G.R. No.

L-45685 December 22, 1937 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. JOSE O. VERA, Judge ad interim of First Instance of Manila, and MARIANO CU UNJIENG, respondents. Solicitor-General Tuason and City Fiscal Diaz for the Government. De Witt, Perkins and Ponce Enrile for the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation. Vicente J. Francisco, Feria and La O, Orence and Belmonte, and Gibbs and McDonough for the respondent Cu Unjieng. No appearance for respondent Judge. LAUREL, J.: After rendition of the judgment of this court in the above-entitled case, the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng, on November 26, 1937, gave notice of his intention to petition the Supreme Court of the United State for a writ of certiorari for the review of said judgment and, desiring to stay execution during the pendency of the application for the writ and of the proceedings relative thereto in the Supreme Court of the United State, now prays that the corresponding supersedeas bond be fixed, as provided by the rules of this court. The People of the Philippines and the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, petitioners in the above-entitled case, oppose the application of the respondent for the granting of a supersedeas bond. The original action instituted in this court which resulted in the declaration of unconstitutionality of the Probation Act (No. 4221 ) was for certiorari and prohibition. Respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng, thru counsel, states that as certiorari and prohibition are civil remedies, it is mandatory upon this court to stay enforcement of its judgment in the above-entitled case. (Sec. 46 [a] infra, Rules of the Supreme Court of the Philippines.) He also calls attention to the principle that probation can not be granted after the defendant has begun the service of his sentence and to the policy of this court to encourage review of its decisions and judgments on certiorari by the Federal Supreme Court. In opposition, the petitioners state that the judgment of this court declaring the Probation Act unconstitutional and void is self-executing; that there is no judgment in the instant proceedings to be executed and that the supersedeas will serve no useful purpose. The petitioner gave answer to the foregoing objections raised by the respondent and reiterated the arguments advanced by him in support of his petition for the fixing of the bond. Section 46 (a) of the rules of this court provides that: Whenever it is made to appear by notice in writing that any party to a civil case in which final judgment has been rendered by this court intends to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of certiorari for the review of the decision and judgment of his court, and it appears that the case is one which, by reason of the amount involved or the nature of the questions of law presented, may be removed to the Supreme Court of the United States by writ of certiorari, and it further appears that the party intending to make application for such writ desires to stay the enforcement of the judgment of this court during the pendency of the application for the writ of certiorari and of the proceeding in the Supreme Court of the United States, it such is granted, this court shall grant a stay, for a term not to exceed ten days, within which the moving party may give a supersedeas bond, and shall designate one of its members to determine the sufficiency of such bond. The foregoing rule requires that in any civil case in which final judgment has been rendered by this court, if any party thereto gives notice in writing of his intention to remove the case to the Supreme Court of the United States by writ of certiorari, this court shall grant a stay for the period therein mentioned within which said party may give a supersedeas bond, the sufficiency of which is to be determined by one of the members of this court. It is admitted that certiorari and prohibition are civil remedies but the certiorari and prohibition proceedings originally instituted in this court were, like the proceedings for probation, an incident of the criminal case. Apart from this, it will be noted that the appeal taken is from the judgment of this court declaring the Probation Act unconstitutional and void. That judgment does not command or permit any act to be done. There is nothing there to be actively enforced by execution or otherwise. Because of its negative or prohibitive character, there is nothing to supersede; nothing, as petitioners assert, upon which the stay bond can operate. In reality, the supersedeas is intended to operate on the decision and judgment in the criminal case entitled "The People of the Philippines Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng et al." The decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila in that case, rendered on January 8, 1934 (Criminal Case No. 42649), was affirmed by this court on March 26, 1935 (G.R. No. 41200), 1. The decision of this court in that criminal case has already become final and the petition for a writ of certiorari to review said decision was denied by the Supreme Court of the United States in November of last year. At bottom, supersedeas is being sought to stay the execution of the final judgment in said criminal case. Thereby, the petitioner will continue to be at large and this is the status quo desired to be maintained. We do not think that this should be allowed. (Sec. 46 [f], Rules of the Supreme Court of the Philippines.) The suspensive effect of supersedeas can only operate in this case on the judgment sought to be reviewed and cannot arrest the execution of the final judgment rendered in the criminal case against the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng. (Cyc. of Fed. Proc., Civil and Criminal, Longsdorf, vol. 6, sec. 2869, p. 362.) The public interest and the interest of the speedy administration of justice demand prompt execution of the final sentence of conviction rendered against the petitioner. Said petitioner has had all the time and opportunity which the law can possibly afford to anyone in self-defense. He had the assistance of able counsel and opportunity to appeal to this court and the Supreme Court of the United States, and the least that can be said is that he must abide by this judgment and serve his term. It is further to be observed that the petition for probation of the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng has already by the trial court. There is force in the argument that where the case is appealable under the Constitution and law to the Supreme Court of the United States, this court is but an agent of that court and must permit the case to take its due course. In such a case, the appeal is a matter of right. But from this premise it does not follow that a stay must be granted by this court where nothing can be stayed, or that the final decision in a criminal case which can no longer be appealed from should be superseded. Upon the other hand, the 1

wide latitude necessarily possessed by this court in the interpretation of its Rules must be exercised in favor of what is believed to be a matter of public interest in the present case. As a rule of federal practice in the United States, section 8 cd. of the Act of Congress of February 13, 1925 (43 Stat., 936, 940; 28 U.S.C.A., sec. 350), provides that in any case the execution and enforcement of final judgment or degree which is subject to review by the Supreme Court of the United States on writ of certiorari is discretionary with "a judge of the court rendering the judgment or decree or by the Justice of the Supreme Court," and this rule is reiterated in paragraph 6 of Rule 38 of the Supreme Court of the United States. (Robertson & Kirkham, sec. 413, p. 831 et seq.) In Magnum Import Co. vs. De Spoturno Coty (262 U.S., 159,163; 43 S. Ct., 531; 67 Law. ed., 922), the Supreme Court of the United States, though Chief Justice Taft, said:lawphil.net The petition should, in the first instance, be made to the circuit court of appeals, which, with its complete knowledge of the cases, may, with full consideration, promptly pass on it. That court is in a position to judge, first, whether the case is one likely, under our practice, to be taken up by us on certiorari; and, second, whether the balance of convenience requires a suspension of its decree and a withholding of its mandate. It involves no disrespect to this court for the circuit court of appeals to refuse to withhold its mandate or to suspend the operation f its judgment or decree pending application for certiorari to us. If it thinks a question involved should be ruled upon by this court, it may certify it. If it does not certify, it may still consider that the case is one in which a certiorari may properly issue, and may, in its discretion, facilitate the application by witholding the mandate or suspend in its decree. If it refuses, this court requires an extaordinary showing before it will grant a stay of the decree below pending the application for a certiorari, and even after it has granted a certiorari, it requires a clear case and decided balance of convenience before it will grant such stay. These remarks, of course, apply also to applications for certiorari to review judgments and decrees of the highest courts of states. Petition for stay of execution and the fixing of a supersedeas bond is denied. So ordered. Avancea, C.J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial, Diaz and Concepcion, JJ., concur. Footnotes 1 35 Off. Gaz., 738. See also resolutions of December 17, 1935. PEOPLE vs. VERA Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration which was elevated to the SC and the SC remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the he is innocent of the crime he was convicted of. Judge Tuason of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by petitioner allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of Legislature granting provincial boards the power to provide a system of probation to convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is applicable to a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein that only provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution provides equal protection of laws. The said law provides absolute discretion to provincial boards and this also constitutes undue delegation of power. Further, the said probation law may be an encroachment of the power of the executive to provide pardon because providing probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon. ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation of power. HELD: The act of granting probation is not the same as pardon. In fact it is limited and is in a way an imposition of penalty. There is undue delegation of power because there is no set standard provided by Congress on how provincial boards must act in carrying out a system of probation. The provincial boards are given absolute discretion which is violative of the constitution and the doctrine of the non delegability of power. Further, it is a violation of equity so protected by the constitution. The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office. This only means that only provinces that can provide appropriation for a probation officer may have a system of probation within their locality. This would mean to say that convicts in provinces where no probation officer is instituted may not avail of their right to probation. G.R. No. 102782 December 11, 1991 THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, RODOLFO A. MALAPIRA, STEPHEN A. MONSANTO, DAN R. CALDERON, and GRANDY N. TRIESTE, petitioners vs. THE METROPOLITAN MANILA AUTHORITY and the MUNICIPALITY OF MANDALUYONG, respondents. CRUZ, J.:p In Metropolitan Traffic Command, West Traffic District vs. Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong, G.R. No. 91023, promulgated on July 13, 1990, 1 the Court held that the confiscation of the license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations was not among the sanctions that could be imposed by the Metro Manila Commission under PD 1605 and was permitted only under the conditions laid dowm by LOI 43 in the case of stalled vehicles obstructing the public streets. It was there also observed that even the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations was not directly prescribed by the decree nor was it allowed by the decree to be imposed by the Commission. No motion for reconsideration of that decision was submitted. The judgment became final and executory on August 6, 1990, and it was duly entered in the Book of Entries of Judgments on July 13, 1990. Subsequently, the following developments transpired: 2

In a letter dated October 17, 1990, Rodolfo A. Malapira complained to the Court that when he was stopped for an alleged traffic violation, his driver's license was confiscated by Traffic Enforcer Angel de los Reyes in Quezon City. On December 18,1990, the Caloocan-Manila Drivers and Operators Association sent a letter to the Court asking who should enforce the decision in the above-mentioned case, whether they could seek damages for confiscation of their driver's licenses, and where they should file their complaints. Another letter was received by the Court on February 14, 1991, from Stephen L. Monsanto, complaining against the confiscation of his driver's license by Traffic Enforcer A.D. Martinez for an alleged traffic violation in Mandaluyong. This was followed by a letter-complaint filed on March 7, 1991, from Dan R. Calderon, a lawyer, also for confiscation of his driver's license by Pat. R.J. Tano-an of the Makati Police Force. Still another complaint was received by the Court dated April 29, 1991, this time from Grandy N. Trieste, another lawyer, who also protested the removal of his front license plate by E. Ramos of the Metropolitan Manila Authority-Traffic Operations Center and the confiscation of his driver's license by Pat. A.V. Emmanuel of the Metropolitan Police Command-Western Police District. Required to submit a Comment on the complaint against him, Allan D. Martinez invoked Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988, of Mandaluyong, authorizing the confiscation of driver's licenses and the removal of license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations. For his part, A.V. Emmanuel said he confiscated Trieste's driver's license pursuant to a memorandum dated February 27, 1991, from the District Commander of the Western Traffic District of the Philippine National Police, authorizing such sanction under certain conditions. Director General Cesar P. Nazareno of the Philippine National Police assured the Court in his own Comment that his office had never authorized the removal of the license plates of illegally parked vehicles and that he had in fact directed full compliance with the above-mentioned decision in a memorandum, copy of which he attached, entitled Removal of Motor Vehicle License Plates and dated February 28, 1991. Pat. R.J. Tano-an, on the other hand, argued that the Gonong decision prohibited only the removal of license plates and not the confiscation of driver's licenses. On May 24, 1990, the Metropolitan Manila Authority issued Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, authorizing itself "to detach the license plate/tow and impound attended/ unattended/ abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila." On July 2, 1991, the Court issued the following resolution: The attention ofthe Court has been called to the enactment by the Metropolitan Manila Authority of Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, providing inter alia that: Section 2. Authority to Detach Plate/Tow and Impound. The Metropolitan Manila Authority, thru the Traffic Operatiom Center, is authorized to detach the license plate/tow and impound attended/unattended/abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila. The provision appears to be in conflict with the decision of the Court in the case at bar (as reported in 187 SCRA 432), where it was held that the license plates of motor vehicles may not be detached except only under the conditions prescribed in LOI 43. Additionally, the Court has received several complaints against the confiscation by police authorities of driver's licenses for alleged traffic violations, which sanction is, according to the said decision, not among those that may be imposed under PD 1605. To clarify these matters for the proper guidance of law-enforcement officers and motorists, the Court resolved to require the Metropolitan Manila Authority and the Solicitor General to submit, within ten (10) days from notice hereof, separate COMMENTS on such sanctions in light of the said decision. In its Comment, the Metropolitan Manila Authority defended the said ordinance on the ground that it was adopted pursuant to the powers conferred upon it by EO 392. It particularly cited Section 2 thereof vesting in the Council (its governing body) the responsibility among others of: 1. Formulation of policies on the delivery of basic services requiring coordination or consolidation for the Authority; and 2. Promulgation of resolutions and other issuances of metropolitan wide application, approval of a code of basic services requiring coordination, and exercise of its rule-making powers. (Emphasis supplied) The Authority argued that there was no conflict between the decision and the ordinance because the latter was meant to supplement and not supplant the latter. It stressed that the decision itself said that the confiscation of license plates was invalid in the absence of a valid law or ordinance, which was why Ordinance No. 11 was enacted. The Authority also pointed out that the ordinance could not be attacked collaterally but only in a direct action challenging its validity. For his part, the Solicitor General expressed the view that the ordinance was null and void because it represented an invalid exercise of a delegated legislative power. The flaw in the measure was that it violated existing law, specifically PD 1605, which does not permit, and so impliedly prohibits, the removal of license plates and the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila. He made no mention, however, of the alleged impropriety of examining the said ordinance in the absence of a formal challenge to its validity. On October 24, 1991, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted a motion for the early resolution of the questioned sanctions, to remove once and for all the uncertainty of their vahdity. A similar motion was filed by the Metropolitan Manila Authority, which 3

reiterated its contention that the incidents in question should be dismissed because there was no actual case or controversy before the Court. The Metropolitan Manila Authority is correct in invoking the doctrine that the validity of a law or act can be challenged only in a direct action and not collaterally. That is indeed the settled principle. However, that rule is not inflexible and may be relaxed by the Court under exceptional circumstances, such as those in the present controversy. The Solicitor General notes that the practices complained of have created a great deal of confusion among motorists about the state of the law on the questioned sanctions. More importantly, he maintains that these sanctions are illegal, being violative of law and the Gonong decision, and should therefore be stopped. We also note the disturbing report that one policeman who confiscated a driver's license dismissed the Gonong decision as "wrong" and said the police would not stop their "habit" unless they received orders "from the top." Regrettably, not one of the complainants has filed a formal challenge to the ordinances, including Monsanto and Trieste, who are lawyers and could have been more assertive of their rights. Given these considerations, the Court feels it must address the problem squarely presented to it and decide it as categorically rather than dismiss the complaints on the basis of the technical objection raised and thus, through its inaction, allow them to fester. The step we now take is not without legal authority or judicial precedent. Unquestionably, the Court has the power to suspend procedural rules in the exercise of its inherent power, as expressly recognized in the Constitution, to promulgate rules concerning "pleading, practice and procedure in all courts." 2 In proper cases, procedural rules may be relaxed or suspended in the interest of substantial justice, which otherwise may be miscarried because of a rigid and formalistic adherence to such rules. The Court has taken this step in a number of such cases, notably Araneta vs. Dinglasan, 3 where Justice Tuason justified the deviation on the ground that "the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure." We have made similar rulings in other cases, thus: Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment ofjustice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be avoided. (Aznar III vs. Bernad, G.R. No. 81190, May 9, 1988, 161 SCRA 276.) Time and again, this Court has suspended its own rules and excepted a particular case from their operation whenever the higher interests of justice so require. In the instant petition, we forego a lengthy disquisition of the proper procedure that should have been taken by the parties involved and proceed directly to the merits of the case. (Piczon vs. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 31). Three of the cases were consolidated for argument and the other two were argued separately on other dates. Inasmuch as all of them present the same fundamental question which, in our view, is decisive, they will be disposed of jointly. For the same reason we will pass up the objection to the personality or sufficiency of interest of the petitioners in case G.R. No. L-3054 and case G.R. No. L-3056 and the question whether prohibition lies in cases G.R. Nos. L-2044 and L2756. No practical benefit can be gained from a discussion of these procedural matters, since the decision in the cases wherein the petitioners'cause of action or the propriety of the procedure followed is not in dispute, will be controlling authority on the others. Above all, the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure. (Avelino vs. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-2821 cited in Araneta vs. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368.) Accordingly, the Court will consider the motion to resolve filed by the Solicitor General a petition for prohibition against the enforcement of Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, of the Metropohtan Manila Authority, and Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of Mandaluyong. Stephen A. Monsanto, Rodolfo A. Malapira, Dan R. Calderon, and Grandy N. Trieste are considered co-petitioners and the Metropolitan Manila Authority and the Municipality of Mandaluyong are hereby impleaded as respondents. This petition is docketed as G.R. No. 102782. The comments already submitted are duly noted and shall be taken into account by the Court in the resolution of the substantive issues raised. It is stressed that this action is not intended to disparage procedural rules, which the Court has recognized often enough as necessary to the orderly administration of justice. If we are relaxing them in this particular case, it is because of the failure of the proper parties to file the appropriate proceeding against the acts complained of, and the necessity of resolving, in the interest of the public, the important substantive issues raised. Now to the merits. The Metro Manila Authority sustains Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, under the specific authority conferred upon it by EO 392, while Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988, is justified on the basis of the General Welfare Clause embodied in the Local Government Code. 4 It is not disputed that both measures were enacted to promote the comfort and convenience of the public and to alleviate the worsening traffic problems in Metropolitan Manila due in large part to violations of traffic rules. The Court holds that there is a valid delegation of legislative power to promulgate such measures, it appearing that the requisites of such delegation are present. These requisites are. 1) the completeness of the statute making the delegation; and 2) the presence of a sufficient standard. 5 Under the first requirement, the statute must leave the legislature complete in all its terms and provisions such that all the delegate will have to do when the statute reaches it is to implement it. What only can be delegated is not the discretion to determine what the law shall be but the discretion to determine how the law shall be enforced. This has been done in the case at bar. As a second requirement, the enforcement may be effected only in accordance with a sufficient standard, the function of which is to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and thus "prevent the delegation from running riot." This requirement has 4

also been met. It is settled that the "convenience and welfare" of the public, particularly the motorists and passengers in the case at bar, is an acceptable sufficient standard to delimit the delegate's authority. 6 But the problem before us is not the validity of the delegation of legislative power. The question we must resolve is the validity of the exercise of such delegated power. The measures in question are enactments of local governments acting only as agents of the national legislature. Necessarily, the acts of these agents must reflect and conform to the will of their principal. To test the validity of such acts in the specific case now before us, we apply the particular requisites of a valid ordinance as laid down by the accepted principles governing municipal corporations. According to Elliot, a municipal ordinance, to be valid: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2) must not be unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be partial or discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; 5) must not be unreasonable; and 6) must be general and consistent with public policy. 7 A careful study of the Gonong decision will show that the measures under consideration do not pass the first criterion because they do not conform to existing law. The pertinent law is PD 1605. PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of license plates or the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in the following provisions of the decree authorizing the Metropolitan Manila Commission (and now the Metropolitan Manila Authority) to impose such sanctions: Section 1. The Metropolitan Manila Commission shall have the power to impose fines and otherwise discipline drivers and operators of motor vehicles for violations of traffic laws, ordinances, rules and regulations in Metropolitan Manila in such amounts and under such penalties as are herein prescribed. For this purpose, the powers of the Land Transportation Commission and the Board of Transportation under existing laws over such violations and punishment thereof are hereby transferred to the Metropolitan Manila Commission. When the proper penalty to be imposed is suspension or revocation of driver's license or certificate of public convenience, the Metropolitan Manila Commission or its representatives shall suspend or revoke such license or certificate. The suspended or revoked driver's license or the report of suspension or revocation of the certificate of public convenience shall be sent to the Land Transportation Commission or the Board of Transportation, as the case may be, for their records update. xxx xxx xxx Section 3.` Violations of traffic laws, ordinances, rules and regulations, committed within a twelve-month period, reckoned from the date of birth of the licensee, shall subject the violator to graduated fines as follows: P10.00 for the first offense, P20.00 for the and offense, P50.00 for the third offense, a one-year suspension of driver's license for the fourth offense, and a revocation of the driver's license for the fifth offense: Provided, That the Metropolitan Manila Commission may impose higher penalties as it may deem proper for violations of its ordinances prohibiting or regulating the use of certain public roads, streets and thoroughfares in Metropolitan Manila. xxx xxx xxx Section 5. In case of traffic violations, the driver's license shall not be confiscated but the erring driver shall be immediately issued a traffic citation ticket prescribed by the Metropolitan Manila Commission which shall state the violation committed, the amount of fine imposed for the violation and an advice that he can make payment to the city or municipal treasurer where the violation was committed or to the Philippine National Bank or Philippine Veterans Bank or their branches within seven days from the date of issuance of the citation ticket. If the offender fails to pay the fine imposed within the period herein prescribed, the Metropolitan Manila Commission or the law-enforcement agency concerned shall endorse the case to the proper fiscal for appropriate proceedings preparatory to the filing of the case with the competent traffic court, city or municipal court. If at the time a driver renews his driver's license and records show that he has an unpaid fine, his driver's license shall not be renewed until he has paid the fine and corresponding surcharges. xxx xxx xxx Section 8. Insofar as the Metropolitan Manila area is concerned, all laws, decrees, orders, ordinances, rules and regulations, or parts thereof inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. (Emphasis supplied). In fact, the above provisions prohibit the imposition of such sanctions in Metropolitan Manila. The Commission was allowed to "impose fines and otherwise discipline" traffic violators only "in such amounts and under such penalties as are herein prescribed," that is, by the decree itself. Nowhere is the removal of license plates directly imposed by the decree or at least allowed by it to be imposed by the Commission. Notably, Section 5 thereof expressly provides that "in case of traffic violations, the driver's license shall not be confiscated." These restrictions are applicable to the Metropolitan Manila Authority and all other local political subdivisions comprising Metropolitan Manila, including the Municipality of Mandaluyong. The requirement that the municipal enactment must not violate existing law explains itself. Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the national legislature (except only that the power to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the Constitution itself). 8 They are mere agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local government unit cannot contravene but must obey at all times the will of their principal. In the case before us, the enactments in question, which are merely local in origin, cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect of a statute. 5

The self-serving language of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance is worth noting. Curiously, it is the measure itself, which was enacted by the Metropolitan Manila Authority, that authorizes the Metropolitan Manila Authority to impose the questioned sanction. In Villacorta vs, Bemardo, 9 the Court nullified an ordinance enacted by the Municipal Board of Dagupan City for being violative of the Land Registration Act. The decision held in part: In declaring the said ordinance null and void, the court a quo declared: From the above-recited requirements, there is no showing that would justify the enactment of the questioned ordinance. Section 1 of said ordinance clearly conflicts with Section 44 of Act 496, because the latter law does not require subdivision plans to be submitted to the City Engineer before the same is submitted for approval to and verification by the General Land Registration Office or by the Director of Lands as provided for in Section 58 of said Act. Section 2 of the same ordinance also contravenes the provisions of Section 44 of Act 496, the latter being silent on a service fee of P0.03 per square meter of every lot subject of such subdivision application; Section 3 of the ordinance in question also conflicts with Section 44 of Act 496, because the latter law does not mention of a certification to be made by the City Engineer before the Register of Deeds allows registration of the subdivision plan; and the last section of said ordinance impose a penalty for its violation, which Section 44 of Act 496 does not impose. In other words, Ordinance 22 of the City of Dagupan imposes upon a subdivision owner additional conditions. xxx xxx xxx The Court takes note of the laudable purpose of the ordinance in bringing to a halt the surreptitious registration of lands belonging to the government. But as already intimated above, the powers of the board in enacting such a laudable ordinance cannot be held valid when it shall impede the exercise of rights granted in a general law and/or make a general law subordinated to a local ordinance. We affirm. To sustain the ordinance would be to open the floodgates to other ordinances amending and so violating national laws in the guise of implementing them. Thus, ordinances could be passed imposing additional requirements for the issuance of marriage licenses, to prevent bigamy; the registration of vehicles, to minimize carnapping; the execution of contracts, to forestall fraud; the validation of parts, to deter imposture; the exercise of freedom of speech, to reduce disorder; and so on. The list is endless, but the means, even if the end be valid, would be ultra vires. The measures in question do not merely add to the requirement of PD 1605 but, worse, impose sanctions the decree does not allow and in fact actually prohibits. In so doing, the ordinances disregard and violate and in effect partially repeal the law. We here emphasize the ruling in the Gonong case that PD 1605 applies only to the Metropolitan Manila area. It is an exception to the general authority conferred by R.A. No. 413 on the Commissioner of Land Transportation to punish violations of traffic rules elsewhere in the country with the sanction therein prescribed, including those here questioned. The Court agrees that the challenged ordinances were enacted with the best of motives and shares the concern of the rest of the public for the effective reduction of traffic problems in Metropolitan Manila through the imposition and enforcement of more deterrent penalties upon traffic violators. At the same time, it must also reiterate the public misgivings over the abuses that may attend the enforcement of such sanction in eluding the illicit practices described in detail in the Gonong decision. At any rate, the fact is that there is no statutory authority for and indeed there is a statutory prohibition against the imposition of such penalties in the Metropolitan Manila area. Hence, regardless of their merits, they cannot be impose by the challenged enactments by virtue only of the delegated legislative powers. It is for Congress to determine, in the exercise of its own discretion, whether or not to impose such sanctions, either directly through a statute or by simply delegating authority to this effect to the local governments in Metropolitan Manila. Without such action, PD 1605 remains effective and continues prohibit the confiscation of license plates of motor vehicles (except under the conditions prescribed in LOI 43) and of driver licenses as well for traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila. WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: (1) declaring Ordinance No.11, Seriesof l991,of theMetropolitan Manila Authority and Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988 of the Municipality of Mandaluyong, NULL and VOID; and (2) enjoining all law enforcement authorities in Metropolitan Manila from removing the license plates of motor vehicles (except when authorized under LOI 43) and confiscating driver licenses for traffic violations within the said area. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur. Nocon, J., took no part. # Footnotes 1 En Banc 187 SCRA 432. 2 Constitution, Article VHI, Section 5(5). 3 84 Phil. 368. 4 R.A. 7160, Title One, Chapter 2, Section 16. 5 Pelaez v. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569. 6

6 Calalang v. Williams, 70 Phil. 726. 7 U.S. v. Abendan, 24 Phil. 165. 8 Article X, Section 5. 9 143 SCR.A 480.

G.R. No. 170656 August 15, 2007 THE METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY and BAYANI FERNANDO as Chairman of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, petitioners, vs. VIRON TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., respondent. x --------------------------------------------- x G.R. No. 170657 August 15, 2007 HON. ALBERTO G. ROMULO, Executive Secretary, the METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY and BAYANI FERNANDO as Chairman of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, petitioners, vs. MENCORP TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM, INC., respondent. DECISION CARPIO MORALES, J.: The following conditions in 1969, as observed by this Court: Vehicles have increased in number. Traffic congestion has moved from bad to worse, from tolerable to critical. 1 The number of people who use the thoroughfares has multiplied x x x, have remained unchecked and have reverberated to this day. Traffic jams continue to clog the streets of Metro Manila, bringing vehicles to a standstill at main road arteries during rush hour traffic and sapping peoples energies and patience in the process. The present petition for review on certiorari, rooted in the traffic congestion problem, questions the authority of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) to order the closure of provincial bus terminals along Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) and major thoroughfares of Metro Manila. Specifically challenged are two Orders issued by Judge Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 26 in Civil Case Nos. 03-105850 and 03-106224. 2 The first assailed Order of September 8, 2005, which resolved a motion for reconsideration filed by herein respondents, declared Executive Order (E.O.) No. 179, hereafter referred to as the E.O., "unconstitutional as it constitutes an unreasonable exercise of 3 police power." The second assailed Order of November 23, 2005 denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. The following facts are not disputed: President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued the E.O. on February 10, 2003, "Providing for the Establishment of Greater Manila Mass Transport System," the pertinent portions of which read: WHEREAS, Metro Manila continues to be the center of employment opportunities, trade and commerce of the Greater Metro Manila area; WHEREAS, the traffic situation in Metro Manila has affected the adjacent provinces of Bulacan, Cavite, Laguna, and Rizal, owing to the continued movement of residents and industries to more affordable and economically viable locations in these provinces; WHEREAS, the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) is tasked to undertake measures to ease traffic congestion in Metro Manila and ensure the convenient and efficient travel of commuters within its jurisdiction; WHEREAS, a primary cause of traffic congestion in Metro Manila has been the numerous buses plying the streets that impedes [sic] the flow of vehicles and commuters due to the inefficient connectivity of the different transport modes; WHEREAS, the MMDA has recommended a plan to decongest traffic by eliminating the bus terminals now located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and providing more convenient access to the mass transport system to the commuting public through the provision of mass transport terminal facilities that would integrate the existing transport modes, namely the buses, the rail-based systems of the LRT, MRT and PNR and to facilitate and ensure efficient travel through the improved connectivity of the different transport modes; WHEREAS, the national government must provide the necessary funding requirements to immediately implement and render operational these projects; and extent to MMDA such other assistance as may be warranted to ensure their expeditious prosecution. 7

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby order: Section 1. THE PROJECT. The project shall be identified as GREATER MANILA TRANSPORT SYSTEM Project. Section 2. PROJECT OBJECTIVES. In accordance with the plan proposed by MMDA, the project aims to develop four (4) interim intermodal mass transport terminals to integrate the different transport modes, as well as those that shall hereafter be developed, to serve the commuting public in the northwest, north, east, south, and southwest of Metro Manila. Initially, the project shall concentrate on immediately establishing the mass transport terminals for the north and south Metro Manila commuters as hereinafter described. Section 3. PROJECT IMPLEMENTING AGENCY. The Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), is hereby designated as the implementing Agency for the project. For this purpose, MMDA is directed to undertake such infrastructure development work as may be necessary and, thereafter, manage the project until it may be turned-over to more appropriate agencies, if found suitable and convenient. Specifically, MMDA shall have the following functions and responsibilities: a) Cause the preparation of the Master Plan for the projects, including the designs and costing; b) Coordinate the use of the land and/or properties needed for the project with the respective agencies and/or entities owning them; c) Supervise and manage the construction of the necessary structures and facilities; d) Execute such contracts or agreements as may be necessary, with the appropriate government agencies, entities, and/or private persons, in accordance with existing laws and pertinent regulations, to facilitate the implementation of the project; e) Accept, manage and disburse such funds as may be necessary for the construction and/or implementation of the projects, in accordance with prevailing accounting and audit polices and practice in government. f) Enlist the assistance of any national government agency, office or department, including local government units, government-owned or controlled corporations, as may be necessary; g) Assign or hire the necessary personnel for the above purposes; and h) Perform such other related functions as may be necessary to enable it to accomplish the objectives 4 and purposes of this Executive Order. (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied) As the above-quoted portions of the E.O. noted, the primary cause of traffic congestion in Metro Manila has been the numerous 5 buses plying the streets and the inefficient connectivity of the different transport modes; and the MMDA had "recommended a plan to decongest traffic by eliminating the bus terminals now located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and providing more and convenient access to the mass transport system to the commuting public through the provision of mass transport terminal 6 facilities" which plan is referred to under the E.O. as the Greater Manila Mass Transport System Project (the Project). The E.O. thus designated the MMDA as the implementing agency for the Project. Pursuant to the E.O., the Metro Manila Council (MMC), the governing board and policymaking body of the MMDA, issued 7 Resolution No. 03-07 series of 2003 expressing full support of the Project. Recognizing the imperative to integrate the different transport modes via the establishment of common bus parking terminal areas, the MMC cited the need to remove the bus 8 terminals located along major thoroughfares of Metro Manila. On February 24, 2003, Viron Transport Co., Inc. (Viron), a domestic corporation engaged in the business of public transportation 9 10 11 with a provincial bus operation, filed a petition for declaratory relief before the RTC of Manila. In its petition which was docketed as Civil Case No. 03-105850, Viron alleged that the MMDA, through Chairman Fernando, was "poised to issue a Circular, Memorandum or Order closing, or tantamount to closing, all provincial bus terminals along EDSA and 12 in the whole of the Metropolis under the pretext of traffic regulation." This impending move, it stressed, would mean the closure of its bus terminal in Sampaloc, Manila and two others in Quezon City. Alleging that the MMDAs authority does not include the power to direct provincial bus operators to abandon their existing bus terminals to thus deprive them of the use of their property, Viron asked the court to construe the scope, extent and limitation of the power of the MMDA to regulate traffic under R.A. No. 7924, "An Act Creating the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, Defining its Powers and Functions, Providing Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes." Viron also asked for a ruling on whether the planned closure of provincial bus terminals would contravene the Public Service Act and related laws which mandate public utilities to provide and maintain their own terminals as a requisite for the privilege of 13 operating as common carriers. 14 Mencorp Transportation System, Inc. (Mencorp), another provincial bus operator, later filed a similar petition for declaratory relief against Executive Secretary Alberto G. Romulo and MMDA Chairman Fernando. Mencorp asked the court to declare the E.O. unconstitutional and illegal for transgressing the possessory rights of owners and operators of public land transportation units over their respective terminals. Averring that MMDA Chairman Fernando had begun to implement a plan to close and eliminate all provincial bus terminals along 15 EDSA and in the whole of the metropolis and to transfer their operations to common bus terminals, Mencorp prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the impending closure of its bus terminals which it was leasing at the corner of EDSA and New York Street in Cubao and at the intersection of Blumentritt, Laon Laan and Halcon Streets in Quezon City. The petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 03-106224 and was raffled to Branch 47 of the RTC of Manila. 8

Mencorps petition was consolidated on June 19, 2003 with Virons petition which was raffled to Branch 26 of the RTC, Manila. Mencorps prayer for a TRO and/or writ of injunction was denied as was its application for the issuance of a preliminary 16 injunction. 17 In the Pre-Trial Order issued by the trial court, the issues were narrowed down to whether 1) the MMDAs power to regulate traffic in Metro Manila included the power to direct provincial bus operators to abandon and close their duly established and existing bus terminals in order to conduct business in a common terminal; (2) the E.O. is consistent with the Public Service Act and the Constitution; and (3) provincial bus operators would be deprived of their real properties without due process of law should they be required to use the common bus terminals. Upon the agreement of the parties, they filed their respective position papers in lieu of hearings. 18 By Decision of January 24, 2005, the trial court sustained the constitutionality and legality of the E.O. pursuant to R.A. No. 7924, which empowered the MMDA to administer Metro Manilas basic services including those of transport and traffic management. The trial court held that the E.O. was a valid exercise of the police power of the State as it satisfied the two tests of lawful subject matter and lawful means, hence, Virons and Mencorps property rights must yield to police power. On the separate motions for reconsideration of Viron and Mencorp, the trial court, by Order of September 8, 2005, reversed its Decision, this time holding that the E.O. was "an unreasonable exercise of police power"; that the authority of the MMDA under Section (5)(e) of R.A. No. 7924 does not include the power to order the closure of Virons and Mencorps existing bus terminals; and that the E.O. is inconsistent with the provisions of the Public Service Act. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by Resolution of November 23, 2005. Hence, this petition, which faults the trial court for failing to rule that: (1) the requisites of declaratory relief are not present, there being no justiciable controversy in Civil Case Nos. 03-105850 and 03-106224; and (2) the President has the authority to undertake 19 or cause the implementation of the Project. Petitioners contend that there is no justiciable controversy in the cases for declaratory relief as nothing in the body of the E.O. mentions or orders the closure and elimination of bus terminals along the major thoroughfares of Metro Manila. Viron and Mencorp, they argue, failed to produce any letter or communication from the Executive Department apprising them of an immediate plan to close down their bus terminals. And petitioners maintain that the E.O. is only an administrative directive to government agencies to coordinate with the MMDA and to make available for use government property along EDSA and South Expressway corridors. They add that the only relation created by the E.O. is that between the Chief Executive and the implementing officials, but not between third persons. The petition fails. It is true, as respondents have pointed out, that the alleged deficiency of the consolidated petitions to meet the requirement of justiciability was not among the issues defined for resolution in the Pre-Trial Order of January 12, 2004. It is equally true, however, 20 that the question was repeatedly raised by petitioners in their Answer to Virons petition, their Comment of April 29, 2003 21 22 opposing Mencorps prayer for the issuance of a TRO, and their Position Paper of August 23, 2004. In bringing their petitions before the trial court, both respondents pleaded the existence of the essential requisites for their 23 24 respective petitions for declaratory relief, and refuted petitioners contention that a justiciable controversy was lacking. There can be no denying, therefore, that the issue was raised and discussed by the parties before the trial court. The following are the essential requisites for a declaratory relief petition: (a) there must be a justiciable controversy; (b) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (c) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal 25 interest in the controversy; and (d) the issue invoked must be ripe for judicial determination. The requirement of the presence of a justiciable controversy is satisfied when an actual controversy or the ripening seeds thereof exist between the parties, all of whom are sui juris and before the court, and the declaration sought will help in ending the 26 27 controversy. A question becomes justiciable when it is translated into a claim of right which is actually contested. th In the present cases, respondents resort to court was prompted by the issuance of the E.O. The 4 Whereas clause of the E.O. sets out in clear strokes the MMDAs plan to "decongest traffic by eliminating the bus terminals now located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and providing more convenient access to the mass transport system to the commuting public through the provision of mass transport terminal facilities x x x." (Emphasis supplied) Section 2 of the E.O. thereafter lays down the immediate establishment of common bus terminals for north- and south-bound commuters. For this purpose, Section 8 directs the Department of Budget and Management to allocate funds of not more than one hundred million pesos (P100,000,000) to cover the cost of the construction of the north and south terminals. And the E.O. was made effective immediately. The MMDAs resolve to immediately implement the Project, its denials to the contrary notwithstanding, is also evident from telltale circumstances, foremost of which was the passage by the MMC of Resolution No. 03-07, Series of 2003 expressing its full support of the immediate implementation of the Project. th Notable from the 5 Whereas clause of the MMC Resolution is the plan to "remove the bus terminals located along major th thoroughfares of Metro Manila and an urgent need to integrate the different transport modes." The 7 Whereas clause proceeds to mention the establishment of the North and South terminals. As alleged in Virons petition, a diagram of the GMA-MTS North Bus/Rail Terminal had been drawn up, and construction of the 28 29 terminal is already in progress. The MMDA, in its Answer and Position Paper, in fact affirmed that the government had begun to implement the Project. It thus appears that the issue has already transcended the boundaries of what is merely conjectural or anticipatory.

Under the circumstances, for respondents to wait for the actual issuance by the MMDA of an order for the closure of respondents bus terminals would be foolhardy for, by then, the proper action to bring would no longer be for declaratory relief which, under 30 Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, must be brought before there is a breach or violation of rights. As for petitioners contention that the E.O. is a mere administrative issuance which creates no relation with third persons, it does not persuade. Suffice it to stress that to ensure the success of the Project for which the concerned government agencies are directed to coordinate their activities and resources, the existing bus terminals owned, operated or leased by third persons like respondents would have to be eliminated; and respondents would be forced to operate from the common bus terminals. It cannot be gainsaid that the E.O. would have an adverse effect on respondents. The closure of their bus terminals would mean, among other things, the loss of income from the operation and/or rentals of stalls thereat. Precisely, respondents claim a deprivation of their constitutional right to property without due process of law. Respondents have thus amply demonstrated a "personal and substantial interest in the case such that [they have] sustained, or 31 will sustain, direct injury as a result of [the E.O.s] enforcement." Consequently, the established rule that the constitutionality of a law or administrative issuance can be challenged by one who will sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement has been satisfied by respondents. On to the merits of the case. Respondents posit that the MMDA is devoid of authority to order the elimination of their bus terminals under the E.O. which, they argue, is unconstitutional because it violates both the Constitution and the Public Service Act; and that neither is the MMDA clothed with such authority under R.A. No. 7924. Petitioners submit, however, that the real issue concerns the Presidents authority to undertake or to cause the implementation of the Project. They assert that the authority of the President is derived from E.O. No. 125, "Reorganizing the Ministry of Transportation and Communications Defining its Powers and Functions and for Other Purposes," her residual power and/or E.O. No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987. They add that the E.O. is also a valid exercise of the police power. 32 E.O. No. 125, which former President Corazon Aquino issued in the exercise of legislative powers, reorganized the then Ministry 33 (now Department) of Transportation and Communications. Sections 4, 5, 6 and 22 of E.O. 125, as amended by E.O. 125-A, read: SECTION 4. Mandate. The Ministry shall be the primary policy, planning, programming, coordinating, implementing, regulating and administrative entity of the Executive Branch of the government in the promotion, development and regulation of dependable and coordinated networks of transportation and communication systems as well as in the fast, safe, efficient and reliable postal, transportation and communications services. To accomplish such mandate, the Ministry shall have the following objectives: (a) Promote the development of dependable and coordinated networks of transportation and communications systems; (b) Guide government and private investment in the development of the countrys intermodal transportation and communications systems in a most practical, expeditious, and orderly fashion for maximum safety, service, and cost effectiveness; (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) xxxx SECTION 5. Powers and Functions. To accomplish its mandate, the Ministry shall have the following powers and functions: (a) Formulate and recommend national policies and guidelines for the preparation and implementation of integrated and comprehensive transportation and communications systems at the national, regional and local levels; (b) Establish and administer comprehensive and integrated programs for transportation and communications, and for this purpose, may call on any agency, corporation, or organization, whether public or private, whose development programs include transportation and communications as an integral part thereof, to participate and assist in the preparation and implementation of such program; (c) Assess, review and provide direction to transportation and communications research and development programs of the government in coordination with other institutions concerned; (d) Administer all laws, rules and regulations in the field of transportation and communications; (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) xxxx SECTION 6. Authority and Responsibility. The authority and responsibility for the exercise of the mandate of the Ministry and for the discharge of its powers and functions shall be vested in the Minister of Transportation and Communications, hereinafter referred to as the Minister, who shall have supervision and control over the Ministry and shall be appointed by the President. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) SECTION 22. Implementing Authority of Minister. The Minister shall issue such orders, rules, regulations and other issuances as may be necessary to ensure the effective implementation of the provisions of this Executive Order. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) It is readily apparent from the abovequoted provisions of E.O. No. 125, as amended, that the President, then possessed of and exercising legislative powers, mandated the DOTC to be the primary policy, planning, programming, coordinating, implementing, regulating and administrative entity to promote, develop and regulate networks of transportation and communications. The grant of 10

authority to the DOTC includes the power to establish and administer comprehensive and integrated programs for transportation and communications. As may be seen further, the Minister (now Secretary) of the DOTC is vested with the authority and responsibility to exercise the mandate given to the department. Accordingly, the DOTC Secretary is authorized to issue such orders, rules, regulations and other issuances as may be necessary to ensure the effective implementation of the law. Since, under the law, the DOTC is authorized to establish and administer programs and projects for transportation, it follows that the President may exercise the same power and authority to order the implementation of the Project, which admittedly is one for transportation. Such authority springs from the Presidents power of control over all executive departments as well as the obligation for the faithful execution of the laws under Article VII, Section 17 of the Constitution which provides: SECTION 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. This constitutional provision is echoed in Section 1, Book III of the Administrative Code of 1987. Notably, Section 38, Chapter 37, Book IV of the same Code defines the Presidents power of supervision and control over the executive departments, viz: SECTION 38. Definition of Administrative Relationships. Unless otherwise expressly stated in the Code or in other laws defining the special relationships of particular agencies, administrative relationships shall be categorized and defined as follows: (1) Supervision and Control. Supervision and control shall include authority to act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units; determine priorities in the execution of plans and programs. Unless a different meaning is explicitly provided in the specific law governing the relationship of particular agencies the word "control" shall encompass supervision and control as defined in this paragraph. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Thus, whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate, the President may act directly or merely 34 direct the performance of a duty. Respecting the Presidents authority to order the implementation of the Project in the exercise of the police power of the State, suffice it to stress that the powers vested in the DOTC Secretary to establish and administer comprehensive and integrated programs for transportation and communications and to issue orders, rules and regulations to implement such mandate (which, as previously discussed, may also be exercised by the President) have been so delegated for the good and welfare of the people. Hence, these powers partake of the nature of police power. Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish wholesome and reasonable laws, 35 statutes and ordinances, not repugnant to the Constitution, for the good and welfare of the people. This power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people flows from the recognition that salus populi est suprema lex the welfare of the people is the supreme law. While police power rests primarily with the legislature, such power may be delegated, as it is in fact increasingly being 36 37 delegated. By virtue of a valid delegation, the power may be exercised by the President and administrative boards as well as by the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local governments under an express delegation by the Local Government 38 Code of 1991. The authority of the President to order the implementation of the Project notwithstanding, the designation of the MMDA as the implementing agency for the Project may not be sustained. It is ultra vires, there being no legal basis therefor. It bears stressing that under the provisions of E.O. No. 125, as amended, it is the DOTC, and not the MMDA, which is authorized to establish and implement a project such as the one subject of the cases at bar. Thus, the President, although authorized to establish or cause the implementation of the Project, must exercise the authority through the instrumentality of the DOTC which, by law, is the primary implementing and administrative entity in the promotion, development and regulation of networks of transportation, and the one so authorized to establish and implement a project such as the Project in question. By designating the MMDA as the implementing agency of the Project, the President clearly overstepped the limits of the authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. No. 179 ultra vires. In another vein, the validity of the designation of MMDA flies in the absence of a specific grant of authority to it under R.A. No. 7924. 39 To recall, R.A. No. 7924 declared the Metropolitan Manila area as a "special development and administrative region" and placed the administration of "metro-wide" basic services affecting the region under the MMDA. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7924 specifically authorizes the MMDA to perform "planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and in the process exercise regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide services," including transport and traffic 40 management. Section 5 of the same law enumerates the powers and functions of the MMDA as follows: (a) Formulate, coordinate and regulate the implementation of medium and long-term plans and programs for the delivery of metro-wide services, land use and physical development within Metropolitan Manila, consistent with national development objectives and priorities; (b) Prepare, coordinate and regulate the implementation of medium-term investment programs for metro-wide services which shall indicate sources and uses of funds for priority programs and projects, and which shall include the packaging of projects and presentation to funding institutions;

11

(c) Undertake and manage on its own metro-wide programs and projects for the delivery of specific services under its jurisdiction, subject to the approval of the Council. For this purpose, MMDA can create appropriate project management offices; (d) Coordinate and monitor the implementation of such plans, programs and projects in Metro Manila; identify bottlenecks and adopt solutions to problems of implementation; (e) The MMDA shall set the policies concerning traffic in Metro Manila, and shall coordinate and regulate the implementation of all programs and projects concerning traffic management, specifically pertaining to enforcement, engineering and education. Upon request, it shall be extended assistance and cooperation, including but not limited to, assignment of personnel, by all other government agencies and offices concerned; (f) Install and administer a single ticketing system, fix, impose and collect fines and penalties for all kinds of violations of traffic rules and regulations, whether moving or non-moving in nature, and confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers licenses in the enforcement of such traffic laws and regulations, the provisions of RA 4136 and PD 1605 to the contrary notwithstanding. For this purpose, the Authority shall impose all traffic laws and regulations in Metro Manila, through its traffic operation center, and may deputize members of the PNP, traffic enforcers of local government units, duly licensed security guards, or members of non-governmental organizations to whom may be delegated certain authority, subject to such conditions and requirements as the Authority may impose; and (g) Perform other related functions required to achieve the objectives of the MMDA, including the undertaking of delivery of basic services to the local government units, when deemed necessary subject to prior coordination with and consent of the local government unit concerned." (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) The scope of the function of MMDA as an administrative, coordinating and policy-setting body has been settled in Metropolitan 41 Manila Development Authority (MMDA) v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. In that case, the Court stressed: Clearly, the scope of the MMDAs function is limited to the delivery of the seven (7) basic services. One of these is transport and traffic management which includes the formulation and monitoring of policies, standards and projects to rationalize the existing transport operations, infrastructure requirements, the use of thoroughfares and promotion of the safe movement of persons and goods. It also covers the mass transport system and the institution of a system of road regulation, the administration of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education programs, including the institution of a single ticketing system in Metro Manila for traffic violations. Under this service, the MMDA is expressly authorized to "to set the policies concerning traffic" and "coordinate and regulate the implementation of all traffic management programs." In addition, the MMDA may install and administer a single ticketing system," fix, impose and collect fines and penalties for all traffic violations. It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and administration. There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no provision in R.A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a development authority. It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, peoples organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in nature and these are actually summed up in the charter itself, viz: SECTION 2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority. . . . The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and in the process exercise regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide services within Metro Manila, without diminution of the autonomy of the local government units concerning purely local 42 matters. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) In light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, the MMDA is devoid of authority to implement the Project as envisioned by the E.O; hence, it could not have been validly designated by the President to undertake the Project. It follows that the MMDA cannot validly order the elimination of respondents terminals. Even the MMDAs claimed authority under the police power must necessarily fail in consonance with the above-quoted ruling in MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. and this Courts subsequent ruling in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. 43 Garin that the MMDA is not vested with police power. Even assuming arguendo that police power was delegated to the MMDA, its exercise of such power does not satisfy the two tests of a valid police power measure, viz: (1) the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from that of a particular class, requires its exercise; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not 44 unduly oppressive upon individuals. Stated differently, the police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare and a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes and the means. 45 As early as Calalang v. Williams, this Court recognized that traffic congestion is a public, not merely a private, concern. The Court therein held that public welfare underlies the contested statute authorizing the Director of Public Works to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control traffic on national roads. 12

Likewise, in Luque v. Villegas, this Court emphasized that public welfare lies at the bottom of any regulatory measure designed 47 "to relieve congestion of traffic, which is, to say the least, a menace to public safety." As such, measures calculated to promote the safety and convenience of the people using the thoroughfares by the regulation of vehicular traffic present a proper subject for the exercise of police power. Notably, the parties herein concede that traffic congestion is a public concern that needs to be addressed immediately. Indeed, the E.O. was issued due to the felt need to address the worsening traffic congestion in Metro Manila which, the MMDA so determined, is caused by the increasing volume of buses plying the major thoroughfares and the inefficient connectivity of existing transport systems. It is thus beyond cavil that the motivating force behind the issuance of the E.O. is the interest of the public in general. Are the means employed appropriate and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose. Are they not duly oppressive? With the avowed objective of decongesting traffic in Metro Manila, the E.O. seeks to "eliminate[e] the bus terminals now located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and provid[e] more convenient access to the mass transport system to the commuting 48 public through the provision of mass transport terminal facilities x x x." Common carriers with terminals along the major thoroughfares of Metro Manila would thus be compelled to close down their existing bus terminals and use the MMDA-designated common parking areas. 49 In Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. v. JAC Liner, Inc., two city ordinances were passed by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Lucena, directing public utility vehicles to unload and load passengers at the Lucena Grand Central Terminal, which was given the exclusive franchise to operate a single common terminal. Declaring that no other terminals shall be situated, constructed, maintained or established inside or within the city of Lucena, the sanggunian declared as inoperable all temporary terminals therein. The ordinances were challenged before this Court for being unconstitutional on the ground that, inter alia, the measures constituted an invalid exercise of police power, an undue taking of private property, and a violation of the constitutional prohibition against monopolies. 50 51 Citing De la Cruz v. Paras and Lupangco v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that the assailed ordinances were characterized by overbreadth, as they went beyond what was reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem in the city. And it found that the compulsory use of the Lucena Grand Terminal was unduly oppressive because it would subject its users to fees, rentals and charges. The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between authority and liberty so that rights are exercised within the framework of the law and the laws are enacted with due deference to rights. A due deference to the rights of the individual thus requires a more careful formulation of solutions to societal problems. From the memorandum filed before this Court by petitioner, it is gathered that the Sangguniang Panlungsod had identified the cause of traffic congestion to be the indiscriminate loading and unloading of passengers by buses on the streets of the city proper, hence, the conclusion that the terminals contributed to the proliferation of buses obstructing traffic on the city streets. Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede or help impede the flow of traffic. How the outright proscription against the existence of all terminals, apart from that franchised to petitioner, can be considered as reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem, this Court has not been enlightened. If terminals lack adequate space such that bus drivers are compelled to load and unload passengers on the streets instead of inside the terminals, then reasonable specifications for the size of terminals could be instituted, with permits to operate the same denied those which are unable to meet the specifications. In the subject ordinances, however, the scope of the proscription against the maintenance of terminals is so broad that even entities which might be able to provide facilities better than the franchised terminal are barred from operating at all. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) As in Lucena, this Court fails to see how the prohibition against the existence of respondents terminals can be considered a reasonable necessity to ease traffic congestion in the metropolis. On the contrary, the elimination of respondents bus terminals brings forth the distinct possibility and the equally harrowing reality of traffic congestion in the common parking areas, a case of transference from one site to another. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of "colorum" buses, vans and taxis entering Metro Manila and using the streets for parking and passenger pick-up points, as respondents suggest, might even be more effective in easing the traffic situation. So would the strict enforcement of traffic rules and the removal of obstructions from major thoroughfares. As to the alleged confiscatory character of the E.O., it need only to be stated that respondents certificates of public convenience 52 confer no property right, and are mere licenses or privileges. As such, these must yield to legislation safeguarding the interest of the people. Even then, for reasons which bear reiteration, the MMDA cannot order the closure of respondents terminals not only because no authority to implement the Project has been granted nor legislative or police power been delegated to it, but also because the elimination of the terminals does not satisfy the standards of a valid police power measure. Finally, an order for the closure of respondents terminals is not in line with the provisions of the Public Service Act. Paragraph (a), Section 13 of Chapter II of the Public Service Act (now Section 5 of Executive Order No. 202, creating the Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board or LFTRB) vested the Public Service Commission (PSC, now the LTFRB) with "x x x jurisdiction, supervision and control over all public services and their franchises, equipment and other properties x x x." 13

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Consonant with such grant of authority, the PSC was empowered to "impose such conditions as to construction, equipment, 53 maintenance, service, or operation as the public interests and convenience may reasonably require" in approving any franchise or privilege. 54 Further, Section 16 (g) and (h) of the Public Service Act provided that the Commission shall have the power, upon proper notice and hearing in accordance with the rules and provisions of this Act, subject to the limitations and exceptions mentioned and saving provisions to the contrary: (g) To compel any public service to furnish safe, adequate, and proper service as regards the manner of furnishing the same as well as the maintenance of the necessary material and equipment. (h) To require any public service to establish, construct, maintain, and operate any reasonable extension of its existing facilities, where in the judgment of said Commission, such extension is reasonable and practicable and will furnish sufficient business to justify the construction and maintenance of the same and when the financial condition of the said public service reasonably warrants the original expenditure required in making and operating such extension.(Emphasis and underscoring supplied) The establishment, as well as the maintenance of vehicle parking areas or passenger terminals, is generally considered a necessary service to be provided by provincial bus operators like respondents, hence, the investments they have poured into the acquisition or lease of suitable terminal sites. Eliminating the terminals would thus run counter to the provisions of the Public Service Act. This Court commiserates with the MMDA for the roadblocks thrown in the way of its efforts at solving the pestering problem of traffic congestion in Metro Manila. These efforts are commendable, to say the least, in the face of the abominable traffic situation of our roads day in and day out. This Court can only interpret, not change, the law, however. It needs only to be reiterated that it is the DOTC as the primary policy, planning, programming, coordinating, implementing, regulating and administrative entity to promote, develop and regulate networks of transportation and communications which has the power to establish and administer a transportation project like the Project subject of the case at bar. No matter how noble the intentions of the MMDA may be then, any plan, strategy or project which it is not authorized to implement cannot pass muster. WHEREFORE, the Petition is, in light of the foregoing disquisition, DENIED. E.O. No. 179 is declared NULL and VOID for being ultra vires. SO ORDERED. Puno, C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Garcia, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Reyes, JJ., concur. Footnotes
1 2

Luque v. Villegas, G.R. No. L-22545, November 28, 1969, 30 SCRA 408, 422. Rollo, pp. 8-12. 3 Id. at 13. 4 Rollo, pp. 60-61. 5 th 4 Whereas Clause. 6 th 5 Whereas clause. 7 Rollo, pp. 194-195. 8 th th 5 and 6 Whereas Clauses of MMDA Resolution No. 03-07, series of 2003. These clauses read: WHEREAS, there is a need to remove the bus terminals located along major thoroughfares of Metro Manila and an urgent need to integrate the different transport modes namely the buses, the rail-based systems of the LRT, MRT and PNR in order to decongest traffic and ensure efficient travel and comfort to the commuters; WHEREAS, the Greater Manila Mass Transport System Project aims to develop five (5) interim intermodal mass transport terminals to integrate the different transport modes to serve the commuting public in the northwest, north, east, south and southwest of Metro Manila. 9 Virons authorized routes are from Metro Manila to Pangasinan, Nueva Ecija, Ilocos Sur and Abra and vice versa. 10 Rollo, pp. 64-75. 11 Branch 26. 12 Rollo, pp. 67-68; pp. 4-5 of Virons Petition. 13 Rollo, p. 30. 14 Id. at 149-162. 15 Id. at 153; page 5 of Mencorps Petition. 16 Id. at 205-207. 17 Id. at 219-221. 18 Id. at 317-323. 19 Id. at 35. 20 Id. at 125-130; dated May 15, 2003. 21 Id. at 200-204. 22 Id. at 309-316. 14

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Id. at 64-75 and 149-162; Virons petition dated February 21, 2003 and Mencorps petition dated March 25, 2003. 24 Id. at 135-148 and 222-249; Virons Reply dated June 17, 2003 and Virons Position Paper of March 16, 2004. 25 Republic v. Orbecido III, G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005, 472 SCRA 114, 118; Board of Optometry v. Colet, 328 Phil. 1187, 1205 (1996); Macasiano v. National Housing Authority, G.R. No. 107921, July 1, 1993, 224 SCRA 236, 243. 26 International Hardwood and Veneer Company of the Philippines v. University of the Philippines, G.R. No. 521518, August 13, 1991, 200 SCRA 554, 569. 27 International Hardwood and Veneer Company of the Philippines v. University of the Philippines, supra. 28 Supra note 20 at 126; paragraph 11 thereof. 29 Supra note 22 at 312. 30 Section 1 of Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides: SECTION 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested under a deed, will, contract, or other written instrument, whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder. (Emphasis supplied) 31 People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 89 (1937). 32 Dated January 30, 1987. 33 "Amending Executive Order No. 125, Entitled Reorganizing the Ministry of Transportation and Communications, Defining its Powers and Functions, and For Other Purposes," dated April 13, 1987. 34 Chavez v. Romulo, G.R. No. 157036, June 9, 2004, 431 SCRA 534, 555. 35 Binay v. Domingo, G.R. No. 92389, September 11, 1991, 201 SCRA508, 514; Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Pea, G.R. No. L-77663, April 12, 1988, 159 SCRA 556, 574; Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 708. 36 In the early case of Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc. v. The Public Service Commission (70 Phil. 221,229 [1940]), this Court observed that "with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater power by the legislature, and toward the approval of the practice by the courts." (Underscoring supplied) Vide also Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, G.R. No. L-76633, October 18, 1988, 166 SCRA 533, 544. 37 Abakada Guro Party List v. Ermita, G.R. No. 168056, September 1, 2005, 469 SCRA 1, 117; Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) v. Bel-Air Village Association, 385 Phil. 586, 601. 38 SEC. 16. General Welfare. Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants. 39 Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of the local government units of Caloocan, Manila, Mandaluyong, Makati, Pasay, Pasig, Quezon, Muntinlupa, Las Pias, Marikina, Paraaque, Valenzuela, Malabon, Navotas, Pateros, San Juan and Taguig. (Sec. 1 of R.A. 7924) 40 Section 3 of R.A. No. 7924 provides the scope of MMDA services : SECTION 3. Scope of MMDA Services. Metro-wide services under the jurisdiction of the MMDA are those services which have metro-wide impact and transcend local political boundaries or entail huge expenditures such that it would not be viable for said services to be provided by the individual local government units (LGUs) comprising Metropolitan Manila. These services shall include: (a) Development planning which includes the preparation of medium and long-term development plans; the development, evaluation and packaging of projects; investments programming; and coordination and monitoring of plan, program and project implementation. (b) Transport and traffic management which include the formulation, coordination, and monitoring of policies, standards, programs and projects to rationalize the existing transport operations, infrastructure requirements, the use of thoroughfares, and promotion of safe and convenient movement of persons and goods; provision for the mass transport system and the institution of a system to regulate road users; administration and implementation of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education programs, including the institution of a single ticketing system in Metropolitan Manila. (c) Solid waste disposal and management which include formulation and implementation of policies, standards, programs and projects for proper and sanitary waste disposal. It shall likewise include the establishment and operation of sanitary land fill and related facilities and the implementation of other alternative programs intended to reduce, reuse and recycle solid waste. 15

(d) Flood control and sewerage management which include the formulation and implementation of policies, standards, programs and projects for an integrated flood control, drainage and sewerage system. (e) Urban renewal, zoning, and land use planning, and shelter services which include the formulation, adoption and implementation of policies, standards, rules and regulations, programs and projects to rationalize and optimize urban land use and provide direction to urban growth and expansion, the rehabilitation and development of slum and blighted areas, the development of shelter and housing facilities and the provision of necessary social services thereof. (f) Health and sanitation, urban protection and pollution control which include the formulation and implementation of policies, rules and regulations, standards, programs and projects for the promotion and safeguarding of the health and sanitation of the region and for the enhancement of ecological balance and the prevention, control and abatement of environmental pollution. (g) Public safety which includes the formulation and implementation of programs and policies and procedures to achieve public safety, especially preparedness for preventive or rescue operations during times of calamities and disasters such as conflagrations, earthquakes, flood and tidal waves, and coordination and mobilization of resources and the implementation of contingency plans for the rehabilitation and relief operations in coordination with national agencies concerned. 41 Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) v. Bel-Air Village Association, supra note 37. 42 Supra at 607-608. 43 G.R. No. 130230, April 15, 2005, 456 SCRA 176, 185. 44 Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. v. JAC Liner, Inc., G.R. No. 148339, February 23, 2005, 452 SCRA 174, 185; Chavez v. Romulo, supra note 34 at 563; Balacuit v. CFI of Agusan del Norte, G.R. No. L-38429, June 30, 1988, 163 SCRA 182, 191. 45 70 Phil. 726, 733 (1940). 46 Supra note 1. 47 Supra at 423. 48 th 5 Whereas Clause. 49 Supra note 44. 50 G.R. No. L-42571-72, July 25, 1983, 123 SCRA 569. In this case, the Court declared as unconstitutional an ordinance passed by the Municipality of Bocaue, Bulacan, which prohibited the operation of all night clubs, cabarets and dance halls within its jurisdiction for the protection of public morals. Stating that the ordinance on its face was overbroad, the Court held that the purpose sought to be achieved could have been attained by reasonable restrictions rather than an absolute prohibition. 51 G.R. No. L-77372, April 29, 1988, 160 SCRA 848. The case involved a resolution issued by the Professional Regulation Commission, which prohibited examinees from attending review classes and receiving handout materials, tips, and the like three days before the date of examination in order to preserve the integrity and purity of the licensure examinations in accountancy. The measure was declared by this Court not only to be unreasonable and violative of academic freedom, but also to be more sweeping than what was necessary. 52 Luque v. Villegas, supra note 1 at 418. 53 Commonwealth Act No. 146, Chapter II, Section 16 (b). 54 The present provision of Section 5(k) of E.O. No. 202 reads: k. To formulate, promulgate, administer, implement and enforce rules and regulations on land transportation public utilities, standards of measurements and/or design, and rules and regulations requiring operators of any public land transportation service to equip, install and provide in their utilities and in their stations such devices, equipment facilities and operating procedures and techniques as may promote safety, protection, comfort and convenience to persons and property in their charges as well as the safety of persons and property within their areas of operations;

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