Monsicha Hoonsuwan Critical Book Review Professor Curt Cardwell U.S.

Interventionism October 4, 2010 Wilsons Way of Waging War On October 24, 1917 Old Style (November 7, 1917 New Style) an armed rebellion in Petrograd marked a significant shift in Russians political destiny, when the Bolsheviks overthrew Kerenskys Russian Provisional Government in the event that became known as The October Revolution or the Bolshevik Revolution. Led by Vladimir Lenin, the Red Guards took over major government facilities and the Winter Palace, whose fall prompted the Bolshevik-led Second Congress of Soviets to ratify the revolution, transforming the parliamentary Russian state into a socialist one. As common to all revolutions, the Bolshevik Revolution was met with oppositionsin this case, by the White Army, a loose union of anti-revolutionary forces, and the Allied armies whose control over various parts of Soviet Russia undermined the legitimacy of the Bolshevik government, which the U.S. refused to recognize until 1933. It is a fact that the U.S., during President Woodrow Wilsons administration, was a part of this Allied intervention scheme, but the reason to why Wilson decided to participate in this intervention remains controversial. While many monographic studies of the Allies intervention in Russia suggest that Wilsons initial rationale could be anything but his anti-Bolshevik mentality, David S. Foglesong argues in Americas Secret War Against Bolshevism that Wilsons heart was never with the Bolsheviks to begin with, and his decision to intervene in Soviet

Russia was deliberate, but was done secretly. The U.S. went into Russia with a firm determination to topple the Bolshevik government because the Bolsheviks, in Secretary of State Robert Lansings words, threatened us (the U.S.) with revolution and was dangerousmore so than Germany (p. 66). Ironically, Wilsons reluctance to deviate from his publicized image of a stanch believer in self-determination and noninterventionism led him to avoid public criticism and resort to new diplomacy (p. 3), characterized by clandestine economic and military operations that are methods beyond conventional diplomacy but short of outright war (p. 12). Therefore, concludes Foglesong, Wilson was an exemplar of humanitarian intervention around the world (p. 298) whose policy failed to live up to his principles. Foglesongs thoroughly researched and heavily documented historiography offers a new perspective to Wilsons true intentions behind his perplexing decision to intervene in Russiaa sign of discrepancies between his public address and administrative actions that had manifested itself in several cases prior to 1917 such as the Mexican Civil War. Constantly speaking to his opponents, Foglesong notes their arguments and refutes them with full credibility. He brings up many oppositions viewpoints that try to explain the presence of U.S. troops in Russia in a way that will certainly please the Wilson worshippers: to rescue the Czech army, to preserve the open-door policy with the Japanese, to block the German forces from resources and weaken them, or even to promote democracy in Russia. Foglesong, in contrast, delivered a more straightforward, shocking conclusion that, in fact, Wilsons Bolshevism-aversion was the main determinant; he did not give in to the pressure from other Allied members, but took

initiative to secretly support the White Army in the Russian Civil War and label any plans to offer assistance to the Soviet government out of the question (p. 66). The books nine chapters outline Foglesongs logic as to why he concludes that Wilson waged a secret war against Bolshevism. Starting from investigating Wilsons background, Foglesong reveals that Wilson was racist, anti-Semitic, and religiousbut was not initially anti-Bolshevik. His anti-Bolshevik stance was later influenced by the shadowy fears (p. 40), which refer to the swarthy immigrant(s) who were infected with fanciful and vicious theories of social orders, as Lansing said (p. 41), rumors about Jewish connections to Bolshevik conspiracies, and increasing African American militancy. Furthermore, the undefined antipathies (p.42) linked Russian radicalism with domestic sexual, moral, and religious turmoil. Eventually, Wilson came to see Bolshevism as a challenge to the American way of life. It was also Wilsons faith in the virtue of democracy and capitalism that intensified his anti-Bolshevik attitude. Wilson believed strongly that if the people were left to choose for themselves, they would naturally choose the U.S.-like system of government. Any deviation from democracy and capitalism is unnatural; therefore, Bolshevism in Wilsons eyes was merely a Russian perversion (p. 294), not a genuine interest expressed by the people of Russia. Having this mindset, the mere existence of Bolshevism became a threat to Wilson because it offered an alternative to the U.S. systemwhich, in the minds of Wilson and many U.S. people, is the only system that works Consequently, despite Wilsons commitment to the principles of selfdetermination and noninterventionism, he only applied them in a way that was convenient

to him. According to Foglesong, Wilson sometimes said that Russia should be left to settle her own affairs in her own way, insofar as she does not become a menace to others (p. 293). Although Wilson did have a case against the Bolsheviksthat Bolshevism was a threat to the American way of lifehe could not afford a full-scale military intervention because it would force the Bolsheviks to align with the Germans, provoke nationalistic backlash rallying around the Soviet, and most importantly, contradict Wilsons own commitment to self-determination and noninterventionism. Finding the way around these limitations did not seem like a problem for Wilson, however. He believed strongly that enlightened statesmen would judge more wisely than the broad masses of the people (p. 2) and thought lying was justified in some instanceswhere it related to matters of public policy (p. 2). Consequently, while Wilson tried his hardest to cling on to his conception of limited, indirect intervention, he also found a way to escaped public scrutiny by keeping the intervention secret from the American public. From giving clandestine financial support to groups opposing to the Bolsheviks to approving the use of German troops against the Bolsheviks in 1919when most U.S. leaders agreed that Bolshevism was more dangerous threat than Prussianism (p. 255), the U.S. use of underhanded methods to overthrow the Bolsheviks was not a strange inconsistency with Wilsons foreign policy, Foglesong argues. The virtue of Foglesongs historiography lies in last chapter where he gives the readers a brief insight to the Soviets side of the story. It was clear that the Soviet Union had no interest in waging an ideology war with the U.S. The country was war-torn and was too busy trying to recuperate economically and politically. Hence, as Foglesong argues, the Soviet Union offered many concessions only to establish economic ties with

the U.S. whom it deemed the most desirable source of modern technology and assistance to Soviet development (p. 273). Yet, the Soviet friendliness was met with a cold shoulder from Wilson, who did not believe that the Soviet Union would last long and did not want to recognize the Bolshevik government as legitimate. After reading the last chapter, it is difficult for one to argue against Foglesongs conclusion that Wilsons decision to intervene was based mainly on his anti-Bolshevismnot U.S. economics or military interests. Furthermore, it would be a lie to deny that all the clandestine operations initiated by the U.S. stood in sharp discordance with Wilsons we are not at war with Russia (p. 189) proclamation. Indeed, the U.S. was at war with the Soviet Union; the U.S. populace just did not know about it. For a president who is known for his Fourteen Pointsprinciples addressing the importance of self-determination and the world that is safe for democracy, Wilson is one of the most hypocritical presidents, exercising his power to intervene in foreign countries more often than anyone else in U.S. history. Woodrow Wilsons reputation as one of the most popular presidents should be reconsidered. Not only did he deceive the U.S. public, but his clandestine operations and his ignorance of what the U.S. public really wanted noninterventionwas also a disgrace to the U.S. highly valued democracy. Foglesongs Americas Secret War Against Bolshevism informs the U.S. populace about the truth behind the Wilsonian policy and raises another important question that every U.S. should be able to honestly answer: when did the Cold War really start, and who actually started it?