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Guerrilla warfare - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Page 1
Guerrilla warfare
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Guerrilla warfare is the unconventional warfare and combat with which

small group combatants use mobile tactics (ambushes, raids, etc.) to combat a
larger, less mobile formal army. The guerrilla army uses ambush (draw enemy
forces to terrain unsuited to them) and mobility (advantage and surprise) in
attacking vulnerable targets in enemy territory.
War
Military history
Eras
Contents Prehistoric · Ancient · Medieval
Gunpowder · Industrial · Modern
1 Etymology Battlespace
2 Strategy, tactics and organization Air · Information · Land · Sea · Space
2.1 Guerrilla warfare as a continuum Weapons
2.2 Strategic models of guerrilla warfare Armor · Artillery · Biological · Cavalry
Chemical · Electronic · Infantry ·
2.2.1 The 'classic' three-phase Maoist model Nuclear · Psychological
2.2.2 The more fragmented contemporary pattern Tactics
2.3 Tactics of guerrilla warfare
2.4 Types of tactical operations Attrition · Guerilla · Maneuver
2.5 Organization Siege · Total war · Trench
2.6 Surprise and intelligence
Strategy
2.7 Relationships with the civil population
2.8 Use of terror Economic · Grand · Operational
2.9 Withdrawal
2.10 Logistics Organization
2.11 Terrain Formations · Ranks · Units
2.12 Foreign support and sanctuaries
2.13 Guerrilla initiative and combat intensity Logistics
3 Other aspects
Equipment · Materiel · Supply line
3.1 Foreign and native regimes
3.2 Ethical dimensions Lists
3.3 Laws of war Battles · Commanders · Operations
3.4 Writings Sieges · Theorists · Wars
3.4.1 Theories of Mao Zedong War crimes · Weapons · Writers
3.4.2 Writings of T. E. Lawrence
3.4.3 Texts and treatises
3.4.4 World War II American writings
4 Counter-guerrilla warfare
4.1 Principles
4.1.1 Classic guidelines
4.1.2 Variants
5 Current guerrilla conflicts
6 History
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6.1 Vendéan Counter-Revolution

6.2 Napoleonic Wars
6.3 Others
6.4 Irish War of Independence and Civil War
6.5 World War I
6.6 World War II
6.7 Post World War II
6.8 Europe 2000 – present
6.9 India
6.10 American Revolutionary War
6.11 American Civil War
6.12 South African War
6.13 Second Sino-Japanese War
6.14 Israel and the West Bank & Gaza
6.15 Latin America
6.16 Kashmir
6.17 Vietnam War
6.18 Iraq (since 2003)
6.19 Historical examples
6.19.1 Successful campaigns
6.19.2 Unsuccessful campaigns
7 Influence on the arts
8 See also
9 Notes
10 External links
Etymology
Guerrilla means small war, the diminutive of the Spanish word guerra (war). The Spanish word derives from the
Old High German word werra and from the middle Dutch word warre; adopted by the Visigoths in A.D. 5th century
Hispania. The use of the diminutive evokes the differences in number, scale, and scope between the guerrilla army
and the formal state army they fight. The word was coined in Spain to describe their warfare in resisting Napoleon
Bonaparte's French régime, its meaning was broadened to mean any similar-scale armed resistance. Guerrillero is the
Spanish word for guerrilla fighter. Per the OED, 'the guerrilla' was an English usage (as early as 1809), describing
the fighters, not just their tactics. In most languages the word still denotes the specific style of warfare.
Though the term "Guerrilla" did not exist in the time of the famous Battle of Roncevaux in 778, its depiction in the
contemporary Annales Regii [1] sounds like a textbook example of this kind of warfare.
Strategy, tactics and organization

Guerrilla warfare as a continuum

An insurgency, or what Mao referred to as a war of revolutionary nature, guerrilla warfare can be conceived of as
part of a continuum.[2] On the low end are small-scale raids, ambushes and attacks. In ancient times these actions
were often associated with smaller tribal polities fighting a larger empire, as in the struggle of Rome against the
Spanish tribes for over a century. In the modern era they continue with the operations of insurgent, revolutionary and
"terrorist" groups. The upper end is composed of a fully integrated political-military strategy, comprising both large
and small units, engaging in constantly shifting mobile warfare, both on the low-end "guerrilla" scale, and that of
large, mobile formations with modern arms.
The latter phase came to fullest expression in the operations of Mao tse-Tung in China and Vo Nguyen Giap in
Vietnam. In between are a large variety of situations - from the war of destruction against Israel waged by Palestinian
irregulars in the contemporary era, to Spanish and Portuguese irregulars operating with the conventional units of
British General Wellington, during the Peninsular War against Napoleon.[3]
Modern insurgencies and other types of warfare may include guerrilla warfare as part of an integrated process,
complete with sophisticated doctrine, organization, specialist skills and propaganda capabilities. Guerrillas can
operate as small, scattered bands of raiders, but they can also work side by side with regular forces, or combine for
far ranging mobile operations in squad, platoon or battalion sizes, or even form conventional units. Based on their
level of sophistication and organization, they can shift between all these modes as the situation demands. Successful
guerrilla warfare is flexible, not static.
Strategic models of guerrilla warfare
The 'classic' three-phase Maoist model
In China, the Maoist Theory of People's War divides warfare into three phases. In Phase One, the guerrillas earn the
population's support by distributing propaganda and attacking the organs of government. In Phase Two, escalating
attacks are launched against the government's military forces and vital institutions. In Phase Three, conventional
warfare and fighting are used to seize cities, overthrow the government, and assume control of the country. Mao's
doctrine anticipated that circumstances may require shifting between phases in either directions and that the phases
may not be uniform and evenly paced throughout the countryside. Mao Zedong's seminal work, On Guerrilla
Warfare,[4] has been widely distributed and applied most successfully in Vietnam, by military leader and theorist Vo
Nguyen Giap, whose "Peoples War, Peoples Army"[5] closely follows the Maoist three-phase approach, but
emphasizing flexibility in shifting between guerrilla warfare and a spontaneous "General Uprising" of the population
in conjunction with guerrilla forces.
The more fragmented contemporary pattern
The classical Maoist model requires a strong, unified organization and a clear objective. However some
contemporary guerrilla warfare may not follow this template at all, and might encompass vicious ethnic strife,
religious fervor, and numerous small, 'freelance' groups operating independently with little overarching structure.
These patterns do not fit easily into neat phase-driven categories, or formal 3-echelon structures (Main Force
regulars, Regional fighters, part-time Guerrillas) as in the People's Wars of Asia.
Some jihadist guerrilla attacks for example, may be driven by a generalized desire to restore a reputed golden age of
earlier times, with little attempt to establish a specific alternative political regime in a specific place. Ethnic attacks

likewise may remain at the level of bombings, assassinations, or genocidal raids as a matter of avenging some
perceived slight or insult, rather than a final shift to conventional warfare as in the Maoist formulation.[6]
Environmental conditions such as increasing urbanization, and the easy access to information and media attention
also complicate the contemporary scene. Guerrillas need not conform to the classic rural fighter helped by cross-
border sanctuaries in a confined nation or region (as in Vietnam,) but now include vast networks of peoples bound by
religion and ethnicity stretched across the globe.[7]
Tactics of guerrilla warfare
Guerrilla warfare is distinguished from the small unit tactics used in screening or recon operations typical of
conventional forces. It is also different from the activities of bandits, pirates or robbers. Such criminal groups may
use guerrilla-like tactics, but their primary purpose is booty, and not a political objective.
Guerrilla tactics are based on intelligence, ambush, deception, sabotage, and espionage, undermining an authority
through long, low-intensity confrontation. It can be quite successful against an unpopular foreign or local regime, as
demonstrated by the Vietnam conflict. A guerrilla army may increase the cost of maintaining an occupation or a
colonial presence above what the foreign power may wish to bear. Against a local regime, the guerrilla fighters may
make governance impossible with terror strikes and sabotage, and even combination of forces to depose their local
enemies in conventional battle. These tactics are useful in demoralizing an enemy, while raising the morale of the
guerrillas. In many cases, guerrilla tactics allow a small force to hold off a much larger and better equipped enemy
for a long time, as in Russia's Second Chechen War and the Second Seminole War fought in the swamps of Florida
(United States of America). Guerrilla tactics and strategy are summarized below and are discussed extensively in
standard reference works such as Mao's "On Guerrilla Warfare."[8]
Types of tactical operations
Guerrilla operations typically include a variety of attacks on transportation

routes, individual groups of police or military, installations and structures,
economic enterprises, and targeted civilians. Attacking in small groups, using
camoflage and often captured weapons of that enemy, the guerrilla force can
constantly keep pressure on its foes and diminish its numbers, while still
Guerrilla warfare may involve allowing escape with relatively few casualties. The intention of such attacks is
attacks by specialized assault not only military but political, aiming to demoralize target populations or
squads. A VC underwater team governments, or goading an overreaction that forces the population to take
sank this US Ship, the USS Card sides for or against the guerrillas. Examples range from the chopping off of
[9]
in 1964 limbs in various internal African rebellions, to the suicide bombings of Palestine
and Sri Lanka, to sophisticated manoeuvres by Viet Cong and NVA forces
against military bases and formations.
Whatever the particular tactic used, the guerrilla primarily lives to fight another day, and to expand or preserve his
forces and political support, not capture or holding specific blocks of territory as a conventional force would. Below
is a simplified version of a typical ambush attack by one of the most effective of post-WWII guerrilla forces, the Viet
Cong (VC).
Ambushes on key transportation routes are a hallmark of guerrilla operations, causing both economic and political
disruption. Careful advance planning is required for operations, indicated here by VC preparation of the withdrawal

route. In this case - the Viet Cong assault was broken up by American aircraft and firepower. However the VC did
destroy several vehicles and the bulk of the main VC force escaped. As in most of the Vietnam conflict, American
forces would eventually leave the area, but the insurgents would regroup and return afterwards. This time dimension
is also integral to guerrilla tactics.[10]
Organization
Guerrilla warfare resembles rebellion, yet it is a different concept. Guerrilla organization ranges from small, local
rebel groups of a few dozen guerrillas, to thousands of fighters, deploying from cells to regiments. In most cases, the
leaders have clear political aims for the warfare they wage. Typically, the organization has political and military
wings, to allow the political leaders "plausible denial" for military attacks.[11] The most fully elaborated guerrilla
warfare structure is by the Chinese and Vietnamese communists during the revolutionary wars of East and Southeast
Asia.[12] A simplified example of this more sophisticated organizational type - used by revolutionary forces during
the Vietnam War, is shown below.
Surprise and intelligence
For successful operations, surprise must be achieved by the guerrilleros. If the operation has been betrayed or
compromised it is usually called off immediately. Intelligence is also extremely important, and detailed knowledge of
the target's dispositions, weaponry and morale is gathered before any attack. Intelligence can be harvested in several
ways. Collaborators and sympathizers will usually provide a steady flow of useful information. If working
clandestinely, the guerrilla operative may disguise his membership in the insurgent operation, and use deception to
ferret out needed data. Employment or enrollment as a student may be undertaken near the target zone, community
organizations may be infiltrated, and even romantic relationships struck up as part of intelligence gathering.[13] Public

sources of information are also invaluable to the guerrilla, from the flight schedules of targeted airlines, to public
announcements of visiting foreign dignitaries, to Army Field Manuals. Modern computer access via the World Wide
Web makes harvesting and collation of such data relatively easy.[14] The use of on the spot reconnaissance is integral
to operational planning. Operatives will "case" or analyze a location or potential target in depth- cataloguing routes
of entry and exit, building structures, the location of phones and communication lines, presence of security personnel
and a myriad of other factors. Finally intelligence is concerned with political factors- such as the occurrence of an
election or the impact of the potential operation on civilian and enemy morale.
Relationships with the civil population
Relationships with civil populations are influenced by whether the guerrillas operate among a hostile or friendly
population. A friendly population is of immense importance to guerrilla fighters, providing shelter, supplies,
financing, intelligence and recruits. The "base of the people" is thus the key lifeline of the guerrilla movement. In the
early stages of the Vietnam War, American officials "discovered that several thousand supposedly government-
controlled 'fortified hamlets' were in fact controlled by Viet Cong guerrillas, who 'often used them for supply and rest
havens'."[15] Popular mass support in a confined local area or country however is not always strictly necessary.
Guerrillas and revolutionary groups can still operate using the protection of a friendly regime, drawing supplies,
weapons, intelligence, local security and diplomatic cover. The Al Qaeda organization is an example of the latter
type, drawing sympathizers and support primarily from the wide-ranging Muslim world, even after Coalition attacks
eliminated the umbrella of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.
An apathetic or hostile population makes life difficult for guerrilleros and strenuous attempts are usually made to
gain their support. These may involve not only persuasion, but a calculated policy of intimidation. Guerrilla forces
may characterize a variety of operations as a liberation struggle, but this may or may not result in sufficient support
from affected civilians. Other factors, including ethnic and religious hatreds, can make a simple national liberation
claim untenable. Whatever the exact mix of persuasion or coercion used by guerrillas, relationships with civil
populations are one of the most important factors in their success or failure.[16]
Use of terror
In some cases, the use of terror can be an aspect of guerrilla warfare. Terror is used to focus international attention
on the guerrilla cause, kill opposition leaders, extort cash from targets, intimidate the general population, create
economic losses, and keep followers and potential defectors in line. Such tactics may backfire and cause the civil
population to withdraw its support, or to back countervailing forces against the guerrillas.[17]
Such situations occurred in Israel, where suicide bombings encouraged most Israeli opinion to take a harsh stand
against Palestinian attackers, including general approval of "targeted killings" to liquidate enemy cells and leaders.[18]
In the Philippines and Malaysia, communist terror strikes helped turn civilian opinion against the insurgents. In Peru
and some other South American countries, civilian opinion at times backed the harsh countermeasures used by
authoritarian regimes against revolutionary movements. (See the Peruvian regime of Alberto Fujimori for example).
Withdrawal
Guerrillas must plan carefully for withdrawal once an operation has been completed, or if it is going badly. The
withdrawal phase is sometimes regarded as the most important part of a planned action, and to get entangled in a
lengthy struggle with superior forces is usually fatal to insurgent, terrorist or revolutionary operatives. Withdrawal is

usually accomplished using a variety of different routes and methods and may include quickly scouring the area for
loose weapons, evidence cleanup, and disguise as peaceful civilians.[19]
Logistics
Guerrillas typically operate with a smaller logistical footprint compared to conventional formations; nevertheless,
their logistical activities can be elaborately organized. A primary consideration is to avoid dependence on fixed bases
and depots which are comparatively easy for conventional units to locate and destroy. Mobility and speed are the
keys and wherever possible, the guerrilla must live off the land, or draw support from the civil population in which
he is embedded. In this sense, "the people" become the guerrilla's supply base.[20] Financing of both terrorist and
guerrilla activities ranges from direct individual contributions (voluntary or non-voluntary), and actual operation of
business enterprises by insurgent operatives, to bank robberies, kidnappings and complex financial networks based on
kin, ethnic and religious affiliation (such as that used by modern Jihadist/Jihad organizations).
Permanent and semi-permanent bases form part of the guerrilla logistical structure, usually located in remote areas or
in cross-border sanctuaries sheltered by friendly regimes.[21] These can be quite elaborate, as in the tough VC/NVA
fortified base camps and tunnel complexes encountered by US forces during the Vietnam War. Their importance can
be seen by the hard fighting sometimes engaged in by communist forces to protect these sites. However, when it
became clear that defence was untenable, communist units typically withdrew without sentiment.
Terrain
Guerrilla warfare is often associated with a rural setting, and this is indeed the case with the definitive operations of
Mao and Giap, the mujahadeen of Afghanistan, the Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres (EGP) of Guatemala, the
Contras of Nicaragua, and the FMLN of El Salvador. Guerrillas however have successfully operated in urban
settings as demonstrated in places like Argentina and Northern Ireland. In those cases, guerrillas rely on a friendly
population to provide supplies and intelligence. Rural guerrillas prefer to operate in regions providing plenty of
cover and concealment, especially heavily forested and mountainous areas. Urban guerrillas, rather than melting into
the mountains and jungles, blend into the population and are also dependent on a support base among the people.
Rooting guerrilleros out of both types of areas can be difficult.
Foreign support and sanctuaries
Foreign support in the form of soldiers, weapons, sanctuary, or statements of sympathy for the guerrillas is not
strictly necessary, but it can greatly increase the chances of an insurgent victory.[22] Foreign diplomatic support may
bring the guerrilla cause to international attention, putting pressure on local opponents to make concessions, or
garnering sympathetic support and material assistance. Foreign sanctuaries can add heavily to guerrilla chances,
furnishing weapons, supplies, materials and training bases. Such shelter can benefit from international law,
particularly if the sponsoring government is successful in concealing its support and in claiming "plausible denial" for
attacks by operatives based in its territory.
The VC and NVA made extensive use of such international sanctuaries during their conflict, and the complex of
trails, way-stations and bases snaking through Laos and Cambodia, the famous Ho Chi Minh Trail, was the logistical
lifeline that sustained their forces in the South. Also, the United States funded a revolution in Colombia in order to
take the territory they needed to build the Panama Canal. Another case in point is the Mukti Bahini guerrilleros who
fought alongside the Indian Army in the 14-day Bangladesh Liberation War in 1971 against Pakistan that resulted in

the creation of the state of Bangladesh. In the post-Vietnam era, the Al Qaida organization also made effective use of
remote territories, such as Afghanistan under the Taliban regime, to plan and execute its operations. This foreign
sanctuary eventually broke down with American attacks against the Taliban and Al Qaida, but not before operatives
perpetrated the September 11, 2001 attacks.
Guerrilla initiative and combat intensity

Able to choose the time and place to strike, guerrilla fighters will usually possess the tactical initiative and the
element of surprise. Planning for an operation may take weeks, months or even years, with a constant series of
cancellations and restarts as the situation changes.[23] Careful rehearsals and "dry runs" are usually conducted to
work out problems and details. Many guerrilla strikes are not undertaken unless clear numerical superiority can be
achieved in the target area, a pattern typical of VC/NVA and other "Peoples War" operations. Individual suicide
bomb attacks offer another pattern, typically involving only the individual bomber and his support team, but these
too are spread or metered out based on prevailing capabilities and political winds.
Whatever approach is used, the guerrilla holds the initiative and can prolong his survival though varying the intensity
of combat. This means that attacks are spread out over quite a range of time, from weeks to years. During the
interim periods, the guerrilla can rebuild, resupply and plan. In the Vietnam War, most communist units (including
mobile NVA regulars using guerrilla tactics) spent only a limited number of days a year fighting. While they might be
forced into an unwanted battle by an enemy sweep, most of the time was spent in training, intelligence gathering,
political and civic infiltration, propaganda indoctrination, construction of fortifications, or stocking supply caches.[24]
The large numbers of such groups striking at different times however, gave the war its "around the clock" quality.
Other aspects
Foreign and native regimes
Examples of successful guerrilla warfare against a native regime include the Cuban Revolution and the Chinese Civil
War, as well as the Sandinista Revolution which overthrew a military dictatorship in Nicaragua. The many coups and
rebellions of Africa often reflect guerrilla warfare, with various groups having clear political objectives and using
guerrilla tactics. Examples include the overthrow of regimes in Uganda, Liberia and other places. In Asia, native or
local regimes have been overthrown by guerrilla warfare, most notably in Vietnam, China and Cambodia.
Foreign forces intervened in all these countries, but the power struggles were eventually resolved locally.
There are some unsuccessful examples of guerrilla warfare against local or native regimes. These include Portuguese
Africa (Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau), Malaysia (then Malaya) during the Malayan Emergency, Bolivia,
Argentina, and the Philippines. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), fighting for an independent homeland
in the north and east of Sri Lanka, achieved significant military successes against the Sri Lankan military and the
government itself for twenty years. It was even able to use these tactics effectively against the Indian Peace Keeping
Force sent by India in the mid-1980s, which were later withdrawn for varied reasons, primarily political. The mutual
attrition on both sides in the island led to a ceasefire following the September 11, 2001 attacks.
Ethical dimensions
Civilians may be attacked or killed as punishment for alleged collaboration, or as a policy of intimidation and
coercion. Such attacks are usually sanctioned by the guerrilla leadership with an eye toward the political objectives

to be achieved. Attacks may be aimed to weaken civilian morale so that support for the guerrilla's opponents
decreases. Civil wars may also involve deliberate attacks against civilians, with both guerrilla groups and organized
armies committing atrocities. Ethnic and religious feuds may involve widespread massacres and genocide as
competing factions inflict massive violence on targeted civilian population.
Guerrillas in wars against foreign powers may direct their attacks at civilians, particularly if foreign forces are too
strong to be confronted directly on a long term basis. In Vietnam, bombings and terror attacks against civilians were
fairly common, and were often effective in demoralizing local opinion that supported the ruling regime and its
American backers. While attacking an American base might involve lengthy planning and casualties, smaller scale
terror strikes in the civilian sphere were easier to execute. Such attacks also had an effect on the international scale,
demoralizing American opinion, and hastening a withdrawal.
In Iraq, most of the deaths since the 2003 US invasion have not been suffered by US troops but by civilians, as
warring factions plunged the country into civil war based on ethnic and religious hostilities. (See also: Sectarian war
in Iraq) Arguments vary on whether such turmoil will succeed in turning American opinion against the US troop
deployment. However, the use of attacks against civilians to create an atmosphere of chaos (and thus political
advantage where the atmosphere causes foreign occupiers to withdraw or offer concessions), is well established in
guerrilla and national liberation struggles. Claims and counterclaims of the morality of such attacks, or whether
guerrillas should be classified as "terrorists" or "freedom fighters" are beyond the scope of this article. See Terrorism
and Genocide for a more in-depth discussion of the moral and ethical implications of targeting civilians.
Laws of war
Guerrilleros are in danger of not being recognized as lawful combatants because they may not wear a uniform, (to
mingle with the local population), or their uniform and distinctive emblems may not be recognized as such by their
opponents. Article 44, sections 3 and 4 of the 1977 First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions, "relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts", does recognize combatants who, because of the
nature of the conflict, do not wear uniforms as long as they carry their weapons openly during military operations.
This gives non-uniformed guerrilleros lawful combatant status against countries that have ratified this convention.
However, the same protocol states in Article 37.1.c that "the feigning of civilian, non-combatant status" shall
constitute perfidy and is prohibited by the Geneva Conventions.
Writings
Theories of Mao Zedong
Mao Zedong, during the Chinese Civil War, summarized the People's
Liberation Army's principles of Revolutionary Warfare in the following
points for his troops: The enemy advances, we retreat. The enemy camps, we
harass. The enemy tires, we attack. The enemy retreats, we pursue. A
common slogan of the time went "Draw back your fist before you strike."
This referred to the tactic of baiting the enemy, "drawing back the fist,"
before "striking" at the critical moment where they are overstretched and
vulnerable. Mao made a distinction between Mobile Warfare (yundong zhan)
and Guerrilla Warfare (youji zhan), but they were part of an integrated
continuum aiming towards a final objective. Mao's seminal work. On
Guerrilla Warfare,[25] has been widely distributed and applied, successfully

in Vietnam, under military leader and theorist Vo Nguyen Giap. Giap's

"Peoples War, Peoples Army"[26] closely follows the Maoist three-stage
approach.
Writings of T. E. Lawrence
T. E. Lawrence, best known as "Lawrence of Arabia," introduced a theory of

guerrilla warfare tactics in an article he wrote for the Encyclopedia
Britannica published in 1938. In that article, he compared guerrilla fighters to
a gas. The fighters disperse in the area of operations more or less randomly.
They or their cells occupy a very small intrinsic space in that area, just as gas
molecules occupy a very small intrinsic space in a container. The fighters
may coalesce into groups for tactical purposes, but their general state is
dispersed. Such fighters cannot be "rounded up." They cannot be contained.
They are extremely difficult to "defeat" because they cannot be brought to
battle in significant numbers. The cost in soldiers and material to destroy a
significant number of them becomes prohibitive, in all senses, that is
physically, economically, and morally. Lawrence describes a non-native
occupying force as the enemy (such as the Turks). Che Guevara's famous book Guerrilla
Warfare published by Ocean Books
Lawrence wrote down some of his theories while ill and unable to fight the in 2006.
Turks, in his book The Seven Pillars of Wisdom, There, he reviews von
Clausewitz and other theorists of war, finding their writings inapplicable to his situation. The Arabs could not then
inspire fear in their enemy, nor would a pitched battle result in 'the effusion of blood' in other than a Turkish victory.
So instead Lawrence proposed if possible never meeting the enemy, thus giving their soldiers nothing to shoot at,
unable to control anything except what ground their rifles could point to. Meanwhile, Lawrence and the Arabs could
ride camels into and out of the desert, attacking railroad lines with impunity, avoiding the garrisoned train stations.
Texts and treatises
Guerrilla tactics were summarized into the Mini-manual of the Urban Guerrilla[27] in 1969 by Carlos Marighella.
This text was banned in several countries including the United States. This is probably the most comprehensive and
informative book on guerrilla strategy ever published, and is available free online. Texts by Che Guevara[28] and Mao
Zedong[29] on guerrilla warfare are also available.
World War II American writings
John Keats wrote about an American guerrilla leader in World War II: Colonel Wendell Fertig, who in 1939
organized a large guerrilla which harassed the Japanese occupation forces on the Philippine Island of Mindanao all
the way up to the liberation of the Philippines in 1945. His abilities were later utilized by the United States Army,
when Fertig helped found the United States Army Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Others
included Col. Aaron Bank and Col. Russell Volckmann. Volckmann, in particular, commanded a guerrilla force
which operated out of the Cordillera of Northern Luzon[30], in the Philippines from the beginning of World War II to
its conclusion. He remained in radio contact with US Forces,[31] prior to the invasion of Lingayen Gulf.

Counter-guerrilla warfare
Principles
The guerrilla can be difficult to beat, but certain principles of counter-insurgency warfare are well known since the
1950s and 1960s and have been successfully applied.
Classic guidelines
The widely distributed and influential work of Sir Robert Thompson, counter-insurgency expert in Malaysia, offers
several such guidelines. Thompson's underlying assumption is that of a country minimally committed to the rule of
law and better governance. Some governments, however, give such considerations short shrift, and their
counterguerrilla operations have involved mass murder, genocide, starvation and the massive spread of terror,
torture and execution. The totalitarian regimes of Stalin and Hitler are classic examples, as are more modern conflicts
in places like Afghanistan. In Afghanistan's anti-Mujahideen war for example, the Soviets implemented a ruthless
policy of wastage and depopulation, driving over one third of the Afghan population into exile (over 5 million people)
, and carrying out widespread destruction of villages, granaries, crops, herds and irrigation systems, including the
deadly and widespread mining of fields and pastures. See Wiki article Soviet war in Afghanistan. Elements of
Thompson's moderate approach are adapted here:[32]
1. The people are the key base to be secured and defended rather than territory won or enemy bodies
counted. Contrary to the focus of conventional warfare, territory gained, or casualty counts are not of
overriding importance in counter-guerrilla warfare. The support of the population is the key variable. Since
many insurgents rely on the population for recruits, food, shelter, financing, and other materials, the counter-
insurgent force must focus its efforts on providing physical and economic security for that population and
defending it against insurgent attacks and propaganda.
2. There must be a clear political counter-vision that can overshadow, match or neutralize the guerrilla
vision. This can range from granting political autonomy, to economic development measures in the affected
region. The vision must be an integrated approach, involving political, social and economic and media
influence measures. A nationalist narrative for example, might be used in one situation, an ethnic autonomy
approach in another. An aggressive media campaign must also be mounted in support of the competing vision
or the counter-insurgent regime will appear weak or incompetent.
3. Practical action must be taken at the lower levels to match the competitive political vision. It may be
tempting for the counter-insurgent side to simply declare guerrillas "terrorists" and pursue a harsh liquidation
strategy. Brute force however, may not be successful in the long run. Action does not mean capitulation, but
sincere steps such as removing corrupt or arbitrary officials, cleaning up fraud, building more infrastructure,
collecting taxes honestly, or addressing other legitimate greviances can do much to undermine the guerrillas'
appeal.
4. Economy of force. The counter-insurgent regime must not overreact to guerrilla provocations, since this may
indeed be what they seek to create a crisis in civilian morale. Indiscriminate use of firepower may only serve to
alienate the key focus of counterinsurgency- the base of the people. Police level actions should guide the effort
and take place in a clear framework of legality, even if under a State of Emergency. Civil liberties and other
customs of peacetime may have to be suspended, but again, the counter-insurgent regime must exercise
restraint, and cleave to orderly procedures. In the counter-insurgency context, "boots on the ground" are even
more important than technological prowess and massive firepower, although anti-guerilla forces should take
full advantage of modern air, artillery and electronic warfare assets.[33]

5. Big unit action may sometimes be necessary. If police action is not sufficient to stop the guerrilla fighters,
military sweeps may be necessary. Such "big battalion" operations may be needed to break up significant
guerrilla concentrations and split them into small groups where combined civic-police action can control them.
6. Aggressive mobility. Mobility and aggressive small unit action is extremely important for the counter-
insurgent regime. Heavy formations must be lightened to aggressively locate, pursue and fix insurgent units.
Huddling in static strongpoints simply concedes the field to the insurgents. They must be kept on the run
constantly with aggressive patrols, raids, ambushes, sweeps, cordons, roadblocks, prisoner snatches, etc.
7. Ground level embedding and integration. In tandem with mobility is the embedding of hardcore counter-
insurgent units or troops with local security forces and civilian elements. The US Marines in Vietnam also saw
some success with this method, under its CAP (Combined Action Progam) where Marines were teamed as
both trainers and "stiffeners" of local elements on the ground. US Special Forces in Vietnam like the Green
Berets, also caused significant local problems for their opponents by their leadership and integration with
mobile tribal and irregular forces.[34] In Iraq, the 2007 US "surge" strategy saw the embedding of regular and
special forces troops among Iraqi army units. These hardcore groups were also incorporated into local
neighborhood outposts in a bid to facilitate intelligence gathering, and to strengthen ground level support
among the masses.[35]
8. Cultural sensitivity. Counter-insurgent forces require familiarity with the local culture, mores and language
or they will experience numerous difficulties. Americans experienced this in Vietnam and during the US Iraqi
Freedom invasion and occupation shortages of Arabic speaking interpreters and translators hindered both civil
and military operations. [36]
9. Systematic intelligence effort. Every effort must be made to gather and organize useful intelligence. A
systematic process must be set up to do so, from casual questioning of civilians to structured interrogations of
prisoners. Creative measures must also be used, including the use of double agents, or even bogus "liberation"
or sympathizer groups that help reveal insurgent personnel or operations.
10. Methodical clear and hold. An "ink spot" clear and hold strategy must be used by the counter-insurgent
regime, dividing the conflict area into sectors, and assigning priorities between them. Control must expand
outward like an ink spot on paper, systematically neutralizing and eliminating the insurgents in one sector of
the grid, before proceeding to the next. It may be necessary to pursue holding or defensive actions elsewhere,
while priority areas are cleared and held.
11. Careful deployment of mass popular forces and special units. Mass forces include village self-defence
groups and citizen militias organized for community defence and can be useful in providing civic mobilization
and local security. Specialist units can be used profitably, including commando squads, long range recon and
"hunter-killer" patrols, defectors who can track or persuade their former colleagues like the Kit Carson units in
Vietnam, and paramilitary style groups. Strict control must be kept over specialist units to prevent the
emergence of violent vigilante style reprisal squads that undermine the government's program.
12. Foreign assistance must be limited and carefully used. Such aid should be limited to material and technical
support and small cadres of specialists. Unless this is done, the foreign helper may find itself "taking over" the
local war, and being sucked into a lengthy commitment, thus providing the guerrillas with valuable propaganda
opportunities as the stream of dead foreigners mounts. Such a scenario occurred with the US in Vietnam, with
the American effort creating dependence in South Vietnam, and war weariness and protests back home.
Heavy-handed foreign interference may also fail to operate effectively within the local cultural context, setting
up conditions for failure.
13. Time. A key factor in guerrilla strategy is a drawn-out, protracted conflict, that wears down the will of the
opposing counter-insurgent forces. Democracies are especially vulnerable to the factor of time. The counter-
insurgent force must allow enough time to get the job done. Impatient demands for victory centered around

short-term electoral cycles plays into the hands of the guerrillas, although it is equally important to recognize
when a cause is lost and the guerillas have won.
Variants
Some writers on counter-insurgency warfare emphasize the more turbulent nature of today's guerrilla warfare
environment, where the clear political goals, parties and structures of such places as Vietnam, Malaysia, or El
Salvador are not as prevalent. These writers point to numerous guerrilla conflicts that center around religious, ethnic
or even criminal enterprise themes, and that do not lend themselves to the classic "national liberation" template. The
wide availability of the Internet has also cause changes in the tempo and mode of guerrilla operations in such areas as
coordination of strikes, leveraging of financing, recruitment, and media manipulation. While the classic guidelines still
apply, today's anti-guerrilla forces need to accept a more disruptive, disorderly and ambiguous mode of operation.
"Insurgents may not be seeking to overthrow the state, may have no coherent strategy or may pursue a faith-
based approach difficult to counter with traditional methods. There may be numerous competing
insurgencies in one theater, meaning that the counterinsurgent must control the overall environment rather
than defeat a specific enemy. The actions of individuals and the propaganda effect of a subjective “single
narrative” may far outweigh practical progress, rendering counterinsurgency even more non-linear and
unpredictable than before. The counterinsurgent, not the insurgent, may initiate the conflict and represent
the forces of revolutionary change. The economic relationship between insurgent and population may be
diametrically opposed to classical theory. And insurgent tactics, based on exploiting the propaganda effects
of urban bombing, may invalidate some classical tactics and render others, like patrolling,
counterproductive under some circumstances. Thus, field evidence suggests, classical theory is necessary but
not sufficient for success against contemporary insurgencies..." [37]
Current guerrilla conflicts

Present ongoing guerrilla wars, and regions suffering from guerrilla war activity include:
Sri Lanka
Arab-Israeli Conflict
Uganda
Zapatista Army of National Liberation - have been relatively non-violent since 1994
India
Nepal
Internal conflict in Peru
Second Chechen War
Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan
Darfur Conflict
Colombian Armed Conflict
Iran
Conflict in Iraq
Kurdish Unrest in Turkey
Ivorian Civil War ended in 2004 but UNOCI is still handling the rebels who are attacking UN peacekeepers
Islamic and Communist Insurgencies in the Philippines
Sudan
Mexico - Zapatistas vs the Mexican Army

Second Tuareg Rebellion
History
Over centuries of history, many guerrilla movements appeared in Europe to fight foreign occupation forces. The
Fabian Strategy applied by the Roman Republic against Hannibal in the Second Punic War could be considered an
early example of guerrilla tactics. After witnessing several disastrous defeats, asassinations and raiding parties. The
Romans set aside the typical military doctrine of crushing the enemy in a single battle and initiated a successful, albeit
unpopular, war of attrition against the Carthaginians that lasted for 14 years. In expanding their own Empire, the
Romans encountered numerous examples of guerrilla resistance to their legions as well. The success of Judas
Maccabeus in his rebellion against Seleucid rule was at least partly due to the use of Guerrilla tactics.
The victory of the Basque forces against Charlemagne's army in the Battle of Roncevaux Pass, which gave birth to
the Medieval myth of Roland, was due to effective use of a Guerrilla principles in the mountain terrain of the
Pyrenees. Mongols also faced guerrillas composed by armed peasants in Hungary after the Battle of Mohi. In the
15th century, Vietnamese leader Le Loi launched a guerrilla war against Chinese. During The Deluge in Poland
guerrilla tactics were applied. In the 19th century, peoples of the Balkans used guerrilla tactics to fight the Ottoman
empire. In the 100 years war between England and France, commander Bertrand du Guesclin used guerrilla tactics to
pester the English invaders. The Frisian warlord, folk hero, legendary warrior and freedom fighter Pier Gerlofs Donia
fought a guerrilla against Philip I of Castile and after him against Charles V. He was also a pirate and well-known
brute, known by the usage of guerrilla-tactics against his enemies. During the Dutch Revolt of the 16th century, the
Geuzen waged a guerrilla war against the Spanish Empire. During the Scanian War, a pro-Danish guerrilla group
known as the Snapphane fought against the Swedes. In 17th century Ireland, Irish irregulars called tories and
rapparees used guerrilla warfare in the Irish Confederate Wars and the Williamite war in Ireland. The Finns
guerrillas, sissis, fought against Russian occupation troops in the Great Northern War 1710-1721. The Russians
retaliated brutally on civilian populace; the period is called Isoviha (Grand Hatred) in Finland.
Vendéan Counter-Revolution
From 1793-1796 a revolt broke out against the French Revolution by Catholic royalists in the Department of the
Vendée. This movement was intended to oppose the persecution endured by the Roman Catholic Church in
revolutionary France (see Dechristianisation of France during the French Revolution#The Revolution and the
Church) and ultimately to restore the monarchy. Though ill-equipped and untrained in conventional military tactics,
the Vendéan counter-revolution, known as the “Royal Catholic Army,” relied heavily on guerrilla tactics, taking full
advantage of their intimate knowledge of the marsh filled, heavily forested countryside. Though the Revolt in the
Vendée was eventually “pacified” by government troops, their successes against the larger, better equipped
republican army were notable.
Works such as “La Vendée” by Anthony Trollope ( http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/etext04/8vend10.txt ), G.A.

Henty’s “No Surrender! A Tale of Rising in the Vendée” ( http://www.gutenberg.org/files/20091/20091-h/20091-
h.htm ) detail the history of the revolt.
Napoleonic Wars
In the Napoleonic Wars many of the armies lived off the land. This often led to some resistance by the local
population if the army did not pay fair prices for produce they consumed. Usually this resistance was sporadic, and
not very successful, so it is not classified as guerrilla action. There are three notable exceptions, though:

The rebellion of 1809 in the Tyrol led by Andreas Hofer.
In Napoleon's invasion of Russia of 1812 two actions could be seen as

initiating guerrilla tactics. The burning of Moscow after it had been
occupied by Napoleon's Grand Army, depriving the French of shelter in
the city, resembled guerrilla action insofar as it was an attack on the
available resources rather than directly on the troops (and insofar as it was
a Russian action rather than an inadvertent consequence of nineteenth-
century troops' camping in a largely abandoned city of wooden buildings).
In a different sense, the imperial command that the Russian serfs should
attack the French resembled guerrilla tactics in its reliance on partisans
rather than army regulars. This did not so much spark a guerrilla war as
encourage a revengeful slaughter of French deserters by Russian peasants. Siege of Saragossa : The assault
on the San Engracia monastery.
In the Peninsular War the British, encouraged by the spontaneous mass
resistance in Spain against Napoleon, gave aid to the Spanish guerrillas
who tied down tens of thousands of French troops. The continual losses of troops caused Napoleon to
describe this conflict his "Spanish ulcer". The British gave this aid because it cost them much less than it would
have done to equip British soldiers to face the French troops in conventional warfare. This was one of the
most successful partisan wars in history and was where the word guerrilla was first used in this context. The
Oxford English Dictionary lists Wellington as the oldest known source, speaking of "Guerrillas" in 1809.
Poet William Wordsworth, a former radical turned conservative, showed a surprising early insight into guerrilla
methods in his pamphlet on the Convention of Cintra.
"It is manifest that, though a great army may easily defeat or disperse another army, less or greater, yet it is not
in a like degree formidable to a determined people, nor efficient in a like degree to subdue them, or to keep
them in subjugation–much less if this people, like those of Spain in the present instance, be numerous, and, like
them, inhabit a territory extensive and strong by nature. For a great army, and even several great armies,
cannot accomplish this by marching about the country, unbroken, but each must split itself into many portions,
and the several detachments become weak accordingly, not merely as they are small in size, but because the
soldiery, acting thus, necessarily relinquish much of that part of their superiority, which lies in what may be
called the engineer of war; and far more, because they lose, in proportion as they are broken, the power of
profiting by the military skill of the Commanders, or by their own military habits. The experienced soldier is
thus brought down nearer to the plain ground of the inexperienced, man to the level of man: and it is then, that
the truly brave man rises, the man of good hopes and purposes; and superiority in moral brings with it
superiority in physical power.” (William Wordsworth: Selected Prose, Penguin Classics 1988, page 177-8.)
Others
In 1848, both The Nation and The United Irishman advocated guerrilla warfare to overthrow English rule in
Ireland, though no actual warfare took place.
The Poles and Lithuanians used guerrilla warfare during the January Uprising of 1863-1865, against Tsarist
Russia.
Irish War of Independence and Civil War

The wars between Ireland and the British state, have been long
and over the centuries have covered the full spectrum of the
types of warfare. The Irish fought the first successful 20th
century war of independence against the British Empire and the
United Kingdom. After the military failure of the Easter Rising
in 1916, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) resorted to guerrilla
tactics involving both urban guerrilla warfare and flying columns
in the countryside during the Irish War of Independence of 1919
to 1921. The chief IRA commanders in the localities during this
period were Tom Barry, Dan Breen, Liam Lynch Seán Mac
IRA Flying Column during the Irish War of
Eoin, and Tom Maguire.
Independence.
The IRA guerrilla was of considerable intensity in parts of the
country, notably in Dublin and in areas such as Cork, Kerry and Mayo in the south and west. Despite this, the Irish
fighters were never in a position to either hold territory or take on British forces in a conventional manner. Even the
largest engagements of the conflict, such as the Kilmichael Ambush or Crossbarry Ambush constituted mere
skirmishes by the standards of a conventional war. Another aspect of the war, particularly in the north-eastern part of
the province of Ulster, was communal violence. The Unionist majority there, who were largely Protestant and loyal
to Britain were granted control over the security forces there, in particular the Ulster Special Constabulary and used
them to attack the Nationalist (and largely Catholic) population in reprisal for IRA actions. Elsewhere in Ireland,
where Unionists were in a minority (as in the Dunmanway Massacre in Cork), they were sometimes attacked by the
IRA for aiding the British forces. The extent to which the conflict was an inter-communal one as well as war of
national liberation is still strongly debated in Ireland. The total death toll in the war came to a little over 2000 people.
By mid 1921, the military and political costs of maintaining the British security forces in Ireland eventually proved
too heavy for the British government. In July 1921, the UK government agreed to a truce with the IRA and agreed
to meet representatives of the Irish First Dail, who since the 1918 General Election held seventy-three of the one
hundred and five parliamentary seats for the island. Negotiations led to a settlement, the Anglo-Irish Treaty. It
created the Irish Free State of 26 counties as a dominion within the British Empire; the other 6 counties remained
part of the UK as Northern Ireland.
Sinn Féin and the Irish Republican Army split into pro- and anti-Treaty factions with the Anti-Treaty IRA forces
losing the Irish Civil War (1922-23) which followed. The partition of Ireland laid the seeds for the later Troubles.
The Irish Civil War is a striking example of the failure of guerrilla tactics when used against a relatively popular
native regime. Following their failure to hold fixed positions against an Irish Free State offensive in the summer of
1922, the IRA re-formed "flying columns" and attempted to use the same tactics they had successfully used against
the British. However, against Irish troops, who knew them and the terrain and faced with the hostility of the Roman
Catholic Church and the majority of Irish nationalist opinion, they were unable to sustain their campaign. In addition,
the Free State government, confident of its legitimacy among the Irish population, sometimes used more ruthless and
effective measures of repression than the British had felt able to employ. Whereas the British executed 14 IRA men
in 1919-1922, the Free State executed 77 anti-treaty prisoners officially and its troops killed another 150 prisoners or
so in the field (see Executions during the Irish Civil War). The Free State also interned 12,000 republicans, compared
with the British figure of 4,500. The last anti-Treaty guerrillas abandoned their military campaign against the Free
State after nine months in March 1923.
World War I

There was a successful campaign in German East Africa in which the German commander Paul Emil von Lettow-
Vorbeck fought against the numerical superior allied forces. Even though he was cut off from Germany and had few
Germans under his command (most of his fighters were African askaris), he won multiple victories during the East
Africa Campaign and managed to exhaust and trouble the Allies; he was undefeated when he accepted a cease-fire in
Northern Rhodesia three days after the end of the war in Europe. He returned to Germany as a hero.
A major guerrilla war was fought by the Arabs against the Ottoman Turks during the Arab Revolt (1916–1918).
Another guerrilla war opposed the German Occupation of Ukraine in 1918 and partisan and guerrilla forces fought
against both the Bolsheviks and the Whites during the Russian Civil War. This fighting continued into 1921 in
Ukraine, in Tambov province, and in parts of Siberia. Other guerrillas opposed the Japanese occupation of the
Russian Far East.
World War II
In World War II, several guerrilla organizations (often known as resistance

movements) operated in the countries occupied by Nazi Germany. These
included the Polish Home Army, Slovak National Uprising, Soviet partisans,
Yugoslav Partisans and Chetniks, Bulgarian NOVA, French resistance or
Maquis, Italian partisans, ELAS and royalist forces in Greece. Many of these
organizations received help from the Special Operations Executive (SOE) which
along with the commandos was initiated by Winston Churchill to "set Europe
ablaze." The SOE was originally designated as 'Section D' of MI6 but its aid to
resistance movements to start fires clashed with MI6's primary role as an Soviet partisan fighters behind
German lines in Belarus in 1943.
intelligence-gathering agency. When Britain was under threat of invasion, SOE
At least 5,295 Belarusian
trained Auxiliary Units to conduct guerrilla warfare in the event of invasion. Not settlements were destroyed by the
only did SOE help the resistance to tie down many German units as garrison Nazis. In total, one-quarter of the
troops, so directly aiding the conventional war effort, but also guerrilla incidents Belarusian population was killed
in occupied countries were useful in the propaganda war, helping to repudiate in the war. [38]
German claims that the occupied countries were pacified and broadly on the
side of the Germans. Despite these minor successes, many historians believe that the efficacy of the European
resistance movements has been greatly exaggerated in popular novels, films and other media.
Contrary to popular belief, the resistance groups were only able to seriously counter the German in areas that offered
the protection of rugged terrain. In relatively flat, open areas, such as France, the resistance groups were all too
vulnerable to decimation by German regulars and pro-German collaborators. Only when operating in concert with
conventional Allied units were the resistance groups to prove indispensable. When the U.S. entered the war, the US
Office of Strategic Services (OSS) co-operated and enhanced the work of SOE as well as working on its own
initiatives in the Far East. Even the Home Guard were trained in guerrilla warfare in the case of invasion of England.
Osterly Park was the first of 3 such schools established to train the Home Guard.
Post World War II
After World War II, during the 1940s and 1950s, thousands of fighters in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (see Forest
Brothers) participated in unsuccessful guerrilla warfare against Soviet occupation.[39] In Lithuania guerilla warfare
was massive until 1958 and the last fighters were killed in combat in 1986 (5 years before Lithuania regained
independance).

In the late 1960s the Troubles began again in Northern Ireland. They had their origins in the partition of Ireland
during the Irish War of Independence. They came to an end with the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998.
The violence was characterised by an armed campaign against the British presence in Northern Ireland by the
Provisional Irish Republican Army, British counter-insurgency policy, and attacks on civilians by both loyalists and
republicans. There were also allegations of collusion between loyalist paramilitaries and British security forces, and
to a lesser extent, republicans and both British and Irish security forces.[40][41][42][43][44]
Although both loyalist and republican paramilitaries carried out terrorist atrocities against civilians which were often
tit-for-tat, a case can be made for saying that attacks such as the Provisional IRA carried out on British soldiers at
Warrenpoint in 1979 was a well planned guerrilla ambush.[45] However media coverage of the attack was
overshadowed by their killing of Louis Mountbatten and three other people on a fishing boat in Sligo on the same
day. The Provisional Irish Republican Army, Loyalist paramilitaries and various anti-Good Friday Agreement
splinter-groups could be called guerrillas but are usually called terrorists by both the British and Irish governments.
The news media such as the BBC and CNN will often use the term "gunmen" as in "IRA gunmen"[46] or "Loyalist
gunmen"[47] committed a "terrorist" act. Since 1995 CNN also uses guerrilla as in "IRA guerrilla" and "Protestant
guerrilla"[48]. Reuters, in accordance with its principle of not using the word terrorist except in direct quotes, refers
to "guerrilla groups".[49]
Europe 2000 – present
Currently, the Corsican FLNC and other groups such as the Greek Marxist Revolutionary Organization 17
November claim to be guerrillas, but are commonly recognized as terrorists since they have murdered civilians on
almost all occasions (collateral damages according to them) and not always purely legitimate military targets.
Furthermore, this is how the governments and media of their respective countries (foreign invader governments
according to these groups) prefer to refer to them.
The ongoing war between pro-independence groups in Chechnya and the Russian government is currently the most
active guerrilla war in Europe. Most of the incidents reported by the Western news media are very gory terrorist acts
against Russian civilians committed by Chechen separatists outside Chechnya. However, within Chechnya the war
has many of the characteristics of a classic guerrilla war. See the article History of Chechnya for more details.
In Northern Ireland the small radical splinter groups, the "Real Irish Republican Army" and "Continuity Irish
Republican Army" also consider themselves to be "guerrillas". This is heavily disputed since their popularity levels
are extremely low amongst Irish Republicans and Irish Nationalists, they are dwarfed in size by the Provisional Irish
Republican Army (usually simply referred to as the IRA) and their "guerrilla tactics" have been less than successful
when compared to the organization they broke with (the Provisional IRA).
The Continuity IRA has so far failed to kill any of their targets, while the only "successful" and important strike by
the "Real" IRA was the Omagh Bombing of 1998 which left 29 civilians dead with absolutely no harm done to
military targets (British army or Loyalist paramilitary) and the assassination of a member of the British Army with a
booby trap torch bomb in Belfast.
India

In India Shivaji Bhonsle, who founded the Maratha empire in 1674 in western India, employed guerrilla warfare
successfully against the Mughals in the hilly terrain of the Sahyadris. For this the Mughals referred to him as the
Mountain Rat.[50]
American Revolutionary War
While the American Revolutionary War is often thought of as a guerrilla war, guerrilla tactics were uncommon, and
almost all of the battles involved conventional set-piece battles. Some of the confusion may be because Generals
George Washington and Nathanael Greene successfully used a strategy of harassment and progressively grinding
down British forces instead of seeking a decisive battle, in a classic example of asymmetric warfare. Nevertheless the
theater tactics used by most of the American forces were those of conventional warfare. One of the exceptions was
in the south, where the brunt of the war was upon militia forces who fought the enemy British troops and their
Loyalist supporters, but used concealment, surprise, and other guerrilla tactics to much advantage. General Francis
Marion of South Carolina, who often attacked the British at unexpected places and then faded into the swamps by
the time the British were able to organize return fire, was named by them The Swamp Fox. However, even in the
south, most of the major engagements were set-piece battles of conventional warfare. See also Ethan Allen and the
Green Mountain Boys, for another Revolutionary example.
American Civil War
Irregular warfare in the American Civil War followed the patterns of irregular warfare in 19th century Europe.
Structurally, irregular warfare can be divided into three different types conducted during the Civil War: 'People's
War', 'partisan warfare', and 'raiding warfare'. The concept of 'People's war,' first described by Clausewitz in On War,
was the closest example of a mass guerrilla movement in the era. In general, this type of irregular warfare was
conducted in the hinterland of the Border States (Missouri, Arkansas, Tennessee, Kentucky, and northwestern
Virginia), and was marked by a vicious neighbor against neighbor quality. One such example was the opposing
irregular forces operating in Missouri and northern Arkansas from 1862 to 1865, most of which were pro-
Confederate or pro-Union in name only and preyed on civilians and isolated military forces of both sides with little
regard of politics. From these semi-organized guerrillas, several groups formed and were given some measure of
legitimacy by their governments. Quantrill's Raiders, who terrorized pro-Union civilians and fought Federal troops in
large areas of Missouri and Kansas, was one such unit. Another notorious unit, with debatable ties to the
Confederate military, was led by Champ Ferguson along the Kentucky-Tennessee border. Ferguson became one of
the only figures of Confederate cause to be executed after the war. Dozens of other small, localized bands terrorized
the countryside throughout the border region during the war, bringing total war to the area that lasted until the end
of the Civil War and, in some areas, beyond.
Partisan warfare, in contrast, more closely resembles Commando operations of the 20th century. Partisans were
small units of conventional forces, controlled and organized by a military force for operations behind enemy lines.
The 1862 Partisan Ranger Act passed by the Confederate Congress authorized the formation of these units and gave
them legitimacy, which placed them in a different category than the common 'bushwhacker' or 'guerrilla'. John
Singleton Mosby formed a partisan unit which was very effective in tying down Federal forces behind Union lines in
northern Virginia in the last two years of the war.
Lastly, deep raids by conventional cavalry forces were often considered 'irregular' in nature. The "Partisan Brigades"
of Nathan Bedford Forrest and John Hunt Morgan operated as part of the cavalry forces of the Confederate Army of
Tennessee in 1862 and 1863. They were given specific missions to destroy logistical hubs, railroad bridges, and other
strategic targets to support the greater mission of the Army of Tennessee. By mid-1863, with the destruction of

Morgan's raiders during the Great Raid of 1863, the Confederacy conducted few deep cavalry raids in the latter years
of the war, mostly because of the losses in experienced horsemen and the offensive operations of the Union army.
Federal cavalry conducted several successful raids during the war but in general used their cavalry forces in a more
conventional role. A good exception was the 1863 Grierson's Raid, which did much to set the stage for General
Ulysses S. Grant's victory during the Vicksburg Campaign.
Federal counter-guerrilla operations were very successful in preventing the success of Confederate guerrilla warfare.
In Arkansas, Federal forces used a wide variety of strategies to defeat irregulars. These included the use of Arkansas
Unionist forces as anti-guerrilla troops, the use of riverine forces such as gunboats to control the waterways, and the
provost marshal military law enforcement system to spy on suspected guerrillas and to imprison those captured.
Against Confederate raiders, the Federal army developed an effective cavalry themselves and reinforced that system
by numerous blockhouses and fortification to defend strategic targets.
However, Federal attempts to defeat Mosby's Partisan Rangers fell short of success because of Mosby's use of very
small units (10–15 men) operating in areas considered friendly to the Rebel cause. Another regiment known as the
"Thomas Legion," consisting of white and anti-Union Cherokee Indians, morphed into a guerrilla force and continued
fighting in the remote mountain back-country of western North Carolina for a month after Lee's surrender at
Appomattox. That unit was never completely suppressed by Union forces, but voluntarily ceased hostilities after
capturing the town of Waynesville on May 10, 1865.
In the late 20th century several historians have focused on the non-use of guerrilla warfare to prolong the war. Near
the end of the war, there were those in the Confederate government, notably Jefferson Davis who advocated
continuing the southern fight as a guerrilla conflict. He was opposed by generals such as Robert E. Lee who
ultimately believed that surrender and reconciliation were better than guerrilla warfare.
South African War
Guerrilla tactics were used extensively by the forces of the Afrikaner republics in the Boer Wars in South Africa
(1880-1881; 1899-1902) against the invading British Army. In the First Boer War, the Boer commandos wore their
everyday farming clothes, earthtone khaki, while the British still wore their bright scarlet red uniforms. The Boers
relied more on stealth and speed than discipline and formation and, being expert marksmen, the Boer were able to
easily snipe at British troops from a distance. Not long after their defeat, the British Army changed to khaki uniforms
and relaxed their formation tactics as well.
In the Second Boer War, after the British defeated the Boer armies in conventional warfare and occupied their
capitals of Pretoria and Bloemfontein, Boer commandos reverted to mobile warfare. Units led by leaders such as
Christian de Wet harassed slow-moving British columns and attacked railway lines and encampments. The Boers
were almost all mounted and possessed long range magazine loaded rifles. This gave them the ability to attack
quickly and cause many casualties before retreating rapidly when British reinforcements arrived. In the early period
of the guerrilla war, Boer commandos could be very large, containing several thousand men and even field artillery.
However, as their supplies of food and ammunition gave out, the Boers increasingly broke up into smaller units and
relied on captured British arms and ammunition.
To counter these tactics, the British under Kitchener interned Boer civilians into concentration camps and built
hundreds of blockhouses all over the Transvaal and Orange Free State. Kitchener also enacted a scorched earth
policy, destroying Boer homes and farms. Eventually, the Boer guerrillas surrendered in 1902, but the British granted

them generous terms in order to bring the war to an end. This showed how effective guerrilla tactics could be in
extracting concessions from a militarily more powerful enemy.
Second Sino-Japanese War
Despite a common misconception, both Nationalist and Communist forces were active underground resistance in
Japanese-occupied areas during the Second Sino-Japanese War. Even before the outbreak of total war in 1937,
partisans were already present in Manchuria hampering Japan's occupation of the region. After the initial phases of
the war, when large swaths of the North China Plain rapidly fell to the Japanese, underground resistance, supported
by either Communist sympathizers or composed of disguised Nationalist soldiers, would soon rise up to combat the
garrison forces. They were quite successful, able to sabotage railroad routes and ambush reinforcements. Many
major campaigns, such as the four failed invasions of Changsha, were caused by overly-stretched supply lines, lack of
reinforcements, and ambushes by irregulars. The Communist cells, many having decades of prior experience in
guerrilla warfare against the Nationalists, usually fared much better, and many Nationalist underground groups were
subsequently absorbed into Communist ones. Usually in Japanese-occupied areas, the IJA only controlled the cities
and railroad routes, with most of them countryside either left alone or with active guerrilla presence. The People's
Republic of China has emphasized their contribution to the Chinese war effort, going as far to say that in addition to
a "overt theatre", which in many cases they deny was effective, there was also a "covert theatre", which they claim
did much to stop the Japanese advance.
Israel and the West Bank & Gaza
European Jews fleeing from anti-Semitic violence (especially Russian pogroms) immigrated in increasing numbers to
Palestine. When the British restricted Jewish immigration to the region (see White Paper of 1939), Jewish
Palestinians began to use guerrilla warfare for two purposes: to bring in more Jewish refugees, and to turn the tide of
British sentiment at home. Jewish groups such as the Lehi and the Irgun - many of whom had experience in the
Warsaw Ghetto battles against the Nazis, fought British soldiers whenever they could, including the bombing of the
King David Hotel.
The Jewish forces were composed of spontaneous groups of civilians working without formal military structure,
fighting the British Empire, which had just emerged victorious from World War II. Some of these groups were
amalgamated into the Israel Defence Force and subsequently fought in the 1948 War of Independence.)
Palestinian groups, among them the Palestinian Liberation Army, soon initiated their own guerrilla warfare against
the new Jewish state.
Latin America
In the Mexican Revolution from 1910 to 1920, the populist revolutionary leader Emiliano Zapata employed the use
of predominantly guerrilla tactics. His forces, composed entirely of peasant farmers turned soldiers, wore no uniform
and would easily blend into the general population after an operation's completion. They would have young soldiers,
called "dynamite boys", hurl cans filled with explosives into enemy barracks, and then a large number of lightly armed
soldiers would emerge from the surrounding area to attack it. Although Zapata's forces met considerable success, his
strategy backfired as government troops, unable to distinguish his soldiers from the normal population, waged a
broad and brutal campaign against the latter.

In the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, Latin America had several urban guerrilla movements whose strategy was to
destabilize regimes and provoke a counter-reaction by the military. The theory was that a harsh military regime
would oppress the middle classes who would then support the guerrillas and create a popular uprising.
While these movements did destabilize governments, such as Argentina, Uruguay, Guatemala, and Peru to the point
of military intervention, the military generally proceeded to completely wipe out the guerrilla movements, usually
committing several atrocities among both civilians and armed insurgents in the process.
Several other left-wing guerrilla movements, sometimes backed by Cuba, attempted to overthrow US-backed
governments or right-wing military dictatorships. US-backed Contra guerrillas attempted to overthrow the left-wing
elected Sandinista government of Nicaragua, though most of these groups should be considered mercenary juntas
rather than rooted guerrillas. The Sandinista Revolution saw the involvement of Women and the Armed Struggle in
Nicaragua.
Kashmir
Kashmir has been disputed between both India and Pakistan. The territory has been disputed since the Indo-Pakistani
Partition in 1947. Many guerrillas fight for an independent Kashmiri state, while other guerrillas wish to annex parts
of Kashmir into Pakistani-Administered Kashmir.
Vietnam War
Within the United States, the Vietnam War is commonly thought of as a guerrilla war. However, this is a
simplification of a much more complex situation which followed the pattern outlined by Maoist theory.
The National Liberation Front (NLF), drawing its ranks from the South Vietnamese peasantry and working class,
used guerrilla tactics in the early phases of the war. However, by 1965 when U.S. involvement escalated, the
National Liberation Front was in the process of being supplanted by regular units of the North Vietnamese Army.
The NVA regiments organized along traditional military lines, were supplied via the Ho Chi Minh trail rather than
living off the land, and had access to weapons such as tanks and artillery which are not normally used by guerrilla
forces. Furthermore, parts of North Vietnam were "off-limits" by American bombardment for political reasons,
giving the NVA personnel and their material a haven that does not usually exist for a guerrilla army.
Over time, more of the fighting was conducted by the North Vietnamese Army and the character of the war become
increasingly conventional. The final offensive into South Vietnam in 1975 was a mostly conventional military
operation in which guerrilla warfare played a minor, supporting role.
The Cu Chi Tunnels (Ðịa ñạo Củ Chi) was a major base for guerrilla warfare during the Vietnam War. Located
about 60 km northwest of Saigon (Ho Chi Minh City), the Viet Cong (NLF) used the complex system tunnels to hide
and live during the day and come up to fight at night.
The communist victory illustrates the importance of the political element in modern guerrilla warfare. "The Party
commands the gun" was the Maoist saying and this is reflected in guerrilla struggles that are non-communist as well,
from colonial liberation conflicts in Africa, to Palestinian operations against Israel. Mao condemned "guerrillasim"
and "banditism", - scattered hit and run attacks for revenge or booty, unfocused on a specific political objective.
Throughout the Vietnam War, the communist Party closely supervised all levels of the conflict. The bulk of the VC/
NLF were initially southerners, with some distinctive southern issues and sensibilities. Nevertheless, the VC/NLF

was associated with the Northern Lao Dong Party which furnished it with supplies, weaponry and trained cadres,
including regular NVA/PAVN troops. The Southern Communist party, the Peoples Revolutionary Party (PRP)
organized in 1962, to participate in the insurgency, and COVSN, Central Office for Southern Vietnam, which
partially controlled military activity.
Iraq (since 2003)

Many guerrilla tactics are used by the Iraqi insurgency against the U.S.-led coalition. Such tactics include the
bombing of vehicles and human targets, suicide bombings, ambushes, sniper attacks, and traditional hit and run raids.
Although it is unclear how many U.S. casualties can be attributed to insurgent guerrilla action because of the high
numbers of non-combat related injuries and deaths being included in all available statistics of total coalition
casualties, it is estimated that they have injured more than 18,000 coalition troops and killed over 3,900, including
more than 3,000 U.S. soldiers. In addition the Sunni insurgents established de facto control over the Al Anbar
Governorate and Diyala Governorate over a third of Iraq's land [2] (http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2003/iraq/
forces/casualties/) ; insurgent control was maintained despite a series of coalition campaigns, the worsening violence
in Baghdad led to the recall of coalition forces ensuring continued insurgent control. [3] (http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/10/AR2006091001204.html?nav=rss_email/components)
[4] (http://www.freemarketnews.com/WorldNews.asp?nid=20468) [5] (http://onthescene.msnbc.com/baghdad/2006/
12/reporting_under.html#posts)
Historical examples
Successful campaigns
Algeria (1954-1962)
Angola (1975-1976)
Afghanistan against the USSR
Cuba
East Timor (1999)
EOKA in the expulsion of British troops from Cyprus (1955-1960)
Eritrean War of Independence 1961 - 1991
Greek War of Independence against the Ottoman Empire (1821-1830)
Haitian Revolution [6] (http://www.historynet.com/mh/blhaitianwar/)
Indonesia
Mozambique
Lebanon
Philippines' during the Japanese occupation of WWII
Rhodesian Bush War
portions of the Wars of Scottish Independence; notably, actions led by Robert the Bruce
Irish War of Independence 1919-1921; campaign organized by Michael Collins
First Indochina War 1946-1954
Vietnam War 1959-1975
Nepali Conflict
The Partisans of Yugoslavia
Iraq In Operation Vigilant Resolve, Operation Matador, Anbar and Diyala campaigns in overall.[7] (http://
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7823375/) [8] (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/05/15/
AR2005051500785_pf.html)

China (Communists vs. Nationalists)

American Revolutionary War
Nicaragua
Unsuccessful campaigns
Ukrainian nationalist partisans and guerrillas during and after the Russian Civil War
Makhnovist partisans and guerrillas after the Russian Civil War
Irish Civil War 1922-23
IRA S-Plan campaign 1939-1941 Northern Campaign (IRA) 1942-1944 Border Campaign (IRA) 1956-62
Spanish republican guerrillas after the Spanish Civil War
Second Boer War 1899-1902
Greek Civil War
Malayan Emergency
Mau Mau Uprising
Philippine American War 1899-1902
Poland 1939-1944, unsuccessful until USSR liberation from German occupation
Tibet 1958-1974, resistance against Chinese occupation ultimately failed when American Central Intelligence
Agency withdrew its support in context of President Richard Nixon's diplomatic overtures to the People's
Republic of China
Uruguay 1965-1973, the Tupamaros were suppressed by the army forces that later took power
Argentina 1969-1981 Montoneros and ERP were suppressed by security forces around 1977
Dominican Republic US forces suppressed Dominican guerrillas
Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania 1944-1956, Forest Brothers
El Salvador Due to the Treaty
Punjab Insurgency in India
Second Chechen war
Influence on the arts

Guerrilla Warfare, 1999 album by the Hot Boys
Guerrilla, a 2007 film
"Guerillas in tha Mist", a song by Da Lench Mob
Guerrilla Girls, a feminist artist group
Guerrilla Radio, a song by Rage Against the Machine
Guerrilla War, an arcade game
Gorillaz, a cartoon band, originally military-themed.
Guerilla (or Gorilla) Unit, a rap group.
Guerilla burlesque, a style of burlesque performance that involves descending upon audiences, uninvited.
Tomorrow series A series of books written by John Marsden (writer) about guerrilla warfare during a fictional
invasion and occupation of Australia.
First Blood which then led to the film series Rambo
Victory Nine A fictional organization that has similarities. Although Victory Nine works a lot like MI6
See also
Militia

Paramilitary
Commando
Special forces
Partisan
Guerrilla Warfare, by Che Guevara.
Spaßguerilla [sic—Deutsch]
Guerrilla communication
List of famous guerrillas
List of guerrilla movements
War
Combatant
Resistance during World War II
List of revolutions and rebellions
Asymmetric warfare
Vietnam War
Lord's Resistance Army
Gladio
Edmund Charaszkiewicz
Cavalry in the American Civil War
Fictional resistance movements and groups
Counter insurgency
Directive control
Basil Henry Liddell Hart
Fitzroy Maclean, Disputed Barricade: The Life and Times of Josip Broz Tito
Robert Asprey, War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History.
Hans von Dach, a Swiss army major famous for his book "Total Resistance: A War Manual for Everyone",
which teaches the readers in guerrilla warfare
LRRP and sissi, regular army units using guerrilla tactics
Resistance movement
Notes
1. ^ Narbaitz, Pierre. Orria, o la batall de Roncesvalles. 778. Elkar, 1979. ISBN 84-400-4926-9
2. ^ On Guerrilla Warfare, by Mao Zedong, 1937, See the text of Mao's work online (http://www.marxists.org/reference/
archive/mao/works/1937/guerrilla-warfare/index.htm) at www.marxists.org
3. ^ Encyclopaedia Britannica, "Warfare Conduct Of, Guerrilla Warfare," 1984 ed, p. 584)
4. ^ Mao, op. cit.
5. ^ Peoples War, Peoples Army, Vo Nguyen Giap
6. ^ Counterinsurgcy Redux - David Kilcullen, 2006, http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/kilcullen1.pdf, retrieved
June 1, 2007
7. ^ FRANK G. HOFFMAN, "Neo-Classical ounterinsurgency?", United States Army War College, Parameters Journal:
Summer 2007, pp. 71-87.
8. ^ Mao, op. cit.
9. ^ Lt. General Philip Davidson, Vietnam at War: The History, 1946-1975, (Presidio Press: 1988), p. 316
10. ^ John A. Cash, John Albright, and Allan W. Sandstrum: "Seven Firefights in Vietnam: CONVOY AMBUSH ON
HIGHWAY 1, 21 NOVEMBER 1966," US Army, Command and General Staff College, Combined Arms Research
Library, US Army, Center for Military History: Vietnam Studies, (DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, WASHINGTON, D.
C., 1985), (web ref: http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/Vietnam/7-ff/Ch2.htm)
11. ^ "Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare", Bard E. O'Neill

12. ^ Inside the VC and the NVA, Michael Lee Lanning and Dan Cragg
13. ^ Lanning/Cragg, op. cit.
14. ^ Terrorist use of web spreads (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/05/
AR2005080501138.html)
15. ^ Encyclopedia Britannica, 14ed, "Guerrilla Warfare" p. 460-464
16. ^ "Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam", Robert Thompson
17. ^ "Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare", Bard E. O'Neill
18. ^ Steven R. David (September 2002). "Fatal Choices: Israel's Policy of Targeted Killing" (PDF). THE BEGIN-SADAT
CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES; BAR-ILAN UNIVERSITY. Retrieved on 2006-08-01.
19. ^ Mao, op. cit.
20. ^ Mao, op. cit.
21. ^ Mao, op. cit., Lanning/Cragg, op. cit.
22. ^ Lanning/Cragg, op. cit.
23. ^ Lanning/Cragg, op. cit
24. ^ Inside the VC and the NVA, Michael Lee Lanning and Dan Cragg
25. ^ On Guerrilla Warfare, by Mao Tse-tung, 1937
26. ^ Peoples War, Peoples Army, Vo Nguyen Giap
27. ^ Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla (http://www.baader-meinhof.com/students/resources/print/minimanual/manualtext.html)
. Retrieved on November 19, 2005.
28. ^ Guerrilla Warfare, Ernesto "Che" Guevara | http://www.freepeoplesmovement.org/fpm/page.php?149
29. ^ On Guerrilla Warfare, by Mao Tse-tung, 1937
30. ^ [http://groups.google.com/group/mvreads/browse_thread/thread/36d3cfe5caa3c0f9 Some biographical information on
Russell Volckmann.
31. ^ Russell W. Volckmann (1954), We Remained: Three Years Behind the Enemy Lines in the Philippines page 157. Online
text here (http://www.archive.org/stream/weremainedthreey011059mbp/weremainedthreey011059mbp_djvu.txt)
32. ^ "Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam", Robert Thompson
33. ^ Learning from Iraq: Counterinsurgency in American Strategy - Steven Metz. US Army Strategic Studies Institute
monograph, December 2006, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=752, retrieved June 1,
2007
34. ^ Michael Lee Lanning and Daniel Craig, "Inside the VC and NVA", and "Inside the LRRP's"
35. ^ Learning from Iraq: Counterinsurgency in American Strategy - Steven Metz. US Army Strategic Studies Institute
monograph, December 2006, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=752, retrieved June 1,
2007
36. ^ Learning from Iraq, op. cit.
37. ^ [1] (http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/uscoin/counterinsurgency_redux.pdf) PDF (146 KiB) Counter-insurgency
Redux", David Kilcullen
38. ^ "Khatyn" - Genocide policy | Punitive operations (http://www.khatyn.by/en/genocide/expeditions/)
39. ^ Could the Baltic States have resisted to the Soviet Union? (http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=68053) ; Crimes
of Soviet Communists (http://www.angelfire.com/de/Cerskus/english/links1.html) — Wide collection of sources and links
about Guerrilla war in the Baltic states against Soviet occupation
40. ^ CAIN (http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/collusion/source.htm)
41. ^ BBC News (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/2955941.stm)
44. ^ BBC News (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/low/northern_ireland/1465494.stm#maurice)
45. ^ BBC ON THIS DAY: 27 : 1979: Soldiers die in Warrenpoint massacre (http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/
august/27/newsid_3891000/3891055.stm) . Retrieved on November 19, 2005.
46. ^ BBC - History - War and Conflict (http://web.archive.org/web/20060114222029/http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/war/
troubles/hungerstrikes/negotiations.shtml) . Retrieved on January 14, 2006.
47. ^ CNN - Almanac - (http://www.cnn.com/almanac/9611/27/) 27 November 1996. Retrieved on November 19, 2005.
48. ^ CNN - IRA splinter gang kills top Protestant guerrilla - (http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9712/27/n.ireland.killing/)
December 27, 1997. Retrieved on November 19, 2005.
49. ^ http://www.reuters.co.uk/newsPackageArticle.jhtml?type=topNews&storyID=584330&section=news. Retrieved on
November 19, 2005.

50. ^ Shivaji Bhonsle Great Personalities Biography (http://profiles.incredible-people.com/shivaji-bhonsle/) . Retrieved on 2007-

03-12.
Further References:
Robert Asprey, War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History.

Fitzroy Maclean, Disputed Barricade: The Life and Times of Josip Broz Tito.
Peter MacDonald, Giap: The Victor in Vietnam.
External links
Guerrilla warfare on Spartacus Schoolnet (http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/VNguerrilla.htm)
Encyclopaedia Britannica, Guerrilla warfare (http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9110197/guerrilla-warfare)
Mao on Guerrilla warfare (http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/works/1937/guerrilla-warfare/)
The Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency (http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/1998/

winter/art5-w98.htm)
Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare (http://www.army.mil/prof_writing/volumes/volume2/march_2004/3_

04_1.html)
Guerrilla Warfare (http://www.insurgentdesire.org.uk/warfare.htm)

Che Guevara on Guerrilla Warfare (http://www.freepeoplesmovement.org/guwar.pdf) PDF (254 KiB)
Counter Insurgency Jungle Warfare School (CIJWS)India (http://www.sepiamutiny.com/sepia/archives/

002207.html)
PKK and Counterinsurgency Warfare in Turkey (http://www.derindusunce.org/2007/09/16/pkk-ters-giden-
nedir-bundan-sonra-nereye/) {Turkish}
Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guerrilla_warfare"
Categories: All articles with unsourced statements | Articles with unsourced statements since November 2007 |
Articles with links needing disambiguation | Articles with sections needing expansion | Articles with unsourced
statements since March 2007 | Articles with unsourced statements since February 2007 | Guerrilla warfare | Warfare
by type
This page was last modified 11:20, 16 December 2007.

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Guerrilla warfare - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Page 1

Guerrilla warfare is the unconventional warfare and combat with which

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6.1 Vendéan Counter-Revolution

Strategy, tactics and organization

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Strategic models of guerrilla warfare

The 'classic' three-phase Maoist model

The more fragmented contemporary pattern

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Tactics of guerrilla warfare

Types of tactical operations

Guerrilla operations typically include a variety of attacks on transportation

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Surprise and intelligence

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Relationships with the civil population

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Foreign support and sanctuaries

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Guerrilla initiative and combat intensity

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Theories of Mao Zedong

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in Vietnam, under military leader and theorist Vo Nguyen Giap. Giap's

T. E. Lawrence, best known as "Lawrence of Arabia," introduced a theory of

Texts and treatises

World War II American writings

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Current guerrilla conflicts

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Second Tuareg Rebellion

Works such as “La Vendée” by Anthony Trollope ( http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/etext04/8vend10.txt ), G.A.

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The rebellion of 1809 in the Tyrol led by Andreas Hofer.

In Napoleon's invasion of Russia of 1812 two actions could be seen as

Irish War of Independence and Civil War

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In World War II, several guerrilla organizations (often known as resistance

Post World War II

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Europe 2000 – present

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American Revolutionary War

American Civil War

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South African War

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Second Sino-Japanese War

Israel and the West Bank & Gaza

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Iraq (since 2003)

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China (Communists vs. Nationalists)

Influence on the arts

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50. ^ Shivaji Bhonsle Great Personalities Biography (http://profiles.incredible-people.com/shivaji-bhonsle/) . Retrieved on 2007-