The Rising China Wants to be a Responsible Great Power. What Does The International Responsibility Mean?

The start of the 21st century may perhaps be described in history as the moment in time of Chinas rise. The process by which China is suddenly being recognized as a new player on the world scene has meant that the country spectacular growth has now become part of a general global common awareness, marking China as a new world power of the contemporary zeitgeist. In the words of Robert Zoellick, China is more than a rising power it is a changing country.1 Chinas main desire is to be seen as a responsible great power, yet the meaning of this phrase is ambiguous, with several competing interpretations about what it entails. Obviously, with any form of prescriptive argument regarding notions of ought and should, there will be elements of variation as to what behavioral elements constitute the definition of responsibility, and competing theories as to the relevant factors that will influence a states translation of that conception. According to structural realist theory, the motivations of all states are identical and thus their foreign policy will be deterministically influenced and constrained by the anarchic nature and structure of the international system.2 In this way, a state will logically want to increase its own power while endeavoring to challenge and weaken other states power relative to its own. However, with regards to China, such a deterministic line of reasoning is open to challenge. Structural variables may still be contingent on unit-level variables, such as nationalism, geography, ideology and historical experience. Following this form of analysis, China, as a large power, will not simply be constrained by systemic factors in the motivations behind its foreign policy, but its own dynamic incentives and driving forces will also act as a significant force shaping Chinas foreign relations and the policy surrounding its rise. In current Chinese political dialogue, the idea of international status has also become a key value shaping foreign policy, which differs from mainstream ideas about traditional power politics. This is what has prompted commentators to remark that what distinguishes Chinas current status conception is its emphasis on both material power and international legitimacy.3 Similarly, the fact that China is a large power may ultimately allow it the ability to shape and influence its own ideas about what international responsibility means on its own terms. Firstly, by taking a deterministic formation of state responsibility constrained by systemic variants, the concept of state responsibility when applied to international relations can be condensed into the idea that a country, within its relations with other powers and through its foreign policy actions, seeks to maintain a degree of stability in the existing system without creating conflict in the world order. The rise of China and its consequent influence on shifting power relations has evoked uncertainties and suspicions: the country is seen to be a rising power within the international system, which could be interpreted within the power-transition account of realist theory as a threat to the existing status quo, especially due to the countrys recent increase in military power. Within a power transition hypothesis, according to Organski4, in an international system where new powers become more powerful as their GNP increases, so too exists the possibility that these capabilities will be translated into military power to be used by an aspiring power to challenge the position of the dominant hegemon.5 Applied to the current international situation, this theory has been used to forecast a dissatisfied and revisionist Chinas future challenge to US dominance. The claim that China is a threat is based on the premise that rivalry between a dominant power or hegemon and the next most powerful rising contender is inevitable. This seeks to undermine Chinas quest to be seen as a responsible rising power within the international system since the idea of responsibility is connected with the belief that, to be a responsible power, Chinas goal is to work within the current international system and not create conflict within the existing world order. Chinas leaders stress that they have no intention of imposing hegemony over Asia, much less displacing the role of the US as world superpower, as the China threat theory would have it.

Robert Zoellick, China and America: Power and Responsibility, Asia Society Annual Dinner, New York, February 25, 2004, www.asiasociety.org/speeches/zoellick04.html 2 Structural realism argues in favor of a systemic approach to international relations: Rejecting essentialist concepts such as human nature, the international structure acts as a constraint on state behavior, privileging structural constraints over agents strategies and motivations to explain international politics. The very essence of structure is both the medium and outcome of the interaction between the units (states) and the system. 3 Yong Deng, Better Than Power, International Status in Chinese Foreign Policy, in China Rising: Power and Motivation in Chinas Foreign Policy, Chapter 3 4 Organski, (1958) World Politics
5

Wayne Bert, Perspectives on the Chinese Challenge to the International Order, paper presented at the ISA 41st annual convention, March 2000

As a result, the Chinese leadership first began to develop a well-coordinated campaign to officially present a new perception of China to the country and the world in 2003. The idea of Chinas peaceful rise (heping jueqi ) may originally have been designed to assuage such concern over Chinas increasingly proactive conduct in regional and global affairs. The phrase, Chinas leaders have been keen to explain, seeks to promote the concept of a cooperative China that will inevitably play a larger regional and global role, and that will do so with as little overt threat as possible. The paradigm, in actuality, provides the theoretical justifications for a change in Chinese behavior that has witnessed Chinas emerging into increasingly proactive regional and global roles. However, the validity of this assertion hinges on whether China is satisfied by its current position within the current world structure, as Alistair Ian Johnson has argued. It is in fact the intention of a challenging country that is tantamount. Organski and Jacek Kugler identified status quo states as those that have participated in designing "the rules of the game" and stand to benefit from these rules, whereas revisionist states express a "general dissatisfaction" with their position in the system, and they have a desire to redraft the rules. Challengers, or "revisionist states, want a new place for themselves in the international system proportionate with their power.6 If, applied to China, the country is revisionist and dissatisfied with its current international position, then it will indeed challenge the US for leadership7. However, if China is content to live within the existing system, then the power transition from US dominance will be peaceful. Chinas leaders are keen to show from the peaceful rise thesis and current discourse on its being a responsible power, that it is this second hypothesis that is nearest to the current reality. Chinas peaceful rise, therefore, will be dependent on the factor of great power acceptance. The chances of a dissatisfied China resorting to war to challenge its place in the system is unlikely due to the fact that it is already recognized within the current system, meaning that it has less incentive to resort to war to challenge the status quo of the international order, as was the case of WW1 Germany and WW2 Japan. In fact, Ikenberry has shown that the hypothesis of China as a dissatisfied challenger is increasingly less likely in todays current international system created under US leadership. This is because the system is open, integrated, and rulebased, with universal institutions that have not only invited global membership, but have a remarkable capacity to accommodate rising powers. New entrants into the system have ways of gaining status and authority and opportunities to play a role in governing the order.8 In this way, China is able to gain admission and participate as a member of the system, thereby expressly ensuring that it has no motivation towards revisionism. Thus, China has greater incentives for integration than opposition, suggesting that in the realist terms of Organskis theory, China can rise peacefully within the ranks of the existing world system and be a responsible power in the eyes of the US and the rest of the world in the fact that it will have no motivation to go to war. In the opinion of Xia Liping, a responsible power should, first, play an international role not just according to its interests but also to benefit regional and world peace; secondly, take its international obligations seriously; and lastly, participate in formulating international rules9. Evidence for this responsible and peaceful integration within existing world structures can be seen by Chinas membership in several international organizations, demonstrating that it is locked into, and has a stake in, the international community. For example, China is a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and is one of the five members who retain a power of veto. This demonstrates that it is already recognized as a great power, with the capacity to translate that power through the advantages and authority bestowed upon to voice its preferences. Similarly, the current open global trade system has allowed China to embrace economic globalization through the open membership of financial and trade institutions such as the IMF, World Bank and WTO. Chinas desire for free trade is compatible with the purposes of the existing global financial system, demonstrated by its eagerness to join the WTO. Chinas overall embrace of globalization, openness to trade, and its remarkable economic success impacts the world economy in numerous positive ways. Joining and largely adhering to the World Trade Organization is an enormous step forward in placing China within the open and rules-based trading system.10 The Chinese leadership realizes that it would be impossible for the country to achieve economic modernization without assimilating into the worlds capitalist economic system, and joining such multilateral mechanisms that are open to membership, the country may benefit just as others do by means of interdependence and interconnected trade. Relating this back to PTT theory, the more that China as a rising power benefits from the mechanisms of the international system, the more feasible it is that it will act as a responsible power and carry on in assimilating
6 7 8 9

AFK Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger, p 19, 20 Alistair Ian Johnson, Is China A Status Quo Power? John Ikenberry, The Rise of China and the Future of the West, Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb 2008, Vol 87 Issue 1

10

Xia Liping, China: A Responsible Great Power? Journal of Contemporary China (2001), 10(26), 17-25 Bates Gill, China Becoming a Responsible Stakeholder, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Bates_paper.pdf

itself into the existing order without resorting to war. The fact that China has increasingly embraced global trade rules offers proof of this claim. Chinas quest to demonstrate that it is a responsible economic power has also been shown intra-regionally. In the wake of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, by not devaluing its currency, China earned significant commendation and helped to promote the idea that it was a responsible economic actor. Similarly, when it set up a bail-out fund and came to the assistance of the countries such as Thailand, that were most affected by the 1997 economic crisis, China correspondingly gained appreciation for its efforts to behave as a responsible power. In the same way, Chinas signing of the ACFTA also helped to promote Beijings desired message to the region that there was nothing to fear from Chinas rise. On the contrary, according to Shambaugh, because China is a responsible economic partner, as witnessed by the ACFTA, Chinas economic progress in fact represents a win-win for both China and Asia, and that Asias economic future is rosy precisely because of the rest of the regions economic relationship with China11. It is specifically these types of action has constituted Chinas being seen by others in the region as a responsible power, through acting to maintain and stabilize the existing international system. It is in fact the belief that its regional security environment has never been as peaceful in any other period in history that has been a major factor behind Chinas recent diplomatic moves, such as its willingness to sign a code of conduct over the South China Sea with ASEAN countries, resolve border disputes with Vietnam, and join the Southeast Asian Treaty of Amity and Cooperation - the first time in history that China has ever acceded to this type of regional non-aggression accord. Similarly, its increased participation in UN peacekeeping efforts also show this trend is not just limited to regional affairs. China's participation in the ASEAN '10+3' (Asean plus South Korea, Japan and China) framework, its initiation of an ASEAN free trade area, and its active sponsorship of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization all highlight its readiness and confidence in dynamically engaging in multilateral settings. China has also been able to employ its newfound soft power within the framework of the Six-Party Talks, gaining praise for being a responsible power through playing a pivotal role. China has, in this way, brought to bear its soft power for diplomatic gains, as well as acting to ensure that the regional security order in East Asia remains stable. According to Zhang Yunling and Tang Shiping, They belie the conventional wisdom that it is reluctant to embrace multilateralism12. Similarly, in Shambaughs opinion, China's growing economic and military power, expanding political influence, distinctive diplomatic voice, and increasing involvement in regional multilateral institutions are key developments in Asian affairs13. All of these diplomatic efforts highlight the fact that China is making an earnest effort to conform to international norms such as free trade, non-proliferation and multilateralism, demonstrating its desire to be seen to be embarking on a more conscientious and collaborative role in international affairs all essential prerequisites for being seen to be a responsible great power in the eyes of others. Another alternate dimension of great power status is the import of ideas and the capacity to exercise ideological hegemony, or what Nye has termed soft power14. Soft power is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments, and the appeal of a countrys culture and ideas to others acts as a measure of its influence15. The appeal of Chinas culture has been growing, demonstrating Chinas role as the cultural magnet of Asia.16 According to constructivist theory, the identities and interests of international actors take a crucial place international relations, and actors are not simply governed by the imperatives of a self-help system. Instead, their identities and interests become important in analyzing how they behave, so that states carry out diplomacy based on their self-perception and visions of the outside world17. China has undergone a overwhelming change in how it sees its place in the world, becoming progressively more confident and no longer viewing itself as a victim of Western Imperialism subjected to shame and manipulation, but instead, as a rising power claiming its rightful place as a member of the international community with a progressively greater ability in shaping its own environment.

11 12

David Shambaugh, China Engages Asia, Reshaping Regional Order.

Zhang Yunling & Tang Shiping, More self-confident China will be a responsible power, The Straits Times Oct 2, 2002 http://iaps.cass.cn/English/articles/showcontent.asp?id=391 13 David Shambaugh, China Engages Asia: Reshaping Regional Order, International Security, Vol 29, No 3, Winter 2004-5
14 15 16 17

Joseph S Nye, Soft Power, Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/Ning/archive/archive/080/SOFT_POWER.PDF Nye, in Bates Gill and Yanzhong Huang, Sources and Limits of Chinese Soft Power, Survuval, Vol 48, No 2 (Summer 2006) Ibid Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics" International Organization (1992)

In recent years, China has gained in importance and significance, most substantially due to the economic miracle it has generated through what has been termed as the Beijing Consensus. This path to economic modernization that emphasizes a nations own characteristics as a basis for development stands in marked contrast to the Washington Consensus that imposes homogeneous solutions and one developmental path model. Instead, Chinas ability to modernize and experiment within the framework of a Communist political system to establish capitalism with Chinese characteristics has led to a altering of the paradigm believed to be essential in developmental economics that to have economic freedom, political freedom is also necessary. This has, in turn, influenced other developing countries such as the former Soviet Republics, Brazil, and Africa. This induced the journalist Robert Kaplan to summarize, sometimes, Autocracy breeds freedom.18 In this way, through its own success, China may have the ability to shape and influence alternate ideas about what international responsibility means on its own terms and by its own example through its increasing soft power. International systemic arrangements and the perceptions of other powers are not the only dynamic influencing Chinas foreign relations. Chinas road to great power status and conception of responsibility is also determined by its own internal domestic situation. Since the Partys continued legitimacy is founded on its ability to promote economic development, building a "harmonious society" is a key goal. The CCP feels it imperative to take extreme measures to avoid social anarchy, and should Chinas growth significantly wane, the Party will find it increasingly difficult to cope with internal pressure. This is why it has failed to implement any meaningful form of political reform, which significantly impacts on Chinas soft power appeal and the countrys continued international legitimacy19. In fact, according to Minxin Pei, Chinas economic growth is having a perverse effect on democratization: It makes the ruling elite even more reluctant to part with power.20 Paradoxically, it will be difficult for Beijing to be accepted internationally so long as political and civil freedoms are ruthlessly restricted. Democratization is a major way for China to enhance its political legitimacy and stability, and relieve the CCPs sense of political insecurity. If this scenario happens, the political preservation of the CCP regime may subside as a major factor for motivating Chinas foreign policy21. The CCP continues to make use of controlled nationalism as a political tool, which continues to be extremely important as a means of domestic legitimation. Similarly, also being seen to be a key actor on the world stage helps to promote the Partys position as leading China back to its rightful place in the world with the status of a great power after the century of humiliation. The new world focus on China shows that in this way, the aspirations of its people are being fulfilled. Events like the Olympics, together with the high profile visits of heads of state, act as symbols of its emerging role and responsibilities, as well legitimizing the Partys newfound position. However, international pressure has also been a motivating factor in ensuring that Chinas practices continue to converge with global norms. The leading powers should be prepared to reward Chinas responsible and constructive behaviors, but also be more willing to call out China as a scofflaw or obstacle22. When US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick first urged China to become a responsible stakeholder, he pushed for China, which has interaction with several countries the US identifies as detrimental for example, its trade with Nigeria, Zimbabwe Cuba, Venezuela and Sudan - to use its international relations to bring about change in those nations and to lure those countries into the international system. According to Bates Gill, the responsible stakeholder concept outlines a set of behavioral benchmarks against which the United States can gauge Chinese policies and practices in the international system as it wields growing power and influence. 23 China will be seen to be a more responsible power in the eyes of the US when it starts to characterize its national interest more largely, acting to develop and uphold the international system under which it has begun to prosper through taking actions within its policy conduct to more actively uphold international norms. To the degree that soft power rests on legitimacy, in questions of human rights, and particularly Chinas economic deals with the Sudanese regime that continues to commit human rights abuses in Darfur, the likelihood such international acceptance wavers most. Chinas transformation in becoming a greater donor of international aid is of course welcomed, however many in the international community are apprehensive over the no strings nature of Chinas aid that does not bind the aid to improvements in accountability or good governance.
18 19 20 21

Robert Kaplan, Sometimes Autocracy Breeds Freedom, New York Times, June 28th 1998 Bates Gill and Yangzhong Huang, Sources and Limits of Chinese Soft Power p28 Minxin Pei, The Dark Side of Chinas Rise, Foreign Policy, Mar/Apr 2006, No 153, p32

Fei Ling Wang, Beijings Incentive Structure: The Pursuit of Preservation, Prosperity, and Power, Chapter 2 p31 in China Rising: Power and Motivation in Chinas Foreign Policy, 22 Ibid
23

Bates Gill, China Becoming a Responsible Stakeholder, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Bates_paper.pdf

On economic norms, including enforcement of intellectual property rights and currency valuation; social interests, such as political rights and Internet freedoms; and security stakes, including Burma and Iran, China is seen to be moving too slowly. But with the exclusion possibly of North Korea and its role in the Six-Party Talks, China has not adopted an explicit role in declaring it can change the political stand of other such rogue states. China is concerned about whether it is really helpful to try to alter their courses of action as it would firstly reduce China's image as an alternative to the US, and possibly more importantly, reduce China's access to energy resources, especially in the face of its increasing energy demands. Beijing now faces a tactical choice: If China does in actual fact desire to be considered as a responsible power by others, then continuing this current policy may prompt significant rethinking, since it may affect the countrys continued international legitimacy in the long run. Chinese analysts see Chinas status not just in terms of Chinas position in the international power hierarchy, but also in its ability to protect its interests and project its influence internationally. In Asia, China is becoming increasingly more powerful in the region, qualified to exert its influence to attain its objectives. As already mentioned, an essential prerequisite of Chinas foreign policy is its need to maintain a stable external security environment. For this reason, China has grown to become more at ease, and hence more assured, in advocating proposals in both bilateral and multilateral settings, all with the aim of molding an atmosphere forthcoming to its interests. Although its leaders still hold an essentially realist view of the international system as intrinsically anarchic with power remaining a benchmark in international politics, they have also shifted their judgments to observe that the world is moving towards a more civilized era, in which the probability of a global war is marginal24. The leadership wishes to assure its neighbours about Chinas peaceful objectives and neutralize the emergence of soft containment or other counterbalancing. Chinas more responsible approach to world affairs can therefore be attributed to the role that its domestic politics plays on its foreign policy, where the prevailing motivation of its leadership is primarily to alleviate external security tensions so as to better address domestic challenges. As China becomes increasingly more powerful, it can use this newfound power to promote its own interests. This leads to the question of whether great powers are in fact as responsible as they seem. For example, the US is respected as much for its ideals as it is revered for its power to shape outcomes. But of late, a more nationally forward US foreign policy demonstrated in the invasion of Iraq, rejection of international treaties, and disregard for traditional allies reversed the view of the as US a responsible global leader. In this way, it is not always necessarily true that a superpower is itself always a responsible power. It may therefore be argued that a state as large as China has the ability to influence its own future conception of what responsibility should entail. Chinas leadership is of two minds about power and responsibility. On the one hand, China is proud of its newfound international respect. On the other, the countrys many internal challenges continue to motivate its foreign policy and make it harder for it to focus on externally responsible behavior. For example, the Taiwan issue remains a dangerous hotspot for national as well as international politics, as the islands status is ultimately tied up to the Partys legitimacy. Even though China seeks international recognition, it still regards coercive measures, especially the threat of force, as a necessary tool of its foreign policy. This is because the perceived damage to its status quest, by failure to stop Taiwans independence, explains Beijings ultrasensitivityultimately Chinas status conception simply cannot imagine the loss of Taiwan.25 The domestic determinants of Chinese foreign policy, in this way, impact upon notions of responsibility and the way in which China perceives itself as a responsible power. Chinas motivations are complex, influenced both by the deterministic nature of the structure of the international system within which it finds itself, yet also by its domestic political system and national characteristics, which have also reconfigured its foreign policy in the international arena. In this way, Chinas conception of responsibility is both influenced by international opinion, but also by its national situation and domestic audience. The CCPs regime interests explain Chinas peaceful, economically oriented foreign policy. Yet the central concern about legitimacy and ensuring the Partys preservation has advanced nationalism and the resolve to preclude Taiwans independence. The dynamic interaction of regime preservation, economic prosperity and the pursuit of Chinas great power status has generated varying foreign policy orientations, and may help to explain why the rapidly rising dragon has yet to follow the great power expansion trajectory predicted by realist power transition theories.26
24

Zhang Yunling & Tang Shiping, More self-confident China will be a responsible power, The Straits Times Oct 2, 2002 http://iaps.cass.cn/English/articles/showcontent.asp?id=391 25 Yong Deng, Better than Power: International Status in Chinese Foreign Policy, p65, Chapter 3, in China Rising: Power and Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy, edited by Yong Deng and Fei-Ling Wang 26 Yong Deng and Fei-Ling Wang, China Rising Power and Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy p 9

BIBLIOGRAPHY Articles Wayne Bert, Perspectives on the Chinese Challenge to the International Order, paper presented at the ISA 41st annual convention, March 2000 John Ikenberry, The Rise of China and the Future of the West, Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb 2008, Vol 87 Issue 1 Bates Gill and Yanzhong Huang, Sources and Limits of Chinese Soft Power, Survuval, Vol 48, No 2 (Summer 2006) Bates Gill, China Becoming a Responsible Stakeholder, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Bates_paper.pdf Alistair Ian Johnson, Is China A Status Quo Power?, International Security, Volume 27, Number 4, Spring 2003, pp. 5-56 Robert Kaplan, Sometimes Autocracy Breeds Freedom, New York Times, June 28th 1998 Minxin Pei, The Dark Side of Chinas Rise, Foreign Policy, Mar/Apr 2006, No 153 David Shambaugh, China Engages Asia: Reshaping Regional Order, International Security, Vol 29, No 3, Winter 2004-5 Zhang Yunling & Tang Shiping, More self-confident China will be a responsible power, The Straits Times Oct 2, 2002 http://iaps.cass.cn/English/articles/showcontent.asp?id=391 Robert B. Zoellick, China and America: Power and Responsibility, Asia Society Annual Dinner, New York, February 25, 2004 http://www.asiasociety.org/speeches/zoellick04.html Books AFK Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger, (University of Chicago Press, 1980) Fei Ling Wang, Beijings Incentive Structure: The Pursuit of Preservation, Prosperity, and Power, Chapter 2, and Yong Deng, Better than Power: International Status in Chinese Foreign Policy, Chapter 3, in China Rising: Power and Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy, edited by Yong Deng and Fei-Ling Wang, (Roman and Littlefield, Lanham, Maryland, 2005)