Bangladesh in 1980: Strains and Stresses -- Opposition in the Doldrums Author(s): Azizul Haque Reviewed work(s): Source: Asian

Survey, Vol. 21, No. 2, A Survey of Asia in 1980: Part II (Feb., 1981), pp. 188-202 Published by: University of California Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2643764 . Accessed: 26/11/2011 06:37
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BANGLADESHIN 1980: STRAINS AND STRESSESOPPOSITION IN THE DOLDRUMS Azizul Haque

IN IN POLITICS BANGLADESH1980 appeared to be full of strains and stresses-social, political, and international. The year ended with a general sense of insecurity resulting from widespread lawlessness, social tensions, and political unrest. With the rise of the biggest-ever opposition bloc in the parliament and the installation of a civilian government (in 1979), the three-yearold government of President Ziaur Rahman claims to have "managed to bring some order out of chaos." With vigorous canal digging programs and population control measures in hand, Dacca hopes, for the first time in the nation's history, to be in position to export food grains in the near future. During 1980 Ziaur Rahman took some positive steps (along with his frequent visits to the remotest corners of the country) in expanding and strengthening his power base, and won the "allegiance" of many people in the countryside. It is to Ziaur Rahman's credit that Dacca, with an improved international image, has usually been skillful in managing the superpowers. However, the floods, soaring prices, the dissatisfaction of the urban middle class and the small educated elite (who saw their life-style whittled away by about 15%,inflation), the rise of lawlessness, the abortive revolt in the army, political unrest emanating from strikes, outbursts of political violence, widespread disorders in jails, and armed action by "miscreants" in the Chittagong Hill Tracts put Zia's system under heavy strains. Moreover, the tense Dacca-New Delhi relationship over the sharing of the waters of the Ganges and the ownership of the newly raised islands in the Bay of Bengal complicated the situation for Zia and his politics. When the mantle of statecraft fell on Zia, he took advantage of a political vacuum to offer the country a stable political system. However,

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Zia's mechanism has perhaps backfired. The Bangladesh National Party (BNP) headed by Zia, a hegemonic party of parties hastily organized around Zia with all shades of opinion grouped together, runs the risk of falling apart the moment Zia goes out of power. This not only reveals the organizational weakness of the party but also indicates the rise of a "personality cult" within the party which goes against the institution of democracy Zia purports to support. Although the opposition itself is greatly to blame, Zia's policies and strategies have had a crippling effect on the opposition. With a very low public image, and posing no viable alternative to Zia's administration, the opposition parties in Bangladesh, many rumored to be externally financed, stand in disarray, nibbling here and there at the government. Overpoliticization seems to have led to depoliticization in Bangladesh.

The Law and OrderSituation:Social Strains and Unrest

As a result of high inflation, erosion of values, the expansion of the number of unemployed and landless, the law and order situation deteriorated further in 1980. The year was full of robberies, highjackings, murders, abductions, rapes, homicides, suicides, and accidents. There were armed clashes, causing many deaths in educational institutions, jails, public meetings, and playgrounds. The already low public image (for alleged corruption) of the police declined further. Some members of the law enforcement agency were involved in rapes, murder, and robberies. The leakage of question papers of public examinations and the forgery of marksheets and educational certificates became rampant, forcing the government to issue an Examinations (Offences) Ordinance in September. The nightmarish days of the period prior to August 1975 had reappeared.
Disorders in jails: Strikes and disorders in jails were important phenomena in the politics of Bangladesh in 1980. Overcrowded, filthy, and antiquated jails in Bangladesh drove large groups of inmates to strikes and protests, culminating in armed clashes in some cases.' The Rangpur jail was occupied by some 650 inmates for 12 days. At Rajshahi and Magura, the prisoners clashed with the jail police and wardens over complaints of unfair treatment, bad food, and poor sleeping conditions. At Mymensing, policemen charged prisoners in order to break up, the police claimed, a fight between two rival groups, resulting in 46 persons injured. The Khulna jail was held by more than 900 inmates for 10 days in October before more than 500 policemen regained control in an early-morning assault. The indent killed 36 inmates and injured more than 200 persons, including 125 policemen. A government press release claimed that the police fired tear gas and rubber bullets only, and that
1 In one and one half years there were 51 strikes in 21 jails. Ittefaq (Bengali daily), July 23, 1980.

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they found, on regaining control, seven injured victims of a serious clash among the inmates; the public was skeptical.
Unrest in the Chittagong Hill Tracts: a tangled web of insurgency: A pat-

tern of insurgency has developed in the jungles of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, causing the government great problems with the rebels fighting to "preserve their identity and autonomy." It is believed that about 2000 guerillas in the Shanti Bahini insurgent force (founded in 1973) have collected about Tk. 60 million (US$4 million) from local traders and villagers over three years to finance the movement.2 Moreover, it is alleged that since 1975 the Shanti Bahini has had close liaison with insurgent forces in eastern India, that it had received arms from India clandestinely, and that its cadres were trained by India's Border Security Force (BSF) along with supporters of the Kaderia Bahini (led by the pro-Mujib Kader Siddiqui, living in India). Although over the last few years there had been intermittent armed clashes between the insurgents and Bangladesh forces, the Shanti Bahini stepped up its operation in 1980. In March, 22 soldiers were killed in an ambush while an army offensive led to the destruction of a village and several deaths later in the month. On April 22, 19 BDR men were killed in an armed clash between BDR forces and insurgents, and on June 12 rebels killed two persons, burned 34 houses and ransacked 14; in August they killed another 15 persons. In September, an armed attack by the rebels on seven Bengali settlers led to 17 deaths with 25 injured.3 The Bengali settlers, as a reaction, moved to contest the situation. On March 28, 28 tribals were killed and more than 30 injured when the settlers went on a rampage around Kaukhali, 31 miles northeast of Chittagong. As a result, the tribals fled in panic into the dense jungles, leaving the entire area deserted. In addition to the Shanti Bahini, essentially composed of Chakma tribesmen, the largest among the more than 16 tribes and accounting for about 40% of the total tribal population of 550,000, there are two other armed resistance groups-i.e., the Mukti Parishad, led by Sudharta Tangchainga and based on the Tangchainga tribe, and the nontribal splinter group of the Sarbohara Party (Marxist-Leninist) led by a fugitive army officer, Lt. Col. Ziauddin. The Shanti Bahini and the Mukti Parishad, although engaged in bloody clashes with each other in the past, have not concentrated on attacking the government forces. The problem in the Hill Tracts goes back to the early 1960s following the commissioning of the Kaptai hydroelectric project. The then Pakistan government adopted a rehabilitation program of $51 million to resettle 100,000 tribals uprooted by the project. However, only about
2 Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER), May 2, 1980, p. 30. 3Ittefaq, September 16, 1980.

BANGLADESH 191 $2.6 million were actually spent with only 2,700 tribal families so far resettled.4 Secondly, during a visit to the Hill Tracts in 1973, Sheikh Mujib's strong words against tribal autonomy and emphasis on Bengali nationalism and culture offended the tribals. After the coup in 1975, the situation further deteriorated, as the Indians, then hostile to Dacca, reportedly decided to support and help the insurgents and pro-Mujib forces who had fled into India. The harassed Dacca administration then decided to allow Bengali settlement inside the tribal areas, apparently to "break the back" of the armed. rebellion there. The unhappy result was that the tribal people became more hostile to the government, and accused it of trying to "eliminate" them from the area by settling "outsiders" on their ancestral land. Although the government claims that not many Bengali families took advantage of the opportunity, it also replies that it would not be constitutionally possible to prevent any citizen of Bangladesh from settling or buying land in any part of the country. However, to combat the situation in the Hill Tracts, the government adopted a combination of tactics and strategies-peace negotiations, the resettlement of uprooted tribals, a development program for the Hill Tracts, and a military operation (if necessary).
Abortive revolt in the army: There was an

abortive coup attempt on

June 17 when Zia was in London. An opposition member, Sirajul Islam, of the Awami League (Malek) [AL (Malek)] on June 20 disclosed the incident in parliament and alleged that four lieutenant colonels had been taken into custody for the attempted coup while others were absconding. Prime Minister Shah Aziz tried to play down the incident, but admitted that some leaflets repugnant to army discipline had been distributed and as a result some people had been taken into custody for questioning. A Muslim League member, Ibrahim Khalil, further reported that one of the top leaders of the attempted coup was a Colonel Didar who absconded, but the government denied this.5

Strategy Zia's Administrative

Since the 1979 parliamentary election Zia has seen the opposition trying to threaten his authority and system in a more organized way. Moreover, some of his followers in the BNP appeared to be restive, nagging at his leadership. Accordingly Zia directed his efforts towards keeping the opposition off balance, disciplining the BNP, and expanding and strengthening his power base. In early January Zia caused the -unceremonious exit" of deputy premier Moudud Ahmed and state
4 FEER, May 23, 1980, p. 34.

5According to a Bengali weekly, there have been 26 coup attempts to topple Ziaur Rahmaan. Khabar (Dacca), October 26, 1980.

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minister Nur Mohammad Khan in "the larger national and party interests." In late April Zia dropped five cabinet ministers, three state and deputy ministers on "their request," appointed another group of eight state and four deputy ministers. A day before this reshuffle Zia announced the appointment of 20 MP's as District Development Coordinators with the rank and status of deputy ministers and the setting up of a 53-member Envoys Pool. The District Development Coordinators would assist in implementing different development schemes in the districts and would entertain and process public complaints. The members of the Envoys Pool would undertake visits to foreign countries on assignments related to foreign aid and allied matters concerning Bangladesh.
Gram Sarkar: As part of Zia's village-oriented politics and decentralization program, 68,000 Gram Sarkarshad been organized by December. On April 16 Zia had announced that a Gram Sarkar would be formed in each village with effect from May, and on April 30 he inaugurated a Gram Sarkar in Savar police station. Zia's government had originated this plan in 1976 when it announced the formation of a Gram Parishad, later renamed as "Swanirvar Gram Sarkar" under an act of the parliament (June 1980). A village Gram Sarkar, comprised of one Gram Pradhan and eleven members including two female members (all selected), would take care of local problems, maintain law and order, control population growth, and double food production through a self-reliant economy. However, Zia's scheme of District Development Coordinators, an Envoys Pool, and Gram Sarkarscame under scathing attack from the opposition and the liberal professionals. For some, the District Development Coordinators, who arouse uneasiness among civil servants, were a new version of the district governors under the BAKSAL program, the one party authoritarian system introduced in early 1975 by Sheikh Mujib. Critics are skeptical about the potential for success of the Gram Sarkar scheme. With no clear source of income for a Gram Sarkar and no clear-cut division of powers between a Gram Sarkar and a Union Parishad, the Gram Sarkar scheme is bound to face and invite problems, among them conflicts of power and position between two rival administrative set-ups in rural Bangladesh. Moreover, it is alleged that most of the Gram Sarkars have been formed by people of questionable character. Hence, it is feared that corruption might be institutionalized, as in the Basic Democracy system under Ayub, if the Gram Sarkars are engaged in development through works programs. Again people are critical that Zia aims at strengthening the BNP at the village level and expounding Bangladeshi nationalism through these basic administrative institutions. However, Zia, in Ayub's style, is not likely to take much note of these criticisms.

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Opposition-Nibbling at the Government

Political moves'6 As the year dawned, the opposition initiated a campaign to unseat Zia's government through the generation of social and political unrest. In early February the opposition and independent members of the parliament went into a three-day "session" to work out the means for restoring parliament's "sovereignty" and decided to boycott the parliamentary session beginning on February 9 until its 24point demands were met. A 10-party alliance7 was formed on February 3 to observe an hartal (general shutdown of economic and other activities) to protest the firing in Rajshahi jail. Zia's reaction to these developments greatly defused the tense situation and threw the opposition off balance. Through a series of political offers and parleys, Zia got the ML-IDL-Gonofront members of parliament to end the boycott on February 22, and another four independent MPs rejoined the session on April 2.8 Zia's next move was to release nearly 1,000 prisoners, induding Mushtaq Ahmed, Major (Rtd.) A. Jalil, Gazi Golam Mostafa, Serajul Anam Khan, and A. S. M. Rob. This had a divisive effect on the opposition's alliance and unity. Cracks appeared in the 10-party alliance and the meeting of the alliance at Baitul Mukarram on April 7 turned into a battleground owing to protracted clashes among the supporters of the component parties. The bomb explosion on May 23, which killed nine and injured 82, at the Democratic League's meeting in Dacca created further misunderstandings among the major political parties-the AL (Malek), the BNP, and the Democratic League (DL). Headed by Jalil and Rab, the JSD's persistent policy of continuing in the 10-party alliance resulted in a split of the party and the formation of a new party, the Bangladesh Samajtantric Dal on November 7. The release of former Red Cross chief Gazi Golam Mostafa (originally imprisoned on charges of corruption) led to feuds in the Dacca city AL (Malek) resulting in the rise of two rival groups-the Mostafa-Moazzem group and the Hanif group. Zia's policies were able to keep his political adversaries disunited and weakened, and there could be no real massive movement against him. Although he released some political prisoners, he imprisoned a number of pro-Moscow communists, including Moni Singh and Moham6 The names and abbreviations for the parties mentioned in this article are: AL-Awami League; BNP-Bangladesh Nationalist Party; BSD-Bangladesh Samajtantric Dal; DL-Democratic League; GONOFRONT-a splinter 7-party alliance formed in December 1978; IDL-Islamic Democratic League; JAGMUI-Jatiya Ganomukti Union; JSD-Jatiya Samajtantric Dal; KSP-Krishak Sramik Party; MLMuslim League; NAP-National Awami Party; and UPP-United People's Party. 7 The 10-party alliance included the AL (Malek), AL (Mizan), NAP (Harun), NAP (Muzaffar), Jatiya Ekata Party, JSD, Gono Azadi League, Krishak Sramak Samajbadi Dal, Gonotantric Andolan, and CPB. 8 Ittefaq, April 1 and 5, 1980. The remaining members, however, joined the budget session which began on May 22.

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mad Farhad, whisked Col. (Rtd.) Faruq (the man behind the 1975 coup) out of the country, and forced former Air Chief M. A. G. Toab to leave the country when he suddenly arrived in Dacca by air on July 1. The opposition parties tried to work together, and were successful to some extent. But on the issue of an alliance they could not come together. There were a number off alliances-10-party, 5-party, 9-party alliances-so the opposition's call for hartal on February 9 and October 22, and the Awami League's (Malek) independent call for hartal on June 7 and November 3 did not disturb Zia very much. The AL's call for an hartal on November 3 was denounced by some other opposition parties as part of a "Baksalite conspiracy."9 Again, owing to differences of opinion among the components of the 10-party alliance, the proposed meeting and the procession in November 28 had to be cancelled. In spite of repeated meetings the JSD and the AL (Malek) in the alliance failed to evolve a common position on Sheikh Mujib's rule and politics-one of the basic points of difference between them. Because of a low public image and bitter experience in regard to politics and parties, people in general in Bangladesh today seem to be less enthusiastic about them. A product of frustration and disgust, this lack of enthusiasm and concern led to a limited response to the opposition's call for hartals. So the opposition failed to dislodge Zia. For example, only two days after the Khulna jail incident, Zia addressed three well-attended meetings in Khulna town where the top opposition leaders were still staying. Again Ziaur Rahman took the opposition by surprise with a novel move: The government put the buses damaged in the hartal on public display and promised compensation for those adversely affected by hartals.10 By a masterstroke Zia took some wind out of the opposition's sails. Unable to challenge the government with cohesive, alternative policies, the opposition in 1980 was reduced to "magnifying marginal issues." Attempts to pool strength in the parliament failed, and factional strifes hindered a "drive" for mass support. Deeply mistrustful of each other and sharply divided over policies, the opposition groups failed to present a "cohesive" economic policy. Although at times the groups entered alliances on specific issues, real unity on a well-conceived program could not be achieved owing to ideological disputes, conflicts, crisis of leadership, clash of personality, and a spirit of accommodation to the party-in-power for selfish ends. As a result the political movements reached no goal. Hence the opposition groups were reduced to harping on certain historical aspects of the country's liberation struggle. The main weakness of the premier opposition alliance (10-party
9 Bichitra, December 26, 1980, p. 39. 1OOn November 9, 71 BRTC buses were damaged and the financial loss incurred was Tk. 1.7 million; on October 28, a loss of Tk. .6 million was incurred in the damage of 10 BRTC buses; and on November 3, 47 BRTC buses were damaged at a loss of Tk. .6 million.

BANGLADESH 195 alliance) was the AL's (Malek) insistence on its own program. For example, the other components refused to accept the League's demands for judicial inquiries into the murders of Mujib and four AL leaders in 1975. The alliance was, however, agreed on carrying on the movement against the observance of March 26 as "national" day rather than "independence" day. The opposition saw the change in name as a deliberate attempt by a section within the government to belittle the liberation struggle. In addition, the government's decision to call nationals Bangladeshis instead of Bengalis and to substitute Bangladeshi nationalism for Bengali nationalism, and Zia's placing a number of people who had opposed the liberation war into top positions, came under severe attack from the opposition. All this indicated that the opposition, am parently incapable of presenting a cohesive economic program, was reduced to "magnifying" vastly the minor issues, "nibbling" at the government here and there. The year 1980 witnessed increased factionalPolitical split and merger: ism. Democrats, socialists, Islamists, communists-all stood divided and subdivided resulting in the formation of new parties and splits in some older ones. There was also the mad rush to join the Democratic League, particularly after Mushtaq's release from prison, and the BNP. Despite strikes and jail disorders throughout the year, Ziaur Rahman, helped by a bumper crop and the weakness of the opposition, survived the political movements and unrest. His success and his power in distributing benefits and privileges attracted a large number of political elements, including students, into the BNP fold. In May, a faction of the Jatiya Janata Party led by Ferdous Ahmed Qureshi merged with the BNP, and Qureshi later on became the joint secretary general of the BNP. The former cultural secretary of the JSD, Harunor Rashid, and the DL's Mohammadullah (former president of Bangladesh) followed suit. The former general secretary of the UPP, A. Mannan Bhuiyan, and his supporters joined the BNP in November; Professor Yousuf Ali (general secretary of the AL-Mizan) and Sohrab Hossain (a former minister) along with four other MPs joined in December. The Muslim League (ML), the UPP, and the JSD experienced serious rifts and splits during the year. The rift in the ML started as the party chief Khan A. Sabur nominated Kazi A. Kader as the party's general secretary. This rift, further widened by separate council meetings of the rival groups, finally led to the rise of a second ML (Siddiqui) in June, which was reflected in the Jubo Muslim League and the parliament's ML group. A former minister, T. Ali, formed yet another ML in April. In two years the UPP split four times. In 1978 Rashed Khan Menon and Amal Sen left the UPP when it entered the Jatiyatabadi Front. In late 1978 Capt. (Ret.) A. Halim Choudhury and Lt. Col. (Rtd.) Akbar Hossain joined the BNP. In 1979 the rift between Kazi Zafar (the party chief) and A. Mannan Bhuiyan (the general secretary of the party) led to the expulsion of the latter from the party, who then

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joined the BNP in November 1;980.Another faction of the UPP aligned with other leftist elements to form the Ganotantric Party in December. The AL (Malek) experienced serious jolts during the year. M. R. Siddiqui, a rightist minister in the Mujib government, was expelled from the party for having signed, when he was ambassador to Washington, the Dacca-Washington agreement on the U.S. Peace Corps. The belief that the dissociation of the right-wing Mizan group from the AL would discipline the party was belied. The joining by a splinter NAP (M) group -headed by pro-Moscow Motia and Dabiruddin in December 1979, and the release of Gazi Golam Mostafa from jail in March 1980 intensified the in-group fighting. On his release, Gazi Golam Mostafa (former president of the Dacca city Awami League) aspired to wrest leadership from the existing president A. Hanif; the Dacca general secretary, Dr. Moazzem Hossain, supported Gazi Golam Mostafa, and serious conflict ensued. Because of bitter schisms within the AL (Malek) at the top level the council session of the central Awami League (last held in 1978) had to be postponed twice (March-April and November) in order to avert an open split. The council session now scheduled to be held on February 14, 1981 may be stormy. Although the present leadership of the AL (Malek) has been maintaining and openly propagating the one-party authoritarian BAKSAL line in general, there have been some subtle differences on the question among the leadership. The Razzak-Mohiuddin-Matia group, following a pro-Soviet line, is believed to be more ardent on the BAKSAL program, while the Tofail-Johra Tajuddin group, allegedly lukewarm about the BAKSAL program, reportedly favors a nonaligned foreign policy and the introduction of a system of "collective leadership" in the party. Another major event in the politics of Bangladesh in 1980 was the break-up of the JSD, and the rise of a new political party, the Bangladesh Samajtantric Dal (BSD), in early November. A series of statements, counter-statements, expulsions, counter-expulsions, resignations, and dissociations between September 14 and September 24 brought about a complete split in the JSD (the second biggest opposition party), resulting in the rise of the BSD on November 7.11 Moreover, some 512 students of the Chatra League (Munir-Hasib), the student front of the JSD, joined the BNP's student front on September 18. Along with the factional character of Bengali politics there were also moves in 1980, particularly initiated by the leftists, for political unity. Two groups of the Bhasani NAP led by Nasser and Satter were reunited in April. A new communist party, the Workers' Party (led by Hyder Akbar Khan Rono), was organized in June. And after a twoday national democratic convention in December another party known as the Gonotantric Party was born out of the NAP (Nuru-Zahid), Gonofront (founded in 1978), the factions of the JAGMUI and the UPP. The party headed by Nurul Huda Mirza believes in "collective leadership"
11 On the break-up of the J.SD, see Bichitra, October 30, 1980, pp. 18-35.

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and aims at defending national sovereignty, resisting the Baksalites and the "authoritarian rule" of Zia, and removing obstacles to building up a self-reliant economy. In order to realize its national democratic program it would work both inside and outside the parliament. During the year two underground parties-the pro-Beijing Purba Bangla Communist Party (M-L) and the Communist Party of Bangladesh (M-L)-were reportedly merged to form the Communist League of Bangladesh. There were also moves to bring in two other underground organizations-the Revolutionary Communist Party (M-L) and the Samyabadi Dal (M-L) within its fold. A section of the Revolutionary Communist Party (M-L) led by Abdul Huq was reportedly opposed to the unity move, for he was said to be following a pro-Albanian line and had recently become anti-Beijing.

Economic Situation
Although adversely affected by strikes, political unrest, and floods, the overall economy of Bangladesh during 1979-1980 showed some imas provement, with GDP estimated to have grown by 4.82%7o against 4.35% during 1978-1979.12 Agricultural output, targeted at 6.9%, rose by only 1.69%. Industrial output rose by 4.5% compared to the preceding year's 4.47%. The power and gas sector and construction sector achieved growth rates of 11.41%0and 9.09%, respectively. Total food imports during fiscal 1979-1980 amounted to 2.78 million tons as against 1.15 million tons in 1978-1979. During fiscal 1980-1981 the estimated total output of food grains will be 13.6 million tons against the domestic requirement of 14.7 million tons. The import target for fiscal 1979-1980, originally fixed at Tk. 18.5 billion (15 Tk. to the U.S. dollar) was later raised to Tk. 20.58 billion; for 1978-1979, these figures were, respectively, Tk. 15 billion and Tk. 14.15 billion. The export and import targets for fiscal 1980-1981 have been fixed at Tk. 26 billion and Tk. 15 billion, respectively. Money supply increased by not more than 16% during 1979-1980, down from a 24% increase in 1978-1979, and thus the rate of monetary expansion slowed during the year. The cost of living index for the Dacca middle class moved up from 522.85 at the end of June 1979 to 587.40 by June 1980, an increase of 12.35% over the year as compared with the rise of 14.34%oin the preceding year. In 1980 the price of petroleum rose by 45-23%, charges for electricity by 57%, bus fare by 40% (twice), domestic air fare by 33%, and the rickshaw fare by 35%. The price rise was attributable to forces working both at home and abroad. The international prices of a large number of important commodities like cement, pig iron, fertilizer, petroleum, sugar, and tin increased significantly during the year and had a substantially adverse im12 See Bangladesh Bank Annual Report 1979-1980, Bangladesh Observer, December 28, 1980.

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pact on the price situation in the country; the imbalance between demand and supply was evidenced by the 16% growth in money supply as against a growth of 4.82% in GDP during 1979-1980.13 On the external front the experience during 1979-1980 was in sharp contrast to that of the preceding year. The overall balance of payments recorded a deficit of Tk. 1.88 billion during 1979-1980; during 1978-1979 there was a surplus of Tk. 9.9 billion. Reflecting the payment strains, the convertible foreign exchange reserves declined from Tk. 5.92 billion at the end of June 1979 to Tk. 4.03 billion at the end of June 1980. However, remittances from Bengalis working abroad increased significantly during the year, amounting to over Tk. 5.73 billion between January 1979 and January 1980. Dacca launched its Second Five-Year Plan on July 1, which aimed at significantly reducing the "level of poverty"'4 in the country and achieving an overall 7.2% annual growth rate, including a 7%, increase in food grain production and 8.6% in manufacturing. This compares with the annual growth in GDP of 4.3% over the past seven years, well short of the 5.5% target for the First Five-Year Plan and 5.6% for the two-year interim plan. The plan aims at increasing rice production from 13.5 million tons to 20 million tons, bringing an additional 10.2 million acres of land under irrigation, raising jute production from 5.4 million bales to 6.5 million bales by 1985, and generating 710,000 new jobs, 606,000 in the private sector. Of the total development outlay of $16.5 billion, nearly $9 billion would flow from external assistance and about $7.6 billion would be met by domestic resources to be realized through about $4.2 billion in budget revenue surplus and $3.4 billion from private savings and loans from the banking sector.15The private sector was allocated 22% of the plan outlay compared with 11% in the First Five-Year Plan (19731978) and 16% in the interim plan (1978-1980). The size of the ADP (capital spending) in- the 1980-1981 budget was placed at about $1.74 billion and current spending at about $910 million. Against this, revenues were expected to be $1.4 billion, leaving a shortfall of about $1.25 billion to be raised from foreign sources. The overall economic growth target for fiscal 1980-1981 was set at 7.6% while GDP was expected to grow at 6.1%, agriculture at 7.2%, industry at 9%, construction at 14%, and per capita income at 3.2%; comparable figures for fiscal 1979-1980 were: agriculture 4.2%, manufacturing 9.3%, and construction 18%.16 Foreign assistance to finance development was reduced to 67% in during the first five-year fiscal 1980-1981 compared with about 80%7o
Ibid. Nearly 85% live below the poverty line, more than 60% are undernourished, 35% of the labor force of 28 million are unemployed, and over 50% are landless or own less than one acre. 15 FEER, July 4, 1980, p. 97. 16 bid., June 20, 1980, p. 40.
13 14

BANGLADESH 199 plan and the interim plan. Of the total $1.7 billion in development spending in 1980-1981, about $583 million would be made available from domestic sources.
Foreign aid: According to the annual report of the Bangladesh Bank, the total outstanding foreign debt as of July 1, 1980 was $4.75 billion, which included an undisbursed amount of $1.74 billion. The total aid commitment since independence till June 30, 1980 amounted to $9.15 billion of which $4.22 billion were grants. During fiscal'1979-1980 aid commitments amounted to $1.14 billion, 38.62% lower than the $1.86 billion in fiscal 1978-1979. However, the estimated foreign aid disbursement at $1.28 billion during 1979-1980 recorded an increase of 26.82% from the level of $1.01 billion in 1978-1979. Disbursement of commodity aid stood at $422 million as against $459 million in 1978-1979. During the year disbursement of project aid increased by 36.80% to $487 million, and a more than 100% increase brought food aid disbursements to $377 million as compared to $187 million in the previous year. Zia's government received a blow as the aid consortium for Bangladesh pledged only $1.3 billion instead of the $2.5 billion sought by Zia for fiscal 1980-1981. However, Dacca expected about $200 million from aid consortium members individually and about $500 million from Muslim countries and East European countries, making a total of $2 billion. The World Bank's record in Bangladesh was quite satisfactory; during fiscal 1979 it exceeded its target by $30 million and ended up paying $271 million. During fiscal 1980, it was expected to exceed its target by about $40 million to $265 million,' which would include $75 million in commodity and $25 million in fertilizer assistance.

ExternalRelations
The boost Dacca received through its election to the UN Security Council was further exploited during 1980. In its "little way," Bangladesh tried to play a "big role" both in and outside the Security Council, but many critics felt this placed too heavy a burden on its size and economy. Its proposal in early 1980 for a six-nation Regional Summit Conference (of South Asia countries) was well received. It was elected a member of the UN Economic and Social Council in October, and its foreign minister, Shamsul Huq, disclosed in October that Dacca would like to contest for the presidency of the UN General Assembly in 1981. In 1980, as in 1979, the principal diplomatic endeavors were undertaken by the president himself. Ziaur Rahman visited New' Delhi in January and September and addressed the UNIDO conference and the Regional Commonwealth Conference. He visited Manila and Belgrade in May, Britain in June, China and Japan in July, Paris in August, Morocco and Guinea in November. In August he addressed the UN General Assembly. During the year a number of foreign dignitaries visited Bangladesh-most notably the King of Nepal (March), the World

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Bank president (April), the Amir of Kuwait (September), President Seku Toure of Guinea (October), and Burmese president Ne Win (November). Dacca tried to cultivate good relations with its neighbors and was successful except in respect to India. The Dacca-Rangoon relationship, which had become bitter during 1977-1978, improved; a BangladeshBurma Boundary Marking agreement was signed in August and a Dacca-Rangoon cooperation agreement in December. The Burmese Home Minister Shin Liu Yin told a newsman in Dacca in December: "In fact we have no problem now to talk about."17Dacca-Beijing friendship intensified as Bengali journalists visited China, Chinese swimmers came to Bangladesh, Dacca and Beijing signed a five-yeareconomic agreement in March, and a scientific and technical cooperation agreement in May. As a part of its policy to develop ties with the Muslim world, Dacca improved relations with Islamabad. During his visit to Dacca in October, the Pakistan foreign secretary, Riaz Piracha, stated that there was no problem between Bangladesh and Pakistan. It was hoped that in the near future the two would agree to the repatriation of nearly half a million Pakistanis trapped in Bangladesh since 1972. In addition to keeping cordial relations with the communist bloc and the ASEAN countries, Dacca maintained good relations with the West, the main source of foreign aid. Britain provided $93 million in both fiscal 1979 and fiscal 1980 and pledged to provide the same amount for the next fiscal year; the U.S. pledged to provide $1.3 million as grants and $18 million as loans for rural electrification programs, and $18 million as grants and $32 million as loans for development of a fertilizer project. Since liberation the total U.S. aid commitment to Bangladesh has amounted to $1636.5 million. During 1980 Dacca's relationship with Moscow and New Delhi was "cool" and at times rather "bitter." During Mujib's rule, the DaccaMoscow relationship reached its peak. The Russians served as advisers for the Bangladesh army, and were engaged in salvaging sunken ships in the Bay of Bengal. However, with Mujib's exit, that "sweet" relationship turned "sour." Moscow was unhappy with Dacca because it demanded the removal of Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea, labelled the Soviet action in Afghanistan as an "invasion" of a weaker nation by a stronger one, and allegedly hobnobbed with Beijing, Moscow's number one enemy. Moscow was displeased when Zia's administration did nothing to control the condemnation by Dacca's press of the Soviet action in Afghanistan,18 and when Zia sent the pro-Moscow communists to jail for having threatened to stage an "Afghan-style revolution in Bangladesh." The Dacca-Moscow relationship became seriously strained when Information Minister Habibullah Khan openly charged the Rus17 Ittejaq, December 26, 1980. 18 Ibid., December 8, 1980.

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sians with having thrown diplomatic norms to the wind by opening a Soviet consulate at Chittagong without prior permission. The fall of the Janata and Lok Dal governments in India (January 1980) was a setback to Dacca-New Delhi relations. During the election campaign, Mrs. Gandhi took the Janata government to task for having pursued a weak policy towards India's small neighbors. Possibly alarmed at this, when Indira assumed power, Zia "managed" a visit to New Delhi, which, along with his proposal to sell gas to India, made him appear "subservient" to India. But Zia's move failed to satisfy New Delhi. India's river-flow blockade attempts, position on the maritime belt issue, unilateral seizure of two newly raised islands in the Bay of Bengal, setting up of camps on Bangladesh territory, talk of pushing "outsiders" in India's northeastern regions into Bangladesh, and failure to implement the 1974 border agreement put serious strains on DaccaNew Delhi relations. India's unilateral stand that the JRC had outlived its utility beyond November 4, its unwillingness to include Nepal in negotiations (implied in the Ganges Waters Agreement) on the Ganges river (calling the agreement "unbalanced"), and above all its insistence on the 200-mile Ganges-Brahmaputra link canal complicated the relationship. As the year went by Dacca and New Delhi stood poles apart. To sum up, Ziaur Rahman directed his politics and policies towards offering the nation a stable political system. To achieve that end he needed to remain in power for some time, and accordingly he directed his energy and efforts towards expanding and strengthening his power-base-the army, the private sector, and the rural populace. By offering better privileges to the army (along with the induction of many army personnel into the top administration) and encouraging the play of free enterprise in the economy, Ziaur Rahman seems to have the army and the capitalists on his side. However, because of the dwarfing of its earlier privileged position, the bureaucracy seems not in sympathy with the system. The professionals and the urban middle class appear interested in nagging most of the time. Zia is popular among the rural masses, his "gravitating image" and strategies based on a "vibrant personality" having won their confidence-but in essence for him rather than for his system. Composed of people of questionable character and past, the youth complexes and gram sarkars have not won the people's confidence in the system. The hasty expansion of the BNP as a colossus is not a blessing for Zia's system, since if the expectations of the fortuneseekers and the unemployed youth remain unfulfilled for long they will not hesitate to rethink their association with the BNP. As regards the role of the opposition, that is much more deplorable. Because of people's bitter experience with them in the past, the lack of coherence between their words and practices, and too many schisms among themselves, it is very difficult to restore their credibility among the masses. People seem to have developed an antipathy towards politics and a sense of hollowness, in spite of about 60 parties in the

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country. Bangladesh abounds in population and parties, but the latter are ineffective. Politics in Bangladesh, as in Pakistan, essentially recoils in the vacuum.

AZIZUL HAQUE is Director of the Center for Asian Studies, JahangirnagarUni.

versity, Dacca, Bangladesh.