Monsicha Hoonsuwan Critical Review Essay U.S.

Interventionism Professor Cardwell 6 December 2010 Expansion Through The Hands of U.S. Consumers The end of WWII sparked a fear in many U.S. citizens of an economic decline, as military spending dropped sharply, threatening the country with a possibility of another Great Depression. However, the Iron Curtain that had descended over war-torn Europe brought about the onset of the Cold War between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Consequently, the U.S. reinvested taxpayers money into maintaining the countrys defense capacity and sophisticated weaponry as a part of deterrence policy to prevent an all-out war. During this time, Truman administration also proposed the Marshall Plan, officially known as the European Recovery Program, to aid the reconstruction of a depressed Europe (p. 43) and prevent the spread of communism as well as safeguarding the flow of U.S. goods into European markets. It is clear that the U.S. government recognized its central role in economic affairs during the Cold War, but the extent of its involvement is further investigated through consumeristic lens in Christopher Endys Cold War Holidays: American Tourism in France. Tourism growth after WWII, argues Endy, did not happen on its own; a section of the Marshall Plan was dedicated to travel development or travel promotion (p.33) such as arranging group tours, lobbying for cheaper transportation fare, and providing free marketing services to travel companies, synthesizing tourism with foreign economic policy. By looking at the history of U.S.

tourism in France, Endy argues, one can understand the seeming paradox (p.4): how the fusion of politics, business, and leisure in the Cold War era increased interdependence and informal exchanges amongst nations, while mounting a sense of national identity and expanding state power at the same time. Consumerism, the Cold War, and globalization went hand in hand in the post-war era. Tourism, argues Endy, is the medium that glues all these aspects together. As the U.S. and French economies became increasingly reliant upon consumer spending on commodified goods and services, leisure travel emerged as one of the characteristics of their consumer societies. Meanwhile, the U.S. government concern over war-torn Europe led the country to consider tourism as a means to indirectly aid Frances postwar reconstruction, while furthering the Marshall Plans goal of strengthening the immunity of the Atlantic Community against communism. Lastly, globalization brought about global economic interdependence, characterized by multinational companies, increased border crossings for people and cultural practices. Tourism, therefore, became a quintessential feature (p. 3) of the globalizing world. Tourism, as perceived by U.S. policymakers, was an economic and cultural tool that could help the U.S. win the Cold War. When Truman administration implemented the Marshall Plan, many U.S. conservatives feared that a large amount of aid to Europe would contribute to inflation and higher taxes, while supporting nationalized industries in Western Europe instead of free enterprise. Hence, a travel promotion plan was introduced as a part of the Marshall Plan to send dollars to Western Europe through consumers and free enterprise, with only marginal use of direct government aid (p. 44). Thus, Endy argues, the increasingly affluent U.S. middle-class and improved transatlantic

transportation in the post-war era alone could not fully account for the rise of tourism in U.S.-French relations; globalization allows both countries to decentralize the way they conduct economic and cultural diplomacy, resulting in the use of consumer diplomacy (p.5)an attempt to exploit private consumer activities for state goals. Hence, Endy suggests, the task of advancing U.S. foreign policy goalsaiding war-torn Europe and containing communismwas also shared among a transnational travel constituencya loose coalition of government officials, business groups, and media elites. The U.S. government was not the only one employing consumer diplomacy, however. According to Endy, the French government also viewed foreign visitors in its land as a means to advance its foreign policy goals, though in a completely different way. While the U.S. view its tourists in France as contributing indirectly to Frances reconstruction, the French were hoping American tourists would be the carriers of the radiance (rayonnement) (p. 6)or international prestigeof French civilization. For many members of Frances travel industry, hosting U.S. tourists presented an opportunity to reclaim French power and cultural influence after it had been threatened by other superpowers and conflicts within its colonies. Furthermore, the U.S. was convinced that, in order to promote mass tourism in France, the government had to make France safe for middle-class Americans (p. 81). Through the Marshall Plan, the U.S. government pushed for hotel modernization essentially a campaign to Americanize French hotels (p. 82), forcing Europeans to imitate the U.S. managerial and industrial practices so U.S. tourists would feel at home in France. In addition to hotel modernization, Endy argues, France also faced heavy pressure from the U.S. to eliminate cover charge in restaurants as it was deemed

inconvenient and unfriendly to U.S. tourists. This campaign resembled an open-door policy for French restaurants (p. 88), in which the aim was to create a safe and accessible commercial environment for U.S. tourists abroad. Indeed, this effort was somewhat wasteful because U.S. tourists were eager to see France that was different from their own country, not another home abroad. Such unexpected behavior disappointed the U.S. government who had hoped that U.S. tourists would develop transnational identities instead of reflecting on what it means to be American and what kind of citizens should represent the U.S. people abroad. Moreover, Endy argues that the French were resistant against the adoption of U.S. popular culture and U.S. hotel standards, but they were able to achieve a synthesis of refined civilization and modernity (p. 207) by selectively adapt certain U.S. practices that suit their traditions and needs. Endy offers an uncommon, yet, thought-provoking perspective on U.S. interventionism, a view that can potentially reshape how one defines the boundaries of which intervention entails. To many, interventionism exclusively means the use of militaristic force to coerce other states, often infringing upon their sovereignty, in order to pursue U.S. self-interests. Nevertheless, Endy generously suggests that intervention not only encompasses the use of the military, but also the use of a more subtle consumer diplomacy (p.5)an attempt to exploit private consumer activity for state goalsas well. Thus, Cold War Holidays: American Tourism in France is a good addition to the study of U.S. foreign policy as it affixes another dimension to the already prevalent, frequently studied outlook on the U.S. consistent exercise of power and influence over the world. In terms of organization, moreover, Endy articulate his thesis quite plainly in the introduction, while providing summaries of his arguments in the conclusions of every

chapter. Identifying the books main argument, as a result, is simple and clear. The use of cartoons and illustrations also adds some humor and entertainment to his otherwise dry narrative. The only problem with the book is the redundancy of the author in trying to present his arguments, which he does so repeatedly that the last few chapters are almost unnecessary. It is up to ones discretion to decide whether the governments involvement in travel promotion during the Cold War era constitutes intervention or not. Yet, it is unarguable that U.S. foreign policy has long been based primarily on economic interests and the U.S. need to expand and secure markets abroad, while ideological factorsas in the case of Guatemalaand the U.S. desire to prove its credibility as the protector of the free worldas in the case of the Vietnam Warfactor in later. An important question one needs to ask now is regardless of the extent and the subtlety of the intervention, does the U.S. have to right to intervene in other countries issues? Even if it does, should it intervene?