ROSY A.

TECIO
Republic oI the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. MT1-96-1110 1une 25, 2001
CONG. MANUEL N. MAMBA, M. D. ATTY. FRANCISCO N. MAMBA, 1R., HON. GUILLERMO SUMIGAD, HON.
CALIXTO GENOVEZA, HON. MARTIN SORIANO, HON. LOURDES FAUSTO, HON. LORENZO FERMIN, HON.
ADORACION RAQUINIO, HON. LEONIDES FAUSTO, HON. DIOGENES BALIGOD, HON. LORETO MABBORANG,
HON. PETER SY, HON. NICCOLO MAMBA, LORETO MAMBA, 1UAN TAGUBA, DOMINGO CAMARAT, SEVERINO
BUCAYU, CASIANO CHAVENTE, ILLUMINADO BALIGOD, FELICIANO SERRANO, TEOFILO URMA, REMIGIO
DE LA CRUZ, ABELARDO BAUIT, MARIANO MIRANDA, 1R., ROMULO SERAFICA, CARLOS MANANGUIT,
ERNESTO FERMIN, ROGELIO FERNANDEZ, ERNESTO CENABRE, TRINIDAD BALUNSAT, MIGUEL PASON, GIL
BALORAN, DOMINGO CALLUENG, BERNARDO BENITO, 1UAN TURINGAN, MARCELINO CORPUZ, IGNACIO
PASCUA, 1R., LEONIDES FAUSTO, TEODORICO PASTOR, DOMINADOR CORSINO, GENEROSO AGLAUA,
ZACARIAS MAGGAY, SIMEON BENZON, PATRICIO TAGUIAM, LUCAS TAGUINOD, MA. GLORIA G. BALIGOD,
LAURO N. FAUSTO, EDGAR AGGABAO, RODOLFO CARDENAS, TERESITA ESPINOSA, PACIFICO C. BINULUAN,
ROGELIO SORIANO, ARTURO MAMBA, DR. EXSUPERIO YUAGA, VIVIAN DE GUZMAN, EX-CONG. FRANCISCO
K. MAMBA, CRISTINA MAMBA, EDWIN LIU, PABLO DANGA, ALICE LOA, VICENTE TOLENTINO, NUMERIANO
MACAPULAY, ROLLY SEDANO, complainants,
vs.
1UDGE DOMINADOR L. GARCIA, MTC, TUAO, CAGAYAN, respondent.
PER CURIAM
This is a "resolution," which is more accurately a maniIesto or a petition oI concerned citizens oI Tuao, Cagayan, denouncing certain
acts oI Judge Dominador L. Garcia, Municipal Trial Court, Tuao, Cagayan, in connection with his handling oI Criminal Case No. 399,
entitled "People vs. Renato Bulatao." The complainants are the then Representative oI the Third District oI Cagayan, the mayor and
vice-mayor, ten (10) members oI the Sangguniang Bayan, thirty-two (32) barrio captains, ten (10) LGU department heads oI Tuao,
Cagayan, and eight (8) heads oI non-governmental organizations or NGOs in the municipality oI Tuao.
The "resolution," dated November 4, 1996, was presented to this Court. It was adopted at an assembly led by Rep. Manuel N. Mamba
which picketed the municipal trial court on that day.
1
The "resolution" was treated as an administrative complaint and respondent
Judge Dominador L. Garcia was required to answer. The matter was reIerred to Executive Judge Orlando D. Beltran, Jr. oI the
Regional Trial Court oI Tuao, Cagayan, Ior investigation, report, and recommendation.
2

ThereaIter, an investigation was held during which the aIIidavits and sworn statements oI NBI Special Investigator Ablezer Rivera,
the joint aIIidavit oI NBI agents, Raul A. Ancheta and Paul D. Rivera, the sworn statement oI the accused in Criminal Case No. 699,
Renato Bulatao, and the testimonies oI Abner P. Cardenas, clerk oI court, MTC, Tuao, Cagayan and Tomas Latauan, Jr., interpreter oI
the same court, were presented. The gist oI the evidence Ior the complainants is as Iollows:
On August 23, 1996, a complaint Ior violation oI Presidential Decree No. 1866 (illegal possession oI Iirearms) was Iiled against a
certain Renato Bulatao by the Cagayan Provincial Police Command beIore the sala oI respondent Judge Dominador L. Garcia oI the
Municipal Trial Court, Tuao, Cagayan.
3
Respondent set the preliminary investigation on September 4, 1996, but the same was
subsequently postponed and reset to October 23, 1996 as respondent was not present, although the complaining oIIicer, P/Sr. Inspector
Danny F. Salvador, appeared in court. On October 23, 1996, the preliminary investigation was again reset to October 30, 1996. On
October 29, 1996, the accused, Renato Bulatao, complained to the NBI that at the scheduled preliminary investigation on September 4,
1996, P/Sr. Inspector Salvador demanded P30,000.00 Irom him in consideration oI the withdrawal oI the criminal case against him.
According to Bulatao, the demand was reiterated by Salvador and respondent judge on October 23, 1996. As Bulatao told them that he
could not aIIord it, the amount was reduced to P6,000.00.
Based on Bulatao's report, the NBI set out to entrap Salvador and respondent judge. The NBI gave Bulatao 12 pieces oI P500.00
marked bills amounting to P6,000.00, which the latter would give to Salvador and respondent the next day.
4

Accordingly, at about 7 o'clock in the morning oI the Iollowing day, October 30, Bulatao met the NBI operatives in the house oI
Francisco Mamba, Sr., Iormer representative oI the 3rd District oI Cagayan, where the entrapment was planned. Bulatao was given a
tape recorder to record his conversation with whoever will receive the money. At 9 a.m., Bulatao went to the Municipal Trial Court
and waited Ior his case to be called. At 10:30 a.m., respondent went out oI his chambers and talked to SPO2 Jonathan Santos and
SPO4 Carlos Poli, representatives oI P/Sr. Inspector Salvador in the preliminary investigation. Respondent then called Bulatao and led
him and the two police oIIicers to the oIIice oI the MTC court personnel. Inside, respondent asked Bulatao iI he had the money with
him. When he answered in the aIIirmative, respondent took them to his chambers and leIt them there as he proceeded to his sala. AIter
handing the money to the police oIIicers, Bulatao went out oI respondent's chambers. Upon his signal, the NBI operatives waiting
outside respondent's court then rushed to the judge's chambers and arrested the two police oIIicers aIter recovering 11 pieces oI
P500.00 marked bills in their possession.
5

AIter the matter was reIerred by this Court to Executive Judge Orlando Beltran Ior investigation, the latter scheduled several hearings
Ior the reception oI evidence Ior the respondent. The records show that hearings were set on diIIerent dates (December 10, 1997,
January 30, 1998, February 10, 1998, March 3, 1998, March 10, 1998, September 10, 1998, October 9, 1998, November 11, 1998,
January 5, 1999, February 9, 1999, March 4, 1999, and April 5, 1999), but respondent did not appear despite due notice. Accordingly,
he was deemed to have waived the right to present evidence and the case was submitted Ior decision. Hence only his counter-aIIidavit
was considered, in which respondent claimed that it was Bulatao who asked permission to talk to the two police oIIicers. He denied
that he took the three to his chambers.
6

On the basis oI these Iacts, the Investigating Judge made the Iollowing recommendation:
"The Ioregoing Iacts indisputably show that the respondent Judge allowed the use oI his chambers by the two (2) police
oIIicers SPO II Jonathan Santos and SPO IV Carlos Poli and Renato Bulatao, the accused in the criminal case Ior illegal
possession oI Iirearms, so that they could talk about the "settlement" oI Bulatao's case which was then pending preliminary
investigation by the respondent Judge. Although the two (2) witnesses, Abner Cardenas and Tomas Latauan, Jr., claimed that
they did not hear the subject oI the conversation between Bulatao, on one hand, and the two (2) policemen and the respondent
Judge Dominador L. Garcia, on the other, beIore the three Iirst-named persons went inside the chambers oI the respondent
Judge, it is not diIIicult to conclude that they must have talked about the criminal case oI Bulatao and its "settlement." For iI
the subject-matter oI their conversation were other than said "settlement" there appears no reason or purpose to allow the
policemen and the accused to go inside the judge's chambers and there to continue their conversation. Simply stated, the
respondent judge allowed the two (2) policemen and the accused Renato Bulatao to use his chambers so that they could
consummate the arrangements Ior the dismissal oI the case, particularly the payment oI the sum oI money being demanded as
consideration Ior such dismissal.
"In this connection, the undersigned Investigating Judge cannot help but reIer to the taped conversation between the two (2)
policemen and Renato Bulatao inside the chamber oI the respondent Judge. A portion oI the translated dialogue between Poli
and Bulatao, which was in Ilocano, tends to show that the P6,000.00 pay-oII handed by Bulatao to the policemen was not
intended Ior the respondent Judge but solely Ior the policemen and their superior, P/Sr. Inspector Salvador. However, it is not
easy to disregard the implication obvious Irom the said conversation that the respondent Judge was privy to the entire
transaction. SPO IV Poli pointedly told Bulatao "to take care oI the Judge" which implies that the Judge knew oI the pay-oII
being made and was willing to abide by the "deal" provided he would be "taken care oI" by Bulatao.
"Such acts oI the respondent Judge are improper, to say the least. He, thereIore, violated the duty oI every Judge to uphold
the integrity oI the judiciary and to avoid impropriety and the appearance oI impropriety in all activities. (Mortel vs. Leido,
Jr. 44 SCAD 567). It cannot be over-emphasized that a judge's oIIicial conduct should be Iree Irom the appearance oI
impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the perIormance oI oIIicial duties but also in his every
day liIe, should be beyond reproach. (Marcos, Sr. vs. Arcangel, 72 SCAD 1). Canon 2 oI the Code oI Judicial Conduct
enjoins judges to avoid not just impropriety in their conduct but even the mere appearance oI impropriety. This is true not
only in the perIormance oI their oIIicial duties but in all their activities, including their private liIe. They must conduct
themselves in such a manner that they give no ground Ior reproach. (Pedro San Juan vs. Judge Lore V. Bagalsera, RTC, BR.
23, Naga City, A. M. No. RTJ-97-1395, December 22, 1997). In this case, the acts oI the respondent judge were clearly
improper as he Iacilitated, iI not participated in, the obviously unauthorized/illegal transaction between the two (2) police
oIIicers and the accused Renato Bulatao Ior the settlement/dismissal oI the latter's criminal case, in consideration oI a sum oI
money, particularly since the oIIense charged against Bulatao is a grievous one and that it is one which is not allowed by law
to be compromised.
"In view oI all the Ioregoing, the undersigned Investigating Judge respectIully recommends that the respondent Judge
Dominador L. Garcia be Iound guilty oI improper conduct and be punished accordingly."
7

The Investigating Judge's reliance on the tape-recorded conversation between Bulatao and the two police oIIicers is erroneous. The
recording oI private conversations without the consent oI the parties contravenes the provisions oI Rep. Act. No. 4200, otherwise
known as the Anti-Wire Tapping Law, and renders the same inadmissible in evidence in any proceeding.
8
The law covers even those
recorded by persons privy to the private communications, as in this case.
9
Thus, the contents oI the tape recorder cannot be relied
upon to determine the culpability oI respondent judge.
In all other respects, however, the Iindings oI the Investigating Judge are in accordance with the evidence. We hold, however, that
respondent judge is guilty not just oI improper conduct but oI serious misconduct. Serious misconduct is such conduct which aIIects a
public oIIicer's perIormance oI his duties as such oIIicer and not only that which aIIects his character as a private individual. For
serious misconduct to warrant a dismissal Irom the service, there must be reliable evidence showing that the judicial acts complained
oI were corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law. It must (1) be serious, important, weighty, momentary, and not triIling;
(2) imply wrongIul intention and not mere error oI judgment; and (3) have a direct relation to and be connected with the perIormance
oI his oIIicial duties.
10

In the case at bar, it is clear that the crime oI bribery was committed. Although the evidence may not be suIIicient to support a
conviction in a criminal case, it is adequate Ior the purpose oI these proceedings. The standards oI integrity required oI members oI the
Bench are not satisIied by conduct which merely allows one to escape the penalties oI the criminal law.
11
In an administrative
proceeding, such as this case, only substantial evidence, or that amount oI relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion, is required.
12

To constitute bribery, the Iollowing must be shown: (1) the oIIender is a public oIIicer within the scope oI Art. 203; (2) the oIIender
accepts an oIIer or a promise or receives a giIt or present by himselI or through another; (3) such oIIer or promise is accepted, or giIt
received by the public oIIicer, (a) with a view to committing some crime; (b) in consideration oI the execution oI an act which does
not constitute a crime, but which is unjust; or (c) to reIrain Irom doing something which it is his oIIicial duty to do; and (4) the act
which he agrees to perIorm is connected with the perIormance oI his oIIicial duties.
13
From the records, it is evident that P/Sr.
Inspector Salvador, a public oIIicer, solicited money Irom Bulatao in consideration oI the withdrawal oI the case against the latter. The
Iormer categorically told the latter that he would withdraw the criminal case against Bulatao iI Bulatao gives him P30,000.00, which
was later lowered to P6,000.00. The Iact that two oI his men came Ior the preliminary investigation and, without hesitation, Iollowed
respondent judge to his chambers aIter hearing that Bulatao had the money, bears out Bulatao's allegations. Although these
circumstances do not show conclusively that respondent judge was privy to the crime oI bribery, there is substantial evidence showing
that he was at least an accomplice to the crime who cooperated in the execution oI the oIIense by previous or simultaneous acts.
14
The
Iollowing circumstances, as corroborated by the report oI the NBI and the testimonies oI two employees oI the MTC, who were
disinterested witnesses, show that respondent judge knowingly and voluntarily cooperated with P/Sr. Inspector Salvador in
consummating the crime:
(1) On the day oI the entrapment, respondent judge asked Bulatao iI he had the money, and when he received an aIIirmative answer,
he took Bulatao and the two police oIIicers to his chambers told the police oIIicers to receive whatever Bulatao would give them,
15

and then leIt; and
(2) When Bulatao leIt respondent's chambers and gave the signal to the NBI operatives waiting outside, the marked bills were Iound
by the agents in the possession oI SPO2 Jonathan Santos, as the latter was leaving the chambers oI respondent judge with SPO4
Carlos Poli. As the Investigating Judge observed, respondent willingly allowed his chambers to be used Ior the consummation oI the
illegal transaction. The actions oI respondent implies a wrongIul intention to commit an unlawIul act while in the perIormance oI his
oIIicial duties.
Canon 2 oI the Code oI Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to avoid not only impropriety but even the appearance oI impropriety in all
their conduct. This includes not taking an undue interest in the settlement oI criminal cases pending beIore them as this may
compromise the integrity and impartiality oI their oIIice.
16
As the visible representation oI the law and oI justice, their conduct must
be above reproach and suspicion.
17
By acting as an accomplice to P/Sr. Inspector Salvador, respondent judge violated not only the law
but also the Code oI Judicial Conduct.
Nor does the Iact that respondent committed misconduct during a preliminary investigation, which is nonjudicial in character, exempt
him Irom the disciplinary power oI this Court as the conduct oI a preliminary investigation is only an addition to his judicial Iunctions.
18

In Cabrera vs. Pafares,
19
where the payment oI the money to respondent judge in his chambers was witnessed by an NBI agent, this
Court ordered his dismissal Irom the service. Likewise, in Court Administrator vs. Hermoso,
20
where the judge received money Irom
a party to a case pending beIore his sala and was entrapped by an NBI agent, this Court ordered his dismissal. In addition, the erring

judge is liable to the IorIeiture oI his leave credits and retirement beneIits and his dismissal shall be with prejudice to reemployment in
any branch oI the government or any oI its agencies or instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled corporations, as
provided by Section 9, Rule 14 oI the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V oI Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code oI
1987) and our current rulings.
21

Respondent judge was previously convicted in two administrative cases Iiled beIore this Court. In A.M. No. MTJ-91-616, entitled
"Clodualdo Escobar vs. Garcia," the Court, in a resolution dated September 1, 1992, Iound respondent guilty oI palpable ignorance oI
Rule 114, section 8 resulting in the denial oI due process to the prosecution in a criminal case. Respondent was Iined an amount
equivalent to 15 days salary with warning that a repetition oI the same would be dealt with more severely. In another case, A.M. No.
MTJ-95-1049, entitled "Eloisa Bernardo v. Garcia," the Court, in a resolution dated June 28, 1995, Iound respondent guilty oI
deliberately delaying his decision in a civil case and IalsiIying certiIicates oI service. He was reprimanded and ordered to pay a Iine oI
P5,000.00 with warning that a repetition oI the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
WHEREFORE, the Court Iinds respondent Judge Dominador L. Garcia guilty oI serious misconduct and accordingly orders his
DISMISSAL Irom the service and the IorIeiture oI his leave credits and retirement beneIits, with prejudice to reemployment in any
branch oI the government or any oI its agencies or instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled corporations.
SO ORDERED.
avide, Jr., C .J ., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Jitug, Kapunan, Panganiban, Pardo, Gon:aga-Reyes, e Leon, Jr., Mendo:a, Quisumbing,
Buena, Ynares-Santiago and Sandoval-Gutierre:, JJ ., concur.

ROSY A. TECIO
Republic oI the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 135882 1une 27, 2001
LOURDES T. MARQUEZ, in her capacity as Branch Manager, UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as OMBUDSMAN, ANGEL C. MAYOR-ALGO, 1R., MARY ANN
CORPUZ-MANALAC AND 1OSE T. DE 1ESUS, 1R., in their capacity as Chairman and Members oI the Panel, respectively,
respondents.
PARDO, .
In the petition at bar, petitioner seeks to --
a. Annul and set aside, Ior having been issued without or in excess oI jurisdiction or with grave abuse oI discretion
amounting to lack oI jurisdiction, respondents' order dated September 7, 1998 in OMB-0-97-0411, In Re: Motion to Cite
Lourdes T. Marquez Ior indirect contempt, received by counsel oI September 9,1998, and their order dated October 14,1998,
denying Marquez's motion Ior reconsideration dated September 10, 1998, received by counsel on October 20, 1998.
b. Prohibit respondents Irom implementing their order dated October 14, 1998, in proceeding with the hearing oI the motion
to cite Marquez Ior indirect contempt, through the issuance by this Court oI a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary
injunction.
1

The antecedent Iacts are as Iollows:
Sometime in May 1998, petitioner Marquez received an Order Irom the Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto dated April 29, 1998, to
produce several bank documents Ior purposes oI inspection in camera relative to various accounts maintained at Union Bank oI the
Philippines, Julia Vargas Branch, where petitioner is the branch manager. The accounts to be inspected are Account Nos. 011-37270,
240-020718, 245-30317-3 and 245-30318-1, involved in a case pending with the Ombudsman entitled, Fact-Finding and Intelligence
Bureau (FFIB) v. Amado Lagdameo, et al. The order Iurther states:
"It is worth mentioning that the power oI the Ombudsman to investigate and to require the production and inspection oI
records and documents is sanctioned by the 1987 Philippine Constitution, Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as
Ombudsman Act oI 1989 and under existing jurisprudence on the matter. It must be noted that R.A. 6770 especially Section
15 thereoI provides, among others, the Iollowing powers, Iunctions and duties oI the Ombudsman, to wit:
x x x
(8) Administer oaths, issue subpoena duces tecum and take testimony in any investigation or inquiry, including the power to
examine and have access to banks accounts and records;
(9) Punish Ior contempt in accordance with the Rules oI Court and under the same procedure and with the same penalties
provided therein.
Clearly, the speciIic provision oI R.A. 6770, a later legislation, modiIies the law on the Secrecy oI Bank Deposits (R.A.1405)
and places the oIIice oI the Ombudsman in the same Iooting as the courts oI law in this regard."
2

The basis oI the Ombudsman in ordering an 3 camera inspection oI the accounts is a trail managers checks purchased by one George
Trivinio, a respondent in OMB-097-0411, pending with the oIIice oI the Ombudsman.

It would appear that Mr. George Trivinio, purchased IiIty one (51) Managers Checks (MCs) Ior a total amount oI P272.1 Million at
Traders Royal Bank, United Nations Avenue branch, on May 2 and 3, 1995. Out oI the 51 MCs, eleven (11) MCs in the amount oI
P70.6 million, were deposited and credited to an account maintained at the Union Bank, Julia Vargas Branch.
3

On May 26, 1998, the FFIB panel met in conIerence with petitioner Lourdes T. Marquez and Atty. Fe B. Macalino at the bank's main
oIIice, Ayala Avenue, Makati City. The meeting was Ior the purpose oI allowing petitioner and Atty. Macalino to view the checks
Iurnished by Traders Royal Bank. AIter convincing themselves oI the veracity oI the checks, Atty. Macalino advised Ms. Marquez to
comply with the order oI the Ombudsman. Petitioner agreed to an 3 camera inspection set on June 3, 1998.
4

However, on June 4,1998, petitioner wrote the Ombudsman explaining to him that the accounts in question cannot readily be
identiIied and asked Ior time to respond to the order. The reason Iorwarded by the petitioner was that "despite diligent eIIorts and Irom
the accounts numbers presented, we can not identiIy these accounts since the checks are issued in cash or bearer. We surmised that
these accounts have long been dormant, hence are not covered by the new account number generated by the Union Bank system. We
thereIore have to veriIy Irom the Interbank records archives Ior the whereabouts oI these accounts.
5

The Ombudsman, responding to the request oI the petitioner Ior time to comply with the order, stated: "Iirstly, it must be emphasized
that Union Bank, Julia Vargas Branch was depositary bank oI the subject Traders Royal Bank Manager's Check (MCs), as shown at its
dorsal portion and as cleared by the Philippines Clearing House, not the International Corporate Bank.
Notwithstanding the Iacts that the checks were payable to cash or bearer, nonetheless, the name oI the depositor(s) could easily be
identiIied since the account numbers x x x where said checks were deposited are identiIied in the order.
Even assuming that the accounts xxx were already classiIied as "dormant accounts," the bank is still required to preserve the records
pertaining to the accounts within a certain period oI time as required by existing banking rules and regulations.
And Iinally, the 3 camera inspection was already extended twice Irom May 13, 1998 to June 3,1998 thereby giving the bank enough
time within which to suIIiciently comply with the order."
6

Thus, on June 16, 1998, the Ombudsman issued an order directing petitioner to produce the bank documents relative to accounts in
issue. The order states:
Viewed Irom the Ioregoing, your persistent reIusal to comply with Ombudsman's order in unjustiIied, and is merely intended
to delay the investigation oI the case. Your act constitutes disobedience oI or resistance to a lawIul order issued by this oIIice
and is punishable as Indirect Contempt under Section 3(b) oI R.A. 6770. The same may also constitute obstruction in the
lawIul exercise oI the Iunctions oI the Ombudsman which is punishable under Section 36 oI R.A. 6770.
7

On July 10,1998, petitioner together with Union Bank oI the Philippines, Iiled a petition Ior declaratory relieI, prohibition and
injunctions
8
with the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, against the Ombudsman.
The petition was intended to clear the rights and duties oI petitioner. Thus, petitioner sought a declaration oI her rights Irom the court
due to the clear conIlict between RA No.6770, Section 15 and R.A. No. 1405, Sections 2 and 3.
Petitioner prayed Ior a temporary restraining order (TRO) because the Ombudsman and the other persons acting under his authority
were continuously harassing her to produce the bank documents relatives to the accounts in question. Moreover, on June 16, 1998, the
Ombudsman issued another order stating that unless petitioner appeared beIore the FFIB with the documents requested, petitioner
manager would be charged with indirect contempt and obstruction oI justice.
In the meantime,
9
on July 14, 1998, the lower court denied petitioner's prayer Ior a temporary restraining order and stated us:
"AIter hearing the arguments oI the parties, the court Iinds the application Ior a Temporary Restraining Order to be without
merit.
"Since the application prays Ior restraint oI the respondent, in the exercise oI his contempt powers under Section 15(9) in
relation to paragraph (8) oI RA. 6770, known as " The Ombudsman Act oI 1989", there is no great or irreparable injury Irom
which petitioners may suIIer, iI respondent is not so restrained. Respondent should he decide to exercise his contempt powers
would still have to apply with the court. x x x Anyone who, without lawIul excuse x x x reIuses to produce documents Ior
inspection, when thereunto lawIully required shall be subject to discipline as in case oI contempt oI Court and upon

application oI the individual or body exercising the power in question shall be dealt with by the Judge oI the First Instance
(now RTC) having jurisdiction oI the case in a manner provided by the law (section 580 oI the Revised Administrative
Code). Under the present Constitution only judges may issue warrants, hence, respondent should apply with the Court Ior the
issuance oI the warrant needed Ior the enIorcement oI his contempt orders. It is in these proceedings where petitioner may
question the propriety oI respondent's exercise oI his contempt powers. Petitioners are not thereIore leIt without any adequate
remedy.
"The questioned orders were issued with the investigation oI the case oI Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau vs. Amado
Lagdameo, et. al., OMB-0-97-0411, Ior violation oI RA. 3019. Since petitioner Iailed to show prima Iacie evidence that the
subject matter oI the investigation is outside the jurisdiction oI the OIIice oI the Ombudsman, no writ oI injunction may be
issued by this Court to delay this investigation pursuant to section 14 oI Ombudsman Act oI 1989."
10

On July 20,1998, petitioner Iiled a motion Ior reconsideration based on the Iollowing grounds:
a. Petitioners' application Ior Iiled Temporary Restraining Order is not only to restrain the Ombudsman Irom exercising his
contempt powers, but to stop him Irom implementing his Orders dated April 29, 1998 and June 16, 1998: and
b. The subject matter oI the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman at petitioners' premises is outside his
jurisdiction.
11

On July 23, 1998, the Ombudsman Iiled a motion to dismiss the petition Ior declaratory relieI
12
on the ground that the Regional Trial
Court has no jurisdiction to hear a petition Ior relieI Irom the Iindings and orders oI the Ombudsman, citing R.A. No. 6770, Sections
14 and 27. On August 7, 1998, the Ombudsman Iiled an opposition to petitioner's motion Ior reconsideration dated July 20, 1998.
13

On August 19,1998, the lower court denied petitioner's motion Ior reconsideration,
14
and also the Ombudsman's motion to dismiss.
15

On August 21, 1998, petitioner received a copy oI the motion to cite her Ior contempt, Iiled with the OIIice oI the Ombudsman by
Agapito B. Rosales, Director, Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB).
16

On August 31, 1998, petitioner Iiled with the Ombudsman an opposition to the motion to cite her in contempt on the ground that the
Iiling thereoI was premature due to the petition pending in the lower court.
17
Petitioner likewise reiterated that she had no intention to
disobey the orders oI the Ombudsman. However, she wanted to be clariIied as to how she would comply with the orders without her
breaking any law, particularly RA. No. 1405.
18

Respondent Ombudsman panel set the incident Ior hearing on September 7, 1998.
19
AIter hearing, the panel issued an order dated
September 7, 1998, ordering petitioner and counsel to appear Ior a continuation oI the hearing oI the contempt charges against her.
20

On September 10, 1998, petitioner Iiled with the Ombudsman a motion Ior reconsideration oI the above order.
21
Her motion was
premised on the Iact that there was a pending case with the Regional Trial Court, Makati City,
22
which would determine whether
obeying the orders oI the Ombudsman to produce bank documents would not violate any law.
The FFIB opposed the motion,
23
and on October 14, 1998, the Ombudsman denied the motion by order the dispositive portion oI
which reads:
"WhereIore, respondent Lourdes T. Marquez's motion Ior reconsideration is hereby DENIED, Ior lack oI merit. Let the
hearing oI the motion oI the Fact Finding Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) to cite her Ior indirect contempt to be intransIerrably set
to 29 October 1998 at 2:00 o'clock p.m. at which date and time she should appear personally to submit her additional
evidence. Failure to do so shall be deemed a waiver thereoI."
24

Hence, the present petition.
25

The issue is whether petitioner may be cited Ior indirect contempt Ior her Iailure to produce the documents requested by the
Ombudsman. And whether the order oI the Ombudsman to have an 3 camera inspection oI the questioned account is allowed as an
exception to the law on secrecy oI bank deposits (R.A. No.1405).
An examination oI the secrecy oI bank deposits law (R.A. No.1405) would reveal the Iollowing exceptions:

1. Where the depositor consents in writing;

2. Impeachment case;
3. By court order in bribery or dereliction oI duty cases against public oIIicials;
4. Deposit is subject oI litigation;
5. Sec. 8, R.A. No.3019, in cases oI unexplained wealth as held in the case oI PNB vs. Gancayco.
26

The order oI the Ombudsman to produce Ior 3 camera inspection the subject accounts with the Union Bank oI the Philippines, Julia
Vargas Branch, is based on a pending investigation at the OIIice oI the Ombudsman against Amado Lagdameo, et. al. Ior violation oI
R.A. No. 3019, Sec. 3 (e) and (g) relative to the Joint Venture Agreement between the Public Estates Authority and AMARI.
We rule that beIore an 3 camera inspection may be allowed, there must be a pending case beIore a court oI competent jurisdiction.
Further, the account must be clearly identiIied, the inspection limited to the subject matter oI the pending case beIore the court oI
competent jurisdiction. The bank personnel and the account holder must be notiIied to be present during the inspection, and such
inspection may cover only the account identiIied in the pending case.
In Union Bank oI the Philippines v. Court oI Appeals, we held that "Section 2 oI the Law on Secrecy oI Bank Deposits, as amended,
declares bank deposits to be "absolutely conIidential" except:
(1) In an examination made in the course oI a special or general examination oI a bank that is speciIically authorized by the
Monetary Board aIter being satisIied that there is reasonable ground to believe that a bank Iraud or serious irregularity has
been or is being committed and that it is necessary to look into the deposit to establish such Iraud or irregularity,
(2) In an examination made by an independent auditor hired by the bank to conduct its regular audit provided that the
examination is Ior audit purposes only and the results thereoI shall be Ior the exclusive use oI the bank,
(3) Upon written permission oI the depositor,
(4) In cases oI impeachment,
(5) Upon order oI a competent court in cases oI bribery or dereliction oI duty oI public oIIicials, or
(6) In cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter oI the litigation".
27

In the case at bar, there is yet no pending litigation beIore any court oI competent authority. What is existing is an investigation by the
OIIice oI the Ombudsman. In short, what the oIIice oI the ombudsman would wish to do is to Iish Ior additional evidence to Iormally
charge Amado Lagdameo, et. al., with the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, there was no pending case in court which would warrant the
opening oI the bank account Ior inspection.
Zone oI privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil Code provides that" |e|very person shall respect the dignity,
personality, privacy and peace oI mind oI his neighbors and other persons" and punishes as actionable torts several acts Ior meddling
and prying into the privacy oI another. It also holds public oIIicer or employee or any private individual liable Ior damages Ior any
violation oI the rights and liberties oI another person, and recognizes the privacy oI letters and other private communications. The
Revised Penal Code makes a crime oI the violation oI secrets by an oIIicer, revelation oI trade and industrial secrets, and trespass to
dwelling. Invasion oI privacy is an oIIense in special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping Law, 9e Secrecy of Bank Deposi9s Ac9, and the
Intellectual Property Code.
28

IN VIEW WHEREOF, we GRANT the petition. We order the Ombudsman to cease and desist Irom requiring Union Bank Manager Lourdes T. Marquez, or anyone
in her place to comply with the order dated October 14,1998, and similar orders. No costs.
SO ORDERED .
avide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Jitug, Kapunan, Mendo:a, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Buena, Gon:aga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, e Leon. Jr., and Sandoval-
Gutierre:, JJ., concur.

ROSY A. TECIO
Republic oI the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 157294-95 November 30, 2006
1osep Vic9or G. Ejerci9o, Petitioner,
vs.
Sandiganbayan (Special Division) and People of 9e Pilippines, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, 1.
The present petition Ior certiorari under Rule 65 assails the Sandiganbayan Resolutions dated February 7 and 12, 2003 denying
petitioner Joseph Victor G. Ejercito`s Motions to Quash Subpoenas Duces Tecum/Ad TestiIicandum, and Resolution dated March 11,
2003 denying his Motion Ior Reconsideration oI the Iirst two resolutions.
The three resolutions were issued in Criminal Case No. 26558, "People oI the Philippines v. Joseph Ejercito Estrada, et al.," Ior
plunder, deIined and penalized in R.A. 7080, "AN ACT DEFINING AND PENALIZING THE CRIME OF PLUNDER."
In above-stated case oI People v. Estrada, et al., the Special Prosecution Panel
1
Iiled on January 20, 2003 beIore the Sandiganbayan a
Request Ior Issuance oI Subpoena Duces Tecum Ior the issuance oI a subpoena directing the President oI Export and Industry Bank
(EIB, Iormerly Urban Bank) or his/her authorized representative to produce the Iollowing documents during the hearings scheduled on
January 22 and 27, 2003:
I. For Trust Account No. 858;
1. Account Opening Documents;
2. Trading Order No. 020385 dated January 29, 1999;
3. ConIirmation Advice TA 858;
4. Original/MicroIilm copies, including the dorsal side, oI the Iollowing:
a. Bank oI Commerce MC # 0256254 in the amount oI P2,000,000.00;
b. Urban bank Corp. MC # 34181 dated November 8, 1999 in the amount oI P10,875,749.43;
c. Urban Bank MC # 34182 dated November 8, 1999 in the amount oI P42,716,554.22;
d. Urban Bank Corp. MC # 37661 dated November 23, 1999 in the amount oI P54,161,496.52;
5. Trust Agreement dated January 1999:
Trustee: Joseph Victor C. Ejercito
Nominee: URBAN BANK-TRUST DEPARTMENT
Special Private Account No. (SPAN) 858; and

6. Ledger oI the SPAN # 858.

II. For Savings Account No. 0116-17345-9
SPAN No. 858
1. Signature Cards; and
2. Statement oI Account/Ledger
III. Urban Bank Manager`s Check and their corresponding Urban Bank Manager`s Check Application Forms, as Iollows:
1. MC # 039975 dated January 18, 2000 in the amount oI P70,000,000.00;
2. MC # 039976 dated January 18, 2000 in the amount oI P2,000,000.00;
3. MC # 039977 dated January 18, 2000 in the amount oI P2,000,000.00;
4. MC # 039978 dated January 18, 2000 in the amount oI P1,000,000.00;
The Special Prosecution Panel also Iiled on January 20, 2003, a Request Ior Issuance oI Subpoena Duces Tecum/Ad TestiIicandum
directed to the authorized representative oI Equitable-PCI Bank to produce statements oI account pertaining to certain accounts in the
name oI "Jose Velarde" and to testiIy thereon.
The Sandiganbayan granted both requests by Resolution oI January 21, 2003 and subpoenas were accordingly issued.
The Special Prosecution Panel Iiled still another Request Ior Issuance oI Subpoena Duces Tecum/Ad TestiIicandum dated January 23,
2003 Ior the President oI EIB or his/her authorized representative to produce the same documents subject oI the Subpoena Duces
Tecum dated January 21, 2003 and to testiIy thereon on the hearings scheduled on January 27 and 29, 2003 and subsequent dates until
completion oI the testimony. The request was likewise granted by the Sandiganbayan. A Subpoena Duces Tecum/Ad TestiIicandum
was accordingly issued on January 24, 2003.
Petitioner, claiming to have learned Irom the media that the Special Prosecution Panel had requested Ior the issuance oI subpoenas Ior
the examination oI bank accounts belonging to him, attended the hearing oI the case on January 27, 2003 and Iiled beIore the
Sandiganbayan a letter oI even date expressing his concerns as Iollows, quoted verbatim:
Your Honors:
It is with much respect that I write this court relative to the concern oI subpoenaing the undersigned`s bank account which I have
learned through the media.
I am sure the prosecution is aware oI our banking secrecy laws everyone supposed to observe. But, instead oI prosecuting those who
may have breached such laws, it seems it is even going to use supposed evidence which I have reason to believe could only have been
illegally obtained.
The prosecution was not content with a general request. It even lists and identiIies speciIic documents meaning someone else in the
bank illegally released conIidential inIormation.
II this can be done to me, it can happen to anyone. Not that anything can still shock our Iamily. Nor that I have anything to hide. Your
Honors.
But, I am not a lawyer and need time to consult one on a situation that aIIects every bank depositor in the country and should interest
the bank itselI, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, and maybe the Ombudsman himselI, who may want to investigate, not exploit, the
serious breach that can only harm the economy, a consequence that may have been overlooked. There appears to have been deplorable
connivance.

x x x x
I hope and pray, Your Honors, that I will be given time to retain the services oI a lawyer to help me protect my rights and those oI
every banking depositor. But the one I have in mind is out oI the country right now.
May I, thereIore, ask your Honors, that in the meantime, the issuance oI the subpoena be held in abeyance Ior at least ten (10) days to
enable me to take appropriate legal steps in connection with the prosecution`s request Ior the issuance oI subpoena concerning my
accounts. (Emphasis supplied)
From the present petition, it is gathered that the "accounts" reIerred to by petitioner in his above-quoted letter are Trust Account No.
858 and Savings Account No. 0116-17345-9.
2

In open court, the Special Division oI the Sandiganbayan, through Associate Justice Edilberto Sandoval, advised petitioner that his
remedy was to Iile a motion to quash, Ior which he was given up to 12:00 noon the Iollowing day, January 28, 2003.
Petitioner, unassisted by counsel, thus Iiled on January 28, 2003 a Motion to Quash Subpoena Duces Tecum/Ad TestiIicandum
praying that the subpoenas previously issued to the President oI the EIB dated January 21 and January 24, 2003 be quashed.
3

In his Motion to Quash, petitioner claimed that his bank accounts are covered by R.A. No. 1405 (The Secrecy oI Bank Deposits Law)
and do not Iall under any oI the exceptions stated therein. He Iurther claimed that the speciIic identiIication oI documents in the
questioned subpoenas, including details on dates and amounts, could only have been made possible by an earlier illegal disclosure
thereoI by the EIB and the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) in its capacity as receiver oI the then Urban Bank.
The disclosure being illegal, petitioner concluded, the prosecution in the case may not be allowed to make use oI the inIormation.
BeIore the Motion to Quash was resolved by the Sandiganbayan, the prosecution Iiled another Request Ior the Issuance oI Subpoena
Duces Tecum/Ad TestiIicandum dated January 31, 2003, again to direct the President oI the EIB to produce, on the hearings
scheduled on February 3 and 5, 2003, the same documents subject oI the January 21 and 24, 2003 subpoenas with the exception oI the
Bank oI Commerce MC #0256254 in the amount oI P2,000,000 as Bank oI Commerce MC #0256256 in the amount oI P200,000,000
was instead requested. Moreover, the request covered the Iollowing additional documents:
IV. For Savings Account No. 1701-00646-1:
1. Account Opening Forms;
2. Specimen Signature Card/s; and
3. Statements oI Account.
The prosecution also Iiled a Request Ior the Issuance oI Subpoena Duces Tecum/Ad TestiIicandum bearing the same date, January 31,
2003, directed to Aurora C. Baldoz, Vice President-CR-II oI the PDIC Ior her to produce the Iollowing documents on the scheduled
hearings on February 3 and 5, 2003:
1. Letter oI authority dated November 23, 1999 re: SPAN |Special Private Account Number| 858;
2. Letter oI authority dated January 29, 2000 re: SPAN 858;
3. Letter oI authority dated April 24, 2000 re: SPAN 858;
4. Urban Bank check no. 052092 dated April 24, 2000 Ior the amount oI P36, 572, 315.43;
5. Urban Bank check no. 052093 dated April 24, 2000 Ior the amount oI P107,191,780.85; and
6. Signature Card Savings Account No. 0116-17345-9. (Underscoring supplied)

The subpoenas prayed Ior in both requests were issued by the Sandiganbayan on January 31, 2003.
On February 7, 2003, petitioner, this time assisted by counsel, Iiled an Urgent Motion to Quash Subpoenae Duces Tecum/Ad
TestiIicandum praying that the subpoena dated January 31, 2003 directed to Aurora Baldoz be quashed Ior the same reasons which he
cited in the Motion to Quash
4
he had earlier Iiled.
On the same day, February 7, 2003, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioner`s Motion to Quash Subpoenae Duces
Tecum/Ad TestiIicandum dated January 28, 2003.
Subsequently or on February 12, 2003, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioner`s Urgent Motion to Quash Subpoena
Duces Tecum/Ad TestiIicandum dated February 7, 2003.
Petitioner`s Motion Ior Reconsideration dated February 24, 2003 seeking a reconsideration oI the Resolutions oI February 7 and 12,
2003 having been denied by Resolution oI March 11, 2003, petitioner Iiled the present petition.
Raised as issues are:
1. Whether petitioner`s Trust Account No. 858 is covered by the term "deposit" as used in R.A. 1405;
2. Whether petitioner`s Trust Account No. 858 and Savings Account No. 0116-17345-9 are excepted Irom the protection oI R.A.
1405; and
3. Whether the "extremely-detailed" inIormation contained in the Special Prosecution Panel`s requests Ior subpoena was obtained
through a prior illegal disclosure oI petitioner`s bank accounts, in violation oI the "Iruit oI the poisonous tree" doctrine.
Respondent People posits that Trust Account No. 858
5
may be inquired into, not merely because it Ialls under the exceptions to the
coverage oI R.A. 1405, but because it is not even contemplated therein. For, to respondent People, the law applies only to "deposits"
which strictly means the money delivered to the bank by which a creditor-debtor relationship is created between the depositor and the
bank.
The contention that trust accounts are not covered by the term "deposits," as used in R.A. 1405, by the mere Iact that they do not entail
a creditor-debtor relationship between the trustor and the bank, does not lie. An examination oI the law shows that the term "deposits"
used therein is to be understood broadly and not limited only to accounts which give rise to a creditor-debtor relationship between the
depositor and the bank.
The policy behind the law is laid down in Section 1:
SECTION 1. It is hereby declared to be the policy oI the Government to give encouragement to the people to deposit their money in
banking institutions and to discourage private hoarding so that the same may be properly utilized by banks in authorized loans to assist
in the economic development oI the country. (Underscoring supplied)
II the money deposited under an account may be used by banks Ior authorized loans to third persons, then such account, regardless oI
whether it creates a creditor-debtor relationship between the depositor and the bank, Ialls under the category oI accounts which the law
precisely seeks to protect Ior the purpose oI boosting the economic development oI the country.
Trust Account No. 858 is, without doubt, one such account. The Trust Agreement between petitioner and Urban Bank provides that
the trust account covers "deposit, placement or investment oI Iunds" by Urban Bank Ior and in behalI oI petitioner.
6
The money
deposited under Trust Account No. 858, was, thereIore, intended not merely to remain with the bank but to be invested by it
elsewhere. To hold that this type oI account is not protected by R.A. 1405 would encourage private hoarding oI Iunds that could
otherwise be invested by banks in other ventures, contrary to the policy behind the law.
Section 2 oI the same law in Iact even more clearly shows that the term "deposits" was intended to be understood broadly:
SECTION 2. All deposi9s of wa9ever na9ure with banks or banking institutions in the Philippines including investments in bonds
issued by the Government oI the Philippines, its political subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby considered as oI an
absolutely conIidential nature and may not be examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government oIIicial, bureau or oIIice,

except upon written permission oI the depositor, or in cases oI impeachment, or upon order oI a competent court in cases oI bribery or
dereliction oI duty oI public oIIicials, or in cases were 9e money deposi9ed or inves9ed is the subject matter oI the litigation.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The phrase "oI whatever nature" proscribes any restrictive interpretation oI "deposits." Moreover, it is clear Irom the immediately
quoted provision that, generally, the law applies not only to money which is deposited but also to those which are invested. This
Iurther shows that the law was not intended to apply only to "deposits" in the strict sense oI the word. Otherwise, there would have
been no need to add the phrase "or invested."
Clearly, thereIore, R.A. 1405 is broad enough to cover Trust Account No. 858.
The protection aIIorded by the law is, however, not absolute, there being recognized exceptions thereto, as above-quoted Section 2
provides. In the present case, two exceptions apply, to wit: (1) the examination oI bank accounts is upon order oI a competent court in
cases oI bribery or dereliction oI duty oI public oIIicials, and (2) the money deposited or invested is the subject matter oI the litigation.
Petitioner contends that since plunder is neither bribery nor dereliction oI duty, his accounts are not excepted Irom the protection oI
R.A. 1405. Philippine National Bank v. Gancayco
7
holds otherwise:
Cases of unexplained weal9 are similar to cases oI bribery or dereliction oI duty and no reason is seen why these two classes oI
cases cannot be excepted Irom the rule making bank deposits conIidential. The policy as to one cannot be diIIerent Irom the policy as
to the other. Tis policy expresses 9e no9ion 9a9 a public office is a public 9rus9 and any person who enters upon its discharge
does so with the Iull knowledge that his liIe, so Iar as relevant to his duty, is open to public scrutiny.
Undoubtedly, cases Ior plunder involve unexplained wealth. Section 2 oI R.A. No. 7080 states so.
SECTION 2. DeIinition oI the Crime oI Plunder; Penalties. Any public officer who, by himselI or in connivance with members oI
his Iamily, relatives by aIIinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumula9es or
acquires ill-go99en weal9 through a combination or series oI overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1(d) hereoI, in the
aggregate amount or total value oI at least Seventy-Iive million pesos (P75,000,000.00), shall be guilty oI the crime oI plunder and
shall be punished by liIe imprisonment with perpetual absolute disqualiIication Irom holding any public oIIice. Any person who
participated with said public oIIicer in the commission oI plunder shall likewise be punished. In the imposition oI penalties, the degree
oI participation and the attendance oI mitigating and extenuating circumstances shall be considered by the court. The court shall
declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets including the properties and shares oI stock
derived Irom the deposit or investment thereoI IorIeited in Iavor oI the State. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
An examination oI the "overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1(d)" oI R.A. No. 7080 would make the similarity between
plunder and bribery even more pronounced since bribery is essentially included among these criminal acts. Thus Section 1(d) states:
d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business enterprise or material possession oI any person within the purview oI
Section Two (2) hereoI, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and or business
associates by any combination or series oI the Iollowing means or similar schemes.
1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation oI public Iunds or raids on the public treasury;
2) By receiving, direc9ly or indirec9ly, any commission, gif9, sare, percen9age, kickbacks or any o9er form of pecuniary
benefi9 from any person and/or en9i9y in connec9ion wi9 any governmen9 con9rac9 or projec9 or by reason of 9e office or
posi9ion of 9e public officer concerned;
3) By the illegal or Iraudulent conveyance or disposition oI assets belonging to the National Government or any oI its subdivisions,
agencies or instrumentalities or government-owned or -controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares oI stock, equity or any other Iorm oI interest or participation
including promise oI Iuture employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;
5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation oI decrees and
orders intended to beneIit particular persons or special interests; or

6) By taking undue advantage oI oIIicial position, authority, relationship, connection or inIluence to unjustly enrich himselI or
themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice oI the Filipino people and the Republic oI the Philippines. (Emphasis
supplied)
Indeed, all the above-enumerated overt acts are similar to bribery such that, in each case, it may be said that "no reason is seen why
these two classes oI cases cannot be excepted Irom the rule making bank deposits conIidential."
8

The crime oI bribery and the overt acts constitutive oI plunder are crimes committed by public oIIicers, and in either case the noble
idea that "a public oIIice is a public trust and any person who enters upon its discharge does so with the Iull knowledge that his liIe, so
Iar as relevant to his duty, is open to public scrutiny" applies with equal Iorce.
Plunder being thus analogous to bribery, the exception to R.A. 1405 applicable in cases oI bribery must also apply to cases oI plunder.
Respecting petitioner`s claim that the money in his bank accounts is not the "subject matter oI the litigation," the meaning oI the
phrase "subject matter oI the litigation" as used in R.A. 1405 is explained in &nion Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,
9
thus:
Petitioner contends that the Court oI Appeals conIuses the "cause oI action" with the "subject oI the action". In Yusingco v. Ong Hing
Lian, petitioner points out, this Court distinguished the two concepts.
x x x "The cause oI action is the legal wrong threatened or committed, while the object oI the action is to prevent or redress the wrong
by obtaining some legal relieI; but the subject oI the action is neither oI these since it is not the wrong or the relieI demanded, the
subject oI the action is the matter or thing with respect to which the controversy has arisen, concerning which the wrong has been
done, and this ordinarily is the property or the contract and its subject matter, or the thing in dispute."
The argument is well-taken. We note with approval the diIIerence between the subject oI the action` Irom the cause oI action.` We
also Iind petitioner`s deIinition oI the phrase subject matter oI the action` is consistent with the term subject matter oI the litigation`,
as the latter is used in the Bank Deposits Secrecy Act.
In Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Magsino, where the petitioner bank inadvertently caused the transIer oI the amount oI US$1,000,000.00
instead oI only US$1,000.00, the Court sanctioned the examination oI the bank accounts where part oI the money was subsequently
caused to be deposited:
x x x Section 2 oI |Republic Act No. 1405| allows the disclosure oI bank deposits in cases where the money deposited is the subject
matter oI the litigation. Inasmuc as Civil Case No. 26899 is aimed a9 recovering 9e amoun9 conver9ed by 9e 1aviers for 9eir
own benefi9, necessarily, an inquiry in9o 9e wereabou9s of 9e illegally acquired amoun9 ex9ends 9o wa9ever is concealed by
being eld or recorded in 9e name of persons o9er 9an 9e one responsible for 9e illegal acquisi9ion."
Clearly, Mellon Bank involved a case where the money deposited was the subject matter oI the litigation since the money deposited
was the very thing in dispute. x x x" (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The plunder case now pending with the Sandiganbayan necessarily involves an inquiry into the whereabouts oI the amount
purportedly acquired illegally by Iormer President Joseph Estrada.
In light then oI this Court`s pronouncement in &nion Bank, the subject matter oI the litigation cannot be limited to bank accounts
under the name oI President Estrada alone, but must include those accounts to which the money purportedly acquired illegally or a
portion thereoI was alleged to have been transIerred. Trust Account No. 858 and Savings Account No. 0116-17345-9 in the name oI
petitioner Iall under this description and must thus be part oI the subject matter oI the litigation.
In a Iurther attempt to show that the subpoenas issued by the Sandiganbayan are invalid and may not be enIorced, petitioner contends,
as earlier stated, that the inIormation Iound therein, given their "extremely detailed" character, could only have been obtained by the
Special Prosecution Panel through an illegal disclosure by the bank oIIicials concerned. Petitioner thus claims that, Iollowing the "Iruit
oI the poisonous tree" doctrine, the subpoenas must be quashed.
Petitioner Iurther contends that even iI, as claimed by respondent People, the "extremely-detailed" inIormation was obtained by the
Ombudsman Irom the bank oIIicials concerned during a previous investigation oI the charges against President Estrada, such inquiry
into his bank accounts would itselI be illegal.

Petitioner relies on Marque: v. esierto

10
where the Court held:
We rule that beIore an in camera inspection may be allowed there must be a pending case beIore a court oI competent jurisdiction.
Further, the account must be clearly identiIied, the inspection limited to the subject matter oI the pending case beIore the court oI
competent jurisdiction. The bank personnel and the account holder must be notiIied to be present during the inspection, and such
inspection may cover only the account identiIied in the pending case. (Underscoring supplied)
As no plunder case against then President Estrada had yet been Iiled beIore a court oI competent jurisdiction at the time the
Ombudsman conducted an investigation, petitioner concludes that the inIormation about his bank accounts were acquired illegally,
hence, it may not be lawIully used to Iacilitate a subsequent inquiry into the same bank accounts.
Petitioner`s attempt to make the exclusionary rule applicable to the instant case Iails. R.A. 1405, it bears noting, nowhere provides that
an unlawIul examination oI bank accounts shall render the evidence obtained thereIrom inadmissible in evidence. Section 5 oI R.A.
1405 only states that "|a|ny violation oI this law will subject the oIIender upon conviction, to an imprisonment oI not more than Iive
years or a Iine oI not more than twenty thousand pesos or both, in the discretion oI the court."
The case oI &.S. v. Fra:in,
11
involving the Right to Financial Privacy Act oI 1978 (RFPA) oI the United States, is instructive.
Because the statute, when properly construed, excludes a suppression remedy, it would not be appropriate Ior us to provide one in the
exercise oI our supervisory powers over the administration oI justice. Where Congress has both established a right and provided
exclusive remedies Ior its violation, we would "encroach upon the prerogatives" oI Congress were we to authorize a remedy not
provided Ior by statute. &nited States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1313 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825, 98 S.Ct. 72, 54 L.Ed.2d
83 (1977).
The same principle was reiterated in &.S. v. Thompson:
12

x x x When Congress speciIically designates a remedy Ior one oI its acts, courts generally presume that it engaged in the necessary
balancing oI interests in determining what the appropriate penalty should be. See Michaelian, 803 F.2d at 1049 (citing cases); Fra:in,
780 F.2d at 1466. Absent a speciIic reIerence to an exclusionary rule, it is not appropriate Ior the courts to read such a provision into
the act.
Even assuming arguendo, however, that the exclusionary rule applies in principle to cases involving R.A. 1405, the Court Iinds no
reason to apply the same in this particular case.
Clearly, the "Iruit oI the poisonous tree" doctrine
13
presupposes a violation oI law. II there was no violation oI R.A. 1405 in the
instant case, then there would be no "poisonous tree" to begin with, and, thus, no reason to apply the doctrine.
How the Ombudsman conducted his inquiry into the bank accounts oI petitioner is recounted by respondent People oI the Philippines,
viz:
x x x |A|s early as February 8, 2001, long beIore the issuance oI the Marquez ruling, the OIIice oI the Ombudsman, acting under the
powers granted to it by the Constitution and R.A. No. 6770, and acting on inIormation obtained Irom various sources, including
impeachment (oI then Pres. Joseph Estrada) related reports, articles and investigative journals, issued a Subpoena uces Tecum
addressed to Urban Bank. (Attachment "1-b") It should be noted that the description oI the documents sought to be produced at that
time included that oI numbered accounts 727, 737, 747, 757, 777 and 858 and included such names as Jose Velarde, Joseph E.
Estrada, Laarni Enriquez, Guia Gomez, Joy Melendrez, Peachy Osorio, Rowena Lopez, Kevin or Kelvin Garcia. The subpoena did not
single out account 858.
x x x x
Thus, on February 13, 2001, PDIC, as receiver oI Urban Bank, issued a certiIication as to the availability oI bank documents relating
to A/C 858 and T/A 858 and the non-availability oI bank records as to the other accounts named in the subpoena. (Attachments "2",
"2-1" and "2-b)
Based on the certiIication issued by PDIC, the OIIice oI the Ombudsman on February 16, 2001 again issued a Subpoena uces
Tecum directed to Ms. Corazon dela Paz, as Interim Receiver, directing the production oI documents pertinent to account A/C 858 and
T/C 858. (Attachment "3")

In compliance with the said subpoena dated February 16, 2001, Ms. Dela Paz, as interim receiver, Iurnished the OIIice oI the
Ombudsman certiIied copies oI documents under cover latter dated February 21, 2001:
1. Transaction registers dated 7-02-99, 8-16-99, 9-17-99, 10-18-99, 11-22-99, 1-07-00, 04-03-00 and 04-24-00;
2. Report oI Unregularized TAFs & TDs Ior UR COIN A & B Placements oI Various Branches as oI February 29, 2000 and as oI
December 16, 1999; and
3. Trading Orders Nos. A No. 78102 and A No. 078125.
Trading Order A No. 07125 is Iiled in two copies a white copy which showed "set up" inIormation; and a yellow copy which
showed "reversal" inIormation. Both copies have been reproduced and are enclosed with this letter.
We are continuing our search Ior other records and documents pertinent to your request and we will Iorward to you on Friday, 23
February 2001, such additional records and documents as we might Iind until then. (Attachment "4")
The OIIice oI the Ombudsman then requested Ior the manger`s checks, detailed in the Subpoena uces Tecum dated Marc 7, 2001.
(Attachment "5")
PDIC again complied with the said Subpoena uces Tecum dated March 7, 2001 and provided copies oI the manager`s checks thus
requested under cover letter dated Marc 16, 2001. (Attachment "6")
14
(Emphasis in the original)
The Sandiganbayan credited the Ioregoing account oI respondent People.
15
The Court Iinds no reason to disturb this Iinding oI Iact by
the Sandiganbayan.
The Marque: ruling notwithstanding, the above-described examination by the Ombudsman oI petitioner`s bank accounts, conducted
beIore a case was Iiled with a court oI competent jurisdiction, was lawIul.
For the Ombudsman issued the subpoenas bearing on the bank accounts oI petitioner about Iour months before Marquez was
promulgated on June 27, 2001.
While judicial interpretations oI statutes, such as that made in Marque: with respect to R.A. No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act oI 1989,
are deemed part oI the statute as oI the date it was originally passed, the rule is not absolute.
Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals
16
teaches:
It is consequently clear that a judicial interpretation becomes a part oI the law as oI the date that law was originally passed, subjec9
only 9o 9e qualifica9ion 9a9 wen a doc9rine of 9is Cour9 is overruled and a differen9 view is adop9ed, and more so wen
9ere is a reversal 9ereof, 9e new doc9rine sould be applied prospec9ively and should not apply to parties who relied on the old
doctrine and acted in good Iaith. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
When this Court construed the Ombudsman Act oI 1989, in light oI the Secrecy oI Bank Deposits Law in Marque:, that "beIore an in
camera inspection may be allowed there must be a pending case beIore a court oI competent jurisdiction", it was, in Iact, reversing an
earlier doctrine Iound in Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Purisima
17
.
Banco Filipino involved subpoenas duces tecum issued by the OIIice oI the Ombudsman, then known as the Tanodbayan,
18
in the
course oI its preliminary inves9iga9ion oI a charge oI violation oI the Anti-GraIt and Corrupt Practices Act.
While the main issue in Banco Filipino was whether R.A. 1405 precluded the Tanodbayan`s issuance oI subpoena duces tecum oI
bank records in the name oI persons other than the one who was charged, this Court, citing P.D. 1630,
19
Section 10, the relevant part
oI which states:
(d) He may issue a subpoena to compel any person to appear, give sworn testimony, or produce documentary or other evidence the
Tanodbayan deems relevant to a matter under his inquiry,

held that "Te power of 9e Tanodbayan 9o issue subpoenae ad 9es9ificandum and subpoenae duces 9ecum a9 9e 9ime in
ques9ion is no9 dispu9ed, and a9 any ra9e does no9 admi9 of doub9."
20

As the subpoenas subject oI Banco Filipino were issued during a preliminary investigation, in eIIect this Court upheld the power oI
the Tandobayan under P.D. 1630 to issue subpoenas duces tecum Ior bank documen9s prior to the Iiling oI a case beIore a court oI
competent jurisdiction.
Marque:, on the other hand, practically reversed this ruling in Banco Filipino despite the Iact that the subpoena power oI the
Ombudsman under R.A. 6770 was essentially the same as that under P.D. 1630. Thus Section 15 oI R.A. 6770 empowers the OIIice oI
the Ombudsman to
(8) Administer oaths, issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum, and take testimony in any investigation or inquiry, including the
power to examine and have access to bank accounts and records;
A comparison oI this provision with its counterpart in Sec. 10(d) oI P.D. 1630 clearly shows that it is only more explicit in stating that
the power oI the Ombudsman includes the power to examine and have access to bank accounts and records which power was
recognized with respect to the Tanodbayan through Banco Filipino.
The Marque: ruling that there must be a pending case in order Ior the Ombudsman to validly inspect bank records in camera thus
reversed a prevailing doctrine.
21
Hence, it may not be retroactively applied.
The Ombudsman`s inquiry into the subject bank accounts prior to the Iiling oI any case beIore a court oI competent jurisdiction was
thereIore valid at the time it was conducted.
Likewise, the Marque: ruling that "the account holder must be notiIied to be present during the inspection" may not be applied
retroactively to the inquiry oI the Ombudsman subject oI this case. This ruling is not a judicial interpretation either oI R.A. 6770 or
R.A. 1405, but a "judge-made" law which, as People v. Luvendino
22
instructs, can only be given prospective application:
x x x Te doc9rine 9a9 an uncounselled waiver of 9e rig9 9o counsel is no9 9o be given legal effec9 was ini9ially a judge-made
one and was firs9 announced on 26 April 1983 in Morales v. E3rle and rei9era9ed on 20 Marc 1985 in People v. Cal9. x x x
While the Morales-Galit doctrine eventually became part oI Section 12(1) oI the 1987 Constitution, that doctrine aIIords no comIort to
appellant Luvendino Ior 9e requiremen9s and res9ric9ions ou9lined in Morales and Cal9 ave no re9roac9ive effec9 and do no9
reac waivers made pror 9o 2 Aprl 1983 the date oI promulgation oI Morales. (Emphasis supplied)
In Iine, the subpoenas issued by the Ombudsman in this case were legal, hence, invocation oI the "Iruit oI the poisonous tree" doctrine
is misplaced.
At all events, even iI the challenged subpoenas are quashed, the Ombudsman is not barred Irom requiring the production oI the same
documents based solely on inIormation obtained by it Irom sources independent oI its previous inquiry.
In particular, the Ombudsman, even beIore its inquiry, had already possessed inIormation giving him grounds to believe that (1) there
are bank accounts bearing the number "858," (2) that such accounts are in the custody oI Urban Bank, and (3) that the same are linked
with the bank accounts oI Iormer President Joseph Estrada who was then under investigation Ior plunder.
Only with such prior independent inIormation could it have been possible Ior the Ombudsman to issue the February 8, 2001 subpoena
duces tecum addressed to the President and/or ChieI Executive OIIicer oI Urban Bank, which described the documents subject thereoI
as Iollows:
(a) bank records and all documen9s relative thereto pertaining to all bank accounts (Savings, Current, Time Deposit, Trust, Foreign
Currency Deposits, etc.) under 9e accoun9 names oI Jose Velarde, Joseph E. Estrada, Laarni Enriquez, Guia Gomez, Joy
Melendrez, Peach Osorio, Rowena Lopez, Kevin or Kelvin Garcia, 727, 737, 747, 757, 777 and 858. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
The inIormation on the existence oI Bank Accounts bearing number "858" was, according to respondent People oI the Philippines,
obtained Irom various sources including the proceedings during the impeachment oI President Estrada, related reports, articles and
investigative journals.
23
In the absence oI prooI to the contrary, this explanation proIIered by respondent must be upheld. To presume

that the inIormation was obtained in violation oI R.A. 1405 would inIringe the presumption oI regularity in the perIormance oI oIIicial
Iunctions.
Thus, with the Iiling oI the plunder case against Iormer President Estrada beIore the Sandiganbayan, the Ombudsman, using the above
independent inIormation, may now proceed to conduct the same investigation it earlier conducted, through which it can eventually
obtain the same inIormation previously disclosed to it by the PDIC, Ior it is an inescapable Iact that the bank records oI petitioner are
no longer protected by R.A. 1405 Ior the reasons already explained above.
Since conducting such an inquiry would, however, only result in the disclosure oI the same documents to the Ombudsman, this Court,
in avoidance oI what would be a time-wasteIul and circuitous way oI administering justice,
24
upholds the challenged subpoenas.
Respecting petitioner`s claim that the Sandiganbayan violated his right to due process as he was neither notiIied oI the requests Ior the
issuance oI the subpoenas nor oI the grant thereoI, suIIice it to state that the deIects were cured when petitioner ventilated his
arguments against the issuance thereoI through his earlier quoted letter addressed to the Sandiganbayan and when he Iiled his motions
to quash beIore the Sandiganbayan.
IN SUM, the Court Iinds that the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse oI discretion in issuing the challenged subpoenas Ior
documents pertaining to petitioner`s Trust Account No. 858 and Savings Account No. 0116-17345-9 Ior the Iollowing reasons:
1. These accounts are no longer protected by the Secrecy oI Bank Deposits Law, there being two exceptions to the said law applicable
in this case, namely: (1) the examination oI bank accounts is upon order oI a competent court in cases oI bribery or dereliction oI duty
oI public oIIicials, and (2) the money deposited or invested is the subject matter oI the litigation. Exception (1) applies since the
plunder case pending against Iormer President Estrada is analogous to bribery or dereliction oI duty, while exception (2) applies
because the money deposited in petitioner`s bank accounts is said to Iorm part oI the subject matter oI the same plunder case.
2. The "Iruit oI the poisonous tree" principle, which states that once the primary source (the "tree") is shown to have been unlawIully
obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the "Iruit") derived Irom it is also inadmissible, does not apply in this case. In the Iirst
place, R.A. 1405 does not provide Ior the application oI this rule. Moreover, there is no basis Ior applying the same in this case since
the primary source Ior the detailed inIormation regarding petitioner`s bank accounts the investigation previously conducted by the
Ombudsman was lawIul.
3. At all events, even iI the subpoenas issued by the Sandiganbayan were quashed, the Ombudsman may conduct on its own the same
inquiry into the subject bank accounts that it earlier conducted last February-March 2001, there being a plunder case already pending
against Iormer President Estrada. To quash the challenged subpoenas would, thereIore, be pointless since the Ombudsman may obtain
the same documents by another route. Upholding the subpoenas avoids an unnecessary delay in the administration oI justice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Sandiganbayan Resolutions dated February 7 and 12, 2003 and March 11, 2003 are
upheld.
The Sandiganbayan is hereby directed, consistent with this Court`s ruling in Marque: v. esierto, to notiIy petitioner as to the date the
subject bank documents shall be presented in court by the persons subpoenaed.
SO ORDERED.

ROSY A. TECIO
Republic oI the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 150224 May 19, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
1OEL YATAR alias "KAWIT", appellant.
D E C I S I O N
PER CURIAM
On automatic review is a Decision oI the Regional Trial Court oI Bulanao, Tabuk, Kalinga, Branch 25, sentencing appellant Joel Yatar
alias "Kawit" to eath Ior the special complex crime oI Rape with Homicide, and ordering him to pay the heirs oI the victim,
Kathylyn D. Uba, civil indemnity in the amount oI P75,000.00, moral damages in the amount oI P200,000.00, exemplary damages in
the amount oI P50,000.00, actual damages in the amount oI P186,410.00, or total damages amounting to P511,410.00, and costs oI
litigation.
1

Appellant was charged with Rape with Homicide under the Iollowing InIormation:
That on or about the aIternoon oI June 30, 1998 at Liwan West, Rizal, Kalinga, and within the jurisdiction oI this Honorable
Court, the accused, in order to have carnal knowledge oI a certain KATHYLYN D. UBA, did then and there wilIully,
unlawIully, and Ieloniously, and with use oI a bladed weapon stab the latter inIlicting upon her Iatal injuries resulting in the
death oI the victim, and on the occasion or by reason thereoI, accused, wilIully, unlawIully and Ieloniously, and by means oI
Iorce and violence had carnal knowledge oI said Kathlyn D. Uba against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
2

The Iacts are:
On June 30, 1998, at 8:30 a.m., Judilyn Pas-a and her Iirst cousin, seventeen year old Kathylyn Uba, were on the ground Iloor
oI the house oI their grandmother, Isabel Dawang, in Liwan West, Rizal, Kalinga. They were talking about the letter sent by
their aunt, Luz Yatar, to her husband, appellant Joel Yatar, through Kathylyn`s Iriend, Cecil Casingan. Kathylyn handed the
letter to appellant earlier that morning.
3

At 9:00 a.m. oI the same day, Judilyn and her husband, together with Isabel Dawang, leIt Ior their Iarm in Nagbitayan some two
kilometers away. BeIore Judilyn and her husband departed, Kathylyn told Judilyn that she intended to go to Tuguegarao, but in the
event she would not be able to leave, she would just stay home and wash her clothes or go to the house oI their aunt, Anita Wania.
Kathylyn was leIt alone in the house.
4

Later, at 10:00 a.m., Anita Wania and IiIteen year old Beverly Deneng stopped by the house oI Isabel. They saw appellant at the back
oI the house. They went inside the house through the back door oI the kitchen to have a drink oI water. Anita asked appellant what he
was doing there, and he replied that he was getting lumber to bring to the house oI his mother.
5

At 12:30 p.m., while Judilyn was on her way home Irom Nagbitayan, she saw appellant descend the ladder Irom the second Iloor oI
the house oI Isabel Dawang and run towards the back oI the house.
6
She later noticed appellant, who was wearing a white shirt with
collar and black pants, pacing back and Iorth at the back oI the house. She did not Iind this unusual as appellant and his wiIe used to
live in the house oI Isabel Dawang.
7

At 1:30 p.m., Judilyn again saw appellant when he called her near her house. This time, he was wearing a black shirt without collar
and blue pants. Appellant told her that he would not be getting the lumber he had stacked, and that Isabel could use it. She noticed that
appellant`s eyes were "reddish and sharp." Appellant asked her where her husband was as he had something important to tell him.
Judilyn`s husband then arrived and appellant immediately leIt and went towards the back oI the house oI Isabel.
8

In the evening oI the same day, Isabel Dawang arrived home and Iound that the lights in her house were oII. She called out Ior her
granddaughter, Kathylyn Uba. The door to the ground Iloor was open. She noticed that the water container she asked Kathylyn to Iill
up earlier that day was still empty. She went up the ladder to the second Iloor oI the house to see iI Kathylyn was upstairs. She Iound
that the door was tied with a rope, so she went down to get a kniIe. While she groped in the dark, she Ielt a liIeless body that was cold
and rigid.
9

Isabel moved her hand throughout the entire body. She Iound out that it was the naked body oI her granddaughter, Kathylyn. She
called Ior help. Judilyn and her husband arrived. Isabel was given a Ilashlight by Judilyn. She Iocused the beam and saw Kathylyn
sprawled on the Iloor naked, with her intestines protruding out oI her stomach. Meanwhile, neighbors had arrived to oIIer assistance.
A daughter oI Isabel, Cion, called the police.
10

At 9:00 that evening, SP04 Melchor Faniswa received a report that a dead woman was Iound in Isabel Dawang`s house. Together with
Iellow police oIIicers, Faniswa went to the house and Iound the naked body oI Kathylyn Uba with multiple stab wounds.
The people in the vicinity inIormed the police oIIicers that appellant was seen going down the ladder oI the house oI Isabel Dawang at
approximately 12:30 p.m.
The police discovered the victim`s panties, brassiere, denim pants, bag and sandals beside her naked cadaver at the scene oI the crime,
and they Iound a dirty white shirt splattered with blood within 50 meters Irom the house oI Isabel.
When questioned by the police authorities, appellant denied any knowledge oI Kathylyns`s death,
11
however, he was placed under
police custody.
On July 3, 1998, appellant asked the police oIIicers iI he could relieve himselI. Police OIIicer Cesar Abagan accompanied him to the
toilet around seven to ten meters away Irom the police station. They suddenly heard someone shout in the Ilocano dialect, "Nagtaray!"
(He`s running away!). Police OIIicer Orlando Manuel exited through the gate oI the Police Station and saw appellant running away.
Appellant was approximately 70 meters away Irom the station when Police OIIicer Abagan recaptured him.
12
He was charged with
Rape with Homicide. When he was arraigned on July 21, 1998, appellant pleaded "not guilty."
AIter trial, appellant was convicted oI the crime oI Rape with Homicide, deIined and penalized under Article 266-A oI the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 8353, otherwise known as the Anti-Rape Law oI 1997, and was accordingly, sentenced to eath.
Hence, this automatic review pursuant to Article 47 oI the Revised Penal Code, as amended. In his BrieI, appellant assigns the
Iollowing errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING MUCH WEIGHT TO THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE
PROSECUTION NOTWITHSTANDING THEIR DOUBTFULNESS.
II
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE SERIOUS
CRIME CHARGED DUE TO REASONABLE DOUBT.
Appellant`s contentions are unmeritorious.
The issue regarding the credibility oI the prosecution witnesses should be resolved against appellant. This Court will not interIere with
the judgment oI the trial court in determining the credibility oI witnesses unless there appears in the record some Iact or circumstance
oI weight and inIluence which has been overlooked or the signiIicance oI which has been misinterpreted.
13
Well-entrenched is the rule
that the Iindings oI the trial court on credibility oI witnesses are entitled to great weight on appeal unless cogent reasons are presented
necessitating a reexamination iI not the disturbance oI the same; the reason being that the Iormer is in a better and unique position oI

hearing Iirst hand the witnesses and observing their deportment, conduct and attitude.
14
Absent any showing that the trial judge
overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some Iacts or circumstances oI weight which would aIIect the result oI the case, the trial
judge`s assessment oI credibility deserves the appellate court`s highest respect.
15
Where there is nothing to show that the witnesses Ior
the prosecution were actuated by improper motive, their testimonies are entitled to Iull Iaith and credit.
16

The weight oI the prosecution`s evidence must be appreciated in light oI the well-settled rule which provides that an accused can be
convicted even iI no eyewitness is available, as long as suIIicient circumstantial evidence is presented by the prosecution to prove
beyond doubt that the accused committed the crime.
17

ReIerence to the records will show that a total oI eleven (11) wounds, six (6) stab and Iive (5) incised, were Iound on the victim`s
abdomen and back, causing a portion oI her small intestines to spill out oI her body.
18
Rigor mortis oI the vicitm`s body was complete
when Dr. Bartolo examined the victim at 9:00 a.m. on July 1, 1998. According to him, the time oI death may be approximated Irom
between nine (9) to twelve (12) hours prior to the completion oI rigor mortis.
19
In other words, the estimated time oI death was
sometime between 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. on June 30, 1998. This was within the timeIrame within which the lone presence oI
appellant lurking in the house oI Isabel Dawang was testiIied to by witnesses.
It should also be noted that, although the Postmortem Report by the attending physician, Dr. Pej Evan C. Bartolo, indicates that no
hymenal lacerations, contusions or hematoma were noted on the victim,
20
Dr. Bartolo discovered the presence oI semen in the vaginal
canal oI the victim. During his testimony, Dr. Bartolo stated that the introduction oI semen into the vaginal canal could only be done
through sexual intercourse with the victim.
21
In addition, it is apparent Irom the pictures submitted by the prosecution that the sexual
violation oI the victim was maniIested by a bruise and some swelling in her right Iorearm indicating resistance to the appellant`s
assault on her virtue.
22

SigniIicantly, subsequent testing showed that the Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) oI the sperm specimen Irom the vagina oI the victim
was identical the semen to be that oI appellant`s gene type.
DNA is a molecule that encodes the genetic inIormation in all living organisms.
23
A person`s DNA is the same in each cell and it does
not change throughout a person`s liIetime; the DNA in a person`s blood is the same as the DNA Iound in his saliva, sweat, bone, the
root and shaIt oI hair, earwax, mucus, urine, skin tissue, and vaginal and rectal cells.
24
Most importantly, because oI polymorphisms in
human genetic structure, no two individuals have the same DNA, with the notable exception oI identical twins.
25

DNA print or identiIication technology has been advanced as a uniquely eIIective means to link a suspect to a crime, or to exonerate a
wrongly accused suspect, where biological evidence has been leIt. For purposes oI criminal investigation, DNA identiIication is a
Iertile source oI both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence. It can assist immensely in eIIecting a more accurate account oI the crime
committed, eIIiciently Iacilitating the conviction oI the guilty, securing the acquittal oI the innocent, and ensuring the proper
administration oI justice in every case.
DNA evidence collected Irom a crime scene can link a suspect to a crime or eliminate one Irom suspicion in the same principle as
Iingerprints are used.
26
Incidents involving sexual assault would leave biological evidence such as hair, skin tissue, semen, blood, or
saliva which can be leIt on the victim`s body or at the crime scene. Hair and Iiber Irom clothing, carpets, bedding, or Iurniture could
also be transIerred to the victim`s body during the assault.
27
Forensic DNA evidence is helpIul in proving that there was physical
contact between an assailant and a victim. II properly collected Irom the victim, crime scene or assailant, DNA can be compared with
known samples to place the suspect at the scene oI the crime.
28

The U.P. National Science Research Institute (NSRI), which conducted the DNA tests in this case, used the Polymerase chain reaction
(PCR) ampliIication method by Short Tandem Repeat (STR) analysis. With PCR testing, tiny amounts oI a speciIic DNA sequence
can be copied exponentially within hours. Thus, getting suIIicient DNA Ior analysis has become much easier since it became possible
to reliably ampliIy small samples using the PCR method.
In assessing the probative value oI DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the Iollowing Iactors: how the samples were
collected, how they were handled, the possibility oI contamination oI the samples, the procedure Iollowed in analyzing the samples,
whether the proper standards and procedures were Iollowed in conducting the tests, and the qualiIication oI the analyst who conducted
the tests.
29

In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly qualiIied by the prosecution as an expert witness on DNA print or
identiIication techniques.
30
Based on Dr. de Ungria`s testimony, it was determined that the gene type and DNA proIile oI appellant are
identical to that oI the extracts subject oI examination.
31
The blood sample taken Irom the appellant showed that he was oI the
Iollowing gene types: vWA 15/19, TH01 7/8, DHFRP2 9/10 and CSF1PO 10/11, which are identical with semen taken Irom the

victim`s vaginal canal.

32
Verily, a DNA match exists between the semen Iound in the victim and the blood sample given by the
appellant in open court during the course oI the trial.
Admittedly, we are just beginning to integrate these advances in science and technology in the Philippine criminal justice system, so
we must be cautious as we traverse these relatively uncharted waters. Fortunately, we can beneIit Irom the wealth oI persuasive
jurisprudence that has developed in other jurisdictions. SpeciIically, the prevailing doctrine in the U.S. has proven instructive.
In aubert v. Merrell ow,
33
it was ruled that pertinent evidence based on scientiIically valid principles could be used as long as it
was relevant and reliable. Judges, under aubert, were allowed greater discretion over which testimony they would allow at trial,
including the introduction oI new kinds oI scientiIic techniques. DNA typing is one such novel procedure.
Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a Iact in issue as to induce belieI in its existence or non-
existence.
34
Applying the aubert test to the case at bar, the DNA evidence obtained through PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis,
and which was appreciated by the court a quo is relevant and reliable since it is reasonably based on scientiIically valid principles oI
human genetics and molecular biology.
Independently oI the physical evidence oI appellant`s semen Iound in the victim`s vaginal canal, the trial court appreciated the
Iollowing circumstantial evidence as being suIIicient to sustain a conviction beyond reasonable doubt: (1) Appellant and his wiIe were
living in the house oI Isabel Dawang together with the victim, Kathylyn Uba; (2) In June 1998, appellant`s wiIe leIt the house because
oI their Irequent quarrels; (3) Appellant received Irom the victim, Kathylyn Uba, a letter Irom his estranged wiIe in the early morning
on June 30, 1998; (4) Appellant was seen by Apolonia Wania and Beverly Denneng at 1:00 p.m. oI June 30, 1998 near the kitchen oI
the house oI Isabel Dawang, acting strangely and wearing a dirty white shirt with collar; (5) Judilyn Pas-a saw appellant going down
the ladder oI the house oI Isabel at 12:30 p.m., wearing a dirty white shirt, and again at 1:30 p.m., this time wearing a black shirt; (6)
Appellant hurriedly leIt when the husband oI Judilyn Pas-a was approaching; (7) Salmalina Tandagan saw appellant in a dirty white
shirt coming down the ladder oI the house oI Isabel on the day Kathylyn Uba was Iound dead; (8) The door leading to the second Iloor
oI the house oI Isabel Dawang was tied by a rope; (9) The victim, Kathylyn Uba, lay naked in a pool oI blood with her intestines
protruding Irom her body on the second Iloor oI the house oI Isabel Dawang, with her stained pants, bra, underwear and shoes
scattered along the periphery; (10) Laboratory examination revealed sperm in the victim`s vagina (Exhibit "H" and "J"); (11) The
stained or dirty white shirt Iound in the crime scene was Iound to be positive with blood; (12) DNA oI slide, Exhibit "J" and "H",
compared with the DNA proIile oI the appellant are identical; and (13) Appellant escaped two days aIter he was detained but was
subsequently apprehended, such Ilight being indicative oI guilt.
35

Circumstantial evidence, to be suIIicient to warrant a conviction, must Iorm an unbroken chain which leads to a Iair and reasonable
conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion oI others, is the perpetrator oI the crime. To determine whether there is suIIicient
circumstantial evidence, three requisites must concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) Iacts on which the inIerences are
derived are proven; and (3) the combination oI all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
36

In an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence, the appellant contends that the blood sample taken Irom him as well as the DNA tests
were conducted in violation oI his right to remain silent as well as his right against selI-incrimination under Secs. 12 and 17 oI Art. III
oI the Constitution.
This contention is untenable. The kernel oI the right is not against all compulsion, but against testimonial compulsion.
37
The right
against selI- incrimination is simply against the legal process oI extracting Irom the lips oI the accused an admission oI guilt. It does
not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part oI object evidence.
We ruled in People v. Rondero
38
that although accused-appellant insisted that hair samples were Iorcibly taken Irom him and
submitted to the National Bureau oI Investigation Ior Iorensic examination, the hair samples may be admitted in evidence against him,
Ior what is proscribed is the use oI testimonial compulsion or any evidence communicative in nature acquired Irom the accused under
duress.
Hence, a person may be compelled to submit to Iingerprinting, photographing, paraIIin, blood and DNA, as there is no testimonial
compulsion involved. Under People v. Gallarde,
39
where immediately aIter the incident, the police authorities took pictures oI the
accused without the presence oI counsel, we ruled that there was no violation oI the right against selI-incrimination. The accused may
be compelled to submit to a physical examination to determine his involvement in an oIIense oI which he is accused.
It must also be noted that appellant in this case submitted himselI Ior blood sampling which was conducted in open court on March 30,
2000, in the presence oI counsel.

Appellant Iurther argues that the DNA tests conducted by the prosecution against him are unconstitutional on the ground that resort
thereto is tantamount to the application oI an ex-post facto law.
This argument is specious. No ex-post facto law is involved in the case at bar. The science oI DNA typing involves the admissibility,
relevance and reliability oI the evidence obtained under the Rules oI Court. Whereas an ex-post facto law reIers primarily to a question
oI law, DNA proIiling requires a Iactual determination oI the probative weight oI the evidence presented.
Appellant`s twin deIense oI denial and alibi cannot be sustained. The Iorensic DNA evidence and bloodied shirt, notwithstanding the
eyewitness accounts oI his presence at Isabel Dawang`s house during the time when the crime was committed, undeniably link him to
the June 30, 1998 incident. Appellant did not demonstrate with clear and convincing evidence an impossibility to be in two places at
the same time, especially in this case where the two places are located in the same barangay.
40
He lives within a one hundred (100)
meter radius Irom the scene oI the crime, and requires a mere Iive minute walk to reach one house Irom the other. This Iact severely
weakens his alibi.
As to the second assignment oI error, appellant asserts that the court a quo committed reversible error in convicting him oI the crime
charged. He alleges that he should be acquitted on reasonable doubt.
Appellant`s assertion cannot be sustained.
Generally, courts should only consider and rely upon duly established evidence and never on mere conjectures or suppositions. The
legal relevancy oI evidence denotes "something more than a minimum oI probative value," suggesting that such evidentiary relevance
must contain a "plus value."
41
This may be necessary to preclude the trial court Irom being satisIied by matters oI slight value, capable
oI being exaggerated by prejudice and hasty conclusions. Evidence without "plus value" may be logically relevant but not legally
suIIicient to convict. It is incumbent upon the trial court to balance the probative value oI such evidence against the likely harm that
would result Irom its admission.
The judgment in a criminal case can be upheld only when there is relevant evidence Irom which the court can properly Iind or inIer
that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. ProoI beyond reasonable doubt requires moral certainty oI guilt in order to sustain
a conviction. Moral certainty is that degree oI certainty that convinces and directs the understanding and satisIies the reason and
judgment oI those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it. It is certainty beyond reasonable doubt.
42
This requires that the
circumstances, taken together, should be oI a conclusive nature and tendency; leading, on the whole, to a satisIactory conclusion that
the accused, and no one else, committed the oIIense charged.
43
In view oI the totality oI evidence appreciated thus Iar, we rule that the
present case passes the test oI moral certainty.
However, as a matter oI procedure, and Ior the purpose oI meeting the requirement oI prooI beyond reasonable doubt, motive is
essential Ior conviction when there is doubt as to the identity oI the culprit.
44

Pertinently, it must be noted that Judilyn Pas-a, Iirst cousin oI the victim, testiIied that she last saw the victim alive in the morning oI
June 30, 1998 at the house oI Isabel Dawang.
45
She witnessed the appellant running down the stairs oI Isabel`s house and proceeding
to the back oI the same house.
46
She also testiIied that a Iew days beIore the victim was raped and killed, the latter revealed to her that
"Joel Yatar attempted to rape her aIter she came Irom the school."
47
The victim told Judilyn about the incident or attempt oI the
appellant to rape her Iive days beIore her naked and violated body was Iound dead in her grandmother`s house on June 25, 1998.
48
In
addition, Judilyn also testiIied that when her auntie Luz Dawang Yatar, wiIe oI appellant, separated Irom her husband, "this Joel Yatar
threatened to kill our Iamily."
49
According to Judilyn, who was personally present during an argument between her aunt and the
appellant, the exact words uttered by appellant to his wiIe in the Ilocano dialect was, "II you leave me, I will kill all your Iamily and
your relatives x x x."
50
These statements were not contradicted by appellant.
Thus, appellant`s motive to sexually assault and kill the victim was evident in the instant case. It is a rule in criminal law that motive,
being a state oI mind, is established by the testimony oI witnesses on the acts or statements oI the accused beIore or immediately aIter
the commission oI the oIIense, deeds or words that may express it or Irom which his motive or reason Ior committing it may be
inIerred.
51

Accordingly, we are convinced that the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt oI the special complex crime oI rape with
homicide. Appellant sexually assaulted Kathylyn Uba, and by reason or on the occasion thereoI, in order to conceal his lustIul deed,
permanently sealed the victim`s lips by stabbing her repeatedly, thereby causing her untimely demise.

The Iollowing are the elements constitutive oI rape with homicide: (1) the appellant had carnal knowledge oI a woman; (2) carnal
knowledge oI a woman was achieved by means oI Iorce, threat or intimidation; and (3) by reason or on the occasion oI such carnal
knowledge by means oI Iorce, threat or intimidation, appellant killed the woman.
52
However, in rape committed by close kin, such as
the victim`s Iather, step-Iather, uncle, or the common-law spouse oI her mother, it is not necessary that actual Iorce or intimidation be
employed.
53
Moral inIluence or ascendancy takes the place oI violence and intimidation.
54
The Iact that the victim`s hymen is intact
does not negate a Iinding that rape was committed as mere entry by the penis into the lips oI the Iemale genital organ, even without
rupture or laceration oI the hymen, suIIices Ior conviction oI rape.
55
The strength and dilatability oI the hymen are invariable; it may
be so elastic as to stretch without laceration during intercourse. Absence oI hymenal lacerations does not disprove sexual abuse
especially when the victim is oI tender age.
56

In the case at bar, appellant is the husband oI the victim`s aunt. He is seven years older than the victim Kathylyn Uba. BeIore he and
his wiIe separated, appellant lived in the house oI his mother-in-law, together with the victim and his wiIe. AIter the separation,
appellant moved to the house oI his parents, approximately one hundred (100) meters Irom his mother-in-law`s house. Being a relative
by aIIinity within the third civil degree, he is deemed in legal contemplation to have moral ascendancy over the victim.
Under Article 266-B oI the Revised Penal Code, the penalty oI death is imposed when by reason or on the occasion oI the rape,
homicide is committed. Although three (3) Justices oI this Court maintain their position that R.A. 7659 is unconstitutional insoIar as it
prescribes the death penalty, they nevertheless submit to the ruling oI the majority that the law is not unconstitutional, and that the
death penalty can be lawIully imposed in the case at bar.
As to damages, civil indemnity ex delicto oI P100,000.00,
57
actual damages incurred by the Iamily oI the victim that have been proved
at the trial amounting to P93,190.00,
58
and moral damages oI P75,000.00
59
should be awarded in the light oI prevailing law and
jurisprudence. Exemplary damages cannot be awarded as part oI the civil liability since the crime was not committed with one or more
aggravating circumstances.
60

WHEREFORE, in view oI the Ioregoing, the Decision oI the RTC oI Bulanao, Tabuk, Kalinga, Branch 25 in Criminal Case No. 35-
98, sentencing appellant Joel Yatar alias "Kawit" to Death Ior the special complex crime oI Rape with Homicide is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that he be ORDERED to pay the Iamily oI the victim Kathylyn Uba civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount
oI P100,000.00, P93,190.00 in actual damages and P75,000.00 in moral damages. The award oI exemplary damages is DELETED.
Upon the Iinality oI this Decision and in accordance with Art. 83 oI the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 25 oI Rep. Act No.
7659, let the records oI this case be Iorthwith Iorwarded to the President oI the Philippines Ior the possible exercise oI the pardoning
power.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
avide, Jr.
*
, Puno
*
, Jitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierre:, Carpio, Austria-Martine:, Corona,
Carpio-Morales, Callefo, Sr., A:cuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.

ROSY A. TECIO
Republic oI the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-26053 February 21, 1967
CITY OF MANILA, plaintiII-appellee,
vs.
GERARDO GARCIA - CARMENCITA VILLANUEVA, MODESTA PARAYNO - NARCISO PARAYNO, 1UAN
ASPERAS, MARIA TABIA - SIMEON DILIMAN, AQUILINO BARRIOS - LEONORA RUIZ, LAUREANO DIZO,
BERNABE AYUDA - LEOGARDA DE LOS SANTOS, ISABELO OBAOB - ANDREA RIPARIP, 1OSE BARRIENTOS,
URBANO RAMOS,
1
ELENA RAMOS, ESTEFANIA NEPACINA, MODESTA SANCHEZ, MARCIAL LAZARO,
MARCIANA ALANO, HONORIO BERIO - SEDORA ORAYLE, GLORIA VELASCO, WILARICO RICAMATA,
BENEDICTO DIAZ, ANA DEQUIZ - (MRS.) ALUNAN, LORENZO CARANDANG, 1UAN PECAYO, FELICIDAD
MIRANDA - EMIGDIO EGIPTO, deIendants-appellants.
Mauricio Z. Alunan for defendants-appellants.
City Fiscals Office for plaintiff-appellee.
SANCHEZ, .:
PlaintiII City oI Manila is owner oI parcels oI land, Iorming one compact area, bordering Kansas, Vermont and Singalong streets in
Malate, Manila, and covered by Torrens Titles Nos. 49763, 37082 and 37558. Shortly aIter liberation Irom 1945 to 1947, deIendants
entered upon these premises without plaintiII's knowledge and consent. They built houses oI second-class materials, again without
plaintiII's knowledge and consent, and without the necessary building permits Irom the city. There they lived thru the years to the
present.
In November, 1947, the presence oI deIendants having previously been discovered, deIendants Felicidad Miranda (Emigdio Egipto),
Modesta C. Parayno, Benedicto Diaz, Laureano Dizo, Jose Barrientos, Elena Ramos, EsteIania Nepacina, Modesta Sanchez, Honorio
Berio, Gloria Velasco, Ana Dequis Alunan and Benedicto OIiaza (predecessor oI deIendant Carandang) were given by Mayor
Valeriano E. Fugoso written permits each labeled "lease contract" to occupy speciIic areas in the property upon conditions
therein set Iorth. DeIendants Isabelo Obaob and Gerardo Garcia (in the name oI Marta A. Villanueva) received their permits Irom
Mayor Manuel de la Fuente on January 29 and March 18, respectively, both oI 1948. The rest oI the 23 deIendants exhibited none.
For their occupancy, deIendants were charged nominal rentals.wph.t
Following are the rentals due as oI February, 1962:
NAME
Area
in sq.m.
Mon9ly
Ren9al
Am9. due from
da9e of delinquency
9o Feb. 1962
1. Gerardo Garcia 66.00 P7.92 P1,628.97
2. Modesta C. Parayno 87.75 10.53 379.08
3. Juan Asperas 39.00 4.68 9.36
4. Maria Tabia 35.20 5.76 570.24
5. Aquilino Barrios
(Leonora Ruiz)
54.00 4.32 99.36

6. Laureano Dizo 35.00 2.80 22.40

7. Bernabe Ayuda 39.60 3.17 323.34
8. Isabelo Obaob 75.52 9.06 208.38
9. Jose Barrientos 39.53 4.74 744.18
10. Cecilia Manzano in
lieu oI Urbano Ramos (deceased) 46.65 5.60
Paid up to
Feb. 1962.
11. Elena Ramos 34.80 2.78 186.26
12. EsteIania Nepacina 41.80 3.34 504.34
13. Modesta Sanchez 33.48 2.68 444.88
14. Marcial Lazaro 22.40 1.79 688.32
15. Marciana Alano 25.80 2.06 255.44
16. Honorio Berio 24.00 1.92 188.16
17. Gloria Velasco 32.40 2.59 56.98
18. Wilarico Ricamata 45.83 3.67 739.68
19. Benedicto Diaz 40.20 4.82
Paid up to
March 1962.
20. Ana Dequis Alunan 64.26 7.71 30.84
21. Lorenzo Carandang 45.03 5.40 437.40
22. Juan N. Pecayo 25.52 3.06 30.60
23. Felicidad Miranda 48.02 5.76 132.48


P7,580.69
EpiIanio de los Santos Elementary School is close, though not contiguous, to the property. Came the need Ior this school's expansion;
it became pressing. On September 14, 1961, plaintiII's City Engineer, pursuant to the Mayor's directive to clear squatters' houses on
city property, gave each oI deIendants thirty (30) days to vacate and remove his construction or improvement on the premises. This
was Iollowed by the City Treasurer's demand on each deIendant, made in February and March, 1962, Ior the payment oI the amount
due by reason oI the occupancy and to vacate in IiIteen (15) days. DeIendants reIused. Hence, this suit to recover possession.
2

The judgment below directed deIendants to vacate the premises; to pay the amounts heretoIore indicated opposite their respective
names; and to pay their monthly rentals Irom March, 1962, until they vacate the said premises, and the costs. DeIendants appealed.
1. We are called upon to rule on the IoreIront question oI whether the trial court properly Iound that the city needs the
premises Ior school purposes.
The city's evidence on this point is Exhibit E, the certiIication oI the Chairman, Committee on Appropriations oI the
Municipal Board. That document recites that the amount oI P100,000.00 had been set aside in Ordinance 4566, the 1962-
1963 Manila City Budget, Ior the construction oI an additional building oI the EpiIanio de los Santos Elementary School. It is
indeed correct to say that the court below, at the hearing, ruled out the admissibility oI said document. But then, in the
decision under review, the trial judge obviously revised his views. He there declared that there was need Ior deIendants to
vacate the premises Ior school expansion; he cited the very document, Exhibit E, aIoresaid.

It is beyond debate that a court oI justice may alter its ruling while the case is within its power, to make it conIormable to law
and justice.
3
Such was done here. DeIendants' remedy was to bring to the attention oI the court its contradictory stance. Not
having done so, this Court will not reopen the case solely Ior this purpose.
4

Anyway, elimination oI the certiIication, Exhibit E, as evidence, would not proIit deIendants. For, in reversing his stand, the
trial judge could well have taken because the was duty bound to take judicial notice
5
oI Ordinance 4566. The reason
being that the city charter oI Manila requires all courts sitting therein to take judicial notice oI all ordinances passed by the
municipal board oI Manila.
6
And, Ordinance 4566 itselI conIirms the certiIication aIoresaid that an appropriation oI
P100,000.00 was set aside Ior the "construction oI additional building" oI the EpiIanio de los Santos Elementary School.
Furthermore, deIendants' position is vulnerable to assault Irom a third direction. DeIendants have absolutely no right to
remain in the premises. The excuse that they have permits Irom the mayor is at best Ilimsy. The permits to occupy are
recoverable on thirty days' notice. They have been asked to leave; they reIused to heed. It is in this Iactual background that
we say that the city's need Ior the premises is unimportant. The city's right to throw deIendants out oI the area cannot be
gainsaid. The city's dominical right to possession is paramount. II error there was in the Iinding that the city needs the land,
such error is harmless and will not justiIy reversal oI the judgment below.
7

2. But deIendants insist that they have acquired the legal status oI tenants. They are wrong.
They entered the land, built houses oI second-class materials thereon without the knowledge and consent oI the city. Their
homes were erected without city permits.
These constructions are illegal. In a language Iamiliar to all, deIendants are squatters:
Since the last global war, squatting on another's property in this country has become a widespread vice. It was and is a blight.
Squatters' areas pose problems oI health, sanitation. They are breeding places Ior crime. They constitute prooI that respect Ior
the law and the rights oI others, even those oI the government, are being Ilouted. Knowingly, squatters have embarked on the
pernicious act oI occupying property whenever and wherever convenient to their interests without as much as leave, and
even against the will, oI the owner. They are emboldened seemingly because oI their belieI that they could violate the law
with impunity. The pugnaciousness oI some oI them has tied up the hands oI legitimate owners. The latter are thus prevented
Irom recovering possession by peaceIul means. Government lands have not been spared by them. They know, oI course, that
intrusion into property, government or private, is wrong. But, then, the mills oI justice grind slow, mainly because oI lawyers
who, by means, Iair or Ioul, are quite oIten successIul in procuring delay oI the day oI reckoning. Rampancy oI Iorcible entry
into government lands particularly, is abetted by the apathy oI some public oIIicials to enIorce the government's rights.
Obstinacy oI these squatters is diIIicult to explain unless it is spawned by oIIicial tolerance, iI not outright encouragement or
protection. Said squatters have become insensible to the diIIerence between right and wrong. To them, violation oI law
means nothing. With the result that squatting still exists, much to the detriment oI public interest. It is high time that, in this
aspect, sanity and the rule oI law be restored. It is in this environment that we look into the validity oI the permits granted
deIendants herein.
These permits, erroneously labeled "lease" contracts, were issued by the mayors in 1947 and 1948 when the eIIects oI the war
had simmered down and when these deIendants could have very well adjusted themselves. Two decades have now elapsed
since the unlawIul entry. DeIendants could have, iI they wanted to, located permanent premises Ior their abode. And yet,
usurpers that they are, they preIerred to remain on city property.
DeIendants' entry as aIoresaid was illegal. Their constructions are as illegal, without permits.
8
The city charter enjoins the
mayor to "saIeguard all the lands" oI the City oI Manila.
9

Surely enough, the permits granted did not "safeguard" the city's land in question. It is our considered view that the Mayor oI
the City oI Manila cannot legalize Iorcible entry into public property by the simple expedient oI giving permits, or, Ior that
matter, executing leases.
Squatting is unlawIul and no amount oI acquiescence on the part oI the city oIIicials will elevate it into a lawIul act. In
principle, a compound oI illegal entry and oIIicial permit to stay is obnoxious to our concept oI proper oIIicial norm oI
conduct. Because, such permit does not serve social justice; it Iosters moral decadence. It does not promote public welIare; it
abets disrespect Ior the law. It has its roots in vice; so it is an inIected bargain. OIIicial approval oI squatting should not,
thereIore, be permitted to obtain in this country where there is an orderly Iorm oI government.

We, accordingly, rule that the Manila mayors did not have authority to give permits, written or oral, to deIendants, and that
the permits herein granted are null and void.
3. Let us look into the houses and constructions planted by deIendants on the premises. They clearly hinder and impair the
use oI that property Ior school purposes. The courts may well take judicial notice oI the Iact that housing school children in
the elementary grades has been and still is a perennial problem in the city. The selIish interests oI deIendants must have to
yield to the general good. The public purpose oI constructing the school building annex is paramount.
10

In the situation thus obtaining, the houses and constructions aIoresaid constitute public nuisance per se. And this, Ior the
reason that they hinder and impair the use oI the property Ior a badly needed school building, to the prejudice oI the
education oI the youth oI the land.
11
They shackle the hands oI the government and thus obstruct perIormance oI its
constitutionally ordained obligation to establish and maintain a complete and adequate system oI public education, and more,
to "provide at least free public primary instruction".
12

Reason dictates that no Iurther delay should be countenanced. The public nuisance could well have been summarily abated by
the city authorities themselves, even without the aid of the courts.
13

4. DeIendants challenge the jurisdiction oI the Court oI First Instance oI Manila. They say that the case should have been
started in the municipal court. They prop up their position by the averment that notice Ior them to vacate was only served in
September, 1961, and suit was started in July, 1962. Their legal ground is Section 1, Rule 70 oI the Rules oI Court. We have
reached the conclusion that their Iorcible entry dates back to the period Irom 1945 to 1947. That entry was not legalized by
the permits. Their possession continued to remain illegal Irom incipiency. Suit was Iiled long aIter the one-year limitation set
Iorth in Section 1 oI Rule 70. And the Manila Court oI First Instance has jurisdiction.
14

Upon the premises, we vote to aIIirm the judgment under review. Costs against deIendants-appellants. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., i:on, Regala, Makalintal, Beng:on, J.P., Zaldivar and Castro, JJ., concur.

ROSY A. TECIO
Republic oI the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 136804 February 19, 2003
MANUFACTURERS HANOVER TRUST CO. and/or CHEMICAL BANK, petitioners,
vs.
RAFAEL MA. GUERRERO, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO, .:
The Case
This is a petition Ior review under Rule 45 oI the Rules oI Court to set aside the Court oI Appeals`
1
Decision oI August 24, 1998 and
Resolution oI December 14, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 42310
2
aIIirming the trial court`s denial oI petitioners` motion Ior partial
summary judgment.
The Antecedents
On May 17, 1994, respondent RaIael Ma. Guerrero ("Guerrero" Ior brevity) Iiled a complaint Ior damages against petitioner
ManuIacturers Hanover Trust Co. and/or Chemical Bank ("the Bank" Ior brevity) with the Regional Trial Court oI Manila ("RTC" Ior
brevity). Guerrero sought payment oI damages allegedly Ior (1) illegally withheld taxes charged against interests on his checking
account with the Bank; (2) a returned check worth US$18,000.00 due to signature veriIication problems; and (3) unauthorized
conversion oI his account. Guerrero amended his complaint on April 18, 1995.
On September 1, 1995, the Bank Iiled its Answer alleging, inter alia, that by stipulation Guerrero`s account is governed by New York
law and this law does not permit any oI Guerrero`s claims except actual damages. Subsequently, the Bank Iiled a Motion Ior Partial
Summary Judgment seeking the dismissal oI Guerrero`s claims Ior consequential, nominal, temperate, moral and exemplary damages
as well as attorney`s Iees on the same ground alleged in its Answer. The Bank contended that the trial should be limited to the issue oI
actual damages. Guerrero opposed the motion.
The aIIidavit oI Alyssa Walden, a New York attorney, supported the Bank`s Motion Ior Partial Summary Judgment. Alyssa Walden`s
aIIidavit ("Walden aIIidavit" Ior brevity) stated that Guerrero`s New York bank account stipulated that the governing law is New York
law and that this law bars all oI Guerrero`s claims except actual damages. The Philippine Consular OIIice in New York authenticated
the Walden aIIidavit.
The RTC denied the Bank`s Motion Ior Partial Summary Judgment and its motion Ior reconsideration on March 6, 1996 and July 17,
1996, respectively. The Bank Iiled a petition Ior certiorari and prohibition with the Court oI Appeals assailing the RTC Orders. In its
Decision dated August 24, 1998, the Court oI Appeals dismissed the petition. On December 14, 1998, the Court oI Appeals denied the
Bank`s motion Ior reconsideration.
Hence, the instant petition.
The Ruling oI the Court oI Appeals
The Court oI Appeals sustained the RTC orders denying the motion Ior partial summary judgment. The Court oI Appeals ruled that
the Walden aIIidavit does not serve as prooI oI the New York law and jurisprudence relied on by the Bank to support its motion. The
Court oI Appeals considered the New York law and jurisprudence as public documents deIined in Section 19, Rule 132 oI the Rules
on Evidence, as Iollows:

"SEC. 19. Classes of ocuments. For the purpose oI their presentation in evidence, documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written oIIicial acts, or records oI the oIIicial acts oI the sovereign authority, oIIicial bodies and tribunals, and public oIIicers,
whether oI the Philippines, or oI a Ioreign country;
x x x."
The Court oI Appeals opined that the Iollowing procedure outlined in Section 24, Rule 132 should be Iollowed in proving Ioreign law:
"SEC. 24. Proof of official record. The record oI public documents reIerred to in paragraph (a) oI Section 19, when admissible Ior
any purpose, may be evidenced by an oIIicial publication thereoI or by a copy attested by the oIIicer having the legal custody oI the
record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, iI the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certiIicate that such oIIicer has the
custody. II the oIIice in which the record is kept is in a Ioreign country, the certiIicate may be made by a secretary oI the embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any oIIicer in the Ioreign service oI the Philippines stationed in
the Ioreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal oI his oIIice."
The Court oI Appeals likewise rejected the Bank`s argument that Section 2, Rule 34 oI the old Rules oI Court allows the Bank to
move with the supporting Walden aIIidavit Ior partial summary judgment in its Iavor. The Court oI Appeals clariIied that the Walden
aIIidavit is not the supporting aIIidavit reIerred to in Section 2, Rule 34 that would prove the lack oI genuine issue between the parties.
The Court oI Appeals concluded that even iI the Walden aIIidavit is used Ior purposes oI summary judgment, the Bank must still
comply with the procedure prescribed by the Rules to prove the Ioreign law.
The Issues
The Bank contends that the Court oI Appeals committed reversible error in -
"x x x HOLDING THAT |THE BANK`S| PROOF OF FACTS TO SUPPORT ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT MAY
NOT BE GIVEN BY AFFIDAVIT;
x x x HOLDING THAT |THE BANK`S| AFFIDAVIT, WHICH PROVES FOREIGN LAW AS A FACT, IS "HEARSAY" AND
THEREBY CANNOT SERVE AS PROOF OF THE NEW YORK LAW RELIED UPON BY PETITIONERS IN THEIR MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT x x x`."
3

First, the Bank argues that in moving Ior partial summary judgment, it was entitled to use the Walden aIIidavit to prove that
the stipulated Ioreign law bars the claims Ior consequential, moral, temperate, nominal and exemplary damages and
attorney`s Iees. Consequently, outright dismissal by summary judgment oI these claims is warranted.
Second, the Bank claims that the Court oI Appeals mixed up the requirements oI Rule 35 on summary judgments and those
oI a trial on the merits in considering the Walden aIIidavit as "hearsay." The Bank points out that the Walden aIIidavit is not
hearsay since Rule 35 expressly permits the use oI aIIidavits.
Lastly, the Bank argues that since Guerrero did not submit any opposing aIIidavit to reIute the Iacts contained in the Walden
aIIidavit, he Iailed to show the need Ior a trial on his claims Ior damages other than actual.
The Court`s Ruling
The petition is devoid oI merit.
The Bank Iiled its motion Ior partial summary judgment pursuant to Section 2, Rule 34 oI the old Rules oI Court which reads:
"Section 2. Summary fudgment for defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a
declaratory relieI is sought may, at any time, move with supporting aIIidavits Ior a summary judgment in his Iavor as to all or any part
thereoI."

A court may grant a summary judgment to settle expeditiously a case iI, on motion oI either party, there appears Irom the pleadings,
depositions, admissions, and aIIidavits that no important issues oI Iact are involved, except the amount oI damages. In such event, the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oI law.
4

In a motion Ior summary judgment, the crucial question is: are the issues raised in the pleadings e3u3e, sham or fc99ous, as shown
by aIIidavits, depositions or admissions accompanying the motion?
5

A genuine issue means an issue oI Iact which calls Ior the presentation oI evidence as distinguished Irom an issue which is fictitious or
contrived so as not to constitute a genuine issue Ior trial.
6

A perusal oI the parties` respective pleadings would show that there are genuine issues oI Iact that necessitate Iormal trial. Guerrero`s
complaint beIore the RTC contains a statement oI the ultimate Iacts on which he relies Ior his claim Ior damages. He is seeking
damages Ior what he asserts as "illegally withheld taxes charged against interests on his checking account with the Bank, a returned
check worth US$18,000.00 due to signature veriIication problems, and unauthorized conversion oI his account." In its Answer, the
Bank set up its deIense that the agreed Ioreign law to govern their contractual relation bars the recovery oI damages other than actual.
Apparently, Iacts are asserted in Guerrero`s complaint while speciIic denials and aIIirmative deIenses are set out in the Bank`s answer.
True, the court can determine whether there are genuine issues in a case based merely on the aIIidavits or counter-aIIidavits submitted
by the parties to the court. However, as correctly ruled by the Court oI Appeals, the Bank`s motion Ior partial summary judgment as
supported by the Walden aIIidavit does not demonstrate that Guerrero`s claims are sham, Iictitious or contrived. On the contrary, the
Walden aIIidavit shows that the Iacts and material allegations as pleaded by the parties are disputed and there are substantial triable
issues necessitating a Iormal trial.
There can be no summary judgment where questions oI Iact are in issue or where material allegations oI the pleadings are in dispute.
7

The resolution oI whether a Ioreign law allows only the recovery oI actual damages is a question oI Iact as Iar as the trial court is
concerned since Ioreign laws do not prove themselves in our courts.
8
Foreign laws are not a matter oI judicial notice.
9
Like any other
Iact, they must be alleged and proven. Certainly, the conIlicting allegations as to whether New York law or Philippine law applies to
Guerrero`s claims present a clear dispute on material allegations which can be resolved only by a trial on the merits.
Under Section 24 oI Rule 132, the record oI public documents oI a sovereign authority or tribunal may be proved by (1) an oIIicial
publication thereoI or (2) a copy attested by the oIIicer having the legal custody thereoI. Such oIIicial publication or copy must be
accompanied, iI the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certiIicate that the attesting oIIicer has the legal custody thereoI. The
certiIicate may be issued by any oI the authorized Philippine embassy or consular oIIicials stationed in the Ioreign country in which
the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal oI his oIIice. The attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy oI
the original, or a speciIic part thereoI, as the case may be, and must be under the oIIicial seal oI the attesting oIIicer.
Certain exceptions to this rule were recognized in Asaves9 Lm9ed v. Cour9 of Appeals
10
which held that:
"x x x:
Although it is desirable that Ioreign law be proved in accordance with the above rule, however, the Supreme Court held in the case oI
illamette Iron and Steel orks v. Mu::al, that Section 41, Rule 123 (Section 25, Rule 132 oI the Revised Rules oI Court) does not
exclude the presentation oI other competent evidence to prove the existence oI a Ioreign law. In that case, the Supreme Court
considered the testimony under oath oI an attorney-at-law oI San Francisco, CaliIornia, who quoted verbatim a section oI CaliIornia
Civil Code and who stated that the same was in Iorce at the time the obligations were contracted, as suIIicient evidence to establish the
existence oI said law. Accordingly, in line with this view, the Supreme Court in the Collector of Internal Revenue v. Fisher et al.,
upheld the Tax Court in considering the pertinent law oI CaliIornia as proved by the respondents` witness. In that case, the counsel Ior
respondent "testiIied that as an active member oI the CaliIornia Bar since 1951, he is Iamiliar with the revenue and taxation laws oI
the State oI CaliIornia. When asked by the lower court to state the pertinent CaliIornia law as regards exemption oI intangible personal
properties, the witness cited Article 4, Sec. 13851 (a) & (b) oI the CaliIornia Internal and Revenue Code as published in Derring`s
CaliIornia Code, a publication oI BancroIt-Whitney Co., Inc. And as part oI his testimony, a Iull quotation oI the cited section was
oIIered in evidence by respondents." Likewise, in several naturalization cases, it was held by the Court that evidence oI the law oI a
Ioreign country on reciprocity regarding the acquisition oI citizenship, although not meeting the prescribed rule oI practice, may be
allowed and used as basis Ior Iavorable action, iI, in the light oI all the circumstances, the Court is "satisIied oI the authenticity oI the
written prooI oIIered." Thus, in a number oI decisions, mere authentication oI the Chinese Naturalization Law by the Chinese
Consulate General oI Manila was held to be competent prooI oI that law." (Emphasis supplied)

The Bank, however, cannot rely on llame99e Iro3 a3d S9eel orks v. Muzzal or Collec9or of I39er3al Reve3ue v. Fsher to support
its cause. These cases involved attorneys testiIying in open court during the trial in the Philippines and quoting the particular Ioreign
laws sought to be established. On the other hand, the Walden aIIidavit was taken abroad ex parte and the aIIiant never testiIied in open
court.a/phi.net The Walden aIIidavit cannot be considered as prooI oI New York law on damages not only because it is selI-
serving but also because it does not state the speciIic New York law on damages. We reproduce portions oI the Walden aIIidavit as
Iollows:
"3. In New York, "|n|ominal damages are damages in name only, trivial sums such as six cents or $1. Such damages are
awarded both in tort and contract cases when the plaintiII establishes a cause oI action against the deIendant, but is unable to
prove" actual damages. Dobbs, Law oI Remedies, 3.32 at 294 (1993). Since Guerrero is claiming Ior actual damages, he
cannot ask Ior nominal damages.
4. There is no concept oI temperate damages in New York law. I have reviewed Dobbs, a well-respected treatise, which does
not use the phrase "temperate damages" in its index. I have also done a computerized search Ior the phrase in all published
New York cases, and have Iound no cases that use it. I have never heard the phrase used in American law.
5. The UniIorm Commercial Code ("UCC") governs many aspects oI a Bank`s relationship with its depositors. In this case, it
governs Guerrero`s claim arising out oI the non-payment oI the $18,000 check. Guerrero claims that this was a wrongIul
dishonor. However, the UCC states that "justiIiable reIusal to pay or accept" as opposed to dishonor, occurs when a bank
reIuses to pay a check Ior reasons such as a missing indorsement, a missing or illegible signature or a Iorgery, 3-510,
OIIicial Comment 2. ... to the Complaint, MHT returned the check because it had no signature card on .. and could not
veriIy Guerrero`s signature. In my opinion, consistent with the UCC, that is a legitimate and justiIiable reason not to pay.
6. Consequential damages are not available in the ordinary case oI a justiIiable reIusal to pay. UCC 1-106 provides that
"neither consequential or special or punitive damages may be had except as speciIically provided in the Act or by other rule
oI law". UCC 4-103 Iurther provides that consequential damages can be recovered only where there is bad Iaith. This is more
restrictive than the New York common law, which may allow consequential damages in a breach oI contract case (as does the
UCC where there is a wrongIul dishonor).
7. Under New York law, requests Ior lost proIits, damage to reputation and mental distress are considered consequential
damages. KenIord Co., Inc. v. Country oI Erie, 73 N.Y.2d 312, 319, 540 N.Y.S.2d 1, 4-5 (1989) (lost proIits); MotiI
Construction Corp. v. BuIIalo Savings Bank, 50 A.D.2d 718, 374 N.Y.S..2d 868, 869-70 (4th Dep`t 1975) damage to
reputation); Dobbs, Law oI Remedies 12.4(1) at 63 (emotional distress).
8. As a matter oI New York law, a claim Ior emotional distress cannot be recovered Ior a breach oI contract. Geler v.
National Westminster Bank U.S.A., 770 F. Supp. 210, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Pitcherello v. Moray Homes, Ltd., 150 A.D.2d
860,540 N.Y.S.2d 387, 390 (3d Dep`t 1989) Martin v. Donald Park Acres, 54 A.D.2d 975, 389 N.Y.S..2d 31, 32 (2nd Dep`t
1976). Damage to reputation is also not recoverable Ior a contract. MotiI Construction Corp. v. BuIIalo Savings Bank, 374
N.Y.S.2d at 869-70.a/phi.net
9. In cases where the issue is the breach oI a contract to purchase stock, New York courts will not take into consideration the
perIormance oI the stock aIter the breach. Rather, damages will be based on the value oI the stock at the time oI the breach,
Aroneck v. Atkin, 90 A.D.2d 966, 456 N.Y.S.2d 558, 559 (4th Dep`t 1982), app. den. 59 N.Y.2d 601, 449 N.E.2d 1276, 463
N.Y.S.2d 1023 (1983).
10. Under New York law, a party can only get consequential damages iI they were the type that would naturally arise Irom
the breach and iI they were "brought within the contemplation oI parties as the probable result oI the breach at the time oI or
prior to contracting." KenIord Co., Inc. v. Country oI Erie, 73 N.Y.2d 312, 319, 540 N.Y.S.2d 1, 3 (1989), (quoting Chapman
v. Fargo, 223 N.Y. 32, 36 (1918).
11. Under New York law, a plaintiII is not entitled to attorneys` Iees unless they are provided by contract or statute. E.g.,
Geler v. National Westminster Bank, 770 F. Supp. 210, 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Camatron Sewing Mach, Inc. v. F.M. Ring
Assocs., Inc., 179 A.D.2d 165, 582 N.Y.S.2d 396 (1st Dep`t 1992); Stanisic v. Soho Landmark Assocs., 73 A.D.2d 268, 577
N.Y.S.2d 280, 281 (1st Dep`t 1991). There is no statute that permits attorney`s Iees in a case oI this type.
12. Exemplary, or punitive damages are not allowed Ior a breach oI contract, even where the plaintiII claims the deIendant
acted with malice. Geler v. National Westminster Bank, 770 F.Supp. 210, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Catalogue Service oI

.chester
11
v. Insurance Co. oI North America, 74 A.D.2d 837, 838, 425 N.Y.S.2d 635, 637 (2d Dep`t 1980); Senior v.
ManuIacturers Hanover Trust Co., 110 A.D.2d 833, 488 N.Y.S.2d 241, 242 (2d Dep`t 1985).
13. Exemplary or punitive damages may be recovered only where it is alleged and proven that the wrong supposedly
committed by deIendant amounts to a Iraud aimed at the public generally and involves a high moral culpability. Walker v.
Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 179 N.E.2d 497, 223 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1961).
14. Furthermore, it has been consistently held under New York law that exemplary damages are not available Ior a mere
breach oI contract Ior in such a case, as a matter oI law, only a private wrong and not a public right is involved. Thaler v. The
North Insurance Company, 63 A.D.2d 921, 406 N.Y.S.2d 66 (1st Dep`t 1978)."
12

The Walden aIIidavit states conclusions Irom the aIIiant`s personal interpretation and opinion oI the Iacts oI the case vis a vis the
alleged laws and jurisprudence without citing any law in particular. The citations in the Walden aIIidavit oI various U.S. court
decisions do not constitute prooI oI the oIIicial records or decisions oI the U.S. courts. While the Bank attached copies oI some oI the
U.S. court decisions cited in the Walden aIIidavit, these copies do not comply with Section 24 oI Rule 132 on prooI oI oIIicial records
or decisions oI Ioreign courts.
The Bank`s intention in presenting the Walden aIIidavit is to prove New York law and jurisprudence. However, because oI the Iailure
to comply with Section 24 oI Rule 132 on how to prove a Ioreign law and decisions oI Ioreign courts, the Walden aIIidavit did not
prove the current state oI New York law and jurisprudence. Thus, the Bank has only alleged, but has not proved, what New York law
and jurisprudence are on the matters at issue.
Next, the Bank makes much oI Guerrero`s Iailure to submit an opposing aIIidavit to the Walden aIIidavit. However, the pertinent
provision oI Section 3, Rule 35 oI the old Rules oI Court did not make the submission oI an opposing aIIidavit mandatory, thus:
"SEC. 3. Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least ten (10) days beIore the time speciIied Ior the
hearing. The adverse party prior to the day oI hearing may serve opposing affidavi9s. AIter the hearing, the judgment sought shall be
rendered Iorthwith iI the pleadings, depositions and admissions on Iile, together with the aIIidavits, show that, except as to the amount
oI damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material Iact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oI law."
(Emphasis supplied)
It is axiomatic that the term "may" as used in remedial law, is only permissive and not mandatory.
13

Guerrero cannot be said to have admitted the averments in the Bank`s motion Ior partial summary judgment and the Walden aIIidavit
just because he Iailed to Iile an opposing aIIidavit. Guerrero opposed the motion Ior partial summary judgment, although he did not
present an opposing aIIidavit. Guerrero may not have presented an opposing aIIidavit, as there was no need Ior one, because the
Walden aIIidavit did not establish what the Bank intended to prove. Certainly, Guerrero did not admit, expressly or impliedly, the
veracity oI the statements in the Walden aIIidavit. The Bank still had the burden oI proving New York law and jurisprudence even iI
Guerrero did not present an opposing aIIidavit. As the party moving Ior summary judgment, the Bank has the burden oI clearly
demonstrating the absence oI any genuine issue oI Iact and that any doubt as to the existence oI such issue is resolved against the
movant.
14

Moreover, it would have been redundant and pointless Ior Guerrero to submit an opposing aIIidavit considering that what the Bank
seeks to be opposed is the very subject matter oI the complaint. Guerrero need not Iile an opposing aIIidavit to the Walden aIIidavit
because his complaint itselI controverts the matters set Iorth in the Bank`s motion and the Walden aIIidavit. A party should not be
made to deny matters already averred in his complaint.
There being substantial triable issues between the parties, the courts a quo correctly denied the Bank`s motion Ior partial summary judgment. There is a need to
determine by presentation oI evidence in a regular trial iI the Bank is guilty oI any wrongdoing and iI it is liable Ior damages under the applicable laws.
This case has been delayed long enough by the Bank`s resort to a motion Ior partial summary judgment. Ironically, the Bank has successIully deIeated the very purpose
Ior which summary judgments were devised in our rules, which is, to aid parties in avoiding the expense and loss oI time involved in a trial.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED Ior lack oI merit. The Decision dated August 24, 1998 and the Resolution dated December 14, 1998 oI the Court oI Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 42310 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug and Azcuna, JJ., concur. Ynares-Santiago, J., no part.

ROSY A. TECIO
Republic oI the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 131516 Marc 5, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiII-appellee,
vs.
RONNIE RULLEPA Y GUINTO, accused-appellant.
CARPIO MORALES, .
On complaint oI Cyra May Francisco BuenaIe, accused-appellant Ronnie Rullepa y Guinto was charged with Rape beIore the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) oI Quezon City allegedly committed as Iollows:
That on or about the 17th day oI November, 1995, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, by means oI Iorce and
intimidation, to wit: by then and there willIully, unlawIully and Ieloniously removing her parity, kissing her lips and vagina
and thereaIter rubbing his penis and inserting the same to the inner portion oI the vagina oI the undersigned complainant, 3
years oI age, a minor, against her will and without her consent.
1

Arraigned on January 15, 1996, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty.
2

From the testimonies oI its witnesses, namely Cyra May,
3
her mother Gloria Francisco BuenaIe, Dr. Cristina V. Preyra, and SPO4
Catherine Borda, the prosecution established the Iollowing Iacts:
On November 20, 1995, as Gloria was about to set the table Ior dinner at her house in Quezon City, Cyra May, then only three and a
halI years old, told her, "Mama, si kuya Ronnie lagay niya titi niya at sinaksak sa puwit at sa bibig ko."
"Kuya Ronnie" is accused-appellant Ronnie Rullepa, the BuenaIes' house boy, who was sometimes leIt with Cyra May at home.
Gloria asked Cyra May how many times accused-appellant did those things to her, to which she answered many times. Pursuing,
Gloria asked Cyra May what else he did to her, and Cyra May indicated the room where accused-appellant slept and pointed at his
pillow.
As on the night oI November 20, 1995 accused-appellant was out with Gloria's husband Col. BuenaIe,
4
she waited until their arrival at
past 11:00 p.m. Gloria then sent accused-appellant out on an errand and inIormed her husband about their daughter's plaint. BuenaIe
thereupon talked to Cyra May who repeated what she had earlier told her mother Gloria.
When accused-appellant returned, BuenaIe and Gloria veriIied Irom him whether what Cyra May had told them was true. Ronnie
readily admitted doing those things but only once, at 4:00 p.m. oI November 17, 1995 or three days earlier. Unable to contain her
anger, Gloria slapped accused-appellant several times.
Since it was already midnight, the spouses waited until the Iollowing morning to bring accused-appellant to Camp Karingal where he
admitted the imputations against him, on account oI which he was detained. Gloria's sworn statement
5
was then taken.
6

Recalling what accused-appellant did to her, Cyra May declared at the witness stand: "Sinaksak nya ang titi sa pepe ko, sa puwit ko, at
sa bunganga," thus causing her pain and drawing her to cry. She added that accused-appellant did these to her twice in his bedroom.
Dr. Ma. Cristina V. Preyra, the Medico-Legal OIIicer and ChieI oI the Biological Science Branch oI the Philippine National Police
Crime Laboratory who examined Cyra May, came up with her report dated November 21, 1995,
7
containing the Iollowing Iindings
and conclusions:

FINDINGS:
GENERAL AND EXTRA GENITAL:
Fairly developed, Iairly nourished and coherent Iemale child subject. Breasts are undeveloped. Abdomen is Ilat and soIt.
GENITAL:
There is absence oI pubic hair. Labia majora are Iull, convex and coaptated with conges9ed and abraded labia minora
presen9ing in be9ween. On separating the same is disclosed an abraded posterior Iourchette and an elastic, Ileshy type intact
hymen. External vaginal oriIice does not admit the tip oI the examining index Iinger.
xxx xxx xxx
CONCLUSION:
Subject is in virgin state physically.
There are no external signs oI recent application oI any Iorm oI trauma at the time oI examination. (Emphasis supplied.)
By Dr. Preyra's explanation, the abrasions on the labia minora could have been caused by Iriction with an object, perhaps an erect
penis. She doubted iI riding on a bicycle had caused the injuries.
8

The deIense's sole witness was accused-appellant, who was 28 and single at the time he took the witness stand on June 9, 1997. He
denied having anything to do with the abrasions Iound in Cyra May's genitalia, and claimed that prior to the alleged incident, he used
to be ordered to buy medicine Ior Cyra May who had diIIiculty urinating. He Iurther alleged that aIter he reIused to answer Gloria's
queries iI her husband BuenaIe, whom he usually accompanied whenever he went out oI the house, was womanizing, Gloria would
always Iind Iault in him. He suggested that Gloria was behind the Iiling oI the complaint. Thus:
q According to them you caused the abrasions Iound in her genital?
a That is not true, sir,
q II that is not true, what is the truth?
a As I have mentioned earlier that beIore I started working with the Iamily I was sent to Crame to buy medicine Ior the
daughter because she had diIIiculty in urinating.
q Did you know why the child has diIIiculty in urinating?
a No, I do not know, sir.
q And how about the present complaint Iiled against you, the complaint Iiled by the mother oI the victim?
a I did not do it, sir.
q What is the truth, what can you say about this present complaint Iiled against you?
a As I said Mrs. BuenaIe got mad at me because aIter I explained to her that I was going with her gusband (sic) to the
children oI the husband with a Iormer marriage.
9

Finding Ior the prosecution, Branch 96 oI the Quezon City RTC rendered judgment, the dispositive portion oI which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered Iinding accused RONNIE RULLEPA y GUINTO guilty beyond reasonable
doubt oI rape, and he is accordingly sentenced to death.

The accused is ordered to pay CYRA MAE BUENAFE the amount oI P40,000.00 as civil indemnity.
Costs to be paid by the accused.
10
(Italics in the original.)
Hence, this automatic review, accused-appellant assigning the Iollowing errors to the trial court:
I
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONSIDERING AS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S
ADMISSION.
II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED ON (sic) RULING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S SILENCE DURING TRIAL
AMOUNTED TO AN IMPLIED ADMISSION OF GUILT.
III
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME
CHARGED HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
IV
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH UPON THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
11
(Emphasis supplied.)
Accused-appellant assails the crediting by the trial court, as the Iollowing portion oI its decision shows, oI his admission to Gloria oI
having sexually assaulted Cyra May:
In addition, the mother asserted that Rullepa had admitted Cyra Ma|y|'s complaint during the conIrontation in the house.
Indeed, according to the mother, the admission was even expressly qualified by Rullepa's insistence that he had committed
the sexual assault only once, speciIying the time thereoI as 4:00 pm oI November 17, 1995. That qualiIication proved that the
admission was voluntary and true. An uncoerced and truthIul admission like this should be absolutely admissible and
competent.
xxx xxx xxx
Remarkably, the admission was not denied by the accused during trial despite his Ireedom to deny it iI untrue. Hence, the
admission became conclusive upon him.
12
(Emphasis supplied.)
To accused-appellant, the statements attributed to him are inadmissible since they were made out oI Iear, having been elicited only
aIter Cyra May's parents "bullied and questioned him." He thus submits that it was error Ior the trial court to take his Iailure to deny
the statements during the trial as an admission oI guilt.
Accused-appellant's submission does not persuade. The trial court considered his admission merely as an addi9ional ground to
convince itselI oI his culpability. Even iI such admission, as well as the implication oI his Iailure to deny the same, were disregarded,
the evidence suIIices to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The plain, matter-oI-Iact manner by which Cyra May described her abuse in the hands oI her Kuya Ronnie is an eloquent testament to
the truth oI her accusations. Thus she testiIied on direct examination:
q Do you recall iI Ronnie Rullepa did anything to you?
a Yes, sir.

q What did he do to you?

a "Sinaksak nya ang titi sa pepe ko, sa puwit ko, at sa bunganga"
q How many times did he do that to you?
a Twice, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
q Do you remember when he did these things to you?
a Opo.
q When was that?
a When my mother was asleep, he put he removed my panty and inserted his penis inside my vagina, my anus and
my mouth, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
q AIter your Kuya Ronnie did those things to you what did you Ieel?
a "Sabi nya ganito (Witness putting her Iinger in her lips) Nasaktan po ako at umiyak po ako".
q Did you cry because oI hurt?
a Yes.
q What part oI your body hurt?
a "Pepe ko po." When I went to the bathroom to urinate, I Ielt pain in my organ, sir.
13

Cyra May reiterated her testimony during cross-examination, providing more revolting details oI her ordeal:
q So, you said that Kuya Ronnie did something to you what did he do to you on November 17, 1995?
a "Sinaksak nga yong titi nya". He inserted his penis to my organ and to my mouth, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
q When you said that your kuya Ronnie inserted his penis into your organ, into your mouth, and into your anus, would
you describe what his penis?
a It is a round object, sir.
Court:
Is this titi oI your kuya Ronnie a part oI his body?
a Opo.
q Was that in the head oI kuya Ronnie?

a No, sir.
q Which part oI his body that titi located?
(Witness pointing to her groin area)
Court:
Continue
xxx xxx xxx
q Why were you in that room?
a Gusto nya po matulog ako sa kuwarto niya.
q When you were in that room, what did Kuya Ronnie do to you?
a "Hinubo po niya ang panty ko."
q And aIter he remove your panty, what did Kuya Ronnie do, what did he do to you?
a He inserted his penis to my organ, sir.
q Why did kuya Ronnie, was kuya Ronnie already naked or he was already wearing any clothing?
a Still had his clothing on, sir.
q So, where did his penis, saan lumabas ang penis ni Kuya Ronnie?
a Dito po, (Witness reIerring or pointing to her groin area)
xxx xxx xxx
q So, that's the and at the time, you did not cry and you did not shout Ior help?
a Sabi nya po, not to make any noise because my mother might be roused Irom sleep.
q How long was kuya Ronnie did that to you?
a Matagal po.
q AIter kuya Ronnie scrub his penis to your vagina, what other things did he do?
a AIter that he inserted his penis to my mouth, and to my anus, sir.
q You did not complain and you did not shout?
a I cried, sir.
14

Accused-appellant draws attention to the statement oI Cyra May that he was not in the house on November 17 (1995), as reIlected in
the Iollowing transcript oI her testimony:

q Is it not a Iact that you said a while ago that when your Iather leaves the house, he |was| usually accompanied by your
kuya Ronnie?
a Opo.
q Why is it that Kuya Ronnie was in the house when your Iather leIt the house at that time, on November 17?
a He was with Kuya Ronnie, sir.
q So, it is not correct that kuya Ronnie did something to you because your kuya Ronnie |was| always with your Papa?
a Yes, sir.
15

The above-quoted testimony oI Cyra May does not indicate the time when her Iather Col. BuenaIe leIt their house on November 17,
1995 with accused-appellant and, thus, does not preclude accused-appellant's commission oI rape on the same date. In any event, a
young child is vulnerable to suggestion, hence, her aIIirmative response to the deIense counsel's above-quoted leading questions.
As Ior the variance in the claim regarding when Gloria was inIormed oI the rape, Gloria having testiIied that she learned oI it on
November 20, 1995
16
while Cyra May said that immediately aIter the incident, she awakened her mother who was in the adjacent
room and reported it:
17
This is a minor matter that does not detract Irom Cyra May's categorical, material testimony that accused-
appellant inserted his penis into her vagina.
Accused-appellant goes on to contend that Cyra May was coached, citing the Iollowing portion oI her testimony:
q "Yong sinabi mong sinira nya ang buhay mo," where did you get that phrase?
a It was the word oI my Mama, sir.
18

On the contrary, the Ioregoing testimony indicates that Cyra May was really narrating the truth, that oI hearing her mother utter "sinira
niya ang buhay mo."
Accused-appellant's suggestion that Cyra May merely imagined the things oI which he is accused, perhaps getting the idea Irom
television programs, is preposterous. It is true that "the ordinary child is a `great weaver oI romances,"' and her "imagination may
induce (her) to relate something she has heard or read in a story as personal experience."
19
But Cyra May's account is hardly the stuII
oI romance or Iairy tales. Neither is it normal TV Iare, iI at all.
This Court cannot believe that a victim oI Cyra May's age could concoct a tale oI deIloration, allow the examination oI her private
parts, and undergo the expense, trouble, inconvenience, not to mention the trauma oI public trial."
20

Besides, her testimony is corroborated by the Iindings oI Dr. Preyra that there were abrasions in her labia minora, which she opined,
could have been caused by Iriction with an erect penis.
This Court thus accords great weight to the Iollowing assessment oI the trial court regarding the competency and credibility oI Cyra
May as a witness:
Her very tender age notwithstanding, Cyra Ma(y) nonetheless appeared to possess the necessary intelligence and
perceptiveness suIIicient to invest her with the competence to testiIy about her experience. She might have been an
impressionable child as all others oI her age are but her narration oI Kuya Ronnie's placing his "titi" in her "pepe" was
certainly one which could not be considered as a common child's tale. Her responses during the examination oI counsel and
oI the Court established her consciousness oI the distinction between good and bad, which rendered inconceivable Ior her to
describe a "bad" act oI the accused unless it really happened to her. Needless to state, she described the act oI the accused as
bad. Her demeanor as a witness maniIested during trial by her unhesitant, spontaneous, and plain responses to questions
Iurther enhanced her claim to credit and trustworthiness.
21
(Italics in the original.)
In a Iutile attempt at exculpation, accused-appellant claims that even beIore the alleged incident Cyra May was already suIIering Irom
pain in urinating. He surmises that she could have scratched herselI which caused the abrasions. Dr. Preyra, however, was quick to

rule out this possibility. She stated categorically that that part oI the Iemale organ is very sensitive and rubbing or scratching it is
painIul.
22
The abrasions could not, thereIore, have been selI-inIlicted.
That the Medical-Legal OIIicer Iound "no external signs oI recent application oI any Iorm oI trauma at the time oI the examination"
does not preclude accused-appellant's conviction since the inIliction oI Iorce is immaterial in statutory rape.
23

More. That Cyra May suIIered pain in her vagina but not in her anus despite her testimony that accused-appellant inserted his penis in
both oriIices does not diminish her credibility. It is possible that accused-appellant's penis Iailed to penetrate her anus as deeply as it
did her vagina, the Iormer being more resistant to extreme Iorces than the latter.
Accused-appellant's imputation oI ill motive on the part oI Gloria is puerile. No mother in her right mind would subject her child to
the humiliation, disgrace and trauma attendant to a prosecution Ior rape iI she were not motivated solely by the desire to incarcerate
the person responsible Ior the child's deIilement.
24
Courts are seldom, iI at all, convinced that a mother would stoop so low as to
subject her daughter to physical hardship and shame concomitant to a rape prosecution just to assuage her own hurt Ieelings.
25

Alternatively, accused-appellant prays that he be held liable Ior acts oI lasciviousness instead oI rape, apparently on the basis oI the
Iollowing testimony oI Cyra May, quoted verbatim, that he merely "scrubbed" his penis against her vagina:
q Is it not a Iact that kuya Ronnie just made some scrubbed his penis into your vagina?
a Yes, Sir.
q And when he did not actually penetrated your vagina?
a Yes, sir.
26

Dr. Preyra, however, Iound abrasions in the labia minora, which is "directly beneath the labia mafora,"
27
proving that there was
indeed penetration oI the vagina, not just a mere rubbing or "scrubbing" oI the penis against its surIace.
In Iine, the crime committed by accused-appellant is not merely acts oI lasciviousness but statutory rape.
The two elements oI statutory rape are (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge oI a woman, and (2) that the woman is below twelve
years oI age.
28
As shown in the previous discussion, the Iirst element, carnal knowledge, had been established beyond reasonable
doubt. The same is true with respect to the second element.
The victim's age is relevant in rape cases since it may constitute an element oI the oIIense. Article 335 oI the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659,
29
provides:
Art. 335. hen and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge oI a woman under any oI the
Iollowing circumstances:
xxx xxx xxx.
3. When the woman is under 9welve years oI age . . .
xxx xxx xxx.
The crime oI rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
xxx xxx xxx.
Furthermore, the victim's age may constitute a qualifying circums9ance, warranting the imposition oI the death sentence. The same
Article states:
The death penalty shall also be imposed iI the crime oI rape is committed with any oI the Iollowing attendant circumstances:

1. when the victim is under eig9een (18) years oI age and the oIIender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative
by consanguinity or aIIinity with the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse oI the parent oI the victim:
xxx xxx xxx.
4. when the victim is . . . a child below seven (7) years old.
xxx xxx xxx.
Because oI the seemingly conIlicting decisions regarding the suIIiciency oI evidence oI the victim's age in rape cases, this Court, in
the recently decided case oI People v. Pruna,
30
established a set oI guidelines in appreciating age as an element oI the crime or as a
qualiIying circumstance, to wit:
1. The best evidence to prove the age oI the oIIended party is an original or certiIied true copy oI the certiIicate oI live birth
oI such party.
2. In the absence oI a certiIicate oI live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certiIicate and school records
which show the date oI birth oI the victim would suIIice to prove age.
3. II the certiIicate oI live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the
testimony, iI clear and credible, oI the victim's mother or a member oI the Iamily either by aIIinity or consanguinity who is
qualiIied to testiIy on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date oI birth oI the oIIended party pursuant to
Section 40, Rule 130 oI the Rules on Evidence shall be suIIicient under the Iollowing circumstances:
a. II the victim is alleged to be below 3 years oI age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years
old;
b. II the victim is alleged to be below 7 years oI age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years
old;
c. II the victim is alleged to be below 12 years oI age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence oI a certiIicate oI live birth, authentic document, or the testimony oI the victim's mother or relatives
concerning the victim's age, the complainant's testimony will suIIice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the
accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden oI proving the age oI the oIIended party. The Iailure oI the accused to object to the
testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him.
6. The trial court should always make a categorical Iinding as to the age oI the victim.
Applying the Ioregoing guidelines, this Court in the Pruna case held that the therein accused-appellant could only be sentenced to
suIIer the penalty oI reclusion perpetua since:
. . . no birth certiIicate or any similar authentic document, such as a baptismal certiIicate oI LIZETTE, was presented to prove
her age. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx.
However, the Medico-Legal Report relied upon by the trial court does not in any way prove the age oI LIZETTE, Ior there is
nothing therein which even mentions her age. Only testimonial evidence was presented to establish LIZETTE's age. Her
mother, Jacqueline, testiIied (that the victim was three years old at the time oI the commission oI the crime).
xxx xxx xxx

Likewise, LIZETTE testiIied on 20 November 1996, or almost two years aIter the incident, that she was 5 years old.
However, when the deIense counsel asked her how old she was on 3 January 1995, or at the time oI the rape, she replied that
she was 5 years old. Upon Iurther question as to the date she was born, she could not answer.
For PRUNA to be convicted oI rape in its qualiIied Iorm and meted the supreme penalty oI death, it must be established with
certainty that LIZETTE was below 7 years old at the time oI the commission oI the crime. It must be stressed that the severity
oI the death penalty, especially its irreversible and Iinal nature once carried out, makes the decision-making process in capital
oIIenses aptly subject to the most exacting rules oI procedure and evidence.
In view oI the uncertainty oI LIZETTE's exact age, corroborative evidence such as her birth certiIicate, baptismal certiIicate
or any other authentic document should be introduced in evidence in order that the qualiIying circumstance oI "below seven
(7) years old" is appreciated against the appellant. The lack oI objection on the part oI the deIense as to her age did not
excuse the prosecution Irom discharging its burden. That the deIense invoked LIZETTE's tender age Ior purposes oI
questioning her competency to testiIy is not necessarily an admission that she was below 7 years oI age when PRUNA raped
her on 3 January 1995. Such being the case, PRUNA cannot be convicted oI qualiIied rape, and hence the death penalty
cannot be imposed on him.
However, conIormably with no. 3 (b) oI the Ioregoing guidelines, the testimony oI LIZETTE's mother that she was 3 years
old at the time oI the commission oI the crime is suIIicient Ior purposes oI holding PRUNA liable Ior statutory rape, or rape
oI a girl below 12 years oI age. Under the second paragraph oI Article 335, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, in relation to no. 3
oI the Iirst paragraph thereoI, having carnal knowledge oI a woman under 12 years oI age is punishable by reclusion
perpetua. Thus, the penalty to be imposed on PRUNA should be reclusion perpetua, and not death penalty. (Italics in the
original.)
Several cases
31
suggest that courts may take "judicial notice" oI the appearance oI the victim in determining her age. For example, the
Court, in People v. Tipay,
32
qualiIied the ruling in People v. Javier,
33
which required the presentation oI the birth certiIicate to prove
the rape victim's age, with the Iollowing pronouncement:
This does not mean, however, that the presentation oI the certiIicate oI birth is at all times necessary to prove minority. The
minority oI a victim oI tender age who may be below the age oI ten is quite maniIest and the court can take judicial notice
thereoI. The crucial years pertain to the ages oI IiIteen to seventeen where minority may seem to be dubitable due to one's
physical appearance. In this situation, the prosecution has the burden oI proving with certainty the Iact that the victim was
under 18 years oI age when the rape was committed in order to justiIy the imposition oI the death penalty under the above-
cited provision. (Emphasis supplied.)
On the other hand, a handIul oI cases
34
holds that courts, without the requisite hearing prescribed by Section 3, Rule 129 oI the Rules
oI Court,
35
cannot take judicial notice oI the victim's age.
Judicial notice signiIies that there are certain "facta probanda," or propositions in a party's case, as to which he will not be required to
oIIer evidence; these will be taken Ior true by the tribunal without the need oI evidence.
36
Judicial notice, however, is a phrase
sometimes used in a loose way to cover some other judicial action. Certain rules oI Evidence, usually known under other names, are
Irequently reIerred to in terms oI judicial notice.
37

The process by which the trier oI Iacts judges a person's age Irom his or her appearance cannot be categorized as judicial notice.
Judicial notice is based upon convenience and expediency Ior it would certainly be superIluous, inconvenient, and expensive both to
parties and the court to require prooI, in the ordinary way, oI Iacts which are already known to courts.
38
As Tundag puts it, it "is the
cognizance oI certain Iacts which judges may properly take and act on wi9ou9 proof because they already know them." Rule 129 oI
the Rules oI Court, where the provisions governing judicial notice are Iound, is entitled "What Need Not Be Proved." When the trier
oI Iacts observes the appearance oI a person to ascertain his or her age, he is not taking judicial notice oI such Iact; rather, he is
conducting an examina9ion of 9e evidence, the evidence being the appearance oI the person. Such a process militates against the
very concept oI judicial notice, the object oI which is to do away with the presentation oI evidence.
This is not to say that the process is not sanctioned by the Rules oI Court; on the contrary, it does. A person's appearance, where
relevant, is admissible as object evidence, the same being addressed to the senses oI the court. Section 1, Rule 130 provides:
SECTION 1. Obfect as evidence. Objects as evidence are those addressed to the senses oI the court. When an object is
relevant to the Iact in issue, it may be exhibited to, examined or viewed by the court.

"To be sure," one author writes, "this practice oI inspection by the court oI objects, things or persons relevant to the Iact in dispute,
has its roots in ancient judicial procedure."
39
The author proceeds to quote Irom another authority:
"Nothing is older or commoner in the administration oI law in all countries than the submission to the senses oI the tribunal
itselI, whether judge or jury, oI objects which Iurnish evidence. The view oI the land by the jury, in real actions, oI a wound
by the judge where mayhem was alleged, and of 9e person of one alleged 9o be an infan9, in order 9o fix is age, the
inspection and comparison oI seals, the examination oI writings, to determine, whether they are (`)blemished,(') the
implements with which a crime was committed or oI a person alleged, in a bastardy proceeding, to be the child oI another, are
Iew illustrations oI what may be Iound abundantly in our own legal records and textbooks Ior seven centuries past."
40

(Emphasis supplied.)
A person's appearance, as evidence oI age (Ior example, oI inIancy, or of being under 9e age of consen9 9o in9ercourse), is usually
regarded as relevant; and, iI so, the tribunal may properly observe the person brought beIore it.
41
Experience teaches that corporal
appearances are approximately an index oI the age oI their bearer, particularly Ior the marked extremes oI old age and youth. In every
case such evidence should be accepted and weighed Ior what it may be in each case worth. In particular, the outward physical
appearance oI an alleged minor may be considered in judging his age; a contrary rule would Ior such an inIerence be pedantically
over-cautious.
42
Consequently, the jury or the court trying an issue oI Iact may be allowed to judge the age oI persons in court by
observation oI such persons.
43
The Iormal oIIer oI the person as evidence is not necessary. The examination and cross-examination oI
a party beIore the jury are equivalent to exhibiting him beIore the jury and an oIIer oI such person as an exhibit is properly reIused.
44

This Court itselI has sanctioned the determination oI an alien's age Irom his appearance. In Braca v. Collector of Customs,
45
this Court
ruled that:
The customs authorities may also determine Irom the personal appearance oI the immigrant what his age is. The person oI a Chinese
alien seeking admission into the Philippine Islands is evidence in an investigation by the board oI special inquiry to determine his right
to enter; and such body may take into consideration his appearance to determine or assist in determining his age and a Iinding that the
applicant is not a minor based upon such appearance is not without evidence to support it.
This Court has also implicitly recognized the same process in a criminal case. Thus, in &nited States v. Agadas,
46
this Court held:
Rosario Sabacahan testiIied that he was 17 years oI age; that he had never purchased a cedula; and that he was going to
purchase a cedula the Iollowing January. Thereupon the court asked this deIendant these questions: "You are a pretty big boy
Ior seventeen." Answer: "I cannot tell exactly because I do not remember when I was born, but 17 years is my guess." Court:
"II you are going to take advantage oI that excuse, you had better get some positive evidence to that eIIect." Answer: "I do
not remember, as I already stated on what date and in what year I was born." The court, in determining the question oI the
age oI the deIendant, Rosario Sabacahan, said:
"The deIendant, Rosario Sabacahan, testiIied that he thought that he was about 17 years oI age, but judging by is
appearance he is a youth 18 or 19 years old. He has shown that he has no positive inIormation on the subject and no
eIIort was made by the deIense to prove the Iact that he is entitled to the mitigating circumstance oI article 9,
paragraph 2, oI the Penal code, which Iact it is held to be incumbent upon the deIense to establish by satisIactory
evidence in order to enable the court to give an accused person the beneIit oI the mitigating circumstance."
In United States vs. Estavillo and Perez (10 OII. Gaz., 1984) Estavillo testiIied, when the case was tried in the court below,
that he then was only 16 years oI age. There was no other testimony in the record with reIerence to his age. But the trial judge
said: "The accused Estavillo, notwithstanding his testimony giving his age as 16 years, is, as a matter oI Iact, not less than
20." This court, in passing upon the age oI Estavillo, held:
"We presume that the trial court reached this conclusion with reIerence to the age oI Estavillo Irom the latter's
personal appearance. There is no prooI in the record, as we have said, which even tends to establish the assertion
that this appellant understated his age. . . . It is true that the trial court had an opportunity to note the personal
appearance oI Estavillo Ior the purpose oI determining his age, and by so doing reached the conclusion that he was
at least 20, just two years over 18. This appellant testiIied that he was only 16, and this testimony stands
uncontradicted. Taking into consideration the marked diIIerence in the penalties to be imposed upon that age, we
must, thereIore, conclude (resolving all doubts in Iavor oI the appellants) that the appellants' ages were 16 and 14
respectively."

While it is true that in the instant case Rosario testiIied that he was 17 years oI age, yet the trial court reached the conclusion,
judging Irom the personal appearance oI Rosario, that "he is a youth 18 or 19 years old." Applying the rule enunciated in the
case just cited, we must conclude that there exists a reasonable doubt, at least, with reIerence to the question whether Rosario
was, in Iact 18 years oI age at the time the robbery was committed. This doubt must be resolved in Iavor oI the deIendant,
and he is, thereIore, sentenced to six months oI arresto mayor in lieu oI six years ten months and one day oI presidio mayor. .
. . .
There can be no question, thereIore, as to the admissibili9y oI a person's appearance in determining his or her age. As to the weig9 to
accord such appearance, especially in rape cases, Pruna laid down guideline no. 3, which is again reproduced hereunder:
3. II the certiIicate oI live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the
testimony, iI clear and credible, oI the victim's mother or a member oI the Iamily either by aIIinity or consanguinity who is
qualiIied to testiIy on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date oI birth oI the oIIended party pursuant to
Section 40, Rule 130 oI the Rules on Evidence shall be suIIicient under the Iollowing circumstances:
a. II the victim is alleged to be below 3 years oI age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years
old;
b. II the victim is alleged to be below 7 years oI age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years
old;
c. II the victim is alleged to be below 12 years oI age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years
old.
Under the above guideline, the testimony oI a relative with respect to the age oI the victim is suIIicient to constitute prooI beyond
reasonable doubt in cases (a), (b) and (c) above. In such cases, the disparity between the allegation and the prooI oI age is so great that
the court can easily determine Irom the appearance oI the victim the veracity oI the testimony. The appearance corroborates the
relative's testimony.
As the alleged age approaches the age sought to be proved, the person's appearance, as object evidence oI her age, loses probative
value. Doubt as to her true age becomes greater and, Iollowing Agadas, supra, such doubt must be resolved in Iavor oI the accused.
This is because in the era oI modernism and rapid growth, the victim's mere physical appearance is not enough to gauge her
exact age. For the extreme penalty oI death to be upheld, nothing but prooI beyond reasonable doubt oI every Iact necessary
to constitute the crime must be substantiated. Verily, the minority oI the victim should be not only alleged but likewise
proved with equal certainty and clearness as the crime itselI. Be it remembered that the prooI oI the victim's age in the
present case spells the diIIerence between liIe and death.
47

In the present case, the prosecution did not oIIer the victim's certiIicate oI live birth or similar authentic documents in evidence. The
victim and her mother, however, testiIied that she was only three years old at the time oI the rape. Cyra May's testimony goes:
q Your name is Cyra Mae is that correct?
a Yes, sir.
q And you are 3 years old?
a Yes, sir.
48

That oI her mother goes:
Q How old was your daughter when there things happened?
A 3 and years old.
Q When was she born?

A In Manila, May 10, 1992.

49

Because oI the vast disparity between the alleged age (three years old) and the age sought to be proved (below twelve years), the trial
court would have had no diIIiculty ascertaining the victim's age Irom her appearance. No reasonable doubt, thereIore, exists that the
second element oI statutory rape, i.e., that the victim was below twelve years oI age at the time oI the commission oI the oIIense, is
present.
Whether the victim was below seven years old, however, is another matter. Here, reasonable doubt exists. A mature three and a halI-
year old can easily be mistaken Ior an underdeveloped seven-year old. The appearance oI the victim, as object evidence, cannot be
accorded much weight and, Iollowing Pruna, the testimony oI the mother is, by itselI, insuIIicient.
As it has not been established with moral certainty that Cyra May was below seven years old at the time oI the commission oI the
oIIense, accused-appellant cannot be sentenced to suIIer the death penalty. Only the penalty oI reclusion perpetua can be imposed
upon him.
In line with settled jurisprudence, the civil indemnity awarded by the trial court is increased to P50,000.00. In addition, Cyra May is
entitled to an award oI moral damages in the amount oI P50,000.00.
50

WHEREFORE, the Decision oI the Regional Trial Court oI Quezon City, Branch 96, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Accused-appellant Ronnie Rullepa y Guinto is Iound GUILTY oI Statutory Rape, deIined and punished by Article 335 (3) oI the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, and is sentenced to suIIer the penalty oI reclusion perpetua. He is ordered to pay private
complainant, Cyra May BuenaIe y Francisco, the amount oI P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
avide, Jr., C .J ., Bellosillo, Puno, Jitug, Mendo:a, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierre:, Carpio, Austria-Martine:,
Callefo, Sr., and A:cuna, JJ ., concur.
Ynares-Santiago and Corona, JJ ., are on leave.














ROSY A. TECIO

Republic oI the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 143276 1uly 20, 2004
LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES VICENTE BANAL and LEONIDAS ARENAS-BANAL, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, .
Spouses Vicente and Leonidas Banal, respondents, are the registered owners oI 19.3422 hectares oI agricultural land situated in San
Felipe, Basud, Camarines Norte covered by TransIer CertiIicate oI Title No. T-6296. A portion oI the land consisting oI 6.2330
hectares (5.4730 oI which is planted to coconut and 0.7600 planted to palay) was compulsorily acquired by the Department oI
Agrarian ReIorm (DAR) pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657,
1
as amended, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian
ReIorm Law oI 1988.
In accordance with the Iormula prescribed in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series oI 1992,
2
as amended by DAR Administrative
Order No. 11, Series oI 1994,
3
the Land Bank oI the Philippines
4
(Landbank), petitioner, made the Iollowing valuation oI the property:
Acquired proper9y Area in ec9ares Value
Coconut land 5.4730 P148,675.19
Riceland 0.7600 25,243.36
P173,918.55
Respondents rejected the above valuation. Thus, pursuant to Section 16(d) oI R.A. 6657, as amended, a summary administrative
proceeding was conducted beIore the Provincial Agrarian ReIorm Adjudicator (PARAD) to determine the valuation oI the land.
Eventually, the PARAD rendered its Decision aIIirming the Landbank's valuation.
DissatisIied with the Decision oI the PARAD, respondents Iiled with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40, Daet, Camarines
Norte, designated as a Special Agrarian Court, a petition Ior determination oI just compensation, docketed as Civil Case No. 6806.
Impleaded as respondents were the DAR and the Landbank. Petitioners therein prayed Ior a compensation oI P100,000.00 per hectare
Ior both coconut land and riceland, or an aggregate amount oI P623,000.00.
During the pre-trial on September 23, 1998, the parties submitted to the RTC the Iollowing admissions oI Iacts: (1) the subject
property is governed by the provisions oI R.A. 6657, as amended; (2) it was distributed to the Iarmers-beneIiciaries; and (3) the
Landbank deposited the provisional compensation based on the valuation made by the DAR.
5

On the same day aIter the pre-trial, the court issued an Order dispensing with the hearing and directing the parties to submit their
respective memoranda.
6

In its Decision dated February 5, 1999, the trial court computed the just compensation Ior the coconut land at P657,137.00 and Ior the
riceland at P46,000.00, or a total oI P703,137.00, which is beyond respondents' valuation oI P623,000.00. The court Iurther awarded
compounded interest at P79,732.00 in cash. The dispositive portion oI the Decision reads:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as Iollows:

1. Ordering respondent Landbank to pay the petitioners, the spouses Dr. Vicente Banal and Leonidas Arenas-Banal, Ior the
5.4730 hectares oI coconut land the sum oI SIX HUNDRED FIFTY-SEVEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-
SEVEN PESOS (P657,137.00) in cash and in bonds in the proportion provided by law;
2. Ordering respondent Landbank to pay the petitioners Ior the .7600 hectares oI riceland the sum oI FORTY-SIX
THOUSAND PESOS (P46,000.00) in cash and in bonds in the proportion provided by law; and
3. Ordering respondent Landbank to pay the petitioners the sum oI SEVENTY-NINE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED
THIRTY-TWO PESOS (P79,732.00) as the compounded interest in cash.
IT IS SO ORDERED."
7

In determining the valuation oI the land, the trial court based the same on the Iacts established in another case pending beIore it (Civil
Case No. 6679, "Luz Rodriguez vs. DAR, et al."), using the Iollowing Iormula:
For the coconut land
1. Average Gross Production (AGP) x .70 x 9.70 (price per kilo oI coconut) Net Income (NI)
2. NI / 6 Price Per Hectare (PPH) (applying the capitalization Iormula under Republic Ac9 No. 3844
8
)
For the riceland
1. 2.5 x AGP x Government Support Price (GSP) Land Value (LV) or PPH (using the Iormula under Execu9ive
Order No. 228
9
)
2. AGP x 6 compounded annually Ior 26 years x GSP Interest (pursuant to DAR AO No. 13, Series oI 1994)
Forthwith, the Landbank Iiled with the Court oI Appeals a petition Ior review, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 52163.
On March 20, 2000, the Appellate Court rendered a Decision
10
aIIirming in toto the judgment oI the trial court. The Landbank's
motion Ior reconsideration was likewise denied.
11

Hence, this petition Ior review on certiorari.
The Iundamental issue Ior our resolution is whether the Court oI Appeals erred in sustaining the trial court's valuation oI the land. As
earlier mentioned, there was no trial on the merits.
To begin with, under Section 1 oI Executive Order No. 405 (1990), the Landbank is charged "primarily" with "the determination oI
the land valuation and compensation Ior all private lands suitable Ior agriculture under the Voluntary OIIer to Sell or Compulsory
Acquisition arrangement." For its part, the DAR relies on the determination oI the land valuation and compensation by the
Landbank.
12

Based on the Landbank's valuation oI the land, the DAR makes an oIIer to the landowner.
13
II the landowner accepts the oIIer, the
Landbank shall pay him the purchase price oI the land aIter he executes and delivers a deed oI transIer and surrenders the certiIicate oI
title in Iavor oI the government.
14
In case the landowner rejects the oIIer or Iails to reply thereto, the DAR adjudicator
15
conducts
summary administrative proceedings to determine the compensation Ior the land by requiring the landowner, the Landbank and other
interested parties to submit evidence as to the just compensation Ior the land.
16
These Iunctions by the DAR are in accordance with its
quasi-judicial powers under Section 50 oI R.A. 6657, as amended, which provides:
"SEC. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the AR. The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reIorm matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation oI agrarian reIorm, except those Ialling under the exclusive jurisdiction oI the Department oI Agriculture
(DA) and the Department oI Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

x x x."
A party who disagrees with the decision oI the DAR adjudicator may bring the matter to the RTC designated as a Special Agrarian
Court
17
"Ior Iinal determination oI just compensation."
18

In the proceedings beIore the RTC, it is mandated to apply the Rules oI Court
19
and, on its own initiative or at the instance oI any oI
the parties, "appoint one or more commissioners to examine, investigate and ascertain Iacts relevant to the dispute, including the
valuation oI properties, and to Iile a written report thereoI x x x."
20
In determining just compensation, the RTC is required to consider
several Iactors enumerated in Section 17 oI R.A. 6657, as amended, thus:
"Sec. 17. etermination of Just Compensation. In determining just compensation, the cost oI acquisition oI the land, the
current value oI like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and
the assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and economic beneIits contributed by the
Iarmers and the Iarmworkers and by the Government to the property, as well as the non-payment oI taxes or loans secured
Irom any government Iinancing institution on the said land, shall be considered as additional Iactors to determine its
valuation."
These Iactors have been translated into a basic Iormula in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series oI 1992, as amended by DAR
Administrative Order No. 11, Series oI 1994, issued pursuant to the DAR's rule-making power to carry out the object and purposes oI
R.A. 6657, as amended.
21

The Iormula stated in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, as amended, is as Iollows:
"LV (CNI x 0.6) (CS x 0.3) (MV x 0.1)
LV Land Value
CNI Capitalized Net Income
CS Comparable Sales
MV Market Value per Tax Declaration
The above Iormula shall be used iI all the three Iactors are present, relevant and applicable.
A.1 When the CS Iactor is not present and CNI and MV are applicable, the Iormula shall be:
LV (CNI x 0.9) (MV x 0.1)
A.2 When the CNI Iactor is not present, and CS and MV are applicable, the Iormula shall be:
LV (CS x 0.9) (MV x 0.1)
A.3 When both the CS and CNI are not present and only MV is applicable, the Iormula shall be:
LV MV x 2"
Here, the RTC Iailed to observe the basic rules oI procedure and the Iundamental requirements in determining just compensation Ior
the property. Firs9ly, it dispensed with the hearing and merely ordered the parties to submit their respective memoranda. Such action
is grossly erroneous since the determination oI just compensation involves the examination oI the Iollowing Iactors speciIied in
Section 17 oI R.A. 6657, as amended:
1. the cost oI the acquisition oI the land;
2. the current value oI like properties;

3. its nature, actual use and income;

4. the sworn valuation by the owner; the tax declarations;
5. the assessment made by government assessors;
6. the social and economic beneIits contributed by the Iarmers and the Iarmworkers and by the government to the property;
and
7. the non-payment oI taxes or loans secured Irom any government Iinancing institution on the said land, iI any.
Obviously, these Iactors involve fac9ual matters which can be established only during a hearing wherein the contending parties
present their respective evidence. In Iact, to underscore the intricate nature oI determining the valuation oI the land, Section 58 oI the
same law even authorizes the Special Agrarian Courts to appoint commissioners Ior such purpose.
Secondly, the RTC, in concluding that the valuation oI respondents' property is P703,137.00, merely took judicial notice oI the
average production Iigures in 9e Rodruez case pending before i9 and applied the same to this case without conducting a hearing
and worse, without the knowledge or consent oI the parties, thus:
"x x x. In the case x x x oI the coconut portion oI the land 5.4730 hectares, deIendants determined the average gross
production per year at 506.95 kilos only, bu9 in 9e very recen9 case of Luz Rodriguez vs. DAR, e9 al., filed and decided
by 9is cour9 in Civil Case No. 6679 also Ior just compensation Ior coconut lands and Riceland situated at Basud, Camarines
Norte wherein also the lands in the above-entitled case are situated, 9e value fixed 9erein was 1,061.52 kilos per annum
per ec9are for coconu9 land and 9e price per kilo is P8.82, bu9 in 9e ins9an9 case 9e price per kilo is P9.70. In the
present case, we consider 506.95 kilos average gross production per year per hectare to be very low considering that Iarm
practice Ior coconut lands is harvest every Iorty-Iive days. We cannot also comprehended why in 9e Rodruez case and in
this case there is a great variance in average production per year when in the two cases the lands are both coconut lands and
in the same place oI Basud, Camarines Norte. We believe that it is more Iair to adapt the 1,061.52 kilos per hectare per year
as average gross production. In 9e Rodruez case, the deIendants Iixed the average gross production oI palay at 3,000 kilos
or 60 cavans per year. Te cour9 is also cons9rained 9o apply 9is yearly palay produc9ion in 9e Rodriguez case 9o 9e
case a9 bar.
x x x x x x x x x
"As shown in the Memorandum oI Landbank in this case, the area oI the coconut land taken under CARP is 5.4730 hectares.
But as already noted, 9e average gross produc9ion a year of 506.96 kilos per ec9are fixed by Landbank is 9oo low as
compared 9o 9e Rodriguez case wic was 1,061 kilos wen 9e coconu9 land in bo9 cases are in 9e same 9own of
Basud, Camarines Nor9e, compelling 9is cour9 9en 9o adap9 1,061 kilos as 9e average gross produc9ion a year of 9e
coconu9 land in 9is case. We have to apply also the price oI P9.70 per kilo as this is the value that Landbank Iixed Ior this
case.
"The net income oI the coconut land is equal to 70 oI the gross income. So, the net income oI the coconut land is 1,061 x
.70 x 9.70 equals P7,204.19 per hectare. Applying the capitalization Iormula oI R.A. 3844 to the net income oI P7,204.19
divided by 6, the legal rate oI interest, equals P120,069.00 per hectare. ThereIore, the just compensation Ior the 5.4730
hectares is P657,137.00.
"The Riceland taken under Presiden9ial Decree No. 27 as oI October 21, 1972 has an area oI .7600 hectare. If in 9e
Rodruez case the Landbank Iixed the average gross production oI 3000 kilos or 60 cavans oI palay per year, then the .7600
hectare in this case would be 46 cavans. The value oI the riceland thereIore in this case is 46 cavans x 2.5 x P400.00 equals
P46,000.00.
22

"PARC Resolution 94-24-1 oI 25 October 1994, implemented by DAR AO 13, granted interest on the compensation at 6
compounded annually. The compounded interest on the 46 cavans Ior 26 years is 199.33 cavans. At P400.00 per cavan, the
value oI the compounded interest is P79,732.00."
23
(emphasis added)

Well-settled is the rule that courts are not authorized to take judicial notice oI the contents oI the records oI other cases even when said
cases have been tried or are pending in the same court or beIore the same judge.
24
They may only do so "in the absence oI objection"
and "with the knowledge oI the opposing party,"
25
which are not obtaining here.
Furthermore, as earlier stated, the Rules oI Court shall apply to all proceedings beIore the Special Agrarian Courts. In this regard,
Section 3, Rule 129 oI the Revised Rules on Evidence is explicit on the necessity oI a hearing beIore a court takes judicial notice oI a
certain matter, thus:
"SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on request oI a party,
may announce i9s in9en9ion 9o 9ake judicial no9ice oI any matter and allow 9e par9ies 9o be eard 9ereon.
"AIter the trial, and beIore judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative or on request oI a party, may take
judicial notice oI any matter and allow 9e par9ies 9o be eard 9ereon iI such matter is decisive oI a material issue in the
case." (emphasis added)
The RTC Iailed to observe the above provisions.
Las9ly, the RTC erred in applying the Iormula prescribed under Executive Order (EO) No. 228
26
and R.A. No. 3844,
27
as amended, in
determining the valuation oI the property; and in granting compounded interest pursuant to DAR Administrative Order No. 13, Series
oI 1994.
28
It must be stressed that EO No. 228 covers private agricultural lands primarily devo9ed 9o rice and corn, while R.A. 3844
governs agricul9ural leaseold rela9ion between "the person who Iurnishes the landholding, either as owner, civil law lessee,
usuIructuary, or legal possessor, and the person who personally cultivates the same."
29
Here, the land is planted to coconut and rice
and does not involve agricultural leasehold relation. What the trial court should have applied is the Iormula in DAR Administrative
Order No. 6, as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11 discussed earlier.
As regards the award oI compounded interest, suIIice it to state that DAR Administrative Order No. 13, Series oI 1994 does not apply
to the subject land but to those lands taken under Presidential Decree No. 27
30
and Executive Order No. 228 whose owners have not
been compensated. In this case, the property is covered by R.A. 6657, as amended, and respondents have been paid the provisional
compensation thereoI, as stipulated during the pre-trial.
While the determination oI just compensation involves the exercise oI judicial discretion, however, such discretion must be discharged
within the bounds oI the law. Here, the RTC wantonly disregarded R.A. 6657, as amended, and its implementing rules and
regulations. (DAR Administrative Order No. 6, as amended by DAR Administrative Order No.11).
In sum, we Iind that the Court oI Appeals and the RTC erred in determining the valuation oI the subject land. Thus, we deem it proper
to remand this case to the RTC Ior trial on the merits wherein the parties may present their respective evidence. In determining the
valuation oI the subject property, the trial court shall consider the Iactors provided under Section 17 oI R.A. 6657, as amended,
mentioned earlier. The Iormula prescribed by the DAR in Administrative Order No. 6, Series oI 1992, as amended by DAR
Administrative Order No. 11, Series oI 1994, shall be used in the valuation oI the land. Furthermore, upon its own initiative, or at the
instance oI any oI the parties, the trial court may appoint one or more commissioners to examine, investigate and ascertain Iacts
relevant to the dispute.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision oI the Court oI Appeals dated March 20, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No.
52163 is REVERSED. Civil Case No. 6806 is REMANDED to the RTC, Branch 40, Daet, Camarines Norte, Ior trial on the merits
with dispatch. The trial judge is directed to observe strictly the procedures speciIied above in determining the proper valuation oI the
subject property.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
Corona, J., on leave.

ROSY A. TECIO

Republic oI the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 150712 May 2, 2006
ESTRELLA PIGAO, ROMEO PIGAO, EMMANUEL PIGAO, ISABELITA ABAD, PURITA SARTIGA, CESAR PIGAO,
TERESITA PIGAO, VIRGILIO PIGAO and EVANGELINE KIUNISALA, Petitioners,
vs.
SAMUEL RABANILLO, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CORONA .
This petition Ior review seeks the reversal oI the decision
1
oI the Court oI Appeals (CA) dated October 29, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No.
60069, the dispositive portion oI which read:
WHEREFORE, the decision rendered in Civil Case No. Q-96-26270 on February 27, 1998 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
As prayed Ior in the answer, TransIer CertiIicate oI Title No. 56210 over the 240 square-meter lot located at 92 (now 102) K-5th
Street, Kamuning, Quezon City issued in the name oI Eusebio Pigao`s children is hereby ordered CANCELLED and the Register oI
Deeds oI Quezon City is hereby ordered to ISSUE a new one in lieu thereoI in the names oI both Eusebio Pigao`s children and Samuel
Rabanillo, with the Iront halI portion oI the lot pertaining to the latter and the back halI portion pertaining to the Iormer.
Let a copy oI this decision be Iurnished the Register oI Deeds oI Quezon City Ior proper action.
SO ORDERED.
2

The antecedent Iacts Iollow.
Sometime in 1947, the late Eusebio Pigao, petitioners` Iather, together with his Iamily, settled on a 240 square meter lot located at 92
(now 102) K-5th Street, Kamuning, Quezon City. The parcel oI land used to be government property owned by the People`s Homesite
and Housing Corporation (PHHC),
3
under TransIer CertiIicate oI Title (TCT) No. 27287.
4
Eusebio applied Ior the purchase oI the
subject lot and a contract to sell Ior a consideration oI P1,022.19 was thereaIter entered into by Eusebio and PHHC.
In 1959, Eusebio executed a deed oI assignment oI rights over one-halI oI the property in Iavor oI respondent, Ior a consideration oI
P1,000. Respondent proceeded to occupy the Iront halI portion, established a residential building thereon, and paid the amortizations
Ior the said portion.
In 1970, Eusebio executed a deed oI mortgage over the same halI-portion oI the property in Iavor oI respondent. AIter the
amortizations on the subject lot were Iully paid in 1973, the PHHC issued a deed oI sale over the entire lot in Iavor oI Eusebio.
Consequently, TCT No. 197941 was issued in Eusebio`s name. In 1978, respondent executed an aIIidavit oI adverse claim over the
Iront halI portion oI the lot registered in Eusebio`s name. This aIIidavit was duly annotated on TCT No. 197941. On June 17, 1979,
Eusebio died and was survived by his children, herein petitioners.
In 1988, aIter the OIIice oI the Register oI Deeds oI Quezon City was gutted by Iire, petitioner Estrella Pigao applied Ior the
reconstitution oI the original oI TCT No. 197941 that was burned. This was approved in 1990 and TCT No. RT-11374 was issued, still
in the name oI Eusebio. This reconstituted title no longer carried the annotation oI the adverse claim oI respondent.
In 1992, petitioners executed an extrajudicial settlement oI Eusebio`s estate among themselves, including the entire subject lot. As a
consequence, TCT No. 56210 was issued Ior the entire lot in the name oI petitioners. Respondent continued to occupy the Iront halI
portion through his tenant, Gil Ymata. On January 29, 1996, petitioners instituted civil case no. Q-96-26270 in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) oI Quezon City, Branch 95, against respondent and Ymata wherein they sought to quiet their title over the entire lot and
to recover possession oI the Iront halI portion. They averred that Eusebio`s deed oI assignment and deed oI mortgage were clouds on
their title which should be nulliIied.
5
The RTC ruled in Iavor oI petitioners:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in the Iollowing:

1. Declaring |petitioners| the absolute owners oI the entire land described in TCT No. 56210 and declaring the deed oI
assignment issued by the late Eusebio Pigao in Iavor oI |respondent| null and void.
2. Ordering |petitioners| to pay |respondent| the value oI the house and improvements thereon in the event that they choose
to appropriate the same in which case |respondent| is given the right oI retention until he has been reimbursed by
|petitioners|; or to compel |respondent| to buy the land in case they choose not to. In the latter case, |respondent| cannot be
compelled to buy the land iI the value thereoI is higher than the value oI the improvements.
3. Dismissing the case against deIendant Gil Ymata Ior lack oI cause oI action there being no privity oI contract between him
and |petitioners|;
4. Dismissing both |petitioners`| and |respondent`s| claims Ior damages and attorney`s Iees there being no satisIactory
warrant thereto; and
5. No pronouncements as to costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
6

As stated earlier, the CA reversed the RTC decision and ruled in Iavor oI respondent.
Petitioners Iiled this petition on the Iollowing grounds:
I.
THE |CA| ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE SUBJECT DEED OF ASSIGNMENT IS VALID AND THAT THERE IS NO
PROHIBITION |AGAINST| THE SALE |OF| RIGHTS OVER THE AWARDED LOT MADE BY EUSEBIO PIGAO.
II.
THE |CA| ERRED IN DECLARING THAT A RELATIONSHIP OF IMPLIED TRUST OVER THE |ONE-HALF| (1/2) PORTION
OF THE SUBJECT LOT WAS CREATED BETWEEN EUSEBIO PIGAO AND |RESPONDENT|.
7

The Iirst issue beIore us is the validity oI the deed oI assignment whereby Eusebio assigned to respondent his rights to halI oI the lot.
Petitioners argue that the lot subject oI this case was public land granted by the PHHC to their predecessor, Eusebio. Hence, they
contend that Section 118 oI Commonwealth Act No. 141 (CA 141)
8
otherwise known as the Public Land Act, was applicable:
Sec. 118. Except in Iavor oI the Government or any oI its branches, units, or institutions, lands acquired under free pa9en9 or
omes9ead provisions sall no9 be subjec9 9o encumbrance or aliena9ion from 9e da9e of 9e approval of 9e applica9ion and
for a 9erm of five years from and af9er 9e da9e of issuance of 9e pa9en9 or gran9, nor shall they become liable to the satisIaction
oI any debt contracted prior to the expiration oI said period, but the improvements or crops on the land may be mortgaged or pledged
to qualiIied persons, associations, or corporations. (emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioners assert that the deed oI assignment was null and void because it was entered into during the prohibited period,
9
i.e., the
entire period Irom the date oI approval oI Eusebio`s application to purchase up to Iive years Irom and aIter the date oI issuance oI the
patent to him in 1973. Respondent counters that CA 141 did not apply because it covered only homestead or sales patents.
10

We agree that CA 141 was inapplicable. The proscription under CA 141 on re-sale within the Iive-year restricted period reIerred to
Iree patents and homestead lands only.
11
Here, the lot in dispute was neither homestead land nor one acquired through patent. It was
owned by PHHC, a government corporation,
12
under TCT No. 27287.
13
avvphil.net
It was not disputed that Eusebio and respondent entered into a deed oI assignment in 1959, long beIore PHHC executed a (Iinal) deed
oI sale in Iavor oI Eusebio in 1973. At that time, title to the lot was still in the name oI PHHC. The deed oI assignment itselI explicitly

stated that the property was "owned by the PHHC."

14
And when the (Iinal) deed oI sale was issued by PHHC in Iavor oI Eusebio in
1973, this deed contained a prohibition against the alienation oI the lot:
(2) Within a period oI one year Irom the issuance oI the CertiIicate oI Title by virtue oI this deed, no transIer or alienation whatsoever
oI the property subject hereoI, in whole or in part, shall be made or registered without the written consent oI the Vendor, and such
transIer or alienation may be made only in Iavor oI persons qualiIied to acquire residential lands under the laws oI the Philippines.
15

The CA, however, held that what was assigned by Eusebio in 1959 was his right to buy, own and occupy the Iront halI portion oI the
lot and not the lot itselI. It went on to conclude that the deed oI assignment was perIectly valid since Eusebio was under no prohibition
to sell such right.
Petitioners insist there was such a prohibition. To support their claim, they request this Court to take judicial notice oI the Iact that the
pro-Iorma conditional contracts-to- sell between PHHC and applicants Ior the purchase oI its lots contained a condition stating that
"the applicant agree(d) not to sell, assign, encumber, mortgage, lease, sublet or in any other manner aIIect his right under this contract,
at any time, in any manner whatsoever, in whole or in part, without Iirst obtaining the written consent oI the Corporation." Although
they admitted that they Iailed to present during the trial the conditional contract to sell between Eusebio and PHHC, they claimed that
they did not have a copy thereoI.
16
In Iact, what they submitted to this Court was a copy oI a conditional contract to sell between a
certain Armando Bernabe and the PHHC pertaining to a lot located at 94 K-5th St., Kamuning, Quezon City
17
to prove the existence
oI the aIorementioned condition. Respondent objects to this attempt oI petitioners to seek admission oI evidence which was presented
neither during trial nor on appeal.
18

We agree with respondent. We cannot take cognizance oI this document the conditional contract to sell between Bernabe and the
PHHC alleged to be the pro-Iorma contract used by PHHC with its applicants - which petitioners are presenting Ior the Iirst time. This
document is not among the matters the law mandatorily requires us to take judicial notice oI.
19
Neither can we consider it oI public
knowledge nor capable oI unquestionable demonstration nor ought to be known to judges because oI their judicial Iunctions.
20
We
have held that:
Matters oI judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one oI common and general knowledge; (2) it must be
well and authoritatively settled and not doubtIul or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits oI jurisdiction oI the
court. The power oI taking judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with caution. Care mus9 be 9aken 9a9 9e requisi9e no9orie9y
exis9s and every reasonable doub9 on 9e subjec9 sould be promp9ly resolved in 9e nega9ive.
21
(emphasis supplied)
Consequently, Ior this document to be properly considered by us, it should have been presented during trial and Iormally oIIered as
evidence. Otherwise, we would be denying due process oI law to respondent:
It is settled that courts will only consider as evidence that which has been Iormally oIIered. xxx II |petitioners| neglected to oIIer |any
document| in evidence, however vital |it| may be, |they| only have themselves to blame, not respondent who was not even given a
chance to object as the documents were never oIIered in evidence.
A document, or any article Ior that matter, is not evidence when it is simply marked Ior identiIication; it must be Iormally oIIered, and
the opposing counsel given an opportunity to object to it or cross-examine the witness called upon to prove or identiIy it. A Iormal
oIIer is necessary since judges are required to base their Iindings oI Iact and judgment only and strictly upon the evidence
oIIered by the parties at the trial. To allow a party to attach any document to his pleading and then expect the court to consider it as
evidence may draw unwarranted consequences. The opposing party will be deprived oI his chance to examine the document and
object to its admissibility. The appellate court will have diIIiculty reviewing documents not previously scrutinized by the court below.
The pertinent provisions oI the Revised Rules oI Court on the inclusion on appeal oI documentary evidence or exhibits in the records
cannot be stretched as to include such pleadings or documents not oIIered at the hearing oI the case.
22

Besides, this document does not even pertain to the lot and parties involved here. Accordingly, it is neither relevant nor material
evidence. But even assuming that it were, then it would substantially aIIect the outcome oI the case so respondent should have been
given the chance to scrutinize the document and object to it during the trial oI the case. It is too late to present it now when nothing
prevented petitioners Irom introducing it beIore.
Nevertheless, we hold that the deed oI assignment between Eusebio and respondent is null and void Ior being contrary to public
policy. Under PHHC rules, preIerence Ior the purchase oI residential lots Irom the PHHC was accorded to bona Iide occupants oI such
lots.
23
This policy was supported by the PHHC charter given that one oI the purposes oI the PHHC was:

to acquire, develop, improve, subdivide, lease and sell lands and construct, lease and sell buildings or any interest therein in the cities
and populous towns in the Philippines wi9 9e objec9 of providing decen9 ousing for 9ose wo may be found unable o9erwise
9o provide 9emselves 9erewi9.
24
(emphasis supplied)
Eusebio, as a bona Iide occupant oI the subject lot, had a vested right to buy the property. This did not, however, give him the
unbridled Ireedom to transIer his right to a third party, specially one who was unqualiIied to avail oI it. Undoubtedly, the PHHC was
clothed with authority to determine iI a person was qualiIied to purchase a residential lot Irom it. The right to purchase was a personal
right that the qualiIied applicant, as determined by PHHC, must personally exercise. As a personal right, it could not be transIerred to
just another person.
Any transIer oI rights, to be valid, must be in line with the policy oI PHHC which was to provide "decent housing Ior those who may
be Iound unable otherwise to provide themselves therewith." Thus, any transIer oI an applicant`s right to buy a lot was invalid iI done
without the consent oI PHHC. The same policy was enunciated by the terms oI the deed oI sale.
25
There is no showing that the
PHHC`s approval Ior the assignment oI halI oI the lot to respondent was ever obtained. Stated otherwise, there is no prooI that
respondent would have been allowed to avail oI the preIerential rights exclusively granted to bona Iide occupants oI PHHC-owned
lots like Eusebio. Thus, the assignment oI rights by Eusebio to respondent, who was not a bona Iide occupant oI the lot, Irustrated the
public policy oI the government. It should thereIore be struck down as null and void.
It Iollows that the second issue oI whether an implied trust relationship was created between Eusebio and his heirs as trustees and
respondent as beneIiciary must also be resolved against respondent. We do not agree with the reasoning oI the CA:
xxx |A|Iter the execution oI the deed oI assignment, |respondent| proceeded to buy the Iront halI portion Irom PHHC by paying the
amortizations due thereon in exercise oI the right which he purchased by way oI deed oI assignment. He also established his residence
on this portion since he was then secure in the knowledge that he eventually will own the same portion having also purchased this
right to own in the deed oI assignment. ThereIore, when the purchase price Ior the entire lot was Iinally paid, the deed oI its
conveyance was Iinally executed and the title to the entire lot was issued in Eusebio Pigao`s name, an implied trust relationship was
created over the Iront halI portion between Pigao and |respondent|.
Per Article 1448 oI the Civil Code, "there is an implied trust when property is sold, and the legal estate is granted to one party but the
price is paid by another Ior the purpose oI having the beneIicial interest oI the property." The Iormer party is reIerred to as the trustee,
while the latter is reIerred to as the beneIiciary.
In the case at bench, the trustee is Pigao, who, with the title to the entire lot issued to him, holds the Iront halI portion thereoI in trust
Ior |respondent|, who is the beneIiciary.
xxx xxx xxx
26

The CA declared that Article 1448 oI the Civil Code was applicable:
Art. 1448. There is an implied trust when property is sold, and the legal estate is granted to one party but the price is paid by another
Ior the purpose oI having the beneIicial interest oI the property. The Iormer is the trustee, while the latter is the beneIiciary.
xxx xxx xxx
In Morales v. Court of Appeals,
27
we extensively discussed the concept oI "trust:"
A trust is the legal relationship between one person having an equitable ownership in property and another person owning the legal
title to such property, the equitable ownership oI the Iormer entitling him to the perIormance oI certain duties and the exercise oI
certain powers by the latter.
xxx xxx xxx
Trusts are either express or implied. Express trusts are created by the intention oI the trustor or oI the parties, while implied trusts
come into being by operation oI law, either through implication oI an intention to create a trust as a matter oI law or through the
imposition oI the trust irrespective oI, and even contrary to, any such intention. In turn, implied trusts are either resulting or
constructive trusts. Resulting trusts are based on the equitable doctrine that valuable consideration and not legal title determines the
equitable title or interest and are presumed always to have been contemplated by the parties. They arise Irom the nature or

circumstances oI the consideration involved in a transaction whereby one person thereby becomes invested with legal title but is
obligated in equity to hold his legal title Ior the beneIit oI another.
xxx xxx xxx
A resulting trust is exempliIied by Article 1448 oI the Civil Code xxx
The trust created under the Iirst sentence oI Article 1448 is sometimes reIerred to as a purchase money resulting trust. The trust is
created in order to eIIectuate what the law presumes to have been the intention oI the parties in the circumstances that the person to
whom the land was conveyed holds it as trustee Ior the person who supplied the purchase money.
To give rise to a purchase money resulting trust, it is essential that there be:
1. an actual payment oI money, property or services, or an equivalent, constituting valuable consideration;
2. and such consideration must be Iurnished by the alleged beneIiciary oI a resulting trust.
There are recognized exceptions to the establishment oI an implied resulting trust. The Iirst is stated in the last part oI Article 1448
itselI. Thus, where A pays the purchase money and title is conveyed by absolute deed to A's child or to a person to whom A stands in
loco parentis and who makes no express promise, a trust does not result, the presumption being that a giIt was intended. Another
exception is, oI course, that in which an actual contrary intention is proved. Also where the purchase is made in violation oI an
existing statute and in evasion oI its express provision, no trust can result in Iavor oI the party who is guilty oI the Iraud.
28

Another exception to the establishment oI an implied resulting trust under Article 1448 is when its enIorcement contravenes public
policy. We have already ruled that the transIer oI rights by Eusebio to respondent was null and void ab initio Ior being contrary to
public policy. As we held in Ramos v. Court of Appeals:
29

Otherwise stated, as an excep9ion 9o 9e law on 9rus9s, "a] 9rus9 or a provision in 9e 9erms of a 9rus9 is invalid if 9e
enforcemen9 of 9e 9rus9 or provision would be agains9 public policy, even though its perIormance does not involve the
commission oI a criminal or tortious act by the trustee." The parties must necessarily be subject to the same limitations on allowable
stipulations in ordinary contracts, i.e., their stipulations must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public
policy. What the parties then cannot expressly provide in their contracts Ior being contrary to law and public policy, they cannot
impliedly or implicitly do so in the guise oI a resulting trust.
30
(emphasis supplied)
Admittedly, respondent shouldered halI oI the amortizations which were received by Eusebio`s wiIe
31
and paid to the PHHC Ior the
purchase oI the lot. He also paid Ior the realty taxes Ior the said portion.
32
However, this was not an implied trust wherein petitioners
held the title over the Iront halI portion in trust Ior respondent. Otherwise, it would again run against public policy.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court oI Appeals decision dated October 29, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV
No. 60069 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision oI the Regional Trial Court oI Quezon City, Branch 95 in Civil Case No.
Q-96-26270 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

ROSY A. TECIO
Republic oI the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 119053 1anuary 23, 1997
FLORENTINO ATILLO III, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, AMANCOR, INC. and MICHELL LHUILLIER, respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N

FRANCISCO, .:
This is a petition Ior review on certiorari oI the decision oI the respondent Court oI Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 3677 promulgated on
August 4, 1994 aIIirming in toto the decision oI Branch 7 oI the Regional Trial Court oI Cebu City in Civil Case No. CEB-9801
entitled "Florentino L. Atillo III versus Amancor, Inc. and Michell Lhuillier".
The material antecedents are as Iollows:
On August 15, 1985, respondent Amancor, Inc. (hereinaIter reIerred to as AMANCOR Ior brevity), a corporation then owned and
controlled by petitioner Florentino L. Atillo III , contracted a loan in the amount oI P1,000,000.00 with Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Company, secured by real estate properties owned by the petitioner.
1
BeIore the said loan could be paid, petitioner entered into a
Memorandum oI Agreement dated June 14, 1988 (Annex "A" oI the Complaint) with respondent Michell Lhuillier (hereinaIter
reIerred to as LHUILLIER Ior brevity) whereby the latter bought shares oI stock in AMANCOR. As a consequence oI the Ioregoing
transaction, petitioner and LHUILLIER each became owner oI 47 oI the outstanding shares oI stock oI AMANCOR while the
oIIicers oI the corporation owned the remaining 6.
2

In view oI the urgent and immediate need Ior Iresh capital to support the business operations oI AMANCOR, petitioner and
LHUILLLER executed another Memorandum oI Agreement on February 13, 1989 (Annex "B" oI the Complaint) by virtue oI which
LHUILLIER undertook to invest additional capital in AMANCOR.
3
As an addendum to the Ioregoing, a Supplemental Memorandum
oI Agreement was entered into by the petitioner and LHUILLIER on March 11, 1989.
4
Relevant to the case at bar is a stipulation in
the said Supplemental Memorandum oI Agreement which provides as Iollows:
4. F.L. Atillo III may dispose oII (sic) his properties at P. del Rosario St., Cebu City which may involve pre-
payment oI AMANCOR'S mortgage loan to the bank estimated at P300,000.00 and while AMANCOR may not yet
be in the position to re-pay said amount to him, it shall pay the interests to him equivalent to prevailing bank rate.
5

Pursuant to this stipulation, petitioner assumed AMANCOR's outstanding loan balance oI P300,000.00 with Metropolitan Bank and
Trust Company. AIter oIIsetting the amount oI P300,000.00 with some oI the accounts that petitioner had with AMANCOR, the
amount which remained due to the petitioner was P199,888.89. Because oI the Iailure oI AMANCOR to satisIy its obligation to repay
petitioner, the latter Iiled a complaint Ior collection oI a sum oI money docketed as Civil Case No. Ceb-9801 against AMANCOR and
LHUILLLER beIore Branch 7 oI the Regional Trial Court oI Cebu City.
At the pre-trial conIerence, petitioner, AMANCOR and LHUILLIER, assisted by their respective counsels, stipulated on the
Iollowing:

1. That the parties admit the due execution and genuineness oI the Memorandum oI Agreement dated 14 June 1988
(Annex A), the Memorandum oI Agreement dated 13 February 1989 (Annex B and Supplemental Agreement dated
11 March 1989 (Annex C);
2. That the deIendants admit that the claim oI the plaintiII amounted to P199,888.89 as oI October 1, 1990;
6

and submitted the Iollowing issues to be resolved by the trial court:
a. From the aforesaid Annexes A, B and C, is Michell J. Lhuillier personally liable to the plaintiff?
b. What rate oI interests shall the deIendant corporation and Michell J. Lhuillier, iI the latter is liable, pay the
plaintiII?
7
(Emphasis supplied.)
On the basis oI the stipulation oI Iacts and the written arguments oI the parties, the trial court rendered a decision in Iavor oI the
petitioner, ordering AMANCOR to pay petitioner the amount oI P199,888.89 with interest equivalent to the bank rate prevailing as oI
March 11, 1989. LHUILLIER was, however, absolved oI any personal liability thereIor.
8

It is Irom the trial court's conclusion oI non-liability that petitioner appealed to respondent court, arguing therein that as LHULLLIER
signed the Memorandum oI Agreement without the oIIicial participation nor ratiIication oI AMANCOR, LHUILLIER should have
been declared jointly and severally liable with AMANCOR.
9

The respondent court Iound petitioner's contention bereIt oI merit and held in part that:
Contrary to plaintiIIs-appellants (sic) allegation, the indebtedness oI P199,888.89 was incurred by deIendant
AMANCOR, INC., alone. A thorough study oI the records shows that plaintiII's cause oI action Ior collection oI a
sum oI money arose Irom "his payment oI the deIendant corporation's outstanding loan balance oI P300,000.00 with
Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company" . . . Considering the allegations in the complaint and those contained in the
Memorandum oI Agreement, the respondent court properly ruled that the liability was incurred by deIendant
AMANCOR, INC., singly. We grant that iI plaintiII really believes that the indebtedness was incurred by deIendant
Lhuillier in his personal capacity, he should not have oIIsetted (sic) some oI his accounts with the deIendant
corporation,
. . . As it is, plaintiII could have oIted (sic) to sue deIendant Lhuillier in his personal capacity the whole amount oI
indebtedness and not implead the deIendant corporation as co-deIendant.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . |T|he indebtedness was incurred by the deIendant corporation as a legal entity to pay the mortgage loan.
DeIendant Lhuillier acted only as an oIIicer/agent oI the corporation by signing the said Memorandum oI
Agreement.
10

Aggrieved by the decision oI respondent court, petitioner brought this instant petition submitting the Iollowing issue Ior the resolution
oI this Court:
When a party, by his judicial admissions, has aIIirmed that he has personal liability in a certain transaction, may a
court rule against such an admission despite clear indications that it was not aIIected by mistakes palpable or
otherwise?
11

Petitioner claims that LHUILLIER made a judicial admission oI his personal liability in his Answer wherein he stated that:
3.11. In all the subfect dealings, it was between plaintiff and Lhuillier personally without the official participation of
Amancor, Inc.
xxx xxx xxx

3.14. Since the board of Amancor, Inc. did not formally ratify nor acceded (sic) to the personal agreement between
plaintiff and Lhuillier through no Iault oI the latter, the corporation is not bound and the actionable documents are, at
most, unenIorceable insoIar as the subject claim oI plaintiII is concerned.
12

And on the basis oI such admission, petitioner contends that the decision oI the respondent court absolving LHUILLIER oI
personal liability is maniIest error Ior being contrary to law, particularly Section 4 oI Rule 129 oI the Rules oI Court which
provides that:
An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course oI the proceedings in the same case, does not require
prooI. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no
such admission was made.
Petitioner would want to Iurther strengthen his contention by adverting to the consistent pronouncement oI this Court that: ". . . an
admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and are conclusive as to him, and that all
prooIs submitted by him contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith, should be ignored, whether objection is interposed by the party or
not . . .
13

We Iind petitioner's contention to be without merit and the reliance on the general rule regarding judicial admissions enunciated by the
abovementioned provision oI law and jurisprudence misplaced.
As provided Ior in Section 4 oI Rule 129 oI the Rules oI Court, the general rule that a judicial admission is conclusive upon the party
making it and does not require prooI admits oI two exceptions: 1) when it is shown that the admission was made through palpable
mistake, and 2) when it is shown that no such admission was in Iact made.
14
The latter exception allows one to contradict an
admission by denying that he made such an admission.
For instance, iI a party invokes an "admission" by an adverse party, but cites the admission "out oI context", then the
one making the admission may show that he made no "such" admission, or that his admission was taken out of
context.
This may be interpreted as to mean "not in the sense in which the admission is made to appear." That is the reason
Ior the modiIier
"such".
15
|Emphasis supplied.|
Here, petitioner appears to have taken the admissions made by LHUILLIER in paragraph 3.11 oI his Answer "out of context".
Petitioner is seemingly misleading this Court by isolating paragraph 3.11 oI the said Answer Irom the preceding paragraphs. A careIul
scrutiny oI the Answer in its entirety will show that paragraph 3.11 is part oI the aIIirmative allegations recounting how LHUILLIER
was persuaded to invest in AMANCOR which was previously owned and managed by petitioner.
16
Paragraph 3.11 has reIerence to
the Iact that in all investments made with AMANCOR through stock purchases, only petitioner and LHUILLIER dealt with each
other.
17
It is more than obvious that paragraph 3.11 has nothing to do with the obligation oI AMANCOR to petitioner which is the
subject oI the present case. Contrary to petitioner's allegations, LHUILLIER had categorically denied personal liability Ior
AMANCOR's corporate debts, and in the succeeding paragraphs oI the said Answer asserted the Iollowing:
3.12. As evident in the wordings oI par. 12 oI the Actionable Memorandum oI Agreement dated 13 February 1989
(Annex B) and par. 4 oI the actionable Supplemental Memorandum oI Agreement dated 11 March 1989 (Annex C),
Lhuillier did not engage to personally pay the corporate loans secured by plaintiffs property as to release the
property to plaintiII. On the contrary, as explicitly stated in the aIoresaid par. 4 oI Annex C, ". . . while Amancor
may not yet be in the position to repay said amount to him, IT shall pay the interests to him equivalent to prevailing
bank rate."
3.13. At most, thereIore, Lhuillier . . . only agreed, for the corporation to repay plaintiff the amount of the pre-
terminated corporate loans with the bank and, pending improvement of Amancors finances, for said corporation to
pay interest at prevailing bank rate. . . .
18
(Emphasis supplied.)
Furthermore, petitioner was well aware that LHUILLIER had never admitted personal liability Ior the said obligation. In Iact, in
delineating the issues to be resolved by the trial court, both parties submitted Ior the determination oI the court, the question oI
whether or not LHUILLIER is personally liable Ior the obligation oI AMANCOR to petitioner.
19
Moreover, as correctly observed by
respondent court, iI petitioner really believed that the liability was incurred by LHULLLIER in his personal capacity, then he should

not have oIIset his accounts with those oI AMANCOR's. The Ioregoing act oI petitioner is a clear indication that he recognized
AMANCOR and not LHUILLIER as the obligor.
Granting arguendo that LHUILLIER had in Iact made the alleged admission oI personal liability in his Answer, We hold that such
admission is not conclusive upon him. Applicable by analogy is our ruling in the case oI Gardner vs. Court of Appeals which allowed
a party's testimony in open court to override admissions he made in his answer. Thus:
The Iact, however, that the allegations made by Ariosto Santos in his pleadings and in his declarations in open court
diIIered will not militate against the Iindings herein made nor support the reversal by respondent court. As a general
rule, Iacts alleged in a party's pleading are deemed admissions oI that party and are binding upon it, but this is not an
absolute and inflexible rule. An answer is a mere statement of fact which the party filing it expects to prove, but it is
not evidence. As ARIOSTO SANTOS himselI, in open court, had repudiated the deIenses he had raised in his
ANSWER and against his own interest, his testimony is deserving oI weight and credence. Both the Trial Court and
the Appellate Court believed in his credibility and we Iind no reason to overturn their Iactual Iindings thereon.
20

(Emphasis supplied.)
Prescinding Irom the Ioregoing, it is clear that in spite oI the presence oI judicial admissions in a party's pleading, the trial court is still
given leeway to consider other evidence presented. This rule should apply with more reason when the parties had agreed to submit an
issue Ior resolution oI the trial court on the basis oI the evidence presented. As distinctly stated in the stipulation oI Iacts entered into
during the pre-trial conIerence, the parties agreed that the determination oI LHUILLIER's liability shall be based on the Memoranda oI
Agreement designated as ANNEXES "A", "B" and "C" oI the Complaint. Thus, the trial court correctly relied on the provisions
contained in the said Memoranda oI Agreement when it absolved LHUILLIER oI personal liability Ior the obligation oI AMANCOR
to petitioner.
Furthermore, on the basis oI the same evidence abovementioned, respondent court did not err when it reIused to pierce the veil oI
corporate Iiction, thereby absolving LHUILLIER oI liability Ior corporate obligations and deciding the question in this wise:
The separate personality oI the corporation may be disregarded, or the veil oI corporation Iiction may be pierced and
the individual shareholder may be personally liable (sic) to the obligations oI the corporation only when the
corporation is used as "a cloak or cover Ior Iraud or illegality, or to work an injustice, or where necessary to achieve
equity or when necessary Ior the protection oI the creditors. This situation does not obtain in this case. In the case at
bar, plaintiff-appellant failed to show that defendant Lhuillier acted otherwise than what is required of him as an
agent of a corporation. It does not appear either that defendant-appellee Michel (sic) Lhuillier is fointly and
severally liable with AMANCOR, INC., absent an express stipulation to that effect and sans clear and convincing
evidence as to his personal liability."
21

The Ioregoing pronouncement is based on Iactual Iindings oI the lower court which were upheld by the respondent court, and which
are thus, conclusive upon us pursuant to the well established rule that Iactual Iindings oI the Court oI Appeals, supported by
substantial evidence on the record, are Iinal and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal.
22

ACCORDINGLY, Iinding no reversible error, the decision appealed Irom is hereby AFFIRMED and this petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., avide, Jr., Melo and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

ROSY A. TECIO
Republic oI the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 149453 Oc9ober 7, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE SECRETARY OF 1USTICE, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE, CHIEF STATE PROSECUTOR 1OVENCITO ZUO, STATE PROSECUTORS PETER L. ONG and
RUBEN A. ZACARIAS; 2ND ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR CONRADO M. 1AMOLIN and CITY PROSECUTOR OF
QUEZON CITY CLARO ARELLANO, petitioners,
vs.
PANFILO M. LACSON, respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
CALLE1O, SR., .:
BeIore the Court are the Iollowing motions oI the respondent, to wit: (a) Omnibus Motion;
1
(b) Motion Ior Reconsideration;
2
(c)
Supplement to Motion Ior Reconsideration;
3
(d) Motion To Set Ior Oral Arguments.
4

The Omnibus Motion
The respondent seeks the reconsideration oI the April 29, 2003 Resolution oI this Court which granted the petitioners` motion Ior
reconsideration. The respondent thereaIter prays to allow Associate Justices Renato C. Corona, Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, Conchita
C. Morales, Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., and AdolIo S. Azcuna to voluntary inhibit themselves or, absent their consent, rule that such
inhibition is in order and to recuse them Irom Iurther deliberating, discussing or, in any manner, participating in the resolution oI the
Motion Ior Reconsideration and the Supplement to Motion Ior Reconsideration. The respondent points out that the aIorenamed
members oI the Court were appointed by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo aIter the February 19, 2002 oral arguments and aIter the
case at bar was submitted Ior the decision oI the Court. He asserts that although A.M. No. 99-8-09-SC
5
speciIically provides that it
applies only to the divisions oI the Court, it should likewise apply to this case, in light oI the April 1, 2003 Resolution oI this Court
which set aside its Resolution dated May 28, 2002, apart Irom the constitutional issues raised by the respondent in his motion Ior
reconsideration and its supplement. As such, according to the respondent, the instant case should be unloaded by Justice Callejo, Sr.
and re-raIIled to any other member oI the Court.
The Court resolves to deny the respondent`s motion Ior lack oI merit.
The records show that as early as May 24, 2002, the respondent Iiled an urgent motion Ior the recusation oI Justices Renato C. Corona
and Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez Ior the reason that they were appointed to the Court aIter the February 19, 2002 oral arguments and
did not participate in the integral portions oI the proceedings. Justices Corona and Austria-Martinez reIused to inhibit themselves and
decided to participate in the deliberation on the petition.
6
On March 18, 2003, the respondent Iiled a motion with the Court Ior the
recusation oI Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. on account oI his voluntary inhibition when the case was pending beIore the Court oI
Appeals.
On March 25, 2003, this Court issued a resolution denying the respondent`s Motion dated March 18, 2003. The respondent thereaIter
Iiled his motion Ior reconsideration oI the April 1, 2003 Resolution oI the Court in which he prayed, inter alia, Ior the inhibition oI
Justice Callejo, Sr. under A.M. No. 99-8-09-SC and that the case be re-raIIled to another member oI the Court who had actually
participated in the deliberation and the rendition oI its May 28, 2002 Resolution. The respondent likewise sought the inhibition oI
Justices Conchita C. Morales and AdolIo S. Azcuna, again Ior the reason that they were appointed to the Court aIter the oral
arguments on February 19, 2002 and aIter the case had already been submitted Ior decision.
On April 29, 2003, this Court issued a resolution denying the aIoresaid motions oI the respondent.
7
The Court ruled that A.M. No. 99-
8-09-SC is applicable only to cases assigned to the divisions oI the Court:

The respondent`s reliance on Supreme Court Circular No. 99-8-09 is misplaced. As admitted by the respondent, the said circular is
applicable only to motions Ior reconsideration in cases assigned to the Divisions oI the Court. For cases assigned to the Court En
Banc, the policy oI the Court had always been and still is, iI the ponente is no longer with the Court, his replacement will act upon the
motion Ior reconsideration oI a party and participate in the deliberations thereoI. This is the reason why Justice Callejo, Sr. who had
replaced retired Justice De Leon, prepared the draIt oI the April 1, 2003 Resolution oI the Court.
8

The Court also ruled that there was no need Ior its newest members to inhibit themselves Irom participating in the deliberation oI the
respondent`s Motion Ior Reconsideration:
Although Justices Conchita Carpio-Morales, Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., and AdolIo S. Azcuna were not yet members oI the Court during
the February 18, 2002
9
oral arguments beIore the Court, nonetheless they were not disqualiIied to participate in the deliberations on
the petitioner`s motion Ior reconsideration oI the May 28, 2002 Resolution oI the Court or oI the instant motion Ior reconsideration.
Neither is Justice Callejo, Sr. disqualiIied to prepare the resolution oI the Court on the motion Ior reconsideration oI the respondent.
When the Court deliberated on petitioners` motion Ior reconsideration, Justices Conchita Carpio-Morales, Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. and
AdolIo S. Azcuna were already members oI the Court.
It bears stressing that transcripts oI stenographic notes taken during the February 18, 2002 hearing and oral arguments oI the parties
are parts oI the records oI this case. Said transcripts are available to the parties or to any member oI the Court. Likewise, Attys. Rene
A.V. Saguisag and Felix Carao, Jr. may not yet have been the counsel oI the respondent on February 18, 2002 but by reading the said
transcripts and the records oI this case they are inIormed oI what transpired during the hearing and oral arguments oI the parties.
10

It is thus clear that the grounds cited by the respondent in his omnibus motion had already been passed upon and resolved by this
Court. The respondent did not make any new substantial arguments in his motion to warrant a reconsideration oI the aIoresaid
resolutions.
Besides, the respondent sought the inhibition oI Justices Conchita C. Morales and AdolIo S. Azcuna only aIter they had already
concurred in the Court`s Resolution dated April 1, 2003. Case law has it that a motion Ior disqualiIication must be denied when Iiled
aIter a member oI the Court has already given an opinion on the merits oI the case, the rationale being that a litigant cannot be
permitted to speculate upon the action oI the Court, only to raise an objection oI this sort aIter a decision has been rendered.
11

The Motion to Set the Case for Oral Arguments
The Court denies the motion oI the respondent. The parties have already extensively discussed the issues involved in the case. The
respondent`s motion Ior reconsideration consists oI no less than a hundred pages, excluding the supplement to his motion Ior
reconsideration and his reply to the petitioners` comment on his motion. There is no longer a need to set the instant case Ior oral
arguments.
The Issue as to the Application of the Time-bar under Section 8, Rule of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure hether
Prospective or Retroactive
The respondent seeks the reconsideration oI the April 1, 2003 Resolution oI the Court and thereaIter reinstate its Resolution oI May
28, 2002.
He asserts that pursuant to a long line oI jurisprudence and a long-standing judicial practice in applying penal law, Section 8, Rule 117
oI the Revised Rules oI Criminal Procedure (RRCP) should be applied prospectively and retroactively without reservations, only and
solely on the basis oI its being Iavorable to the accused. He asserts that case law on the retroactive application oI penal laws should
likewise apply to criminal procedure, it being a branch oI criminal law. The respondent insists that Section 8 was purposely craIted
and included as a new provision to reinIorce the constitutional right oI the accused to a speedy disposition oI his case. It is primarily a
check on the State to prosecute criminal cases diligently and continuously, lest it loses its right to prosecute the accused anew. The
respondent argues that since Section 8 is indubitably a rule oI procedure, there can be no other conclusion: the rule should have
retroactive application, absent any provision therein that it should be applied prospectively. Accordingly, prospective application
thereoI would in eIIect give the petitioners more than two years Irom March 29, 1999 within which to revive the criminal cases, thus
violating the respondent`s right to due process and equal protection oI the law.
The respondent asserts that Section 8 was meant to reach back in time to provide relieI to the accused. In this case, the State had been
given more than suIIicient opportunity to prosecute the respondent anew aIter the March 29, 1999 dismissal oI the cases by then Judge
Wenceslao Agnir, Jr. and even beIore the RRCP took eIIect on December 1, 2000. According to the respondent, the petitioners Iiled

the InIormations with the RTC in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 beyond the two-year bar, in violation oI his right to a
speedy trial, and that such Iiling was designed to derail his bid Ior the Senate.
In their comment on the respondent`s motions, the petitioners assert that the prospective application oI Section 8 is in keeping with
Section 5(5), Article VIII oI the 1987 Constitution, which provides in part that the rules oI procedure which the Court may promulgate
shall not diminish, increase or modiIy substantial rights. While Section 8 secures the rights oI the accused, it does not and should not
preclude the equally important right oI the State to public justice. II such right to public justice is taken away, then Section 8 can no
longer be said to be a procedural rule. According to the petitioners, iI a procedural rule impairs a vested right, or would work injustice,
the said rule may not be given a retroactive application. They contend that the right oI the accused to a speedy trial or disposition oI
the criminal cases applies only to outstanding and pending cases and not to cases already dismissed. The petitioners assert that the
"reIiling oI the cases" under Section 8 should be taken to mean as the Iiling oI the criminal complaint with the appropriate oIIice Ior
the purpose oI conducting a preliminary investigation, and not the actual Iiling oI the criminal complaint or inIormation in court Ior
trial. Furthermore, according to the petitioners, the oIIended parties must be given notices oI the motion Ior provisional dismissal oI
the cases under Section 8 since the provision so expressly states. Thus, iI the requisite notices to the heirs oI the deceased would be
taken into consideration, the two-year period had not yet even commenced to run.
In his consolidated reply to the comment oI the petitioners, the respondent asserts that the State is proscribed Irom reIiling a criminal
case iI it can be shown that the delay resulted in a violation oI the right oI the accused to due process. In this case, there was an
inordinate delay in the revival oI the cases, considering that the witnesses in the criminal cases Ior the State in March 1999 are the
same witnesses in 2001. The State had reasonable opportunity to reIile the cases beIore the two-year bar but Iailed to do so because oI
negligence; and perhaps institutional indolence. Contrary to the petitioners` contention, the respondent posits that the revival oI the
cases contemplated in Section 8 reIers to the Iiling oI the InIormations or complaints in court Ior trial. The operational act then is the
reIiling oI the InIormations with the RTC, which was done only on June 6, 2001, clearly beyond the two-year bar.
The Court Iinds the respondent`s contentions to be without merit.
First. The Court approved the RRCP pursuant to its power under Article VIII, Section 5, paragraph 5 oI the Constitution which reads:
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enIorcement oI constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts,
the admission to the practice oI law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simpliIied and inexpensive procedure Ior the speedy disposition oI cases, shall be uniIorm Ior all courts oI the same grade, and shall
not diminish, increase, or modiIy substantive rights. Rules oI procedure oI special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain
eIIective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
The Court is not mandated to apply Section 8 retroactively simply because it is Iavorable to the accused. It must be noted that the new
rule was approved by the Court not only to reinIorce the constitutional right oI the accused to a speedy disposition oI the case. The
time-bar under the new rule was Iixed by the Court to excise the malaise that plagued the administration oI the criminal justice system
Ior the beneIit oI the State and the accused; not Ior the accused only. The Court emphasized in its assailed resolution that:
In the new rule in question, as now construed by the Court, it has Iixed a time-bar oI one year or two years Ior the revival oI criminal
cases provisionally dismissed with the express consent oI the accused and with a priori notice to the oIIended party. The time-bar may
appear, on Iirst impression, unreasonable compared to the periods under Article 90 oI the Revised Penal Code. However, in Iixing the
time-bar, the Court balanced the societal interests and those oI the accused Ior the orderly and speedy disposition oI criminal cases
with minimum prejudice to the State and the accused. It took into account the substantial rights oI both the State and oI the accused to
due process. The Court believed that the time limit is a reasonable period Ior the State to revive provisionally dismissed cases with the
consent oI the accused and notice to the oIIended parties. The time-bar Iixed by the Court must be respected unless it is shown that the
period is maniIestly short or insuIIicient that the rule becomes a denial oI justice.
12

In criminal litigations concerning constitutional issue claims, the Court, in the interest oI justice, may make the rule prospective where
the exigencies oI the situation make the rule prospective. The retroactivity or non-retroactivity oI a rule is not automatically
determined by the provision oI the Constitution on which the dictate is based. Each constitutional rule oI criminal procedure has its
own distinct Iunctions, its own background or precedent, and its own impact on the administration oI justice, and the way in which
these Iactors combine must inevitably vary with the dictate involved.
13

Matters oI procedure are not necessarily retrospective in operation as a statute.
14
To paraphrase the United States Supreme Court per
Justice Benjamin Cardozo, the Court in deIining the limits oI adherence may make a choice Ior itselI between the principle oI Iorward
operation and that oI relating Iorward.
15

The Court approved Section 8 pursuant to its power under Article VIII, Section 5, paragraph 5 oI the Constitution. This constitutional
grant to promulgate rules carries with it the power, inter alia, to determine whether to give the said rules prospective or retroactive
eIIect. Moreover, under Rule 144 oI the Rules oI Court, the Court may not apply the rules to actions pending beIore it iI in its opinion
their application would not be Ieasible or would work injustice, in which event, the Iormer procedure shall apply.
16

The absence oI a provision in Section 8 giving it prospective application only does not proscribe the prospective application thereoI;
nor does it imply that the Court intended the new rule to be given retroactive and prospective eIIect. II the statutory purpose is clear,
the provisions oI the law should be construed as is conducive to Iairness and justice, and in harmony with the general spirit and policy
oI the rule. It should be construed so as not to deIeat but to carry out such end or purpose.
17
A statute derives its vitality Irom the
purpose Ior which it is approved. To construe it in a manner that disregards or deIeats such purpose is to nulliIy or destroy the law.
18

In Cometa v. Court oI Appeals,
19
this Court ruled that "the spirit rather than the letter oI the statute determines its construction; hence,
a statute must be read according to its spirit or intent."
20
While we may not read into the law a purpose that is not there, we
nevertheless have the right to read out oI it the reason Ior its enactment. In doing so, we deIer not to the "letter that killeth" but to the
"spirit that viviIieth, to give eIIect to the lawmaker`s will."
21

In this case, when the Court approved Section 8, it intended the new rule to be applied prospectively and not retroactively, Ior iI the
intention oI the Court were otherwise, it would deIeat the very purpose Ior which it was intended, namely, to give the State a period oI
two years Irom notice oI the provisional dismissal oI criminal cases with the express consent oI the accused. It would be a denial oI
the State`s right to due process and a travesty oI justice Ior the Court to apply the new rule retroactively in the present case as the
respondent insists, considering that the criminal cases were provisionally dismissed by Judge Agnir, Jr. on March 29, 1999 beIore the
new rule took eIIect on December 1, 2000. A retroactive application oI the time-bar will result in absurd, unjust and oppressive
consequences to the State and to the victims oI crimes and their heirs.
Consider this scenario: the trial court (RTC) provisionally dismissed a criminal case with the express consent oI the accused in 1997.
The prosecution had the right to revive the case within the prescriptive period, under Article 90 oI the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. On December 1, 2000, the time-bar rule under Section 8 took eIIect, the prosecution was unable to revive the criminal case
beIore then.
II the time-bar Iixed in Section 8 were to be applied retroactively, this would mean that the State would be barred Irom reviving the
case Ior Iailure to comply with the said time-bar, which was yet to be approved by the Court three years aIter the provisional dismissal
oI the criminal case. In contrast, iI the same case was dismissed provisionally in December 2000, the State had the right to revive the
same within the time-bar. In Iine, to so hold would imply that the State was presumed to Ioresee and anticipate that three years aIter
1997, the Court would approve and amend the RRCP. The State would thus be sanctioned Ior its Iailure to comply with a rule yet to
be approved by the Court. It must be stressed that the institution and prosecution oI criminal cases are governed by existing rules and
not by rules yet to exist. It would be the apex oI injustice to hold that Section 8 had a platonic or ideal existence beIore it was
approved by the Court. The past cannot be erased by a capricious retroactive application oI the new rule.
In holding that the petitioners had until December 1, 2002 within which to revive the criminal cases provisionally dismissed by Judge
Agnir, Jr. on March 29, 1999, this Court explained, thus:
The Court agrees with the petitioners that to apply the time-bar retroactively so that the two-year period commenced to run on March
31, 1999 when the public prosecutor received his copy oI the resolution oI Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the criminal cases is
inconsistent with the intendment oI the new rule. Instead oI giving the State two years to revive provisionally dismissed cases, the
State had considerably less than two years to do so. Thus, Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689
on March 29, 1999. The new rule took eIIect on December 1, 2000. II the Court applied the new time-bar retroactively, the State
would have only one year and three months or until March 31, 2001 within which to revive these criminal cases. The period is short oI
the two-year period Iixed under the new rule. On the other hand, iI the time limit is applied prospectively, the State would have two
years Irom December 1, 2000 or until December 1, 2002 within which to revive the cases. This is in consonance with the intendment
oI the new rule in Iixing the time-bar and thus prevent injustice to the State and avoid absurd, unreasonable, oppressive, injurious, and
wrongIul results in the administration oI justice.
The period Irom April 1, 1999 to November 30, 1999
22
should be excluded in the computation oI the two-year period because the rule
prescribing it was not yet in eIIect at the time and the State could not be expected to comply with the time-bar. It cannot even be
argued that the State waived its right to revive the criminal cases against respondent or that it was negligent Ior not reviving them
within the two-year period under the new rule.a/phi.net As the United States Supreme Court said, per Justice Felix FrankIurter, in
GriIIin v. People, 351 US 12 (1956):

We should not indulge in the Iiction that the law now announced has always been the law and, thereIore, that those who did not avail
themselves oI it waived their rights .
The two-year period Iixed in the new rule is Ior the beneIit oI both the State and the accused. It should not be emasculated and reduced
by an inordinate retroactive application oI the time-bar therein provided merely to beneIit the accused. For to do so would cause an
"injustice oI hardship" to the State and adversely aIIect the administration oI justice in general and oI criminal laws in particular.
23

Further quoting Justice Felix FrankIurter`s opinion in GriIIin v. People,
24
he said, "it is much more conducive to law`s selI-respect to
recognize candidly the considerations that give prospective content to a new pronouncement oI law. That this is consonant with the
spirit oI our law and justiIied by those considerations oI reason which should dominate the law has been luminously expounded by
Mr. Justice Cardozo shortly beIore he came here and in an opinion which he wrote Ior the Court."
Parenthetically, the respondent himselI admitted in his motion Ior reconsideration that Judge Agnir, Jr. could not have been expected
to comply with the notice requirement under the new rule when it yet had to exist:
99. Respondent submits that the records are still in the same state oI inadequacy and incompletion. This however is not strange
considering that Section 8, Rule 117 had not existed on March 29, 1999, when the criminal cases were dismissed, and then Judge
Agnir did not have its text to guide his actions. How could the good judge have complied with the mandate oI Section 8, Rule 117
when it yet had to exist?
25

Statutes regulating the procedure oI the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time oI their
passage. In that sense and to that extent, procedural laws are retroactive.
26
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 had long
been dismissed by Judge Agnir, Jr. beIore the new rule took eIIect on December 1, 2000. When the petitioners Iiled the InIormations
in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 on June 6, 2001, Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 and Q-99-81689 had long since
been terminated. The two-year bar in the new rule should not be reckoned Irom the March 29, 1999 dismissal oI Criminal Cases Nos.
Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 but Irom December 1, 2000 when the new rule took eIIect. While it is true that the Court applied Section 8
oI Rule 110
27
oI the RRCP retroactively, it did so only to cases still pending with this Court and not to cases already terminated with
Iinality.
The records show that aIter the requisite preliminary investigation conducted by the petitioners in accordance with existing rules,
eleven InIormations in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 were Iiled with the RTC on June 6, 2001, very well within the
time-bar thereIor. The respondent cannot argue that his right to due process and to a speedy disposition oI the cases as enshrined in the
Constitution had been violated.
28

The respondent`s plaint that he was being singled out by the prospective application oI the new rule simply because beIore the Court
issued its April 1, 2003 Resolution, he announced his candidacy Ior the presidency oI the Republic Ior the 2004 elections has no
Iactual basis whatsoever.
29
The bare and irreIutable Iact is that it was in this case where the issue oI the retroactive/prospective
application oI the new rule was Iirst raised beIore the Court. The ruling oI the Court in its April 1, 2003 Resolution and its ruling
today would be the same, regardless oI who the party or parties involved are, whether a senator oI the Republic or an ordinary citizen.
The respondent`s contention that the prospective application oI the new rule would deny him due process and would violate the equal
protection oI laws is barren oI merit. It proceeds Irom an erroneous assumption that the new rule was approved by the Court solely Ior
his beneIit, in derogation oI the right oI the State to due process. The new rule was approved by the Court to enhance the right oI due
process oI both the State and the accused. The State is entitled to due process in criminal cases as much as the accused.
Due process has never been and perhaps can never be precisely deIined.a/phi.net It is not a technical conception with a Iixed
content unrelated to time, place and circumstances. The phrase expresses the requirement oI Iundamental Iairness, a requisite whose
meaning can be as opaque as its importance is loIty.
30
In determining what Iundamental Iairness consists oI in a particular situation,
relevant precedents must be considered and the interests that are at stake; private interests, as well as the interests oI the government
must be assessed. In this case, in holding that the new rule has prospective and not retroactive application, the Court took into
consideration not only the interests oI the respondent but all other accused, whatever their station in liIe may be. The interest oI the
State in the speedy, impartial and inexpensive disposition oI criminal cases was likewise considered.
The Respondent Failed to Comply with the Essential Prerequisites of Section 8, Rule of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
The respondent argues that the issue involved in the Court oI Appeals is entirely diIIerent Irom the issue involved in the present
recourse; hence, any admissions he made in the court below are not judicial admissions in this case. He asserts that the issue involved

in the CA was whether or not he was placed in double jeopardy when he was charged with murder in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102
to 01-101112 despite the dismissal oI Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689; whereas the issue in this Court is whether the
prosecution oI Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 was barred by Section 8, Rule 117 oI the RRCP. The respondent avers
that the proceedings in the appellate court are diIIerent Irom those in this Court.
The respondent posits that this Court erred in giving considerable weight to the admissions he made in his pleadings and during the
proceedings in the CA. He stresses that judicial admissions may only be used against a party iI such admissions are (a) made in the
course oI the proceedings in the same case; and (b) made regarding a relevant Iact, pursuant to Section 4, Rule 129 and Section 26,
Rule 130 oI the Rules oI Evidence. He contends that contrary to the ruling oI the Court, when he Iiled his motion Ior the judicial
determination oI probable cause in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689, he thereby prayed Ior the dismissal oI the said
cases. His motion carried with it, at the very least, the prayer Ior the dismissal oI the criminal cases. Absent a Iinding oI probable
cause, Judge Agnir, Jr. had no recourse but to dismiss the criminal cases. Moreover, the respondent avers that his motion included the
general prayer "Ior such other relieIs as may be equitable in the premises." The respondent also points out that the public prosecutor
agreed to the averments in his motion as the latter did not even Iile any motion Ior the reconsideration oI Judge Agnir, Jr.`s order
dismissing the cases.
The respondent Iurther contends that the Court is not a trier oI Iacts. It has no means to ascertain or veriIy as true the contrasting
claims oI the parties on the Iactual issues, a Iunction best leIt to the trial court as the trier oI Iacts. He posits that there is a need Ior the
case to be remanded to the RTC to enable him to present evidence on whether or not Judge Agnir, Jr. complied with the notice
requirements oI Section 8. Echoing the May 28, 2002 ruling oI this Court, the respondent contends that it is not Iair to expect the
element oI notice under Section 8 to be litigated beIore Judge Agnir, Jr., Ior the said rule was not yet in existence at the time he Iiled
his motion Ior a determination oI probable cause.
The respondent avers that the requirement Ior notices to the oIIended parties under Section 8 is a Iormal and not an essential requisite.
In criminal cases, the oIIended party is the State and the role oI the private complainant is limited to the determination oI the civil
liability oI the accused. According to the respondent, notice to the prosecution provides suIIicient saIeguard Ior the private
complainant to recover on the civil liability oI the accused based on the delicts; aIter all, the prosecution oI the oIIense is under the
control and direction oI the public prosecutor.
The contentions oI the respondent have no merit.
First. The issue posed by the respondent in the CA and in this Court are the same. To recall, in Civil Case No. 01-100933,
31
the
respondent
32
sought injunctive relieI Irom the RTC oI Manila on his claim that in conducting a preliminary investigation in Criminal
Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112, the petitioners thereby placed him in double jeopardy under Section 7, Rule 117 oI the RRCP.
33

When the RTC denied his plea Ior injunctive relieI, the respondent Iiled his petition Ior certiorari in the CA, again invoking his right
against double jeopardy, praying that:
13. Inasmuch as the case subject oI the "preliminary investigation" was dismissed Ior the reasons mentioned, there currently exists no
complaint upon which a valid investigation can be had in light oI the clear provisions oI Rule 110 which requires the existence oI a
"sworn written statement charging a person with an oIIense" as basis Ior the commencement oI a preliminary investigation under Rule
112.awphi.net
For petitioner, the investigation covers exactly the same oIIenses over which he had been duly arraigned and a plea validly entered
beIore the Sandiganbayan (in Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 57) beIore its remand to the QC RTC. Hence, to proceed therewith on
similar charges will put him in jeopardy oI being twice punished thereIor (Article III, 21, Constitution).
34

The respondent (petitioner therein) contended that the dismissal oI Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 by Judge Agnir,
Jr. amounted to a judgment oI acquittal; hence, he could no longer be charged and prosecuted anew Ior the same oIIense without
violating his right against double jeopardy. However, the respondent Iiled a second amended petition wherein he invoked Ior the Iirst
time Section 8 oI Rule 117 oI the RRCP:
(e) the new criminal cases Ior Murder Iiled by respondents against petitioner and the other accused on June 6, 2001 (docketed as
Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112) and pending beIore respondent Judge Yadao (Annex B) is dismissible on its Iace as
they involve exactly the same accused, Iacts, and oIIenses which had previously been dismissed by the QC RTC in Criminal Cases
Nos. Q-99-81679 to 89 on March 29, 1999, hence, can no longer be revived two (2) years aIter such dismissal in accordance with the
clear provisions oI Section 8, Rule 117.
35

Indeed, the CA granted the respondent`s petition based on Section 8, Rule 117 oI the RRCP. In this case, the respondent invoked the
same rule and the Constitution. Thus, during the oral arguments in this Court, the respondent, through counsel, admitted that he was
indeed invoking Section 8 anew and the provisions oI the Constitution on double jeopardy:
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
You are saying that Sen. Lacson can no longer be prosecuted Iorever Ior that crime, Ior the killing oI the 11 in 1995?
ATTY. FORTUN:
That is my submission, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
Let us see your reason Ior it?
ATTY. FORTUN:
36

First, are you saying that double jeopardy applies or not?
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
37

Allow me to qualiIy the eIIects oI double jeopardy occur with permanent dismissal that is my submission.
ATTY. FORTUN:
38

No, no, I am not talking oI the eIIects, I am talking oI the doctrine, you are not invoking the doctrine oI double jeopardy?
ATTY. FORTUN:
Your Honor, double jeopardy does not apply Section 8, 117 they are (interrupted)
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
That is right.
ATTY. FORTUN:
They are two diIIerent claims.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
That is what I am trying to rule out so that we do not have to discuss it.
ATTY. FORTUN:
Very well, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
You are not invoking double jeopardy?
ATTY. FORTUN:

As I mentioned we are saying that the eIIects oI a permanent dismissal vest the eIIects (interrupted)
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
No, I am not talking oI the eIIects, I am asking about the application, you are not asking the Court to apply the doctrine oI
double jeopardy to prevent a prosecution oI Mr. Lacson?
ATTY. FORTUN:
Because the element oI double jeopardy cannot apply 8, 117.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
So, the answer is yes?
ATTY. FORTUN:
No, Your Honor, we were saying that precisely a permanent dismissal vests the rights oI double jeopardy upon the accused
who invokes it.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
What you are saying is the eIIects, I am not asking about the eIIects, I will ask that later.
ATTY. FORTUN:
They are two diIIerent (interrupted)
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
Later, I am asking about doctrines. Since you are not invoking the doctrine oI double jeopardy you are resting your case win
or lose, sink or sail on the application oI 8,117?
ATTY. FORTUN:
On the constitutional right oI the accused under Section 16 oI Article 3 which is speedy disposition oI cases which
implemented 8,817, that is our arguments in this bar.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
Are you not resting on 8,117?
ATTY. FORTUN:
That and the constitutional provision, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
So, you are resting on 8,117?
ATTY. FORTUN:
Not exclusive, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
And the Constitution?
ATTY. FORTUN:
The Constitution which gave liIe to 8,117.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
To speedy disposition?
ATTY. FORTUN:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
Can a Court, let us see your theory then your theory rest on two provisions: Iirst, the Rules oI Court 8,117 and Second, the
Constitution on speedy disposition?
ATTY. FORTUN:
Yes, Your Honor.
39

Second. The respondent`s answers to the questions oI Madame Justice JoseIina Salonga during the hearing in the CA where
he admitted, through counsel, that he gave no express conIormity to the dismissal oI the cases by Judge Agnir, Jr., were in
relation to Section 8 oI Rule 117 and not to Section 7 oI Rule 117 on double jeopardy, thus:
JUSTICE SALONGA:
Do we get it Irom you that it is your stand that this is applicable to the case at bar?
ATTY. FORTUN:
It is my submission, that it is, Your Honor. In addition, oI course, to my proposition that Mr. Lacson is covered by the rule on
double jeopardy as well, because he had already been arraigned beIore the Sandiganbayan prior to the case being remanded
to the RTC.
JUSTICE SALONGA:
You are reIerring to those cases which were dismissed by the RTC oI Quezon City.
ATTY. FORTUN:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE SALONGA:
And it is your stand that the dismissal made by the Court was provisional in nature?
ATTY. FORTUN:
It was in that the accused did not ask Ior it. What they wanted at the onset was simply a judicial determination oI probable
cause Ior warrants oI arrest issued. Then Judge Agnir, |Jr.| upon the presentation by the parties oI their witnesses, particularly

those who had withdrawn their aIIidavits, made one Iurther conclusion that not only was this case lacking in probable cause
Ior purposes oI the issuance oI an arrest warrant but also it did not justiIy proceeding to trial.
JUSTICE SALONGA:
And it is expressly provided under Section 8 that a case shall not be provisionally dismissed except |iI| it is with the express
conIormity oI the accused.
ATTY. FORTUN:
That is correct, Your Honor.
JUSTICE SALONGA:
And with notice to the oIIended party.
ATTY. FORTUN:
That is correct, Your Honor.
JUSTICE SALONGA:
Was there an express conIormity on the part oI the accused?
ATTY. FORTUN:
There was none, Your Honor. We were not asked to sign any order, or any statement which would normally be required by
the Court on pre-trial or on other matters, including other provisional dismissal. My very limited practice in criminal courts,
Your Honor, had taught me that a judge must be very careIul on this matter oI provisional dismissal. In Iact, they ask the
accused to come Iorward, and the judge himselI or herselI explains the implications oI a provisional dismissal.
40

The respondent, through counsel, even admitted that despite his plea Ior equitable relieI in his motion Ior a judicial
determination oI probable cause in the RTC, he did not agree to a provisional dismissal oI the cases. The respondent insisted
that the only relieI he prayed Ior beIore Judge Agnir, Jr. was that warrants Ior his arrest be withheld pending a Iinding oI
probable cause. He asserted that the judge did not even require him to agree to a provisional dismissal oI the cases:
JUSTICE ROSARIO:
You were present during the proceedings?
ATTY. FORTUN:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE ROSARIO:
You represented the petitioner in this case?
ATTY. FORTUN:
Ta9 is correc9, Your Honor. And 9ere was no9ing of 9a9 sor9 wic 9e good 1udge Agnir, 1r.] wo is mos9
knowledgeable in criminal law, ad done in respec9 of provisional dismissal or 9e ma99er of Mr. Lacson agreeing 9o
9e provisional dismissal of 9e case.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:

Now, you Iiled a motion, the other accused then Iiled a motion Ior a judicial determination oI probable cause?
ATTY. FORTUN:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
Did you make any alternative prayer in your motion that iI there is no probable cause what should the Court do?
ATTY. FORTUN:
Ta9 9e arres9 warran9s only be wi9eld. Ta9 was 9e only prayer 9a9 we asked. In Iact, I have a copy oI that
particular motion, and iI I may read my prayer beIore the Court, it said: "WhereIore, it is respectIully prayed that (1) a
judicial determination oI probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III oI the Constitution be conducted, and Ior this
purpose, an order be issued directing the prosecution to present private complainants and their witnesses at the scheduled
hearing Ior that purpose; and (2) the warrants Ior the arrest oI the accused be withheld, or, iI issued, recalled in the meantime
until resolution oI this incident."
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
There is no general prayer Ior any Iurther relieI?
ATTY. FORTUN:
There is but it simply says other equitable relieIs are prayed Ior.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
Don`t you surmise Judge Agnir, |Jr.| now a member oI this Court, precisely addressed your prayer Ior just and equitable
relieI to dismiss the case because what would be the net eIIect oI a situation where there is no warrant oI arrest being issued
without dismissing the case?
ATTY. FORTUN:
Yes, Your Honor. I will no9 second say (sc) yes 9e Good 1us9ice, bu9 wa9 is plain is we did no9 agree 9o 9e
provisional dismissal, nei9er were we asked 9o sign any assen9 9o 9e provisional dismissal.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
II you did not agree to the provisional dismissal, did you not Iile any motion Ior reconsideration oI the order oI Judge Agnir,
|Jr.| that the case should be dismissed?
ATTY. FORTUN:
I did no9, Your Honor, because I knew fully well a9 9a9 9ime 9a9 my clien9 ad already been arraigned, and 9e
arraignmen9 was valid as far as I was concerned. So, 9e dismissal, Your Honor, by 1udge Agnir opera9ed 9o benefi9
me, and 9erefore I did no9 9ake any fur9er s9ep in addi9ion 9o rocking 9e boa9 or clarifying 9e ma99er fur9er
because i9 probably could prejudice 9e in9eres9 of my clien9.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
Continue.
41

In his memorandum, in lieu oI the oral argument Iiled with the Court oI Appeals, the respondent declared in no uncertain terms that:

Soon thereaIter, the SC in early 1999 rendered a decision declaring the Sandiganbayan without jurisdiction over the cases. The records
were remanded to the QC RTC. Upon raIIle, the case was assigned to Branch 91. Petitioner and the others promptly Iiled a motion Ior
judicial determination oI probable cause (Annex B). He asked that warrants Ior his arrest not be issued. He did not move Ior the
dismissal oI the InIormations, contrary to respondent OSG`s claim.
42

Section 4, Rule 129 oI the Revised Rules oI Court reads:
Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course oI the proceedings in the same case, does
not require prooI. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such
admission was made.
A judicial admission is a Iormal statement made either by a party or his or her attorney, in the course oI judicial proceeding which
removes an admitted Iact Irom the Iield oI controversy. It is a voluntary concession oI Iact by a party or a party`s attorney during such
judicial proceedings, including admissions in pleadings made by a party.
43
It may occur at any point during the litigation process. An
admission in open court is a judicial admission.
44
A judicial admission binds the client even iI made by his counsel.
45
As declared by
this Court:
... |I|n Iact, "judicial admissions are Irequently those oI counsel or oI attorney oI record, who is, Ior the purpose oI the trial, the agent
oI his client. When such admissions are made ... Ior the purpose oI dispensing with prooI oI some Iact, ... they bind the client, whether
made during, or even aIter the trial."
46

When the respondent admitted that he did not move Ior the dismissal oI Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 in his motion
Ior a judicial determination oI probable cause, and that he did not give his express consent to the provisional dismissal oI the said
cases, he in Iact admitted that one oI the essential requisites oI Section 8, Rule 117 was absent.
The respondent`s contention that his admissions made in his pleadings and during the hearing in the CA cannot be used in the present
case as they were made in the course oI a diIIerent proceeding does not hold water. It should be borne in mind that the proceedings
beIore the Court was by way oI an appeal under Rule 45 oI the Rules oI Court, as amended, Irom the proceedings in the CA; as such,
the present recourse is but a mere continuation oI the proceedings in the appellate court. This is not a new trial, but a review oI
proceedings which commenced Irom the trial court, which later passed through the CA. The respondent is bound by the judicial
admissions he made in the CA, and such admissions so hold him in the proceedings beIore this Court. As categorically stated in
Habecker v. Clark Equipment Company:
47

... |J|udicial admissions on issues oI Iact, including those made by counsel on behalI oI a client during a trial, are binding "Ior the
purpose oI the case ... including appeals."
While it may be true that the trial court may provisionally dismiss a criminal case iI it Iinds no probable cause, absent the express
consent oI the accused to such provisional dismissal, the latter cannot thereaIter invoke Section 8 to bar a revival thereoI. Neither may
the accused do so simply because the public prosecutor did not object to a motion oI the accused Ior a judicial determination oI
probable cause or Iile a motion Ior the reconsideration oI the order oI dismissal oI the case. Even a cursory reading oI the respondent`s
motion Ior a judicial determination oI probable cause will show that it contained no allegation that there was no probable cause Ior the
issuance oI a warrant Ior the respondent`s arrest as a prayer Ior the dismissal oI the cases. The respondent was only asking the court to
determine whether or not there was probable cause Ior the issuance oI a warrant Ior his arrest and in the meantime, to hold in abeyance
the issuance oI the said warrant. Case law has it that a prayer Ior equitable relieI is oI no avail, unless the petition states Iacts which
will authorize the court to grant such relieI.
48
A court cannot set itselI in motion, nor has it power to decide questions except as
presented by the parties in their pleadings. Anything that is resolved or decided beyond them is coram non judice and void.
49

Third. There is no need Ior the Court to remand the instant case to the trial court to enable the respondent to adduce post Iacto
evidence that the requisite notices under Section 8 had been complied with by Judge Agnir, Jr. The Court has thoroughly examined the
voluminous records Irom the Sandiganbayan and the RTC
50
and Iound no prooI that the requisite notices were even served on all the
heirs oI the victims. The respondent himselI admitted that, as held by this Court, in its May 28, 2002 Resolution, "Judge Agnir, Jr.
could not have complied with the mandate under Section 8 because said rule had yet to exist."
51

One Iinal matter. The records show that Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 were assigned, through the customary raIIle oI
cases, to Branch 81 oI the RTC oI Quezon City, the same branch which dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. 99-81679 to 99-81689.
52
In the
April 1, 2003 Resolution oI the Court, the Presiding Judge oI Branch 81 oI the RTC oI Quezon City was directed to try and decide
Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 with reasonable dispatch. The Court notes, however, that in Administrative Order No.
104-96, it designated six branches oI the RTC oI Quezon City
53
as special courts, exclusively to try and decide heinous crimes under

Rep. Act No. 7659. Since the accused in the said cases are charged with murder, which under Rep. Act No. 7659, is classiIied as a
heinous crime, the above cases should be consolidated and re-raIIled by the Executive Judge oI the RTC oI Quezon City to a branch
thereoI designated as a special court, exclusively to try and decide heinous crimes.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, respondent PanIilo M. Lacson`s Omnibus Motion and Motion to Set Ior Oral Arguments
are DENIED. The respondent`s Motion Ior Reconsideration and its Supplement are DENIED WITH FINALITY. The Executive Judge
oI the Regional Trial Court oI Quezon City is hereby DIRECTED to CONSOLIDATE Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112
and to RE-RAFFLE the same with dispatch to one oI the branches oI the Regional Trial Court oI Quezon City designated as a special
court, exclusively to try and decide heinous crimes.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Puno, J., maintains his dissent.
Vitug, J., maintains his dissent and reiterate his opinion on the Court`s resolution oI 28 May 2002.
Ynares-Santiago, J., see separate dissenting opinion.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., see dissenting opinion.
Carpio, J., no part.
Corona, J., on leave.
Tinga, J., no part.

ROSY A. TECIO
Republic oI the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 152154 1uly 15, 2003
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION), FERDINAND E. MARCOS (REPRESENTED BY HIS
ESTATE/HEIRS IMELDA R. MARCOS, MARIA IMELDA IMEE] MARCOS-MANOTOC, FERDINAND R. MARCOS,
1R. AND IRENE MARCOS-ARANETA) AND IMELDA ROMUALDEZ MARCOS, respondents.
CORONA, .:
This is a petition Ior certiorari under Rule 65 oI the Rules oI Court seeking to (1) set aside the Resolution dated January 31, 2002
issued by the Special First Division oI the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case No. 0141 entitled Republic of the Philippines vs. Ferdinand E.
Marcos, et. al., and (2) reinstate its earlier decision dated September 19, 2000 which IorIeited in Iavor oI petitioner Republic oI the
Philippines (Republic) the amount held in escrow in the Philippine National Bank (PNB) in the aggregate amount oI
US$658,175,373.60 as oI January 31, 2002.
BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
On December 17, 1991, petitioner Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), represented by the
OIIice oI the Solicitor General (OSG), Iiled a petition Ior IorIeiture beIore the Sandiganbayan, docketed as Civil Case No. 0141
entitled Republic of the Philippines vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, represented by his Estate/Heirs and Imelda R. Marcos, pursuant to RA
1379
1
in relation to Executive Order Nos. 1,
2
2,
3
14
4
and 14-A.
5

In said case, petitioner sought the declaration oI the aggregate amount oI US$356 million (now estimated to be more than US$658
million inclusive oI interest) deposited in escrow in the PNB, as ill-gotten wealth. The Iunds were previously held by the Iollowing
Iive account groups, using various Ioreign Ioundations in certain Swiss banks:
(1) Azio-Verso-Vibur Foundation accounts;
(2) Xandy-Wintrop: Charis-Scolari-Valamo-Spinus- Avertina Foundation accounts;
(3) Trinidad-Rayby-Palmy Foundation accounts;
(4) Rosalys-Aguamina Foundation accounts and
(5) Maler Foundation accounts.
In addition, the petition sought the IorIeiture oI US$25 million and US$5 million in treasury notes which exceeded the Marcos
couple's salaries, other lawIul income as well as income Irom legitimately acquired property. The treasury notes are Irozen at the
Central Bank oI the Philippines, now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, by virtue oI the Ireeze order issued by the PCGG.
On October 18, 1993, respondents Imelda R. Marcos, Maria Imelda M. Manotoc, Irene M. Araneta and Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. Iiled
their answer.
BeIore the case was set Ior pre-trial, a General Agreement and the Supplemental Agreements
6
dated December 28, 1993 were
executed by the Marcos children and then PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo Ior a global settlement oI the assets oI the Marcos
Iamily. Subsequently, respondent Marcos children Iiled a motion dated December 7, 1995 Ior the approval oI said agreements and Ior
the enIorcement thereoI.

The General Agreement/Supplemental Agreements sought to identiIy, collate, cause the inventory oI and distribute all assets
presumed to be owned by the Marcos Iamily under the conditions contained therein. The aIorementioned General Agreement speciIied
in one oI its premises or "whereas clauses" the Iact that petitioner "obtained a judgment Irom the Swiss Federal Tribunal on December
21, 1990, that the Three Hundred FiIty-six Million U.S. dollars (US$356 million) belongs in principle to the Republic oI the
Philippines provided certain conditionalities are met x x x." The said decision oI the Swiss Federal Supreme Court aIIirmed the
decision oI Zurich District Attorney Peter Consandey, granting petitioner's request Ior legal assistance.
7
Consandey declared the
various deposits in the name oI the enumerated Ioundations to be oI illegal provenance and ordered that they be Irozen to await the
Iinal verdict in Iavor oI the parties entitled to restitution.
Hearings were conducted by the Sandiganbayan on the motion to approve the General/Supplemental Agreements. Respondent
Ferdinand, Jr. was presented as witness Ior the purpose oI establishing the partial implementation oI said agreements.
On October 18, 1996, petitioner Iiled a motion Ior summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings. Respondent Mrs. Marcos
Iiled her opposition thereto which was later adopted by respondents Mrs. Manotoc, Mrs. Araneta and Ferdinand, Jr.
In its resolution dated November 20, 1997, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's motion Ior summary judgment and/or judgment on
the pleadings on the ground that the motion to approve the compromise agreement "(took) precedence over the motion Ior summary
judgment."
Respondent Mrs. Marcos Iiled a maniIestation on May 26, 1998 claiming she was not a party to the motion Ior approval oI the
Compromise Agreement and that she owned 90 oI the Iunds with the remaining 10 belonging to the Marcos estate.
Meanwhile, on August 10, 1995, petitioner Iiled with the District Attorney in Zurich, Switzerland, an additional request Ior the
immediate transIer oI the deposits to an escrow account in the PNB. The request was granted. On appeal by the Marcoses, the Swiss
Federal Supreme Court, in a decision dated December 10, 1997, upheld the ruling oI the District Attorney oI Zurich granting the
request Ior the transIer oI the Iunds. In 1998, the Iunds were remitted to the Philippines in escrow. Subsequently, respondent Marcos
children moved that the Iunds be placed in custodia legis because the deposit in escrow in the PNB was allegedly in danger oI
dissipation by petitioner. The Sandiganbayan, in its resolution dated September 8, 1998, granted the motion.
AIter the pre-trial and the issuance oI the pre-trial order and supplemental pre-trial order dated October 28, 1999 and January 21,
2000, respectively, the case was set Ior trial. AIter several resettings, petitioner, on March 10, 2000, Iiled another motion Ior summary
judgment pertaining to the IorIeiture oI the US$356 million, based on the Iollowing grounds:
I
THE ESSENTIAL FACTS WHICH WARRANT THE FORFEITURE OF THE FUNDS SUBJECT OF THE PETITION
UNDER R.A. NO. 1379 ARE ADMITTED BY RESPONDENTS IN THEIR PLEADINGS AND OTHER SUBMISSIONS
MADE IN THE COURSE OF THE PROCEEDING.
II
RESPONDENTS' ADMISSION MADE DURING THE PRE-TRIAL THAT THEY DO NOT HAVE ANY INTEREST OR
OWNERSHIP OVER THE FUNDS SUBJECT OF THE ACTION FOR FORFEITURE TENDERS NO GENUINE ISSUE
OR CONTROVERSY AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT IN THE PRESENT ACTION, THUS WARRANTING THE
RENDITION OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
8

Petitioner contended that, aIter the pre-trial conIerence, certain Iacts were established, warranting a summary judgment on the Iunds
sought to be IorIeited.
Respondent Mrs. Marcos Iiled her opposition to the petitioner's motion Ior summary judgment, which opposition was later adopted by
her co-respondents Mrs. Manotoc, Mrs. Araneta and Ferdinand, Jr.
On March 24, 2000, a hearing on the motion Ior summary judgment was conducted.
In a decision
9
dated September 19, 2000, the Sandiganbayan granted petitioner's motion Ior summary judgment:
CONCLUSION

There is no issue oI Iact which calls Ior the presentation oI evidence.

The Motion Ior Summary Judgment is hereby granted.
The Swiss deposits which were transmitted to and now held in escrow at the PNB are deemed unlawIully acquired as ill-
gotten wealth.
DISPOSITION
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in Iavor oI the Republic oI the Philippines and against the respondents,
declaring the Swiss deposits which were transIerred to and now deposited in escrow at the Philippine National Bank in the
total aggregate value equivalent to US$627,608,544.95 as oI August 31, 2000 together with the increments thereoI IorIeited
in Iavor oI the State.
10

Respondent Mrs. Marcos Iiled a motion Ior reconsideration dated September 26, 2000. Likewise, Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr.
Iiled their own motion Ior reconsideration dated October 5, 2000. Mrs. Araneta Iiled a maniIestation dated October 4, 2000 adopting
the motion Ior reconsideration oI Mrs. Marcos, Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr.
Subsequently, petitioner Iiled its opposition thereto.
In a resolution
11
dated January 31, 2002, the Sandiganbayan reversed its September 19, 2000 decision, thus denying petitioner's
motion Ior summary judgment:
CONCLUSION
In sum, the evidence oIIered Ior summary judgment oI the case did not prove that the money in the Swiss Banks belonged to
the Marcos spouses because no legal prooI exists in the record as to the ownership by the Marcoses oI the Iunds in escrow
Irom the Swiss Banks.
The basis Ior the IorIeiture in Iavor oI the government cannot be deemed to have been established and our judgment thereon,
perIorce, must also have been without basis.
WHEREFORE, the decision oI this Court dated September 19, 2000 is reconsidered and set aside, and this case is now being
set Ior Iurther proceedings.
12

Hence, the instant petition. In Iiling the same, petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan, in reversing its September 19, 2000 decision,
committed grave abuse oI discretion amounting to lack or excess oI jurisdiction considering that --
I
PETITIONER WAS ABLE TO PROVE ITS CASE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUISITES OF SECTIONS 2 AND
3 OF R.A. NO. 1379:
A. PRIVATE RESPONDENTS CATEGORICALLY ADMITTED NOT ONLY THE PERSONAL
CIRCUMSTANCES OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS AND IMELDA R. MARCOS AS PUBLIC OFFICIALS BUT
ALSO THE EXTENT OF THEIR SALARIES AS SUCH PUBLIC OFFICIALS, WHO UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION, WERE PROHIBITED FROM ENGAGING IN THE MANAGEMENT OF FOUNDATIONS.
B. PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ALSO ADMITTED THE EXISTENCE OF THE SWISS DEPOSITS AND THEIR
OWNERSHIP THEREOF:
1. ADMISSIONS IN PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' ANSWER;
2. ADMISSION IN THE GENERAL / SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENTS THEY SIGNED AND
SOUGHT TO IMPLEMENT;

3. ADMISSION IN A MANIFESTATION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT IMELDA R. MARCOS AND

IN THE MOTION TO PLACE THE RES IN CUSTODIA LEGIS; AND
4. ADMISSION IN THE UNDERTAKING TO PAY THE HUMAN RIGHTS VICTIMS.
C. PETITIONER HAS PROVED THE EXTENT OF THE LEGITIMATE INCOME OF FERDINAND E.
MARCOS AND IMELDA R. MARCOS AS PUBLIC OFFICIALS.
D. PETITIONER HAS ESTABLISHED A PRIMA FACIE PRESUMPTION OF UNLAWFULLY ACQUIRED
WEALTH.
II
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS PROPER SINCE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE NOT RAISED ANY GENUINE ISSUE
OF FACT CONSIDERING THAT:
A. PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' DEFENSE THAT SWISS DEPOSITS WERE LAWFULLY ACQUIRED DOES
NOT ONLY FAIL TO TENDER AN ISSUE BUT IS CLEARLY A SHAM; AND
B. IN SUBSEQUENTLY DISCLAIMING OWNERSHIP OF THE SWISS DEPOSITS, PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS ABANDONED THEIR SHAM DEFENSE OF LEGITIMATE ACQUISITION, AND THIS
FURTHER JUSTIFIED THE RENDITION OF A SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
III
THE FOREIGN FOUNDATIONS NEED NOT BE IMPLEADED.
IJ
THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUSTICE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REVERSING
HIMSELF ON THE GROUND THAT ORIGINAL COPIES OF THE AUTHENTICATED SWISS DECISIONS AND
THEIR "AUTHENTICATED TRANSLATIONS" HAVE NOT BEEN SUBMITTED TO THE COURT, WHEN EARLIER
THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS QUOTED EXTENSIVELY A PORTION OF THE TRANSLATION OF ONE OF THESE
SWISS DECISIONS IN HIS "PONENCIA" DATED JULY 29, 1999 WHEN IT DENIED THE MOTION TO RELEASE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTY MILLION US DOLLARS ($150,000,000.00) TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS VICTIMS.
J
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARE DEEMED TO HAVE WAIVED THEIR OBJECTION TO THE AUTHENTICITY OF
THE SWISS FEDERAL SUPREME COURT DECISIONS.
13

Petitioner, in the main, asserts that nowhere in the respondents' motions Ior reconsideration and supplemental motion Ior
reconsideration were the authenticity, accuracy and admissibility oI the Swiss decisions ever challenged. Otherwise stated, it was
incorrect Ior the Sandiganbayan to use the issue oI lack oI authenticated translations oI the decisions oI the Swiss Federal Supreme
Court as the basis Ior reversing itselI because respondents themselves never raised this issue in their motions Ior reconsideration and
supplemental motion Ior reconsideration. Furthermore, this particular issue relating to the translation oI the Swiss court decisions
could not be resurrected anymore because said decisions had been previously utilized by the Sandiganbayan itselI in resolving a
"decisive issue" beIore it.
Petitioner Iaults the Sandiganbayan Ior questioning the non-production oI the authenticated translations oI the Swiss Federal Supreme
Court decisions as this was a marginal and technical matter that did not diminish by any measure the conclusiveness and strength oI
what had been proven and admitted beIore the Sandiganbayan, that is, that the Iunds deposited by the Marcoses constituted ill-gotten
wealth and thus belonged to the Filipino people.

In compliance with the order oI this Court, Mrs. Marcos Iiled her comment to the petition on May 22, 2002. AIter several motions Ior
extension which were all granted, the comment oI Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr. and the separate comment oI Mrs. Araneta were
Iiled on May 27, 2002.
Mrs. Marcos asserts that the petition should be denied on the Iollowing grounds:
A.
PETITIONER HAS A PLAIN, SPEEDY, AND ADEQUATE REMEDY AT THE SANDIGANBAYAN.
B.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN SETTING THE CASE FOR FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS.
14

Mrs. Marcos contends that petitioner has a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course oI law in view oI the resolution
oI the Sandiganbayan dated January 31, 2000 directing petitioner to submit the authenticated translations oI the Swiss decisions.
Instead oI availing oI said remedy, petitioner now elevates the matter to this Court. According to Mrs. Marcos, a petition Ior certiorari
which does not comply with the requirements oI the rules may be dismissed. Since petitioner has a plain, speedy and adequate remedy,
that is, to proceed to trial and submit authenticated translations oI the Swiss decisions, its petition beIore this Court must be dismissed.
Corollarily, the Sandiganbayan's ruling to set the case Ior Iurther proceedings cannot and should not be considered a capricious and
whimsical exercise oI judgment.
Likewise, Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr., in their comment, prayed Ior the dismissal oI the petition on the grounds that:
(A)
BY THE TIME PETITIONER FILED ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON 10 MARCH 2000, IT WAS
ALREADY BARRED FROM DOING SO.
(1) The Motion Ior Summary Judgment was based on private respondents' Answer and other documents that had long been in
the records oI the case. Thus, by the time the Motion was Iiled on 10 March 2000, estoppel by laches had already set in
against petitioner.
(2) By its positive acts and express admissions prior to Iiling the Motion Ior Summary Judgment on 10 March 1990,
petitioner had legally bound itselI to go to trial on the basis oI existing issues. Thus, it clearly waived whatever right it had to
move Ior summary judgment.
(B)
EVEN ASSUMING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT LEGALLY BARRED FROM FILING THE MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, THE SANDIGANBAYAN IS CORRECT IN RULING THAT PETITIONER HAS NOT YET
ESTABLISHED A PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR THE FORFEITURE OF THE SWISS FUNDS.
(1) Republic Act No. 1379, the applicable law, is a penal statute. As such, its provisions, particularly the essential elements
stated in section 3 thereoI, are mandatory in nature. These should be strictly construed against petitioner and liberally in Iavor
oI private respondents.
(2) Petitioner has Iailed to establish the third and Iourth essential elements in Section 3 oI R.A. 1379 with respect to the
identiIication, ownership, and approximate amount oI the property which the Marcos couple allegedly "acquired during their
incumbency".
(a) Petitioner has Iailed to prove that the Marcos couple "acquired" or own the Swiss Iunds.

(b) Even assuming, Ior the sake oI argument, that the Iact oI acquisition has been proven, petitioner has categorically
admitted that it has no evidence showing how much oI the Swiss Iunds was acquired "during the incumbency" oI the
Marcos couple Irom 31 December 1965 to 25 February 1986.
(3) In contravention oI the essential element stated in Section 3 (e) oI R.A. 1379, petitioner has Iailed to establish the
other proper earnings and income Irom legitimately acquired property oI the Marcos couple over and above their
government salaries.
(4) Since petitioner Iailed to prove the three essential elements provided in paragraphs (c)
15
(d),
16
and (e)
17
oI Section 3, R.A.
1379, the inescapable conclusion is that the prima Iacie presumption oI unlawIul acquisition oI the Swiss Iunds has not yet
attached. There can, thereIore, be no premature IorIeiture oI the Iunds.
(C)
IT WAS ONLY BY ARBITRARILY ISOLATING AND THEN TAKING CERTAIN STATEMENTS MADE BY
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS OUT OF CONTEXT THAT PETITIONER WAS ABLE TO TREAT THESE AS "JUDICIAL
ADMISSIONS" SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE AND THEREAFTER A CONCLUSIVE CASE TO
JUSTIFY THE FORFEITURE OF THE SWISS FUNDS.
(1) Under Section 27, Rule 130 oI the Rules oI Court, the General and Supplemental Agreements, as well as the other written
and testimonial statements submitted in relation thereto, are expressly barred Irom being admissible in evidence against
private respondents.
(2) Had petitioner bothered to weigh the alleged admissions together with the other statements on record, there would be a
demonstrable showing that no such "judicial admissions" were made by private respondents.
(D)
SINCE PETITIONER HAS NOT (YET) PROVEN ALL THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS TO ESTABLISH A PRIMA
FACIE CASE FOR FORFEITURE, AND PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE NOT MADE ANY JUDICIAL ADMISSION
THAT WOULD HAVE FREED IT FROM ITS BURDEN OF PROOF, THE SANDIGANBAYAN DID NOT COMMIT
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. CERTIORARI,
THEREFORE, DOES NOT LIE, ESPECIALLY AS THIS COURT IS NOT A TRIER OF FACTS.
18

For her part, Mrs. Araneta, in her comment to the petition, claims that obviously petitioner is unable to comply with a very plain
requirement oI respondent Sandiganbayan. The instant petition is allegedly an attempt to elevate to this Court matters, issues and
incidents which should be properly threshed out at the Sandiganbayan. To respondent Mrs. Araneta, all other matters, save that
pertaining to the authentication oI the translated Swiss Court decisions, are irrelevant and impertinent as Iar as this Court is concerned.
Respondent Mrs. Araneta maniIests that she is as eager as respondent Sandiganbayan or any interested person to have the Swiss Court
decisions oIIicially translated in our known language. She says the authenticated oIIicial English version oI the Swiss Court decisions
should be presented. This should stop all speculations on what indeed is contained therein. Thus, respondent Mrs. Araneta prays that
the petition be denied Ior lack oI merit and Ior raising matters which, in elaborated Iashion, are impertinent and improper beIore this
Court.
PROPRIETY OF PETITIONER'S ACTION FOR CERTIORARI
But beIore this Court discusses the more relevant issues, the question regarding the propriety oI petitioner Republic's action Ior
certiorari under Rule 65
19
oI the 1997 Rules oI Civil Procedure assailing the Sandiganbayan Resolution dated January 21, 2002 should
be threshed out.
At the outset, we would like to stress that we are treating this case as an exception to the general rule governing petitions Ior certiorari.
Normally, decisions oI the Sandiganbayan are brought beIore this Court under Rule 45, not Rule 65.
20
But where the case is
undeniably ingrained with immense public interest, public policy and deep historical repercussions, certiorari is allowed
notwithstanding the existence and availability oI the remedy oI appeal.
21

One oI the Ioremost concerns oI the Aquino Government in February 1986 was the recovery oI the unexplained or ill-gotten wealth
reputedly amassed by Iormer President and Mrs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, their relatives, Iriends and business associates. Thus, the very

Iirst Executive Order (EO) issued by then President Corazon Aquino upon her assumption to oIIice aIter the ouster oI the Marcoses
was EO No. 1, issued on February 28, 1986. It created the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) and charged it with
the task oI assisting the President in the "recovery oI all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by Iormer President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his
immediate Iamily, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or
sequestration oI all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them during his administration, directly or through
nominees, by taking undue advantage oI their public oIIice and/or using their powers, authority, inIluence, connections or
relationship." The urgency oI this undertaking was tersely described by this Court in Republic vs. Lobregat
22
:
surely x x x an enterprise "oI great pith and moment"; it was attended by "great expectations"; it was initiated not only out oI
considerations oI simple justice but also out oI sheer necessity - the national coIIers were empty, or nearly so.
In all the alleged ill-gotten wealth cases Iiled by the PCGG, this Court has seen Iit to set aside technicalities and Iormalities
that merely serve to delay or impede judicious resolution. This Court preIers to have such cases resolved on the merits at the
Sandiganbayan. But substantial justice to the Filipino people and to all parties concerned, not mere legalisms or perIection oI
Iorm, should now be relentlessly and Iirmly pursued. Almost two decades have passed since the government initiated its
search Ior and reversion oI such ill-gotten wealth. The deIinitive resolution oI such cases on the merits is thus long overdue.
II there is prooI oI illegal acquisition, accumulation, misappropriation, Iraud or illicit conduct, let it be brought out now. Let
the ownership oI these Iunds and other assets be Iinally determined and resolved with dispatch, Iree Irom all the delaying
technicalities and annoying procedural sidetracks.
23

We thus take cognizance oI this case and settle with Iinality all the issues therein.
ISSUES BEFORE THIS COURT
The crucial issues which this Court must resolve are: (1) whether or not respondents raised any genuine issue oI Iact which would
either justiIy or negate summary judgment; and (2) whether or not petitioner Republic was able to prove its case Ior IorIeiture in
accordance with Sections 2 and 3 oI RA 1379.
(1) THE PROPRIETY OF SUMMARY 1UDGMENT
We hold that respondent Marcoses Iailed to raise any genuine issue oI Iact in their pleadings. Thus, on motion oI petitioner Republic,
summary judgment should take place as a matter oI right.
In the early case oI Auman vs. Esten:o
24
, summary judgment was described as a judgment which a court may render beIore trial but
aIter both parties have pleaded. It is ordered by the court upon application by one party, supported by aIIidavits, depositions or other
documents, with notice upon the adverse party who may in turn Iile an opposition supported also by aIIidavits, depositions or other
documents. This is aIter the court summarily hears both parties with their respective prooIs and Iinds that there is no genuine issue
between them. Summary judgment is sanctioned in this jurisdiction by Section 1, Rule 35 oI the 1997 Rules oI Civil Procedure:
SECTION 1. Summary judgment Ior claimant.- A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to
obtain a declaratory relieI may, at any time aIter the pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting
aIIidavits, depositions or admissions Ior a summary judgment in his Iavor upon all or any part thereoI.
25

Summary judgment is proper when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material Iact in the action.
26
The theory oI summary
judgment is that, although an answer may on its Iace appear to tender issues requiring trial, iI it is demonstrated by aIIidavits,
depositions or admissions that those issues are not genuine but sham or Iictitious, the Court is justiIied in dispensing with the trial and
rendering summary judgment Ior petitioner Republic.
The Solicitor General made a very thorough presentation oI its case Ior IorIeiture:
x x x
4. Respondent Ferdinand E. Marcos (now deceased and represented by his Estate/Heirs) was a public oIIicer Ior several
decades continuously and without interruption as Congressman, Senator, Senate President and President oI the Republic oI
the Philippines Irom December 31, 1965 up to his ouster by direct action oI the people oI EDSA on February 22-25, 1986.

5. Respondent Imelda Romualdez Marcos (Imelda, Ior short) the Iormer First Lady who ruled with FM during the 14-year
martial law regime, occupied the position oI Minister oI Human Settlements Irom June 1976 up to the peaceIul revolution in
February 22-25, 1986. She likewise served once as a member oI the Interim Batasang Pambansa during the early years oI
martial law Irom 1978 to 1984 and as Metro Manila Governor in concurrent capacity as Minister oI Human Settlements. x x
x
xxx xxx xxx
11. At the outset, however, it must be pointed out that based on the OIIicial Report oI the Minister oI Budget, the total
salaries oI Iormer President Marcos as President Iorm 1966 to 1976 was P60,000 a year and Irom 1977 to 1985, P100,000 a
year; while that oI the Iormer First Lady, Imelda R. Marcos, as Minister oI Human Settlements Irom June 1976 to February
22-25, 1986 was P75,000 a year xxx.
ANALYSIS OF RESPONDENTS LEGITIMATE INCOME
x x x
12. Based on available documents, the ITRs oI the Marcoses Ior the years 1965-1975 were Iiled under Tax IdentiIication No.
1365-055-1. For the years 1976 until 1984, the returns were Iiled under Tax IdentiIication No. M 6221-J 1117-A-9.
13. The data contained in the ITRs and Balance Sheet Iiled by the "Marcoses are summarized and attached to the reports in
the Iollowing schedules:
Schedule A:
Schedule oI Income (Annex "T" hereoI);
Schedule B:
Schedule oI Income Tax Paid (Annex "T-1" hereoI);
Schedule C:
Schedule oI Net Disposable Income (Annex "T-2" hereoI);
Schedule D:
Schedule oI Networth Analysis (Annex "T-3" hereoI).
14. As summarized in Schedule A (Annex "T" hereoI), the Marcoses reported P16,408,442.00 or US$2,414,484.91 in total
income over a period oI 20 years Irom 1965 to 1984. The sources oI income are as Iollows:
OIIicial Salaries - P 2,627,581.00 - 16.01
Legal Practice - 11,109,836.00 - 67.71
Farm Income - 149,700.00 - .91
Others - 2,521,325.00 - 15.37
Total P16,408,442.00 - 100.00
15. FM's oIIicial salary pertains to his compensation as Senate President in 1965 in the amount oI P15,935.00 and
P1,420,000.00 as President oI the Philippines during the period 1966 until 1984. On the other hand, Imelda reported salaries
and allowances only Ior the years 1979 to 1984 in the amount oI P1,191,646.00. The records indicate that the reported
income came Irom her salary Irom the Ministry oI Human Settlements and allowances Irom Food Terminal, Inc., National
Home Mortgage Finance Corporation, National Food Authority Council, Light Rail Transit Authority and Home
Development Mutual Fund.

16. OI the P11,109,836.00 in reported income Irom legal practice, the amount oI P10,649,836.00 or 96 represents
"receivables Irom prior years" during the period 1967 up to 1984.
17. In the guise oI reporting income using the cash method under Section 38 oI the National Internal Revenue Code, FM
made it appear that he had an extremely proIitable legal practice beIore he became a President (FM being barred by law Irom
practicing his law proIession during his entire presidency) and that, incredibly, he was still receiving payments almost 20
years aIter. The only problem is that in his Balance Sheet attached to his 1965 ITR immediately preceeding his ascendancy to
the presidency he did not show any Receivables Irom client at all, much less the P10,65-M that he decided to later recognize
as income. There are no documents showing any withholding tax certiIicates. Likewise, there is nothing on record that will
show any known Marcos client as he has no known law oIIice. As previously stated, his networth was a mere P120,000.00 in
December, 1965. The joint income tax returns oI FM and Imelda cannot, thereIore, conceal the skeletons oI their kleptocracy.
18. FM reported a total oI P2,521,325.00 as Other Income Ior the years 1972 up to 1976 which he reIerred to in his return as
"Miscellaneous Items" and "Various Corporations." There is no indication oI any payor oI the dividends or earnings.
19. Spouses Ferdinand and Imelda did not declare any income Irom any deposits and placements which are subject to a 5
withholding tax. The Bureau oI Internal Revenue attested that aIter a diligent search oI pertinent records on Iile with the
Records Division, they did not Iind any records involving the tax transactions oI spouses Ferdinand and Imelda in Revenue
Region No. 1, Baguio City, Revenue Region No.4A, Manila, Revenue Region No. 4B1, Quezon City and Revenue No. 8,
Tacloban, Leyte. Likewise, the OIIice oI the Revenue Collector oI Batac. Further, BIR attested that no records were Iound on
any Iiling oI capital gains tax return involving spouses FM and Imelda covering the years 1960 to 1965.
20. In Schedule B, the taxable reported income over the twenty-year period was P14,463,595.00 which represents 88 oI the
gross income. The Marcoses paid income taxes totaling P8,233,296.00 or US$1,220,667.59. The business expenses in the
amount oI P861,748.00 represent expenses incurred Ior subscription, postage, stationeries and contributions while the other
deductions in the amount oI P567,097.00 represents interest charges, medicare Iees, taxes and licenses. The total deductions
in the amount oI P1,994,845.00 represents 12 oI the total gross income.
21. In Schedule C, the net cumulative disposable income amounts to P6,756,301.00 or US$980,709.77. This is the amount
that represents that portion oI the Marcoses income that is Iree Ior consumption, savings and investments. The amount is
arrived at by adding back to the net income aIter tax the personal and additional exemptions Ior the years 1965-1984, as well
as the tax-exempt salary oI the President Ior the years 1966 until 1972.
22. Finally, the networth analysis in Schedule D, represents the total accumulated networth oI spouses, Ferdinand and Imelda.
Respondent's Balance Sheet attached to their 1965 ITR, covering the year immediately preceding their ascendancy to the
presidency, indicates an ending networth oI P120,000.00 which FM declared as Library and Miscellaneous assets. In
computing Ior the networth, the income approach was utilized. Under this approach, the beginning capital is increased or
decreased, as the case may be, depending upon the income earned or loss incurred. Computations establish the total networth
oI spouses Ferdinand and Imelda, Ior the years 1965 until 1984 in the total amount oI US$957,487.75, assuming the income
Irom legal practice is real and valid x x x.
G. THE SECRET MARCOS DEPOSITS IN SWISS BANKS
23. The Iollowing presentation very clearly and overwhelmingly show in detail how both respondents clandestinely stashed
away the country's wealth to Switzerland and hid the same under layers upon layers oI Ioundations and other corporate
entities to prevent its detection. Through their dummies/nominees, Ironts or agents who Iormed those Ioundations or
corporate entities, they opened and maintained numerous bank accounts. But due to the diIIiculty iI not the impossibility oI
detecting and documenting all those secret accounts as well as the enormity oI the deposits therein hidden, the Iollowing
presentation is conIined to Iive identiIied accounts groups, with balances amounting to about $356-M with a reservation Ior
the Iiling oI a supplemental or separate IorIeiture complaint should the need arise.
H. THE AZIO-VERSO-VIBUR FOUNDATION ACCOUNTS
24. On June 11, 1971, Ferdinand Marcos issued a written order to Dr. Theo Bertheau, legal counsel oI Schweizeresche
Kreditanstalt or SKA, also known as Swiss Credit Bank, Ior him to establish the AZIO Foundation. On the same date,
Marcos executed a power oI attorney in Iavor oI Roberto S. Benedicto empowering him to transact business in behalI oI the
said Ioundation. Pursuant to the said Marcos mandate, AZIO Foundation was Iormed on June 21, 1971 in Vaduz. Walter
Fessler and Ernst Scheller, also oI SKA Legal Service, and Dr. Helmuth Merling Irom Schaan were designated as members

oI the Board oI Trustees oI the said Ioundation. Ferdinand Marcos was named Iirst beneIiciary and the Marcos Foundation,
Inc. was second beneIiciary. On November 12, 1971, FM again issued another written order naming Austrahil PTY Ltd. In
Sydney, Australia, as the Ioundation's Iirst and sole beneIiciary. This was recorded on December 14, 1971.
25. In an undated instrument, Marcos changed the Iirst and sole beneIiciary to CHARIS FOUNDATION. This change was
recorded on December 4, 1972.
26. On August 29, 1978, the AZIO FOUNDATION was renamed to VERSO FOUNDATION. The Board oI Trustees
remained the same. On March 11, 1981, Marcos issued a written directive to liquidated VERSO FOUNDATION and to
transIer all its assets to account oI FIDES TRUST COMPANY at Bank HoIman in Zurich under the account "ReIerence
OSER." The Board oI Trustees decided to dissolve the Ioundation on June 25, 1981.
27. In an apparent maneuver to bury Iurther the secret deposits beneath the thick layers oI corporate entities, FM eIIected the
establishment oI VIBUR FOUNDATION on May 13, 1981 in Vaduz. Atty. Ivo Beck and Limag Management, a wholly-
owned subsidiary oI Fides Trust, were designated as members oI the Board oI Trustees. The account was oIIicially opened
with SKA on September 10, 1981. The beneIicial owner was not made known to the bank since Fides Trust Company acted
as Iiduciary. However, comparison oI the listing oI the securities in the saIe deposit register oI the VERSO FOUNDATION
as oI February 27, 1981 with that oI VIBUR FOUNDATION as oI December 31, 1981 readily reveals that exactly the same
securities were listed.
28. Under the Ioregoing circumstances, it is certain that the VIBUR FOUNDATION is the beneIicial successor oI VERSO
FOUNDATION.
29. On March 18, 1986, the Marcos-designated Board oI Trustees decided to liquidate VIBUR FOUNDATION. A notice oI
such liquidation was sent to the OIIice oI the Public Register on March 21, 1986. However, the bank accounts and respective
balances oI the said VIBUR FOUNDATION remained with SKA. Apparently, the liquidation was an attempt by the
Marcoses to transIer the Ioundation's Iunds to another account or bank but this was prevented by the timely Ireeze order
issued by the Swiss authorities. One oI the latest documents obtained by the PCGG Irom the Swiss authorities is a declaration
signed by Dr. Ivo Beck (the trustee) stating that the beneIicial owner oI VIBUR FOUNDATION is Ferdinand E. Marcos.
Another document signed by G. Raber oI SKA shows that VIBUR FOUNDATION is owned by the "Marcos Familie"
30. As oI December 31, 1989, the balance oI the bank accounts oI VIBUR FOUNDATION with SKA, Zurich, under the
General Account No. 469857 totaled $3,597,544.00
I. XANDY-WINTROP CHARIS-SCOLARI-
VALAMO-SPINUS-AVERTINA FOUNDATION ACCOUNTS
31. This is the most intricate and complicated account group. As the Flow Chart hereoI shows, two (2) groups under the
Ioundation organized by Marcos dummies/nominees Ior FM's beneIit, eventually joined together and became one (1) account
group under the AVERTINA FOUNDATION Ior the beneIit oI both FM and Imelda. This is the biggest group Irom where
the $50-M investment Iund oI the Marcoses was drawn when they bought the Central Bank's dollar-denominated treasury
notes with high-yielding interests.
32. On March 20, 1968, aIter his second year in the presidency, Marcos opened bank accounts with SKA using an alias or
pseudonym WILLIAM SAUNDERS, apparently to hide his true identity. The next day, March 21, 1968, his First Lady, Mrs.
Imelda Marcos also opened her own bank accounts with the same bank using an American-sounding alias, JANE RYAN.
Found among the voluminous documents in Malacaang shortly aIter they Iled to Hawaii in haste that IateIul night oI
February 25, 1986, were accomplished Iorms Ior "Declaration/Specimen Signatures" submitted by the Marcos couple. Under
the caption "signature(s)" Ferdinand and Imelda signed their real names as well as their respective aliases underneath. These
accounts were actively operated and maintained by the Marcoses Ior about two (2) years until their closure sometime in
February, 1970 and the balances transIerred to XANDY FOUNDATION.
33. The XANDY FOUNDATION was established on March 3, 1970 in Vaduz. C.W. Fessler, C. Souviron and E. Scheller
were named as members oI the Board oI Trustees.
34. FM and Imelda issued the written mandate to establish the Ioundation to Markus Geel oI SKA on March 3, 1970. In the
handwritten Regulations signed by the Marcos couple as well as in the type-written Regulations signed by Markus Geel both

dated February 13, 1970, the Marcos spouses were named the Iirst beneIiciaries, the surviving spouse as the second
beneIiciary and the Marcos children Imee, Ferdinand, Jr. (Bongbong) and Irene as equal third beneIiciaries.
35. The XANDY FOUNDATION was renamed WINTROP FOUNDATION on August 29, 1978. The Board oI Trustees
remained the same at the outset. However, on March 27, 1980, Souviron was replaced by Dr. Peter Ritter. On March 10.
1981, Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos issued a written order to the Board oI Wintrop to liquidate the Ioundation and transIer all
its assets to Bank HoImann in Zurich in Iavor oI FIDES TRUST COMPANY. Later, WINTROP FOUNDATION was
dissolved.
36. The AVERTINA FOUNDATION was established on May 13, 1981 in Vaduz with Atty. Ivo Beck and Limag
Management, a wholly-owned subsidiary oI FIDES TRUST CO., as members oI the Board oI Trustees. Two (2) account
categories, namely: CAR and NES, were opened on September 10, 1981. The beneIicial owner oI AVERTINA was not made
known to the bank since the FIDES TRUST CO. acted as Iiduciary. However, the securities listed in the saIe deposit register
oI WINTROP FOUNDATION Category R as oI December 31, 1980 were the same as those listed in the register oI
AVERTINA FOUNDATION Category CAR as oI December 31, 1981. Likewise, the securities listed in the saIe deposit
register oI WINTROP FOUNDATION Category S as oI December 31, 1980 were the same as those listed in the register oI
Avertina Category NES as oI December 31, 1981.Under the circumstances, it is certain that the beneIicial successor oI
WINTROP FOUNDATION is AVERTINA FOUNDATION. The balance oI Category CAR as oI December 31, 1989
amounted to US$231,366,894.00 while that oI Category NES as oI 12-31-83 was US$8,647,190.00. Latest documents
received Irom Swiss authorities included a declaration signed by IVO Beck stating that the beneIicial owners oI AVERTINA
FOUNDATION are FM and Imelda. Another document signed by G. Raber oI SKA indicates that Avertina Foundation is
owned by the "Marcos Families."
37. The other groups oI Ioundations that eventually joined AVERTINA were also established by FM through his dummies,
which started with the CHARIS FOUNDATION.
38. The CHARIS FOUNDATION was established in VADUZ on December 27, 1971. Walter Fessler and Ernst Scheller oI
SKA and Dr. Peter Ritter were named as directors. Dr. Theo Bertheau, SKA legal counsel, acted as Iounding director in
behalI oI FM by virtue oI the mandate and agreement dated November 12, 1971. FM himselI was named the Iirst beneIiciary
and Xandy Foundation as second beneIiciary in accordance with the handwritten instructions oI FM on November 12, 1971
and the Regulations. FM gave a power oI attorney to Roberto S. Benedicto on February 15, 1972 to act in his behalI with
regard to Charis Foundation.
39. On December 13, 1974, Charis Foundation was renamed Scolari Foundation but the directors remained the same. On
March 11, 1981 FM ordered in writing that the Valamo Foundation be liquidated and all its assets be transIerred to Bank
HoImann, AG in Iavor oI Fides Trust Company under the account "ReIerence OMAL". The Board oI Directors decided on
the immediate dissolution oI Valamo Foundation on June 25, 1981.
40 The SPINUS FOUNDATION was established on May 13, 1981 in Vaduz with Atty. Ivo Beck and Limag Management, a
wholly-owned subsidiary oI Fides Trust Co., as members oI the Foundation's Board oI Directors. The account was oIIicially
opened with SKA on September 10, 1981. The beneIicial owner oI the Ioundation was not made known to the bank since
Fides Trust Co. acted as Iiduciary. However, the list oI securities in the saIe deposit register oI Valamo Foundation as oI
December 31, 1980 are practically the same with those listed in the saIe deposit register oI Spinus Foundation as oI
December 31, 1981. Under the circumstances, it is certain that the Spinus Foundation is the beneIicial successor oI the
Valamo Foundation.
41. On September 6, 1982, there was a written instruction Irom Spinus Foundation to SKA to close its Swiss Franc account
and transIer the balance to Avertina Foundation. In July/August, 1982, several transIers Irom the Ioundation's German marks
and US dollar accounts were made to Avertina Category CAR totaling DM 29.5-M and $58-M, respectively. Moreover, a
comparison oI the list oI securities oI the Spinus Foundation as oI February 3, 1982 with the saIe deposit slips oI the Avertina
Foundation Category CAR as oI August 19, 1982 shows that all the securities oI Spinus were transIerred to Avertina.
J. TRINIDAD-RAYBY-PALMY FOUNDATION ACCOUNTS
42. The Trinidad Foundation was organized on August 26, 1970 in Vaduz with C.W. Fessler and E. Scheller oI SKA and Dr.
Otto Tondury as the Ioundation's directors. Imelda issued a written mandate to establish the Ioundation to Markus Geel on
August 26, 1970. The regulations as well as the agreement, both dated August 28, 1970 were likewise signed by Imelda.

Imelda was named the Iirst beneIiciary and her children Imelda (Imee), Ferdinand, Jr. (Bongbong) and, Irene were named as
equal second beneIiciaries.
43. Rayby Foundation was established on June 22, 1973 in Vaduz with Fessler, Scheller and Ritter as members oI the board
oI directors. Imelda issued a written mandate to Dr. Theo Bertheau to establish the Ioundation with a note that the
Ioundation's capitalization as well as the cost oI establishing it be debited against the account oI Trinidad Foundation. Imelda
was named the Iirst and only beneIiciary oI Rayby Ioundation. According to written inIormation Irom SKA dated November
28, 1988, Imelda apparently had the intention in 1973 to transIer part oI the assets oI Trinidad Foundation to another
Ioundation, thus the establishment oI Rayby Foundation. However, transIer oI assets never took place. On March 10, 1981,
Imelda issued a written order to transIer all the assets oI Rayby Foundation to Trinidad Foundation and to subsequently
liquidate Rayby. On the same date, she issued a written order to the board oI Trinidad to dissolve the Ioundation and transIer
all its assets to Bank HoImann in Iavor oI Fides Trust Co. Under the account "ReIerence Dido," Rayby was dissolved on
April 6, 1981 and Trinidad was liquidated on August 3, 1981.
44. The PALMY FOUNDATION was established on May 13, 1981 in Vaduz with Dr. Ivo Beck and Limag Management, a
wholly-owned subsidiary oI Fides Trust Co, as members oI the Foundation's Board oI Directors. The account was oIIicially
opened with the SKA on September 10, 1981. The beneIicial owner was not made known to the bank since Fides Trust Co.
acted as Iiduciary. However, when one compares the listing oI securities in the saIe deposit register oI Trinidad Foundation
as oI December 31,1980 with that oI the Palmy Foundation as oI December 31, 1980, one can clearly see that practically the
same securities were listed. Under the circumstances, it is certain that the Palmy Foundation is the beneIicial successor oI the
Trinidad Foundation.
45. As oI December 31, 1989, the ending balance oI the bank accounts oI Palmy Foundation under General Account No.
391528 is $17,214,432.00.
46. Latest documents received Irom Swiss Authorities included a declaration signed by Dr. Ivo Beck stating that the
beneIicial owner oI Palmy Foundation is Imelda. Another document signed by Raber shows that the said Palmy Foundation
is owned by "Marcos Familie".
K. ROSALYS-AGUAMINA FOUNDATION ACCOUNTS
47. Rosalys Foundation was established in 1971 with FM as the beneIiciary. Its Articles oI Incorporation was executed on
September 24, 1971 and its By-Laws on October 3, 1971. This Ioundation maintained several accounts with Swiss Bank
Corporation (SBC) under the general account 51960 where most oI the bribe monies Irom Japanese suppliers were hidden.
48. On December 19, 1985, Rosalys Foundation was liquidated and all its assets were transIerred to Aguamina Corporation's
(Panama) Account No. 53300 with SBC. The ownership by Aguamina Corporation oI Account No. 53300 is evidenced by an
opening account documents Irom the bank. J. Christinaz and R.L. Rossier, First Vice-President and Senior Vice President,
respectively, oI SBC, Geneva issued a declaration dated September 3, 1991 stating that the by-laws dated October 3, 1971
governing Rosalys Foundation was the same by-law applied to Aguamina Corporation Account No. 53300. They Iurther
conIirmed that no change oI beneIicial owner was involved while transIerring the assets oI Rosalys to Aguamina. Hence, FM
remains the beneIiciary oI Aguamina Corporation Account No. 53300.
As oI August 30, 1991, the ending balance oI Account No. 53300 amounted to $80,566,483.00.
L. MALER FOUNDATION ACCOUNTS
49. Maler was Iirst created as an establishment. A statement oI its rules and regulations was Iound among Malacaang
documents. It stated, among others, that 50 oI the Company's assets will be Ior sole and Iull right disposal oI FM and
Imelda during their liIetime, which the remaining 50 will be divided in equal parts among their children. Another
Malacaang document dated October 19,1968 and signed by Ferdinand and Imelda pertains to the appointment oI Dr. Andre
Barbey and Jean Louis Sunier as attorneys oI the company and as administrator and manager oI all assets held by the
company. The Marcos couple, also mentioned in the said document that they bought the Maler Establishment Irom SBC,
Geneva. On the same date, FM and Imelda issued a letter addressed to Maler Establishment, stating that all instructions to be
transmitted with regard to Maler will be signed with the word "JOHN LEWIS". This word will have the same value as the
couple's own personal signature. The letter was signed by FM and Imelda in their signatures and as John Lewis.

50. Maler Establishment opened and maintained bank accounts with SBC, Geneva. The opening bank documents were signed
by Dr. Barbey and Mr. Sunnier as authorized signatories.
51. On November 17, 1981, it became necessary to transIorm Maler Establishment into a Ioundation. Likewise, the attorneys
were changed to Michael Amaudruz, et. al. However, administration oI the assets was leIt to SBC. The articles oI
incorporation oI Maler Foundation registered on November 17, 1981 appear to be the same articles applied to Maler
Establishment. On February 28, 1984, Maler Foundation cancelled the power oI attorney Ior the management oI its assets in
Iavor oI SBC and transIerred such power to Sustrust Investment Co., S.A.
52. As oI June 6, 1991, the ending balance oI Maler Foundation's Account Nos. 254,508 BT and 98,929 NY amount SF
9,083,567 and SG 16,195,258, respectively, Ior a total oI SF 25,278,825.00. GM only until December 31, 1980. This account
was opened by Maler when it was still an establishment which was subsequently transIormed into a Ioundation.
53. All the Iive (5) group accounts in the over-all Ilow chart have a total balance oI about Three Hundred FiIty Six Million
Dollars ($356,000,000.00) as shown by Annex "R-5" hereto attached as integral part hereoI.
x x x x x x.
27

Respondents Imelda R. Marcos, Maria Imelda M. Manotoc, Irene M. Araneta and Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., in their answer, stated the
Iollowing:
xxx xxx xxx
4. Respondents ADMIT paragraphs 3 and 4 oI the Petition.
5. Respondents speciIically deny paragraph 5 oI the Petition in so Iar as it states that summons and other court processes may
be served on Respondent Imelda R. Marcos at the stated address the truth oI the matter being that Respondent Imelda R.
Marcos may be served with summons and other processes at No. 10-B Bel Air Condominium 5022 P. Burgos Street, Makati,
Metro Manila, and ADMIT the rest.
xxx xxx xxx
10. Respondents ADMIT paragraph 11 oI the Petition.
11. Respondents speciIically DENY paragraph 12 oI the Petition Ior lack oI knowledge suIIicient to Iorm a belieI as to the
truth oI the allegation since Respondents were not privy to the transactions and that they cannot remember exactly the truth as
to the matters alleged.
12. Respondents speciIically DENY paragraph 13 oI the Petition Ior lack oI knowledge or inIormation suIIicient to Iorm a
belieI as to the truth oI the allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents oI the alleged ITRs
and Balance Sheet.
13. Respondents speciIically DENY paragraph 14 oI the Petition Ior lack oI knowledge or inIormation suIIicient to Iorm a
belieI as to the truth oI the allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents oI the alleged ITRs.
14. Respondents speciIically DENY paragraph 15 oI the Petition Ior lack oI knowledge or inIormation suIIicient to Iorm a
belieI as to the truth oI the allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents oI the alleged ITRs.
15. Respondents speciIically DENY paragraph 16 oI the Petition Ior lack oI knowledge or inIormation suIIicient to Iorm a
belieI as to the truth oI the allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents oI the alleged ITRs.
16. Respondents speciIically DENY paragraph 17 oI the Petition insoIar as it attributes willIul duplicity on the part oI the late
President Marcos, Ior being Ialse, the same being pure conclusions based on pure assumption and not allegations oI Iact; and
speciIically DENY the rest Ior lack oI knowledge or inIormation suIIicient to Iorm a belieI as to the truth oI the allegation
since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents oI the alleged ITRs or the attachments thereto.

17. Respondents speciIically DENY paragraph 18 oI the Petition Ior lack oI knowledge or inIormation suIIicient to Iorm a
belieI as to the truth oI the allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents oI the alleged ITRs.
18. Respondents speciIically DENY paragraph 19 oI the Petition Ior lack oI knowledge or inIormation suIIicient to Iorm a
belieI as to the truth oI the allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents oI the alleged ITRs
and that they are not privy to the activities oI the BIR.
19. Respondents speciIically DENY paragraph 20 oI the Petition Ior lack oI knowledge or inIormation suIIicient to Iorm a
belieI as to the truth oI the allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents oI the alleged ITRs.
20. Respondents speciIically DENY paragraph 21 oI the Petition Ior lack oI knowledge or inIormation suIIicient to Iorm a
belieI as to the truth oI the allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents oI the alleged ITRs.
21. Respondents speciIically DENY paragraph 22 oI the Petition Ior lack oI knowledge or inIormation suIIicient to Iorm a
belieI as to the truth oI the allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents oI the alleged ITRs.
22. Respondents speciIically DENY paragraph 23 insoIar as it alleges that Respondents clandestinely stashed the country's
wealth in Switzerland and hid the same under layers and layers oI Ioundation and corporate entities Ior being Ialse, the truth
being that Respondents aIoresaid properties were lawIully acquired.
23. Respondents speciIically DENY paragraphs 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 and 30 oI the Petition Ior lack oI knowledge or
inIormation suIIicient to Iorm a belieI as to the truth oI the allegation since Respondents were not privy to the transactions
regarding the alleged Azio-Verso-Vibur Foundation accounts, except that as to Respondent Imelda R. Marcos she
speciIically remembers that the Iunds involved were lawIully acquired.
24. Respondents speciIically DENY paragraphs 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36,37, 38, 39, 40, and 41 oI the Petition Ior lack oI
knowledge or inIormation suIIicient to Iorm a belieI as to the truth oI the allegations since Respondents are not privy to the
transactions and as to such transaction they were privy to they cannot remember with exactitude the same having occurred a
long time ago, except that as to Respondent Imelda R. Marcos she speciIically remembers that the Iunds involved were
lawIully acquired.
25. Respondents speciIically DENY paragraphs 42, 43, 44, 45, and 46, oI the Petition Ior lack oI knowledge or inIormation
suIIicient to Iorm a belieI as to the truth oI the allegations since Respondents were not privy to the transactions and as to such
transaction they were privy to they cannot remember with exactitude the same having occurred a long time ago, except that as
to Respondent Imelda R. Marcos she speciIically remembers that the Iunds involved were lawIully acquired.
26. Respondents speciIically DENY paragraphs 49, 50, 51 and 52, oI the Petition Ior lack oI knowledge or inIormation
suIIicient to Iorm a belieI as to the truth oI the allegations since Respondents were not privy to the transactions and as to such
transaction they were privy to they cannot remember with exactitude the same having occurred a long time ago, except that as
to Respondent Imelda R. Marcos she speciIically remembers that the Iunds involved were lawIully acquired.
Upon careIul perusal oI the Ioregoing, the Court Iinds that respondent Mrs. Marcos and the Marcos children indubitably Iailed to
tender genuine issues in their answer to the petition Ior IorIeiture. A genuine issue is an issue oI Iact which calls Ior the presentation oI
evidence as distinguished Irom an issue which is Iictitious and contrived, set up in bad Iaith or patently lacking in substance so as not
to constitute a genuine issue Ior trial. Respondents' deIenses oI "lack oI knowledge Ior lack oI privity" or "(inability to) recall because
it happened a long time ago" or, on the part oI Mrs. Marcos, that "the Iunds were lawIully acquired" are Iully insuIIicient to tender
genuine issues. Respondent Marcoses' deIenses were a sham and evidently calibrated to compound and conIuse the issues.
The Iollowing pleadings Iiled by respondent Marcoses are replete with indications oI a spurious deIense:
(a) Respondents' Answer dated October 18, 1993;
(b) Pre-trial BrieI dated October 4, 1999 oI Mrs. Marcos, Supplemental Pre-trial BrieI dated October 19, 1999 oI Ferdinand,
Jr. and Mrs. Imee Marcos-Manotoc adopting the pre-trial brieI oI Mrs. Marcos, and ManiIestation dated October 19, 1999 oI
Irene Marcos-Araneta adopting the pre-trial brieIs oI her co- respondents;

(c) Opposition to Motion Ior Summary Judgment dated March 21, 2000, Iiled by Mrs. Marcos which the other respondents
(Marcos children) adopted;
(d) Demurrer to Evidence dated May 2, 2000 Iiled by Mrs. Marcos and adopted by the Marcos children;
(e) Motion Ior Reconsideration dated September 26, 2000 Iiled by Mrs. Marcos; Motion Ior Reconsideration dated October 5,
2000 jointly Iiled by Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr., and Supplemental Motion Ior Reconsideration dated October 9, 2000
likewise jointly Iiled by Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr.;
(I) Memorandum dated December 12, 2000 oI Mrs. Marcos and Memorandum dated December 17, 2000 oI the Marcos
children;
(g) ManiIestation dated May 26, 1998; and
(h) General/Supplemental Agreement dated December 23, 1993.
An examination oI the Ioregoing pleadings is in order.
Respondents' Answer dated October 18, 1993.
In their answer, respondents Iailed to speciIically deny each and every allegation contained in the petition Ior IorIeiture in the manner
required by the rules. All they gave were stock answers like "they have no suIIicient knowledge" or "they could not recall because it
happened a long time ago," and, as to Mrs. Marcos, "the Iunds were lawIully acquired," without stating the basis oI such assertions.
Section 10, Rule 8 oI the 1997 Rules oI Civil Procedure, provides:
A deIendant must speciIy each material allegation oI Iact the truth oI which he does not admit and, whenever practicable,
shall set Iorth the substance oI the matters upon which he relies to support his denial. Where a deIendant desires to deny only
a part oI an averment, he shall speciIy so much oI it as is true and material and shall deny the remainder. Where a deIendant
is without knowledge or inIormation suIIicient to Iorm a belieI as to the truth oI a material averment made in the complaint,
he shall so state, and this shall have the eIIect oI a denial.
28

The purpose oI requiring respondents to make a speciIic denial is to make them disclose Iacts which will disprove the allegations oI
petitioner at the trial, together with the matters they rely upon in support oI such denial. Our jurisdiction adheres to this rule to avoid
and prevent unnecessary expenses and waste oI time by compelling both parties to lay their cards on the table, thus reducing the
controversy to its true terms. As explained in Alonso vs. Jillamor,
29

A litigation is not a game oI technicalities in which one, more deeply schooled and skilled in the subtle art oI movement and
position, entraps and destroys the other. It is rather a contest in which each contending party Iully and Iairly lays beIore the
court the Iacts in issue and then, brushing aside as wholly trivial and indecisive all imperIections oI Iorm and technicalities oI
procedure, asks that justice be done upon the merits. Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapier's thrust.
On the part oI Mrs. Marcos, she claimed that the Iunds were lawIully acquired. However, she Iailed to particularly state the ultimate
Iacts surrounding the lawIul manner or mode oI acquisition oI the subject Iunds. Simply put, she merely stated in her answer with the
other respondents that the Iunds were "lawIully acquired" without detailing how exactly these Iunds were supposedly acquired legally
by them. Even in this case beIore us, her assertion that the Iunds were lawIully acquired remains bare and unaccompanied by any
Iactual support which can prove, by the presentation oI evidence at a hearing, that indeed the Iunds were acquired legitimately by the
Marcos Iamily.
Respondents' denials in their answer at the Sandiganbayan were based on their alleged lack oI knowledge or inIormation suIIicient to
Iorm a belieI as to the truth oI the allegations oI the petition.
It is true that one oI the modes oI speciIic denial under the rules is a denial through a statement that the deIendant is without
knowledge or inIormation suIIicient to Iorm a belieI as to the truth oI the material averment in the complaint. The question, however,
is whether the kind oI denial in respondents' answer qualiIies as the speciIic denial called Ior by the rules. We do not think so. In
Morales vs. Court oI Appeals,
30
this Court ruled that iI an allegation directly and speciIically charges a party with having done,

perIormed or committed a particular act which the latter did not in Iact do, perIorm or commit, a categorical and express denial must
be made.
Here, despite the serious and speciIic allegations against them, the Marcoses responded by simply saying that they had no knowledge
or inIormation suIIicient to Iorm a belieI as to the truth oI such allegations. Such a general, selI-serving claim oI ignorance oI the Iacts
alleged in the petition Ior IorIeiture was insuIIicient to raise an issue. Respondent Marcoses should have positively stated how it was
that they were supposedly ignorant oI the Iacts alleged.
31

To elucidate, the allegation oI petitioner Republic in paragraph 23 oI the petition Ior IorIeiture stated:
23. The Iollowing presentation very clearly and overwhelmingly show in detail how both respondents clandestinely stashed
away the country's wealth to Switzerland and hid the same under layers upon layers oI Ioundations and other corporate
entities to prevent its detection. Through their dummies/nominees, Ironts or agents who Iormed those Ioundations or
corporate entities, they opened and maintained numerous bank accounts. But due to the diIIiculty iI not the impossibility oI
detecting and documenting all those secret accounts as well as the enormity oI the deposits therein hidden, the Iollowing
presentation is conIined to Iive identiIied accounts groups, with balances amounting to about $356-M with a reservation Ior
the Iiling oI a supplemental or separate IorIeiture complaint should the need arise.
32

Respondents' lame denial oI the aIoresaid allegation was:
22. Respondents speciIically DENY paragraph 23 insoIar as it alleges that Respondents clandestinely stashed the country's
wealth in Switzerland and hid the same under layers and layers oI Ioundations and corporate entities Ior being Ialse, the truth
being that Respondents' aIoresaid properties were lawIully acquired.
33

Evidently, this particular denial had the earmark oI what is called in the law on pleadings as a negative pregnant, that is, a denial
pregnant with the admission oI the substantial Iacts in the pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. It was in eIIect an
admission oI the averments it was directed at.
34
Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a Iorm oI negative expression which carries
with it an aIIirmation or at least an implication oI some kind Iavorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission
oI the substantial Iacts alleged in the pleading. Where a Iact is alleged with qualiIying or modiIying language and the words oI the
allegation as so qualiIied or modiIied are literally denied, has been held that the qualiIying circumstances alone are denied while the
Iact itselI is admitted.
35

In the instant case, the material allegations in paragraph 23 oI the said petition were not speciIically denied by respondents in
paragraph 22 oI their answer. The denial contained in paragraph 22 oI the answer was Iocused on the averment in paragraph 23 oI the
petition Ior IorIeiture that "Respondents clandestinely stashed the country's wealth in Switzerland and hid the same under layers and
layers oI Ioundations and corporate entities." Paragraph 22 oI the respondents' answer was thus a denial pregnant with admissions oI
the Iollowing substantial Iacts:
(1) the Swiss bank deposits existed and
(2) that the estimated sum thereoI was US$356 million as oI December, 1990.
ThereIore, the allegations in the petition Ior IorIeiture on the existence oI the Swiss bank deposits in the sum oI about US$356 million,
not having been speciIically denied by respondents in their answer, were deemed admitted by them pursuant to Section 11, Rule 8 oI
the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure:
Material averment in the complaint, xxx shall be deemed admitted when not speciIically denied. xxx.
36

By the same token, the Iollowing unsupported denials oI respondents in their answer were pregnant with admissions oI the substantial
Iacts alleged in the Republic's petition Ior IorIeiture:
23. Respondents speciIically DENY paragraphs 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 and 30 oI the Petition Ior lack oI knowledge or
inIormation suIIicient to Iorm a belieI as to the truth oI the allegation since respondents were not privy to the transactions
regarding the alleged Azio-Verso-Vibur Foundation accounts, except that, as to respondent Imelda R. Marcos, she
speciIically remembers that the Iunds involved were lawIully acquired.

24. Respondents speciIically DENY paragraphs 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41 oI the Petition Ior lack oI knowledge
or inIormation suIIicient to Iorm a belieI as to the truth oI the allegations since respondents were not privy to the transactions
and as to such transactions they were privy to, they cannot remember with exactitude the same having occurred a long time
ago, except as to respondent Imelda R. Marcos, she speciIically remembers that the Iunds involved were lawIully acquired.
25. Respondents speciIically DENY paragraphs 42, 43, 45, and 46 oI the petition Ior lack oI knowledge or inIormation
suIIicient to Irom a belieI as to the truth oI the allegations since respondents were not privy to the transactions and as to such
transaction they were privy to, they cannot remember with exactitude, the same having occurred a long time ago, except that
as to respondent Imelda R. Marcos, she speciIically remembers that the Iunds involved were lawIully acquired.
26. Respondents speciIically DENY paragraphs 49, 50, 51 and 52 oI the petition Ior lack oI knowledge and inIormation
suIIicient to Iorm a belieI as to the truth oI the allegations since respondents were not privy to the transactions and as to such
transaction they were privy to they cannot remember with exactitude the same having occurred a long time ago, except that as
to respondent Imelda R. Marcos, she speciIically remembers that the Iunds involved were lawIully acquired.
The matters reIerred to in paragraphs 23 to 26 oI the respondents' answer pertained to the creation oI Iive groups oI accounts as well as
their respective ending balances and attached documents alleged in paragraphs 24 to 52 oI the Republic's petition Ior IorIeiture.
Respondent Imelda R. Marcos never speciIically denied the existence oI the Swiss Iunds. Her claim that "the Iunds involved were
lawIully acquired" was an acknowledgment on her part oI the existence oI said deposits. This only reinIorced her earlier admission oI
the allegation in paragraph 23 oI the petition Ior IorIeiture regarding the existence oI the US$356 million Swiss bank deposits.
The allegations in paragraphs 47
37
and 48
38
oI the petition Ior IorIeiture reIerring to the creation and amount oI the deposits oI the
Rosalys-Aguamina Foundation as well as the averment in paragraph 52-a
39
oI the said petition with respect to the sum oI the Swiss
bank deposits estimated to be US$356 million were again not speciIically denied by respondents in their answer. The respondents did
not at all respond to the issues raised in these paragraphs and the existence, nature and amount oI the Swiss Iunds were thereIore
deemed admitted by them. As held in Galofa vs. Nee Bon Sing,
40
iI a deIendant's denial is a negative pregnant, it is equivalent to an
admission.
Moreover, respondents' denial oI the allegations in the petition Ior IorIeiture "Ior lack oI knowledge or inIormation suIIicient to Iorm a
belieI as to the truth oI the allegations since respondents were not privy to the transactions" was just a pretense. Mrs. Marcos' privity to
the transactions was in Iact evident Irom her signatures on some oI the vital documents
41
attached to the petition Ior IorIeiture which
Mrs. Marcos Iailed to speciIically deny as required by the rules.
42

It is worthy to note that the pertinent documents attached to the petition Ior IorIeiture were even signed personally by respondent Mrs.
Marcos and her late husband, Ferdinand E. Marcos, indicating that said documents were within their knowledge. As correctly pointed
out by Sandiganbayan Justice Francisco Villaruz, Jr. in his dissenting opinion:
The pattern oI: 1) creating Ioundations, 2) use oI pseudonyms and dummies, 3) approving regulations oI the Foundations Ior
the distribution oI capital and income oI the Foundations to the First and Second beneIiciary (who are no other than FM and
his Iamily), 4) opening oI bank accounts Ior the Foundations, 5) changing the names oI the Foundations, 6) transIerring Iunds
and assets oI the Foundations to other Foundations or Fides Trust, 7) liquidation oI the Foundations as substantiated by the
Annexes U to U-168, Petition |Ior IorIeiture| strongly indicate that FM and/or Imelda were the real owners oI the assets
deposited in the Swiss banks, using the Foundations as dummies.
43

How could respondents thereIore claim lack oI suIIicient knowledge or inIormation regarding the existence oI the Swiss bank deposits
and the creation oI Iive groups oI accounts when Mrs. Marcos and her late husband personally masterminded and participated in the
Iormation and control oI said Ioundations? This is a Iact respondent Marcoses were never able to explain.
Not only that. Respondents' answer also technically admitted the genuineness and due execution oI the Income Tax Returns (ITRs)
and the balance sheets oI the late Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos attached to the petition Ior IorIeiture, as well as the
veracity oI the contents thereoI.
The answer again premised its denials oI said ITRs and balance sheets on the ground oI lack oI knowledge or inIormation suIIicient to
Iorm a belieI as to the truth oI the contents thereoI. Petitioner correctly points out that respondents' denial was not really grounded on
lack oI knowledge or inIormation suIIicient to Iorm a belieI but was based on lack oI recollection. By reviewing their own records,
respondent Marcoses could have easily determined the genuineness and due execution oI the ITRs and the balance sheets. They also
had the means and opportunity oI veriIying the same Irom the records oI the BIR and the OIIice oI the President. They did not.

When matters regarding which respondents claim to have no knowledge or inIormation suIIicient to Iorm a belieI are plainly and
necessarily within their knowledge, their alleged ignorance or lack oI inIormation will not be considered a speciIic denial.
44
An
unexplained denial oI inIormation within the control oI the pleader, or is readily accessible to him, is evasive and is insuIIicient to
constitute an eIIective denial.
45

The Iorm oI denial adopted by respondents must be availed oI with sincerity and in good faith, and certainly not for the purpose of
confusing the adverse party as to what allegations of the petition are really being challenged, nor should it be made for the purpose of
delay.
46
In the instant case, the Marcoses did not only present unsubstantiated assertions but in truth attempted to mislead and deceive
this Court by presenting an obviously contrived deIense.
Simply put, a proIession oI ignorance about a Iact which is patently and necessarily within the pleader's knowledge or means oI
knowing is as ineffective as no denial at all.
47
Respondents' ineIIective denial thus Iailed to properly tender an issue and the averments
contained in the petition Ior IorIeiture were deemed judicially admitted by them.
As held in J.P. Juan & Sons, Inc. vs. Lianga Industries, Inc.:
Its "speciIic denial" oI the material allegation oI the petition without setting Iorth the substance oI the matters relied upon to
support its general denial, when such matters were plainly within its knowledge and it could not logically pretend ignorance
as to the same, thereIore, Iailed to properly tender on issue.
48

Thus, the general denial oI the Marcos children oI the allegations in the petition Ior IorIeiture "Ior lack oI knowledge or inIormation
suIIicient to Iorm a belieI as to the truth oI the allegations since they were not privy to the transactions" cannot rightIully be accepted
as a deIense because they are the legal heirs and successors-in-interest oI Ferdinand E. Marcos and are thereIore bound by the acts oI
their Iather vis-a-vis the Swiss Iunds.
PRE-TRIAL BRIEF DATED OCTOBER 18, 1993
The pre-trial brieI oI Mrs. Marcos was adopted by the three Marcos children. In said brieI, Mrs. Marcos stressed that the Iunds
involved were lawIully acquired. But, as in their answer, they Iailed to state and substantiate how these Iunds were acquired lawIully.
They Iailed to present and attach even a single document that would show and prove the truth oI their allegations. Section 6, Rule 18
oI the 1997 Rules oI Civil Procedure provides:
The parties shall Iile with the court and serve on the adverse party, x x x their respective pre-trial brieIs which shall contain, among
others:
x x x
(d) the documents or exhibits to be presented, stating the purpose thereoI;
x x x
(I) the number and names oI the witnesses, and the substance oI their respective testimonies.
49

It is unquestionably within the court's power to require the parties to submit their pre-trial brieIs and to state the number oI witnesses
intended to be called to the stand, and a brieI summary oI the evidence each oI them is expected to give as well as to disclose the
number oI documents to be submitted with a description oI the nature oI each. The tenor and character oI the testimony oI the
witnesses and oI the documents to be deduced at the trial thus made known, in addition to the particular issues oI Iact and law, it
becomes apparent iI genuine issues are being put Iorward necessitating the holding oI a trial. Likewise, the parties are obliged not only
to make a Iormal identiIication and speciIication oI the issues and their prooIs, and to put these matters in writing and submit them to
the court within the speciIied period Ior the prompt disposition oI the action.
50

The pre-trial brieI oI Mrs. Marcos, as subsequently adopted by respondent Marcos children, merely stated:
x x x
WITNESSES

4.1 Respondent Imelda will present herselI as a witness and reserves the right to present additional witnesses as may be
necessary in the course oI the trial.
x x x
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
5.1 Respondent Imelda reserves the right to present and introduce in evidence documents as may be necessary in the course
oI the trial.
Mrs. Marcos did not enumerate and describe the documents constituting her evidence. Neither the names oI witnesses nor the nature
oI their testimony was stated. What alone appeared certain was the testimony oI Mrs. Marcos only who in Iact had previously claimed
ignorance and lack oI knowledge. And even then, the substance oI her testimony, as required by the rules, was not made known either.
Such cunning tactics oI respondents are totally unacceptable to this Court. We hold that, since no genuine issue was raised, the case
became ripe Ior summary judgment.
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY 1UDGMENT
DATED MARCH 21, 2000
The opposition Iiled by Mrs. Marcos to the motion Ior summary judgment dated March 21, 2000 oI petitioner Republic was merely
adopted by the Marcos children as their own opposition to the said motion. However, it was again not accompanied by aIIidavits,
depositions or admissions as required by Section 3, Rule 35 oI the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure:
x x x The adverse party may serve opposing aIIidavits, depositions, or admissions at least three (3) days beIore hearing. AIter
hearing, the judgment sought shall be rendered Iorthwith iI the pleadings, supporting aIIidavits, depositions, and admissions
on Iile, show that, except as to the amount oI damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material Iact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oI law.
51

The absence oI opposing aIIidavits, depositions and admissions to contradict the sworn declarations in the Republic's motion only
demonstrated that the averments oI such opposition were not genuine and thereIore unworthy oI belieI.
Demurrer 9o Evidence da9ed May 2, 2000;
52

Mo9ions for Reconsidera9ion;
53
and Memoranda
of Mrs. Marcos and 9e Marcos cildren
54

All these pleadings again contained no allegations oI Iacts showing their lawIul acquisition oI the Iunds. Once more, respondents
merely made general denials without alleging Iacts which would have been admissible in evidence at the hearing, thereby Iailing to
raise genuine issues oI Iact.
Mrs. Marcos insists in her memorandum dated October 21, 2002 that, during the pre-trial, her counsel stated that his client was just a
beneIiciary oI the Iunds, contrary to petitioner Republic's allegation that Mrs. Marcos disclaimed ownership oI or interest in the Iunds.
This is yet another indication that respondents presented a Iictitious deIense because, during the pre-trial, Mrs. Marcos and the Marcos
children denied ownership oI or interest in the Swiss Iunds:
PJ Garchitorena:
Make oI record that as Iar as Imelda Marcos is concerned through the statement oI Atty. Armando M. Marcelo that
the US$360 million more or less subject matter oI the instant lawsuit as allegedly obtained Irom the various Swiss
Foundations do not belong to the estate oI Marcos or to Imelda Marcos herselI. That's your statement oI Iacts?
Atty. MARCELO:
Yes, Your Honor.
PJ Garchitorena:

That's it. Okay. Counsel Ior Manotoc and Manotoc, Jr. What is your point here? Does the estate oI Marcos own
anything oI the $360 million subject oI this case.
Atty. TECSON:
We joined the ManiIestation oI Counsel.
PJ Garchitorena:
You do not own anything?
Atty. TECSON:
Yes, Your Honor.
PJ Garchitorena:
Counsel Ior Irene Araneta?
Atty. SISON:
I join the position taken by my other compaeros here, Your Honor.
x x x
Atty. SISON:
Irene Araneta as heir do (sic) not own any oI the amount, Your Honor.
55

We are convinced that the strategy oI respondent Marcoses was to conIuse petitioner Republic as to what Iacts they would prove or
what issues they intended to pose Ior the court's resolution. There is no doubt in our mind that they were leading petitioner Republic,
and now this Court, to perplexity, iI not trying to drag this IorIeiture case to eternity.
Manifes9a9ion da9ed May 26, 1998 filed by MRS.
Marcos; General/Supplemen9al Compromise
Agreemen9 da9ed December 28, 1993
These pleadings oI respondent Marcoses presented nothing but Ieigned deIenses. In their earlier pleadings, respondents alleged either
that they had no knowledge oI the existence oI the Swiss deposits or that they could no longer remember anything as it happened a
long time ago. As to Mrs. Marcos, she remembered that it was lawIully acquired.
In her ManiIestation dated May 26, 1998, Mrs. Marcos stated that:
COMES NOW undersigned counsel Ior respondent Imelda R. Marcos, and beIore this Honorable Court, most respectIully
maniIests:
That respondent Imelda R, Marcos owns 90 oI the subject matter oI the above-entitled case, being the sole beneIiciary oI
the dollar deposits in the name oI the various Ioundations alleged in the case;
That in Iact only 10 oI the subject matter in the above-entitled case belongs to the estate oI the late President Ferdinand E.
Marcos.
In the Compromise/Supplemental Agreements, respondent Marcoses sought to implement the agreed distribution oI the Marcos assets,
including the Swiss deposits. This was, to us, an unequivocal admission oI ownership by the Marcoses oI the said deposits.

But, as already pointed out, during the pre-trial conIerence, respondent Marcoses denied knowledge as well as ownership oI the Swiss
Iunds.
Anyway we look at it, respondent Marcoses have put Iorth no real deIense. The "Iacts" pleaded by respondents, while ostensibly
raising important questions or issues oI Iact, in reality comprised mere verbiage that was evidently wanting in substance and
constituted no genuine issues Ior trial.
We thereIore rule that, under the circumstances, summary judgment is proper.
In Iact, it is the law itselI which determines when summary judgment is called Ior. Under the rules, summary judgment is appropriate
when there are no genuine issues oI Iact requiring the presentation oI evidence in a Iull-blown trial. Even iI on their Iace the pleadings
appear to raise issue, iI the aIIidavits, depositions and admissions show that such issues are not genuine, then summary judgment as
prescribed by the rules must ensue as a matter oI law.
56

In sum, mere denials, iI unaccompanied by any Iact which will be admissible in evidence at a hearing, are not suIIicient to raise
genuine issues oI Iact and will not deIeat a motion Ior summary judgment.
57
A summary judgment is one granted upon motion oI a
party Ior an expeditious settlement oI the case, it appearing Irom the pleadings, depositions, admissions and aIIidavits that there are no
important questions or issues oI Iact posed and, thereIore, the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter oI law. A motion Ior
summary judgment is premised on the assumption that the issues presented need not be tried either because these are patently devoid
oI substance or that there is no genuine issue as to any pertinent Iact. It is a method sanctioned by the Rules oI Court Ior the prompt
disposition oI a civil action where there exists no serious controversy.
58
Summary judgment is a procedural device Ior the prompt
disposition oI actions in which the pleadings raise only a legal issue, not a genuine issue as to any material Iact. The theory oI
summary judgment is that, although an answer may on its Iace appear to tender issues requiring trial, iI it is established by aIIidavits,
depositions or admissions that those issues are not genuine but Iictitious, the Court is justiIied in dispensing with the trial and
rendering summary judgment Ior petitioner.
59

In the various annexes to the petition Ior IorIeiture, petitioner Republic attached sworn statements oI witnesses who had personal
knowledge oI the Marcoses' participation in the illegal acquisition oI Iunds deposited in the Swiss accounts under the names oI Iive
groups or Ioundations. These sworn statements substantiated the ill-gotten nature oI the Swiss bank deposits. In their answer and other
subsequent pleadings, however, the Marcoses merely made general denials oI the allegations against them without stating Iacts
admissible in evidence at the hearing, thereby Iailing to raise any genuine issues oI Iact.
Under these circumstances, a trial would have served no purpose at all and would have been totally unnecessary, thus justiIying a
summary judgment on the petition Ior IorIeiture. There were no opposing aIIidavits to contradict the sworn declarations oI the
witnesses oI petitioner Republic, leading to the inescapable conclusion that the matters raised in the Marcoses' answer were Ialse.
Time and again, this Court has encountered cases like this which are either only halI-heartedly deIended or, iI the semblance oI a
deIense is interposed at all, it is only to delay disposition and gain time. It is certainly not in the interest oI justice to allow respondent
Marcoses to avail oI the appellate remedies accorded by the Rules oI Court to litigants in good Iaith, to the prejudice oI the Republic
and ultimately oI the Filipino people. From the beginning, a candid demonstration oI respondents' good Iaith should have been made
to the court below. Without the deceptive reasoning and argumentation, this protracted litigation could have ended a long time ago.
Since 1991, when the petition Ior IorIeiture was Iirst Iiled, up to the present, all respondents have oIIered are Ioxy responses like "lack
oI suIIicient knowledge or lack oI privity" or "they cannot recall because it happened a long time ago" or, as to Mrs. Marcos, "the
Iunds were lawIully acquired." But, whenever it suits them, they also claim ownership oI 90 oI the Iunds and allege that only 10
belongs to the Marcos estate. It has been an incredible charade Irom beginning to end.
In the hope oI convincing this Court to rule otherwise, respondents Maria Imelda Marcos-Manotoc and Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr.
contend that "by its positive acts and express admissions prior to Iiling the motion Ior summary judgment on March 10, 2000,
petitioner Republic had bound itselI to go to trial on the basis oI existing issues. Thus, it had legally waived whatever right it had to
move Ior summary judgment."
60

We do not think so. The alleged positive acts and express admissions oI the petitioner did not preclude it Irom Iiling a motion Ior
summary judgment.
Rule 35 oI the 1997 Rules oI Civil Procedure provides:

Rule 35
Summary Judgment
Section 1. Summary judgment Ior claimant. - A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to
obtain a declaratory relieI may, a9 a3 9me af9er 9he plead3 3 a3swer 9here9o has bee3 served, move with supporting
aIIidavits, depositions or admissions Ior a summary judgment in his Iavor upon all or any part thereoI.
Section 2. Summary judgment Ior deIending party. - A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted
or a declaratory relieI is sought may, a9 a3 9me, move with supporting aIIidavits, depositions or admissions Ior a summary
judgment in his Iavor as to all or any part thereoI. (Emphasis ours)
61

Under the rule, the plaintiII can move Ior summary judgment "at any time aIter the pleading in answer thereto (i.e., in answer to the
claim, counterclaim or cross-claim) has been served." No Iixed reglementary period is provided by the Rules. How else does one
construe the phrase "any time aIter the answer has been served?"
This issue is actually one oI Iirst impression. No local jurisprudence or authoritative work has touched upon this matter. This being so,
an examination oI Ioreign laws and jurisprudence, particularly those oI the United States where many oI our laws and rules were
copied, is in order.
Rule 56 oI the Federal Rules oI Civil Procedure provides that a party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim
may move Ior summary judgment at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or aIter service oI a
motion Ior summary judgment by the adverse party, and that a party against whom a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim is asserted
may move Ior summary judgment at any time.
However, some rules, particularly Rule 113 oI the Rules oI Civil Practice oI New York, speciIically provide that a motion Ior
summary judgment may not be made until issues have been joined, that is, only aIter an answer has been served.
62
Under said rule,
aIter issues have been joined, the motion Ior summary judgment may be made at any stage of the litigation.
63
No Iixed prescriptive
period is provided.
Like Rule 113 oI the Rules oI Civil Practice oI New York, our rules also provide that a motion Ior summary judgment may not be
made until issues have been joined, meaning, the plaintiII has to wait Ior the answer beIore he can move Ior summary judgment.
64
And
like the New York rules, ours do not provide Ior a Iixed reglementary period within which to move Ior summary judgment.
This being so, the New York Supreme Court's interpretation oI Rule 113 oI the Rules oI Civil Practice can be applied by analogy to
the interpretation oI Section 1, Rule 35, oI our 1997 Rules oI Civil Procedure.
Under the New York rule, aIter the issues have been joined, the motion Ior summary judgment may be made at any stage oI the
litigation. And what exactly does the phrase "at any stage oI the litigation" mean? In Ecker vs. Muzysh,
65
the New York Supreme
Court ruled:
"PER CURIAM.
PlaintiII introduced her evidence and the deIendants rested on the case made by the plaintiII. The case was submitted. Owing
to the serious illness oI the trial justice, a decision was not rendered within sixty days aIter the Iinal adjournment oI the term
at which the case was tried. With the approval oI the trial justice, the plaintiII moved Ior a new trial under Section 442 oI the
Civil Practice Act. The plaintiII also moved Ior summary judgment under Rule 113 oI the Rules oI Civil Practice. %he
mo9o3 was opposed ma3l o3 9he rou3d 9ha9 b proceed3 9o 9ral 9he pla39ff had waved her rh9 9o summar
judme39 and that the answer and the opposing aIIidavits raised triable issues. The amount due and unpaid under the contract
is not in dispute. The Special Term granted both motions and the deIendants have appealed.
The Special Term properly held that the answer and the opposing aIIidavits raised no triable issue. Rule 113 of 9he Rules of
Cvl Prac9ce a3d 9he Cvl Prac9ce Ac9 prescrbe 3o lm9a9o3 as 9o 9he 9me whe3 a mo9o3 for summar judme39 mus9
be made. %he objec9 of Rule 113 s 9o empower 9he cour9 9o summarl de9erm3e whe9her or 3o9 a bo3a fde ssue exs9s
be9wee3 9he par9es a3d 9here s 3o lm9a9o3 o3 9he power of 9he cour9 9o make such a de9erm3a9o3 a9 a3 s9ae of 9he
l9a9o3." (emphasis ours)

On the basis oI the aIorequoted disquisition, "any stage oI the litigation" means that "even iI the plaintiII has proceeded to trial, this
does not preclude him Irom thereaIter moving Ior summary judgment."
66

In the case at bar, petitioner moved Ior summary judgment aIter pre-trial and beIore its scheduled date Ior presentation oI evidence.
Respondent Marcoses argue that, by agreeing to proceed to trial during the pre-trial conIerence, petitioner "waived" its right to
summary judgment.
This argument must Iail in the light oI the New York Supreme Court ruling which we apply by analogy to this case. In Ecker,
67
the
deIendant opposed the motion Ior summary judgment on a ground similar to that raised by the Marcoses, that is, "that plaintiII had
waived her right to summary judgment" by her act oI proceeding to trial. II, as correctly ruled by the New York court, plaintiII was
allowed to move Ior summary judgment even after trial and submission oI the case Ior resolution, more so should we permit it in the
present case where petitioner moved Ior summary judgment before trial.
ThereIore, the phrase "anytime aIter the pleading in answer thereto has been served" in Section 1, Rule 35 oI our Rules oI Civil
Procedure means "at any stage oI the litigation." Whenever it becomes evident at any stage oI the litigation that no triable issue exists,
or that the deIenses raised by the deIendant(s) are sham or Irivolous, plaintiII may move Ior summary judgment. A contrary
interpretation would go against the very objective oI the Rule on Summary Judgment which is to "weed out sham claims or deIenses
thereby avoiding the expense and loss oI time involved in a trial."
68

In cases with political undertones like the one at bar, adverse parties will oIten do almost anything to delay the proceedings in the hope
that a Iuture administration sympathetic to them might be able to inIluence the outcome oI the case in their Iavor. This is rank injustice
we cannot tolerate.
The law looks with disIavor on long, protracted and expensive litigation and encourages the speedy and prompt disposition oI cases.
That is why the law and the rules provide Ior a number oI devices to ensure the speedy disposition oI cases. Summary judgment is one
oI them.
FaithIul thereIore to the spirit oI the law on summary judgment which seeks to avoid unnecessary expense and loss oI time in a trial,
we hereby rule that petitioner Republic could validly move Ior summary judgment any time aIter the respondents' answer was Iiled or,
Ior that matter, at any subsequent stage oI the litigation. The Iact that petitioner agreed to proceed to trial did not in any way prevent it
Irom moving Ior summary judgment, as indeed no genuine issue oI Iact was ever validly raised by respondent Marcoses.
This interpretation conIorms with the guiding principle enshrined in Section 6, Rule 1 oI the 1997 Rules oI Civil Procedure that the
"|r|ules should be liberally construed in order to promote their objective oI securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition oI
every action and proceeding."
69

Respondents Iurther allege that the motion Ior summary judgment was based on respondents' answer and other documents that had
long been in the records oI the case. Thus, by the time the motion was Iiled on March 10, 2000, estoppel by laches had already set in
against petitioner.
We disagree. Estoppel by laches is the Iailure or neglect Ior an unreasonable or unexplained length oI time to do that which, by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, warranting a presumption that the person has abandoned his right or
declined to assert it.
70
In eIIect, thereIore, the principle oI laches is one oI estoppel because "it prevents people who have slept on their
rights Irom prejudicing the rights oI third parties who have placed reliance on the inaction oI the original parties and their successors-
in-interest".
71

A careIul examination oI the records, however, reveals that petitioner was in Iact never remiss in pursuing its case against respondent
Marcoses through every remedy available to it, including the motion Ior summary judgment.
Petitioner Republic initially Iiled its motion Ior summary judgment on October 18, 1996. The motion was denied because oI the
pending compromise agreement between the Marcoses and petitioner. But during the pre-trial conIerence, the Marcoses denied
ownership oI the Swiss Iunds, prompting petitioner to Iile another motion Ior summary judgment now under consideration by this
Court. It was the subsequent events that transpired aIter the answer was Iiled, thereIore, which prevented petitioner Irom Iiling the
questioned motion. It was deIinitely not because oI neglect or inaction that petitioner Iiled the (second) motion Ior summary judgment
years aIter respondents' answer to the petition Ior IorIeiture.

In invoking the doctrine oI estoppel by laches, respondents must show not only unjustiIied inaction but also that some unIair injury to
them might result unless the action is barred.
72

This, respondents Iailed to bear out. In Iact, during the pre-trial conIerence, the Marcoses disclaimed ownership oI the Swiss deposits.
Not being the owners, as they claimed, respondents did not have any vested right or interest which could be adversely aIIected by
petitioner's alleged inaction.
But even assuming Ior the sake oI argument that laches had already set in, the doctrine oI estoppel or laches does not apply when the
government sues as a sovereign or asserts governmental rights.
73
Nor can estoppel validate an act that contravenes law or public
policy.
74

As a Iinal point, it must be emphasized that laches is not a mere question oI time but is principally a question oI the inequity or
unIairness oI permitting a right or claim to be enIorced or asserted.
75
Equity demands that petitioner Republic should not be barred
Irom pursuing the people's case against the Marcoses.
(2) The Propriety oI ForIeiture
The matter oI summary judgment having been thus settled, the issue oI whether or not petitioner Republic was able to prove its case
Ior IorIeiture in accordance with the requisites oI Sections 2 and 3 oI RA 1379 now takes center stage.
The law raises the prima facie presumption that a property is unlawIully acquired, hence subject to IorIeiture, iI its amount or value is
maniIestly disproportionate to the oIIicial salary and other lawIul income oI the public oIIicer who owns it. Hence, Sections 2 and 6 oI
RA 1379
76
provide:
x x x x x x
Section 2. Filing oI petition. Whenever any public oIIicer or employee has acquired during his incumbency an amount or
property which is maniIestly out oI proportion to his salary as such public oIIicer or employee and to his other lawIul income
and the income Irom legitimately acquired property, said property shall be presumed prima facie to have been unlawIully
acquired.
x x x x x x
Sec. 6. Judgment II the respondent is unable to show to the satisIaction oI the court that he has lawIully acquired the
property in question, then the court shall declare such property in question, IorIeited in Iavor oI the State, and by virtue oI
such judgment the property aIoresaid shall become the property oI the State. Provided, That no judgment shall be rendered
within six months beIore any general election or within three months beIore any special election. The Court may, in addition,
reIer this case to the corresponding Executive Department Ior administrative or criminal action, or both.
From the above-quoted provisions oI the law, the Iollowing Iacts must be established in order that IorIeiture or seizure oI the Swiss
deposits may be eIIected:
(1) ownership by the public oIIicer oI money or property acquired during his incumbency, whether it be in his name or
otherwise, and
(2) the extent to which the amount oI that money or property exceeds, i. e., is grossly disproportionate to, the legitimate
income oI the public oIIicer.
That spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos were public oIIicials during the time material to the instant case was never in dispute.
Paragraph 4 oI respondent Marcoses' answer categorically admitted the allegations in paragraph 4 oI the petition Ior IorIeiture as to the
personal circumstances oI Ferdinand E. Marcos as a public oIIicial who served without interruption as Congressman, Senator, Senate
President and President oI the Republic oI the Philippines Irom December 1, 1965 to February 25, 1986.
77
Likewise, respondents
admitted in their answer the contents oI paragraph 5 oI the petition as to the personal circumstances oI Imelda R. Marcos who once
served as a member oI the Interim Batasang Pambansa Irom 1978 to 1984 and as Metro Manila Governor, concurrently Minister oI
Human Settlements, Irom June 1976 to February 1986.
78

Respondent Mrs. Marcos also admitted in paragraph 10 oI her answer the allegations oI paragraph 11 oI the petition Ior IorIeiture
which reIerred to the accumulated salaries oI respondents Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos.
79
The combined accumulated
salaries oI the Marcos couple were reIlected in the CertiIication dated May 27, 1986 issued by then Minister oI Budget and
Management Alberto Romulo.
80
The CertiIication showed that, Irom 1966 to 1985, Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos had
accumulated salaries in the amount oI P1,570,000 and P718,750, respectively, or a total oI P2,288,750:
Ferdinand E. Marcos, as President
1966-1976 at P60,000/year P660,000
1977-1984 at P100,000/year 800,000
1985 at P110,000/year 110,000
P1,570,00
Imelda R. Marcos, as Minister
June 1976-1985 at P75,000/year P718,000
In addition to their accumulated salaries Irom 1966 to 1985 are the Marcos couple's combined salaries Irom January to February 1986
in the amount oI P30,833.33. Hence, their total accumulated salaries amounted to P2,319,583.33. Converted to U.S. dollars on the
basis oI the corresponding peso-dollar exchange rates prevailing during the applicable period when said salaries were received, the
total amount had an equivalent value oI $304,372.43.
The dollar equivalent was arrived at by using the oIIicial annual rates oI exchange oI the Philippine peso and the US dollar Irom 1965
to 1985 as well as the oIIicial monthly rates oI exchange in January and February 1986 issued by the Center Ior Statistical InIormation
oI the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.
Prescinding Irom the aIoresaid admissions, Section 4, Rule 129 oI the Rules oI Court provides that:
Section 4. Judicial admissions An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course oI the proceedings in the
same case does not require prooI. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable
mistake or that no such admission was made.
81

It is settled that judicial admissions may be made: (a) in the pleadings Iiled by the parties; (b) in the course oI the trial either by verbal
or written maniIestations or stipulations; or (c) in other stages oI judicial proceedings, as in the pre-trial oI the case.
82
Thus, Iacts
pleaded in the petition and answer, as in the case at bar, are deemed admissions oI petitioner and respondents, respectively, who are
not permitted to contradict them or subsequently take a position contrary to or inconsistent with such admissions.
83

The sum oI $304,372.43 should be held as the only known lawIul income oI respondents since they did not Iile any Statement oI
Assets and Liabilities (SAL), as required by law, Irom which their net worth could be determined. Besides, under the 1935
Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos as President could not receive "any other emolument Irom the Government or any oI its
subdivisions and instrumentalities".
84
Likewise, under the 1973 Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos as President could "not receive
during his tenure any other emolument Irom the Government or any other source."
85
In Iact, his management oI businesses, like the
administration oI Ioundations to accumulate Iunds, was expressly prohibited under the 1973 Constitution:
Article VII, Sec. 4(2) The President and the Vice-President shall not, during their tenure, hold any other oIIice except when
otherwise provided in this Constitution, nor may they practice any proIession, participate directly or indirectly in the
management oI any business, or be Iinancially interested directly or indirectly in any contract with, or in any Iranchise or
special privilege granted by the Government or any other subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereoI, including any
government owned or controlled corporation.
Article VII, Sec. 11 No Member oI the National Assembly shall appear as counsel beIore any court inIerior to a court with
appellate jurisdiction, x x x. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested Iinancially in any contract with, or in any
Iranchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereoI including
any government owned or controlled corporation during his term oI oIIice. He shall not intervene in any matter beIore any
oIIice oI the government Ior his pecuniary beneIit.

Article IX, Sec. 7 The Prime Minister and Members oI the Cabinet shall be subject to the provision oI Section 11, Article
VIII hereoI and may not appear as counsel beIore any court or administrative body, or manage any business, or practice any
proIession, and shall also be subject to such other disqualiIication as may be provided by law.
Their only known lawIul income oI $304,372.43 can thereIore legally and Iairly serve as basis Ior determining the existence oI a
prima facie case oI IorIeiture oI the Swiss Iunds.
Respondents argue that petitioner was not able to establish a prima facie case Ior the IorIeiture oI the Swiss Iunds since it Iailed to
prove the essential elements under Section 3, paragraphs (c), (d) and (e) oI RA 1379. As the Act is a penal statute, its provisions are
mandatory and should thus be construed strictly against the petitioner and liberally in Iavor oI respondent Marcoses.
We hold that it was not Ior petitioner to establish the Marcoses' other lawIul income or income Irom legitimately acquired property Ior
the presumption to apply because, as between petitioner and respondents, the latter were in a better position to know iI there were such
other sources oI lawIul income. And iI indeed there was such other lawIul income, respondents should have speciIically stated the
same in their answer. InsoIar as petitioner Republic was concerned, it was enough to speciIy the known lawIul income oI respondents.
Section 9 oI the PCGG Rules and Regulations provides that, in determining prima Iacie evidence oI ill-gotten wealth, the value oI the
accumulated assets, properties and other material possessions oI those covered by Executive Order Nos. 1 and 2 must be out oI
proportion to the known lawIul income oI such persons. The respondent Marcos couple did not Iile any Statement oI Assets and
Liabilities (SAL) Irom which their net worth could be determined. Their Iailure to Iile their SAL was in itselI a violation oI law and to
allow them to successIully assail the Republic Ior not presenting their SAL would reward them Ior their violation oI the law.
Further, contrary to the claim oI respondents, the admissions made by them in their various pleadings and documents were valid. It is
oI record that respondents judicially admitted that the money deposited with the Swiss banks belonged to them.
We agree with petitioner that respondent Marcoses made judicial admissions oI their ownership oI the subject Swiss bank deposits in
their answer, the General/Supplemental Agreements, Mrs. Marcos' ManiIestation and Constancia dated May 5, 1999, and the
Undertaking dated February 10, 1999. We take note oI the Iact that the Associate Justices oI the Sandiganbayan were unanimous in
holding that respondents had made judicial admissions oI their ownership oI the Swiss Iunds.
In their answer, aside Irom admitting the existence oI the subject Iunds, respondents likewise admitted ownership thereoI. Paragraph
22 oI respondents' answer stated:
22. Respondents speciIically DENY PARAGRAPH 23 insoIar as it alleges that respondents clandestinely stashed the
country's wealth in Switzerland and hid the same under layers and layers oI Ioundations and corporate entities Ior being Ialse,
the truth being that responden9s' aforesaid proper9ies were lawfully acquired. (emphasis supplied)
By qualiIying their acquisition oI the Swiss bank deposits as lawIul, respondents unwittingly admitted their ownership thereoI.
Respondent Mrs. Marcos also admitted ownership oI the Swiss bank deposits by Iailing to deny under oath the genuineness and due
execution oI certain actionable documents bearing her signature attached to the petition. As discussed earlier, Section 11, Rule 8
86
oI
the 1997 Rules oI Civil Procedure provides that material averments in the complaint shall be deemed admitted when not speciIically
denied.
The General
87
and Supplemental
88
Agreements executed by petitioner and respondents on December 28, 1993 Iurther bolstered the
claim oI petitioner Republic that its case Ior IorIeiture was proven in accordance with the requisites oI Sections 2 and 3 oI RA 1379.
The whereas clause in the General Agreement declared that:
WHEREAS, the FIRST PARTY has obtained a judgment Irom the Swiss Federal Tribunal on December 21, 1990, that the
$356 million belongs in principle to the Republic oI the Philippines provided certain conditionalities are met, but even aIter 7
years, the FIRST PARTY has not been able to procure a Iinal judgment oI conviction against the PRIVATE PARTY.
While the Supplemental Agreement warranted, inter alia, that:
In consideration oI the Ioregoing, the parties hereby agree that the PRIVATE PARTY shall be entitled to the equivalent oI
25 oI the amount that may be eventually withdrawn Irom said $356 million Swiss deposits.

The stipulations set Iorth in the General and Supplemental Agreements undeniably indicated the maniIest intent oI respondents to
enter into a compromise with petitioner. Corollarily, respondents' willingness to agree to an amicable settlement with the Republic
only aIIirmed their ownership oI the Swiss deposits Ior the simple reason that no person would acquiesce to any concession over such
huge dollar deposits iI he did not in Iact own them.
Respondents make much capital oI the pronouncement by this Court that the General and Supplemental Agreements were null and
void.
89
They insist that nothing in those agreements could thus be admitted in evidence against them because they stood on the same
ground as an accepted oIIer which, under Section 27, Rule 130
90
oI the 1997 Rules oI Civil Procedure, provides that "in civil cases, an
oIIer oI compromise is not an admission oI any liability and is not admissible in evidence against the oIIeror."
We Iind no merit in this contention. The declaration oI nullity oI said agreements was premised on the Iollowing constitutional and
statutory inIirmities: (1) the grant oI criminal immunity to the Marcos heirs was against the law; (2) the PCGG's commitment to
exempt Irom all Iorms oI taxes the properties to be retained by the Marcos heirs was against the Constitution; and (3) the government's
undertaking to cause the dismissal oI all cases Iiled against the Marcoses pending beIore the Sandiganbayan and other courts
encroached on the powers oI the judiciary. The reasons relied upon by the Court never in the least bit even touched on the veracity
and truthfulness of respondents admission with respect to their ownership of the Swiss funds. Besides, having made certain
admissions in those agreements, respondents cannot now deny that they voluntarily admitted owning the subject Swiss Iunds,
notwithstanding the Iact that the agreements themselves were later declared null and void.
The Iollowing observation oI Sandiganbayan Justice Catalino Castaeda, Jr. in the decision dated September 19, 2000 could not have
been better said:
x x x The declaration oI nullity oI the two agreements rendered the same without legal eIIects but it did not detract Irom the
admissions oI the respondents contained therein. Otherwise stated, the admissions made in said agreements, as quoted above,
remain binding on the respondents.
91

A written statement is nonetheless competent as an admission even iI it is contained in a document which is not itselI eIIective Ior the
purpose Ior which it is made, either by reason oI illegality, or incompetency oI a party thereto, or by reason oI not being signed,
executed or delivered. Accordingly, contracts have been held as competent evidence oI admissions, although they may be
unenIorceable.
92

The testimony oI respondent Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. during the hearing on the motion Ior the approval oI the Compromise Agreement
on April 29, 1998 also lent credence to the allegations oI petitioner Republic that respondents admitted ownership oI the Swiss bank
accounts. We quote the salient portions oI Ferdinand Jr.'s Iormal declarations in open court:
ATTY. FERNANDO:
Mr. Marcos, did you ever have any meetings with PCGG Chairman Magtanggol C. Gunigundo?
F. MARCOS, JR.:
Yes. I have had very many meetings in Iact with Chairman.
ATTY. FERNANDO:
Would you recall when the Iirst meeting occurred?
PJ GARCHITORENA:
In connection with what?
ATTY. FERNANDO:
In connection with the ongoing talks to compromise the various cases initiated by PCGG against your Iamily?
F. MARCOS, JR.:

The nature oI our meetings was solely concerned with negotiations towards achieving some kind oI agreement
between the Philippine government and the Marcos Iamily. The discussions that led up to the compromise
agreement were initiated by our then counsel Atty. Simeon Mesina x x x.
93

xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. FERNANDO:
What was your reaction when Atty. Mesina inIormed you oI this possibility?
F. MARCOS, JR.:
My reaction to all oI these approaches is that I am always open, we are always open, we are very much always in
search oI resolution to the problem oI the Iamily and any approach that has been made us, we have entertained. And
so my reaction was the same as what I have always . why not? Maybe this is the one that will Iinally put an end to
this problem.
94

xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. FERNANDO:
Basically, what were the true amounts oI the assets in the bank?
PJ GARCHITORENA:
So, we are talking about liquid assets here? Just Cash?
F. MARCOS, JR.:
Well, basically, any assets. Anything that was under the Marcos name in any oI the banks in Switzerland which may
necessarily be not cash.
95

xxx xxx xxx
PJ GARCHITORENA:
x x x What did you do in other words, aIter being apprised oI this contract in connection herewith?
F. MARCOS, JR.:
I assumed that we are beginning to implement the agreement because this was Iorwarded through the Philippine
government lawyers through our lawyers and then, subsequently, to me. I was a little surprised because we hadn't
really discussed the details oI the transIer oI the Iunds, what the bank accounts, what the mechanism would be. But
nevertheless, I was happy to see that as Iar as the PCGG is concerned, that the agreement was perIected and that we
were beginning to implement it and that was a source oI satisIaction to me because I thought that Iinally it will be
the end.
96

Ferdinand Jr.'s pronouncements, taken in context and in their entirety, were a conIirmation oI respondents' recognition oI their
ownership oI the Swiss bank deposits. Admissions oI a party in his testimony are receivable against him. II a party, as a witness,
deliberately concedes a Iact, such concession has the Iorce oI a judicial admission.
97
It is apparent Irom Ferdinand Jr.'s testimony that
the Marcos Iamily agreed to negotiate with the Philippine government in the hope oI Iinally putting an end to the problems besetting
the Marcos Iamily regarding the Swiss accounts. This was doubtlessly an acknowledgment oI ownership on their part. The rule is that
the testimony on the witness stand partakes oI the nature oI a Iormal judicial admission when a party testiIies clearly and
unequivocally to a Iact which is peculiarly within his own knowledge.
98

In her ManiIestation
99
dated May 26, 1998, respondent Imelda Marcos Iurthermore revealed the Iollowing:

That respondent Imelda R. Marcos owns 90 oI the subject matter oI the above-entitled case, being the sole beneIiciary oI
the dollar deposits in the name oI the various Ioundations alleged in the case;
That in Iact only 10 oI the subject matter in the above-entitled case belongs to the estate oI the late President Ferdinand E.
Marcos;
xxx xxx xxx
Respondents' ownership oI the Swiss bank accounts as borne out by Mrs. Marcos' maniIestation is as bright as sunlight. And her claim
that she is merely a beneIiciary oI the Swiss deposits is belied by her own signatures on the appended copies oI the documents
substantiating her ownership oI the Iunds in the name oI the Ioundations. As already mentioned, she Iailed to speciIically deny under
oath the authenticity oI such documents, especially those involving "William Saunders" and "Jane Ryan" which actually reIerred to
Ferdinand Marcos and Imelda Marcos, respectively. That Iailure oI Imelda Marcos to speciIically deny the existence, much less the
genuineness and due execution, oI the instruments bearing her signature, was tantamount to a judicial admission oI the genuineness
and due execution oI said instruments, in accordance with Section 8, Rule 8
100
oI the 1997 Rules oI Civil Procedure.
Likewise, in her Constancia
101
dated May 6, 1999, Imelda Marcos prayed Ior the approval oI the Compromise Agreement and the
subsequent release and transIer oI the $150 million to the rightIul owner. She Iurther made the Iollowing maniIestations:
xxx xxx xxx
2. The Republic's cause oI action over the Iull amount is its IorIeiture in Iavor oI the government iI Iound to be ill-gotten. On
the other hand, the Marcoses deIend that it is a legitimate asset. ThereIore, both parties have an inchoate right oI ownership
over the account. II it turns out that the account is oI lawIul origin, the Republic may yield to the Marcoses. Conversely, the
Marcoses must yield to the Republic. (underscoring supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
3. Consistent with the Ioregoing, and the Marcoses having committed themselves to helping the less Iortunate, in the interest
oI peace, reconciliation and unity, deIendant MADAM IMELDA ROMUALDEZ MARCOS, in Iirm abidance thereby,
hereby aIIirms her agreement with the Republic Ior the release and transIer oI the US Dollar 150 million Ior proper
disposition, without prejudice to the Iinal outcome oI the litigation respecting the ownership oI the remainder.
Again, the above statements were indicative oI Imelda's admission oI the Marcoses' ownership oI the Swiss deposits as in Iact "the
Marcoses deIend that it (Swiss deposits) is a legitimate (Marcos) asset."
On the other hand, respondents Maria Imelda Marcos-Manotoc, Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. and Maria Irene Marcos-Araneta Iiled a
motion
102
on May 4, 1998 asking the Sandiganbayan to place the res (Swiss deposits) in custodia legis:
7. Indeed, the prevailing situation is Iraught with danger! Unless the aIoresaid Swiss deposits are placed in custodia legis or
within the Court's protective mantle, its dissipation or misappropriation by the petitioner looms as a distinct possibility.
Such display oI deep, personal interest can only come Irom someone who believes that he has a marked and intimate right over the
considerable dollar deposits. Truly, by Iiling said motion, the Marcos children revealed their ownership oI the said deposits.
Lastly, the Undertaking
103
entered into by the PCGG, the PNB and the Marcos Ioundations on February 10, 1999, conIirmed the
Marcoses' ownership oI the Swiss bank deposits. The subject Undertaking brought to light their readiness to pay the human rights
victims out oI the Iunds held in escrow in the PNB. It stated:
WHEREAS, the Republic oI the Philippines sympathizes with the plight oI the human rights victims-plaintiIIs in the
aIorementioned litigation through the Second Party, desires to assist in the satisIaction oI the judgment awards oI said human
rights victims-plaintiIIs, by releasing, assigning and or waiving US$150 million oI the Iunds held in escrow under the Escrow
Agreements dated August 14, 1995, although the Republic is not obligated to do so under Iinal judgments oI the Swiss courts
dated December 10 and 19, 1997, and January 8, 1998;
WHEREAS, the Third Party is likewise willing to release, assign and/or waive all its rights and interests over said US$150
million to the aIorementioned human rights victims-plaintiIIs.

All told, the Ioregoing disquisition negates the claim oI respondents that "petitioner Iailed to prove that they acquired or own the
Swiss Iunds" and that "it was only by arbitrarily isolating and taking certain statements made by private respondents out oI context
that petitioner was able to treat these as judicial admissions." The Court is Iully aware oI the relevance, materiality and implications oI
every pleading and document submitted in this case. This Court careIully scrutinized the prooIs presented by the parties. We analyzed,
assessed and weighed them to ascertain iI each piece oI evidence rightIully qualiIied as an admission. Owing to the Iar-reaching
historical and political implications oI this case, we considered and examined, individually and totally, the evidence oI the parties,
even iI it might have bordered on Iactual adjudication which, by authority oI the rules and jurisprudence, is not usually done by this
Court. There is no doubt in our mind that respondent Marcoses admitted ownership oI the Swiss bank deposits.
We have always adhered to the Iamiliar doctrine that an admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making
such admission and becomes conclusive on him, and that all prooIs submitted by him contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith should
be ignored, whether an objection is interposed by the adverse party or not.
104
This doctrine is embodied in Section 4, Rule 129 oI the
Rules oI Court:
SEC. 4. Judicial admissions. - An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course oI the proceedings in the same
case, does not require prooI. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake
or that no such admission was made.
105

In the absence oI a compelling reason to the contrary, respondents' judicial admission oI ownership oI the Swiss deposits is deIinitely
binding on them.
The individual and separate admissions oI each respondent bind all oI them pursuant to Sections 29 and 31, Rule 130 oI the Rules oI
Court:
SEC. 29. Admission by co-partner or agent. - The act or declaration oI a partner or agent oI the party within the scope oI his
authority and during the existence oI the partnership or agency, may be given in evidence against such party aIter the
partnership or agency is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The same rule applies to the act or declaration
oI a joint owner, joint debtor, or other person jointly interested with the party.
106

SEC. 31. Admission by privies. - Where one derives title to property Irom another, the act, declaration, or omission oI the
latter, while holding the title, in relation to the property, is evidence against the Iormer.
107

The declarations oI a person are admissible against a party whenever a "privity oI estate" exists between the declarant and the party,
the term "privity oI estate" generally denoting a succession in rights.
108
Consequently, an admission oI one in privity with a party to
the record is competent.
109
Without doubt, privity exists among the respondents in this case. And where several co-parties to the record
are jointly interested in the subject matter oI the controversy, the admission oI one is competent against all.
110

Respondents insist that the Sandiganbayan is correct in ruling that petitioner Republic has Iailed to establish a prima facie case Ior the
IorIeiture oI the Swiss deposits.
We disagree. The sudden turn-around oI the Sandiganbayan was really strange, to say the least, as its Iindings and conclusions were
not borne out by the voluminous records oI this case.
Section 2 oI RA 1379 explicitly states that "whenever any public oIIicer or employee has acquired during his incumbency an amount
oI property which is maniIestly out oI proportion to his salary as such public oIIicer or employee and to his other lawIul income and
the income Irom legitimately acquired property, said property shall be presumed prima facie to have been unlawIully acquired. x x x"
The elements which must concur Ior this prima facie presumption to apply are:
(1) the oIIender is a public oIIicer or employee;
(2) he must have acquired a considerable amount oI money or property during his incumbency; and
(3) said amount is maniIestly out oI proportion to his salary as such public oIIicer or employee and to his other lawIul income
and the income Irom legitimately acquired property.
It is undisputed that spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos were Iormer public oIIicers. Hence, the Iirst element is clearly extant.

The second element deals with the amount oI money or property acquired by the public oIIicer during his incumbency. The Marcos
couple indubitably acquired and owned properties during their term oI oIIice. In Iact, the Iive groups oI Swiss accounts were
admittedly owned by them. There is prooI oI the existence and ownership oI these assets and properties and it suIIices to comply with
the second element.
The third requirement is met iI it can be shown that such assets, money or property is maniIestly out oI proportion to the public
oIIicer's salary and his other lawIul income. It is the prooI oI this third element that is crucial in determining whether a prima facie
presumption has been established in this case.
Petitioner Republic presented not only a schedule indicating the lawIul income oI the Marcos spouses during their incumbency but
also evidence that they had huge deposits beyond such lawIul income in Swiss banks under the names oI Iive diIIerent Ioundations.
We believe petitioner was able to establish the prima facie presumption that the assets and properties acquired by the Marcoses were
manifestly and patently disproportionate to their aggregate salaries as public oIIicials. Otherwise stated, petitioner presented enough
evidence to convince us that the Marcoses had dollar deposits amounting to US $356 million representing the balance oI the Swiss
accounts oI the Iive Ioundations, an amount way, way beyond their aggregate legitimate income oI only US$304,372.43 during their
incumbency as government oIIicials.
Considering, thereIore, that the total amount oI the Swiss deposits was considerably out oI proportion to the known lawIul income oI
the Marcoses, the presumption that said dollar deposits were unlawIully acquired was duly established. It was suIIicient Ior the
petition Ior IorIeiture to state the approximate amount oI money and property acquired by the respondents, and their total government
salaries. Section 9 oI the PCGG Rules and Regulations states:
Prima Facie Evidence. Any accumulation oI assets, properties, and other material possessions oI those persons covered by
Executive Orders No. 1 and No. 2, whose value is out oI proportion to their known lawIul income is prima Iacie deemed ill-
gotten wealth.
Indeed, the burden oI prooI was on the respondents to dispute this presumption and show by clear and convincing evidence that the
Swiss deposits were lawIully acquired and that they had other legitimate sources oI income. A presumption is prima facie prooI oI the
Iact presumed and, unless the Iact thus prima facie established by legal presumption is disproved, it must stand as proved.
111

Respondent Mrs. Marcos argues that the Ioreign Ioundations should have been impleaded as they were indispensable parties without
whom no complete determination oI the issues could be made. She asserts that the Iailure oI petitioner Republic to implead the
Ioundations rendered the judgment void as the joinder oI indispensable parties was a sine qua non exercise oI judicial power.
Furthermore, the non-inclusion oI the Ioreign Ioundations violated the conditions prescribed by the Swiss government regarding the
deposit oI the Iunds in escrow, deprived them oI their day in court and denied them their rights under the Swiss constitution and
international law.
112

The Court Iinds that petitioner Republic did not err in not impleading the Ioreign Ioundations. Section 7, Rule 3 oI the 1997 Rules oI
Civil Procedure,
113
taken Irom Rule 19b oI the American Federal Rules oI Civil Procedure, provides Ior the compulsory joinder oI
indispensable parties. Generally, an indispensable party must be impleaded Ior the complete determination oI the suit. However,
Iailure to join an indispensable party does not divest the court oI jurisdiction since the rule regarding indispensable parties is Iounded
on equitable considerations and is not jurisdictional. Thus, the court is not divested oI its power to render a decision even in the
absence oI indispensable parties, though such judgment is not binding on the non-joined party.
114

An indispensable party
115
has been deIined as one:
|who| must have a direct interest in the litigation; and iI this interest is such that it cannot be separated Irom that oI the parties
to the suit, iI the court cannot render justice between the parties in his absence, iI the decree will have an injurious eIIect upon
his interest, or iI the Iinal determination oI the controversy in his absence will be inconsistent with equity and good
conscience.
There are two essential tests oI an indispensable party: (1) can relieI be aIIorded the plaintiII without the presence oI the other party?
and (2) can the case be decided on its merits without prejudicing the rights oI the other party?
116
There is, however, no Iixed Iormula
Ior determining who is an indispensable party; this can only be determined in the context and by the Iacts oI the particular suit or
litigation.

In the present case, there was an admission by respondent Imelda Marcos in her May 26, 1998 ManiIestation beIore the
Sandiganbayan that she was the sole beneIiciary oI 90 oI the subject matter in controversy with the remaining 10 belonging to the
estate oI Ferdinand Marcos.
117
Viewed against this admission, the Ioreign Ioundations were not indispensable parties. Their non-
participation in the proceedings did not prevent the court Irom deciding the case on its merits and according Iull relieI to petitioner
Republic. The judgment ordering the return oI the $356 million was neither inimical to the Ioundations' interests nor inconsistent with
equity and good conscience. The admission oI respondent Imelda Marcos only conIirmed what was already generally known: that the
Ioundations were established precisely to hide the money stolen by the Marcos spouses Irom petitioner Republic. It negated whatever
illusion there was, iI any, that the Ioreign Ioundations owned even a nominal part oI the assets in question.
The rulings oI the Swiss court that the Ioundations, as Iormal owners, must be given an opportunity to participate in the proceedings
hinged on the assumption that they owned a nominal share oI the assets.
118
But this was already reIuted by no less than Mrs. Marcos
herselI. Thus, she cannot now argue that the ruling oI the Sandiganbayan violated the conditions set by the Swiss court. The directive
given by the Swiss court Ior the Ioundations to participate in the proceedings was Ior the purpose oI protecting whatever nominal
interest they might have had in the assets as Iormal owners. But inasmuch as their ownership was subsequently repudiated by Imelda
Marcos, they could no longer be considered as indispensable parties and their participation in the proceedings became unnecessary.
In Republic vs. Sandiganbayan,
119
this Court ruled that impleading the Iirms which are the res oI the action was unnecessary:
"And as to corporations organized with ill-gotten wealth, but are not themselves guilty oI misappropriation, Iraud or other
illicit conduct in other words, the companies themselves are not the object or thing involved in the action, the res thereoI
there is no need to implead them either. Indeed, their impleading is not proper on the strength alone oI their having been
Iormed with ill-gotten Iunds, absent any other particular wrongdoing on their part.
Such showing oI having been Iormed with, or having received ill-gotten Iunds, however strong or convincing, does not,
without more, warrant identiIying the corporations in question with the person who Iormed or made use oI them to give the
color or appearance oI lawIul, innocent acquisition to illegally amassed wealth at the least, not so as place on the
Government the onus oI impleading the Iormer with the latter in actions to recover such wealth. Distinguished in terms oI
juridical personality and legal culpability Irom their erring members or stockholders, said corporations are not themselves
guilty oI the sins oI the latter, oI the embezzlement, asportation, etc., that gave rise to the Government's cause oI action Ior
recovery; their creation or organization was merely the result oI their members' (or stockholders') manipulations and
maneuvers to conceal the illegal origins oI the assets or monies invested therein. In this light, they are simply the res in the
actions Ior the recovery oI illegally acquired wealth, and there is, in principle, no cause oI action against them and no ground
to implead them as deIendants in said actions."
Just like the corporations in the aIorementioned case, the Ioreign Ioundations here were set up to conceal the illegally acquired Iunds
oI the Marcos spouses. Thus, they were simply the res in the action Ior recovery oI ill-gotten wealth and did not have to be impleaded
Ior lack oI cause oI action or ground to implead them.
Assuming arguendo, however, that the Ioundations were indispensable parties, the Iailure oI petitioner to implead them was a curable
error, as held in the previously cited case oI Republic vs. Sandiganbayan:
120

"Even in those cases where it might reasonably be argued that the Iailure oI the Government to implead the sequestered
corporations as deIendants is indeed a procedural abberation, as where said Iirms were allegedly used, and actively
cooperated with the deIendants, as instruments or conduits Ior conversion oI public Iunds and property or illicit or Iraudulent
obtention oI Iavored government contracts, etc., slight reIlection would nevertheless lead to the conclusion that the deIect is
not Iatal, but one correctible under applicable adjective rules e.g., Section 10, Rule 5 oI the Rules oI Court |speciIying the
remedy oI amendment during trial to authorize or to conIorm to the evidence|; Section 1, Rule 20 |governing amendments
beIore trial|, in relation to the rule respecting omission oI so-called necessary or indispensable parties, set out in Section 11,
Rule 3 oI the Rules oI Court. It is relevant in this context to advert to the old Iamiliar doctrines that the omission to implead
such parties "is a mere technical deIect which can be cured at any stage oI the proceedings even aIter judgment"; and that,
particularly in the case oI indispensable parties, since their presence and participation is essential to the very liIe oI the action,
Ior without them no judgment may be rendered, amendments oI the complaint in order to implead them should be Ireely
allowed, even on appeal, in Iact even aIter rendition oI judgment by this Court, where it appears that the complaint otherwise
indicates their identity and character as such indispensable parties."
121

Although there are decided cases wherein the non-joinder oI indispensable parties in Iact led to the dismissal oI the suit or the
annulment oI judgment, such cases do not jibe with the matter at hand. The better view is that non-joinder is not a ground to dismiss
the suit or annul the judgment. The rule on joinder oI indispensable parties is Iounded on equity. And the spirit oI the law is reIlected

in Section 11, Rule 3

122
oI the 1997 Rules oI Civil Procedure. It prohibits the dismissal oI a suit on the ground oI non-joinder or
misjoinder oI parties and allows the amendment oI the complaint at any stage oI the proceedings, through motion or on order oI the
court on its own initiative.
123

Likewise, jurisprudence on the Federal Rules oI Procedure, Irom which our Section 7, Rule 3
124
on indispensable parties was copied,
allows the joinder oI indispensable parties even aIter judgment has been entered iI such is needed to aIIord the moving party Iull
relieI.
125
Mere delay in Iiling the joinder motion does not necessarily result in the waiver oI the right as long as the delay is
excusable.
126
Thus, respondent Mrs. Marcos cannot correctly argue that the judgment rendered by the Sandiganbayan was void due to
the non-joinder oI the Ioreign Ioundations. The court had jurisdiction to render judgment which, even in the absence oI indispensable
parties, was binding on all the parties beIore it though not on the absent party.
127
II she really Ielt that she could not be granted Iull
relieI due to the absence oI the Ioreign Ioundations, she should have moved Ior their inclusion, which was allowable at any stage oI
the proceedings. She never did. Instead she assailed the judgment rendered.
In the Iace oI undeniable circumstances and the avalanche oI documentary evidence against them, respondent Marcoses Iailed to
justiIy the lawIul nature oI their acquisition oI the said assets. Hence, the Swiss deposits should be considered ill-gotten wealth and
IorIeited in Iavor oI the State in accordance with Section 6 oI RA 1379:
SEC. 6. Judgment.- II the respondent is unable to show to the satisIaction oI the court that he has lawIully acquired the
property in question, then the court shall declare such property IorIeited in Iavor oI the State, and by virtue oI such judgment
the property aIoresaid shall become property oI the State x x x.
THE FAILURE TO PRESENT AUTHENTICATED TRANSLATIONS OF THE SWISS DECISIONS
Finally, petitioner Republic contends that the Honorable Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena committed grave
abuse oI discretion in reversing himselI on the ground that the original copies oI the authenticated Swiss decisions and their
authenticated translations were not submitted to the court a quo. Earlier PJ Garchitorena had quoted extensively Irom the unoIIicial
translation oI one oI these Swiss decisions in his ponencia dated July 29, 1999 when he denied the motion to release US$150 Million
to the human rights victims.
While we are in reality perplexed by such an incomprehensible change oI heart, there might nevertheless not be any real need to
belabor the issue. The presentation oI the authenticated translations oI the original copies oI the Swiss decision was not de rigueur Ior
the public respondent to make Iindings oI Iact and reach its conclusions. In short, the Sandiganbayan's decision was not dependent on
the determination oI the Swiss courts. For that matter, neither is this Court's.
The release oI the Swiss Iunds held in escrow in the PNB is dependent solely on the decision oI this jurisdiction that said Iunds belong
to the petitioner Republic. What is important is our own assessment oI the suIIiciency oI the evidence to rule in Iavor oI either
petitioner Republic or respondent Marcoses. In this instance, despite the absence oI the authenticated translations oI the Swiss
decisions, the evidence on hand tilts convincingly in Iavor oI petitioner Republic.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Resolution oI the Sandiganbayan dated January 31, 2002 is SET
ASIDE. The Swiss deposits which were transIerred to and are now deposited in escrow at the Philippine National Bank in the
estimated aggregate amount oI US$658,175,373.60 as oI January 31, 2002, plus interest, are hereby IorIeited in Iavor oI petitioner
Republic oI the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
avide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martine:, Carpio-Morales, Callefo, Sr., A:cuna, and Tinga, JJ.,
concur.
Puno, and Jitug, JJ., in the result
Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierre:, J., on oIIicial leave.
Carpio, J., no part.

ROSY A. TECIO
Republic oI the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 143736 Augus9 11, 2004
OFELIA HERRERA-FELIX, Represen9ed by 1OVITA HERRERA-SEA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and ST. 1OSEPH RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT, INC., respondents.

R E S O L U T I O N

CALLE1O, SR. .
This is a petition Ior review on certiorari assailing the Decision
1
oI the Court oI Appeals which dismissed the petition to annul the
Decision
2
oI the Regional Trial Court oI Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch 73, in Civil Case No. 1967, on the ground oI lack oI
jurisdiction over the person oI herein petitioner OIelia Herrera-Felix.
Te An9eceden9s
On March 11, 1993, respondent St. Joseph Resource Development, Inc. Iiled a complaint Ior sum oI money against the Spouses
Restituto and OIelia Felix with a prayer Ior a writ oI preliminary attachment. It was alleged therein that, during the period Irom
November 16, 1992 to December 14, 1992, the Felix Spouses purchased Irom the respondent tubs oI assorted Iish, as Iollows:
Date oI Purchase Amount oI Fish Purchased
November 16, 1992 P 183,360.00
November 17, 1992 114,380.00
November 19, 1992 56,014.00
November 20, 1992 183,400.00
December 2, 1992 70,000.00
December 3, 1992 159,100.00
December 5, 1992 73,500.00
December 8, 1992 79,025.50
December 9, 1992 275,190.00
December 11, 1992 102,840.00

December 12, 1992 78,300.00

December 13, 1992 108,692.00
December 14, 1992 32,379.50
Total . . . . . P 1,516,181.00
It was also alleged that the Felix Spouses still had an outstanding obligation amounting to P1,132,065.50, aIter deducting their total
payment oI P438,615.50 Irom their aggregate purchases. The respondent prayed that, aIter due proceedings, judgment be rendered in
its Iavor, thus:
WHEREFORE, it is respectIully prayed that judgment be rendered in Iavor oI plaintiII and against deIendants, ordering the
latter to pay the Iormer the Iollowing:
1. P1,132,065.50, representing their unpaid obligation, including unpaid tubs, plus legal interest Irom the date oI Iiling oI the
complaint;
2. Attorney's Iees equivalent to 25 oI the Ioregoing amount; and
3. Costs oI suit.
PlaintiII likewise prays that a writ oI preliminary attachment be issued ex parte against the properties oI deIendants as
security Ior the satisIaction oI any judgment that may be recovered.
Other just and equitable relieI is also prayed Ior.
3

The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 1967.
The trial court granted the respondent's prayer Ior a writ oI preliminary attachment on a bond oI P1,132,065.50 which was posted on
March 26, 1993. The SheriII levied and took custody oI some oI the personal properties oI the Felix Spouses. On March 26, 1993, a
copy oI the writ oI preliminary attachment, summons and complaint were served on them at their residence, through the sister oI
OIelia Herrera-Felix, Ma. Luisa Herrera.
4
According to the SheriII's Return, OIelia Herrera-Felix was out oI the country, as per the
inIormation relayed to him by Ma. Luisa Herrera. On April 5, 1993, the Felix Spouses, through Atty. Celestino C. Juan, Iiled a motion
praying Ior an extension oI time to Iile their answer to the complaint.
5
On April 6, 1993, the trial court issued an Order granting the
motion. However, the Felix Spouses Iailed to Iile their answer to the complaint. The respondent then Iiled a Motion dated April 23,
1993 to declare the said spouses in deIault,
6
which motion was granted by the court in its Resolution
7
dated May 13, 1993. A copy oI
the said resolution was sent to and received by the counsel oI the Felix Spouses through registered mail.
On August 11, 1993, the court a quo rendered a decision in Iavor oI the respondent, the decretal portion oI which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering:
1. The deIendants to pay, jointly and severally, the plaintiIIs the amount oI ONE MILLION SEVENTY-SEVEN
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED SIXTY-FIVE PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (P1,077,565.50) plus legal rate oI
interest Irom the date oI the Iiling oI the complaint;
2. The deIendants to pay, jointly and severally, the amount of TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P25,000.00) as/Ior
reasonable Attorney's Iees;
3. The deIendants to pay the costs oI this suit.
SO ORDERED.
8

Copies oI the said decision were mailed to the Felix Spouses and their counsel, Atty. Celestino C. Juan, by registered mail. The copy
oI the decision addressed to the spouses was returned to the court aIter two notices Ior having been "Unclaimed." However, then
counsel Ior the Felix Spouses received his copy oI the decision.
The decision oI the trial court became Iinal and executory aIter the Felix Spouses Iailed to appeal the same. The respondent Iiled a
motion Ior a writ oI execution. A copy thereoI was served on the said spouses by registered mail, but they Iailed to oppose the motion.
The court thereaIter issued an order granting the motion and directing the issuance oI a writ oI execution. The counsel Ior the Felix
Spouses received a copy oI the said order. ThereaIter, the Iollowing personal properties oI the latter were levied upon and sold by the
sheriII at public auction Ior P83,200.00 to the respondent as the winning bidder:
(1) unit Jeep-semi stainless
(1) unit Jeep-stainless
(1) Victor-Radio/TV/Cassette Recorder
(1) Sony "17" TV w/ remote control
(1) Kawai Electric Organ
(3) Hitachi Stand Fan
(1) Standard Desk Fan
(1) 6 pieces Sala Set.
9

On August 14, 1995, the SheriII executed a CertiIicate oI Sale oI personal properties.
10

On September 13, 1996, petitioner OIelia Herrera-Felix, represented by another sister, Jovita Herrera-Sea, Iiled a petition with the
Court oI Appeals under Rule 47 oI the Rules oI Court Ior the nulliIication oI the trial court's judgment by deIault, the writ oI execution
issued by the said court, and the sale oI her properties at public auction. The petitioner alleged, inter alia, that the complaint and
summons were handed over to her sister, Ma. Luisa Herrera, who was merely a visitor in her house and, as such, was not a valid
substituted service under Rule 14, Section 7 oI the Rules oI Court. She also alleged that her husband Restituto Felix had died as early
as April 23, 1988, as evidenced by his CertiIicate oI Death.
11

In its comment on the petition, the respondent alleged that the substituted service oI the complaint and summons on the petitioner,
who was then temporarily outside the Philippines, through her sister Ma. Luisa Herrera, was valid and eIIective. The respondent,
likewise, averred that even iI such substituted service on the petitioner was deIective, the deIect was cured when the latter, through her
counsel, Atty. Celestino C. Juan, appeared in court and moved Ior an extension oI time to Iile her responsive pleading. The respondent
also maintained that the petitioner and her counsel were served with copies oI the decision oI the court a quo, but that the petitioner
Iailed to appeal the decision.
In her reply to the comment oI the respondent, the petitioner alleged that since she Iailed to Iile a responsive pleading to the complaint,
the appearance oI Atty. Celestino C. Juan, as her counsel, did not constitute as a voluntary submission to the jurisdiction oI the court.
On June 7, 2000, the CA rendered a decision, the dispositive portion oI which reads:
EREFORE, premises considered, Iinding that the court a quo validly acquired jurisdiction over the action and absent any
ground warranting the annulment oI its judgment, this petition is hereby DISMISSED Ior lack oI merit
SO ORDERED.
12

The petitioner, through her sister, Jovita Herrera-Sea, now comes to this Court via a petition Ior review on certiorari praying Ior the
reversal oI the decision oI the Court oI Appeals. She alleges that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over her person through the
service oI the complaint and summons on her sister, Ma. Luisa Herrera. She maintains that the latter was a mere visitor in her house,
not a resident therein; hence, the decision oI the trial court is null and void. She Iurther alleges that even assuming the validity oI the

trial court's decision, such decision never became Iinal and executory since she was not served a copy oI the same. As such, the writ oI
execution issued by the trial court, the sale oI her personal properties at public auction, as well as the issuance oI the CertiIicate oI
Sale, are null and void. She asserts that the actuations oI both the trial court and the SheriII deprived her oI her right to due process.
The contentions oI the petitioner have no merit.
The court acquires jurisdiction over the person oI the deIendant by service oI the complaint and summons on him, either by personal
service or by substituted service or by extra-territorial service thereoI or by his voluntary personal appearance beIore the court or
through counsel. In this case, the petitioner appeared before the court, through counsel, and filed a motion for extension of time to file
her answer to the complaint which the trial court granted. She even admitted in the said motion that she was served with a copy oI the
complaint as well as the summons. The admissions made in a motion are judicial admissions which are binding on the party who made
them. Such party is precluded Irom denying the same unless there is prooI oI palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.
13

By Iiling the said motion, through counsel, the petitioner thereby submitted herselI to the jurisdiction oI the trial court. Indeed, in
Busuego vs. Court oI Appeals,
14
we ruled that:
A voluntary appearance is a waiver oI the necessity oI a Iormal notice. An appearance in whatever form, without explicitly
obfecting to the furisdiction of the court over the person, is a submission to the furisdiction of the court over the person.
While the Iormal method oI entering an appearance in a cause pending in the courts is to deliver to the clerk a written
direction ordering him to enter the appearance oI the person who subscribes it, an appearance may be made by simply filing a
formal motion, or plea or answer. This Iormal method oI appearance is not necessary. He may appear without such Iormal
appearance and thus submit himselI to the jurisdiction oI the court. He may appear by presenting a motion, for example, and
unless by such appearance he specifically obfects to the furisdiction of the court, he thereby gives his assent to the
furisdiction of the court over his person. When the appearance is by motion objecting to the jurisdiction oI the court over his
person, it must be Ior the sole and separate purpose oI objecting to the jurisdiction oI the court. If his motion is for any other
purpose than to obfect to the furisdiction of the court over his person, he thereby submits himself to the furisdiction of the
court.
15

Equally barren oI Iactual basis is the claim oI the petitioner that she was not served with a copy oI the decision oI the trial court. The
records show that aside Irom the copy oI the decision sent to her by the Branch Clerk oI Court by registered mail, another copy oI the
decision was served on her through her counsel, Atty. Celestino C. Juan, who received the same. The service oI the decision on the
petitioner, through counsel, is binding on her, conIormably to Rule 13, Section 2 oI the Rules oI Court.
16

We reject the petitioner's plaint oI having been deprived oI her right to due process.
The essence oI due process is a reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit evidence in support oI one's deIense. What the law
proscribes, thereIore, is the lack oI opportunity to be heard.
17
A party who opts not to avail oI the opportunity to answer cannot
complain oI procedural due process. There can be no denial oI due process where a party had the opportunity to participate in the
proceedings but Iailed to do so through his own Iault.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE. The assailed decision oI the Court oI Appeals dated June 7, 2000 is hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martine:, Tinga, and Chico-Na:ario, JJ., concur.

ROSY A. TECIO
Republic oI the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 155508 Sep9ember 11, 2006
HEIRS OF PEDRO CLEMEA Y ZURBANO, petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF IRENE B. BIEN, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CORONA, .
The only question presented in this petition Ior review on certiorari
1
is whether petitioners, the heirs oI Pedro Clemea y Zurbano,
should be made to pay respondents, the heirs oI Irene B. Bien, compensatory damages Ior depriving them oI the owner's share oI the
harvest Irom a tract oI riceland in Bolo, Municipality oI Tiwi, Albay.
This piece oI land, described in Tax Declaration No. 5299 (TD 5299) as having a surIace area oI more or less 20,644 square meters,
was one oI three lots
2
involved in two consolidated cases
3
Ior recovery oI possession and ownership Iiled in the 1940s by respondents'
predecessor Irene Bien (through her attorney-in-Iact Gregorio Clemea) against petitioners'
predecessor Pedro Clemea y Zurbano. The pertinent averments in Irene Bien's complaint read:
|T|he plaintiII is x x x the absolute owner oI a parcel oI land situated in the province oI Albay described and limited as
Iollows:
"Una parcela de terreno arrozal en el sitio de Bolo, Municipio de Tiwi, Provincia de Albay, con una extension
superIicial de 20,644 metros cuadrados poco mas o menos, lindante al Norte - Eulalio Copino y Esteban Bobis; al
Este Pedro Clemea y Conde; al Sur Canal de Ragadio y Valentina Conde; y al Oeste Marcial Copino, Pedro
Clemea y Valentina Conde.
Declared as Tax No. 5299 and assessed at P310.00"
|T|he plaintiII acquired the above parcel oI land by purchase Irom Victoriano Napa as per deed oI sale in her Iavor x x x; and
the said Victoriano Napa in turn acquired the same by purchase Irom Francisco Barrameda who also bought the said land
Irom the administrator oI the estate oI Pedro Clemea y Conde which sale had been duly authorized and approved by this
Honorable Court in Civil Case No. 3410-In re The Estate oI Pedro Clemea y Conde x x x;
|T|he deIendant ever since he was removed as administrator oI the Estate oI Pedro Clemea y Conde in the year 1939
deliberately continued to occupy and usurp the possession and use oI the above described parcel oI land x x x, and has ever
since reIused to relinquish the possession oI the same to the lawIul owner thereoI notwithstanding the Iact that he has no right
or any color oI title over the said land;
|B|y reason oI this unlawIul occupation and usurpation by the deIendant, the plaintiII will suIIer damages and in Iact has
suIIered damages beginning this October 1943 harvest at the rate oI 25 cavans oI palay per harvest or 50 cavans yearly x x x
4

In his answer, Pedro Clemea y Zurbano alleged that the land was his and that it was in his exclusive possession.
5
His claim oI
ownership was similarly based on a sale by the estate oI the late Pedro Clemea y Conde to his predecessor-in-interest.
Neither one oI the original parties lived to see the end oI the trial. The plaintiII, Irene Bien, passed away in 1953 and was substituted
by

respondents.
6
Not long aIter that, petitioners succeeded the deIendant Pedro Clemea y Zurbano who died in 1955.
7
The trial lasted
decades. Eventually, the cases were re-raIIled to Branch 2
8
oI the Regional Trial Court (RTC) oI Legaspi City in November oI 1994.
On August 10, 1995, the RTC rendered a decision
9
declaring petitioners to be the absolute owners oI the land described in TD 5299
and directing respondents to respect petitioners' possession thereoI.
10
Subsequently, however, the RTC reconsidered its Iindings with
respect to ownership. This time, it ruled that the contending parties had Iailed to prove their respective claims oI ownership and
thereIore the land in question still belonged to its original owner, the estate oI the late Pedro Clemea y Conde. Thus, in an order dated
November 13, 1995,
11
the RTC modiIied the dispositive portion oI its decision to read:
1. Considering that the parcel covered by |TD| No. 5299, the other parcel subject matter oI Civil Case No. 115, is not
included among those parcels sold by the estate oI the late Pedro Clemea y Conde to Francisco Barameda, the predecessor
oI the original plaintiII Irene Bien and neither was it included in the sale executed by Special Administrator Salustiano
Zubeldia in Iavor oI Jesus Salazar, the predecessor-in-interest oI the deIendants |petitioners|, the same still Iorms part oI the
estate oI the late Pedro Clemea y Conde. Neither the plaintiIIs |respondents| nor the deIendants |petitioners| own the same.
2. Considering that the deIendants |petitioners,| in their opposition to the motion Ior reconsideration, no longer disputes (sic)
the ownership oI the plaintiIIs |respondents| as regards the parcel covered by |TD| No. 5681, subject matter oI Civil Case
No. 74, plaintiIIs |respondents| are declared the owners thereoI, as stated in the decision. As regards the claim Ior damages
by the plaintiIIs |respondents|, since it was not duly established that the deIendants |petitioners| entered and occupied a
portion oI said property, no damage is just the same awarded.
3. Considering that the parcel oI land covered by |TD| No. 5685 is included in the sale executed by Special Administrator
Salustiano Zubeldia to Jesus Salazar, and Iurther considering that said deed oI sale is earlier than the sale executed in Iavor oI
Mr. Francisco Barameda, the deIendants |petitioners| are declared the owners thereoI and thereIore entitled to its possession.
No damages having been proved, no award concerning is awarded (sic).
SO ORDERED.
12

From that order, respondents appealed to the Court oI Appeals (CA). It was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 50912. In a decision dated
April 4, 2002,
13
the CA aIIirmed the RTC's resolution oI the issues relating to the other two parcels oI land but reversed the ruling on
the ownership oI the land covered by TD 5299. It proceeded to award respondents P118,000 in damages as compensation Ior their
having been deprived oI possession and the owner's share in the harvest. The Iindings on which this award was based were stated in
the appellate court's decision:
|T|he recovered exhibits oI the appellants |respondents| clearly indicate that ownership thereoI belongs to |them| by virtue oI
the Iollowing documents oI sale x x x. Hence, the appellants |respondents| are the owners oI the property covered by Tax
Declaration No. 5299. The remaining issue to be determined is the amount oI damages sustained by appellants |respondents|
Irom appellees' |petitioners'| retention oI possession thereoI.
Gregorio Clemea testiIied on the damages incurred Irom the appellees' occupation oI the property in the Iorm oI deprivation
oI the owner's share oI the harvest, to wit:
"Q This second parcel oI land described in the SECOND cause oI action which is Tax No. 5299, what kind oI land
is this?
A Riceland.
Q How big is this parcel oI land?
A More or less, two (2) hectares.
Q What is the average owner's share oI the harvest?
A About IiIty cavans oI palay.
xxx xxx xxx

Q From the time you Iiled this case in the year 1943, who had been receiving the owner's share Irom this property,
known as Tax No. 5299?
A The late Pedro Clemea y Zurbano when he was still alive and then his children aIter his death."
He likewise testiIied on the changes in the price oI a cavan oI palay over the years, thus:
"Q What was the current average price oI palay aIter liberation, starting Irom the year 1945 up to 1950?
A About FiIteen (P15.00) Pesos a sack.
Q How about aIter 1950 to 1960?
A The same.
Q How about Irom 1960 to 1970?
A At present, it is Twenty Five (P25.00) Pesos per cavan."
xxx xxx xxx
We believe, in the exercise oI discretion, that the |respondents| are entitled to an award oI damages in the amount oI
P118,000 computed in the Iollowing manner: P1,500.00 (50 cavans multiplied by two |the number of harvests in a year|
multiplied by P15.00) multiplied by 27 years (1943 to 1970) and P2,700.00 (50 cavans multiplied by two |the number of
harvests in a year| multiplied by P25.00) multiplied by 31 years (1971-2001).
WHEREFORE, the appeal is partly granted in that the Order, dated November 13, 1995, oI the Regional Trial Court oI
Legazpi City, Branch II, in two consolidated cases, docketed as Civil Case Nos. 74 and 155, is aIIirmed with the modiIication
that paragraph 1 is deleted and replaced with the Iollowing:
"1. Appellants |respondents| are hereby DECLARED entitled to the ownership oI the property covered by Tax
Declaration No. 5299. The appellees |petitioners| and all persons claiming under them are hereby ORDERED to
vacate this tract oI land immediately and to turn over the possession oI such land together with all improvements
thereon to appellants. Appellees |petitioners| are Iurther directed to pay to appellants |respondents| the amount oI
one hundred and eighteen thousand pesos (P118,000.00), by way oI actual and compensatory damages, with legal
interest thereon Irom the date oI Iinality oI this decision until actual payment thereoI."
14

Petitioners' motion Ior reconsideration was denied in a resolution dated October 1, 2002.
15
Hence, this petition.
Petitioners no longer dispute respondents' ownership oI the property covered by TD 5299. They insist, however, that they cannot be
held liable to respondents Ior the harvest because (1) they never took possession oI the property declared in TD 5299 and (2) the
evidence the CA relied on to determine the amount oI damages, proceeding as it did Irom one oI the plaintiIIs, was selI-serving and
thereIore could not have been a proper basis Ior such an award.
The petition is devoid oI merit.
Petitioners' contention that the land was never in their possession should be dismissed outright Ior two reasons, both oI them simple
and rather obvious.
First, petitioners' predecessor Pedro Clemea y Zurbano alleged in his answer that the land declared in TD 5299 was in his exclusive
possession.
16
That statement, insoIar as it conIirmed the allegation in the complaint that petitioners' predecessor had retained
possession oI the land in question,
17
took on the character oI a judicial admission contemplated in Section 4, Rule 129 oI the Rules oI
Court:

An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course oI proceedings in the same case, does not require prooI. The
admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was
made.
18

A judicial admission conclusively binds the party making it. He cannot thereaIter contradict it. The exception is Iound only in those
rare instances when the trial court, in the exercise oI its discretion and because oI strong reasons to support its stand, may relieve a
party Irom the consequences oI his admission.
19

The rule on judicial admissions Iound its way into black-letter law only in 1964
20
but its content is supplied by case law much older
and in many instances more explicit than the present codal expression. In the early case oI Irlanda v. Pitargue,
21
this Court laid down
the doctrine that acts or Iacts admitted do not require prooI and cannot be contradicted unless it can be shown that the admission was
made through palpable mistake. The rule was more Iorcibly stated by Mr. Justice Street in the 1918 decision Ramire: v. Orientalist
Co.:
22

An admission made in a pleading can not be controverted by the party making such admission; and all prooI submitted by
him contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith should simply be ignored by the court, whether objection is interposed by the
opposite party or not.
23

And in Cunanan v. Amparo,
24
the Court declared that:
the allegations, statements, or admissions contained in a pleading are conclusive as against the pleader. A party cannot
subsequently take a position contrary to, or inconsistent with, his pleadings.
25

Petitioners' newly-contrived assertion that they were never in possession oI the land cannot hold up against these pronouncements. As
substituting deIendants, they were bound by the admission oI Pedro Clemea y Zurbano, their predecessor in the litigation.
26
Without
any showing that the admission was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made, petitioners cannot now
contradict it.
Second, the issue oI whether petitioners ever had possession oI the land is undeniably a question oI Iact. Questions oI this nature
cannot be raised in a petition Ior review on certiorari as the remedy is conIined to pure questions oI law.
27

The Court is well aware, oI course, that this rule has been watered down by a slew oI exceptions. Hoping to convince the Court to
reverse the CA's Iindings, petitioners invoke a number oI these exceptions, namely: (1) the Iactual Iindings oI the trial court and the
CA are contradictory; (2) the decision sought to be reviewed is against the law and in complete disregard oI the rules on evidence; (3)
there was grave abuse oI discretion in the appreciation oI Iacts; and (4) the CA Iailed to notice relevant Iacts and evidence which iI
properly considered would justiIy a diIIerent conclusion.
28
But this case does not Iall within any oI these. For one, petitioners have
shown no contradiction between the Iindings oI the CA and the RTC on the matter. And Ior obvious reasons, our preceding
disquisition on the conclusiveness oI Pedro Clemea y Zurbano's admission oI the Iact oI possession makes the rest oI the grounds
invoked by petitioners undeserving oI even passing consideration.
Petitioners' next proposition, i.e., that Gregorio Clemea's testimony was selI-serving and thereIore an improper basis Ior the damages
awarded to respondents, is just as unworthy oI this Court's Iavorable consideration.
"SelI-serving evidence," perhaps owing to its descriptive Iormulation, is a concept much misunderstood. Not inIrequently, the term is
employed as a weapon to devalue and discredit a party's testimony Iavorable to his cause. That, it seems, is the sense in which
petitioners are using it now. This is a grave error. "SelI-serving evidence" is not to be taken literally to mean any evidence that serves
its proponent's interest.
29
The term, iI used with any legal sense, reIers only to acts or declarations made by a party in his own interest
at some place and time out of court, and it does not include testimony that he gives as a witness in court.
30
Evidence oI this sort is
excluded on the same ground as any hearsay evidence, that is, lack oI opportunity Ior cross-examination by the adverse party and on
the consideration that its admission would open the door to Iraud and Iabrication.
31
In contrast, a party's testimony in court is sworn
and subject to cross-examination by the other party,
32
and thereIore, not susceptible to an objection on the ground that it is selI-
serving.
At any rate, Ior all their protestations against the use oI Gregorio Clemea's testimony, petitioners never once alleged, much less tried
to show, that his testimony was inaccurate or untrue. As already observed, petitioners' objection is Iounded solely on the mere Iact that
he, being a plaintiII, was a witness interested in the outcome oI the case. Now, it is true that a party's interest may to some extent aIIect

his credibility as a witness.

33
To insist otherwise would be the height oI naivete. Nonetheless, the Court cannot subscribe to the view,
implicit in petitioners' argument, that a party's
testimony Iavorable to himselI must be disregarded on account solely oI his interest in the case. Our justice system will not survive
such a rule Ior obdurate cynicism on the part oI a court is just as odious to the administration oI justice as utter gullibility.
Moreover, this Court held in National evelopment Company v. orkmens Compensation Commission
34
that interest alone is not a
ground Ior disregarding a party's testimony.
35
Elsewhere it has been said that the interest oI a witness does not ipso facto deprive his
testimony oI probative Iorce or require it to be disregarded, and the trier oI Iacts is entitled to accept as much oI the witness' testimony
as he Iinds credible and to reject the rest.
36
To these dicta we give our complete assent. Petitioners' arguments to the contrary must be
rejected.
In view oI the Ioregoing, we hold that the appellate court committed no reversible error in relying on Gregorio Clemea's testimony.
The award oI damages must stand.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The April 4, 2002 decision and October 1, 2002 resolution oI the Court oI Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 50912 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierre:, A:cuna, Garcia, J.J., concur.

ROSY A. TECIO
Republic oI the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 168071 December 18, 2006
LUCIANO TAN, petitioner,
vs.
RODIL ENTERPRISES, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, .
The instant Petition Ior Review on Certiorari assails the Decision
1
dated 21 October 2002 and the Resolution
2
dated 12 May 2005 oI
the Court oI Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67201, which set aside the 18 June 2001 Decision
3
oI the Regional Trial Court (RTC) oI
Manila, Branch 26 in Civil Case No. 01-99797. The RTC reversed the 6 October 2000 Decision
4
oI the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) oI Manila, Branch 13 in Civil Case No. 166584, and dismissed the Complaint Iiled by respondent Rodil Enterprises against
petitioner Luciano Tan Ior utter lack oI merit.
This case has its origin Irom the Complaint
5
Ior UnlawIul Detainer Iiled on 13 March 2000 by Rodil Enterprises against Luciano Tan
with the MeTC oI Manila, Branch 13, docketed as Civil Case No. 166584.
The Iactual antecedents to the Iiling oI the Complaint show that Rodil Enterprises is a lessee oI the subject premises, the Ides O`Racca
Building since 1959. The Ides O`Racca Building, located at the corner oI M. de Santos and Folgueras Streets in Binondo, Manila, is
owned by the Republic oI the Philippines. On 18 May 1992, Rodil Enterprises and the Republic, through the Department oI
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), entered into a Renewal oI a Contract oI Lease over the Ides O`Racca Building. A
subsequent Supplementary Contract dated 25 May 1992 was similarly entered into, thus, extending the lease agreement until 1
September 1997.
The validity oI the 18 May 1992 and the 25 May 1992 contracts was placed in question in several actions involving Rodil Enterprises,
the Ides O`Racca Building Tenants Association, Inc., and other tenants. This Court upheld the validity oI the aIoresaid contracts in a
Decision rendered on 29 November 2001, in the consolidated cases oI Rodil Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, Carmen Bondoc,
Teresita Bondoc-Esto, ivisoria Footwear and Chua Huay Soon (G.R. No. 129609) and Rodil Enterprises, Inc. v. Ides ORacca
Building Tenants Association, Inc. (G.R. No. 135537).
6

Prior thereto, the OIIice oI the President in OP Case No. 4968 entitled, Spouses Saturnino B. Alvare: and Epifania Binay Alvare: v.
Rodil Enterprises Company, Inc. rendered a Decision
7
dated 8 February 1994, declaring the Renewal oI Contract oI Lease and the
Supplementary Contract, dated 18 May 1992 and 25 May 1992, respectively, oI no Iorce and eIIect.
It appears that Rodil Enterprises appealed the 8 February 1994 Decision to the Court oI Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 34586
which was dismissed by the appellate court Ior non-compliance with procedural requirements. The dismissal was appealed by Rodil
Enterprises to the Supreme Court, docketed as G.R. No. 119711 which was also dismissed. Subsequently, the OIIice oI the President
issued an Order oI Execution oI its 8 February 1994 Decision in OP Case No. 4968. ThereaIter, Rodil Enterprises Iiled a Petition Ior
Review on Certiorari with the Court oI Appeals on the Order oI Execution, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No 79157. The Court oI Appeals
rendered a Decision therein dated 28 March 2005 which annulled the Order oI Execution, and enjoined the OIIice oI the President
Irom enIorcing its 8 February 1994 Decision in OP Case No. 4968. Likewise, the Court oI Appeals ordered the OIIice oI the President
to abide by the 29 November 2001 Decision oI the Supreme Court in the consolidated cases oI G.R. No. 129609 and G.R. No. 135537,
upholding the validity oI the Renewal oI Contract oI Lease and the Supplemental Contract, dated 18 May 1992 and the 25 May 1992,
respectively. Finally, the Decision oI the Court oI Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79157 was brought on certiorari by the Ides O`Racca
Building Tenants Association, Inc. to the Supreme Court, and docketed as G.R. No. 169892. On 25 January 2006, the Court, in G.R.
No. 169892, issued a Resolution denying the Petition. On 20 March 2006, a Resolution was rendered in the same case denying with
Iinality the amended Motion Ior Reconsideration.

Meanwhile, during the pendency oI the preceding cases, on 18 October 1999, a subsequent Contract oI Lease was drawn between
Rodil Enterprises and the Republic, the same to be eIIective retroactively Irom 1 September 1997 to 21 August 2012 at a monthly
rental oI P65,206.67, subject to adjustment upon the approval oI a new appraisal covering the Ides O`Racca Building. Rodil
Enterprises subleased various units oI the property to members oI the Ides O`Racca Building Tenants Association, Inc. A space
thereoI, known as Botica Divisoria was subleased to herein petitioner, Luciano Tan.
In Rodil Enterprises` Complaint Ior UnlawIul Detainer Iiled against Luciano Tan, the Iormer alleged that Luciano Tan bound himselI
to pay under a Contract oI Sublease, the amount oI P13,750.00 as monthly rentals, representing the reasonable use and occupancy oI
the said premises. However, Luciano Tan unjustiIiably and unreasonably reIused to pay the rentals Irom September 1997 up to the
time oI the Iiling oI the Complaint, and despite repeated oral and written demands, reIused to vacate the premises and to pay the rents
due. Rodil Enterprises prayed that Luciano Tan and those claiming rights under him be ordered to vacate the leased premises. A
payment oI rentals in arrears, amounting to P385,000.00 was similarly sought, including attorney`s Iees and litigation costs, as well as,
subsequent monthly rentals in the amount oI P13,750.00 until Luciano Tan vacates Botica Divisoria.
In his Answer, Luciano Tan insists that he is a legitimate tenant oI the government who owns the Ides O`Racca Building and not oI
Rodil Enterprises. As such, he has the right to lease the said premises pending the disposition and sale oI the building. He based his
claim on the Iact that on 8 February 1994, the OIIice oI the President in OP Case No. 4968, had declared the Renewal oI Contract oI
Lease dated 18 May 1992 and the Supplemental Contract dated 25 May 1992 between Rodil Enterprises and the Republic to be
without Iorce and eIIect. Accordingly, the DENR was directed to award the lease contract in Iavor oI the Ides O`Racca Building
Tenants Association, Inc. oI which Luciano Tan is a member. He, thus, prayed Ior the dismissal oI the Complaint, and Ior the return oI
whatever amount Rodil Enterprises had collected Irom 1987 to 1997, or during such time when he was still paying rentals to the latter.
On 27 June 2000, the MeTC issued an Order, recognizing an agreement entered into in open court by Luciano Tan and Rodil
Enterprises. The Order, inter alia, declared, thus:
On second call, the parties and counsel agreed in principle in open court to the Iollowing terms to put an end to this civil case
Ior ejectment between them:
1.) that |Luciano Tan| will pay P440,000.00 representing rentals Irom September, 1997 up to the present, which is the
outstanding obligation oI |Luciano Tan| as oI June, 2000, on or beIore June 30, 2000; and
2.) |Luciano Tan| will pay the monthly rentals computed at P13,750.00 on or beIore the 5
th
day oI each month aIter June 30,
2000.
8

On 14 August 2000, Luciano Tan Iiled a Motion to Allow DeIendant to Deposit Rentals,
9
averring therein that he had agreed to pay all
the rentals due on the subject premises and to pay the subsequent monthly rentals as they Iall due; that the rentals in arrears Irom
September 1997 amounted to P467,500.00; and in line with his good Iaith in dealing with Rodil Enterprises, he would like to deposit
the aIoresaid amount, and the subsequent monthly rentals as they Iall due. He prayed that he be allowed to deposit the Manager`s
Check Ior the amount oI P467,500.00, made payable to the City Treasurer oI Manila. However, on 15 August 2000, the MeTC denied
the Motion on the rationalization that Luciano Tan`s prayer to deposit the speciIied sum with the City Treasurer oI Manila contravenes
Section 19,
10
Rule 70 oI the 1997 Rules oI Civil Procedure.
Subsequently, the issues Ior the resolution oI the MeTC were synthesized by the court in its Order, dated 25 July 2000, to wit:
|T|he issue insoIar as |Rodil Enterprises|, revolved on:
"Whether |Rodil Enterprises| is legally entitled to collect Irom |Luciano Tan| the amount oI rentals and interest
thereon as prayed Ior in the complaint and to ask Ior the ejectment oI the deIendant Irom the leased premises."
On the other hand, |Luciano Tan|`s counsel Iormulated the issues oI the case in the Iollowing manner|,| to wit:
1) Whether or not under the circumstances|,||Luciano Tan| could be ejected Irom the premises in question;
2) Whether or not under the circumstances|,| |Rodil Enterprises| should be made to return the amounts collected
Irom |Luciano Tan| Irom 1987 to 1997 amounting to P988,650.00.
11

On 6 October 2000, the MeTC rendered a Decision in Iavor oI Rodil Enterprises. The court said that Luciano Tan did not contest the
sublease on a monthly basis, and in Iact admitted in judicio, viz:
1.) That |Luciano Tan| will pay P440,000.00 representing rentals Irom September 1997 up to the present, which is the
outstanding obligation oI the deIendant as oI June, 2000, on or beIore June 30, 2000; and
2) ||Luciano Tan| will pay the monthly rentals computed at P13,750.00, on or beIore the 5
th
day oI each month aIter June 30,
2000.
(Order dated June 27, 2000)
12

According to the MeTC, notwithstanding the evidentiary norm in civil cases that an oIIer oI compromise is not an admission oI any
liability, and is not admissible in evidence against the oIIeror, the court cannot overlook the Irank representations by Luciano Tan`s
counsel oI the Iormer`s liability in the Iorm oI rentals, coupled with a proposal to liquidate.
13
The Ioregoing gestures, as appreciated
by the MeTC, were akin to an admission oI a Iact, like the existence oI a debt which can serve as prooI oI the loan, and was thus,
admissible.
14
The court pronounced that Luciano Tan had explicitly acknowledged his liability Ior the periodic consideration Ior the
use oI the subleased property. Estoppel, thus, precludes him Irom disavowing the Iact oI lease implied Irom the tender oI payment Ior
the rentals in arrears.
15
The MeTC, explained Iurther:
Prescinding Irom the Ioregoing discourse, it ineluctably Iollows that |Luciano Tan|`s indiIIerence to heed the two demand
letters, the cognition oI which were recognized (paragraphs VII and IX, Complaint; paragraph 2, Answer), rendered him a
deIorciant (1 Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 6
th
Revised Edition, 1997, page 770, citing Dikit vs. Ycasiano, 89 Phil.
44), and was thus vulnerable to the special civil action under Section 1, Rule 70 oI the 1997 Rules oI Civil Procedure,
especially so when non-payment oI rentals is an accepted prelude to, and a secondary matrix Ior, a tenant`s eviction (Article
1673 (2), New Civil Code).
From a diIIerent plane, |Luciano Tan|`s quest at this juncture Ior recovery oI the rentals he paid to the plaintiII Irom 1987 to
1997 will not merit the desired result since, in a manner oI speaking, it will place the cart ahead oI the horse, when
juxtaposed with another pending controversy between the parties beIore the Supreme Court (Annex "1," Position Paper Ior
the DeIendant; Annex "B," Answer to Counterclaim).
The decretal portion oI the Decision, states, viz:
WHEREFORE, in view oI the Ioregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered in Iavor oI |Rodil Enterprises|, ordering:
1. DeIendant Luciano Tan, and all persons claiming rights under him, to vacate the subject realty, and to peaceIully deliver
possession to the plaintiII`s representative;
2. DeIendant |Luciano Tan| to pay the sum oI FOUR HUNDRED FORTY THOUSAND PESOS (P440,000.00) as
recognized unpaid rentals Irom September, 1997 up to June 30, 2000;
3. DeIendant |Luciano Tan| to pay the sum oI THIRTEEN THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (P13,750.00)
as agreed rental per month, starting July, 2000, and every month thereaIter, until possession is delivered to the plaintiII`s
representative;
4. DeIendant |Luciano Tan| to pay the sum oI FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) as reasonable attorney`s Iees; and
5. DeIendant |Luciano Tan| to pay the cost oI suit.
For want oI merit, deIendant`s counterclaim is hereby DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
16

Aggrieved thereby, Luciano Tan appealed the Decision to the RTC. Meanwhile, Rodil Enterprises Iiled a Motion Ior Issuance oI Writ
oI Execution,
17
which was subsequently denied by the MeTC in the Order
18
oI 15 December 2000.

On 18 June 2001, the RTC rendered a Decision reversing the judgment appealed Irom and dismissing the Complaint. It Iound that the
MeTC erred in holding that the oIIer to compromise by Luciano Tan`s counsel was akin to an admission oI Iact, the same being
contrary to Section 27,
19
Rule 130 oI the 1997 Rules oI Civil Procedure. As reasoned by the RTC:
During the pre-trial conIerence held in the lower court, proposals and counter-proposals emanated Irom the parties` counsels,
which was normally inspired by the desire to "buy peace", nay, to put an end to the troubles oI litigation, and to promote
settlement oI disputes as a matter oI public policy. The act oI deIendant/appellant`s (sic) in the midst oI pre-trial is not an
admission oI any liability and thereIore, should not be considered admissible evidence against him.
20

Proceeding to the issue oI the right oI Rodil Enterprises to collect rentals and eject Luciano Tan based on the contracts, dated 18 May
1992 and 25 May 1992, the RTC ruled that the controversy is still pending beIore the Supreme Court. It, thus, held that the prayer Ior
recovery oI rentals Irom 1987 to 1997 is premature.
The RTC, disposed, as Iollows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed Irom is hereby REVERSED, and a new judgment is hereby entered
DISMISSING the complaint in Civil Case No. 166584 Ior utter lack oI merit.
21

Subsequently, Rodil Enterprises Iiled a Petition Ior Review with the appellate court, which, in a Decision dated 21 October 2002 set
aside the judgment oI the RTC, and aIIirmed and reinstated the 6 October 2000 Decision oI the MeTC.
According to the appellate court, there is, between Rodil Enterprises and the Republic oI the Philippines, a valid and subsisting
Contract oI Lease executed on 18 October 1999, the same Ior a period oI IiIteen (15) years.
22
The period oI the lease, under the 18
October 1999 contract is Irom 1 September 1997 to 31 August 2012. The Court oI Appeals gave credence to the Iact that the existence
oI the aIoresaid contract was not denied nor controverted by Luciano Tan. What Luciano Tan, instead, impugned was the validity oI
the contracts dated 18 and 25 May 1992, which was upheld by this Court in the consolidated cases oI Rodil Enterprises, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals, Carmen Bondoc, Teresita Bondoc-Esto, ivisoria Footwear and Chua Huay Soon (G.R. No. 129609) and Rodil
Enterprises, Inc. v. Ides ORacca Building Tenants Association, Inc. (G.R. No. 135537).
23

Ruling on the more important question oI whether Luciano Tan made a judicial admission anent his liability as a sublessee oI Rodil
Enterprises, the Court oI Appeals held that the Iormer made an implied admission oI the existence oI a contract oI sublease between
him and Rodil Enterprises on the subject premises; and that he had reneged in the payment oI rentals since 1 September 1997.
Moreover, it deemed Luciano Tan`s Motion to Allow DeIendant to Deposit Rentals as another admission in Iavor oI Rodil
Enterprises. The appellate court elucidated, thus:
The evidence on record indubitably shows that respondent |Luciano Tan| is a sublessee oI petitioner |Rodil Enterprises| who
Iailed to pay rentals Irom 01 September 1997 and even until the case was Iiled beIore the |M|etropolitan |T|rial |C|ourt,
when respondent |Luciano Tan| "agreed in principle in open court" to the Iollowing terms:
1) that the deIendant |Luciano Tan| will pay P440,000.00 representing rentals Irom September, 1997 up to the
present, which is the outstanding obligation oI the deIendant as oI June, 2000, on or beIore June 30, 2000; and
2) deIendant |Luciano Tan| will pay the monthly rentals computed at P13,750.00 on or beIore the 5
th
day oI each
month aIter June 30, 2000.
at the hearing on 27 June 2000 though no settlement was eventually reached between the parties, respondent |Luciano Tan| in
eIIect made an implied judicial admission that there was a subsisting contract oI sublease between him and petitioner, and
that he was remiss in the payment oI rentals Irom 01 September 1997 up to that day (Rollo, Annex "9" oI petition).
Respondent |Luciano Tan|`s admission was Iurther bolstered by the Iact that he Iiled a "Motion to Allow DeIendant to
Deposit Rentals" (Rollo, p. 3 oI Annex "15" oI petition). By such acts, respondent |Luciano Tan| accepted the truth oI
petitioner |Rodil Enterprises`| allegation oI the existence oI a contract oI sublease between them and oI his non-payment oI
the rentals Irom 01 September 1997. A judicial admission is an admission made in the course oI the proceedings in the same
case, verbal or written, by a party accepting Ior the purposes oI the suit the truth oI some alleged Iact, which said party cannot
thereaIter disprove (Remedial Law by Herrera, Oscar M. citing Section 4, Rule 129 oI the Revised Rules on Evidence and
Evidence by Salonga).
24

The decretal portion oI the 21 October 2002 Court oI Appeals` Decision, states, thus:

WHEREFORE, in the light oI the Ioregoing, the petition Ior review is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The Decision dated 18 June
2001 oI the Regional Trial Court oI Manila, Branch 26 is hereby SET ASIDE. The Decision dated 06 October 2000 oI the
Metropolitan Trial Court oI Manila, Branch 13 is AFFIRMED and REINSTATED.
25

The appellate court denied Luciano Tan`s Motion Ior Reconsideration thereon, in a Resolution,
26
dated 12 May 2005.
Thus, petitioner comes beIore us, raising the Iollowing grounds, to wit:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT ISSUED ITS
RESOLUTION DENYING PETITIONER`S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ITS DECISION BY RELYING
SOLELY AND EXCLUSIVELY ON THE MARCH 28, 2005 DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS AND DESPITE
THE FACT THAT THE SAID DECISION HAS NOT YET BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.
II
RESPONDENT RODIL ENTERPRISES IS GUILTY OF FORUM SHOPPING WHEN IT FILED THE PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS DOCKETED AS CA-G.R. SP. NO. 79517 SEEKING TO NULLIFY
THE ORDER OF EXECUTION BY THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF ITS 8 FEBRUARY 1994 DECISION IN OP
CASE NO. 4968, DESPITE THE FACT THAT ITS PREVIOUS PETITION FOR REVIEW FILED WITH THE COURT
OF APPEALS OF THE SAME DECISION OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT DATED 8 FEBRUARY 1994 HAD
BEEN DISMISSED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS IN ITS RESOLUTION DATED NOVEMBER 17, 1994 DUE TO
NON-COMPLIANCE WITH PROCEDURAL RULES.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR AND A GRAVE
MISAPPREHENSION OF THE FACTS AND MISAPPRECIATION OF THE EVIDENCE WHEN IT RULED THAT
PETITIONER IS A SUBLESSEE OF RESPONDENT AND THAT PETITIONER WAS REMISS IN THE PAYMENT OF
HIS RENTALS OVER THE PREMISES.
27

The Petition is without merit.
We shall address the Iirst ground raised by petitioner with regard to the alleged reliance oI the Court oI Appeals on the Decision oI the
Tenth Division oI the same court, dated 28 March 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 79157, entitled, Rodil Enterprises, Inc. v. The Office of the
President and Ides ORacca Building Tenants Association, Inc.
28

Contrary to petitioner`s contention, we do not Iind that the Court oI Appeals was in error when it took notice oI the ruling in CA-G.R.
SP No. 79157 in resolving petitioner`s Motion Ior Reconsideration. As respondent Rodil Enterprises asseverated, Ior the appellate
court to ignore a decision rendered by a division thereoI would be to turn a blind eye on a valid judgment rendered by the same
appellate body. Neither can we give merit to petitioner`s submission that the reliance by the Court oI Appeals on its Decision in CA-
G.R. SP No. 79517 is premature and misplaced. More signiIicantly, the contention oI the petitioner that the Decision in CA-G.R. SP
No. 79517 has not attained Iinality has become mute when viewed within recent Iactual developments. The ruling in CA-G.R. SP No.
79517 has long reached Iinality. This Court in a Resolution
29
dated 25 January 2006 denied the Petition Ior Review on Certiorari Iiled
by the Ides O`Racca Building Tenants Association, Inc. thereon. On 20 March 2006, this Court denied with Iinality the Motion Ior
Reconsideration oI the 25 January 2006 Resolution Ior lack oI compelling reason or substantial argument.
30

Moreover, on 12 April 2004, the appellate court issued a Resolution,
31
granting petitioner a hearing on its Motion Ior Reconsideration
as the grounds cited therein needed Iurther clariIication. This belies petitioner`s claim that the resolution on the Motion Ior
Reconsideration was based solely on the ruling oI the Court oI Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79517.
We come to the second ground raised by the petitioner. Petitioner argues that Rodil Enterprises is guilty oI Iorum shopping when it
Iiled the Petition Ior Certiorari with the Court oI Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 79157,
32
aIter it Iiled an Appeal with the
appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 34586.
33
Forum shopping is the act oI a party against whom an adverse judgment has been
rendered in one Iorum, seeking another and possibly Iavorable opinion in another Iorum other than by appeal or special civil action oI
certiorari.
34

The question oI Iorum shopping is not even material to the instant petition.
It must be emphasized that neither CA-G.R. SP No. 79157 nor CA-G.R. SP No. 34586 is beIore this Court Ior consideration. These
cases are separate and distinct Irom CA-G.R. SP No. 67201 now beIore us.
What are assailed in the instant Petition are the Decision oI the Court oI Appeals, dated 21 October 2002 and the Resolution, dated 12
May 2005 in CA G.R. SP No. 67201, which reversed the ruling oI the RTC, and aIIirmed the MeTC, ordering Luciano Tan to vacate
the premises and peaceIully deliver possession to Rodil Enterprises. The matter in controversy is the reIusal oI Luciano Tan to pay the
monthly rentals over Botica Divisoria under the contract oI sublease between the parties.
On the other hand, CA-G.R. SP No. 79157 was a Petition Ior Review on Certiorari seeking to nulliIy the Order oI Execution oI the
OIIice oI the President oI its 8 February 1994 Decision in OP Case No. 4968 Iinding the Renewal oI Contract oI Lease, and the
Supplemental Contract oI no Iorce and eIIect. CA-G.R. SP No. 34586 was an appeal on the Decision in O.P. Case No. 4968, which
was the basis oI the Order oI Execution. II there has indeed been Iorum shopping when CA-G.R. SP No. 79517 was instituted during
the pendency oI CA-G.R. SP No. 34586, such question should have been raised by petitioner, at Iirst instance, beIore the Court oI
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79517. It should be noted that the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 79517 was already given due course by the
Court oI Appeals and its ruling therein has long attained Iinality when, on appeal to this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 169892, we
denied the said appeal with Iinality in our Resolutions dated 25 January 2000 and dated 20 March 2006. Whatever matters concerning
the said case is now beyond the jurisdiction oI this Court to resolve.
We proceed to the Iinal ground raised by the petitioner Ior the allowance oI the instant Petition. Petitioner assails the Iactual Iindings
oI the Court oI Appeals when it ruled that there was a judicial admission as to petitioner`s liability under a contract oI sublease
between him and Rodil Enterprises.
To resolve this issue, a reading oI the signiIicant orders oI the MeTC and the pleadings Iiled by petitioner is warranted.
The MeTC issued an Order, dated 27 June 2000 oI the Iollowing import, to wit:
On second call, the parties and counsel agreed in principle in open court to the Iollowing terms to put an end to this civil case
Ior ejectment between them:
1.) that the deIendant |Luciano Tan| will pay P440,000.00 representing rentals Irom September, 1997 up to the
present, which is the outstanding obligation oI the deIendant as oI June, 2000 on or beIore June 30, 2000; and
2.) the deIendant |Luciano Tan| will pay the monthly rentals computed at P13,750.00 on or beIore the 5
th
day oI
each month aIter June 30, 2000.
35

On 14 August 2000, petitioner Iiled a Motion to Allow DeIendant to Deposit Rentals with the MeTC, praying that he be allowed to
deposit the rentals due as oI August 2000, in the amount oI P467,500.00, and the subsequent monthly rentals as it Ialls due.
Petitioner posits that the aIoresaid admission, made in open court, and then, reiterated in his Motion to Allow DeIendant to Deposit
Rentals, cannot be taken as an admission oI his liability, citing Section 27, Rule 130 oI the Rules oI Court,
36
which states, inter alia,
that an oIIer oI compromise in a civil case is not a tacit admission oI liability.
The general rule is an oIIer oI compromise in a civil case is not an admission oI liability. It is not admissible in evidence against the
oIIeror.
The rule, however, is not iron-clad. This much was elucidated by this Court in Trans-Pacific Industrial Supplies, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,
37
to wit:
To determine the admissibility or non-admissibility oI an oIIer to compromise, the circumstances oI the case and the intent oI
the party making the oIIer should be considered. Thus, iI a party denies the existence oI a debt but oIIers to pay the same Ior
the purpose oI buying peace and avoiding litigation, the oIIer oI settlement is inadmissible. II in the course thereoI, the party
making the oIIer admits the existence oI an indebtedness combined with a proposal to settle the claim amicably, then, the
admission is admissible to prove such indebtedness (Moran, Comments on the Rules oI Court, Vol. 5, p. 233 |1980 ed.|);
Francisco, Rules oI Court, Vol. VII, p. 325 |1973 ed.| citing McNiel v. Holbrook, 12 Pac. (US) 84, 9 L. ed., 1009). Indeed, an

oIIer oI settlement is an eIIective admission oI a borrower`s loan balance (L.M. HandicraIt ManuIacturing Corp. v. Court oI
Appeals, 186 SCRA 640 |1990|. x x x.
38

Similarly, in the case oI Jaradero de Manila v. Insular Lumber Co.
39
the Court applied the exception to the general rule. In Jaradero
there was neither an expressed nor implied denial oI liability, but during the course oI the abortive negotiations therein, the deIendant
expressed a willingness to pay the plaintiII. Finding that there was no denial oI liability, and considering that the only question
discussed was the amount to be paid, the Court did not apply the rule oI exclusion oI compromise negotiations.
In the case at bar, the MeTC and the Court oI Appeals properly appreciated petitioner`s admission as an exception to the general rule
oI inadmissibility. The MeTC Iound that petitioner did not contest the existence oI the sublease, and his counsel made Irank
representations anent the Iormer`s liability in the Iorm oI rentals. This expressed admission was coupled with a proposal to liquidate.
The Motion to Allow DeIendant to Deposit Rentals was deemed by the MeTC as an explicit acknowledgment oI petitioner`s liability
on the subleased premises. The Court oI Appeals agreed with the MeTC. Indeed, the existence oI the Contract oI Lease, dated 18
October 1999 was not denied by petitioner. The contracts that were assailed by petitioner are the contracts dated 18 and 25 May 1992,
the validity oI which has been upheld by this Court in the consolidated cases oI G.R. No. 129609 and G.R. No. 135537.
Finally, we Iind a categorical admission on the part oI petitioner, not only as to his liability, but also, as to the amount oI indebtedness
in the Iorm oI rentals due. The Order oI the MeTC dated 27 June 2000 was clear that the petitioner agreed in open court to pay the
amount oI P440,000.00, representing petitioner`s unpaid rentals Irom September 1997 to June 2000; and that petitioner will pay the
monthly rentals computed at P13,750.00 on or beIore the 5
th
day oI each month aIter 30 June 2000. The petitioner`s judicial admission
in open court, as Iound by the MeTC, and aIIirmed by the Court oI Appeals Iinds particular signiIicance when viewed together with
his Motion to Allow DeIendant to Deposit Rentals, wherein petitioner stated that the rentals due on the premises in question Irom
September 1997 up to the present amounted to P467,500.00, as oI the date oI Iiling the Motion. Petitioner cannot now be allowed to
reject the same. An admission made in the pleading cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and are conclusive as
to him, and that all prooIs submitted by him contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith should be ignored whether objection is
interposed by a party or not.
40
A judicial admission is an admission made by a party in the course oI the proceedings in the same case,
Ior purposes oI the truth oI some alleged Iact, which said party cannot thereaIter disprove.
41

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 21 October 2002 and the Resolution dated 12 May 2005 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 67201, aIIirming and reinstating the 6 October 2000 Decision oI the MeTC in Civil Case No. 166584 are AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, (orking Chairman), Austria-Martine:, Callefo, Sr., and, Chico-Na:ario, JJ., concur.
Panganiban, C.J., Retired as oI 7 December 2006.








ROSY A. TECIO

S9a9e of Wasing9on vs. Ta9um

360 P.2d 754 (1961)
Real and Demonstrative Evidence
FACTS:
William Tousin received monthly welIare checks Irom the state oI Washington. In February oI 1960, Tousin did not receive
his check which was normally mailed to him. It was discovered that Tousin`s check had been taken by Ralph Tatum who subsequently
Iorged an endorsement on the check to his name and cashed the same at a Iood store.
A criminal case was subsequently brought against Tatum Ior Iirst degree Iorgery. During the trial, Caroline Pentecost, an
employee oI the store, testiIied that, although she could not recall the speciIic transaction involving Tatum, the initials appearing on
the back oI the check were hers.
She explained that whenever a check was presented to her Ior payment at the store, she had been instructed by the manager
to initial it and then to insert it into a 'regiscope machine. The machine was designed to simultaneously photograph both the check
and the person Iacing the machine. The Regiscope Iilm oI the transaction was then sent to the Regiscope distributor to be developed.
The processed Iilm showed both the check and the person oI Tatum with the Iood store in the background. The negative and the print
were admitted in evidence and Tatum was convicted and sentenced to liIe imprisonment. On appeal, Tatum questions the Iilm`s
admission into evidence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Regiscope Iilms were authenticated suIIiciently to warrant their
admission into evidence?

RULING: Yes .
The quantum oI authentication required by the courts beIore a photograph may be admissible in evidence was stated thus:
'that some witness, not necessarily the photographer, be able to give some indication as to when, where and under what circumstances
the photograph was taken, and the photograph accurately portray the subject or subjects illustrated. The photograph need only be
suIIiciently accurate to be helpIul to the court and the jury.
Witness Pentecost testiIied that she recognized the background shown in the picture as that oI the Iood store, and as already
mentioned, she testiIied as to the store`s standard procedure oI 'regiscoping each individual who cashed a check at the store. Also,
one Philip Dale testiIied at length concerning the Regiscope process. The testimony oI these two witnesses taken together amounted to
a suIIicient authentication to warrant admission oI the photograph into evidence.
The authentication supplied by the testimony summarized above, oI course, did not preclude appellant Irom attempting to
prove that the individual portrayed was someone other than the appellant, that the photograph was inaccurate in or more respects, the
appellant was somewhere else at the moment the photograph was taken, or any other such deIense. But these arguments go to the
weight rather than to the admissibility oI the exhibits in question. In our opinion, the Regiscope exhibits, coupled with the other
evidence produced by the state, suIIiced to establish a prima Iacie case oI Iirst degree oI Iorgery.


ROSY A. TECIO

Adamczuk vs. Holloway

13 A.2d.2 (1940)
Real and Demonstrative Evidence

FACTS:
Jack Adamczuk brought an action in trespass against deIendants car owner Morris Cohon and driven by deIendant Elmer
Holloway Ior an incident arising out oI the collision between the cars they were driving. The accident took place at 9:30 p.m. at the
junction were Highway Route 6 meet with Bridgeville Road. Adamczuk was driving southwardly on the Bridgeville Road and
Holloway was driving eastwardly on Route 6. The jury ruled in Iavor oI Holloway. Adamczuk`s motion Ior a new trial was reIused
and these appeals Iollowed.
It was Iound that on trial, Jack Adamczuk was on the stand and he was shown 'Exhibit no. 3, a picture and when queried as
to what it depicted, he replied, 'the conditions represented by that picture truly represents the conditions oI the crossing at the time oI
this accident except Ior the Iact oI daylight or dark. Then the exhibit was oIIered in evidence. On cross, it was disclosed that the
witness did not know who took the picture or when it was taken. He could not relate the circumstances at to how the picture was
taken. The court then sustained the objection to the picture`s introduction, wherein the court did not admit it.
The none admission oI this evidence is the main issue asserted by the plaintiII in this appeal.


ISSUE:

Whether or not the Photograph (Exhibit no. 3) is admissible as evidence even iI the taker is not presented to veriIy the picture?


RULING:

The court aIIirmed the decision.
The rule is well settled that a photograph may be put in evidence iI relevant to the issue and iI veriIied. It does not have to be
veriIied by the taker. Its veriIication depends on the competency oI the veriIying witness and as to that the trial judge must in the Iirst
instance decide, subject to reversal Ior substantial error.
The map or photograph must Iirst, to be admissible, be made a part oI some qualiIied person`s testimony. Some one must
stand Iorth as its testimonial sponsor; in other words, IT MUST BE VERIFIED. II a witness is Iamiliar with the scene photographed
and is competent to testiIy that the photograph correctly represents it, it should, iI relevant, be admitted.
There is also a rule giving the trial judge discretion to reject a picture, on the ground that the evidence is cumulative or that
the photograph is unnecessary. This can be done the court in such situations that there are Iar better photographs oI the place taken
than the photo oIIered or the jury had personally visited the place photographed. 'The question oI the suIIiciency oI the preliminary
prooIs to identiIy a photograph and show that it is a Iair representation oI the objects which it purports to portray is a question
committed to the discretion oI the trial judge.
The court thus Iinds that the exclusion under the Iacts oI this case amounted to reversible error because:

a.) the jury had the beneIit oI other photos oI the intersection
b.) the testimony oI Herbert Dillard
c.) Also, it would not support Adamczuk`s contention that he had his head turned at a 45 degree angle and, thus, being able to see Ior
200 Ieet only. This caused him not to see the car coming Irom the west. But Dillard`s testimony stated that at the intersection he had
an unobstructed view to the west oI 793 Ieet

ROSY A. TECIO

Sison vs. People

250 SCRA 58 (1995)
Real and Demonstrative Evidence
FACTS
Several inIormations were Iiled in court against eleven persons (Sison et al) identiIied as Marcos loyalists charging them
with the murder oI Stephen Salcedo, a supporter oI Cory Aquino, which happened on the occasion oI a rally held by the Marcos
loyalists at Luneta. AIter being asked to disperse the crowd Ior not having with them the required permit, the loyalists started hurling
stones toward the police oIIicers at the scene, and directed their ire against Cory supporters. Salcedo, wearing a yellow shirt was
ganged upon by several men, and he was beaten and mauled. When he tried to get away Irom his attackers by running away, the
attackers ran aIter him and when they caught up with him, he was Iurther beaten until he was knocked unconscious. He was dead upon
arriving at the PGH.
All these were witnessed by Renato Banculo, a cigarette vendor. Banculo and Sumilang (who was also a witness who tried
to help Salcedo but to no avail) were principal witnesses Ior the prosecution. The incident was also witnessed by photographers,
whose pictures ere published in major newspapers in Metro Manila and were presented as evidence as to the participation oI the
accused in the mauling. Several oI the accused were photographed with Salcedo.
Despite their deIense oI alibis, the trial court convicted several oI the accused oI homicide and acquitted the others. Upon
appeal to the CA, the charge was qualiIied to murder. In the SC, the accused question the admissibility oI the photographs taken oI the
victims as he was being mauled at the Luneta, Ior lack oI proper identiIication by the person or persons who took the same.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the photographs should be admitted as evidence against the accused?

RULING: Yes .
The rule in this jurisdiction is that photographs, when presented in evidence, must be identiIied by the photographer as to its
production and testiIied as to the circumstances which they were produced. The value oI this kind oI evidence lies in its being a
correct representation or reproduction oI the original, and its admissibility is determined by its accuracy in portraying the scene at the
time oI the crime.
The photographer, however, is not only the witness who can identiIy the pictures he has taken. The correctness oI the
photograph as a IaithIul representation oI the object portrayed can be proved prima Iacie, either by the testimony oI the person who
made it or by other competent witnesses, aIter which the court can admit it subject to impeachment as to its accuracy. Photographs,
thereIore, can be identiIied by the photographer or by any other competent witness who can testiIy to its exactness and accuracy.
Even iI the person who took the photographs was not presented to identiIy them, the use oI these photos by some oI the
accused to show their alleged non-participation in the crime is an admission oI the exactness and accuracy thereoI. That the photos are
IaithIul representations oI the mauling incident was aIIirmed when appellants identiIied themselves therein and gave reasons Ior their
presence thereat.


ROSY A. TECIO

People vs. Bardaje

99 SCRA 388 (1980)
Real and Demonstrative Evidence
FACTS:

The accused, Adelino Bardaje was convicted oI Forcible Abduction with Rape and sentenced to death. Thus, the case is
brought to the SC Ior automatic review.
The complainant Marcelina Cuizon claimed that she was dragged by the accused together with Iive other persons Irom the
house oI a certain Fernandez by means oI Iorce and intimidation and at nighttime. Also, she narrated that Bardaje slapped her
rendering her unconscious and when she regained consciousness in a hut, Bardaje was holding her hands and removing her panties.
Despite her struggle, Bardaje succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her while his companions kept guard.
When Cuizon underwent physical examination, the doctor Iound that there were 'old healed lacerations which may have
been caused by possible sexual intercourse or other Iactors, and iI it were intercourse, it could have occurred 'two weeks or one month
ago.
During trial, Adelino admitted having had carnal knowledge oI the victim but denied having raped her. He claims that they
eloped as previously planned.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the guilt oI Bardaje was established beyond reasonable doubt?

RULING: No.
Cuizon`s charge that she was Iorcibly abducted and aIterwards raped was highly dubious and inherently improbable.
According to the medical Iindings, 'no evidence oI external injuries was Iound around the vulva or any part oI the body. Considering
that complainant was allegedly 'dragged, 'slapped into unconsciousness, 'wrestled with and criminally abused. Physical evidence
is oI the highest order and speaks more eloquently than all witness put together.
The medical Iindings oI 'old healed lacerations in the hymen which according to the testimony oI the examining physician
would have occurred two weeks or even one month beIore, iI said lacerations had been caused by sexual intercourse. This expert
opinion bolsters the deIense that Bardaje and Cuizon had previous amorous relations at the same time that it casts serious doubts on
the charge oI intercourse by Iorce and intimidation.
It is impossible that complainant could have been raped by the accused inside a small room occupied by a woman and two
children and in a small hut where the owner, his wiIe and seven children are all present. It is improbable that she could have been
sexually abused with so many within hearing and seeing distance.
Under the abovementioned circumstances, the Five Others who stood guard outside while Adelino allegedly took advantage
oI her. Would have taken turns in abusing her iI rape indeed happen. The Iact that they did not do so, implies a special relationship
between Marcelino and Adelino.
This is a case where a young girl could not admit to her parents that she had eloped and voluntarily submitted to sexual
intercourse. She was leIt with no choice but to charge Bardaje with rape or incur the ire oI her parents and social disrepute Irom a
small community.
ROSY A. TECIO

Torres vs. Cour9 of Appeals

11 SCRA 24 (1984)
Judicial Admissions
FACTS:

This is a Petition Ior Review, treated as a special civil action praying that the decision oI the CA be set aside.
Lot no. 551 was originally owned by Margarita Torres. Margarita was married to Claro Santillan and out oI this union were
begotten Vicente and Antonina. Claro died. Antonina married and had six children, who, together with Vicente are the private
respondents. AIter Claro`s death, Margarita cohabited with Leon Arbole, and out oI this, petitioner Macaria Torres was born.
Lot no. 551, an urban lot, was leased to Margarita, who was the actual occupant oI the lot. A Sale CertiIicate was issued to
Margarita by the Director oI Lands. The purchase price was to be paid in installments. According to testimonial evidence, Leon paid
the installments out oI his own earnings. BeIore his death, Leon sold and transIerred all his rights to portion oI the lot in Iavor oI
petitioner Macaria. Subsequently, Vicente executed an AIIidavit claiming possession oI Lot no. 551 and petitioned the Bureau oI
Lands Ior the issuance oI title in his name. A title was then issued in the name oI the legal heirs oI Margarita (private respondents).
On June 3, 1954, respondents Iiled a complaint against petitioner Ior Iorcible entry alleging that petitioner entered a portion
oI Lot no. 551 without their consent and constructed a house therein. The case was decided against the petitioner.
On June 8, 1954, petitioner instituted an action Ior Partition oI Lot. N0. 551 alleging that said lot was conjugal property and
the she is the legitimated child oI Margarita and Leon. The ejectment case and the partition case was consolidated.
The trial court ruled that the lot was paraphernal property oI Maragarita and adjudicated 2/3 oI the lot to respondents and 1/3
to petitioner Macaria. On Motion Ior Reconsideration, the decision was amended with Macaria being entitled to 4/6 oI the lot. On
appeal to the CA, the CA changed Macaria`s share to oI the lot and declared that she is not a legitimated child.
Petitioner now alleges that although the CA is correct in declaring that she is not a legitimated child oI the spouses, it has
overlooked to include in its Iindings oI Iacts the admission made by the respondents that she and Vicente and Antonina are brothers
and sisters and they are the legal heirs and nearest oI relatives oI Maragarita. The admission adverted to appears in paragraph 3 oI
respondents` original complaint in the Ejectment Case, which was however subsequently amended.
ISSUE:

Whether or not said statement in the original complaint must be treated as a judicial admission despite the Iact that the same
statements no longer appears in the amended complaint?

RULING:
No, in the Amended Complaint Iiled by respondents in the same ejectment case, the supposed admission was deleted and in
Iact the statement simply read, 'That plaintiIIs are the legal heirs and nearest oI kin oI Margarita. By virtue thereoI, the amended

complaint takes the place oI the original. The latter is regarded as abandoned and ceases to perIorm any Iurther Iunction as a pleading.
The original complaint no longer Iorms part oI the record.
II petitioner had intended to utilize the original complaint, she should have oIIered it in evidence. Having been amended, the
original complaint lost its character as a judicial admission, which would have required no prooI, and became merely an extrajudicial
admission oI which as evidence, required its Iormal oIIer. Contrary to petitioner`s submission, thereIore, there can be no estoppel by
extrajudicial admission in the original complaint, Ior the Iailure to oIIer it in evidence.

Teehankee, separate opinion:
Such admission did not cease to be a judicial admission simply because respondents subsequently deleted the same in their
amended complaint. The original complaint, although replaced by an amended complaint, does not cease to be part oI the judicial
record, not having been expunged thereIrom.


















ROSY A. TECIO

Lucido vs. Calupi9an

27 Phil. 48 (1914)
Judicial Admissions
FACTS:
The properties oI Leonardo Lucido were sold on auction on Feb. 10, 1903 to Rosales and Zolaivar. On March 30, 1903,
Rosales and Zolaivar with the consent oI Lucido, sold the properties to Calupitan via a public document. On the same day, Calupitan
and Lucido executed a document admitting the sale and that their real agreement was that redemption by Lucido can only be eIIected
3 years. Irom the date oI the document. Lucido tendered the redemption price to Calupitan. For Iailure oI the latter to surrender the
properties to Lucido, this case was instituted. Calupitan claimed that the sale was not one with a right to redeem. The lower court
decided in Iavor oI Lucido.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Calupitan`s original answer to the complaint may be used as evidence against him to prove that a sale with a right to
redeem was in Iact agreed to by both parties?
RULING:
Yes, Calupitan`s original answer to the complaint expressly stated that the transaction was one oI sale with right to
repurchase. The Court held that its admission was proper, especially in view oI the Iact that it was signed by Calupitan himselI, who
was acting as his own attorney.
The Court cited Jones on Evidence (sec. 272, 273) which stated that although pleadings were originally considered as
inadmissible as admissions because it contained only pleader`s matter (Iiction stated by counsel and sanctioned by the courts), modern
tendency was to treat pleadings as statements oI real issues and herein, admissions oI the parties.










ROSY A. TECIO

BPI-Savings vs. Cour9 of Tax Appeals

330 SCRA 507 (2000)
Judicial Notice
FACTS:
This case involves a claim Ior tax reIund in the amount oI P112,491.00 representing BPI`s tax withheld Ior the year 1989.
BPI`s 1989 Income Tax Return (ITR) shows that it had a total reIundable amount oI P297,492 inclusive oI the P112,491.00 being
claimed as tax reIund in this present controversy. However, BPI declared in the same 1989 ITR that the said total reIundable amount
oI P297,492.00 will be applied as tax credit to the succeeding taxable year.
On October 11, 1990, BPI Iiled a written claim Ior reIund in the amount oI P112,491.00 with the Commissioner oI Internal
Revenue (CIR) alleging that it did not apply the 1989 reIundable amount to its 1990 Annual ITR or other tax liabilities due to the
alleged business losses it incurred Ior the same year. Without waiting Ior the CIR to act on the claim Ior reIund, BPI Iiled a petition
Ior review with the CTA, seeking the reIund oI the amount oI P112,491.00.
The CTA dismissed BPI`s petition on the ground that petitioner Iailed to present as evidence its Corporate Annual ITR Ior
1990 to establish the Iact that BPI had not yet credited the amount oI P297,492.00 to its 1990 income tax liability. BPI Iiled a Motion
Ior Reconsideration which was denied by the CTA. The CA aIIirmed the CTA. Hence, this Petition. BeIore the Supreme Court, the
petitioner called the attention oI the Court to a Decision rendered by the Tax Court in CTA Case No. 4897 involving its claim Ior
reIund Ior the year 1990 wherein the Tax Court held that 'petitioner suIIered a net loss Ior the taxable year 1990. Respondent,
however, urges the Supreme Court not to do so.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court may take judicial notice oI the Decision by the CTA in deciding the present case?


RULING:
AS A RULE, "courts are not authorized to take judicial notice oI the contents oI the records oI other cases, even when such
cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the Iact that both cases may have been heard or are
actually pending beIore the same judge." Be that as it may, Section 2, Rule 129 provides that courts may take judicial notice oI matters
ought to be known to judges because oI their judicial Iunctions. In this case, the Court notes that a copy oI the Decision in CTA Case
No. 4897 was attached to the Petition Ior Review Iiled beIore this Court. SigniIicantly, respondents do not claim at all that the said
Decision was Iraudulent or nonexistent. Indeed, they do not even dispute the contents oI the said Decision, claiming merely that the
Court cannot take judicial notice thereoI.
This merely showed the weakness oI the respondent`s case because they did not take steps to prove that BPI did not suIIer
any loss in 1990. Respondents opted not to assail the Iact appearing therein - that petitioner suIIered a net loss in 1990 the same way
that it reIused to controvert the same Iact established by petitioner`s other documentary exhibits. The Decision in CTA Case No. 4897
is not the sole basis oI petitioner`s case. It is merely one more bit oI inIormation showing that the petitioner did not use its 1989 reIund
to pay its taxes Ior 1990.


ROSY A. TECIO

People vs. Godoy

250 SCRA 676 (1995)
Judicial Notice
FACTS:
This is an automatic review oI the decision oI the RTC in view oI the death sentence imposed upon Danny Godoy, who was
charged in two separate inIormations with rape and another Ior kidnapping with serious illegal detention.
Complainant Mia Taha alleged that Godoy, her Physics Teacher and a married man raped her Iirst on Jan. 21, 1994 in her
cousin`s boarding house wherein upon entering the back door, Godoy pointed a kniIe at her. As Godoy removed her panties and
brought out his penis to rape her, a kniIe was pointed at her neck. As such, she was not able to resist. The next day, Godoy came by
their house and asked the permission oI her parents iI she can join him in soliciting Iunds, since Mia was a candidate Ior Ms. Palawan
National School (PNS). Mia`s parents allowed her to go with Godoy and she was allegedly brought to the Sunset Garden Motel where
she was repeatedly raped again. AIter three days, they transIerred to Edward`s subdivision where she was kept in a lodging house and
was again raped.
During this time, a police blotter had already been placed Ior the missing Mia. She was later released by Godoy aIter a
certain Naem interceded and only aIter her parents agreed to settle the case. It was aIter Mia`s return that her parents accompanied her
to a medico-legal which Iound lacerations in her vagina concluding that 'she just had sexual
intercourse. She and her mother Helen went to the police and executed sworn statements
stating that the accused Godoy had raped and abducted Mia.
Godoy denied that he raped Mia Taha. He admitted having had sex with her and that they indeed stayed in Sunset Gardens
and in Edward`s Subdivision, but it was because they were lovers and that Mia had consented to their having sex. To support his claim
that they were lovers, he presented two letters supposedly delivered to him in the provincial jail while he was detained by Mia`s
cousin Lorna. There Mia explained that it was her parents who Iorced her to testiIy against him.
The delivery oI the letter was denied by Lorna but the deIense presented the provincial jail guard on duty on the supposed
date oI the delivery and testiIied that indeed Lorna had visited Godoy on said date. Several witnesses were also presented including
two Iormer teachers oI Mia who knew the handwriting on the two said letters as belonging to Mia having been their Iormer student
and where thus Iamiliar with her handwriting particularly those made in her test papers. Other witnesses were presented by the deIense
attesting that they saw the two together in a manner that was aIIectionate and cordial, prior to the said 'kidnapping and even during
such.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt oI the accused

RULING:
The Supreme Court acquitted Danny Godoy .

Three guiding principles in the appellate review oI the evidence oI the prosecution Ior the crime oI rape, namely: a) while
rape is a most detestable crime, it must be borne in mind that it is an accusation easy to be made, hard to be proved, but harder to be
deIended by the party accused, though innocent; b) the testimony oI the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and c)
that the evidence Ior the prosecution must stand or Iall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength Irom the weakness oI
the evidence Ior the deIense.
Mia claimed that the appellant always carried a kniIe but it was never explained how she was threatened with the same in
such a manner that she was allegedly always cowed into giving in to his innumerable sexual demands. In taking judicial notice, the
Supreme Court said that it is not unaware that in rape cases, the claim oI the complainant oI having been threatened appears to be a
common testimonial expedient and Iace-saving subterIuge. But it had not been duly corroborated by other evidence nor proved that
the accused indeed always carried a kniIe.
The SC also takes judicial cognizance oI the Iact that in rural areas (such as in Palawan) young ladies are strictly required to
act with circumspection and prudence. Great caution is observed so that their reputations shall remain untainted. Any breath oI scandal
which brings dishonor to their character humiliates their entire Iamilies. It could precisely be that complainant`s mother wanted to
save Iace in the community where everybody knows everybody else, and in an eIIort to conceal her daughter`s indiscretion and escape
wagging tongues oI their small rural community, she had to weave the scenario oI this rape drama.

















ROSY A. TECIO

Tabuena vs. Cour9 of Appeals

196 SCRA 650 (1991)
Judicial Notice
FACTS:
The subject oI the dispute is a parcel oI residential land oI about 440 sq. meters in Makato, Aklan. In 1973, an action Ior
recovery oI ownership was Iiled by the estate oI AlIredo Tabernilla against Jose Tabuena. AIter trial, the court ordered Tabuena to
return the property to Tabernilla.
At the trial, it was Iound that the lot was sold by Juan Peralta, Jr. in 1926 to Tabernilla while they were in the United States.
Upon Tabernilla`s return to the Philippines in 1934, Damasa Timtiman, mother oI Juan Peralta acting upon Juan`s instructions
conveyed the land to Tabernilla. Upon her request, she was supposedly allowed by Tabernilla to remain in the said lot provided she
paid the realty taxes on the property which she did do so. She remained on the lot until her death and, thereaIter, the property was
taken possession by Tabuena. This complaint was Iiled aIter a demand Ior Tabuena to vacate was made.
The trial court rejected his deIense that the subject oI the sale was a diIIerent lot and that he was the absolute owner oI the
said property by virtue oI the inheritance he acquired Irom his deceased parent. The Court oI Appeals aIIirmed the decision oI the trial
court, rejecting therein his claim that the trial court erred in taking cognizance oI Exhibits 'A, 'B, & 'C` which had been marked
but not Iormally oIIered in evidence by Tabernilla.

ISSUE(S):

(1) Whether or not it was proper Ior the CA and trial court properly took cognizance oI the exhibits even iI they were not Iormally
oIIered during trial?
(2) Whether or not the trial court erred in taking judicial notice oI Tabuena`s testimony in a case it had previously heard which was
closely connected with the case beIore it?

RULING:

The SC reversed the decision and ruled in Iavor oI Tabuena.
(1) No. The mere Iact that a particular document is marked as an exhibit does not mean it has thereby already been oIIered as
part oI the evidence oI a party. It is true that Exhibits 'A, 'B, and 'C were marked at pre-trial but this was only Ior identiIying
them and not Ior making a Iormal oIIer. It is during the trial that the party presenting the marked evidence decides whether to oIIer the
evidence or not. In case they don`t, such documents cannot be considered evidence, nor can they be given any evidentiary value.
An exception was given in People vs. Napat-a, wherein the court ruled that evidence even iI not oIIered can be admitted
against the adverse party iI: Iirst, it has been duly identiIied by testimony duly recorded and second, it has itselI been incorporated in
the records oI the case. In this case, these requirements had not been satisIied. The documents were indeed testiIied to but there was no
recital oI its contents having been read into the records.(2) Yes. The Court oI Appeals conceded that as a general rule, 'courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice in the adjudication oI cases pending beIore them oI the contents oI the records oI other cases, even
when such events have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the Iact that both cases may have been heard
or are actually pending beIore the same judge. Nevertheless, it applied the exception that 'in the absence oI objection, 'with the
knowledge oI the opposing party, or 'at the request or with the consent oI the parties, the case is clearly reIerred to or 'the original
or part oI the records oI the case are actually withdrawn Irom the archives and admitted as part oI the record oI the case then pending.
These conditions however, were not established in this case. Tabuena was completely unaware that the court had taken judicial notice
oI Civil Case no. 1327. Thus, the said act by the trial court was improper.
ROSY A. TECIO

Yao-Kee vs. Sy-Gonzales

167 SCRA 736 (1988)
Judicial Notice
FACTS:
Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died intestate, leaving real and personal properties in the Philippines. AIDA SY-GONZALES
and the other children oI Sy with Asuncion Gillego Iiled a petition Ior the settlement oI his estate. YAO KEE Iiled her opposition to
the petition claiming that she is the legitimate wiIe oI Sy. The probate court sustained the validity oI Yao`s marriage to Sy, but the
Court oI Appeals (CA) reversed the lower court`s decision and held that the petitioner`s and Yao`s children were all oI illegitimate
status. The CA ruled that the marriage between Yao and Sy was not proven to be valid under the Chinese laws.
Hence, Yao Iiled a petition Ior review with the Supreme Court claiming that the CA erred in holding that the validity oI the
Ioreign marriage between Yao and Sy had not been proven. To support this contention, Yao claimed that the CA should have taken
judicial notice oI the Chinese laws on marriage which show the validity oI her marriage to Sy.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA should take judicial notice oI Ioreign laws (i.e. Chinese laws on marriage), thus, relieving Yao oI her
duty oI proving the validity oI her marriage under Chinese laws.

RULING:
COURTS CANNOT TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF FOREIGN LAWS. Under the Philippine jurisprudence, to establish a
valid Ioreign marriage two things must be proven: (1) the existence oI the Ioreign law as a question oI Iact; and (2) the alleged Ioreign
marriage by convincing evidence. Though Yao may have established the Iact oI marriage, she has Iailed to prove the Chinese laws on
marriage that would show the validity oI her marriage to Sy.
Well-established is the rule that Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice oI Ioreign laws or customs. They must be
alleged and proved as any other Iact. On this point, Yao cannot rely on a the case oI Sy Joc Lieng v. Sy Quia (16 Phil. 137 (1910)) to
prove her case. The ruling that case did not show that the court took judicial notice oI Chinese laws on marriages. Even assuming Ior
the sake oI argument that the court did take judicial notice oI Chinese laws or customs on Ioreign marriages in that case, Yao still
Iailed to show that the law assumed to recognized in Sy Joc Lieng case (wherein the marriage was celebrated in 1847) was still
applicable during the time oI her marriage to Sy, which took place 84 years later. Hence, the CA was correct in considering that the
validity oI the marriage between Yao and Sy has not been established.







ROSY A. TECIO

Prie9o vs. Arroyo

14 SCRA 549 (1965)
Judicial Notice
FACTS:
ZEFERINO ARROYO and GABRIEL PRIETO were registered owners oI adjoining lots in Camarines Sur. AIter ZeIerino
died, his heirs had a new certiIicate oI title registered in their names. Subsequently, the heirs discovered that the technical description
set Iorth in their transIer certiIicate oI title and in the original certiIicate oI title did not conIorm with that embodied in the decision oI
the land registration court (which registered the land in ZeIerino`s name), and was less in area by 157 square meters. They, thereIore,
Iiled a petitionIor the correction oI the said description in their titles. ThereaIter, the court issued an order directing the correction oI
the technical description oI the land covered by their title.
Gabriel Iiled a petition to annul the order granting the correction claiming that the 157 square meters were unduly taken Irom
his lot. However, his petition was dismissed Ior Iailure to prosecute. Thus, Gabriel Iiled a second petition containing similar
allegations. As expected, the court dismissed his second petition on the ground oI res judicata.
Hence, Gabriel appealed to the Supreme Court to question the dismissal oI his second petition. He insisted that there was no
res judicata since the dismissal oI his Iirst petition was erroneous. He claimed that the lower court should have not dismissed his Iirst
petition Ior Iailure to prosecute because 'no parole` evidence need be taken to support it, the matters therein alleged being part oI the
records land registration proceedings, which were well within the judicial notice and cognizance oI the court.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court oI First Instance (CFI) oI Camarines Sur (in dismissing the Iirst petition oI Gabriel) erred in not
taking judicial notice oI the parts oI the records oI the land registration proceedings that would have supported Gabriel`s allegations,
thus, making the dismissal Ior Iailure to prosecute erroneous.

RULING:
THE CFI OF CAMARINES SUR WAS CORRECT IN NOT TAKING JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE RECORDS THE
LAND REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS. As a general rule, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice, in the adjudication oI
the cases pending beIore them, oI the contents oI other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court,
and notwithstanding the Iact that both cases may have been tried or actually pending beIore the same judge. Besides, iI Gabriel really
wanted the court to take judicial notice oI such records, he should have presented the proper request or maniIestation to that eIIect. For
Iailing to do so in the appropriate time, the dismissal oI the Iirst petition is now valid and binding on him. Thus, the dismissal on the
ground oI res judicata must be sustained.





ROSY A. TECIO

Baguio vs. . Vda de 1alaga9

42 SCRA 337 (1971)
Judicial Notice
FACTS:
GABRIEL BAGUIO Iiled Ior the quieting oI title to real property against TEOFILA JALAGAT and her minor children with
the Court oI First Instance (CFI) oI Misamis Oriental. The Jalagats Iiled a motion to dismiss on the ground that the present complaint
is barred by a previous judgment rendered by the same court. The previous case involved practically the same property, the same
cause oI action, and the same parties, with Melecio Jalagat (TeoIila`s deceased husband and predecessor in interest) as the deIendant.
The previous case was terminated with the court dismissing Baguio`s complaint. Acting on the motion and taking judicial notice oI its
previous judgment, the lower court dismissed the present complaint on the ground oI res judicata.
Consequently, Baguio appealed the order oI dismissal. He claimed that Ior the ground oI res judicata to suIIice as a basis Ior
dismissal it must be apparent on the Iace oI the complaint.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the CFI oI Misamis Oriental was correct in Iinding that there was res judicata by taking judicial notice oI its
previous judgment.

RULING:

THE CFI OF MISAMIS ORIENTAL WAS CORRECT IN TAKING JUDICIAL OF ITS PREVIOUS JUDGMENT. It ought
to be clear even to the appellant that under the circumstances, the lower court certainly could take judicial notice oI the Iinality oI
judgment in a case that was previously pending and thereaIter decided by it. That was all that was done by the lower court in
decreeing the dismissal. Certainly, such an order is not contrary to law. The Supreme Court quoted ChieI Justice Morgan, who said:
'Courts have also taken judicial notice oI previous cases to determine whether or not the case pending is a moot one or whether or not
the previous ruling is applicable in the case under consideration.












ROSY A. TECIO

Ci9y of Manila vs. Garcia

19 SCRA 413 (1967)
Judicial Notice
FACTS:
Finding that it was necessary to expand the school grounds oI EpiIanio de los Santos Elementary School, Manila`s City
Engineer, pursuant to the Mayor`s directive, ordered the illegal occupants/squatters (deIendants) to vacate the property contiguous to
the school. The deIendants reIused to vacate, thus, prompting the City oI Manila to Iile a suit to recover possession over the land. The
Court oI First Instance (CFI) oI Manila Iavored the plaintiII.
Consequently, the squatters appealed and questioned the lower court`s Iinding that the city needs the premises Ior school
purposes. The city`s evidence on this point was the certiIication oI the Chairman Committee on Appropriations oI the Municipal
Board. The certiIication recites that the amount oI P100,000 had been set aside in Ordinance 4566, the 1962-63 Manila City Budget,
Ior the construction oI an additional building oI the elementary school. The said document was originally deemed inadmissible, but
was, subsequently, admitted into evidence by the lower court. Hence, the deIendants appealed.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the CFI oI Manila had properly Iound that the City oI Manila needs the premises Ior school purposes (considering that
it had a contradictory stance regarding the admissibility oI the evidence oI the City on this point).

RULING:

The CFI oI Manila properly Iound that the city needs the premises Ior school purposes. It is beyond debate that a court oI
justice may alter its ruling while the case is within its power, to make it conIormable to law and justice. Such was done here. The
deIendants` remedy was to bring the attention oI the court to its contradictory stance. Not having done so, the Supreme Court will not
reopen the case solely Ior this purpose.
Anyway, elimination oI the certiIication as evidence would not beneIit the deIendants. For in reversing his stand, the trial
judge could have well taken because he was duty bound to take judicial notice oI Ordinance 4566. The reason being that the city
charter oI Manila requires that all courts sitting therein to take judicial notice oI all ordinances passed by the municipal board oI
Manila.









ROSY A. TECIO

Ramirez vs. Cour9 of Appeals

248 SCRA 590 (1995)
Competence (Anti-Wiretapping Act)
FACTS:
Ester Garcia Iiled a criminal case Ior violation oI R.A. No. 4200 (Anti-Wiretapping Act) against Socorro Ramirez, Ior
secretly taping their conIrontation. Socorro Iiled a Motion to Quash the InIormation, which the Regional Trial Court (RTC) oI Pasay
granted, agreeing that the Iacts charged did not constitute an oIIense under R.A. No. 4200 since the law reIers to the taping oI a
communication by a person other than a participant to the communication. AIter which, Ester Iiled a petition Ior review with the Court
oI Appeals (CA), which reversed the ruling oI the lower court. Hence, Socorro Iiled this instant petition where she raised three
ISSUES:
(2) That R.A. No. 4200 does not apply to the taping oI the conversation by one oI the parties to the conversation. She contends that
R.A. 4200 only reIers to unauthorized taping oI a conversation oI a person other than those involved in the conversation.
(3) That the substance or contents oI the convesation must be alleged in the inIormation; otherwise, the Iacts charged will not
constitute a violation oI R.A. No. 4200.
(4) That R.A. No. 4200 penalizes the taping oI 'private communication not a 'private conversation and that, consequently, her act
oI secretly taping her conversation with Ester was not illegal under the said Act.

RULING:

(1) R.A. No. 4200 applies to recordings by one oI the parties to the conversation. Section 1 oI the Act clearly and unequivocally
makes it illegal Ior any person, not authorized by all parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by
means oI a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a
party other than or diIIerent Irom those involved in the private communication. The statute`s intent to penalize all persons
unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use oI the qualiIier 'any. Consequently, the CA was correct in concluding
that 'even a person privy to a communication, who records his private conversation with another without knowledge oI the latter, will
qualiIy as a violator under R.A. No. 4200. A perusal oI the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports such conclusion.

(2) The substance oI the conversation need not be alleged in the inIormation. The nature oI the communication is immaterial. The
mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording oI a private communication by means oI a tape recorder would suIIice to
constitute an oIIense under Section 1 oI R.A. No. 4200 As the Solicitor General pointed out, 'Nowhere (in the said law) is it required
that beIore one can be regarded as a violator, the nature oI the conversation, as well as its communication to a third person should be
proIessed.

(3) 'Private communication includes 'private conversation. The word communicate comes Irom the Latin word communicate,
meaning 'to share or to impart. In its ordinary signiIication, communication connotes an act oI sharing or imparting, as in a
conversation ('process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system oI symbols). These
broad deIinitions are likely to include the conIrontation between Socorro and Ester. Moreover, any doubts about the legislative body`s
meaning oI the phrase 'private communication are put to rest by the Iact that Senator Taada in his Explanatory Note to the Bill used
'communication and 'conversation interchangeably.

ROSY A. TECIO
Salcedo-Or9aez vs. Cour9 of Appeals
235 SCRA 111 (1994)
Competence (Anti-Wiretapping Act)
FACTS:
RaIael Ortaez Iiled a complaint Ior annulment oI marriage with damages against his wiIe Teresita Salcedo-Ortaez, on
grounds oI lack oI marriage license and/or psychological incapacity oI Teresita. Among the exhibits oIIered by RaIael were three (3)
cassette tapes oI alleged telephone conversations between Teresita and unidentiIied persons. These tape recordings were made and
obtained when RaIael allowed his Iriends Irom the military to wire tap his home telephone.
Teresita objected to RaIael`s oral oIIer oI the said tapes. However, the Regional Trail Court (RTC) oI Quezon City admitted
the tapes into evidence. Teresita Iiled a petition Ior certiorari with the Court oI Appeals (CA), but the CA upheld the lower court`s
order Ior two reasons: (1) Tape recordings are not inadmissible per se. hey are admissible depending on how they are presented and
oIIered and how the trial judge utilizes them and (2) Certiorari is inappropriate since the order admitting the tape into evidence is
interlocutory. The order should be questioned in the appeal Irom the judgment on the merits and through the special civil action oI
certiorari.
Hence, Teresita Iiled a petition Ior review with the Supreme Court (SC).

ISSUE(S):

(1) Whether or not the recordings oI Teresita`s phone conversations, made and obtained through wiretapping are admissible as
evidence (not per se inadmissible)

(2) Whether or not a petition Ior certiorari is the appropriate remedy to question an order admitting the tapes into evidence

RULING:

(1)The tape recordings are inadmissible. Relevant provisions oI R.A. 4200
(Anti-Wiretapping Act) provides that:
Section 1:It shall be unlawIul Ior any person, not being authorized by all parties to any private conversation or spoken word, to tap any
wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken
word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone, or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however
otherwise described x x x
Section 4.Any communication, or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, or meaning oI the same or any part
thereoI, or any inIormation therein contained, obtained, or secured by any person in violation oI the preceding section oI this Act shall
not be admitted in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative, or administrative hearing or investigation.
Hence, absent any clear showing that both parties consented to the recording, the inadmissibility oI the tapes is mandatory under R.A.
No. 4200

(2) Certiorari was the appropriate remedy. Generally, the extraordinary writ oI certiorari is not available to challenge interlocutory
orders oI a trial court. The proper remedy is an ordinary appeal Irom an adverse judgment, incorporating in the said appeal the grounds
Ior assailing the interlocutory order. However, where the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy oI appeal
would not aIIord adequate and expeditious relieI, the Court may allow certiorari as a mode oI redress.

ROSY A. TECIO
Gaanan vs. In9ermedia9e Appella9e Cour9
145 SCRA 112 (1986)
Competence (Anti-Wiretapping Act)

FACTS:
Complainant Atty. Pintor and his client Montebon, were in the living room oI complainant`s residence, discussing the terms
Irom the withdrawal oI the complaint Ior direct assault which they Iiled against Laconico. AIter they decided on the conditions, Atty.
Pintor made a phone call to Laconico. That same morning, Laconico telephoned Atty. Gaanan to come to his oIIice and advise him on
the settlement oI the direct assault case. When Atty. Pintor called, Laconico requested Atty. Gaanan to secretly listen to the telephone
conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions Ior the settlement. Twenty minutes later,
Atty. Pinto called up again to ask Laconico iI he was agreeable to the conditions. Laconico agreed. An amount oI P5,000 as settlement
money was agreed upon. He was instructed to give the money to give the money to Atty. Pintor`s wiIe at the oIIice oI the Department
oI Public Highways. However, Laconico insisted that Atty. Pintor himselI should receive the money. However, when Atty. Pintor
received the money, he was arrested by agents oI the Philippine Constabulary.
On the Iollowing day, Atty. Gaanan executed an aIIidavit that he heard complainant Atty. Pintor demand P8,000 Ior the
withdrawal oI the case Ior direct assault. Laconico attached the aIIidavit to the complaint Ior robbery/extortion which he Iiled against
Atty. Pintor. Since Atty. Gaanan listened to the telephone conversation without Atty. Pintor`s consent, Atty. Pintor charged Atty.
Gaanan and Laconico with violation oI the Anti- Wiretapping Act (R.A. No. 4200).
Atty. Gaanan and Laconico were Iound guilty by the trial court. The decision was aIIirmed by the Intermediate Appellate
Court (IAC) stating that the 'extension telephone which was used to overhear the telephone conversation was covered in the term
'device as provided in R.A. No. 4200.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not an extension telephone is among the prohibited device in Section 1 oI the Anti-Wiretapping Act, such that its
use to overhear a private conversation would constitute unlawIul interception oI communications between the two parties using a
telephone line.
RULING:
The main issue revolves around the meaning oI the phrase 'any other device or arrangement. The law reIers to a 'tap oI a
wire or cable or the use oI a 'device or arrangement Ior the purpose oI secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the
communication. There must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the
deliberate installation oI a device or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the An extension telephone cannot
be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other device enumerated un Section 1 oI R.A. No. 4200 as the use
thereoI cannot be considered as 'tapping the wire or cable oI a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not installed
Ior that purpose. It just happened to be there Ior ordinary oIIice use.
The phrase 'device or arrangement, although not exclusive to that enumerated, should be construed to comprehend
instruments oI the same or similar nature, that is, instruments the use oI which would be tantamount to tapping the main line oI a
telephone. It reIers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being overheard because,
by their very nature, they are not oI common usage and their purpose is precisely Ior tapping, intercepting, or recording a telephone
conversation. An extension telephone is an instrument which is very common especially now when the extended unit does not have to
be connected by wire to the main telephone but can be moved Irom place to place within a radius oI a kilometer or more. An extension
telephone is not among such device or arrangements covered by Section 1 oI R.A No. 4200 spoken words.

ROSY A. TECIO
Reyes vs. Cour9 of Appeals
216 SCRA 25 (1993)
Rule 128, Sec. 1-4
FACTS:
Juan Mendoza, the Iather oI deIendant Olympio, is the owner oI Farm Lots Nos. 46 and 106, devoted to the production oI
palay. The lots are tenanted and cultivated by Julian de la Cruz, the husband oI plaintiII EuIrocina de la Cruz.
In her complaint, EuIrocina alleged that upon the death oI her husband, she succeeded him as bona Iide tenant. However,
Olympio in conspiracy with the other deIendants prevented her daughter Violeta and her workers Irom entering and working on the
Iarm lots. DeIendants likewise reIused to vacate and surrender the lots, which prompted EuIrocina to Iile a case Ior the recover oI
possession and damages with a writ oI preliminary mandatory injunction in the meantime.
The petitioners in this case, the deIendants Reyes, Parayao, Aguinaldo and Mananghaya, are duly elected and appointed
barangay oIIicials oI the locality, who denied their interIerence in the tenancy relationship existing between Olympio and EuIrocina.
Olympio, Ior his part, raised abandonment, sublease and mortgage oI the Iarm lots without his consent, and non-payment oI rentals as
his deIenses.
The Court oI Appeals (CA) aIIirmed the agrarian court`s decision with modiIication, which ordered the deIendants to restore
possession oI the Iarm lots to plaintiII EuIrocina. The CA likewise ruled that the petitioners are solidarily liable to pay to EuIrocina
the value oI cavans oI palay until they have vacated the area.
On appeal, the petitioners questioned the Iavorable consideration given to the aIIidavits oI EuIrocina and EIren Tecson, since
the aIIiants were not presented and subjected to cross-examination.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the trial court erred when it gave Iavorable consideration to the aIIidavits oI plaintiII, even iI the aIIiant was
not presented and subjected to cross- examination.
RULING:
The judgment is aIIirmed. The trial court did not err when it Iavorable considered the aIIidavits oI EuIrocina and EIren
Tecson although the aIIiants were not presented and subjected to cross-examination. Section 16 oI P.D. No. 946 provides that the
'Rules oI Court shall not be applicable in agrarian cases even in a suppletory character. The same provision states that 'In the
hearing, investigation and determination oI any question or controversy, aIIidavits and counter-aIIidavits may be allowed and are
admissible in evidence, Moreover, in agrarian cases, the quantum oI evidence required is no more than substantial evidence. Thus,
this case is an application oI the rule with regard the scope oI the Rules on Evidence which states that 'The rules oI evidence shall be
the same in all courts and in all trials and hearings except as otherwise provided by law (ex. Section 16 oI P.D. No. 946) or these
rules.

ROSY A. TECIO
People vs. Turco
337 SCRA 714 (2000)
Rule 128, Sec 1-4
FACTS:
Rodegelio Turco, Jr. (a.k.a. 'Totong) was charged with the crime oI rape. The prosecution alleged that the victim, Escelea
Tabada (12 yrs and 6 months old at the time oI the incident) and accused Turco were neighbors. On the night oI the incident, upon
reaching her home, Escelea heard a call Irom outside. She recognized the voice to be Turco`s since they have been neighbors Ior 4
years and are second cousins. When she opened the door, the accused with the use oI a towel, covered the victim`s Iace. Then the
accused bid the victim to walk. When they reached a grassy part, near the pig pen which was about 12 meters away Irom the victim`s
house, the accused laid the victim on the grass, went on top oI her an took oII her short pants and panty. The victim tried to resist by
moving her body but to no avail. The accused succeeded in pursuing his evil design by Iorcibly inserting his penis inside the victim`s
private parts.
Upon reaching home, the victim discovered that her short pants and panty were Iilled with blood. For almost ten days, she kept to
herselI the harrowing experience, until she had the courage to tell her brother-in-law, who in turn told the victim`s Iather about the
rape oI his daughter. ThereaIter, they did not waste time and immediately asked the victim to see a doctor Ior medical examination.
AIter the issuance oI the medical certiIicate, they went to the Isabela Municipal Station and Iiled a compliant against the accused
charging him with rape.
The trial court convicted the accused, stating that the deIense oI 'sweetheart theory was a mere concoction oI the accused in
order to exculpate him Irom criminal liability. Appealing his conviction, the accused-appellant argues that the trial court erred because
no actual prooI was presented that the rape oI the complainant actually happened considering that although a medical certiIicate was
presented, the medico-legal oIIicer who prepared the same was not presented in court to explain the same.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting the medical certiIicate in evidence, although the medico-legal oIIicer who
prepared the same was not presented in court to testiIy on it.
RULING:

Conviction aIIirmed. We place emphasis on the distinction between admissibility oI evidence and the probative value
thereoI.Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules (Section 3, Rule 128) or is
competent.
Since admissibility oI evidence is determined by its relevance and competence, admissibility is thereIore, an aIIair oI logic
and law. On the other hand, the weight to be given to such evidence, once admitted, depends on judicial evaluation within the
guidelines provided in rule 133 and the jurisprudence laid down by the Court.Thus, while evidence may be admissible, it may be
entitled to little or no weight at all. Conversely, evidence which may have evidentiary weight may be inadmissible because a special
rule Iorbids its reception.
However, although the medical certiIicate is an exception to the hearsay rule, hence admissible as evidence, it has very little
probative value due to the absence oI the examining physician. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the prosecution relied solely on the
medical certiIicate. In Iact, reliance was made on the testimony oI the victim herselI, which standing alone even without the medical
examination, is suIIicient evidence. The absence oI medical Iindings by a medico-legal oIIicer does not disprove the occurrence oI
rape. It is enough that the evidence on hand convinces the court that conviction is proper. In the instant case, the victim`s testimony
alone is credible and suIIicient to convict.

ROSY A. TECIO
Bau9is9a vs. Aparece
51 O.G. 805 (1995)
Relevance
FACTS:
As owner oI the lot subject oI the case, Nicolas Anasco sold the same to Valentin Justiniani. In the same year, Valentin sold
this property to Claudio Justiniani, In October 12, 1935, Claudio Justiniani executed a public instrument whereby he sold the same
property Ior P100 to Apolonio Aparece in whose name it was assessed since 1935. While Aparece was in possession, Hermogenes
Bautista illegally entered a part oI the land and took possession thereoI. Thus, Aparece Iile a complaint with the guerilla Iorces then
operating in the province oI Bohol. When the case was called Ior hearing, and aIter inspection was made by a guerilla oIIicer, Bautista
executed a public instrument wherein he promised to return the land to Aparece in good will, and recognized Aparece`s lawIul
ownership over the land. Thus, possession oI the land was restored to Aparece.
However, claiming that the property belongs to him, and alleging that with the aid oI armed men and pretending to be owner,
usurped the land, Bautista Iiled a complaint in the Court oI First Instance (CFI) oI Bohol. The CFI rendered judgment declaring
Aparece as owner oI the land.
On appeal, Bautista raised as deIense the error oI the trial court in admitting the public instrument which he executed as
evidence. He argued that the document was executed under duress, violence, and intimidation, and that the guerilla oIIicer beIore
whom it was executed, had no jurisdiction over the matter.
ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting as evidence, a public document executed beIore an oIIicer who had no jurisdiction
over the matter.

RULING:

This argument is beside the point.The test Ior the admissibility or inadmissibility oI a certain document is whether or not it is
relevant, material or competent.The public document is not only relevant, but is also material and competent to the issue oI ownership
between the parties litigants.Relevant evidence is one that has any value in reason as tending to prove any matter probable in ac action.
And evidence is said to bemater ial when it is directed to prove a Iact in issue as determined by the rules oI substantive law and
pleadings, whilecom petent evidence is one that s not excluded by law in a particular case.
With these criteria in mind, we hold that the mere Iact that the public document was executed beIore a guerilla oIIicer does
not make the same as irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent to the main issue raised in the pleadings. The public document, considered
together with the other evidence, documentary and oral, satisIies the Court that the portions oI land in question really belong to
deIendant Aparece.

ROSY A. TECIO
Lopez vs. Heesen
365 P.2d 448 (1961)
Relevance
FACTS:
Appellee Heesen, an air Force oIIicer, purchased a J.C. Higgins Model 51 30.06 riIle Irom the store oI appellee Sears. The
riIle has a bolt action known as a 'Mausser type action with a 'Class 1 saIety mechanism. At the time oI the purchase, Heesen was
given an instruction pamphlet which he read, explaining the composition oI the riIle and gave operating instructions, including the
method to be pursued to make the gun 'saIe.
Immediately aIter the purchase, Heesen leIt Ior a deer hunting trip in an area known as Ute Park. He placed a live cartridge
in the chamber and placed the gun on saIety position. He traveled a good deal during the hours beIore the shooting and on one oI two
occasions, he discovered the gun oII saIety position. This occurred when he had come down a long hill covered with rocks and
boulders. Heesen was not aware that the riIle moved Irom 'saIe to Iire` position at least twice beIore the shooting. Ten minutes beIore
the accident began, he leIt the knoll and he was carrying the gun on his shoulder.
He later heard a rustle and saw a deer go between some trees. When he Iollowed the deer, his leIt Ioot went down hard on
the ground on one side oI a log and his right Ioot slipped on the grass. This brought the riIle down and the riIle discharged, the bullet
hitting appellant Lopez, who was nearby.
Lopez brought suit against Heesen Ior allegedly unlawIully assaulting him, thereby inIlicting dangerous and painIul wounds.
He also included as party-deIendant, the designer, manuIacturer and seller oI the riIle, Sears, Ior allegedly negligently designing and
manuIacturing the riIle bought by Heesen.
DeIendants presented expert testimony on the general reputation oI other Iirearms companies who use the same modiIied
leaI saIety device as the Higgins Model 51. Lopez objected to this evidence on the ground that it was wholly immaterial and irrelevant
to any issue in the case. He likewise objected on the introduction oI testimony on the 'poundage pressure required to move the saIety
levers Irom saIe to Iire position on the ground oI irrelevance and immateriality. Lastly, he objected to the introduction oI opinion
evidence regarding the design oI the saIety mechanism, on the ground that it was a subject which is within the province oI the jury to
determine.
ISSUE(S):

(1) Whether or not expert testimony on the general reputation oI other Iirearms companies using the same saIety device is material and
relevant.

(2) Whether or not testimony on the 'poundage pressure required is relevant and material.

(3) Whether or not the design oI the saIety mechanism was a proper subject oI expert testimony.

RULING:

(1) The expert testimony is admissible. The allegations on the ultimate Iacts in issue involve whether the Higgins Model 51 riIle was
in a dangerous and deIective condition due to its negligent manuIacture, in that the saIety mechanism moved re4adily Irom 'saIe to
'Iire position. This is an issue, the proper understanding oI which, requires knowledge or experience and cannot be determined
independently merely Irom deductions made and inIerences drawn on the basis oI ordinary knowledge. Moreover, the conduct oI

others is proper evidence Ior a jury to consider, in determining whether the tendency oI the thing is dangerous, deIective, or the
reverse. Considering these principles, the Court held that the testimony as to the reputation oI other Iirearms companies using the same
saIety device is material and relevant to the issue oI whether the saIety device on the Higgins Model 51 was unsaIe or saIe, and that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this testimony.

(2) The testimony was introduced under Lopez`s contention that the Higgins model was unsaIe and thus, the issue arose as to the
'poundage pressure` required to move the saIety lever Irom saIe to Iire. It was then proper Ior Sears to show the amount oI pressure
required to move the saIety lever as this was relevant to the issue posed.

(3) Expert testimony is admissible because the expert testimony was upon the ultimate issue oI whether or not the saIety device was
dangerous and deIective. It was the proper subject oI expert testimony. It does not usurp the Iunctions oI the jury as the latter may still
reject these opinions. Said opinion evidence is not binding on the jury.

ROSY A. TECIO
S9a9e vs Ball
339 S.w2d 783 (1960)
Relevance
FACTS:
Ball appeals Irom an order oI the trial court, convicting him oI robbery.
At about 2:30 in the aIternoon, two colored men, one oI them tall and the other short, entered the Krekeler Jewelry Store. As
the taller man looked at jewelry and made his purchase, the shorter man looked in the cases and moved about in the store. Later in the
same day, at around 5:30 p.m., as John Krekeler was placing the rings and watches in the saIe preparing Ior the closing oI the store,
the two men who had been in the store at 2:30, entered the store. They were immediately recognized by Krekeler, especially the taller
man`s narrow-brimmed tall hat, brown jacket, gray short and particularly a scar on his Iace.
The shorter man walked behind the counter and as Krekeler tried to intercept him, the man hit Krekeler on the Iace using a
0.38 long barreled pistol. With the gun on his back, the two men directed Krekeler to go to the watch repair department, then to the
restroom, where he was positioned, Iacing the wall. ThereaIter, he could hear jewelry being dumped in a bag, and the 'jingle oI the
car register. AIter hearing the door slam, Krekeler call the police. He reported that the two men took $4,455.21 worth oI watched and
rings, and $140 in cash.
Three weeks later, Ball was arrested by OIIicers Powell and Ballard while walking in the street. Ball shoved OIIicer Powell
over and ran down the avenue. The oIIicers ran aIter him and he was only paciIied when the OIIicer`s Iired a bullet which Iell in his
back. Ball claims that this evidence oI 'Ilight was not material or relevant, since it was too remote Irom the date oI the robbery (3
weeks later), to indicate a consciousness oI guilt. Ball likewise objected to the admissibility oI the Iollowing articles Iound in his
person during the arrest on grounds oI immateriality and irrelevance: a brown Ielt hat, a brownish windbreaker type jacket, trousers,
gray shirt and shoes, and $258.02 in currency and two pennies.

ISSUES(S)

(1) Whether or not the evidence oI Ilight is inadmissible Ior reason oI remoteness to the time oI the commission oI the crime.

(2) Whether or not the articles Iound in the person oI the accused at the time oI his arrest are inadmissible Ior being irrelevant and
immaterial.

RULING:

(1) Unexplained Ilight and resisting arrest even thirty days aIter the supposed commission oI the crime is a relevant
circumstance. The remoteness oI the Ilight goes to the weight oI the evidence rather than to its admissibility.

(2) In identiIying Ball, Krekeler was impressed with and remembered the brown ensemble, particularly the tall brown hat. These
items were oI course relevant and admissible in evidence and there is no objection to them.
However, the money is inadmissible. The prooI oI the money here was evidently on the theory that Ball did not have or was
not likely to have such a sum oI money on his person prior to the commission oI the oIIense. However, Krekeler was not able to
identiIy the money or any oI the items on Ball`s person as having come Irom the jewelry store so that in Iact, they were not admissible
in evidence. There was no prooI as to the denomination oI the money in the cash register, it was simply a total oI $140. Here, nineteen
days had elapsed, there was no prooI that Ball had suddenly come into possession oI the $258.02 and in all these circumstances 'the
mere possession oI a quantity oI money is in itselI no indication that the possessor was the taker oI the money charged as taken,
because in general all money oI the same denomination and material is alike, and the hypothesis that the money Iound is the same as
the money taken is too Iorced and extraordinary to be receivable.