VIII. DAMAGES A.

Concept/Kinds of Damages (2197) Spouses Ong v CA Spouses Ong sustained injuries when Inland Bus, which was owned by Inland Trailways under a Lease Agreement with Philtranco, slowed down to avoid a cargo truck but was hit from behind by another bus, owned and operated by Philtranco. The court ruled, base on the police report, that the proximate cause of the accident was the bumping of the bus from behind hence ruled against Philtranco and awarded damages. However, this police report was contested as it was formally offered as evidence but merely as an annex to Inlands answer. Whether damages were properly awarded. RULING The fundamental principle of the law on damages is that one injured by a breach of contract (in this case, the contract of transportation) or by a wrongful or negligent act or omission shall have a fair and just compensation, commensurate with the loss sustained as a consequence of the defendant's acts. Hence, actual pecuniary compensation is the general rule, except where the circumstances warrant the allowance of other kinds of damages. Actual damages Actual damages are such compensation or damages for an injury that will put the injured party in the position in which he had been before he was injured. They pertain to such injuries or losses that are actually sustained and susceptible of measurement. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, a party is entitled to adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss as he has duly proven. To be recoverable, actual damages must be pleaded and proven in Court. No such proof was offered to the P10,000 claim of damages. At the most, documentary evidence showed P3, 977 only as damages. Moral Damages and Diminution of use of arm A person is entitled to the physical integrity of his or her body, and if that integrity is violated, damages are due and assessable. However, physical injury, like loss or diminution of use of an arm or a limb, is not a pecuniary loss. Indeed, it is nor susceptible of exact monetary estimation. Thus, the usual practice is to award moral damages for physical injuries sustained. In the case at bar, it was sufficiently shown during the trial that Francia's right arm could not function in a normal manner and that, as a result, she suffered mental anguish and anxiety. Thus, an increase in the amount of moral damages awarded, from P30,000 to P50,000, appears to be reasonable and justified. Renato also suffered mental anxiety and anguish from the accident. Thus, he should be separately awarded P30,000 as moral damages. Unrealized Income Protesting the deletion of the award for Francia's unrealized income, petitioners contend that Francia's injuries and her oral testimony adequately support their claim. The Court disagrees. Although actual damages include indemnification for profits which the injured party failed to obtain (lucro cesante or lucrum cesans), the rule requires that said person

produce the "best evidence of which his case is susceptible. The petitioners failed to do so, as she could have returned to work despite the plaster in her arm. Attorney fees Counsel's performance, however, does not justify the award of 25 percent attorney's fees. It is well-settled that such award is addressed to sound judicial discretion and subject to judicial control. Only a 10% attorneys fee is awarded. Art. 2197. Damages may be: (1) Actual or compensatory; (2) Moral; (3) Nominal; (4) Temperate or moderate; (5) Liquidated; or (6) Exemplary or corrective. B. General Principles of Recovery

Air France v CA Private respondent Morales, thru his agent, bought an airline ticket from petitioners Manila ticketing office. The itinerary covered by the ticket included several cities with certain segments thereof restricted by markings of non endorsable and valid on AF (Air France) only. While in New York, respondent obtained medical certificates attesting to an ear infection which necessitated medical treatment. After a few more trips to other cities in Europe, he requested to the petitioner (twice) to shorten his trip by deleting some of the cities in his itinerary so that he can go back to Manila and have his ear checked. Petitioner informed respondent that as a matter of procedure, confirmation of the Manila ticketing office must be secured before shortening of the route. His requests were eventually denied. This prompted the respondent to buy an entirely new set of tickets to be able to go back home. Upon arriving in Manila, respondent sent a letter-complaint to petitioner thru its Manila ticketing office. The petitioner advised the respondent to surrender the unused flight coupons in order to have them refunded but the respondent kept the said coupons and instead, filed a complaint for breach of contract of carriage and damages. RTC held in favor of respondent. CA modified the judgment but it was still for the respondent. W/N there was really a breach of contract of carriage on the part of the petitioner, as to justify the award to private respondent of actual, moral, and exemplary damages? NO. RULING International Air Transportation Association (IATA) Resolution No. 275 e, 2., special note reads: "Where a fare is restricted and such restrictions are not clearly evident from the required entries on the ticket, such restrictions may be written, stamped or reprinted in plain language in the Endorsement/Restrictions" box of the applicable flight coupon(s); or attached thereto by use of an appropriate notice." Voluntary changes to tickets, while

allowable, are also covered by (IATA) Resolution No. 1013, Art. II, which provides: "1. changes to the ticket requested by the passenger will be subject to carriers regulations. Private respondent wanted a rerouting to Hamburg, Geneva, Rome, Hongkong and Manila which shortened the original itinerary on the ticket issued by AF Manila through ASPAC, its general sales agent. Considering the original restrictions on the ticket, it was not unreasonable for Air France to deny the request. Besides, a recurring ear infection was pleaded as reason necessitating urgent return to Manila. Assuming arguendo a worsening pain or discomfort, private respondent appears to have still proceeded to four (4) other cities covering a period of at least six (6) days and leaving open his date of departure from Hongkong to Manila. And, even if he claimed to have undergone medical examination upon arrival in Manila, no medical certificate was presented. He failed to even remember his date of arrival in Manila. With a claim for a large amount of damages, the Court finds it unsual for respondent, a lawyer, to easily forget vital information to substantiate his plea. It is also essential before an award of damages that the claimant must satisfactorily prove during the trial the existence of the factual basis of the damages and its causal connection to defendant's acts.Air France employees in Hamburg informed private respondent that his tickets were partly stamped "non-endorsable" and "valid on Air France only." Mere refusal to accede to the passenger's wishes does not necessarily translate into damages in the absence of bad faith. To our mind, respondent has failed to show wanton, malevolent or reckless misconduct imputable to petitioner in its refusal to re-route. Air France Manila acted upon the advise of its Manila ticketing office in denying private respondent's request. There was no evident bad faith when it followed the advise not to authorize rerouting. At worst, the situation can be considered a case of inadvertence on the part of petitioners Manila ticketing office in not explaining the non-endorsable character of the ticket. Of importance, however, is the fact that private respondent is a lawyer, and the restriction box clearly indicated the non- endorsable character of the ticket. Omissions by ordinary passengers may be condoned but more is expected of members of the bar who cannot feign ignorance of such limitations and restrictions. An award of moral and exemplary damages cannot be sustained under the circumstances, but petitioner has to refund the unused coupons in the Air France ticket to the private respondent. Dichoso v CA The dispute arose from a contested portion of a land which both Teodolfo Ramos and Ernesto Dichoso claim to legally belong to them as part of their property. This portion produces crops where both parties brought their own constabularies to forcefully claim crops produced. As such, they petitioned an action for quieting of titles wherein Ramos won. W/N recovery of damages is proper. RULING Actual or compensatory damages cannot be presumed, but must be duly proved, and proved with reasonable degree of certainty. A court cannot rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork as to the fact and amount of damages, but must depend upon competent proof that they have suffered and on evidence of the actual amount thereof (Dee Hua Liong Electrical Corporation v. Reyes, 145 SCRA 713, November 25, 1986). It is undisputed that the land in question yields an average of twenty (20) sacks of palay per planting and that it is planted to palay twice a year. Ramos' share of the harvest is only one-

third (1/3). In view of his dispossession from 1964 and the fact that his tenant has vacated the land that same year, he cannot allege that his tenant is entitled to his two-thirds (2/3) share.

PAL v Miano On August 31, 1988, private respondent took petitioner's flight PR 722, Mabuhay Class, bound for Frankfurt, Germany. He had an immediate onward connecting flight via Lufthansa flight LH 1452 to Vienna, Austria. At the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, he checked-in one brown suitcase weighing twenty (20) kilograms but did not declare a higher valuation. He claimed that his suitcase contained money, documents, one Nikkon camera with zoom lens, suits, sweaters, shirts, pants, shoes, and other accessories. Upon private respondent's arrival at Vienna via Lufthansa flight LH 1452, his checked-in baggage was missing. He reported the matter to the Lufthansa authorities. After three (3) hours of waiting in vain, he proceeded to Piestany, Czechoslovakia. Eleven (11) days after or on September 11, 1988, his suitcase was delivered to him in his hotel in Piestany, Czechoslovakia. He claimed that because of the delay in the delivery of his suitcase, he was forced to borrow money to buy some clothes, to pay $200.00 for the transportation of his baggage from Vienna to Piestany, and lost his Nikkon camera. In November 1988, private respondent wrote to petitioner a letter demanding: (1) P10,000.00 cost of allegedly lost Nikkon camera; (2) $200.00 for alleged cost of transporting luggage from Vienna to Piestany; and (3) P100,000.00 as damages. In its reply, petitioner informed private respondent that his letter was forwarded to its legal department for investigation. Private respondent felt his demand letter was left unheeded. He instituted an action for Damages docketed as Civil Case No. 89-3496 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Petitioner contested the complaint. It disclaimed any liability on the ground that there was neither a report of mishandled baggage on flight PR 722 nor a tracer telex received from its Vienna Station. It, however, contended that if at all liable its obligation is limited by the Warsaw Convention rate. Petitioner filed a Third-Party Complaint against Lufthansa German Airlines imputing the mishandling of private respondent's baggage, but was dismissed for its failure to prosecute. In its decision, the trial court observed that petitioner's actuation was not attended by bad faith. Nevertheless, it awarded private respondent moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees hence this petition for review. Whether or not trial court erred in awarding moral and exemplary damages? YES. RULING In breach of contract of carriage by air, moral damages are awarded only if the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. Bad faith means a breach of a known duty through same motive of interest or ill will. The trial court erred in awarding moral damages to private respondent. The established facts evince that petitioner's late delivery of the baggage for eleven (11) days was not

motivated by ill will or bad faith. In fact, it immediately coordinated with its Central Baggage Services to trace private respondent's suitcase and succeeded in finding it. At the hearing, petitioner's Manager for Administration of Airport Services Department Miguel Ebio testified that their records disclosed that Manila, the originating station, did not receive any tracer telex. A tracer telex, an airline lingo, is an action of any station that the airlines operate from whom a passenger may complain or have not received his baggage upon his arrival. It was reasonable to presume that the handling of the baggage was normal and regular. Upon inquiry from their Frankfurt Station, it was however discovered that the interline tag of private respondent's baggage was accidentally taken off. According to Mr. Ebio, it was customary for destination stations to hold a tagless baggage until properly identified. The tracer telex, which contained information on the baggage, is matched with the tagless luggage for identification. Without the tracer telex, the color and the type of baggage are used as basis for the matching, thus, the delay. We can neither sustain the award of exemplary damages. The prerequisite for the award of exemplary damages in cases of contract or quasi-contract is that the defendant acted in wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner. The undisputed facts do not so warrant the characterization of the action of petitioner. The award of attorney's fees must also be disallowed for lack of legal leg to stand on. The fact that private respondent was compelled to litigate and incur expenses to protect and enforce his claim did not justify the award of attorney's fees. The general rule is that attorney's fees cannot be recovered as part of damages because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate. Petitioner is willing to pay the just claim of $200.00 as a result of the delay in the transportation of the luggage in accord with the Warsaw Convention. Needless to say, the award of attorney's fees must be deleted where the award of moral and exemplary damages are eliminated. DBP v CA Lydia P. Cuba is a grantee of a Fishpond Lease the Government; She obtained several loans from the Development Bank of the under the terms stated in the Promissory Notes. As security for said loans, Cuba executed two Deeds of Assignment of her Leasehold Rights. Cuba failed to pay her loan on the scheduled dates thereof in accordance with the terms of the Promissory Notes. Without foreclosure proceedings, whether judicial or extrajudicial, DBP appropriated the Leasehold Rights of Cuba over the fishpond in question. After DBP has appropriated the Leasehold Rights of Cuba over the fishpond in question, DBP, in turn, executed a Deed of Conditional Sale of the Leasehold Rights in favor of Cuba over the same fishpond in question. In the negotiation for repurchase, Cuba addressed two letters to the Manager DBP, Dagupan City. DBP thereafter accepted the offer to repurchase in a letter addressed to Cuba. After the Deed of Conditional Sale was executed in favor of Cuba, a new Fishpond Lease Agreement was issued by the Ministry of Agriculture and Food in favor of Cuba only, excluding her husband. Cuba failed to pay the amortizations stipulated in the Deed of Conditional Sale. After Cuba failed to pay the amortization as stated in Deed of Conditional Sale, she entered with the DBP a temporary arrangement whereby in consideration for the deferment of the Notarial Rescission of Deed of Conditional Sale, Cuba promised to make certain payments. DBP thereafter sent a Notice of Rescission thru Notarial Act, and which was received by Cuba. After the Notice of Rescission, DBP took possession of the Leasehold

Rights of the fishpond in question. That after DBP took possession of the Leasehold Rights over the fishpond in question, DBP thereafter executed a Deed of Conditional Sale in favor of defendant Agripina Caperal through a public sale; Thereafter, Caperal was awarded Fishpond Lease Agreement. W/N Cuba is entitled to recover damages YES. RULING Article 2199 provides:Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages. Actual or compensatory damages cannot be presumed, but must be proved with reasonable degree of certainty. A court cannot rely on speculations, conjectures, or guesswork as to the fact and amount of damages, but must depend upon competent proof that they have been suffered by the injured party and on the best obtainable evidence of the actual amount thereof. It must point out specific facts which could afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory or actual damages are borne. In the present case, the trial court awarded in favor of CUBA P1,067,500 as actual damages consisting of P550,000 which represented the value of the alleged lost articles of CUBA and P517,500 which represented the value of the 230,000 pieces of bangus allegedly stocked in 1979 when DBP first ejected CUBA from the fishpond and the adjoining house. This award was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. We find that the alleged loss of personal belongings and equipment was not proved by clear evidence. Other than the testimony of CUBA and her caretaker, there was no proof as to the existence of those items before DBP took over the fishpond in question. As pointed out by DBP, there was not "inventory of the alleged lost items before the loss which is normal in a project which sometimes, if not most often, is left to the care of other persons." Neither was a single receipt or record of acquisition presented. Curiously, in her complaint dated 17 May 1985, CUBA included "losses of property" as among the damages resulting from DBP's take-over of the fishpond. Yet, it was only in September 1985 when her son and a caretaker went to the fishpond and the adjoining house that she came to know of the alleged loss of several articles. Such claim for "losses of property," having been made before knowledge of the alleged actual loss, was therefore speculative. The alleged loss could have been a mere afterthought or subterfuge to justify her claim for actual damages. With regard to the award of P517,000 representing the value of the alleged 230,000 pieces of bangus which died when DBP took possession of the fishpond in March 1979, the same was not called for. Such loss was not duly proved; besides, the claim therefor was delayed unreasonably. From 1979 until after the filing of her complaint in court in May 1985, CUBA did not bring to the attention of DBP the alleged loss. The award of actual damages should, therefore, be struck down for lack of sufficient basis. In view, however, of DBP's act of appropriating CUBA's leasehold rights which was contrary to law and public policy, as well as its false representation to the then Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources that it had "foreclosed the mortgage," an award of moral damages in the amount of P50,000 is in order conformably with Article 2219(10), in relation to Article 21,

of the Civil Code. Exemplary or corrective damages in the amount of P25,000 should likewise be awarded by way of example or correction for the public good. There being an award of exemplary damages, attorney's fees are also recoverable. C. Actual Damages (Art. 2199-2203; 2207, 2209) a. Damnum emergencs/lucrum cessans b. Disability c. Indemnity for death d. Interest e. Attorneys fees (Art. 2208)

The M/V Maria Efigenia XV, owned by Maria Efigenia Fishing Corporation collided with the vessel Petroparcel which at that time was owned by Luzon Stevedoring Corporation (LSC). The Board of Marine Inquiry declared Petroparcel to be at fault. After unsuccessful demands on LSC, Marie Efigenia sued the LSC and the Petroparcel captain before the CFI. It prayed for an award of P692,680.00, allegedly representing the value of the fishing nets, boat equipment, and cargoes. During the pendency of the case, petitioner PNOC sought to be substituted in the place of LSC as it had already acquired ownership of Petroparcel. Meanwhile, Maria Efigenia sought to amend its complaint by also claiming for the amount of P600,000.00 as the value of the vessel, and alleging that it had also incurred unrealized profits and lost business opportunities. The lower court ordered PNOC to pay Maria Efigenia, based on some documentary evidence presented by the latter (in the form of price quotations). The CA affirmed in toto. Hence the instant recourse. W/N the award of actual damages was proper. RULING: NO, lack of evidentiary basis but nominal damages proper. Under Article 2199 of the NCC, actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury sustained. They proceed from a sense of natural justice and are designed to repair the wrong that has been done, to compensate for the injury inflicted and not to impose a penalty. In actions based on torts and quasi-delicts, actual damages include all the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. There are two kinds: one is the loss of what a person already possesses (dano emergente), and the other is the failure to receive as a benefit that which would have pertained to him (lucro cesante). In the case of profit-earning chattels, what has to be assessed is the value of the chattel as to its owner as a going concern at the time and place of the loss, and this means, at least in the case of ships, that regard must be had to existing and pending engagements. If the value of the ship reflects the fact that it is in any case certain of profitable employment, then nothing can be added to that value in respect of charters actually lost, since it would compensate the plaintiff twice over. On the other hand, if the ship is valued without reference to its actual future engagements, then it may be necessary to add to the value the anticipated profit.To enable an injured party to recover actual or compensatory damages, he is required to prove the actual amount of loss with reasonable degree of certainty premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence available. He must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. Damages cannot be presumed by the courts, in making an award it must point out specific facts that could afford a basis for measuring such damages. In this case, actual damages were proven through the sole testimony of Maria Efigenias general manager and certain pieces of documentary evidence. The price quotations are ordinary private writings, and should have been proffered along with the testimony of the

Art. 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages. Art. 2200. Indemnification for damages shall comprehend not only the value of the loss suffered, but also that of the profits which the obligee failed to obtain. (1106) Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor who acted in good faith is liable shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted. In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation. (1107a) Art. 2202. In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. It is not necessary that such damages have been foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by the defendant. Art. 2203. The party suffering loss or injury must exercise the diligence of a good father of a family to minimize the damages resulting from the act or omission in question. Art. 2207. If the plaintiff's property has been insured, and he has received indemnity from the
insurance company for the injury or loss arising out of the wrong or breach of contract complained of, the insurance company shall be subrogated to the rights of the insured against the wrongdoer or the person who has violated the contract. If the amount paid by the insurance company does not fully cover the injury or loss, the aggrieved party shall be entitled to recover the deficiency from the person causing the loss or injury.

Art. 2209. If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money, and the debtor incurs in delay, the indemnity for damages, there being no stipulation to the contrary, shall be the payment of the interest agreed upon, and in the absence of stipulation, the legal interest, which is six per cent per annum. (1108) PNOC Shipping v CA 358 Phil 38 (1998)

authors thereof. In the absence of which, they partake of hearsay evidence. Damages may not be awarded on the basis of hearsay evidence. Nonetheless, if there is lack of sufficient proof as to the actual damages suffered, the complainant is entitled to nominal damages. Eastern Shipping v CA, GR 97412 (1994) Eastern Shipping Line to Metro Port Service to Allied Brokerage Corporation to consignees warehouse Two fiber drums of riboflavin were shipped from Japan via vessel ss eastern comet, owned by EASTERN SHIPPING LINES (carrier). This shipment was insured under PLAINTIFFS MARINE POLICY. It was received by METRO PORT SERVICE INC (arrastre operator), upon arrival in manila, but there was one drum which was damage nd unknown to plaintiff. ALLIED BROKERAGE (broker) received the shipment with one drum opened and without seal. The latter then delivered said shipments to consignees warehouse. At this point it was discovered that the rest of the content of the other drums was adulterated/fake. As a result, plaintiff insurance company had to pay the claims against its insurance policy and it became subrogated to all the rights of claim against damages from Allied Brokerage. 1. Whether or not the shipment sustained losses/damages = YES. Before shipping, it was ascertained that it was in perfect condition as shown in the Bill of Lading and commercial invoice 2. Whether or not these losses/damages were sustained while in the custody of defendants (in whose respective custody, if determinable) = YES. Losses/damages were sustained while in the respective and/or successive custody and possession of Eastern, Metro Port and Allied Brokerage. 3. Whether or not the interest rate should be applied from the time of complaint or final decision of the court = SEE held below. RULING: The case listed several precedent rulings on similar facts. The "first group" would consist of the cases of Reformina v. Tomol (1985), Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines v. Cruz (1986), Florendo v. Ruiz (1989) and National Power Corporation v. Angas (1992). In the "second group" would be Malayan Insurance Company v. Manila Port Service (1969), Nakpil and Sons v. Court of Appeals (1988), and American Express International v. Intermediate Appellate Court (1988). In the "first group", the basic issue focuses on the application of either the 6% (under the Civil Code) or 12% (under the Central Bank Circular) interest per annum. It is easily discernible in these cases that there has been a consistent holding that the Central Bank 16 Circular imposing the 12% interest per annum applies only to loans or forbearance of money, goods or credits, as well as to judgments involving such loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits, and that the 6% interest under the Civil Code governs when the transaction involves the payment of indemnities in the concept of damage arising from the breach or a delay in the performance of obligations in general applied per annum from the time of the filing of the complaint until fully paid.

The "second group", did not alter the pronounced rule on the application of the 6% or 12% 17 interest per annum, but varied on the commencement of the running of the legal interest. Malayan held that the amount awarded should bear legal interest from the date of the decision of the court a quo, explaining that "if the suit were for damages, 'unliquidated and not known until definitely ascertained, assessed and determined by the courts after proof,' then, interest 'should be from the date of the decision.'" American Express International v. IAC, introduced a different time frame for reckoning the 6% interest by ordering it to be "computed from the finality of (the) decision until paid." The Nakpil and Sons case ruled that 12% interest per annum should be imposed from the finality of the decision until the judgment amount is paid. This was attributed to the different factual circumstances surrounding the case. However, it is prudent to lay down guidelines in its application: I. When an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts is breached, the contravenor can be held liable for damages. The provisions under Title XVIII on "Damages" of the Civil Code govern in determining the measure of recoverable damages. II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows: 1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code. 2. otherwise, interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages except when or until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty. The interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is made (damages ascertained already). The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally adjudged. 3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit.

Francisco v. Roque, GR. 151339, January 31, 2006 After the death of Pastora Baetiong in 1975 by a complaint for accion publiciana filed against the heirs of Baetiong, including petitioner, by respondents Roque Co and Mariano Co, involving the above-mentioned parcel of land, and another property. The complaint was settled when the parties entered into a Compromise Agreement dated 10 November 1983, which was duly approved. In the Compromise Agreement, the parties acknowledged the heirs of Baetiong as the owner of the subject properties. Further, it was agreed upon that the heirs of Baetiong would lease to respondents a portion of the properties, totaling between 25,000 square meters to 30,000 square meters, covering land then already occupied by respondents. The lease agreement, which was contained in a Contract of Lease, was to subsist for 15 years commencing retroactively from 1 October 1983. Five years after the execution of the Compromise Agreement and Contract of Lease, the heirs of Baetiong filed a Motion with the Quezon City, RTC, Branch 101, wherein they alleged that respondents were actually occupying a larger portion of their land than the 30,000 square meter limit agreed upon in the Compromise Agreement. The RTC granted the motion but Court of Appeals reversed the RTC and declared that the judgment by compromise rendered in Civil Case No. Q-38464 "was finally terminated and executed". Four years later, or on 24 July 1995, petitioner filed a complaint for forcible entry against respondents before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC). Petitioner maintained that on 19 July 1995, respondents, through agents, entered Lot No. 2-F-4 and started fencing the said property. In their answer, respondents alleged that the property over which petitioner was asserting her rights was covered under the Contract of Lease which had been executed pursuant to the earlier Compromise Agreement. The MeTC ruled in favor of petitioner and affirmed by the RTC. Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that the complaint for forcible entry was indeed barred by res judicata. CA also concluded that due to malicious prosecution, respondents were liable for moral damages of P30,000.00, exemplary damages of P20,000.00, and attorneys fees of P20,000.00. W/N CA was correct in awarding moral & exemplary damages. NO. RULING The Court is not wont to uphold awards of moral damages based on haphazard conjectures on the awardees resultant mental state. We cannot agree with the appellate court that bad faith on the part of petitioner had been preponderantly established in this case. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence, but it imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong. It should be established by clear and convincing evidence since the law always presumes good faith. In ascertaining the intention of the person accused of acting in bad faith, the courts must carefully examine the evidence as to the conduct and outward acts from which the inward motive may be determined. Certainly, it does not appear that the Court of Appeals has conducted the mandated careful examination of evidence that would sustain the award of moral damages. Nothing in the record establishes any right to moral damages by respondents. Neither should exemplary damages avail under the circumstances. The plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the court may

consider the question of whether exemplary damages should be awarded. If the court has no proof or evidence upon which the claim for moral damages could be based, such indemnity could not be outrightly awarded. The same holds true with respect to the award of exemplary damages where it must be shown that the party acted in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner. Furthermore, this specie of damages is allowed only in addition to moral damages such that no exemplary damages can be awarded unless the claimant first establishes his clear right to moral damages. Contrary to the pronouncement of the Court of Appeals, the mere fact that petitioners were constrained to litigate in order to protect and assert their rights does not ipso facto entitle them to attorneys fees. What Article 2208 (2) of the Civil Code provides, in order that attorneys fees may be awarded, is that "the defendants act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest". It is settled that the fact that the party was "compelled to litigate and incur expenses to protect and enforce their claim does not justify the award of attorney's fees. The general rule is that attorney's fees cannot be recovered as part of damages because of the public policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate. The award of attorney's fees must be deleted where the award of moral and exemplary damages are eliminated." Marikina Autoline v. People, GR 152040, March 31, 2006 At around 2:00 p.m. on October 3, 1992, Suelto was driving a passenger bus along Quezon City, going towards (EDSA). The bus suddenly swerved to the right and struck the terrace of the commercial apartment owned by Valdellon located along Kamuning Road. Upon Valdellons request, the court ordered Pontiveros, the Senior Building Inspection Officer of the City Engineers Office, to inspect the damaged terrace. Pontiveros recommended that since the structural members made of concrete had been displaced, the terrace would have to be demolished "to keep its monolithicness, and to insure the safety and stability of the building." In a letter addressed to the bus company and Suelto, Valdellon demanded payent to cover the cost of the damage to the terrace. The bus company and Suelto offered a P30,000.00 settlement which Valdellon refused. Valdellon filed a criminal complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property against Suelto and he was found guilty. Trial court awarded P150,000 as actual damages. While CA modified and awarded P100,000 as actual damages. Whether respondents are entitled to P100,000 for actual damages. Ruling: No. Private respondents failed to adduce adequate and competent proof of the pecuniary loss they actually incurred. It is not enough that the damage be capable of proof but must be actually proved with a reasonable degree of certainty, pointing out specific facts that afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory damages are borne. The burden of proof is on the party who would be defeated if no evidence would be presented on either side.

The only evidence adduced by respondents to prove actual damages claimed by private respondent were the summary computation of damage made by Engr. Regal amounting to P171,088.46 and the receipt issued by the BB Construction and Steel Fabricator to private respondent for P35,000.00 representing cost for carpentry works, masonry, welding, and electrical works. Respondents failed to present Regal to testify on his estimation. The trial court awarded P150,000.00 as actual damages to private respondent but failed to state the factual basis for such award The appellate court, for its part, failed to explain how it arrived at the amount of P100,000.00 in its three-page decision. Under Article 2199 of the Civil Code, actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury sustained. They proceed from a sense of natural justice and are designed to repair the wrong that has been done, to compensate for the injury inflicted and not to impose a penalty. In actions based on torts or quasi-delicts, actual damages include all the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. There are two kinds of actual or compensatory damages: one is the loss of what a person already possesses (dao emergente), and the other is the failure to receive as a benefit that which would have pertained to him (lucro cesante). Actual damages are not presumed. Actual damages cannot be anchored on mere surmises, speculations or conjectures. The Court further declared that "where goods are destroyed by the wrongful act of defendant, the plaintiff is entitled to their value at the time of the destruction, that is, normally, the sum of money which he would have to pay in the market for identical or essentially similar goods, plus in a proper case, damages for the loss of the use during the period before replacement. While claimants bare testimonial assertions in support of their claims for damages should not be discarded altogether, however, the same should be admitted with extreme caution. Their testimonies should be viewed in light of claimants self-interest, hence, should not be taken as gospel truth. Such assertion should be buttressed by independent evidence. An estimate of the damage cost will not suffice. We note, however, that petitioners adduced evidence that, in their view, the cost of the damage to the terrace of private respondent would amount to P55,000.00. Accordingly, private respondent is entitled to P55,000.00 actual damages. Valdellon is entitled to only P20,000.00 by way of exemplary damages.

The Medical Certificate and the testimony of the attending physician as well as the Decision of the NAPOLCOM finding the investigating officers on the fact that Rosemary was physically maltreated by the investigating officers in an attempt to force her to confess her participation in the robbery. Whatever declaration of accused therefore against her interest is inadmissible in evidence against her, hence, the alleged admission of the accused that she participated in the commission of the Robbery made to the police investigator and Junsay even if it is true cannot be used against her. Rosemarie, together with her father filed a Complaint for Damages against respondent Pilar, Ibarra and Junanito. Ibarra and Juanito were members of the police force of Bacolod City. The Complaint, alleged that by reason of respondents false, malicious, and illegal actuations in filing Criminal Case for Robbery against Rosemarie, the latter suffered untold pain, shame, humiliation, worry, and mental anguish, which if assessed in monetary terms will not be less than P200,000.00. It was further alleged therein that Conrado, Rosemaries father, lost his job and his entire family suffered. Petitioners maintained that Rosemarie suffered physical pain and mental torture due to the filing of the false criminal charge against her. They sought moral and exemplary damages, including attorneys fees and litigation expenses, as well as loss of earnings and expenses incurred in connection with Rosemaries defense in Criminal Case No. 28 for Robbery. They similarly prayed for payment of the expenses incurred in the prosecution of the instant case. Counsel for the petitioners manifested that they were claiming damages not for physical injuries which petitioner Rosemarie allegedly suffered in the hands of respondents during her investigation, but for her malicious prosecution. RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the Complaint. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC in toto. Whether petitioners are entitled to damages for malicious prosecution. - NO This Court has drawn the four elements that must be shown to concur to recover damages for malicious prosecution. The plaintiff must prove the following: (1) the prosecution did occur, and the defendant was himself the prosecutor or that he instigated its commencement; (2) the criminal action finally ended with an acquittal; (3) in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and (4) the prosecution was impelled by legal malice -- an improper or a sinister motive. The gravamen of malicious prosecution is not the filing of a complaint based on the wrong provision of law, but the deliberate initiation of an action with the knowledge that the charges were false and groundless. It is not disputed that the first and second elements are present.

Magbanua v. Junsay, Gr. No. 132659, Feb. 12, 2007 Petitioner Rosemarie Magbanua, who worked as a housemaid in the residence of Pilar S. Junsay was charged as a co-accused with the crime of Robbery of the personal belongings of Dra. Junsay. Rosemary was acquitted for lack of evidence.

Anent the question of whether the prosecutor acted without probable cause in bringing the action against petitioner Rosemarie, we find no reason to depart from the conclusions reached by the RTC and the Court of Appeals. The filing of Criminal Case for Robbery was not without probable cause. Indeed, during the investigation petitioner Rosemarie admitted her participation in the commission of the incident complained of. The investigation report, which prompted the

filing of the Information for Robbery against petitioner Rosemarie showed that she admitted to receiving instruction from her co-accused Ernesto Fernandez and a certain Gudo to leave the barrel belt of the kitchen door unlocked, so her co-accused can gain entry to the house of respondent Pilar. Moreover, she admitted that after her co-accused had taken the pieces of jewelry owned by respondent Pilar, they gave her a necklace which she kept in a shoulder bag. During the investigation, she was shown the said necklace, and she positively identified the same to be the necklace her co-accused had given her. On the basis of the said admission, the Office of the Prosecutor found basis and probable cause to file the appropriate Information with the RTC against petitioner Rosemarie and her co-accused Ernesto Fernandez and a certain Gudo. The inadmissibility of the aforesaid admission on the ground that the same was extracted under duress was an evidentiary matter, which does not detract from the fact that based on petitioner Rosemaries admission, there was reason for the respondents to believe that the suit was not unfounded, and that the crime was committed. Finally, in an action to recover damages based on malicious prosecution, it must be established that the prosecution was impelled by legal malice. There is necessity of proof that the suit was so patently malicious as to warrant the award of damages under Articles 19 to 21,48 of the Civil Code, or that the suit was grounded on malice or bad faith. Moreover, it is a doctrine well-entrenched in jurisprudence that the mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution, for the law would not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. Applying the rule to the case at bar, we affirm the findings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals that there was no proof of a sinister design on the part of the respondents to vex or humiliate petitioner Rosemarie by instituting the criminal case against her and her coaccused. Respondent Pilar who was robbed of her valuable belongings can only be expected to bring the matter to the authorities. There can be no evil motive that should be attributed to one, who, as victim of a crime institutes the necessary legal proceedings. At the risk of redundancy, we stress that the proscription against the imposition of penalty on the right to litigate must not be violated. Mere filing of a suit does not render a person liable for malicious prosecution should he be unsuccessful, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. There was no other explanation or motive as to why respondents would institute baseless prosecution of petitioner Rosemarie. No evidence was shown that there was bad blood between respondent Pilar and petitioner Rosemarie prior to the supposed robbery. We also do not find the actuations of respondents Ibarra and Juanito to be impelled by legal malice. Their commencement of the action against petitioner Rosemarie and her co-accused was pursuant to their duties as police officers. The same was made subsequent to the report of respondent Pilar of the commission of the crime, and the investigation on the person of petitioner Rosemarie. Even then, mistakes committed by a public officer are not actionable absent any clear showing that they were motivated by malice or gross negligencem aounting to bad faith,which was not established in the case at bar See City Trust v. Villanueva Gr. No. 141011 (July 19, 2001)

Villanueva opened a savings account and a current account with Citytrust Banking Corporation (the BANK), with an automatic transfer arrangement. VILLANUEVA deposited some money in his savings account. Realizing that he had run out of blank checks, VILLANUEVA requested a new checkbook from one of the BANKs customer service representatives. He then filled up a checkbook requisition slip with the obligatory particulars, except for his current account number which he could not remember. He expressed his predicament to a lady customer service representative of the BANK, who in turn assured him that she could supply the information from the BANKs account records. After signing the requisition slip, he gave it to her. Pia Rempillo, another customer service representative of the BANK, saw VILLANUEVAs checkbook requisition slip. She took it and proceeded to check the BANKs checkbook register which contained all the names and account numbers of the BANKs clients who were issued checkbooks. Upon seeing the name Isagani Villanueva -- Account No. 33-00446-3 in the checkbook register, Rempillo copied the aforesaid account number on the space intended for it in VILLANUEVAs requisition slip. VILLANUEVA received from the BANK his requested checkbook. On the same day, he immediately signed a Check bearing the amount of P50,000 payable to the order of Kingly Commodities Traders and Multi Resources, Inc. VILLANUEVA thereafter delivered the check to Helen Chu, his investment consultant at Kingly Commodities, with his express instruction to use said check in placing a trading order at Kingly Commodities future trading business as soon as a favorable opportunity presented itself. Two days later, VILLANUEVA received a call from Helen Chu, informing him that she had already placed a trading order in his behalf and delivered the check to Kingly Commodities. The check was deposited with the China Banking Corporation. The next day, he deposited P31,600 in cash to his savings account to cover the full amount of the check he issued. His deposits in both accounts totalled P51,304.91. However, VILLANUEVAs Check was dishonored due to insufficiency of funds and disparity in the signature. VILLANUEVA called Kingly Commodities and explained that there was a mistake in the dishonor of the check because he had sufficient funds. Forthwith on the same day, VILLANUEVA called up the BANKs Branch Operations Manager, Maritess Gamboa, and inquired about the dishonor of his well-funded check. Gamboa promised to look into the matter and instructed VILLANUEVA to advise his payee, Kingly Commodities, to re-deposit the check. Gamboa assured VILLANUEVA that the check would be honored after the sufficiency of the funds was ascertained. VILLANUEVA learned that his check was again dishonored due to insufficiency of funds and a stop- payment order he allegedly issued. Dismayed by the turn of events, VILLANUEVA called up the BANK and inquired from Gamboa the reason for the dishonor of his wellfunded check and the alleged stop-payment order which he never issued. Gamboa promised to investigate the matter and to call VILLANUEVA in fifteen (15) minutes. In the meantime, she advised VILLANUEVA to re-deposit the check. VILLANUEVA then requested Lawrence Chin of Kingly Commodities to give him until 5:30 p.m. that same day to make good his P50,000 check. He then proceeded to the BANKs

Legaspi Village Branch Office, together with his investment consultant and his trading partner, to personally inquire into the matter. They were met by Marilou Genuino, the BANKs Branch Manager. There he complained that his trading order was rejected because of the dishonor of the check and that Kingly Commodities threatened to close his trading account unless his check payment would be made good before 5:30 p.m. that day. After making the necessary investigation, Genuino related to VILLANUEVA that the reason for the dishonor of the check was that the account number assigned to his new checkbook was the account number of another depositor also named Isagani Villanueva but with a different middle initial. To resolve the matter, Genuino promised to send to Kingly Commodities a managers check for P50,000 before 5:30 p.m., the deadline given to VILLANUEVA. She also personally called Kingly Commodities and explained the reason for the dishonor of the check. VILLANUEVA sent a letter to the BANK addressed to the President, Jose Facundo, demanding indemnification for alleged losses and damages suffered by him as a result of the dishonor of his well-funded check. He demanded the amount of P 70,000 as indemnification for actual damages in the form of lost profits and P 2 Million for moral and other damages. Failing to obtain from the BANK a favorable action on his demand for indemnification, VILLANUEVA filed a complaint for damages based on breach of contract and/or quasi-delict. VILLANUEVA alleged in his complaint that the BANK breached its contractual obligation to him as a depositor because of its repeated dishonor of his valid and well-funded check. The breach arose from the BANKs gross negligence and culpable recklessness in supplying the wrong account number. As a consequence, he suffered and sustained (1) actual damages consisting of loss of profits in the amount of at least P240,000, for he was not allowed to trade by Kingly Commodities; and (2) P2 Million as moral damages because of the intolerable physical inconvenience, discomfort, extreme humiliation, indignities, etc., that he had borne before his peers and colleagues in the firm, his trading partners, and the officers of Kingly Commodities. He prayed for an additional award of P500,000 for exemplary damages, attorneys fees, litigation expenses and costs of the suit. In its answer, the BANK alleged that VILLANUEVA suffered no actionable injury, much less damages, considering his blatant irresponsibility in not remembering his current account number and in failing to bring his checkbook re-order slip form on which his account number was inscribed when he requested a new set of checks. His negligence in verifying the account number of the new set of checks issued to him also contributed to the dishonor of his check. The BANK claimed that it acted in good faith when it twice dishonored the check. It further asserted that VILLANUEVAs negligence was the proximate cause of his selfproclaimed injury; and the alleged losses and damages could not likewise be deemed the natural and probable consequences of the BANKs breach of obligation, had there been any. Finally, it claimed that VILLANUEVA acted with malice in filing the case, and interposed counterclaims of P500,000 as exemplary damages; P250,000 as attorneys fees; and actual damages as may be determined by the court. Trial Court dismissed the complaint and found that VILLANUEVAs negligence set the chain of events which resulted in his alleged losses and damages.

Likewise, the trial court doubted that VILLANUEVA sustained actual damages in the amount of P240,000 due to loss of profits as averred in the complaint considering that his initial claim against the BANK for actual loss was merely P70, 000 and the evidence presented in support thereof was hearsay, unreliable and not the best evidence. CA reversed. It considered the BANKs voluntary processing of the requisition slip as the cause which in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produced the injury and without which the result would not have occurred. However, although it conceded that the BANKs negligence was not attended with malice and bad faith, it nonetheless awarded moral damages in the amount of P 100,000. It also awarded attorneys fees in the amount of P 50,000, since VILLANUEVA was compelled to incur expenses to protect his interests by reason of the unjustified act or omission of the BANK. However, it rejected VILLANUEVAs claim for compensatory damages and affirmed the trial courts finding thereon. Issue: 1. Whether VILLANUEVA suffered actual or compensatory damages in the form of loss of profits- NO 2. Whether VILLANUEVA is entitled to the moral damages and attorneys fees granted by the Court of Appeals- NO 3. Whether he is entitled to attorneys fees - NO RULING: 1. Both the Court of Appeals and the trial court have ascertained that VILLANUEVA was unable to prove his demand for compensatory damages arising from loss. His evidence thereon was found inadequate, uncorroborated, speculative, hearsay and not the best evidence. Basic is the jurisprudential principle that in determining actual damages, the court cannot rely on mere assertions, speculations, conjectures or guesswork but must depend on competent proof and on the best obtainable evidence of the actual amount of the loss. Actual damages cannot be presumed but must be duly proved with reasonable certainty. 2. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Although incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendants wrongful act or omission. Thus, case law establishes the requisites for the award of moral damages: (1) there must be an injury, whether physical, mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) there must be a culpable act or omission factually established; (3) the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and (4) the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. It is beyond cavil that VILLANUEVA had sufficient funds for the check. Had his account number been correct, the check would not have been dishonored. Hence, we can say that VILLANUEVAs injury arose from the dishonor of his well-funded check. We have already ruled that the dishonor of the check does not entitle him to compensatory damages. But, could the dishonor result in his alleged intolerable physical inconvenience and discomfort, extreme humiliation, indignities, etc, which he had borne before his peers, trading partners

and officers of Kingly Commodities? True, we find that under the circumstances of this case, VILLANUEVA might have suffered some form of inconvenience and discomfort as a result of the dishonor of his check. However, the same could not have been so grave or intolerable as he attempts to portray or impress upon us. Further, it is clear from the records that the BANK was able to remedy the caveat of Kingly Commodities to VILLANUEVA that his trading account would be closed at 5:30 p.m. on 26 June 1986. The BANK was able to issue a managers check in favor of Kingly Commodities before the deadline. It was able to likewise explain to Kingly Commodities the circumstances surrounding the unfortunate situation. Verily, the alleged embarrassment or inconvenience caused to VILLANUEVA as a result of the incident was timely and adequately contained, corrected, mitigated, if not entirely eradicated. VILLANUEVA, thus, failed to support his claim for moral damages. In short, none of the circumstances mentioned in Article 2219 of the Civil Code exists to sanction the award for moral damages. 3. The award of attorneys fees should likewise be deleted. The general rule is that attorneys fees cannot be recovered as part of damages because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate. They are not to be awarded every time a party wins a suit. The power of the court to award attorneys fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands factual, legal and equitable justification. Even when a claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his rights, still attorneys fees may not be awarded where there is no sufficient showing of bad faith in the parties persistence of a case other than an erroneous conviction of the righteousness of his cause. In view of the foregoing discussion, we need not deliberate on the dispute as to whether it was the BANKs or VILLANUEVAs negligence which was the proximate cause of the latters injury because, in the first place, he did not sustain any compensable injury. If any damage had been suffered at all, it could be equivalent to damnum absque injuria, i.e., damage without injury or damage or injury inflicted without injustice, or loss or damage without violation of a legal right, or a wrong done to a man for which the law provides no remedy. Spouses Ong v CA, Gr. No. 117103 (1999) Spouses Ong sustained injuries when Inland Bus, which was owned by Inland Trailways under a Lease Agreement with Philtranco, slowed down to avoid a cargo truck but was hit from behind by another bus, owned and operated by Philtranco. The court ruled, base on the police report, that the proximate cause of the accident was the bumping of the bus from behind hence ruled against Philtranco and awarded damages. However, this police report was contested as it was formally offered as evidence but merely as an annex to Inlands answer. Whether damages were properly awarded RULING: The fundamental principle of the law on damages is that one injured by a breach of contract (in this case, the contract of transportation) or by a wrongful or negligent act or omission shall have a fair and just compensation, commensurate with the loss sustained as a consequence of the defendant's acts. Hence, actual pecuniary compensation is the general rule, except where the circumstances warrant the allowance of other kinds of damages.

Actual damages Actual damages are such compensation or damages for an injury that will put the injured party in the position in which he had been before he was injured. They pertain to such injuries or losses that are actually sustained and susceptible of measurement. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, a party is entitled to adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss as he has duly proven. To be recoverable, actual damages must be pleaded and proven in Court. No such proof was offered to the P10,000 claim of damages. At the most, documentary evidence showed P3, 977 only as damages. Moral Damages and Diminution of use of arm A person is entitled to the physical integrity of his or her body, and if that integrity is violated, damages are due and assessable. However, physical injury, like loss or diminution of use of an arm or a limb, is not a pecuniary loss. Indeed, it is nor susceptible of exact monetary estimation. Thus, the usual practice is to award moral damages for physical injuries sustained. In the case at bar, it was sufficiently shown during the trial that Francia's right arm could not function in a normal manner and that, as a result, she suffered mental anguish and anxiety. Thus, an increase in the amount of moral damages awarded, from P30,000 to P50,000, appears to be reasonable and justified. Renato also suffered mental anxiety and anguish from the accident. Thus, he should be separately awarded P30,000 as moral damages. Unrealized Income Protesting the deletion of the award for Francia's unrealized income, petitioners contend that Francia's injuries and her oral testimony adequately support their claim. The Court disagrees. Although actual damages include indemnification for profits which the injured party failed to obtain (lucro cesante or lucrum cesans), the rule requires that said person produce the "best evidence of which his case is susceptible. The petitioners failed to do so, as she could have returned to work despite the plaster in her arm. Attorney fees Counsel's performance, however, does not justify the award of 25 percent attorney's fees. It is well-settled that such award is addressed to sound judicial discretion and subject to judicial control. Only a 10% attorneys fee is awarded. Ramos v. CA, GR No. 124354 (December 29, 1999) Erlinda Ramos underwent an operation known as cholecystectomy (removal of stone in her gallbladder) under the hands of Dr. Orlino Hosaka. He was accompanied by Dr. Perfecta Gutierrez, an anesthesiologist which Dr. Hosaka recommended since Ramos (and her husband Rogelio) did not know any. The operation was schedule at 9am of June 17, 1985 but was however delayed for three hours due to the late arrival of Dr. Hosaka. Dr. Gutierrez subsequently started trying to intubate her. And at around 3pm, Erlinda was seen being wheeled to the Intensive Care Unit

(ICU). The doctors explained to petitioner Rogelio that his wife had bronchospasm. Erlinda stayed in the ICU for a month. She was released from the hospital only four months later or on November 15, 1985. Since the ill-fated operation, Erlinda remained in comatose condition until she died on August 3, 1999. RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners, holding the defendants guilty of, at the very least, negligence in the performance of their duty to plaintiff-patient Erlinda Ramos. On appeal to CA, the said decision was reversed dismissing the complaint against the defendants. Hence this petition. RULING: Well-settled is the rule that actual damages which may be claimed by the plaintiff are those suffered by him as he has duly proved. The Civil Code provides: Art. 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages. Our rules on actual or compensatory damages generally assume that at the time of litigation, the injury suffered as a consequence of an act of negligence has been completed and that the cost can be liquidated. However, these provisions neglect to take into account those situations, as in this case, where the resulting injury might be continuing and possible future complications directly arising from the injury, while certain to occur, are difficult to predict. In these cases, the amount of damages which should be awarded, if they are to adequately and correctly respond to the injury caused, should be one which compensates for pecuniary loss incurred and proved, up to the time of trial; and one which would meet pecuniary loss certain to be suffered but which could not, from the nature of the case, be made with certainty. In other words, temperate damages can and should be awarded on top of actual or compensatory damages in instances where the injury is chronic and continuing. And because of the unique nature of such cases, no incompatibility arises when both actual and temperate damages are provided for. The reason is that these damages cover two distinct phases. As it would not be equitable and certainly not in the best interests of the administration of justice for the victim in such cases to constantly come before the courts and invoke their aid in seeking adjustments to the compensatory damages previously awarded temperate damages are appropriate. The amount given as temperate damages, though to a certain extent speculative, should take into account the cost of proper care. In the instant case, petitioners were able to provide only home-based nursing care for a comatose patient who has remained in that condition for over a decade. Having premised our award for compensatory damages on the amount provided by petitioners at the onset of litigation, it would be now much more in step with the interests of justice if the value awarded for temperate damages would allow petitioners to provide optimal care for their loved one in a facility which generally specializes in such care. They should not be compelled by dire circumstances to provide substandard care at home without the aid of professionals, for anything less would be grossly inadequate. Under the circumstances, an award of P1,500,000.00 in temperate damages would therefore be reasonable.

Petitioner Erlinda Ramos was in her mid-forties when the incident occurred. She has been in a comatose state for over fourteen years now. The burden of care has so far been heroically shouldered by her husband and children, who, in the intervening years have been deprived of the love of a wife and a mother. Meanwhile, the actual physical, emotional and financial cost of the care of petitioner would be virtually impossible to quantify. Even the temperate damages herein awarded would be inadequate if petitioner's condition remains unchanged for the next ten years. We recognized, in Valenzuela that a discussion of the victim's actual injury would not even scratch the surface of the resulting moral damage because it would be highly speculative to estimate the amount of emotional and moral pain, psychological damage and injury suffered by the victim or those actually affected by the victim's condition. The husband and the children, all petitioners in this case, will have to live with the day to day uncertainty of the patient's illness, knowing any hope of recovery is close to nil. They have fashioned their daily lives around the nursing care of petitioner, altering their long term goals to take into account their life with a comatose patient. They, not the respondents, are charged with the moral responsibility of the care of the victim. The family's moral injury and suffering in this case is clearly a real one. For the foregoing reasons, an award of P2,000,000.00 in moral damages would be appropriate. Finally, by way of example, exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 are hereby awarded. Considering the length and nature of the instant suit we are of the opinion that attorney's fees valued at P100,000.00 are likewise proper. Industrial Insurance Co. v Bondad, Gr. No. 136722 (April 12, 2000) The present Petition finds its roots in an incident which involved three vehicles: a Galant Sigma car driven by Grace Ladaw Morales, a packed passenger jeepney originally driven by Ligorio Bondad, and a DM Transit Bus driven by Eduardo Mendoza. Investigation disclosed that shortly before the accident took place, V-3 (D.M. Transit Bus) was traveling along South Expressway coming from Alabang towards the general direction of Makati. When upon reaching a place at KM Post 14 [in front] of Merville Subd., said V-3 hit and bumped the rear left side portion of V-1 [Bondads' jeepney] which was then at [stop] position due to flat tire[;] due to the severe impact cause by V-3 it swerved to the left and collided with the right side portion of V-2 [Morales' car] which was travelling [in] the same direction taking the innermost lane V-2 was dragged to its left side and hit the concrete wall. All vehicles incurred damages and sustaining injuries to the occupant of V-1 and the passengers of V-3. Victims were brought to the hospital for treatment Before the Regional Trial Court of Makati on April 12, 1985, Petitioner Industrial Insurance Company, Inc. and Grace Ladaw Morales filed a Complaint for damages 7 against DM Transit Corporation, Eduardo Diaz, Pablo Bondad and Ligorio Bondad. Petitioner contended that it had paid Morales P29,800 for the damages to her insured car. It also asserted that the December 17, 1984 accident had been caused "solely and proximately" by the "joint gross and wanton negligence, carelessness and imprudence of both defendant drivers Eduardo Diaz y Mendoza and Ligorio Bondad y Hernandez, who failed to exercise and observe the

diligence required by law in the management and operation of their respective vehicles and by their defendant employers; D.M. Transit Corporation and Pablo Bondad, respectively, for their failure to exercise the diligence required of them by law in the selection and supervision of their employees including their aforementioned involved drivers In its October 14, 1991 Decision, the trial court exculpated the Bondads and ordered petitioner to pay them actual, moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the ruling of the trial court with modification. Hence, this Petition for Review. W/N The award for damages was proper. YES. RULING: In justifying the award of attorney's fees and other litigation expenses, the appellate court held that respondents were compelled to litigate an unfounded suit because of petitioner's negligence and lack of prudence in not verifying the facts before filing this action. In affirming the award of moral damages, it accepted the trial court's justification that respondents had "been recklessly and without basis . . . impleaded by the plaintiff in spite of the clear language in the Traffic Investigation Report . . . submitted by Pfc. Agapito Domingo." Attorney's fees may be awarded by a court if one who claims it is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect one's interests by reason of an unjustified act or omission on the part of the party from whom it is sought. In this case, the records show that petitioner's suit against respondents was manifestly unjustified. In the first place, the contact between the vehicles of respondents and of Morales was completely due to the impact of the onrushing bus. This fact is manifest in the police investigation report and, significantly, in the findings of facts of both lower courts.Moreover, even a cursory examination of the events would show that respondents were not even remotely the cause of the accident. Their vehicle was on the shoulder of the road because of a flat tire. In view of their emergency situation, they could not have done anything to avoid getting hit by the bus. Verily, an ordinary person has no reason to think that respondents could have caused the accident. It is difficult to imagine how petitioner could have thought so.More significantly, petitioner knew that respondents were not the cause of the accident. This is evident from its failure to even make a prior formal demand on them before initiating the suit. Indeed, the cause of the accident was the negligence of the DM Transit bus driver. In the same vein, we affirm the award of moral damages. To sustain this award, it must be shown that (1) the claimant suffered injury, and (2) such injury sprung from any of the cases listed in Articles 2219 and 2220 of the Civil Code. It is not enough that the claimant alleges mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, social humiliation, and the like as a result of the acts of the other party. It is necessary that such acts be shown to have been tainted with bad faith or ill motive. In the case at bar, it has been shown that the petitioner acted in bad faith in compelling respondents to litigate an unfounded claim. As a result, Respondent Ligorio Bondad "could no longer concentrate on his job." Moreover, Pablo Bondad became sick and even suffered a mild stroke. Indeed, respondents' anxiety is not difficult to understand. They were innocently attending to a flat tire on the shoulder of the road; the next thing they knew, they were already being blamed for an accident. Worse, they were

forced to commute all the way from Laguna to Makati in order to attend the hearings. Under the circumstances of this case, the award of moral damages is justified. Likewise, we affirm the award of exemplary damages because petitioner's conduct needlessly dragged innocent bystanders into an unfounded litigation. Indeed, exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. Pestano v. Spouses Sumayang, Gr. No. 139875 (Dec. 4, 2000) At 2:00 oclock on the afternoon of August 9, 1986, Ananias Sumayang was riding a motorcycle along the national highway in Ilihan, Tabagon, Cebu. Riding with him was his friend Manuel Romagos. As they came upon a junction, they were hit by a passenger bus driven by Petitioner Gregorio Pestao and owned by Petitioner Metro Cebu Autobus Corporation, which had tried to overtake them, sending the motorcycle and its passengers hurtling upon the pavement. Both Sumayang and Romagos were rushed to the hospital in Sogod, where Sumayang was pronounced dead on arrival. Romagos was transferred to the Cebu Doctors Hospital, but he died the day after. The heirs of Sumayang instituted criminal action against Pestano and filed an action for damages against the driver, Pestano and Metro Cebu as the owner and operator of the bus. The CA and RTC ruled that Pestano was negligent and is therefore liable criminally and civilly. The appellate court opined that Metro Cebu had shown laxity in the conduct of its operations and in the supervision of its employees. By allowing the bus to ply its route despite the defective speedometer, said petitioner showed its indifference towards the proper maintenance of its vehicles. Having failed to observe the extraordinary diligence required of public transportation companies, it was held vicariously liable to the victims of the vehicular accident. RULING: Life Indemnity The indemnity for death caused by a quasi-delict used to be pegged at P3,000, based on Article 2206 of the Civil Code. However, the amount has been gradually increased through the years because of the declining value of our currency. At present, prevailing jurisprudence fixes the amount at P50,000. Loss of Earning Capacity The Court has consistently computed the loss of earning capacity based on the life expectancy of the deceased, and not on that of the heir. Even Villa Rey Transit did likewise. The award for loss of earning capacity is based on two factors: (1) the number of years on which the computation of damages is based and (2) the rate at which the loss sustained by the heirs is fixed. The first factor refers to the life expectancy, which takes into consideration the nature of the victim's work, lifestyle, age and state of health prior to the accident. The second refers to the victim's earning capacity minus the necessary living expenses. Stated

otherwise, the amount recoverable is that portion of the earnings of the deceased which the beneficiary would have received the net earnings of the deceased. D. Moral Damages (Art. 2217-2220)

Art. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act for omission. Art. 2218. In the adjudication of moral damages, the sentimental value of property, real or personal, may be considered. Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: (1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries; (2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries; (3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts; (4) Adultery or concubinage; (5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest; (6) Illegal search; (7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation; (8) Malicious prosecution; (9) Acts mentioned in Article 309; (10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35. The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3 of this article, may also recover moral damages. The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of this article, in the order named. Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. Villanueva v Salvador GR 139436 (January 25, 2006) Salvador pawned jewelries. They filed a complaint for damages against Villanueva and Ever Pawnshop arising from the sale without notice of the two sets of jewelry pledged as security for two loans (First loan fully paid). RTC and CA ordered Villanuevas to pay Salvador Damages. Whether lower courts erred in ordering both petitioners to pay damages? RULING: This is a case of Simple Negligence only thus no moral damages are due. There has to be bad faith or willful intent to injure before moral damages can be awarded. The award of attorneys fees should, likewise, be struck down, both the CA and trial court having failed to explain respondents entitlement thereto. ---Original Ruling--This brings us to the issue of the award of moral damages which petitioners correctly tag as erroneous, and, therefore, should be deleted.

While proof of pecuniary loss is unnecessary to justify an award of moral damages, the amount of indemnity being left to the sound discretion of the court, it is, nevertheless, essential that the claimant satisfactorily proves the existence of the factual basis of the damages and its causal connection to defendants wrongful act or omission. This is so because moral damages, albeit incapable of pecuniary estimation, are designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. There is thus merit on petitioners assertion that proof of moral suffering must precede a moral damage award. The conditions required in awarding moral damages are: (1) there must be an injury, whether physical, mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) there must be a culpable act or omission factually established; (3) the wrongful act or omission of the defendant must be the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and (4) the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. While there need not be a showing that the defendant acted in a wanton or malevolent manner, as this is a requirement for an award of exemplary damages, there must still be proof of fraudulent action or bad faith for a claim for moral damages to succeed. Then, too, moral damages are generally not recoverable in culpa contractual except when bad faith supervenes and is proven. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty through some motive or interest or ill-will that partakes of the nature of the fraud. And to the person claiming moral damages rests the onus of proving by convincing evidence the existence of bad faith, for good faith is presumed. As aptly pointed out by petitioners, the trial court concluded that the respondents cause of action arose merely from the negligence of the herein [petitioners]. It may be that gross negligence may sometimes amount to bad faith.[\ But what is before us is a matter of simple negligence only, it being the trial courts categorical finding that the case came about owing to petitioners mistake in renewing the loan when the sale of the article to secure the loan had already been effected. Wrote the trial court: What must have happened next was that the jewelry under the first loan was sold, as scheduled, on 7 May 1992. Due to an oversight, the defendants mistakenly renewed the first loan on 1 June 1992, issuing pawn ticket number 34932 in the process. [Emphasis supplied] The CAs reliance on Article 2220 of the Civil Code in affirming the award of moral damages is misplaced. Said article provides: Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.

Clear it is from the above that before moral damages may be assessed thereunder, the defendants act must be vitiated by bad faith or that there is willful intent to injure. Simply put, moral damages cannot arise from simple negligence. The award of attorneys fees should, likewise, be struck down, both the CA and trial court having failed to explain respondents entitlement thereto. As a matter of sound practice, an award of attorneys fee has always been regarded as the exception rather than the rule. Counsels fees are, to be sure, not awarded every time a party prevails in a suit because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate. Attorneys fees, as part of damages, are assessed only in the instances specified in Article 2208 of the Civil Code. And it is necessary for the trial court to make express findings of fact and law that would bring the case within the exception. In short, the factual, legal or equitable justification for the award must be set forth in the text of the decision.[22] The matter of attorneys fees cannot be touched only in the fallo of the decision, else the award should be thrown out for being speculative and conjectural.[23] Certainly not lost on the Court is the fact that petitioners, after being served with summons, made an attempt to obviate litigation by offering to accept tender of payment and return the jewelry. This offer, however belated, could have saved much expense on the part of both parties, as well as the precious time of the court itself. The respondents chose to turn down this offer and pursue judicial recourse. With this in mind, it hardly seems fair to award them attorneys fees at petitioners expense. Morris v CA 352 SCRA 428 (2001) Petitioners Collin A. Morris and Thomas P. Whittier were American citizens; the vicepresident for technical service and the director for quality assurance, respectively, of Sterling Asia, a foreign corporation with regional headquarters at No. 8741 Paseo de Roxas, Makati City. Respondent Scandinavian Airline System (SAS for brevity) has been engaged in the commercial air transport of passengers globally. Petitioners had a series of business meetings in Japan from Feb 14-22 1978, thusthey made travel arrangements with their agent in Staats Travel Service. They werebook in 1st class, SAS Flight SK893, Manila-Tokyo for Feb 14, 3:50 pm. On the day of the flight, the limo service agency fetched Morris at Urdaneta and Whittier in Merville. They arrived at MIA at 230pm. They were at the counter around 310pm and gave their travel documents to Erlinda Ponce at the reception desk. Later they realized that their travel documents is not being processed. They called their agent to find out the problem. They learned that they were bumped off the flight. They insisted to get their flight from Ponce and her supervisor, Mr. Basa. Later, they learned the economy section was overbooked, and those who came early were given the option to upgrade to 1st class. Their seats were given away and the flight manifest marked NOSH (no show) after their name, because the check-in counter closed already 40mins before departure. Petitioners were advised to be at the airport an hour before the flight. They came late, and SAS simply followed company policies.

Petitioners filed a complaint for damages. RTC awarded:Moral damages: Morris, 1M; Whittier, 750K exemplary: 200K attys fees: 300K. Petitioners filed an MR to the RTC to increase award, moral damages increased to 1.5M and 1M. CA reversed, hence this petition. W/N SAS is liable for damages for breach of contract of carriage? NO. RULING: To begin with, it must be emphasized that a contract to transport passengers is quite different kind and degree from any other contractual relations, and this is because relation, which an air carrier sustains with the public. Its business is mainly with the traveling public. It invites people business is mainly with the traveling public. It invites people to avail [themselves] of the comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended wit h a pubic duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees naturally could give ground for an action for damages." In awarding moral damages for breach of contract of carriage, the breach must be wanton and deliberately injurious or the one responsible acted fraudulently or with malice or bad faith. Where in breaching the contract of carriage the defendant airline is not shown to have acted fraudulently or in bad faith, liability for damages is limited to the natural and probable consequences of the breach of obligation which the parties had foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen. In that case, such liability does not include moral and exemplary damages. Moral damages are generally not recoverable in culpa contractual except when bad faith had been proven. However, the same damages may be recovered when reach of contract of carriage results in the death of a passenger. The award of exemplary damages has likewise no factual basis. It is requisite that the act must be accompanied by bad faith or done in wanton, fraudulent or malevolent mannercircumstances which are absent in this case. In addition, exemplary damages cannot be awarded as the requisite element of compensatory damages was not present. In the instant case, assuming arguendo that breach of contract of carriage may be attributed to respondent, petitioners' travails were directly traceable to their failure to check-in on time, which lewd to respondent's refusal to accommodate them on the flight. Mrs. Rebecca Lo and her daughter Annette Ferrer ordered a 3-layered cake from Fountainhead Bakeshop. It was agreed that the wedding cake shall be delivered at 5:00 in the afternoon on December 14, 1992 at the Cebu Country Club, Cebu City. Plaintiffs made their full payment. At 7:00 in the evening, the wedding cake has not arrived. Plaintiffs made a follow-up call and were informed that it was probably late because of the traffic. At 8:00, plaintiffs were informed that no wedding cake will be delivered because the order slip got lost. They were then compelled to buy the only available cake at the Cebu Country Club which was a sans rival. At 10:00, a 2-layered wedding cake arrived. Plaintiffs declined to accept it. Defendant Erlinda Francisco sent a letter of apology accompanied with a P5,000.00 check which was declined by plaintiffs. 2 weeks after the wedding, Francisco called Mrs. Lo and apologized. Plaintiffs filed an action for breach of contract with damages.

TC decided in favor of plaintiffs, directing defendant to pay the cost of the wedding cake, MORAL DAMAGES, attorneys fees and the cost of litigation. CA modified the award by increasing the MORAL DAMAGES to P250,000.00 and awarding EXEMPLARY DAMAGES of P100,000.00. 1. W/N the CA erred in affirming the TCs award of MORAL DAMAGES and increasing the amount from P30,000.00 to P250,000.00. YES. 2. W/N the CA was justified in awarding in addition to moral damages, EXEMPLARY DAMAGES of P100,000.00. YES. RULING: 1. Article 2219 of the Civil Code provides: To recover moral damages in an action for breach of contract, the breach must be palpably wanton, reckless, malicious, in bad faith, oppressive or abusive. In culpa contractual or breach of contract, moral damages may be recovered when the defendant acted in bad faith or was guilty of gross negligence (amounting to bad faith) or in wanton disregard of his contractual obligation and, exceptionally, when the act of breach of contract itself is constitutive of tort resulting in physical injuries. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence, it imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty through some motive or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud.Moral damages are in the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. The person claiming moral damages must prove the existence of bad faith by clear and convincing evidence for the law always presumes good faith. It is not enough that one merely suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish, serious anxiety as the result of the actuations of the other party. Mere allegations of besmirched reputation, embarrassment and sleepless nights are insufficient to warrant an award for moral damages. An award of moral damages would require certain conditions to be met, to wit: (1) first, there must be an injury, whether physical, mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) second, there must be culpable act or omission factually established; (3) third, the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and (4) fourth, the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. When awarded, moral damages must not be palpably and scandalously excessive as to indicate that it was the result of passion, prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial court judge or appellate court justices.In this case, we find no such fraud or bad faith. 2. To warrant the award of exemplary damages, [t]he wrongful act must be accompanied by bad faith, and an award of damages would be allowed only if the guilty party acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless or malevolent manner. The requirements of an award of exemplary damages are: (1) they may be imposed by way of example in addition to compensatory damages, and only after the claimants right to them has been established; (2) that they can not be recovered as a matter of right, their

determination depending upon the amount of compensatory damages that may be awarded to the claimant; (3) the act must be accompanied by bad faith or done in a wanton, fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent manner. BUT NOMINAL DAMAGES AWARDED. The facts show that when confronted with their failure to deliver on the wedding day, petitioners gave the lame excuse that delivery was probably delayed because of the traffic, when in truth, no cake could be delivered because the order slip got lost. For such prevarication, petitioners must be held liable for nominal damages for insensitivity, inadvertence or inattention to their customers anxiety and need of the hour. Nominal damages are recoverable where a legal right is technically violated and must be vindicated against an invasion that has produced no actual present loss of any kind or where there has been a breach of contract and no substantial injury or actual damages whatsoever have been or can be shown. Nominal damages may be awarded to a plaintiff whose right has been violated or invaded by the defendant, for the purpose of vindicating or recognizing that right, not for indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered. Francisco v Ferrer, Jr. 353 SCRA 261 (2001) Mrs. Rebecca Lo and her daughter Annette Ferrer ordered a 3-layered cake from Fountainhead Bakeshop. It was agreed that the wedding cake shall be delivered at 5:00 in the afternoon on December 14, 1992 at the Cebu Country Club, Cebu City. Plaintiffs made their full payment. At 7:00 in the evening, the wedding cake has not arrived. Plaintiffs made a follow-up call and were informed that it was probably late because of the traffic. At 8:00, plaintiffs were informed that no wedding cake will be delivered because the order slip got lost. They were then compelled to buy the only available cake at the Cebu Country Club which was a sans rival. At 10:00, a 2-layered wedding cake arrived. Plaintiffs declined to accept it. Defendant Erlinda Francisco sent a letter of apology accompanied with a P5,000.00 check which was declined by plaintiffs. 2 weeks after the wedding, Francisco called Mrs. Lo and apologized. Plaintiffs filed an action for breach of contract with damages. TC decided in favor of plaintiffs, directing defendant to pay the cost of the wedding cake, MORAL DAMAGES, attorneys fees and the cost of litigation. CA modified the award by increasing the MORAL DAMAGES to P250,000.00 andawarding EXEMPLARY DAMAGES of P100,000.00. 1. W/N the CA erred in affirming the TCs award of MORAL DAMAGES and increasing the amount from P30,000.00 to P250,000.00. YES. 2. W/N the CA was justified in awarding in addition to moral damages, EXEMPLARY DAMAGES of P100,000.00. NO.

RULING 1. Article 2219 of the Civil Code provides: To recover moral damages in an action for breach of contract, the breach must be palpably wanton, reckless, malicious, in bad faith, oppressive or abusive. In culpa contractual or breach of contract, moral damages may be recovered when the defendant acted in bad faith or was guilty of gross negligence (amounting to bad faith) or in wanton disregard of his contractual obligation and, exceptionally, when the act of breach of contract itself is constitutive of tort resulting in physical injuries. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence, it imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty through some motive or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud. Moral damages are in the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. The person claiming moral damages must prove the existence of bad faith by clear and convincing evidence for the law always presumes good faith. It is not enough that one merely suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish, serious anxiety as the result of the actuations of the other party.Mere allegations of besmirched reputation, embarrassment and sleepless nights are insufficient to warrant an award for moral damages. An award of moral damages would require certain conditions to be met, to wit: (1) first, there must be an injury, whether physical, mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) second, there must be culpable act or omission factually established; (3) third, the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and (4) fourth, the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. When awarded, moral damages must not be palpably and scandalously excessive as to indicate that it was the result of passion, prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial court judge or appellate court justices. In this case, we find no such fraud or bad faith. 2. Article 2219 of the Civil Code provides: To recover moral damages in an action for breach of contract, the breach must be palpably wanton, reckless, malicious, in bad faith, oppressive or abusive. In culpa contractual or breach of contract, moral damages may be recovered when the defendant acted in bad faith or was guilty of gross negligence (amounting to bad faith) or in wanton disregard of his contractual obligation and, exceptionally, when the act of breach of contract itself is constitutive of tort resulting in physical injuries. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence, it imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty through some motive or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud. Moral damages are in the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. The person claiming moral damages must prove the existence of bad faith by clear and convincing evidence for the law always presumes good faith. It is not enough that one merely suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish, serious anxiety as the result of the actuations of the other party.Mere allegations of besmirched reputation, embarrassment and sleepless nights are insufficient to warrant an award for moral damages. An award of moral damages would require certain conditions to be met, to wit: (1) first, there must be an injury, whether physical, mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the

claimant; (2) second, there must be culpable act or omission factually established; (3) third, the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and (4) fourth, the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. When awarded, moral damages must not be palpably and scandalously excessive as to indicate that it was the result of passion, prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial court judge or appellate court justices. In this case, we find no such fraud or bad faith. BUT, NOMINAL DAMAGES awarded. The facts show that when confronted with their failure to deliver on the wedding day, petitioners gave the lame excuse that delivery was probably delayed because of the traffic, when in truth, no cake could be delivered because the order slip got lost. For such prevarication, petitioners must be held liable for nominal damages for insensitivity, inadvertence or inattention to their customers anxiety and need of the hour. Nominal damages are recoverable where a legal right is technically violated and must be vindicated against an invasion that has produced no actual present loss of any kind or where there has been a breach of contract and no substantial injury or actual damages whatsoever have been or can be shown. Nominal damages may be awarded to a plaintiff whose right has been violated or invaded by the defendant, for the purpose of vindicating or recognizing that right, not for indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered. Filipinas Broadcasting v. Ago Medical Gr. No. 141994, 17 January 2005 Expos is a radio documentary program hosted by Carmelo Mel Rima (Rima) and Hermogenes Jun Alegre (Alegre). Expos is aired every morning over DZRC-AM which is owned by Filipinas Broadcasting Network, Inc. (FBNI). Expos is heard over Legazpi City, the Albay municipalities and other Bicol areas. In the morning of 14 and 15 December 1989, Rima and Alegre exposed various alleged complaints from students, teachers and parents against Ago Medical and Educational Center-Bicol Christian College of Medicine (AMEC) and its administrators. Claiming that the broadcasts were defamatory, AMEC and Angelita Ago (Ago), as Dean of AMECs College of Medicine, filed a complaint for damages against FBNI, Rima and Alegre on 27 February 1990. The complaint further alleged that AMEC is a reputable learning institution. With the supposed exposs, FBNI, Rima and Alegre transmitted malicious imputations, and as such, destroyed plaintiffs (AMEC and Ago) reputation. AMEC and Ago included FBNI as defendant for allegedly failing to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees, particularly Rima and Alegre. On 18 June 1990, FBNI, Rima and Alegre, through Atty. Rozil Lozares, filed an Answer alleging that the broadcasts against AMEC were fair and true. FBNI, Rima and Alegre claimed that they were plainly impelled by a sense of public duty to report the goings-on in AMEC, [which is] an institution imbued with public interest. Thereafter, trial ensued.

During the presentation of the evidence for the defense, Atty. Edmundo Cea, collaborating counsel of Atty. Lozares, filed a Motion to Dismiss on FBNIs behalf. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. Consequently, FBNI filed a separate Answer claiming that it exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of Rima and Alegre. FBNI claimed that before hiring a broadcaster, the broadcaster should (1) file an application; (2) be interviewed; and (3) undergo an apprenticeship and training program after passing the interview. FBNI likewise claimed that it always reminds its broadcasters to observe truth, fairness and objectivity in their broadcasts and to refrain from using libelous and indecent language. Moreover, FBNI requires all broadcasters to pass the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster sa Pilipinas (KBP) accreditation test and to secure a KBP permit. On 14 December 1992, the trial court rendered a Decision finding FBNI and Alegre liable for libel except Rima. The trial court held that the broadcasts are libelous per se. The trial court rejected the broadcasters claim that their utterances were the result of straight reporting because it had no factual basis. The broadcasters did not even verify their reports before airing them to show good faith. In holding FBNI liable for libel, the trial court found that FBNI failed to exercise diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees. In absolving Rima from the charge, the trial court ruled that Rimas only participation was when he agreed with Alegres expos. The trial court found Rimas statement within the bounds of freedom of speech, expression, and of the press.Both parties, namely, FBNI, Rima and Alegre, on one hand, and AMEC and Ago, on the other, appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts judgment with modification. The appellate court made Rima solidarily liable with FBNI and Alegre. The appellate court denied Agos claim for damages and attorneys fees because the broadcasts were directed against AMEC, and not against her. FBNI, Rima and Alegre filed a motion for reconsideration which the Court of Appeals denied in its 26 January 2000 Resolution. Hence, FBNI filed the petition for review. Whether FBNI is solidarily liable with Rima and Alegre. YES. RULING As operator of DZRC-AM and employer of Rima and Alegre, FBNI is solidarily liable to pay for damages arising from the libelous broadcasts. As stated by the CA, "recovery for defamatory statements published by radio or television may be had from the owner of the station, a licensee, the operator of the station, or a person who procures, or participates in, the making of the defamatory statements. An employer and employee are solidarily liable for a defamatory statement by the employee within the course and scope of his or her employment, at least when the employer authorizes or ratifies the defamation. In this case, Rima and Alegre were clearly performing their official duties as hosts of FBNIs radio program Expos when they aired the broadcasts. FBNI neither alleged nor proved that Rima and Alegre went beyond the scope of their work at that time. There was likewise no showing that FBNI did not authorize and ratify the defamatory broadcasts. Moreover, there is insufficient evidence on record that FBNI exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees, particularly Rima and Alegre. FBNI merely showed that it exercised diligence in the selection of its broadcasters without introducing any evidence to prove that it observed the same diligence in the supervision of Rima and Alegre. FBNI did not show how it exercised diligence in supervising its broadcasters. FBNIs alleged constant reminder to its broadcasters to "observe truth, fairness and objectivity and to refrain from

using libelous and indecent language" is not enough to prove due diligence in the supervision of its broadcasters. Adequate training of the broadcasters on the industrys code of conduct, sufficient information on libel laws, and continuous evaluation of the broadcasters performance are but a few of the many ways of showing diligence in the supervision of broadcasters. FBNI claims that it "has taken all the precaution in the selection of Rima and Alegre as broadcasters, bearing in mind their qualifications." However, no clear and convincing evidence shows that Rima and Alegre underwent FBNIs "regimented process" of application. Furthermore, FBNI admits that Rima and Alegre had deficiencies in their KBP accreditation, which is one of FBNIs requirements before it hires a broadcaster. Significantly, membership in the KBP, while voluntary, indicates the broadcasters strong commitment to observe the broadcast industrys rules and regulations. Clearly, these circumstances show FBNIs lack of diligence in selecting and supervising Rima and Alegre. Hence, FBNI is solidarily liable to pay damages together with Rima and Alegre. See Expert Travel & Tours v. CA Gr. No. 130030 (June 25, 1999) Expertravel & Tours Inc. issued to private respondent Ricardo Lo four round trip plane tickets to Hong Kong, together with hotel accommodations and transfers, for a total cost of 39, 677.20. Alleging that Lo had failed to pay the amount due, Expertravel caused several demands to be made. Since the demands were ignored by Lo, Expertravel filed a court complaint for recovery of amount due plus damages. In his answer, Lo explained that he had already paid such amount to expertravel. It was remmited to the Chairperson of Expertravel, Ms. De Vega. This was evidenced by Monte de Pieda check with the amount of 50,000 pesos. The trial court, affirmed by the appellate court, ruled that payment to Ms. De Vega is valid and binding to Expertravel and awarded moral damages, attorneys fees and cost of suit in favor of Lo. W/N the appellate court was correct in awarding moral damages in favor of Lo. NO. RULING: Moral damages are not punitive in nature but are designed to compensate and alleviate in some way the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feeling, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury unjustly caused to a person. Such damages must be the proximate result of a wrongful act or omission the factual basis for which is satisfactorily established by the aggrieved party. An award of moral damages would require certain conditions to be met; to wit: 1. there must be an injury, whether physical, mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant. 2. there must be a culpable act or omission factually established

3. 4.

the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in article 2219, death of a passenger under breach of carriage, when the defendant is guilty of intentional tort, culpa criminal, analogous cases, or malicious prosecution

results in the death of a passenger, as provided in Art. 1764, in relation to Art. 2206(3) of the Civil Code; and (2) in the cases in which the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, as provided in Art. 2220. In this case, there is no legal basis for awarding moral damages since there was no factual finding by the appellate court that petitioner acted in bad faith in the performance of the contract of carriage. Sunga's contention that petitioner's admission in open court that the driver of the jeepney failed to assist her in going to a nearby hospital cannot be construed as an admission of bad faith. The fact that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who took her to the hospital does not imply that petitioner was utterly indifferent to the plight of his injured passenger. If at all, it is merely implied recognition by Verena that he was the one at fault for the accident. Cocoland Devt v NLRC Gr. 98458, July 17, 1996, 328 Phil 351 Jeremias Mago filed a complaint against Cocoland and/or Alfredo C. de la Cruz (VP of operations of Cocoland) for illegal dismissal with damages, with the Department of Labor and Employment. Labor Arbiter found the the dismissal "tainted with illegality. The petitioner charges respondent NLRC with grave abuse of discretion for . . . declaring that complainant Mago (private respondent) was illegally dismissed when the evidence clearly show that complainant was "moonlighting" or rendering services to outside parties(,) (thereby) imparting technology acquired from his employment with the company and . . . awarding moral and exemplary damages when the evidence extant shows that the company did not act in bad faith, wanton or fraudulent or reckless manner, or that the labor arbiter below did not find that the company acted in a manner by which damages may be awarded On the second ground, petitioner assails respondent Commission's award of formal and exemplary damages to private respondent, contending that the latter's dismissal was neither tainted with bad faith nor carried out in a wanton, fraudulent, or oppressive manner. RULING: Moral and Exemplary Damages In defending the assailed Resolutions, private respondent argued that the law on moral damages, contained in Article 2217 of the Civil Code, provides that "moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission." While the foregoing discussion clearly shows that private respondent was wrongfully dismissed by petitioner without valid cause, this does not automatically mean that petitioner is liable to private respondent for moral or other damages. In Primero vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, this Court held that ". . . an award (of moral damages) cannot be justified solely upon the premises (otherwise sufficient for redress under the Labor Code) that the employer fired his employee without just cause or due process. Additional facts must be pleaded and proven to warrant the grant of moral damages under the Civil Code, these being, to repeat, that the act of dismissal was attended by bad faith or fraud, or was oppressive to labor, or done in a manner contrary to morals, good

Although the institution of a clearly unfounded civil suit can at times be a legal justification for award of attorneys fees, such filing is however, has almost been invariably been held not a ground for award of moral damages. The rationale for this rule is that the law could have not meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. The anguish suffered by a person for having been a defendant in a civil suit would be no different from the usual worry and anxiety suffered by anyone who is haled to court, a situation that cannot by itself be a cogent reason for award of moral damage if the rule were otherwise, then moral damages must every time be awarded in favor of the prevailing defendant against an unsuccessful plaintiff. Calalas v CA Gr. No. 122039 (May 31, 2000) At 10 o'clock in the morning of August 23, 1989, Sunga, then a college freshman majoring in Physical Education at the Siliman University, took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by Calalas. As the jeepney was filled to capacity of about 24 passengers, Sunga was given by the conductor an "extension seat," a wooden stool at the back of the door at the rear end of the vehicle. On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros Occidental, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. As she was seated at the rear of the vehicle, Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu truck driven by Verena and owned by Salva bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney, injuring Sunga necessitating her confinement and to ambulate in crutches for 3 months. Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas, alleging violation of the contract of carriage, to which Calalas in turn filed a thirdparty complaint against Salva, the owner of the Isuzu truck. The lower court rendered judgment against Salva as third-party defendant and absolved Calalas of liability, holding that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who was responsible for the accident, taking cognizance of another case (Civil Case No. 3490), filed by Calalas against Salva and Verena, for quasi-delict, in which Branch 37 of the same court held Salva and his driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas for the damage to his jeepney. On appeal, the CA reversed on the ground that Sunga's cause of action was based on a contract of carriage, not quasi-delict, and that the common carrier failed to exercise the diligence required under the Civil Code, and dismissed the third-party complaint against Salva and adjudged Calalas liable for damages to Sunga. W/N awarding of Moral Damages was proper NO. RULING As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages predicated on a breach of contract for it is not one of the items enumerated under Art. 2219 of the Civil Code. As an exception, such damages are recoverable: (1) in cases in which the mishap

customs, or public policy; and of course, that social humiliation, wounded feelings, grave 16 anxiety, etc., resulted therefrom." This was reiterated in Garcia vs. NLRC, where the Court added that exemplary damages may be awarded only if the dismissal was shown to have been effected in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner. This the private respondent failed to do. Because no evidence was adduced to show that petitioner company acted in bad faith or in a wanton or fraudulent manner in dismissing the private respondent, the labor arbiter did not award any moral and exemplary damages in his decision. Respondent NLRC therefore had no factual or legal basis to award such damages in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. However, the Court sustains the award of attorney's fees equivalent to five percent (5%) of the total monetary award as authorized by the Labor Code. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Resolutions are herewith AFFIRMED, except that the award of moral and exemplary damages are hereby deleted for lack of factual and legal basis.