HILARIO vs. SALVADOR G.R. No. 160384 . April 29, 2005, CALLEJO, SR. , J .

FACTS: Petitioners herein are co-owners of a parcel of land located in Romblon. In 1996, they filed a complaint with the RTC of Romblon against herein, respondent, alleging that as co-owners, they are entitled to possession of the lot, and that respondent constructed his house thereon without their knowledge and refused to vacate the property despite demands to do so. They prayed for the private respondent to vacate the property and restore possession thereof to them. The complaint, however, failed to allege the assessed value of the land. Nevertheless, petitioners were able to present during the trial the most recent tax declaration, which shows that the assessed value of the property was Php 5,950.00. The respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction because of the failure to allege the value of the land. The motion was denied. Respondent then filed an Answer, traversing the material allegations of the complaint, contending that petitioners had no cause of action against him since the property in dispute was the conjugal property of his grandparents, the spouses Salustiano Salvador and Concepcion Mazo-Salvador. The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision, holding that the action was one for the recovery of ownership and possession of real property, and that absent any allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the property, the MTC had exclusive jurisdiction over the action (citing Sec. 33 of R.A. No. 7691). The CA then ordered the refiling of the case in the proper court. ISSUES: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the action HELD: NO. Petitioner argues that the RTC has jurisdiction since their action is an accion reivindicatoria, an action incapable of pecuniary estimation. Thus, regardless of the assessed value of the subject property, exclusive jurisdiction falls within the said court. This argument is without merit. The jurisdiction of the court over an action involving title to or possession of land is now determined by the

assessed value of the said property and not the market value thereof. [] In the case at bar, the complaint does not contain an allegation stating the assessed value of the property subject of the complaint. The court cannot take judicial notice of the assessed or market value of land. The Court noted that during the trial, the petitioners adduced in evidence at ax de c l a r a t ion, showing that the assessed value of the property in 1991 was Php5,950.00. The petitioners, however, did not bother to adduce in evidence the tax declaration containing the assessed value of the property when they filed their complaint in 1996. Even assuming that the assessed value of the property in 1991 was the same in 1995 or 1996, the MTC, and not the RTC had jurisdiction over the action of the petitioners, since the case involved title to or possession of real property with an assessed value of less than Php20,000.00. As the Court of Appeals had held: The determining jurisdictional element for the accion reinvindicatoria [sic] is, as RA 7691 discloses, the assessed value of the property in question. For properties in the provinces, the RTC has jurisdiction if the assessed value exceeds Php20,000.00, and the MTC, if the value is Php20,000.00 or below. An assessed value can have reference only to the tax rolls in the municipality where the property is located, and is contained in the tax declaration. In the case at bench, the most recent tax declaration secured and presented by the plaintiffs-appellees is Exhibit B. The loose remark made by them that the property was worth 3.5 million pesos, not to mention that there is absolutely no evidence for this, is irrelevant in the light of the fact that there is an assessed value. It is the amount in the tax declaration that should be consulted and no other kind of value, and as appearing in Exhibit B, this is Php5,950.00. The case, therefore, falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of Romblon which has jurisdiction over the territory where the property is located, and not the court a quo. 24

In an obiter, the Court discussed the nature of an accion publiciana, thus: The action of the petitioners was an accion publiciana, or one for the recovery of possession of the real property subject matter thereof. It does not involve a claim of ownership over the property. An accion reinvindicatoria is a suit which has for its object the recovery of possession over the real property as owner. It involves recovery of ownership and possession based on the said ownership. On the other hand, an accion publiciana is one for the recovery of pos session of the right to possess. It is also referred to as an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year after the occurrence of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty. [] The Supreme Court finally held that all proceedings before the RTC, including the RTC decision, are null and void, since the RTC had no jurisdiction over the action of the petitioners. Criticism of the ponencia: The discussion about the distinction between an accion reivindicatoria and an accion publiciana is inappropriate. The issue to be resolved by the court is: which court has jurisdiction, the MTC or the RTC? It is immaterial whether the case is one for accion reivindicatoria or accion publiciana; only one court will have exclusive jurisdiction. I submit that what should have been discussed in the obiter is that if the claim of co-ownership by the defendant is true, may a plaintiff co-owner then file an action in ejectment against another co-owner? Dr. Tolentino is of the opinion that a co-owner may bring such an action against another co-owner who takes exclusive possession of and asset ownership in himself alone. The effect of the action will be to obtain recognition of the coownership. The defendant co-owner, however, cannot be excluded from possession because as co-owner, he also has the right to possess. SAMPAYAN vs . COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 156360. January 14, 2005 GARCIA , J . FACTS: On July 8, 1992, in the MCTC of Bayugan and Sibagat, Agusan del Sur, the siblings Crispulo Vasquez and Florencia Vasquez-Gilsano filed complaint for forcible entry against Cesar Sampayan for allegedly having entered and occupied a parcel of land, identified as Lot No. 1959, PLS225, and built a house thereon without their knowledge, consent or authority, the entry having been supposedly effected through strategy and stealth. In their complaint, Crispulo and Florencia asserted that they were co-owners pro-indiviso of the said lot, their mother Cristita Quita being the ownerand actual possessor thereof. Upon the latters death and while they were absent from the said lot, Cesar Sampayan, through strategy and stealth, allegedly built a house on the lot, to their exclusion. After repeated demands, Cesar Sampayan allegedly refused to vacate the said lot. Thus, they filed an action for unlawful detainer. In his defense, Cesar Sampayan asserted that his occupation of the lot was by tolerance of the lots true owners, Mr. and Mrs. Terrado, who were then residing in Cebu. The permission was given by the lots overseer, Maria Ybanez. Sampayan further asserted that Crispulo and

Valencias action had long prescribed, inasmuch as the said lot had already been owned and possessed by the spouses Oriol since 1960, as evidenced by the latters payment of taxes. The Oriols, in turn, sold half the land to the Terrados. Together, they maintained possession of their respective portions. Both the plaintiff siblings and defendant Sampayan submitted their respective evidence consisting of affidavits and tax declarations. Meanwhile, the MCTC judge also conducted an ocular inspection of the premises, where he found improvements. The findings in the ocular inspection have confirmed the allegation of the defendant that his predecessors-in-interest have introduced improvements by planting caimito trees, coconut trees, and others on the land in question. The MCTC dismissed the complaint. It held that it is clear that defendants have been in possession for more than one year and that the appropriate remedy would have been accion publiciana or lenaria de possession. Upon appeal to the RTC, it reversed the decision, relying on the involvement of Cristita Quita, plaintiffs mother, in a cadastral case involving the lot in 1957. Sampayan then appealed to the CA, which denied the same. Thus this petition for certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint for forcible entry would prosper HELD: YES. In Sarmiento vs. CA, the Court held: [t]o give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant or deforciant on the land, it is necessary that the complaint should embody such a statement of facts as brings the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in nature. The complaint must show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol testimony. The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. . . . It is clear it is from the above that for the MCTC to acquire jurisdiction over a forcible entry case, it is enough that the complaint avers the jurisdictional facts, i.e. that the plaintiff had prior physical possession and that he was deprived thereof by the defendant through force,

intimidation, threats, strategy and stealth. The complaint in this case makes such an averment. Hence, the irrelevant circumstance that the evidence adduced during the hearing rendered improper an action for forcible entry is of no moment and cannot deprive the MCTC of its jurisdiction over the case. The MCTC continues to have that jurisdiction. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner had prior physical possession HELD: YES. To begin with, the Court is at once confronted by the uncontested findings of the MCTC judge himself during his ocular inspection of the premises in dispute that what he saw thereat confirmed the allegations of the defendant [now petitioner Sampayan] that his predecessors-in-interest have introduced improvements by planting caimito trees, coconut trees, and others on the land in question, adding that [N]othing can be seen on the land that plaintiff had once upon a time been in possession of the land, and categorically stating that [T]he allegation that Cristita Quita, the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs had been in possession of the said property since 1957, openly, exclusively, continuously, adversely and in the concept of an owner is a naked claim, unsupported by any evidence. x x x The Court noted that in the assailed decision herein, the Court of Appeals attached much significance to the fact that private respondents mother, Cristita Quita, was an oppositor in Cadastral Case No. 149. The Court ruled and held that the mothers being an oppositor in said cadastral case does not, by itself, establish prior physical possession because not all oppositors in cadastral cases are actual possessors of the lots or lands subject thereof. SANTOS v s . AYON G.R. No. 137013, Ma y 6, 2005, SANDOVAL -GUTIERREZ, J. FACTS: In 1996, the petitioner, Santos, filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) in Davao City a complaint for illegal detainer against the respondents,

spouses Ayon. In his complaint, he averred that a building used by the respondents as a warehouse, encroached on a portion of his land. As early as 1985, he had allegedly already informed respondents that the said building occupies a portion of his land, but allowed them to continue using the building. In 1996, needing the entire portion of his lot, he demanded that respondents remove the part of the building encroaching on his property, but respondents refused and continued to occupy the contested portion. The MTCC ruled in favor of petitioner and ordered the respondents to vacate and surrender possession of the property. On appeal, the RTC affirmed in toto the MTCC judgment, and upheld the finding that respondents occupation of the contested portion was by mere tolerance. On petition for review however, the CA held that petitioners proper remedy should have been an accion publiciana before the RTC and not anaction for unlawful detainer, and thus dismissing the complaint. ISSUE: Whether the MTCC properly exercised jurisdiction over the complaint. HELD: YES. All actions for forcible entry or unlawful detainer shall be filed with the proper Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, which actions shall include not only the plea for restoration of possession but also all claims for damages and costs arising therefrom. The said courts are not divested of jurisdiction over such cases even if the defendants therein raises the question of ownership over the litigated property in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership. The Court found no error in the MTCC assuming jurisdiction over petitioners complaint. A complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges that the withholding of the possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful, without necessarily employing the terminology of the law. Here, there is an allegation in petitioners complaint that respondents occupancy on the portion of his property is by virtue of his tolerance.

Petitioners cause of action for unlawful detainer springs from respondents failure to vacate the questioned premises upon his demand sometime in 1996. It bears stressing that possession by tolerance is lawful, but such possession becomes unlawful when the possessor by tolerance refuses to vacate upon demand made by the owner. Our ruling in Roxas vs. Court of Appeals 391 SCRA 351 is applicable in this case: A person who occupies the land of another at the latters tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which, a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him.

GANILA vs . COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 150755, 06/28/2005 QUISUMBING, J . FACTS: Private respondent, Violeta Herrera, filed 21 ejectment complaints in the MCTC, which ordered the 21 defendants, now petitioners, to vacate the property in question (Lot 1227). The RTC sustained the decision as to 19 defendants but dismissed the case against 2. The 19 defendants who were ordered to vacate Lot 1227 filed a petition for review with the CA based on two arguments, namely: first, that they possessed lot 1227 in good faith for more than 30 years in the concept of owners, and second, that there was no withholding of possession since private respondent was not in prior possession of the lot. I S S U E S / H E L D: Whether prior physical possession by the plaintiff is necessary for a complaint for unlawful detainer to prosper NO. While petitioners assert that this case involves only deprivation of possession, they confuse the remedy of an action for forcible entry with that of unlawful detainer. In unlawful detainer, prior physical possession by the plaintiff is not necessary. It is enough that plaintiff has a better right of possession. Actual and prior physical possession of a property by a party is indispensable only in forcible entry cases. In unlawful detainer cases, the defendant is necessarily in prior lawful possession of the property but his possession eventually becomes unlawful upon termination or expiration of his right to possess. Thus, the fact that petitioners are in possession of the lot does not automatically entitle them to remain in possession. And the issue of prior lawful possession by the defendants does not arise at all in a suit for unlawful detainer simply because prior lawful possession by virtue of contract or other reasons is given or admitted. Unlike in a forcible entry where defendants, by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, deprive the palintiff or the prior physical possessor of possession, here there is no evidence to show that petitioners entered the lot by any of these acts.

Whether private respondent properly filed complaints for unlawful detainer YES. If only to stress the fundamental principles related to the present controversy, jurisdiction over unlawful detainer suits is vested in Municipal Trial Courts. And in ejectment cases, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations of the complaint. In the case for ejectment, private respondents allegations sufficiently present a case of unlawful detainer. She alleged that (1) she owns Lot 1227, (2) she tolerated petitioners to construct their houses thereon; (3) she withdrew her tolerance; and (4) petitioners refused to heed her demand to vacate the lot. The Complaints were also filed within one year from the date of her demand. The cause of action for unlawful detainer between the parties springs from the failure of petitioners to vacate the lot upon lawful demand of the private respondent. When they refused to vacate the lot after her demand, petitioners continued possession became unlawful. Her complaint for ejectment against respondent, to put it simply, is not without sufficient basis. Whether private respondent should have filed an action to recover possession de jure, as argued by petitioners on appeal NO. Petitioners contention that private respondent should have filed an action to recover possession de jure with the TC is not supported by law or jurisprudence. The distinction between a summary action of ejectment and a plenary action for recovery of possession and/or ownership of the land is settled in our jurisprudence. Petitioners present contention was first raised only in their appeal to the RTC. Raising it before the appellate tribunal is barred by estoppel. They should have raised it in the proceedings before the MCTC. In our view, this issue is a mere afterthought, when the MCTC decided against them. Basic rules of fair play, justice and due process require that as a rule an issue cannot be raised by the petitioners for the first time on appeal. The Court noted with dismay petitioners insistence that it must order the MCTC to conduct the requisite

preliminary conference. The summary character of ejectment suits will be disregarded if the Court would allow petitioners to further delay this case by allowing a second preliminary conference. Ejectment by way of forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are summary proceedings, designed to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or the right to possession over the property involved. It is a timely procedure designed to remedy the delay in the resolution of such cases. In sum, the Court found no reversible error much less any grave abuse of discretion committed by the Court of Appeals. A person who occupies the land of another at the latters tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him. His status is analogous to that of a lessee or tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy continued by tolerance of the owner. In such a case, the date of unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession is to be counted from the date of the demand to vacate. ROSS RICA SALES CENTER vs. SPS. ONG G.R. No. 132197. 08/16/2005, TINGA , J . FACTS: The spouses Ong are the original owners of 3 parcels of land which they occupy. They sold it to Mandaue Prime Estate Realty, which then sold it to Ross Rica Sales Center, Inc. The spouses Ong filed an action to annul the sale and transfer of property to Mandaue Prime Estate Realty and at present, the case is still pending. In the meantime, an ejectment case was filed against spouses Ong in the MTC, which ruled against the latter. On appeal to the RTC, the judgment was affirmed by a decision dated March 1, 1997. The spouses Ong received a copy of the decision on April 28, 1997. The spouses Ong first filed a Notice of Appeal with the RTC (May 8, 1997) but on the very next day filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied on June 23, 1997. The spouses Ong received a copy of the order on July 9, 1997. On July 24, 1997 respondents filed with the CA a motion for an additional 10 days to file their Petition for Review, which they would eventually file on July 30, 1997. The CA gave their petition for review due course and reversed the decision of the RTC on the finding that the action filed was not one for unlawful detainer based on two grounds: that the allegations fail to show that petitioners were deprived of possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and that there is no contract, express or implied, between the parties that would qualify the case as one of unlawful detainer.

ISSUES/HELD Whether the complaint satisfies the jurisdictional requirements for a case of unlawful detainer properly cognizable by the MTC - YES. Well-settled is the rule that what determines the nature of an action as well as which court has jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought. In Javelosa vs. Court of the Appeals, it was held that the allegation in the complaint that there was unlawful withholding of possession is sufficient to make out a case for unlawful detainer. It is equally settled that in an action for unlawful detainer, an allegation that the defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from the plaintiff is deemed sufficient, without necessarily employing the terminology of the law. Hence, the phrase unlawful withholding has been held to imply possession on the part of defendant, which was legal in the beginning, having no other source than a contract, express or implied, and which later expired as a right and is being withheld by defendant. In Rosanna B. Barba vs. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held that a simple allegation that the defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from plaintiff is sufficient. Based on this premise, the allegation in the Complaint that: . . . . despite demand to vacate, the defendants have refused and still refuse to vacate said lots, thus, unlawfully withholding possession of said lots from plaintiffs and depriving plaintiffs of the use of their lots; is already sufficient to constitute an unlawful detainer case. Likewise, the case of Co Tiamco vs. Diaz provides for a liberal approach in considering the sufficiency of a complaint for unlawful detainer, thus: . . . The principle underlying the brevity and simplicity of pleadings in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases rests upon considerations of public policy. Cases of forcible entry

and detainer are summary in nature, for they involve perturbation of social order which must be restored as promptly as possible and, accordingly, technicalities or details of procedure should be carefully avoided. Whether the case should be considered as one for accion reivindicatoria, and thus the jurisdiction would lie with the RTC - NO. The issue involved in accion reivindicatoria is the recovery of ownership of real property. This differs from accion publiciana where the issue is the better right of possession or possession de jure, and accion interdictal where the issue is material possession or possession de facto. In an action for unlawful detainer, the question of possession is primordial, while the issue of ownership is generally unessential. Petitioners, in all their pleadings, only sought to recover physical possession of the subject property. The mere fact that they claim ownership over the parcels of land as well did not deprive the MTC of jurisdiction to try the ejectment case. Even if respondents claim ownership as a defense to the complaint for ejectment, the conclusion would be the same, for mere assertion of ownership by the defendant in an ejectment case will not oust the municipal court of its summary jurisdiction. This Court in Ganadin vs. Ramos stated that if what is prayed for is ejectment or recovery of possession, it does not matter if ownership is claimed by either party. Therefore, the pending actions for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Sale and Transfer Certificates of Title and quieting of title in Civil Case No. MAN-2356 will not abate the ejectment case. In Drilon vs. Gaurana, this Court ruled that the filing of an action for reconveyance of title over the same property or for annulment of the deed of sale over the land does not divest the MTC of its jurisdiction to try the forcible entry or unlawful detainer case before it, the rationale being that, while there may be identity of parties and subject matter in the forcible entry case and the suit for annulment of title and/or reconveyance, the rights asserted and the relief prayed for are not the same.

The long settled rule is that the issue of ownership cannot be the subject of a collateral attack. In Apostol vs. Court of Appeals, this Court had the occasion to clarify this: . . . Under Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled, except in a direct proceeding for that purpose in accordance with law. The issue of the validity of the title of the respondents can only be assailed in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. Whether or not the petitioners have the right to claim ownership over the property is beyond the power of the court a quo to determine in an action for unlawful detainer.

subsequently issued Tax Declaration No. 02-2460R for the separated lot. Sometime in 1994, respondent Silverio Bugarin forcibly took possession of the 108 sq. m. lot and refused to vacate the same despite the pleas of petitioner. Hence, on January 18, 1996, she instituted a complaint for recovery of possession and ownership against respondent before the MTC. In his Answer with Counterclaims, respondent Bugarin contended that the area claimed by petitioner is included in the 4,473 square-meter lot, covered by the Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-13011, and that he has been in continuous possession and occupation thereof since 1955. In his Amended Answer with Counterclaim, respondent failed to allege that the questioned lot is covered by the OCT No. P13011 and instead asserted that he planted fruit-bearing trees in the property. Respondent further pleaded the defenses of lack of cause of action and prescription. The MTC decided in favor of respondent declaring him as the owner of the controverted lot on the basis of the OCT No. P-13011. The complaint was dismissed for failure of petitioner to prove prior physical possession and ownership thereof. The decision was affirmed by the RTC. Petitioner further filed a petition for review before the CA, but the same was denied for insufficiency of evidence and petitioners failure to adduce evidence to prove either ownership or prior physical possession. ISSUE: Whether petitioner has a cause of action for forcible entry against respondent

PERALTA -LABRADOR v s . BUGARIN G.R. No. 165177. August 25, 2005 YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. FACTS: Petitioner Peralta-Labrador was the owner of a 400 sq. m. parcel of land, purchased in 1976 from the spouses Pronto. In 1990, the DPWH constructed a road which traversed her lot and separated 108 sq. m. from it. She was

HELD: NO. In Lopez vs. David Jr., it was held that an action for forcible entry is a quieting process and the one year time bar for filing a suit is in pursuance of the summary nature of the action. Thus, the Court has nullified proceedings in theMTCs when it improperly assumed jurisdiction of a case in which the unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession had exceeded one year. After the lapse of the one year period, the suit must be commenced in the RTC via an accion

publiciana, a suit for recovery of the right to possess. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title. It also refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty independently of title. Likewise, the case may be instituted before the same court as an accion reivindicatoria, which is an action to recover ownership as well as possession. It is clear that petitioners averment make out a case for forcible entry because she alleged prior physical possession of the subject lot way back in 1976, and the forcible entry thereon by respondent. Considering her allegation that the unlawful possession of respondent occurred two years prior to the filing of the complaint on January 18, 1996, the cause of action for forcible entry has prescribed and the MTC had no jurisdiction to entertain the case. Therefore petitioners complaint should have been filed with the proper RTC. On this point, the Court held in Bongato vs. Malvar that: It is wise to be reminded that forcible entry is a quieting process, and that the restrictive time-bar is prescribed to complement the summary nature of such process. Indeed, the one-year period within which to bring an action for forcible entry is generally counted from the date of actual entry to the land. However, when entry is made through stealth, then the one-year period is counted from the time the plaintiff learned about it. After the lapse of the one-year period, the party dispossessed of a parcel of land may file either an accion publiciana, which is a plenary action to recover the right of possession; or an accion reivindicatoria, which is an action to recover ownership as well as possession.

United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946)

Syllabus Respondents owned a dwelling and a chicken farm near a municipal airport. The safe path of glide to one of the runways of the airport passed directly over respondents' property at 83 feet, which was 67 feet above the house, 63 feet above the barn and 18 feet above the highest tree. It was used 4% of the time in taking off and 7% of the time in landing. The Government leased the use of the airport for a term of one month commencing June 1, 1942, with a provision for renewals until June 30, 1967, or six months after the end of the national emergency, whichever was earlier. Various military aircraft of the United States used the airport. They frequently came so close to respondents' property that they barely missed the tops of trees, the noise was startling, and the glare from their landing lights lighted the place up brightly at night. This destroyed the use of the property as a chicken farm and caused loss of sleep, nervousness, and fright on the part of respondents. They sued in the Court of Claims to recover for an alleged taking of their property and for damages to their poultry business. The Court of Claims found that the Government had taken an easement over respondents' property, and that the value of the property destroyed and the easement taken was $2,000; but it made no finding as to the precise nature or duration of the easement. Held: 1. A servitude has been imposed upon the land for which respondents are entitled to compensation under the Fifth Amendment. Pp. 328 U. S. 260-267. (a) The common law doctrine that ownership of land extends to the periphery of the universe has no place in the modern world. Pp. 328 U. S. 260-261. (b) The air above the minimum safe altitude of flight prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Authority is a public highway and part

of the public domain, as declared by Congress in the Air Commerce Act of 1926, as amended by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938. Pp.328 U. S. 260-261, 328 U. S. 266. (c) Flights below that altitude are not within the navigable air space which Congress placed within the public domain, even though they are within the path of glide approved by the Civil Aeronautics Authority. Pp. 328 U. S. 263-264. Page 328 U. S. 257 (d) Flights of aircraft over private land which are so low and frequent as to be a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of the land are as much an appropriation of the use of the land as a more conventional entry upon it. Pp. 328 U. S. 261-262, 328 U. S. 264-267. 2. Since there was a taking of private property for public use, the claim was "founded upon the Constitution," within the meaning of 141(1) of the Judicial Code, and the Court of Claims had jurisdiction to hear and determine it. P. 328 U. S. 267. 3. Since the court's findings of fact contain no precise description of the nature or duration of the easement taken, the judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the Court of Claims so that it may make the necessary findings. Pp. 328 U. S. 267-268. (a) An accurate description of the easement taken is essential, since that interest vests in the United States. P. 328 U. S. 267. (b) Findings of fact on every "material issue" are a statutory requirement, and a deficiency in the findings cannot be rectified by statements in the opinion. Pp. 328 U. S. 267-268. (c) A conjecture in lieu of a conclusion from evidence would not be a proper foundation for liability of the United States. P. 328 U. S. 268. 104 Ct.Cls. 342, 60 F.Supp. 751, reversed and remanded. The Court of Claims granted respondents a judgment for the value of property destroyed and damage to their property resulting from the taking of an easement over their property by low-flying military aircraft of the United States, but failed to

include in its findings of fact a specific description of the nature or duration of the easement. 104 Ct.Cls. 342, 60 F.Supp. 751. This Court granted certiorari. 327 U.S. 775. Reversed and remanded, p. 328 U. S. 268.