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Why Does the New Labor Movement Look So Much Like the Old One? Putting the 1990s Revitalization Project in Historical Context
ANDREW W. MARTIN Ohio State University, Columbus, OH 43210 In the 1990s the labor movement underwent a major transformation in an attempt to confront the challenges facing organized labor, most notably a precipitous membership declinein the private sector, membership is currently at a post-Great Depression low. Despite the enthusiastic response among unionists and scholars alike to this revitalization project, as Zald and Berger (1978) note, change within formal organizations is often a contentious process, as competing interests struggle for control. The current labor movement is no exception: Signicant conict surrounds the issue of new organizing activities. While this period is certainly interesting for the level of open debate occurring over the future of the movement, it is not unique as a time of heightened tensions among unionists. Herein I describe debates, both historical and present, over organizing goals and tactics. In order to draw parallels between the past and present, I offer a theoretical account of why organizing is such a controversial topic. Initial support for these explanations, drawn from quotes from unionists and observers of the movement alike, indicates that the current turmoil in the labor movement is similar to that which occurred in other important periods and that the consequences of the decisions made today regarding organizing can have signicant ramications for the movements future.

I. Introduction In the 1990s the American labor movement underwent a major conflict around how to revitalize itself. Faced with rapidly declining membership, increased political and business opposition, and retrenchment in the manufacturing sector, a traditional stronghold of unions, many within the movement have pressed for serious internal change. Perhaps no event signaled the success of these reformers more than the election of the insurgent candidate, John Sweeney, to the presidency of the AFL-CIO in 1995, the organizations rst contested election since the merger of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations in 1955. Not surprisingly, this revitalization process has received a great deal of attention both by union leaders (BenJOURNAL OF LABOR RESEARCH Volume XXVII, Number 2 Spring 2006

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son, 1999; Mort, 1998; Sweeney, 1997; Welsh, 1997) and in current research and commentaries on labor (Bronfenbrenner et al., 1998; Mantsios, 1998a; Tillman and Cummings, 1999; Turner et al., 2001). One of the central issues facing the contemporary labor movement is the monumental task of reversing the nearly 50-year trend of declining private sector membership by developing and implementing a successful organizing strategy (Clawson, 2003; Milkman and Voss, 2004). Many progressive unionists, including the reformers in power in the AFL-CIO, have recognized that a major reason for the declining fortunes of organized labor is a shift away from the post-WWII labor-management accord (Davis, 1986; Nissen, 1990),1 including the increasing importance of international trade, an antilabor political climate, and most importantly, management hostility to new union organizing efforts (Clawson and Clawson, 1999; Cooke, 1985; Dickens, 1983; Goldeld, 1987). These unionists have pushed organized labor to, in the words of John Sweeney (1996: 106), act like a social movement that represents working people throughout the society. While many support the changes brought about by the reformers,2 as Zald and Berger (1978) note, transformation within institutions, including organized labor, is often a contentious process, illustrated by research such as Cornelds (1989) account of the United Furniture Workers of America. My two primary aims herein are to provide a careful account of internal conict within the movement over the introduction of a new organizing program, and, perhaps more importantly, to identify potential reasons why changes sought by reformers have been so contentious. Although the current labor movement presents an interesting case study for examining the dynamics of internal change in a social movement, the main lines of todays struggles are reminiscent of earlier conflicts during turbulent periods in the movement. Therefore, an additional goal is to compare the present with the past, which not only permits a deeper understanding of these debates,3 but also highlights the historical significance of the 1990s, which is of central importance to those scholars who examine organizing processes at the end of the twentieth century (Isaac and Grifn, 1989). In addition, historical debates can provide insights into the potential implications for the outcome of struggles among contemporary unionists. Unfortunately, describing all debates over organizing throughout entire history of the labor movement would be a difficult, if not impossible task. Therefore, my discussion is limited in various ways. First, I only describe debates around two central organizing topics: (1) Which groups are the appropriate target of organizing (Goals), and (2) Among available organizing strategies, which are the most likely to be successful in increasing membership (Tactics)? Not only have these two issues been extensively debated, but also as demonstrated below, how they are resolved can have major implications for the future of the movement. The second limitation is the evidence employed to compare the present in the past. Rather than any systematic analysis, such as interviews with important union leaders and prominent members of the rank and file, I draw heavily on prior research on the movement, including case studies, general histories, and commentaries. These sources

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are employed in two ways: (1) the comments and ndings of the authors, and (2) quotes from individuals within the movement, such as union leaders and rank and le. Although the evidence certainly does not allow me to systematically compare current debates with historical ones, it does accomplish the other major goal by offering initial explanations for why organizing goals and tactics have been so controversial within the movement.4 Because of these limitations, my objective herein is not to provide conclusive evidence supporting the reasons for these debates over organizing, but to raise these issues for future discussion. I begin with the conicts that have surrounded the targets of organizing efforts. At present there is controversy surrounding the unskilled laborers of the late twentieth century, including janitors, sweatshop workers, and healthcare workers, large proportions of whom are immigrants, minorities, and women. Historically, similar debates have occurred among groups such as the Knights of Labor (KOL), the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), and the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), all of which sought to mobilize unskilled industrial workers, and the American Federation of Labor (AFL), which struggled to protect the interest of labors aristocracy, skilled craft workers. A discussion then follows of the debates over membership recruitment strategies. Currently, conflict surrounds the use of the corporate campaign, a broadbased approach designed to circumvent traditional methods of organizing that have been deemed ineffective, while in the earlier periods the strike was often a controversial tactic, further compounded by innovations such as sit-down strikes employed by various CIO unions, notably the Autoworkers. For both topics much of the discussion is spent raising possible explanations for the erce debates surrounding these important issues. II. Conict over Organizing Goals Although the general goal of any union organizing strategy is to expand membership, the types of workers who should be recruited are often a key decision. Given the origins of the labor movement among skilled artisans who created organizations to protect themselves from the encroachment of the unskilled, this debate has often centered on the necessity of organizing workers with few occupational skills. Historically this included the large number of industrial workers employed in the growing factory system, while the marginalized5 workers of today include temps, janitors, and sweatshop workers (Waldinger and Der-Martirosian, 2000).6 Two possible explanations may be offered for why the recruitment of these workers has been so contentious. The rst is based loosely on Michels iron law of oligarchyunion leaders, who tend to be white, male, and middle-class, will often resist the mobilization of groups such as immigrants, women, minorities, whose entrance into the organization can destabilize the structure and have negative political ramications for existing leaders. A second explanation is that even when unions decide to organize these workers, significant resources must be devoted to this task, resources that must be shifted from other activities, such as servicing existing members and other possible routes of advancement, including political activity (Asher et al., 2001; Block, 1980; Fletcher and Hurd, 1998).

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Oligarchy and Organizing Goals. Ever since Michels ([1902] 1959) observations on the German socialist party, scholars have used his iron law of oligarchy to critique the inherently conservative nature of existing union leaders (Leier, 1995; Mills, 1948; Piven and Cloward, 1977). However, despite the assertion that oligarchy is inevitable within such organizations, recent changes in the labor movement, including the election of reformers to top leadership posts, has generated scholarship on the dynamic elements of leadership (Ganz, 1999; Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin, 2003; Voss and Sherman, 2000). As Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin (2003: 56) argue, oligarchy in organized labor is no more immanent than democracy . . . both are the product of determinate . . . political struggles among rival workers factions and parties. . . . In the following section I recount debates within the movement between those who support an inclusive organizing program and others who prefer an organizing agenda that maintains the existing power structure of the movement. Current Period. Although one may reasonably assume that in organizations such as the American labor movement oligarchic tendencies would be most common among the elite, the ofcial rhetoric of todays top ofcials supports an expansive organizing platform. The Full Participation Conference, held immediately before the AFL-CIO annual convention in 1995, stated, We are gathered today to pledge our support to build a labor movement that embraces diversity as its strength. AFL-CIO President John Sweeney (1996) has argued that the labor movement must form coalitions with women and minority groups to remain viable, a sentiment echoed by observers such as Ruth Milkman (2000b: 1), who writes, recruiting immigrants is an increasingly urgent imperative for the besieged labor movement. If those in positions of power support such an agenda, why does the topic of membership recruitment remain so contentious today? As the evidence presented below indicates, it is often local union ofcials, those most affected by the recruitment of marginalized workers, who oppose proposed organizing goals. Nowhere has opposition to changes in organizing been more evident than in one of the brightest example of progressive unionism, the Service Employees International Unions (SEIU) Justice for Janitors campaigns conducted around the country (Fisk et al., 2000; Williams, 1999).7 Despite the overall success of this broad-based campaign, local SEIU affiliates have often struggled to keep their organization from becoming involved in the campaign, in part, according to Waldinger et al. (1998: 113), an incumbent [local] leadership will opt for the status quo, especially in light of the political ramifications of a sudden infusion of new, possibly ethnically distinctive members. In their case study of the Los Angeles Justice for Janitors campaign, Waldinger et al. document the conict between the local and the national union over the locals involvement in the campaign, a dispute that was eventually resolved when the national union took over the local organization. Although the LA Justice for Janitors campaign dramatically illustrates the conict over organizing marginalized workers, it is certainly not unique in this regard. In the case of a 1992 drywallers strike in Southern California, led primarily by Mexicans and Mexican-Americans, union leaders were willing to ignore the strikers even after the drywallers were able to build

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strong support for the strike. As one local business agent said (quoted by a union staffer), No, you can never organize those guys [Mexican drywallers]. Youre beating your head against the concrete. . . . (Milkman and Wong, 2000: 182). These two examples illustrate not only the resistance of local union ofcials to a more inclusive organizing program, but also, more importantly, the difficulties this opposition can cause for national leaders who support such a program. Currently, some progressive national unions, such as SEIU, seem willing to deal with this issue by taking over the political structure of recalcitrant locals. However, the long-term implications of this strategy on important issues such democratic decision-making at the local level are unknown. Historical Struggles. Unlike todays movement, where most debates over organizing goals are confined within the boundaries of one organization, often local vs. national, in the past supporters of more inclusive organizations, often referred to as industrial unions, formed their own groups in opposition to more traditional, craftbased organizations, such as the AFL. Below I describe the organizing objectives of three such unions, the KOL, the IWW, and the CIO, and the reaction of the AFL, the organization most strongly identied with the elite craft elements of the movement.8 The KOL was rst organization to make signicant efforts to organize the growing number of unskilled factory workers. The unions declaration of principles states, We have formed the order of the Knights of Labor with a view of securing the organization and direction, by cooperative effort with the power of the industrial classes (Voss, 1993: 83). Although this organization, despite its initial success, was unable to remain viable into the twentieth century (Voss, 1993), the principles on which it was founded were soon to be manifested in the IWW, albeit in a more radical form. The IWWs driving philosophy was expressed by Bill Haywood in his address to the Continental Congress of the Working Class, The aims and objects of this organization should be to put the working class in possession of the economic power, the means of life, in control of the machinery of production and distribution, without regard to capitalist masters (Dubofsky, 1969: 81). D.C. Coats, another IWW founder, summarized the IWWs view of a skill-segregated labor movement, We find there is no need of aristocratic unions standing aloof from the common laborer as the craftsman is fast passing away. . . . (Dubofsky, 1969: 72). Despite some success, the IWW was doomed to the same fate as the Knights, leaving the growing number of industrial workers waiting for another union to meet their needs, which eventually took the form of the Congress of Industrial Organizations, formed in 1936. Unlike the Knights and the IWW, both of which were formed independently of the AFL, the CIO arose out of internal conict within the AFL, as not leaders all within this organization supported a union for the skilled few. One such leader was Charles Howard, president of the International Typographical Union, who claimed the greatest obstacle at this time is the refusal of the American Federation of Labor to adopt more modern organization policies to meet modern conditions (Zeiger, 1995: 27). The workers targeted by this new union were not limited to native-born whites, the skilled craftsmen of the AFL, but rather, according to the CIO constitu-

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tion, the organization sought to bring about the effective organization of the working men and women of American without regard to race, color, creed, or nationality (Chen and Wong, 1998: 216). This time industrial unionism was able to remain viable, and conicts with the AFL ended only when the two organizations merged in 1955. Although the Knights, the IWW, and the CIO represented different philosophies, organizational structures, and organizing strategies, the response of the dominant AFL to these industrial unions was always the same: overt hostility. The concept of industrial unionism and the workers it represented was a foreign one to craft leaders like AFL president Samuel Gompers, who said, to attempt to institute what some are pleased to call industrial organizations with the avowed purpose of destroying existing trade unions is not only foolhardy, but it is ruinous, nay criminal (Reed, 1930: 133). In his autobiography Gompers accused the Knights of collaborating with capitalists to ensure the downfall of the AFL, writing, the struggle which the trade unions had to make in order to defend themselves against attacks of employers all too often aided by the K. of L. (Gompers, 1984: 83). For the IWW, with its radical, and often anti-AFL rhetoric, Gompers was especially vitriolic, calling this organization an industrial crime against which the trade unions of America will contend to the end (Dubofsky, 1969: 94) and a radical fungus on the labor movement. . . . (Gompers, 1984: 126). Although the CIO arose out of the AFL, the mass-organizing goal of this organization was met with swift opposition from the entrenched craft leaders. As the CIO moved further from its forbearer, the executive committee of the AFL, in a letter sent to all leaders of the CIO unions, claimed that the CIO advocates the pursuit of organizing policies in opposition to those formulated and adopted at conventions of the American Federation of Labor. . . . (Galenson, 1960: 15). AFL President William Green, a strong proponent of labor unity, warned the insurgents that many within the AFL regard separate movements formed within the main structure as dual in character and as decidedly menacing to its success and welfare (Phelan, 1989: 131). It is reasonable to assume that Green and AFL leaders regarded the formation of a viable industrial organization as an immediate threat to their power within the movement. In the struggles discussed above, the AFL leadership consistently opposed the mobilization of industrial workers. The reason for these interorganizational conicts is best summarized by Irving Bernstein (1970: 353), who writes, the dominant leadership of the AFL had no interest in the unionization of low-skilled workers in the mass production industries, and, in fact, considered such a prospect a threat to its continued control of the Federation. Livesay (1978: 95) makes a similar argument, claiming, Industrial unions not only would have threatened the dominance of the crafts in the AF of L affairs but also would have involved the organization of thousands of people whom craft unions despised, for organizing industrial unions would have required enrolling blacks, women, foreigners, and the unskilled. The evidence presented herein, both current and historical, supports the supposition that some unionists oppose organizing marginalized workers due to their threat

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to the existing power structure. In addition, at least part of the historical resistance to the mobilization of industrial workers was that, like the marginalized workers of today, they were drawn from diverse ethnic and racial backgrounds, which did not coincide with the largely white AFL (Asher and Stephenson, 1990; Foner, 1974). Although the political and social costs of building a movement of such workers today may not be as controversial as they were in the past, some union leaders have likely considered the possibility that as the union becomes a vehicle for the disadvantaged, there is a risk of alienating some of the more conservative supporters (for a general discussion of this issue, see Milkman, 2000a). To the extent that this apprehension exists today, it only serves to aggravate the difculties of organizing those workers who may hold the key to labors future. Resources and Organizing Goals. A second possible reason for this controversy is rooted in the resource mobilization paradigm (McCarthy and Zald, 1977), which highlights the importance of resources in the functioning of social movement organizations (SMOs). Finite union resources generate conflicts over organizing goals between those who support significant resources for membership recruitment and others who prefer that resources be used for different tasks, such as servicing existing members. In contrast to the iron-law explanation offered earlier, this explanation indicates that leaders, rather than acting out of self-interests, may actually be responding to the wishes of the existing rank and le. Current Period. Today, with the creation of new organizing strategies designed specically to recruit marginalized workers, described in greater detail below, unions are recognizing the importance of ensuring that organizing drives are well-funded. John Sweeney has advocated a massive increase in the amount of resources, both nancial and human, that the AFL-CIO allocates to organizing (Dark, 1999). Individual internationals, such as the SEIU, which devotes over 30 percent of its budget to organizing and mandates its locals do the same or face trusteeship (Slaughter, 1999; Voss and Sherman, 2000), are also allocating signicant resources to organizing. Yet, despite top-level support, there are numerous instances when the lack of available resources hamstrings efforts to recruit marginalized groups. One such example is the Los Angeles Manufacturing Action Project, a joint organization funded by a number of unions that targets immigrant and minority workers in Los Angeles manufacturing industry. The project failed, according to Delgado, because, The project failed to secure, let alone retain or increase, the long-term financial commitment of the unions and the AFL-CIO (Delgado, 2000: 237). In a broader analysis of union/community group networks, Needleman (1998b) explores how relationships between unions and potential organizational allies in immigrant enclaves are strained because unions, while theoretically committed to organizing immigrant workers, often are constrained in their availability of resources. The argument that resource demands and uncertain outcomes may prevent organizing among traditionally nonunion employees is supported by cases when such groups successfully initiated organizing drives without outside support, thus reducing

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existing unions cost of organizing. One prominent example9 is the case of the 1990 strike by employees of American Racing Equipment (ARE) in Los Angeles (Zabin, 2000), in which the workers, mostly first or second generation Latinos, created an indigenous organizational structure capable of ensuring nearly full participation in the strike. When such an opportunity presents itself to organized labor, they are quick to take advantage. Said one AFL-CIO ofcial, So its [the strike] kind of like having big chunks of gold pop up at cave you walk into. . . . We embarrassed ourselves (Zabin, 2000: 156). Unfortunately, the union that eventually organized the workers, the Machinists (IAM), made little effort to use the momentum created by this victory to organize other factories in the industry, which would have required a significant investment of resources. The lesson of this particular organizing effort is that only when the cost of organizing marginalized workers declines do existing unions broaden their organizing programs to include these workers. Just as uncertain outcomes and increased resources often prevent unions from organizing marginalized groups, routine demands from the existing membership for services, such as bargaining and grievance settlement, may also reduce the resources devoted to new organizing efforts (Block, 1980; Fletcher and Hurd, 1998), especially if resource demands are high, which is often the case in new forms of organizing, such as the Justice for Janitors campaigns. As one staff member put it, They [the membership] have this culture that we pay our dues, the local union hires representation staff, and therefore they take care of my needs. (Sherman and Voss, 2000: 321). As Fletcher and Hurd (1998: 49) note, Members have difficulty understanding why they should support organizing unless there is a direct link to their own situations. This selfishness of the rank and file is an alternative explanation to the oligarchy argumentrather than seeking to preserve their own interests, leadership opposition to expansive organizing programs reects the wishes of their constituents. Before turning to a historical discussion of the debates over resource allocation and union organizing, it is worthwhile to briefly discuss two issues that are particularly relevant for unions that see increased resources for organizing as a way to enhance labors position in society. First, the previous description of current conict within the labor movement over the amount of resources to allocate to union organizing efforts raises an important point about the feasibility of actually achieving this goal. Organizing success is shaped by a number of factors, not the least of which is how workers perceive the utility of unions as a vehicle for addressing workplace concerns. Employees desire for unionization is driven by diverse factors, including general perceptions of unions and their activities, the degree of satisfaction in ones work, government regulation of working conditions, other employment opportunities, and alternative avenues of workplace redress, such as joint worker councils, to name just a few (Bennett and Kaufman, 2002; Kaufman and Taras, 2000). If these issues are becoming increasingly important, employees may simply feel that unions are no longer relevant. Given this possibility, increasing the amount of resources for organizing would be a fruitless gesture, likely to produce few new members. Alternatively, many scholars have argued that workers demands for union-

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ization are heavily shaped not by the declining importance of unions, but by employer hostility towards unionization (Clawson and Clawson, 1999; Cooke, 1985; Goldeld, 1987). If this is instead the primary determinant of workers perceptions of unions, allocating resources to organizing is not doomed to failure, but rather unions must confront this reality and funnel their limited resources into alternative tactics to overcome the hostile environment in which they operate. In the next section I discuss new strategies designed by unions explicitly to address the concern of employer resistance. Regardless of the dynamics shaping workers attitudes towards unions (Corneld and Kim, 1994), the labor movement must confront this reality when engaging in new organizing efforts. The second issue that the previous discussion raises is the utility of allocating funds to organizing to revitalize the movement. As noted, organizing is a risky process that depends not only on the union, but also on the potential support of the targeted workers. Although the American labor movement has adopted a particular form of industrial syndicalism, preferring to force gains at the point of production through collective bargaining rather than targeting the state (Kimeldorf, 1999), unions have engaged in extensive political activity to achieve gains for their constituency. Some notable political gains include the eight-hour day, the regulation of child labor, increases in workplace safety, tariffs designed to prevent the decline of certain industries such as steel, and minimum wage laws (Coleman, 1988/1989; Form, 1995; Greene, 1998; Marks, 1989). Given the increasing importance of this activity, illustrated by the activities of the AFL-CIOs lobbying arm, the Committee on Political Education (COPE), it seems reasonable to assume that many unions may prefer to devote resources to political action, such as lobbying efforts and supporting campaigns of particular politicians, to the risky activity of attempting to organize new members.10 Although organizing and political activity may be somewhat complementary, the issue of deciding what tasks to allocated limited resources to can be a serious problem for many unions. Historical Struggles. In the past organizing marginalized workers concentrated in the industrial sector also required the mobilization of significant organizational resources. Although, as discussed above, AFL leaders opposed industrial unionism to maintain organizational stability, resistance was also based on the belief that unskilled workers were impossible to organize, so resources devoted to this task were wasted. As Livesay (1978: 95) notes, Even after the passage of New Deal laws eliminating many of the practical obstacles to industrial unions, the AF of L leaders refused to venture into uncharted waters. . . . This attitude led the AFL to struggle with militant unions that were willing to devote signicant resources to a goal that conservative craft leaders viewed as unobtainable. For example, although Gompers was often critical of the IWW, he also regarded this organization as chasing after impossible goals that were too chimerical [for] an intelligent man or woman confronted with the practical problems of securing a better home, better food and clothing, and a better life and its followers unorganized and exploited workers were misled into chasing a will-o-the-wisp (Livesay, 1978: 94).

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Others in the AFL, such as Photo Engravers president Matthew Woll, who claimed that industrial workers were, unorganized, and perhaps unorganizable (Bernstein, 1970: 366), shared Gompers sense of the futility. However, despite this attitude, as Livesay (1978: 161) notes, the IWWs history offered a hard, practical lesson: Gompers was wrong about industrial unionisms possibilities. It could have been done despite injunctions, militia, and the whole arsenal of weapons in the hands of business. A significant impetus for the creation of the CIO, as well as its eventual split with the AFL, was due to the failure of the AFL to devote resources to organizing industrial workers. John L. Lewis, vice president of the AFL and leader at the time of the largest industrial union in the United States, the United Mineworkers, complained, there still remains the fact that there has been no administration of that policy [to grant industrial unions charters], no execution of the promissory note that the Federation held out to the millions of workers in the mass production industry. . . . (Galenson, 1960: 6). Lewiss vision that unions must devote signicant organizational resources to membership recruitment was first realized in the steel industry. Steelworkers had long been under the jurisdiction of the Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel, and Tin Workers. By the time of the AFL-CIO split during the Great Depression, any gains this union had made were completely goneit was a failure. In fact, the poor record of the AFL in general and the Amalgamated in particular in regard to steelworkers was one of the major reasons for Lewiss attack on the AFL. Lewis stated, If we do not take some action the public and steel workers are going to take it that we have given up hope of organizing the steel industry. . . . We [must] have the resolution to carry on a campaign without the authority of the Amalgamated (Bernstein, 1970: 37172). The CIO was quite willing to devote the resources to undertake what was at the time an organizing program of unprecedented magnitude. While still operating within the AFL, the CIO offered to contribute one-half million dollars to a steelworkers organizing fund. In response to this offer, the AFL and President Green were only able to raise about $8,000 to revive the dying Amalgamated (Lages, 1967). In response to the actions of the AFL, the CIO created its own organization, the Steel Workers Organizing Committee, and, through signicant funding, was able to organize nearly 200,000 members in its rst year of existence (Lages, 1967), proving beyond a doubt that industrial unionism was indeed possible. Despite the differences between the marginalized workers today and their industrial counterparts of the past, the debates over the importance of organizing these workers are remarkably similar. The oligarchic interests of some existing leaders, both local and national, are a major stumbling block for those who seek to develop an organizing model specically designed to mobilize nonunion workers. In addition, even when unions have been willing to make the commitment to organize these workers, as is often the case today, the level of resources necessary to conduct successful organizing drives often proves prohibitive, especially in light of employer resistance and the possibilities of alternative union activities, such as direct political action. In the past the lack of funding was a major criticism of the AFL by those who formed the CIO. Yet despite these obstacles, as a comparison of the Amalgamated and SWOC indicates,

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todays movement is unlikely to expand in the twenty-first century if efforts are not made to mobilize the new industrial workers. III. Conicts over Organizing Strategies Having described debates over organizing goals, I now explore the struggles among unionists over the types of organizing repertoires that are most appropriate for increasing the membership. Both current and historical debates have centered on the use of disruptive tactics, including strikes and civil disobedience, tactics that have often been used by more militant sections of the movement. As Tarrow (1998: 98) notes, disruptive tactics give weak actors leverage against powerful opponents. . . . The choice of disruptive tactics is often a contentious one as well, as some groups within the movement prefer to rely on institutionalized means to achieve their goals, while others argue that only through disruption will their demands be met (della Porta and Diani, 1999; Piven and Cloward, 1977; Tarrow, 1998; Tilly, 1995). Herein I identify two reasons why the choice of tactics has often been so controversial in the labor movement. First, disruptive tactics tend to be highly innovative, as unions engage in activities that are unfamiliar to businesses and authorities. Today many unions are relying on the corporate campaign, a broad-based organizing strategy designed to avoid the institutional NLRB process, while in the past innovations such as the sit-down strike were often initiated by the rank and file. Given the existing leaderships unfamiliarity with these tactics, the use of these tactics often threatens their institutional knowledge, and hence, their position of power within the organization. Second, disruptive tactics are often very effective at mobilizing the rank and le, especially marginalized workers, which, as discussed earlier, may be threatening to certain segments of the movement. Institutional Knowledge and Innovative Tactics. As Weber (1946) first noted, bureaucratic authority in rational-legal organizations, which most, if not all, labor unions are, is based on the skills and knowledge required by a particular position. Because the authority of the individual rests in part on his claim of expertise, by threatening this knowledge the individuals position within the organization is also threatened. In Lipsets ([1950] 1968) study of the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) of Saskatchewan, the reforms of the elected socialist party were often nullied by a civil service who opposed change based, on a desire to maintain the stability of their departments and their own positions (Lipset, 1968: 316). In the case of the labor movement, the development of innovative strategies reduces the institutional knowledge of existing leaders, thus making these new tactics potentially threatening to their position within the movement. Current Period. Since the passage of the Wagner Act unions have had access to a relatively institutionalized mechanism to recruit new members, the NLRB certication election (see Williams, 1985 for a detailed discussion of this process). Increasingly, however many militant unions have called for an organizing tactic that bypasses the NLRB (Crump, 1991; Lerner, 1991) because of the opportunities the certication

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election affords anti-union employers (Clawson and Clawson, 1999; Freeman, 1988; Goldfield, 1987). The development of the corporate campaign has been one method that some unionists have advocated as a solution to the increasingly anti-union environment in which organizing currently takes place. Through the corporate campaign, a union seeks to force the targeted corporation into recognizing the union without going through the NLRB election process.11 In the corporate campaign, unions rely on various outsider/disruptive (marches, sit-ins, civil disobedience) and insider (shareholders meetings, lobbying) tactics to mobilize public pressure against an employee (Jarley and Maranto, 1990; Lerner, 1998; Manheim, 2001; Perry, 1987). In addition, unions also attempt to mobilize outside allies, ranging from community groups to the state, to pressure the rm to recognize the union as the authorized bargaining agent of the employees. Unlike the institutionalized NLRB certication election process, which is regulated by the federal government, the corporate campaign lacks a procedure that is straightforward and familiar. Perry (1987: 16) writes, the corporate campaign game lacks well-dened rules and requirements. . . . Despite the recent increase in the popularity of this organizing form, (see Manheim, 2001 for trends), some unionists are hesitant to rely on this innovative tactic as an alternative to the NLRB method of organizing. In describing the Justice for Janitors campaign, one of the most successful corporate campaigns of recent years, Waldinger et al. (1998: 110) identify a commonly held belief among the rank and le about the differences between the corporate campaign and the NLRB certication election process: [NLRB] elections are controlled by the [union] bosses and set up for them. Its an alienating process for workers . . . and separates the union from the workers. According to Brecher and Costello (1998), an official in John Sweeneys administration told Jobs for Justice activists (a program that involves the creation of labor-community coalitions) that they should focus on traditional union channels. In his account of the development of the corporate campaign by the labor movement in the 1970s, Manheim (2001) notes that although some within the movement were quick to adopt this strategy, many leaders remained wary of this unfamiliar organizing tactic. These examples illustrate that the adoption of the corporate campaign is controversial at least in part because of the threat to the leaderships knowledge of the traditional organizing strategy, the NLRB election. In addition, given the high costs of the corporate campaign (Jarley and Maranto, 1990), unions engaging in this tactic may have limited resources to pursue other objectives, including political action, which, as noted earlier, can also yield signicant gains. Factors such as cost are only likely to increase leadership opposition to new forms of organizing. Historical Struggles. Historically, the strike12 was the primary strategy used to organize new workers, and even conservative groups such as the AFL were quick to use it to bolster their membership. Gompers, when responding to the Commissioner of Labor on the possibility of reducing strikes, relied on the rhetoric of justice to defend the most basic weapon of organized labor, So long as the present industrial and commercial system will last, so long will strikes continue. . . . I regard the strike as the sign that the people are not yet willing to surrender every spark of the manhood and

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their honor and their independence. It is the protest of the worker against unjust conditions. . . . (Mandel, 1963: 68). Despite Gompers claim that the strike was a vehicle of improvement for the common laborer, he clearly believed that it should be exercised in a cautious manner, closely supervised by union ofcials. While still in the Cigarmakers Union, he fought against the unmitigated use of the strike, claiming, It is not wise nor practical, to at all times strike, even against the reduction of wages [Italics in original] (Mandel, 1963: 40). Of a cloakmakers strike in New York City, where Gompers was brought in by the union leadership over the objections of the rank and file to end the work stoppage, Gompers later recalled, Strong, resourceful leaders were instilling into these mutinous, undisciplined minds the fundamental theories of unionism. They were held steadily in line, taught to curb their ghting spirit . . . in a word the cloakmakers were taught unionism (Mandel, 1963: 3056). Despite the AFLs rather conservative use of the strike, others within the movement were willing to use this tactic in new ways. Probably the most important innovation was the sit-down strike of the 1930s, shaped through the autoworkers struggles with General Motors (Fine, 1969; Kraus, 1947). The sit-down strike developed as a response both to employer resistance to unionization efforts during the Great Depression and the lack of militancy among many union ofcials. In 1935 the United Rubber Council, an AFL afliate that represented workers at the Goodyear tire factor in Akron, Ohio, signed a no-strike agreement with the company shortly after the membership voted to strike. The response of the rank and le was one of outrage: Workers tore up their union cards, and membership in the union dropped from 40,000 to 5,000. Said one member, Id see myself in hell before I ever belong to another dirty, stinking union (Brecher, 1972: 180). More importantly, however, workers responded to union betrayal by resorting to a new organizing tactic, the sit-down strike (Brecher, 1972). Because the sit-down strike was developed and controlled almost entirely by the rank and file, rather than existing leaders, the widespread use of this tactic13 threatened existing leaders knowledge about how strikes should be conducted (Brecher, 1972; Krause, 1947). William Green, the president of the AFL at the time of the sitdown strikes called the strategy, sabotage beyond the wildest dreams of the I.W.W. and that the sit-down, connotes a desire to bargain by violence, to use force in the taking of public and private property, to take the law into ones own hands (Phelan, 1989: 145). Other union leaders, such as those of the United Rubber Workers, sought to force the sit-down strikers to engage in a conventional work stoppage, a tactic with which these leaders were more familiar (Bernstein, 1969). Today, as in the past, existing leaders have carefully sought to regulate the organizing activities of the membership to preserve their institutional knowledge and control in the organization. Mobilization of the Rank and File and Disruptive Tactics. Disruptive tactics such as the corporate campaign and sit-down strike are threatening to existing leaders not only because of their innovativeness, but also because these strategies are particularly well-suited to mobilize marginalized groups. By forging a larger role for these members

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in union affairs, these tactics are likely to erode the power of existing leaders. This sentiment is expressed by Dave Beck, Teamsters president in the 1950s, who said, Unions are big business. Why should truck drivers and bottle washers be allowed to make big decisions affecting union policy? Would any corporation allow it (Moody, 1988: 57)? If some union leaders hold such sentiments, they should be expected to resist any new form of organizing that builds increased membership participation in the affairs of the organization. Current Period. Examples abound of the success unions have achieved when targeting marginalized workers through the corporate campaign (Milkman and Wong, 2001). The Justice for Janitors campaigns have mobilized thousands of janitors across the country, many of whom are immigrants. Through boycotts, mobilization of immigrant community organizations, public awareness campaigns, and support from the Department of Labor, UNITE was able to successfully organize immigrant workers employed by contractors that supplied fashion designer Jessica McClintock (Needleman, 1998). In evaluating UNITEs efforts to organize garment workers in Los Angeles, which included extensive use of the corporate campaign, Bonacich (2000) concludes that traditional NLRB organizing is a completely ineffective approach, and the use of the corporate campaign is crucial if UNITE is to make any progress. In addition to the strength of the corporate campaign in organizing marginalized groups, others concerned about the lack of democracy in the labor movement have praised the effectiveness of the corporate campaign in mobilizing the rank and file and creating a more democratic union.14 Rathke (1999) argues that the alternative to the corporate campaign, the NLRB certication election, limits the tactical options available to unions and also fails to create an organization with signicant rank-and-le participation.15 Joe Crump (1991: 42), an organizer for the United Food and Commercial Workers, claims that one of the reasons why his union relies heavily on the corporate campaign is because, Its [the corporate campaign] an opportunity to build membership participation in the local union. In addition, the corporate campaign uses various strategies that require increased rank-and-le participation. For example, the LA Justice for Janitors campaign relied on tactics such as marches and civil disobedience, all of which required extensive participation by the membership (Waldinger et al., 1998), and, according to one informant, has been so successful because, weve had the highest percentage of workers participation (Waldinger et al., 1998: 116). As noted earlier, organizing is unlikely to be successful if targeted workers are uninterested or afraid of supporting the union. Because the corporate campaign maximizes worker participation, this tactic may be particularly well-suited for developing worker commitment to the union, which may overcome preexisting feelings of apathy or fear that employees have of unions. Although many have embraced the corporate campaign as a potential solution to the challenges currently faced by organized labor, others feel threatened by the increased rank-and-le participation associated with this tactic. For example, as paid staffs have become more important in organizing activities, they have become increasingly jealous of their role in the organization. Many staff resist increased membership

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involvement, For most field reps, it [rank-and-file organizing] scares them cause it means they have to give up a little power (Voss and Sherman, 2000: 321, quote from a staff organizer). Often existing staff will resist efforts to shift to an organizing model that involves more membership participation. One organizer notes, The field reps dont block organizing, they just dont get it. Many staffs have a hard time letting go and letting members run things (Fletcher and Hurd, 1998: 42). Theyre scared . . . on a power trip (Fletcher and Hurd, 1998: 48). The leadership of SEIU local 399, the union responsible for the LA Justice for Janitors campaign, never completely supported the organizing drive and eventually stopped funding it, prompting the international to place the union in trusteeship (Waldinger et al., 1998). Given the mobilizing potential of the corporate campaign, it is not surprising that those in authority view this strategy with at least some degree of suspicion and may be unlikely to welcome its implementation.16 Historical Struggles. Like the corporate campaign, disruptive organizing tactics have in the past often been opposed by union leadership both because of their potential to mobilize industrial workers and the strong leadership role these strategies forge for members. In both industrial strikes and sit-down strikes labor leaders expressed opposition due at least in part to the mobilizing potential of these tactics. In particular, the AFL sought to maintain control over the strike, opposing irresponsible strikes, which often involved industrial workers. The opposition of the AFL to the industrial strike is dramatically illustrated by the steelworkers strike of 1919. Mandel (1963) documents the lack of support given by the AFL leadership to the strikers, including the undercutting of the strike by the Amalgamated, which signed a contract before the strike was over. According to Mandel, this opposition was due to the fact that a successful outcome would lead to similar organizing in other basic industries and that this would change the character of the A.F. of L. by shifting the center of gravity to the unskilled workers, lay the basis of industrial unionism, make the labor movement more militant, and threaten the position of the old conservative leadership (Mandel, 1963: 471). Eventually, however, Gompers and the AFL were forced to support the strike because, postponement was impossible and that to attempt it would mean . . . a loss of condence in the leadership of the AF of L, with the possibility that radical leaders might get control (Mandel, 1963: 470). It was in this strike that the AFL clearly demonstrated its opposition to an organizing strategy that would mobilize the masses of industrial workers, those union members the AFL sought to avoid. Although, unlike the AFL leadership, CIO ofcials strongly supported industrial unionism, even these leaders opposed more militant actions like the sit-down strike. Brecher (1972) cites a major reason why the sit-down strike was an effective strategy in ensuring rank-and-file participation: It was a democratic process in the sense that control of the strike comes from the people involved, not union leaders. In his attack on this strategy, William Green made it quite clear that this strategy would not be tolerated in the AFL, saying, The sit-down strike has never been approved or supported by the American Federation of Labor because there is involved in its application grave

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implications detrimental to labors interests. It must be disavowed by the thinking men and women of labor (Galenson, 1960: 145). Even unions that realized heightened success from the sit-down strike, notably the CIO, sought to control this new form of rankand-file militancy. Zeiger (1988: 98) writes, Even as he [John L. Lewis] bargained with corporate leaders and government ofcials on behalf of auto and rubber workers engaged in sit-downs, he toughened the language of UMW contract to penalize any sort of spontaneous or unauthorized work stoppage. The reason for Lewiss opposition to this strike tactic was obvious, Nor was the grass-roots democratic unionism that surfaced in key CIO afliates [during the sit-downs] in tune with Lewiss bedrock values as a union leader (Zeiger, 1988: 98). As in the case of organizing goals, organizing tactics have been and continue to be a source of controversy within the union movement. Whether more disruptive tactics are controversial because they threaten the institutional knowledge of existing leaders or because of their potential to mobilize the rank and file, especially marginalized workers, more conservative elements of the movement have consistently resisted organizing innovations, even when they produce membership gains. Because of the similarities of present debates to those of the past, the ultimate acceptance or rejection of the corporate campaign will likely have long-term implications for the growth of the movement. When unions such as the UAW, notably the rank and file, embraced innovative tactics such as the sit-down strike, they were able to experience signicant growth and build a democratic union. It is not surprising that unions today that rely on innovative tactics like the corporate campaign have been able to begin to increase their membership and play a key role in revitalizing the movement. IV. Conclusions My main objective is to place the present American labor revitalization project in historic context by drawing parallels between current debates over organizing to those that took place during important periods in labors past. Through such a comparison, I illustrate that the 1990s is indeed an important period of examination, a crucial time in the course of the union movement. In many ways the labor movement at the end of the 20th century is similar to the late 1800s when the KOL struggled with AFL; the turn of the century, when the radical IWW threatened to wrest control of the movement from the AFL; and the 1930s, a period that witnessed the rise of a permanent industrial union, the CIO. However, the 1990s is in many respects different from the past organizing processes have changed, potential members are different, industries have shifted, and political philosophies have been reconstructed. Along with the similarities to important periods in the past, the uniqueness of the current period also justies the volume of research on the movement. In addition to this historical comparison, I offer some initial explanations of why such debates take place at all. While social movements and their organizational manifestations often seek broader societal transformation, they themselves are not immune to change. Herein I explore some possible reasons why the labor movement has experienced such conict over organizing goals and tactics. One obvious reason is the oli-

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garchic nature of the movements leadership. The recruitment of marginalized groups and the use of unconventional organizing tactics can threaten the existing power arrangement of the movement in various ways. Union leaders are mindful of this, and hence are often unenthusiastic about instituting change, yet, as I have also noted, there are sections of the movement willing to press for broader organizing goals and tactics. More mundane factors also prevent organizational change. For example, recruiting marginalized workers is often an uncertain task requiring significant effort and resources to accomplish such a project. Therefore, it is not surprising that even militant unionists are hesitant to devote the level of resources necessary to undertake these organizing drives, especially when existing rank and le may oppose such efforts. In addition, the possibility of unreceptive workers, who either see little need for unions, or are intimidated by management, and alternative avenues of action, including political activity, may further hinder efforts to mobilize resources specically for new organizing drives. Despite evidence presented herein, which indicates support for explanations of internal movement conflict, it is also important to realize that these hypotheses are exploratory in nature. Systematic research is needed to examine the reasons why the labor movement has often resisted change. One important question I raise is: Are existing leaders resistant to the mobilization of marginalized workers because of the threat these groups pose to leaders position within the organization, or are they merely responding to the demands of the rank and le? The quotes and commentaries given as evidence here merely provide initial support for the validity of my explanations, and do not provide evidence to the extent to which these processes operate in the movement. Although scholarship on the labor movement has been revitalized in part because of the increasing use of social movement scholarship, it is important that those who study other social movements are aware of the lessons that can be drawn from the labor movement. For example, organizations in other movements (environment, civil rights) have gone mainstream in order to appeal to the broader public. By doing so, they hope to achieve important organizational goals. However, as the conclusion of past debates in the labor movement have illustrated, narrow goals and conservative tactics, which can lead to success in the short-run, are often a recipe for long-term failure, especially if the movement is committed to democratic principles. Scholars should be aware that the labor movement does not have a monopoly on entrenched leadership. Given the important struggles described above, it is also evident that the organizational structure of labor unions plays an important role in determining the success of unions in recruiting new members. While some scholars interested in the present state of the labor movement have examined unions, many attribute the fate of the movement to various structural factors, including employer resistance, the apathy (at best) of the state, and a changing economy. While I do not discount other dimensions of organizing, I believe the unions themselves should play a central role in accounting for organizing success and failures. As scholars such as Ganz (2000) note, unions can develop successful organizing strategies even in the face of erce employer opposition and workers who have little legal protection or experience with unions. Obsta-

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cles such as rm resistance and state repression are not new to labor unions. Much of the success unions experienced during and after the Great Depression was built on a foundation of unionism forged in a period of industrial conict marked by bloody state and employer repression, no legal protection for organizing, and a common belief that unions were un-American. In sum, the concept of agency is one of central importance in the study of the American labor movement.

NOTES
*I thank John D. McCarthy, Glenn Firebaugh, Frank Baumgartner, Roger Finke, and an anonymous reviewer for their helpful comments. An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the Southern Sociological Meetings in New Orleans (2003). This research was supported in part by NSF Doctoral Dissertation Support Grant #SES-0221279.
1The

post-war labor-management pact was in reality an informal dtente that granted labor signicant freedom to expand its membership and press for economic benets while limiting unions ability to challenge capitals authority in the workplace, or the political regime of production (Burawoy, 1985).
2Some

militant unionists have been wary of the changes the movement has undergone, not because they oppose a broader organizing program, but because they are suspicious of top-down efforts to reform the movement (Eisenscher, 1999; Slaughter, 1999).
3It

is not my argument that the labor movement of the 1990s and the debates that are occurring today are identical to those of the past. The current labor movement operates in an environment that in many ways differs fundamentally from the past. Trade is increasingly global; neoliberal economic policies have been adopted by the state; labor conflict is highly institutionalized; and the economy has shifted from a mass production to service orientation, to name a few differences. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, in the past multiple unions struggled with each other for dominance, while today, most unionists are embedded in one dominant organizationthe AFL-CIO. While this present circumstance still leads to conict, it tends to be much more muted than the debates of the past as the AFL-CIO still attempts to maintain a united front to the world. Despite these dissimilarities, I believe it is crucial to understand the parallels between the past and present, which is my goal.
4Because

my focus is on the internal union processes, I necessarily ignore environmental reasons for internal conflict, which, as Balser (1997) illustrates, are also important for explaining factionalism in social movement organizations.
5I

use the term marginalized as a general concept throughout this paper to refer to the growing number of unskilled (and often semiskilled) workers employed in the service sector. These employees typically enjoy low occupation power, little prestige, and underemployment; see Applebaum et al. (2003) and Simmons (2004) for a discussion of these issues. In many respects, given the historical comparison made in this analysis, the marginalized workers of today are the equivalent of the factory workers of the early 20th century.
6The

low-skilled occupations created by the service economy are not the only potential union targets. More skilled occupations, ranging from doctors to informational technology specialists, could also provide fertile ground for membership expansion. However, with few exceptions (such as the aggressive organizing of nurses by unions such as the California Nurses Association and the Service Employees International Union), little effort has been made to organize highly skilled, professionalized workers.
7The Justice for Janitors campaign is a corporate campaign (described in more detail in the discussion of organizing strategies) that employs various tactics, ranging from street theater to lawsuits, to pressure building owners to recognize the union.

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8Here

the AFL and its leaders (notably Samuel Gompers and William Green) are portrayed in a rather conservative, reactionary light. Although, as the evidence suggests, this union certainly represented the rightwing of organized labor, but this is not to say that neither the union nor its leaders were not genuinely interested in advancing the cause of the working class, as they certainly were. However, they were interested in creating a movement where they were rmly in control of the reins of power.
9For

a similar example, see Milkman and Wongs (2000) account of the 1992 drywallers strike in Southern California discussed earlier.
10Of course, expanding the membership base of the organization will only increase the political clout of the union (Marks, 1989). 11See

Manheim (2001) for other uses of the corporate campaign.

the focus is on strikes of union recognition, which are substantially different from strikes arising out of the process of collective bargaining, which have a substantially different dynamic, due in part to the existing legitimacy of the union.
13According

12Here

to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, there were only 48 sit-down strikes in 1936, compared to 477 the following year (Anonymous, 1938).

14Although

corporate campaigns have been lauded by many for encouraging rank-and-le participation in the movement, it is important to note that campaigns have been implemented from the top down, with little rank-and-le involvement, thus virtually eliminating the grass-roots dimension of the tactic, resulting in a much more institutionalized union action. the NLRB election can be conducted with little rank-and-le support, it too is most successful when it involves broad based support from the membership (Bronfenbrenner, 1997).

15Although

16Again, as I noted earlier, the increasing involvement of disadvantaged groups, including ethnic and racial minorities, may alienate more conservative union supportersa potential worry for union leaders.

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