binaguri 400kV S/S. The huge quantum of hydro power gets evacuated through 400KV Binaguri to Purnea (four circuits) making these four circuits critically loaded. In case of tripping of any of the circuit it is difficult to transfer power in a secure and reliable manner. Transmission facilities are shared resources and the Indian grid is no exception. While we are yet to achieve the desired level of adequacy, the rapid growth of electricity market and its sustenance demands almost 100% availability of the transmission network on 24x7 basis. Despite good practices being adopted in ensuring maximum availability of the transmission system, natural disasters, which now seem to happen more frequently than before, are posing a serious challenge in system operation. In particular, Eastern Region has been affected by several natural disasters over the last couple of years. II. GRID DISTURBANCE ON 13th APRIL 2010 [1] A) Description of the incident On 13/04/10, at approximately 11 pm local time, a severe Table I
Sl.No. Line / Element 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
400 KV MALDA - PURNEA - I 400 KV TALA - BINAGURI - IV 400 KV TALA- BINAGURI-II 400 KV TALA- BINAGURI-I

Reasons for outage

TOWER COLLAPSE C.B. PROBLEM AT TALA END UNDER SHUT DOWN UNDER SHUT DOWN

400 KV BINAGURI - PURNEA - KEPT OPEN DUE TO OVERVOLTAGE II 400KV BINAGURI -PURNIA- III OVERVOLTAGE 400KV MUZAFARPUR PURNEA-II
KEPT OPEN DUE TO

KEPT OPEN DUE TO OVERVOLTAGE

P.Pentayya (email: ppentayya@gmail.com), P.Mukhopadhyay (email: prithwish25@yahoo.com), S.Banerjee (email: surojitb@gmail.com), M.K.Thakur (email: mkt_elect@yahoo.co.in) are with Eastern Regional Load Despatch Center, Power System Operation Corporation Ltd, Kolkata-700033

cyclonic storm struck parts of Bangladesh and Eastern India It lasted about 90 minutes, with the most intense portion spanning 3040 minutes.

Department of Electrical Engineering, Univ. College of Engg., Osmania University, Hyderabad, A.P, INDIA.

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Due to low hydro availability during the Month of April, the 400kV Tala Transmission system remained lightly loaded and the some of the lines of the affected part of Eastern region were already kept open besides some of lines under forced outage ( Table I): The following lines ( Table 2) impact of cyclone:Table 2 Sl no 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Name of the Lines 400kV Purnea-Binaguri I & II 400kV Purnea-Binaguri III & IV 400kV Malda Purnea II 400kV Teesta Binaguri D/C 400kV Tala-Malbase-Binaguri III 400kV Binaguri Bongaigaon D/C 220kV Mlada-Dalkhola D/C 220kV Purnea- Dalkhola D/C 220kV Dalkhola- Shiliguri tripped under the

Reasons Towers Collapsed Loc 46,47,48 Towers Collapsed 366 to 369 Towers collapsed location 920 Tripped Tripped Tripped Tower Collapsed loc 316 & 317 Towers collapsed loc 17 Tripped

at at at

at at

Consequent to tripping of above lines part of NEW grid comprising North Bengal, Sikkim, NER and Bhutan got isolated from the NEW grid and collapsed on load-generation mismatch. Generation from all hydro generators at Sikkim (Rangit, Teesta) Bhutan (Tala, Chukha, Kurichu) together with those in NER became nil. Diagram of Eastern Region is given in Fig. 1. A geographical power map of Eastern region is available at www.erldc.org [2]. Total loss of Generation was 650 MW and loss of load 400 MWin the Eastern Grid.

B) Restoration The hydro units in NER grid restored first. Power was availed by Eastern Regional grid from 220KV Salakati substation (NER) and extended to 220KV Birpara (POWERGRID). After restoring some load at Birpara (West Bengal) start up power was extended to Chukha HPS and the station synchronized. Power was also extended to 220KV Binaguri and West Bengal load at Binaguri released. 400KV bus at Binaguri was charged and power extended to Teesta HPS. Start up power to Tala HPS (Bhutan) was extended through 400KV Binaguri-Malbase-Tala route. The NER Grid , Bhutan System and the North Bengal system could be restored with restricted generation at the hydro stations and had to be operated in isolated mode for two days. One twin moose (Ckt. I) and two quad moose (Ckts III & IV) circuits from Binaguri to Purnea were restored using ERS at the damaged locations and the isolated part of the network could then be synchronized. C) Transmission constraints post incident However constraints were imposed on their loading limits viz. 700MW for each of the quad moose circuits and 500MW for the twin moose circuit. The above constraints continued till mid June, without any serious threat to operational security. However as the hydro availability from Teesta, NER and hydro stations in Bhutan began to increase from end of June the system had to be operated with risk, because of failure to comply with N-1 security criteria. 400KV Binaguri-Purnea-II and 220KV Purnea-Dalkhola D/C continued to remain under break down. D) Scenario as on 30th June 2010 Full hydro generation available in Sikkim, NER, Bhutan and North Bengal is shown at Table 3 Below Table 3 Teesta 510 MW Rangit 60 MW Tala 1020 MW Chukha 336 MW Kurichu 30 MW NER 400 MW Total 2356 MW As recorded by ERLDC SCADA is shown in Fig 2. .As can be seen the power flow pattern on 400KV Binaguri- Purnea lines depict the crossing of allowable limits.
400KV Binaguri-Purnea line flow from SCADA
750.0

each 3 &4
700.0 650.0 600.0

circuit 1
MW 550.0 500.0 450.0 400.0 350.0 300.0 10:00 11:00 12:00 13:00 14:00 15:00 16:00 17:00 18:00 19:00 20:00 21:00 22:00 23:00 0:00 1:00 2:00 3:00 4:00 5:00 6:00 7:00 8:00 9:00

Fig: 1

Time

Fig.2

Department of Electrical Engineering, Univ. College of Engg., Osmania University, Hyderabad, A.P, INDIA.

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III. CONTINGENCY ANALYSIS Amongst deterministic security criteria, the most generally used is certainly the N-1 criterion. Indeed it corresponds to possible events. This criterion stipulates amongst other things that in its state N, that is to say when all elements of the system are in operation, operating conditions are in accordance with rules. Generally this is tested for different conventional states at least for peak and off peak load of the system etc. It implies further that for all types of incidents leading to the disconnection of only one element (generator, line, transformer, etc) the system operating point stays within the requested area. The operating point and the system is then declared N-1 secure. However, the disturbance of 13/04/2010 caused loss of multiple elements and the ER grid no more qualified the security criteria. To avoid spilling of water of the hydro reservoirs, the ER gird has to be operated without N-1 compliance and the N-1 compliance would requires backing down of hydro generation. This is a typical case of economy versus security conflict. It becomes therefore essential to have some contingency plans in place preferably through automation like Special Protection Schemes (SPS). 5.

6.

IV. CONTINGENCY TOOLS AVAILABLE AT ERLDC A. On Line Tool[3] ERLDC uses the EMS application package supplied by M/S AREVA. Among various applications of this package, Real-Time Network Analysis (RTNET) has the following subapplications:1. Network Topology processor: This application processes the status changes of digital inputs (circuit breaker and isolator) to construct an updated network model for use in both real time and study mode. The status changes are taken from the SCADA status processing program or by a manual override of the points. 2. State Estimator (SE): This application gives the best estimate of the state of the system based upon the configuration and given analog measurements and provides a steady state solution. The State estimator has been designed to encompass both the observable portions of the network which are monitored by the RTUs as well as unmonitored areas such as low voltage portion of the system where reasonable estimates of load/ generation exist. The State Estimator solves the entire modelled network. 3. State Monitor: This application monitors limit violations of identified variables (such as bus voltage, MVA flows on line/transformers etc) for an identified set of devices based upon inputs from a calculated network state such as the estimated state from RTNET. 4. Bus load Forecast: This program is primarily responsible for forecasting the loads (MW and

7.

MVAR) on the buses and takes into consideration time switch capacitor/reactor breaker position. Real time contingency analysis (RTCA): This function facilitates to assess the impact of user specified contingencies as well as dynamic contingencies selected automatically based on the base case violations and to alert the operator to any contingency that would cause branch overloads, abnormal voltage or generator limit violation. RTCA can be triggered in the following modes:i. Event trigger (i.e. based on occurrence of status changes) ii. Periodic triggering (i.e. once in every minute/5 minute etc.) iii. Operator initiated trigger. Contingency Ranking: RTCA ranks contingencies in the order of severity based on criteria like voltage violations & branch flow violations. Full AC load flow is carried out to assess the impact of contingencies. The contingency selection can be dynamic based on present limit violations or user defined. RTCA classifies contingencies as harmful potentially harmful processed not harmful unsolved and not active (Shown in Fig.3) Security Enhancement (SCNH):- This module helps in identifying the remedial action plans. The employed include generator outputs, transformer taps, capacitor/reactors switching etc.

B. Off Line Tools ERLDC has a reliability group which carries out detailed off-line studies, for operation planning, contingency analysis and computation of ATC, TTC etc. The various flow gates of the region are monitored and their limits are duly considered while computing the TTC. For the purpose the Power System simulator Engine (PSS/E) developed by M/S PTI is used. It is a package of programs for study of power system transmission network and generation performance in both steady-state and dynamic conditions.PSS/E handles power flow, fault analysis (balanced and unbalanced), network equivalent construction, and dynamic simulation.

V. CONTINGENCY ANALYSIS OF ER GRID-CASE STUDY & RESULTS. A. Base Case On 30 June 2010 Eastern Regional grid was running in an integrated manner and catering to about 10500 MW at 14:00 Hours. Import from NER was around 400 MW, 300MW from WR and 3000 MW was being exported to NR. The generation, drawl and demand met by ER constituents were as shown at Table 4 below.

Department of Electrical Engineering, Univ. College of Engg., Osmania University, Hyderabad, A.P, INDIA.

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Table 4 Generation Bihar 150 Jharkhand 430 Damodar Valley Corporation 1910 Orissa 1988 West Bengal 4290 Total 8768

Demand 1200 750 1721 2300 4300 10270

In Central sector, the generation level of major generating stations belonging to National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC), National Hydral Power Corporation (NHPC) and Bhutan were as under (Table 5) Table : 5 NTPC Farakka STPP Kahalgaon STPP TSTPP NHPC TEESTA BHUTAN TALA CHUKHA 1020 MW 336 MW 510 MW

B. Contingency Analysis The list of contingencies considered is shown. Results of contingency analysis both in off line and on line studies are also indicated. The contingencies selected (user defined) are:a) Loss of either circuit III or IV of 400KV PurneaBinaguri line b) Loss of circuit I of 400KV Purnea-Binaguri line c) Loss of both circuit III and IV (being on the same tower) Results shown in table below.
Sl.No.
1 2

Name of the lines for Contingency

400KV Binaguri-Purnea-III 400KV Binaguri-Purnea-I 400KV Binaguri-Purnea-III & IV

On Line Results Line-IV 980MW Line I 677MW Line-III 882MW Line IV 882MW Line I 1382MW

Off Line Results Line-IV 975MW Line I 700MW Line-III 860MW Line IV 860MW Line I 1375MW

1485 MW 1965 MW 935 MW

Inter-regional flows were considered as under: ER NR: 3000 MW WR ER: 300 MW NER ER 400 MW The main concerns are violation of ATC in ER-NR corridor and significant import from NER which is likely to cause critical loading of Binaguri Purnea flow gate. B. Lines under shut down / break down - 400KV Binaguri-Purnea II - 400KV Malda-Purnea-I - 315 MVA Malda ICT-II - 220 KV Purnea-Dalkhola D/C It is to mention that circuits III & IV (quad moose) of 400KV Binaguri-Purnea line are strung on D/C towers while circuits I & II (twin moose) are similarly strung on D/C towers along a separate corridor. It is therefore worth to examine outage of a D/C contingency also. The total energy generated by Tala & Teesta hydro stations and total injection from NER hydro stations on 30/06/2010 was 49.69MU and this amount of energy had to be handled by the depleted network in ER. If N-1 compliance had to be insured then backing down to be carried out would lead to a loss of generation of almost 17 MU/Day on considering average real time pricing of energy on 30th June 2010 to be `3.10 (UI rate corresponding to average frequency) loss of ` 4.5 Corers /Day would have occurred. The importation of N-1 compliance for a period of 3 months (July, Aug, & Sept) would lead to cumulative loss of Rs 405 Corers

It is apparent that N-1 contingency of 400KV Binaguri-Purnea 3 or 4 would cause remaining circuits also to trip. This would again lead to isolation of North Bengal, NER, Bhutan and Sikkim. Part of network diagram of the affected area is shown in Fig.3 from PSS/E (off line study) & Snap shot of EMS is shown in Fig.4. The result of RTCA is shown Fig 5 also shown.

Fig 3

Department of Electrical Engineering, Univ. College of Engg., Osmania University, Hyderabad, A.P, INDIA.

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running RTCA the SE outputs for those potentially hazardous cases can be saved as saved cases and more detailed studies can be carried out in study mode. The saved case can also be transferred to PSS/E for carrying out dynamic studies as these are not available in EMS. Carrying out dynamics in off-line mode is important as stability limits would help in identifying limits, reliability margin etc. The synergy between off-line and on-line tools is recognized and being explored at ERLDC. ERLDC is also in the process of designing Special Protection Schemes for several flow gates where N-1 compliance at times may be overlooked due to economic consideration ACKNOWLEDGMENT The authors acknowledge with thanks the guidance and support given by management of POSOCO and for permitting the publication of this paper. The views expressed in this paper are of the authors in their individual capacity and not necessarily that of Power System Operation Corporation Ltd. REFERENCES
[1] Report of the disturbance which occurred in ER on 13/04/10 [2] Website of ERLDC www.erldc.org [3] EMS/SCADA manuals of AREVA [4] M.G.Raoot, P.Pentayya and S.Ganguly, Evaluation of Potential Threats to Grid Security by Contingency Analysis in WRLDC, Mumbai National Power System Conference (NPSC), DEC.2008.

Fig. 4

Fig. 5 VI. CONCLUSION From economic considerations, sometimes the regional grid has to be operated even under non-compliance of N-1 security criterion. Under such conditions only automation (System Protection Scheme) can come to rescue the grid. However in the absence of System Protection Scheme (SPS), load shedding & rapid backing down of generation are the means to tide over the contingencies to met the real time requirements. The operator requires lookup tables which indicate remedial action for potentially hazarders contingencies [4]. The off line studies can also be used to prepare look up tables and would become most important in case of failure of SE to converge. Further the offline studies would also help user to select user defined contingencies for the online application such as RTCA. After

Department of Electrical Engineering, Univ. College of Engg., Osmania University, Hyderabad, A.P, INDIA.