Ateneo de Davao UniversityCollege of Law of 9 Election Laws (MANRESA 2008) CASES ON ELECTION LAWS

- Page 1 FOR PROOF-READING There can be failure of election in a political unit only if the will of the majority has been defiled and cannot be ascertained. But, if it can be determined, it must be accorded respect. After all, there is no provision in our election laws which requires that a majority of registered voters must cast their votes. All the law requires is that a winning candidate must be elected by a plurality of valid votes, regardless of the actual number of ballots cast. Thus, even if less than 25% of the electorate in the questioned precincts cast their votes, the same must still be respected. Construction/Limitations, Section 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. 4. BENITO VS. COMELEC (1994) Records bear out that herein private respondents filed their appeal from the May 30, 1992 ruling only on June 4, 1992, in violation of Section 19 of Republic Act No. 7166, which provides that a party adversely affected by a ruling of the Board of Canvassers must appeal the same to the Commission within three (3) days from the said ruling. However, adherence to a technicality here would put a stamp of validity on petitioner's palpably void proclamation, with the inevitable result of frustrating the popular will. Adjudication of cases on substantive merits and not on technicalities has been consistently observed by this Court. 5. FERNANDEZ VS. COMELEC (1990) While Section 24 of Republic Act No. 7166, otherwise known as An Act Providing For Synchronized National and Local Elections and For Electoral Reforms, requires the BEI chairman to affix his signature at the back of the ballot, the mere failure to do so does not invalidate the same although it may constitute an election offense imputable to said BEI chairman. Nowhere in said provision does it state that the votes contained therein shall be nullified. It is a well-settled rule that the failure of the BEI chairman or any of the members of the board to comply with their mandated administrative responsibility, i.e., signing, authenticating and thumbmarking of ballots, should not penalize the voter with disenfranchisement, thereby frustrating the will of the people. (as cited in Punzalan vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 126669. April 27, 1998]) Exception to liberal construction. 6. BAUTISTA VS. CASTRO (1992) The absence of the signature of the Chairman of the Board of Election Tellers in the ballot given to a voter as required by law and the rules as proof of the authenticity of said ballot is fatal. This requirement is mandatory for the validity of the said ballot. REFERENDUM Editor: Please bear with the following lengthy digests. I am working on the premise that, because of the inherent length of these cases, not everyone has read them, nor will they be still interested in reading any of them. Requirements; Procedure; Effectivity. 1. SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC (1997) Issue: What is the nature of Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution? SEC. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter. The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right. Ruling: This provision is not self-executory. xxx while the Constitution has recognized or granted that right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for its implementation. Issue: Is R.A. No. 6735 a full compliance with the power and duty of Congress to provide for the implementation of the exercise of the right? Ruling: It is not. In a nutshell, the SC reasoned as follows: 1. The inclusion of the word Constitution therein (Section 2 of the law) was a delayed afterthought. That word is neither germane nor relevant to said section, which exclusively relates to initiative and referendum on national laws and local laws, ordinances, and resolutions. That section is silent as to amendments on the Constitution.

CONSTRUCTION OF ELECTION LAWS/LIMITATIONS TO LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION 1. MARUHOM VS. COMELEC (2000) The legal compass from which the COMELEC should take its bearings in acting upon election controversies is the principle that "clean elections control the appropriateness of the remedy." xxx At balance, the question really boils down to a choice of philosophy and perception of how to interpret and apply the laws relating to elections; literal or liberal; xxx In applying elections laws, it would be far better to err in favor of popular sovereignty than to be right in complex but little understood legalisms. 2. PEA VS. HRET (1997) The Court has already ruled in Joker P. Arroyo vs. HRET that substantial amendments to the protest may be allowed only within the same period for filing the election protest, which, under Rule 16 of the HRET Rules of Procedure is ten (10) days after proclamation of the winner. While it is conceded that statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officers may not be defeated by mere technical questions, the rule likewise stands, that in an election protest, the protestant must stand or fall upon the issues he had raised in his original or amended pleading filed prior to the lapse of the statutory period for filing of the protest. 3. BINCE JR. VS. COMELEC (1995) Technicalities of the legal rules enunciated in the election laws should not frustrate the determination of the popular will. ELECTIONS Definition; How exercised. 1. CARLOS VS. ANGELES (2000) In this jurisdiction, an election means "the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote" through the use of the ballot, and the elected officials of which are determined through the will of the electorate. "An election is the embodiment of the popular will, the expression of the sovereign power of the people." Specifically, the term 'election', in the context of the Constitution, may refer to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of votes." The winner is the candidate who has obtained a majority or plurality of valid votes cast in the election. Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who receive the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office. xxx In case of protest, a revision or recount of the ballots cast for the candidates decides the election protest case. The candidate receiving the highest number or plurality of votes shall be proclaimed the winner. Even if the candidate receiving the majority votes is ineligible or disqualified, the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes or the second placer, can not be declared elected. "The wreath of victory cannot be transferred from the disqualified winner to the repudiated loser because the law then as now only authorizes a declaration of election in favor of the person who has obtained a plurality of votes and does not entitle a candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected." In other words, "a defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office." Essence of election; basis. 2. SUNGA VS. COMELEC (1998) Election is the process of complete ascertainment of the expression of the popular will. Its ultimate purpose is to give effect to the will of the electorate by giving them direct participation in choosing the men and women who will run their government. Thus, it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of whom have positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose him. 3. MITMUG VS. COMELEC (1994)

Based on the Election Laws Outline of Atty. J. Valencia (2006)

Ateneo de Davao UniversityCollege of Law of 9 Election Laws (MANRESA 2008) xxx initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to laws, ordinances, or resolutions. 2. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. There was, therefore, an obvious downgrading of the more important or the paramount system of initiative. R.A. No. 6735 thus delivered a humiliating blow to the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution by merely paying it a reluctant lip service. Davide, Jr., J.

- Page 2 FOR PROOF-READING From the above differentiation, it follows that there is need for the Comelec to supervise an initiative more closely, its authority thereon extending not only to the counting and canvassing of votes but also to seeing to it that the matter or act submitted to the people is in the proper form and language so it may be easily understood and voted upon by the electorate. This is especially true where the proposed legislation is lengthy and complicated, and should thus be broken down into several autonomous parts, each such part to be voted upon separately. Care must also be exercised that "(n)o petition embracing more than one subject shall be submitted to the electorate," although "two or more propositions may be submitted in an initiative. RECALL Editor: Please take note of RA 9244 dated February 19, 2004. It deleted the mode of initiating recall thru a PRA. As it now stands, recall can be initiated only upon compliance with Sec. 70 of RA 7160, as amended. Definition; nature. 1. GARCIA VS. COMELEC (1993) Recall is a mode of removal of a public officer by the people before the end of his term of office. The people's prerogative to remove a public officer is an incident of their sovereign power and in the absence of constitutional restraint, the power is implied in all governmental operations. xxx Issue: It is argued that the electorates right to recall includes the sole and exclusive right to decide on whether to initiate a recall proceedings or not, such that the constitution of a Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRA) in a LGU is not legally permissible. Ruling: There is nothing in the Constitution that will remotely suggest that the people have the "sole and exclusive right to decide on whether to initiate a recall proceeding." The Constitution did not provide for any mode, let alone a single mode, of initiating recall elections. Neither did it prohibit the adoption of multiple modes of initiating recall elections. Issue: It is argued that the initiation of a recall through the PRA effectively shortens and ends the term of the incumbent local officials. Otherwise put, the PRA resolution of recall is the recall itself." Ruling: That is erroneous. They have embraced the view that initiation by the PRAC is not initiation by the people. Initiation by the PRAC is also initiation by the people, albeit done indirectly through their representatives. It cannot be seriously doubted that a PRA resolution of recall merely, starts the process. It is part of the process but is not the whole process. The initiatory resolution merely sets the stage for the official concerned to appear before the tribunal of the people so he can justify why he should be allowed to continue in office. Before the people render their sovereign judgment, the official concerned remains in office but his right to continue in office is subject to question. This is clear in section 72 of the Local Government Code which states that "the recall of an elective local official shall be effective only upon the election and proclamation of a successor in the person of the candidate receiving the highest number of votes cast during the election on recall." 2. PARAS VS. COMELEC (1996) Facts: Citing Section 74 (b) of the LGC, which states that: no recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the officials assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election petitioner insists that the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall election is now barred as the SK election was set by RA 7808 on the first Monday of May 1996, and every three years thereafter. Ruling: Subscribing to the above interpretation of the phrase regular local election to include the SK election will unduly circumscribe the novel provision of the LGC on recall. If the SK election, which is set by R.A. No. 7808 to be held every three years from May 1996, were to be deemed within the purview of the phrase regular local election, then no recall election can be conducted rendering inutile the recall provision. 3. ANGOBUNG VS. COMELEC (1997) Issue: Can COMELEC schedule the recall election within one (1) year from the May 12, 1997 Barangay Elections, where the official sought to be recalled is a mayor? Ruling: Yes. For the time bar to apply, the approaching regular local election must be one where the position of the official to be recalled, is to be actually contested and filled by the electorate.

Distinctions between initiative and referendum. 2. SBMA VS. COMELEC (1996) The process started by private respondents was an INITIATIVE but respondent Comelec made preparations for a REFERENDUM only. xxx There are statutory and conceptual demarcations between a referendum and an initiative. In enacting the "Initiative and Referendum Act, Congress differentiated one term from the other, thus: (a) "Initiative" is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an election called for the purpose. There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely: a.1. Initiative on the Constitution, which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution; a.2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and a.3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance. (b) "Indirect initiative" is exercise of initiative by the people through a proposition sent to Congress or the local legislative body for action. (c) "Referendum" is the power of the electorate to approve or reject a legislation through an election called for the purpose. It may be of two classes, namely: c.1. Referendum on statutes which refers to a petition to approve or reject an act or law, or part thereof, passed by Congress; and c.2. Referendum on local law which refers to a petition to approve or reject a law, resolution or ordinance enacted by regional assemblies and local legislative bodies. Along these statutory definitions, Justice Isagani A. Cruz defines initiative as the "power of the people to propose bills and laws, and to enact or reject them at the polls independent of the legislative assembly." On the other hand, he explains that referendum "is the right reserved to the people to adopt or reject any act or measure which has been passed by a legislative body and which in most cases would without action on the part of electors become a law. xxx initiative is resorted to (or initiated) by the people directly either because the law-making body fails or refuses to enact the law, ordinance, resolution or act that they desire or because they want to amend or modify one already existing. On the other hand, in a local referendum, the law-making body submits to the registered voters of its territorial jurisdiction, for approval or rejection, any ordinance or resolution which is duly enacted or approved by such law-making authority. Said referendum shall be conducted also under the control and direction of the Commission on Elections. In other words, while initiative is entirely the work of the electorate, referendum is begun and consented to by the law-making body. Initiative is a process of law-making by the people themselves without the participation and against the wishes of their elected representatives, while referendum consists merely of the electorate approving or rejecting what has been drawn up or enacted by a legislative body. Hence, the process and the voting in an initiative are understandably more complex than in a referendum where expectedly the voters will simply write either "Yes" or "No" in the ballot.

Based on the Election Laws Outline of Atty. J. Valencia (2006)

Ateneo de Davao UniversityCollege of Law of 9 Election Laws (MANRESA 2008) Thus, in the instant case, where the time bar is being invoked by petitioner mayor in view of the approaching Barangay Elections (in May 1997), there can be no application of the one-year bar. Issue: Is a COMELEC resolution approving a Petition for Recall valid although it was signed by just one person, in violation of the statutory 25% minimum requirement as to the number of signatures supporting and petition for recall? Ruling: No, it is not. The law is plain and unequivocal as to what initiates recall proceedings: only a petition of at least 25% of the total number of registered voters, may validly initiate recall proceedings. We take careful note of the phrase, petition of at least twenty-five percent (25%) and point out that the law does not state that the petition must be signed by at least 25% of the registered voters; rather, the petition must be of or by, at least 25% of the registered voters, i.e., the petition must be filed, not by one person only, but by at least 25% of the total number of registered voters. 4. MALONZO VS. COMELEC (1997) *Decided before RA 9244 Facts: Malonzo argues that the initiation of the recall proceedings was invalid since it was convened by the Liga ng mga Barangays. Ruling: The barangays are represented in the Liga by the barangay captains as provided under Section 492 of the LGC. It also provides that the Kagawad may represent the barangay in the absence of the barangay chairman. The Liga ng mga Barangay is undoubtedly an entity distinct from the Preparatory Recall Assembly. It just so happens that the personalities representing the barangays in the Liga are the very members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly, the majority of whom met on July 7, 1996, and voted in favor of the resolution calling for the recall of Mayor Malonzo, after deliberation reported in the record, in accordance with the existing law. 5. CLAUDIO VS. COMELEC (May 2000) Facts: The COMELEC maintains that the process of recall starts with the filing of the petition for recall and ends with the conduct of the recall election, and that, since the petition for recall in this case was filed on July 2, 1999, exactly one year and a day after petitioner's assumption of office, the recall was validly initiated outside the one-year prohibited period.

- Page 3 FOR PROOF-READING voting, the election nevertheless resulted in a failure to elect; and second, the votes not cast would affect the result of the election. We must add, however, that the cause of such failure of election should have been any of the following: force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes. This is an important consideration for, where the propriety of a pre-proclamation controversy ends, there may begin the realm of a special action for declaration of failure of elections. The COMELEC is empowered nullify certain contested returns on the ground of statistical improbability "where the fraud is so palpable from the return itself (res ipsa loquitur - the thing speaks for itself), there is no reason to accept it and give it prima facie value." 2. Lucero v Comelec In fixing the date of the special election, the COMELEC should see to it that: (1) it should be not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of the postponement or suspension of the election or the failure to elect, and (2) it should be reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended, or which resulted in failure to elect. The first involves questions of fact. The second must be determined in the light of the peculiar circumstances of a case. In the instant case, the delay was not attributable to the poor voters of Precinct No. 13 or to the rest of the electorate of the Second Legislative District of Northern Samar. The delay was, as stated in the opening paragraph of this ponencia, primarily caused by the legal skirmishes or maneuvers of the petitioners which muddled simple issues. The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that G. R. No. 113509 is the third case Ong has brought to this Court. Considering then that the petitioners themselves must share the blame for the delay, and taking into account the fact that since the term of the office of the contested position is only three years, the holding of a special election in Precinct No. 13 within the next few months may still be considered "reasonably close to the date of the election not held." 3. Borja v. Comelec Grounds for election contest are: 1. Lack of notice of the date and time of canvass; 2. fraud, 3. violence, 4. terrorism and 5. analogous causes; 6. disenfranchisement of voters; 7. presence of flying voters; and 8. unqualified members of the Board of Election Inspectors. These grounds, however, as correctly pointed out by the COMELEC, are proper only in an election contest but not in a petition to declare a failure of election and to nullify a proclamation. If a case raises "pre-proclamation issues, the COMELEC, sitting en banc, has no original jurisdiction" over the same. Accordingly, said case should be remanded to the COMELEC which, in turn, will refer the same to any of its Divisions for proper disposition. A petition to declare a failure of election is neither a preproclamation controversy as classified under Section 5(h), Rule 1 of the Revised COMELEC Rules of Procedure, nor an election case. It must be remembered that Capco was duly elected and proclaimed as Mayor of Pateros. The COMELEC can call for the holding or continuation of election by reason of failure of election only when: 1. 2. 3. the election is not held, is suspended or results in a failure to elect.

DECLARATION OF POSTPONEMENT, FAILURE, ANNULMENT OF ELECTIONS 1. Loong v Comelec There is really no compulsion for the calling of a special election. The voters of Parang constitute only about less than 15% of the entire Sulu electorate. And there are results from seventeen out of eighteen municipalities of Sulu. Excluding the Parang election results, a valid proclamation can still be had. Under the present state of our election laws, the COMELEC has been granted precisely the power to annul elections. Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7166, otherwise known as, "The Synchronized Elections Law of 1991," provides that the COMELEC sitting, En Banc by a majority vote of its members may decide, among others, the declaration of failure of election and the calling of special elections as provided in Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code. Said Section 6, in turn, provides as follows: "SEC. 6. Failure of election. - If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect." The COMELEC may exercise such power motu proprio or upon a verified petition. The hearing of the case shall be summary in nature, and the COMELEC may delegate to its lawyers the power to hear the case and to receive evidence. Before COMELEC can act on a verified petition seeking to declare a failure of election, two (2) conditions must concur: first, no voting has taken place in the precincts concerned on the date fixed by law or, even if there were

The latter phrase, in turn, must be understood in its literal sense, which is "nobody was elected." 4. Balindong vs Comelec Reiterates Loong. In this case, the SC ruled that were mere rumors that the ballots had been filled out by private respondent's supporters, but there was no evidence shown to support the claim, nor a single witness had first hand knowledge of actual fraud, terrorism, violence or force majeure that attended the election, the COMELEC thus correctly denied petitioner's motion for technical examination of the Voters' Lists and Voters' Affidavits.

Based on the Election Laws Outline of Atty. J. Valencia (2006)

Ateneo de Davao UniversityCollege of Law of 9 Election Laws (MANRESA 2008) 4. Bulaong vs. Comelec Allegations of "huge, abnormal and unexplained discrepancies" between the election results reflected in the tally sheets and election returns, on the one hand, and the result of the revision of the ballots, on the other hand, and that he, as "aggrieved party," has a right to show: (1) that the ballots found in the ballot boxes are not the ballots cast and canvassed on election day and (2) that there was "massive, large-scale and fraudulent substitution/ switching of ballots after election day" are questions of facts, which the petitioner must prove. And when given ample opportunity to prove his allegations but did not present any evidence in support thereof, the protestant cannot claim grave abuse of discretion if the Comelec denies his motion for further examination of election documents. 5. Hassan vs. Comelec Two (2) pre-conditions must exist before a failure of election may be declared, thus: (1) no voting has been held in any precinct or precincts due to force majeure, violence or terrorism; and (2) the votes not cast therein are sufficient to affect the results of the election. The cause of such failure may arise before or after the casting of votes or on the day of the election. Brute fact: No Election took place on the scheduled date of election. Thus, there is failure of election. The hasty re-scheduled May 29 election is invalid. POWER TO CALL SPECIAL ELECTIONS Akbayan vs Comelec Special Registration Case. Implied facts: many youths allegedly were not able to register on time. Ruling: The COMELEC, in denying the request of petitioners to hold a special registration, acted within the bounds and confines of the applicable law on the matter --Section 8 of RA 8189. In issuing the assailed Resolution, respondent COMELEC simply performed its constitutional task to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, inter alia, questions relating to the registration of voters; evidently, respondent COMELEC merely exercised a prerogative that chiefly pertains to it and one which squarely falls within the proper sphere of its constitutionally-mandated powers. POWER TO REGISTER POLITICAL PARTIES / ACCREDITED CITIZENS ARMS Benito vs Comelec There was a very low voting turn-out. This is not a ground for declaring failure of elections and calling a special election. In a sense, failure of elections to the low percentage of votes cast vis--vis the number of registered voters in the subject election precincts are equivalents. PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATION 1. Veterans Federation Party vs Comelec Editor: If I understood this case, all I can say is this: Walang fractional round off sa ating systema. The Philippine style party-list system is a unique paradigm which demands an equally unique formula. The 4 parameters of the Filipino party-list system are: (FAQ) First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list. Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are qualified to have a seat in the House of Representatives; Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one qualifying and two additional seats. Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed in proportion to their total number of votes.

- Page 4 FOR PROOF-READING The Court spelled out the formula for allocating the seats for party-list winners, thus: Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private respondents, as well as the members of this Court, that the initial step is to rank all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they each received. Then the ratio for each party is computed by dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all the parties participating in the system. All parties with at least two percent of the total votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only these parties shall be considered in the computation of additional seats. The party receiving the highest number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to as the "first" party. Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to, in order to be able to compute that for the other parties. Since the distribution is based on proportional representation, the number of seats to be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the first party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes. Now, how do we determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to? The formula is as follows: N/T += P (N) Number of votes of first party (P) Proportion of votes of first party relative to total votes for party-list system (T)Total votes for Party-list system If the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding it off is equal to at least six percent of the total valid votes cast for all the party list groups, then the first party shall be entitled to two additional seats or a total of three seats overall. If the proportion of votes without a rounding off is equal to or greater than four percent, but less than six percent, then the first party shall have one additional or a total of two seats. And if the proportion is less than four percent, then the first party shall not be entitled to any additional seat. Step Three. The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified parties are entitled to, based on proportional representation. The Court has previously ruled in Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales that a fractional membership cannot be converted into a whole membership of one when it would, in effect, deprive another party's fractional membership. It would be a violation of the constitutional mandate of proportional representation. We said further that "no party can claim more than what it is entitled to x x x. In Ang Bagong Bayani Labor Party vs Comelec The Court, therefore, deems it proper to remand the case to the Comelec for the latter to determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations allowed to participate in the party-list elections comply with the requirements of the law. In this light, the Court finds it appropriate to lay down the following guidelines, culled from the law and the Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its work. First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. In other words, it must show -- through its constitution, articles of incorporation, bylaws, history, platform of government and track record -- that it represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its membership should belong to the marginalized and underrepresented. And it must demonstrate that in a conflict of interests, it has chosen or is likely to choose the interest of such sectors. Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to the House of Representatives. In other words, while they are not disqualified merely on the ground that they are political parties, they must show, however, that they represent the interests of the marginalized and underrepresented. The counsel of Aksyon Demokratiko and other similarly situated political parties admitted as much during the Oral Argument, as the following quote shows: JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: I am not disputing that in my question. All I am saying is, the political party must claim to represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors? ATTY. KAPUNAN: Yes, Your Honor, the answer is yes. Third, in view of the objections directed against the registration of Ang Buhay Hayaang Yumabong, which is allegedly a religious group, the Court notes the express constitutional provision that the religious sector may not be represented in the party-list system. Furthermore, the Constitution provides that religious denominations and sects shall not be registered. The prohibition was explained by a member of the Constitutional Commission in this wise: [T]he prohibition is on any religious organization registering as a

Based on the Election Laws Outline of Atty. J. Valencia (2006)

Ateneo de Davao UniversityCollege of Law of 9 Election Laws (MANRESA 2008) political party. I do not see any prohibition here against a priest running as a candidate. That is not prohibited here; it is the registration of a religious sect as a political party. Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, which enumerates the grounds for disqualification as follows: (1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious purposes; (2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal; (3) It is a foreign party or organization; (4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes; (5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections; (6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition; (7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or (8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered. Note should be taken of paragraph 5, which disqualifies a party or group for violation of or failure to comply with election laws and regulations. These laws include Section 2 of RA 7941, which states that the party-list system seeks to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties x x x to become members of the House of Representatives. A party or an organization, therefore, that does not comply with this policy must be disqualified. Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity funded or assisted by, the government. By the very nature of the party-list system, the party or organization must be a group of citizens, organized by citizens and operated by citizens. It must be independent of the government. The participation of the government or its officials in the affairs of a party-list candidate is not only illegal and unfair to other parties, but also deleterious to the objective of the law: to enable citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations to be elected to the House of Representatives. Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees must likewise do so. Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as follows: SEC. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election. In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term. Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees. To repeat, under Section 2 of RA 7941, the nominees must be Filipino citizens who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties. Surely, the interests of the youth cannot be fully represented by a retiree; neither can those of the urban poor or the working class, by an industrialist. To allow otherwise is to betray the State policy to give genuine representation to the marginalized and underrepresented. Eighth, as previously discussed, while lacking a well-defined political constituency, the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. Senator Jose Lina explained during the bicameral committee proceedings that the nominee of a party, national or regional, is not going to represent a particular district x x x. In Pimentel vs HRET The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the prerogative, within constitutionally defined limits, to choose from among its district and party-list representatives those who may occupy the seats allotted to the House in the HRET and the CA. Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution explicitly confers on the Senate and on the House the authority to elect among their members those who would fill the 12 seats for Senators and 12 seats for House members in the Commission on Appointments. Under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, each chamber of Congress exercises the

- Page 5 FOR PROOF-READING power to choose, within constitutionally defined limits, who among their members would occupy the allotted 6 seats of each chambers respective electoral tribunal. 2. PM & Butil vs. Comelec reiterates the landmark case of Veterans. POWER TO REGULATE/ SUPERVISE ENJOYMENT OR UTILIZATION OF FRANCHISE/OBJECTIVE 1. National Press Club vs Comelec Here, Court sustained the constitutionality of Section 11 (b) of R.A. No. 6646, known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which prohibits the sale or donation of print space and airtime for campaign or other political purposes, except to the Comelec. In doing so, the Court carefully distinguished: (a) paid political advertisements which are reached by the prohibition of Section 11 (b), from (b) the reporting of news, commentaries and expressions of belief or opinion by reporters, broadcasters, editors, commentators or columnists which fall outside the scope of Section 11 (b) and which are protected by the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press: "Secondly, and more importantly, Section 11 (b) is limited in its scope of application. Analysis of Section 11 (b) shows that it purports to apply only to the purchase and sale, including purchase and sale disguised as a donation, of print space and air time for campaign or other political purposes. Section 11 (b) does not purport in any way to restrict the reporting by newspapers or radio or television stations of news or newsworthy events relating to candidates, their qualifications, political parties and programs of government. Moreover, Section 11 (b) does not reach commentaries and expressions of belief or opinion by reporters or broadcasters or editors or commentators or columnists in respect of candidates, their qualifications, and programs and so forth, so long at least as such comments, opinions and beliefs are not in fact advertisements for particular candidates covertly paid for. In sum, Section 11 (b) is not to be read as reaching any report or commentary or other coverage that, in responsible media, is not paid for by candidates for political office. We read Section 11 (b) as designed to cover only paid political advertisements of particular candidates. 2. Philippine Press Institute vs Comelec Section 8 is now in question. We turn to Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772, which needs to be quoted in full again: Sec. 8. Undue Reference to Candidates/Political parties in Newspaper. - No newspaper or publication shall allow to be printed or published in the news, opinion, features, or other sections of the newspaper or publication accounts or comments which manifest favor or oppose any candidate or political party by unduly or repeatedly referring to or including therein said candidate or political party. However, unless the facts and circumstances clearly indicate otherwise, the Commission will respect the determination by the publisher and/or editors of the newspapers or publications that the accounts or views published are significant, newsworthy and of public interest." Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772 appears to represent the effort of the Comelec to establish a guidelines for implementation of the above-quoted distinction and doctrine in National Press Club, an effort not blessed with evident success. Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772-A while possibly helpful, does not add substantially to the utility of Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772. The distinction between paid political advertisements on the one hand and news reports, commentaries and expressions of belief or opinion by reporters, broadcasters, editors, etc. on the other hand, can realistically be given operative meaning only in actual cases or controversies, on a case-to-case basis, in terms of very specific sets of facts. At all events, the Court is bound to note that PPI has failed to allege any specific affirmative action on the part of Comelec designed to enforce or implement Section 8. PPI has not claimed that it or any of its members has sustained actual or imminent injury by reason of Comelec action under Section 8. Put a little differently, the Court considers that the precise constitutional issue here sought to be raised - whether or not Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772 constitutes a permissible exercise of the Comelec's power under Article IX, Section 4 of the Constitution to "supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchise or permits for the operation of - media of communication or information [for the purpose of ensuring] equal opportunity, time and space, and the right of reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates in connection with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections is not ripe for judicial review for lack of an actual case or controversy involving, as the very lis mota thereof, the constitutionality of Section 8. 1. Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772, in its present form and as interpreted by Comelec in its 22 March 1995 letter directives, purports

Based on the Election Laws Outline of Atty. J. Valencia (2006)

Ateneo de Davao UniversityCollege of Law of 9 Election Laws (MANRESA 2008) to require print media enterprises to "donate" free print space to Comelec. As such, Section 2 suffers from fatal constitutional vice and must be set aside and nullified. 2. To the extent it pertains to Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition must be dismissed for lack of an actual, justificiable case or controversy. 3. Adiong vs Comelec The specific issue in this petition is whether or not the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) may prohibit the posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places, public or private, and limit their location or publication to the authorized posting areas that it fixes. NO for three reasons: First the prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech enshrined in the Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III). There is no public interest substantial enough to warrant the kind of restriction involved in this case. Second the questioned prohibition premised on the statute and as couched in the resolution is void for overbreadth. A statute is considered void for overbreadth when "it offends the constitutional principle that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. Third the constitutional objective to give a rich candidate and a poor candidate equal opportunity to inform the electorate as regards their candidacies, mandated by Article II, Section 26 and Article XIII, section 1 in relation to Article IX (c) Section 4 of the Constitution, is not impaired by posting decals and stickers on cars and other private vehicles. Compared to the paramount interest of the State in guaranteeing freedom of expression, any financial considerations behind the regulation are of marginal significance. 4. Telecommunications & Broadcast attorneys of the Philippines vs GMA All broadcasting, whether by radio or by television stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to assign. A franchise is thus a privilege subject, among other things, to amendment by Congress in accordance with the constitutional provision that "any such franchise or right granted . . . shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires." 4. Osmena vs Comelec Reiterates NPC ruling. 5. ABS-CBN vs Comelec The holding of exit polls and the dissemination of their results through mass media constitute an essential part of the freedoms of speech and of the press. Hence, the Comelec cannot ban them totally in the guise of promoting clean, honest, orderly and credible elections. Quite the contrary, exit polls -- properly conducted and publicized -- can be vital tools in eliminating the evils of election-fixing and fraud. Narrowly tailored countermeasures may be prescribed by the Comelec so as to minimize or suppress the incidental problems in the conduct of exit polls, without transgressing in any manner the fundamental rights of our people. RA 9006 FAIR ELECTIONS ACT SWS vs Comelec Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to enjoin the Commission on Elections from enforcing 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 (Fair Election Act), which provides: Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published fifteen (15) days before an election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published seven (7) days before an election. The term election surveys is defined in 5.1 of the law as follows: Election surveys refer to the measurement of opinions and perceptions of the voters as regards a candidates popularity, qualifications, platforms or a matter of public discussion in relation to the election, including voters preference for candidates or publicly discussed issues during the campaign period (hereafter referred to as Survey). Ruling: Section 5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and

- Page 6 FOR PROOF-READING (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than the suppression of freedom of expression. REGISTRATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND ENLIST CITIZENS ARMS LDP vs Comelec If there is a political party controversy, a reference to its own constitution and election laws could solve the problem. In this case, the leaders of LDP are divided as to who between them is authorized to sign the nomination. REGISTRATION OF VOTERS 1. Akbayan-Youth vs Comelec Special registration outside the scheduled registration period is not allowed when not allowed by the COMELEC, the same being within its discretionary power under the Constitution. 2. Romualdez-Marcos vs Comelec Domicile of Imelda is in Leyte, where she was born. When she married Ferdinand Marcos, she followed her husband in Ilocos. 3. Maria Jeanette Tecson vs Comelec & Companion Cases The Supreme Court did not rule on the citizenship of FPJ. The SC merely said that the petitioner failed to substantiate her claim. 4. De Guzman vs Comelec Petitioners contentions revolve on the pivotal issue, whether Section 44 of RA 8189 is valid and constitutional. RA 8189 was enacted on June 10, 1996 and approved by President Fidel V. Ramos on June 11, 1996. Section 44 thereof provides: "SEC. 44. Reassignment of Election Officers. - No Election Officer shall hold office in a particular city or municipality for more than four (4) years. Any election officer who, either at the time of the approval of this Act or subsequent thereto, has served for at least four (4) years in a particular city or municipality shall automatically be reassigned by the Commission to a new station outside the original congressional district." Ruling: Section 44 of RA 8189 enjoys the presumption of validity. The singling out of election officers in order to "ensure the impartiality of election officials by preventing them from developing familiarity with the people of their place of assignment" does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Neither does Section 44 of RA 8189 infringe the security of tenure of petitioners nor unduly deprive them of due process of law. PRECINCT AND POLLING PLACES Cawasa vs Comelec The regular polling place was transferred to another place and military personnel were assigned in the area. The remaining 45 precincts will affect the results of the elections. Is the transfer valid? No. There was no notice and hearing held. Sections 152, 153 and 154 of the Omnibus Election Code shed light on this matter, to wit: SEC. 152. Polling Place. A polling place is the building or place where the board of election inspectors conducts its proceedings and where the voters shall cast their votes. SEC. 153. Designation of polling places. The location of polling places designated in the preceding regular election shall continue with such changes as the Commission may find necessary, after notice to registered political parties and candidates in the political unit affected, if any, and hearing: provided, That no location shall be changed within forty-five days before a regular election and thirty days before a special election or a referendum or plebiscite, except in case it is destroyed or it cannot be used. SEC. 154. Requirements for polling places. Each polling place shall be, as far as practicable, a ground floor and shall be of sufficient size to admit and comfortably accommodate forty voters at one time outside the guard rail for the board of election inspectors. The polling place shall be located within the territory of the precinct as centrally as possible with respect to the residence of the voters therein and whenever possible, such location shall be along a public road. No designation of polling places shall be changed except upon written petition of the majority of the voters of the precinct or agreement of all the political parties or by resolution of the Commission upon prior notice and hearing.

Based on the Election Laws Outline of Atty. J. Valencia (2006)

Ateneo de Davao UniversityCollege of Law of 9 Election Laws (MANRESA 2008) ELIGIBILITY OF CANDIDATES Qualifications and Disqualifications of candidates and term of office. Under the Local Government Code, RA 7160, Section 39. Qualifications. (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect. (b) Candidates for the position of governor, vicegovernor, or member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, or mayor, vice-mayor or member of the sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities must be at least twenty-one (21) years of age on election day. (c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vicemayor of independent component cities, component cities, or municipalities must be at least twenty-one (21) years of age on election day. (d) Candidates for the position of member of the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan must be at least eighteen (18) years of age on election day. (e) Candidates for the position of punong barangay or member of the sangguniang barangay must be at least eighteen (18) years of age on election day. (f) Candidates for the sangguniang kabataan must be at least fifteen (15) years of age but not more than twentyone (21) years of age on election day. Cases on residency requirement: Coquilla vs Comelec US Navy Romualdez Marcos vs Comelec Leyte Perez vs Comelec - Cagayan First, 39(a) of the Local Government Code (R.A No. 7160) provides: The term residence is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to dwelling or habitation, but rather to domicile or legal residence, that is, the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi). A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where the childs parents reside and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice). (Coquilla) In the case of Romualdez vs. RTC (226 SCRA 408) the Court explained how one acquires a new domicile by choice. There must concur.(1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (2) intention to remain there; and (3) intention to abandon the old domicile. Residence (Romualdez) and domicile in politics are the same.

- Page 7 FOR PROOF-READING (a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for an elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the elections laws." 6. Domingo vs Comelec Mayor Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. as co-sponsor of the "PasyalAral" program did not violate section 68(a). 7. Trinidad vs Comelec With the complaint for disqualification of private respondent rendered moot and academic by the expiration of petitioners term of office therein contested, COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in proceeding to disqualify petitioner from his reelected term of office in its second questioned Resolution on the ground that it comes as a matter of course after his disqualification in SPA No. 95-213 promulgated after the 1998 election. While it is true that the first questioned Resolution was issued eight (8) days before the term of petitioner as Mayor expired, said Resolution had not yet attained finality and could not effectively be held to have removed petitioner from his office. Indeed, removal cannot extend beyond the term during which the alleged misconduct was committed. If a public official is not removed before his term of office expires, he can no longer be removed if he is thereafter reelected for another term. 8. Go vs Comelec Go filed a certificate of candidancy for mayorship for Baybay, Leyte. Later, she also filed a certificate of candidancy for governorship of Leyte. She filed a withdrawal of her candidacy for mayorship at 12:28 a.m. March 01, 2001. Two opponents filed for her disqualification. The petitions were based on the ground that petitioner filed certificates of candidacy for two positions, namely, that for mayor of Baybay, Leyte, and that for governor of Leyte, thus, making her ineligible for both. Ruling: She is not disqualified for both office. Her submission of her withdrawal of her certificate of candidacy was a substantial compliance with the law. Section 73, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, provides that: "SEC. 73. Certificate of candidacy.- No person shall be eligible for any elective public office unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein. "A person who has filed a certificate of candidacy may, prior to the election, withdraw the same by submitting to the office concerned a written declaration under oath. "No person shall be eligible for more than one office to be filled in the same election, and if he files his certificate of candidacy for more than one office, he shall not be eligible for any of them. However, before the expiration of the period for the filing of certificates of candidacy, the person who has filed more than one certificate of candidacy may declare under oath the office for which he desires to be eligible and cancel the certificate of candidacy for the other office or offices." There is nothing in this Section which mandates that the affidavit of withdrawal must be filed with the same office where the certificate of candidacy to be withdrawn was filed. Thus, it can be filed directly with the main office of the COMELEC, the office of the regional election director concerned, the office of the provincial election supervisor of the province to which the municipality involved belongs, or the office of the municipal election officer of the said municipality. 9. Dimaporo vs Mitra Dimaporo was duly elected congressman of ARMM. During the governatorial race, he filed a certificate of candidacy. Upon his filing of his candidacy, his name in the roll of congressmen was blotted. He did not win in the governatorial race. He wants to be back in office as congressman. Ruling: He lost his position ipso facto when he filed his certificate of candidacy for governor. Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 reads:

Under the Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 6: No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election. The fact that a person is registered as a voter in one district is not proof that he is not domiciled in another district. (Perez) Rationale of the Constitution and the laws on residency requirement: The Constitution and the law requires residence as a qualification for seeking and holding elective public office, in order to give candidates the opportunity to be familiar with the needs, difficulties, aspirations, potentials for growth and all matters vital to the welfare of their constituencies; likewise, it enables the electorate to evaluate the office seekers' qualifications and fitness for the job they aspire for. (Torayno vs Comelec) 5. Nolasco vs Comelec Disqualified for vote-buying. "Sec. 68. Disqualifications. - Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having:

Based on the Election Laws Outline of Atty. J. Valencia (2006)

Ateneo de Davao UniversityCollege of Law of 9 Election Laws (MANRESA 2008) "Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity except for President and VicePresident shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy." Rationale of the law: this statutory provision seeks to ensure that such officials serve out their entire term of office by discouraging them from running for another public office and thereby cutting short their tenure by making it clear that should they fail in their candidacy, they cannot go back to their former position. This is consonant with the constitutional edict that all public officials must serve the people with utmost loyalty and not trifle with the mandate which they have received from their constituents. DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES 1. Coquilla vs Comelec A retired US Navy, misrepresented in his certificate of candidacy his residence for two years at Leyte. Ruling: Indeed, it has been held that a candidates statement in her certificate of candidacy for the position of governor of Leyte that she was a resident of Kananga, Leyte when this was not so or that the candidate was a natural-born Filipino when in fact he had become an Australian citizen[38] constitutes a ground for the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy. SEC. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. 2. Salcedo II vs Comelec As stated in the law, in order to justify the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy under section 78, it is essential that the false representation mentioned therein pertain to a material matter for the sanction imposed by this provision would affect the substantive rights of a candidate - the right to run for the elective post for which he filed the certificate of candidacy. Although the law does not specify what would be considered as a "material representation," the Court has interpreted this phrase in a line of decisions applying section 78 of the Code. 3. Frivaldo vs Comelec THRICE Frivaldo won as governor in Sorsogon. This is his third time to be petitionede for disqualification on account of noncitizenship. Anent the subject matter, Section 78 of BP881, the issue passed before the SC is : Did the respondent Commission on Elections exceed its jurisdiction in promulgating the assailed Resolutions, all of which prevented Frivaldo from assuming the governorship of Sorsogon, considering that they were not rendered within the period referred to in Seciton 78 of the Onmibus Election Code, vix., "not later than fifteen days before the elections"? In other words, is section 78 mandatory? Ruling: No, it is not mandatory. It is merely directory. In dismissing the petition in G.R. No. 120295, we hold that the Comelec did not commit grave abuse of discretion because "Section 6 of R.A. 6646 authorizes the Comelec to try and decide disqualifications even after the elections. Section 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position: (a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence; (b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case; (c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic; (d) Those with dual citizenship; (allegiance) (e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad; (f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and (g) The insane or feeble-minded. 4. Rodriguez vs Comelec Who is a fugitive from justice? A "fugitive from justice" x x x includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution."

- Page 8 FOR PROOF-READING The definition thus indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that animates one's flight from a particular jurisdiction. And obviously, there can only be an intent to evade prosecution or punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of conviction. Rodriguez' case just cannot fit in this concept. There is no dispute that his arrival in the Philippines from the US on June 25, 1985, as per certifications issued by the Bureau of Immigrations dated April 273 and June 26 of 1995,4 preceded the filing of the felony complaint in the Los Angeles Court on November 12, 1985 and of the issuance on even date of the arrest warrant by that same foreign court, by almost five (5) months. It was clearly impossible for Rodriguez to have known about such felony complaint and arrest warrant at the time he left the US, as there was in fact no complaint and arrest warrant - much less conviction - to speak of yet at such time. What prosecution or punishment then was Rodriguez deliberately running away from with his departure from the US? The very essence of being a "fugitive from justice" under the MARQUEZ Decision definition, is Just nowhere to be found in the circumstances of Rodriguez. 5. Grego vs Comelec; Aguinaldo vs Comelec and Reyes vs Comelec, Salalima vs Guingona Jr. Re: Section 40(b) and other provisions of Republic Act 7160 took effect only on January 1, 1992. It cannot be given a retroactive effect. It applies only to those removed from office on or after January 1, 1992. 6. Caasi vs Comelec The Supreme Court held that Miguels application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S. and his possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is a permanent resident of the U.S. despite his occasional visits to the Philippines. The waiver of such immigrant status should be as indubitable as his application for it. Absent clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that he surrendered his green card to the appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor of Bolinao in the local election on January 18, 1988, the Courts conclusion is that he was disqualified to run for said public office, hence, his election thereto was null and void. 7. Mercado vs Manzano Clearly, in including 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase dual citizenship in R.A. No. 7160, 40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, 20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states. As Joaquin G. Bernas, one of the most perceptive members of the Constitutional Commission, pointed out: [D]ual citizenship is just a reality imposed on us because we have no control of the laws on citizenship of other countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But whether or not she is considered a citizen of another country is something completely beyond our control. 8. Aznar vs Comelec In the instant case, private respondent vehemently denies having taken the oath of allegiance of the United States (p. 81, Rollo). He is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine passport and has continuously participated in the electoral process in this country since 1963 up to the present, both as a voter and as a candidate (pp. 107-108, Rollo). Thus, private respondent remains a Filipino and the loss of his Philippine citizenship cannot be presumed. 9. Valles vs Comelec Private respondent was born in 1934 in Australia of a Filipino mother and Australian father. Petitioner maintains that the private respondent is an Australian citizen, placing reliance on the admitted facts that: a) In 1988, private respondent registered herself with the Bureau of Immigration as an Australian national and was issued Alien Certificate of Registration No. 404695 dated September 19, 1988;

Based on the Election Laws Outline of Atty. J. Valencia (2006)

Ateneo de Davao UniversityCollege of Law of 9 Election Laws (MANRESA 2008) b) On even date, she applied for the issuance of an Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR), and c) She was issued Australian Passport No. H700888 on March 3, 1988. WON respondent is Filipino? Ruling: YES. The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth. As the daughter of a Filipino mother, she is Filipino. 10. Labo vs Comelec There is no claim or finding that petitioner automatically ceased to be a Filipino because of his marriage to an Australian national in 1976. He became a citizen of Australia because he was naturalized as such through a formal and positive process, simplified in his case because he was married to an Australian citizen. The electorate had no power to permit a foreigner owing his total allegiance to the Queen of Australia, or at least a stateless individual owing no allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, to preside over the people of Baguio as mayor of their city. Only citizens of the Philippines have that privilege over their countrymen. 11. Frivaldo vs Comelec 174 SCRA Facts: Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governorelect and assume office in due time. The League of Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a petition for annulment of Frivaldos election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States. Frivaldo admitted the allegation but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that his naturalization was merely forced upon himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting prosecution by the Martial Law Dictators agent abroad. He is not a Filipino Citizen and therefore disqualified from serving as Governor of Sorsogon. Citizenship is a continuous requirement. 12. Adormeo vs Comelec Reiterates Borja and Lonzanida cases. In this case, Private respondent Talaga, Jr. was elected mayor in May 1992. He served the full term. Again, he was re-elected in 19951998. In the election of 1998, he lost to Bernard G. Tagarao. In the recall election of May 12, 2000, he again won and served the unexpired term of Tagarao until June 30, 2001. On March 2, 2001, petitioner filed with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor, Lucena City a Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and/or Disqualification of Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr., on the ground that the latter was elected and had served as city mayor for three (3) consecutive terms as follows: (1) in the election of May 1992, where he served the full term; (2) in the election of May 1995, where he again served the full term; and, (3) in the recall election of May 12, 2000, where he served only the unexpired term of Tagarao after having lost to Tagarao in the 1998 election. Petitioner contended that Talagas candidacy as Mayor constituted a violation of Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution which provides: Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. Issue: was private respondent disqualified to run for mayor of Lucena City in the May 14, 2001 elections? This issue hinges on whether, as provided by the Constitution, he had already served three consecutive terms in that office. Rulings: 1. To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply. This point can be made clearer by considering the following case or situation: Case No. 2. Suppose B is elected mayor and, during his first term, he is twice suspended for misconduct for a total of 1 year. If he is twice reelected after that, can he run for one more term in the next election? Yes, because he has served only two full terms successively. (Borja) 2. This Court held that the two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: a) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government

- Page 9 FOR PROOF-READING post and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. (Lonzanida) 3. Neither can respondents victory in the recall election be deemed a violation of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution as voluntary renunciation for clearly it is not. RA 6646, Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission (COMELEC) shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. 13. Perez vs Comelec and Aguinaldo As already stated, the petition for disqualification against private respondent was decided by the First Division of the COMELEC on May 10, 1998. The following day, May 11, 1998, the elections were held. Notwithstanding the fact that private respondent had already been proclaimed on May 16, 1998 and had taken his oath of office on May 17, 1998, petitioner still filed a motion for reconsideration on May 22, 1998, which the COMELEC en banc denied on June 11, 1998. Clearly, this could not be done. Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the continuation of proceedings for disqualification even after the elections if the respondent has not been proclaimed. The COMELEC en banc had no jurisdiction to entertain the motion because the proclamation of private respondent barred further consideration of petitioner's action. In the same vein, considering that at the time of the filing of this petition on June 16, 1998, private respondent was already a member of the House of Representatives, this Court has no jurisdiction over the same. Pursuant to Art. VI, sec.17 of the Constitution, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal has the exclusive original jurisdiction over the petition for the declaration of private respondent's ineligibility. HRET has sole jurisdiction to try the election cases against its members. 14. Bagatsing vs Comelec Section 6 explicitly applies only to any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified before an election. The section provides further that if for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest xxx. There is no provision in R.A. 6646 that treats of a situation where the complaint for disqualification is filed after the election. If the intention of decide disqualification cases made a distinction between Section 6 would not have election. the law is for the COMELEC to hear and filed after the election, it would not have cases filed before and after the election. used the word before preceding an

Thus, the need for implementing rules as embodied in Comelec Resolution No. 2050 which provide that any complaint for disqualification based on Section 6 of R.A. 6646 is filed after the election against a candidate who has already been proclaimed as winner shall be dismissed as a disqualification case, but the complaint shall be referred for preliminary investigation to the Law Department of COMELEC.

Based on the Election Laws Outline of Atty. J. Valencia (2006)